Declassified per NARA MDR 54284 57678 November 25 2019 - NW 146 DocId 21D7 Page 1 w -I 1117-23 - a u - 3m - 146 Donald 210' Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AD HOC CHAIRMAN J EDGAR HOOVER JUNE 1970 i NW 146 DocId 210 June 25 1970 This report prepared for the President is approved by all members of this committee and their signatures are affixed hereto Di 1 Bureau of Investigation airman Dix-Eater Central Intelligence Agency 01 Director efense Intelligence Agency Director National Security- Agency COPY No 1 OF 5 COPIES Page 3 PRE FACE The objectives of this report are to assess the current i internal security threat 2 evaluate current intelligence collection procedures identify restraints under which U S intelligence services operate and list the advantages and disadvantages of such restraints and 3 evaluate current interagency coordination and recommend means to improve it The Committee has attempted to set forth the essence of the-issues and the major policy considerations involved which fall within the scope of its mandate NW 146 Page 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page i PREFACE 1 i PART ONE - SUMMARY OF INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT I MILITANT NEW LEFT GROUPS 1 A Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 1 Student Protest Groups 1 2 Antiwar Activists 3 3 New Left Terrorist Groups 4 B Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures 5 1 Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage 5 2 Gaps in Current Coverage 6 3 Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection 7 11 BLACK EXTREMSTMOVEMENT - 9 r A Assessment of Currant Internal Security Threat 9 1 Black Panther Party 9 2 New Left Support for BPP 9 4 3- BPP Propaganda Appearances 9 4 Appeal to Military 10 5 BPP Philosophy and Foreign Support 10 6 Other Black Extremist Groups 10 Black Student Extremist In uence 11 8 Foreign In uence in the Black Extremist Movement 11 B Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures 12 1 Other Black Extremist Organizations 13 NH 146 Page 5 IV I II I INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES A Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat l Intervention in Domestic Unrest 2 Intelligence Operations B Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection 1 Scope and Effectiveness 2 Gaps in Current Coverage OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS A Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat Communist Party Socialist Workers Party and Other Trotskyist Groups Pro Chinese Communist Groups Puerto Rican Nationalist Extremist Groups pm B Assessment of Current Intelligence Coverage 1 Scope and Effectiveness 2 Gaps in Current Coverage 3 Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection PART TWO RESTRAINTS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations Mail Coverage Surreptltious Entry Development of Campus Sources Use of Military Undercover Agents amuse BUDGET AND MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS PART THREE EVALUATION OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION CURRENT PROCEDURES T0 EFFECT COORDINATION SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION um NW 146 DocId 21D7 Page PART ONE SUMMARY OF INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT I MILITANT NEW LEFT GROUPS A Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat The movement of rebellious youth known as the New Left involving and in uencing a substantial number of college students is 'hav ing a serious 1m act on nte a with a In I - revolutionary aims of the New Left are apparent when their identi cation with Marxism Leninism is examined They pointedly advertise their objective as the overthrow of our system of government by force and violence Under the guise of freedom of speech they seek to confront all i and sorder They intend to smas the U S educational s_ stem the structure -rous do not have a lar hnu be fra I hav Thank 0 the Other hand situations and an inclination to utilize more extreme means to attain their objectives 1 Student Protest Groups The for a Democratic W has in the past year gum into severa actions including the Rev outh Move ent which has control over 30 chapters and the Wor er tudent ll'Lance which consists of 63 chapters The i ion omma the pro-Chinese commi t sive Labor Par PLP aims to build a worker-student movement in keeping wi A aim of developing a ma wor er- ase revolutionary movement in the United States There are 59mg 85 unaffiliated SDS chapters generally empathetic to revolutionary tactics and goa s rend of increased radical campus organizations is noticeable at campuses where recognition of SDS has been refused or rescinded and SDS members have banded together with or without sanction under a new title to attract student support In addition numerous ad hoc groups have been established 011 campuses and elsewhere to exploit Specific issues The National Student Strike was also known as the National Strike Iggrma 1011 enter was formed following the entry 0 the nited States forces into Cambodia and the deaths of four students at Kent State University NSS which helped to coordinate the nationwide student strike in May 19'70 has llies regional centers and includes ess-seems a HIM-146 Page among its leadership SDS members and other New Left activists he N33 has established a natioaniII-Ieco111munic 1 - - 1 _nI This communica ions capabi s1i ican 1pto campus stability in the coming school year The Venceggmg Engadg established to send United States yOuth to Cuba to aid in the 1970 harvests has continually received favorable publicity in Cuban prepag'anda media To date over 900 members of the VB have visited Cuba and another group of approximately 500 members are expected to follow suit While in Cuba VB members were individually photographed and questioned in detail about their backgrOunds Because of their centacts with Cuban officials these individuals must be considered as potential for Cuban intelligence activities and sabotage in the United States The greatest threa the countr 'lifi I'ior fomentin vi lence and unr on 1 s Demonstrations have triggered acts of arson by extremists against war -oriented research and ROTC facilities and have virtually paralyzed many schools There has been a growing number of noncampus but student-related acts of violence which increase tensions between town and gown and which constitute a marked escalation of the scope and level of protest activities Few student protests are currently related to exclusi cam us issues involve Eolitical and social is les IWL the battlefield is the community with the campus serving primarily as a staging area The efforts of the New Left aimed at fomenting unrest and i subversion among civil servants labOr unions and mass media have met with very limited success although the WSA and its parent the PLP have attempted through their Summer Work-Ins to infiltrate and radicalize labor The inability of these groups to subvert and control the mass media has led to the establishment of a large network of under- ground publications which serve the dual purpose of an internal communi cation network and an external propaganda organ Leaders of student protest groups have traveled extensively over the years to communist countries have openly stated their sympathy with the international communist revolutionary movements in South Vietnam and Cuba and have directed others into activities which support these movements These individuals must be considered to have poten_t_i_al for -2- RH 146 DocId 2107 Page 3 kuld sages 2 Antiwar Activists The impetus and continuity for the antiwar movement-is provided by the New Mobilization Committee 19 EnglI the War in Vietnam ilization Committee to End the War inV1 tnam SMCL The m is a coahHon of numerous antiwar groups and individuals including communist old lef elements The SMC is under the control of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party SWP The NMC and SMC have announced a policy of nonexclusion which places no limitation on the type of individuals allowed to participate in demonstrations This policy opens the door for violence-prone individuals who want to capitalize on the activities of these groups Both groups profess to follow a policy of nonviolence however the very nature of the protests that they sponsor sets the stage for civil disobedience and police confrOntation by irresponsible dissident elements Various individuals 1n NMC and SMC are calling more militant Erotestactivities a subject to pe discussed at national meetings oth groups in late June 197m Although antiwar groups are not known to be collecting weapons engaging in paramilitary training or advocating terrorist tactics the pro- -Hanoi attitude of their leaders the unstable nature of many NMC advocates and their policy of nonexclusio-n underscore the We This is further emp asized by IMC leadership advocacy of civil disobedience to_ achieve desired objectives There is no indication that the antiwar movement has made serious inroads or achieved any more than a slight degree of in uence among labor unions the mass media and civil servants One group however the Federal Employees for a Democratic Society FEDS offers a means of protest for recent radical graduates employed by the Federal Government DocId 2107 Page 9 DocId 210 Page 10 The military and awe tagMWLI mt In addition to vandalism arsons and bombings of an 1 we there has been stepped up activity to spread antiwar sympathy among American servicemen from within through sympathetic members in the military and from without through Such programs as Coffeehouses and the proposed National GI Alliance The increasing access by members of the military to the underground press the establishment of servicemen's unions and organizations which facilitate desertions have contributed significantly to the increasing instances of dissent in the military services went 'They have called for an end to the ROTC and have demon- strated often violently to force universities to halt war-related research projects The NMC maintains close contact with the Soviet controlled World Council for Peace and Stockholm Conference on Vietnam A new organization dominated by NMQ leaders the Committee of Liaison Fish Qt Serviceman Detained in North Vietnam emerged in January 19'70 after contacts wi or ietnamese representatives It attempts to present a favorable picture of North Vietnamese treatment of American prisoners of war One NMC official is known to have met with a Soviet intelligence officer NMC leaders have frequently traveled abroad It is therefore necessary to consider these individuals as hayigg for enming in foreign- directed intelligence collection The Central Intelligence Agency CIA i_n_ ts analysis of bloc intelligence is'of the view that the Soviet and bloc intelligence services Ere committed a the political level to exploit all domestic dissidents possible This attack is being agents agents of influence and the use of front groups It is established bloc policy to deploy its fOrces against the United States as the main enemy and to direct all bloc intelligence forces toward ultimately political objectives which disrupt U S domestic and foreign policies 3 New Left Terrorist GrOups The Weatherman terrorist group which emerged from a factional split of SDS during the Summer of 19 69 is a revolutionary youth movement which actively supports the -4- revolutionary leadership role of the Negro in the United States It has evolved into a number of small commando type units which plan to utilize bombings arsons and assassinations as political weapons There has been evidence of Weatherman involvement in terrorist tactics including the accidental explosion of a 'Weatherman bomb factory in New York City on March 6 1970 the discovery of two undetonated bombs in Detroit police facilities on thesame date and the blast at New York Citypolice installations on June 9 1970 While nggherman membership is not clearly defined it is estimated that W- In addition groups such as the White Panther Party Running Dog Mad Dog and the Youth International Party Yippies are supporters of Weatherman terrorism but have no clearly definable ideology of their own Adherents to Weatherman ideology are also found within radical elements on campuses among those living in off-campus communes among New Left movement lawyers and doctors and the underground press Individuals whoadhere to the Weatherman ideology have offered support and aid to hard-core Weatherman members including 21 Weatherman members currently in hiding to avoid apprehension They identify themselves politically with North Vietnam Cuba and North Korea and consider pro Soviet and pro Chinese organi- zations as being aligned with imperialist powers In addition some of the Weatherman leaders and adherents have traveled to communist countries or have met in Western countries with communist representatives Weatherman leaders and other members of terrorist groups are not known at this time to be involved in foreign-directed intelligence collection activity The fugitive and underground status of manyr of these people as well as their involvement in activities which would likely bring them to the attention of American authorities would he a deterrent to contacts by foreign intelligence organizations B Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures 1 Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage Although New Left groups have been responsible for widespread damage to ROTC facilities for the halting of some weapons-related research and for the increasing dissent within the military services the major threat to the internal security of the United States is that directed against the civilian sector of Our society NYE- 146 DocId 2107 Page 11 Cover of st rou is_hand1 e ou and it is enerall ef 3 1 eve or at maJor meetings of these_ggo ups whejzggoveggll policy aims and objectives of the groups are determined The antiwar moveme t' by live informants in all organizations of interest This is by in armation furnished By all members of the intelligence community and other Key leaders and activists are afforded concentrated and intensified investigative coverage on a continuing basis and in situations where there are positive indications of violence electronic surveillanges hayg been on a selective basis ormant and electronic coverage does not meet present requirements Although several SDS chapters on college campuses which adhere to Weatherman ideology have been penetrated by live informants there is no live informant coverage at present of underground Weatherman fugitives There is electronic coverage on the residence of a Weatherman contact in New York City and on the residence of an alleged Weatherman member in San Francisco however no information has been developed concerning the whereabouts of the 21 Weatherman fugitives 2 Gaps in Current _ Coverage Established long-term coverage is not available within student protest groups due to the fact that the student body itself changes yearly necessitating a constant turnover in the informants targeted against these groups His idealism and immaturity as well as the sensitive issues of academic freedom and the right to dissent all serve to increase the risk that the student informant will be exposed as such Generally day-to-dauz coverage of the planned of student prote st groups which are somewhat autonomous and disjointed could be strengthened Advance notice of foreign travel - by ent militants is particularly needed Campus viglence is generally attributable to small close knit ist rou 5 among ra 1 s ovegge of these latter groups is minimal DocId 210 Page 12 The antiwar movement is comprised of a great many organizations and people which represent varied political moral and ethnic beliefs Current manpower commitments preclude optimum cove rage of all antiwar activities on a day-to-day basis Existing veragiof New Left extremists the Weatherman group in particular is negligible Most of the Weatherman group has gone underground and farmed floating commando-type units composed of three to six individuals The transitory nature of these units hinders the installation of electronic'surveillances and their smallness and distrust of outsiders make penetration of these units through live informants extremely difficult Financially the Weatherman group appears to be without a centralised source of funds Wealthy parents have furnished funds to some of these individuals including those in a fugitive status Many members have also been involved in the thefts of credit and identification cards as well as checks and have utilized them for obtaining operating expenses 3 Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection To establish effectiye coverage pish entpxotest groups would require the expansion of live informant coverage of individual campus 0 ap ers of these or aniza lens This would entail extensive use of stu ent informants to obtain maximum utilization of their services for the periods of their college attendance - Because of the great number of individuals and groups in the antiwar movement an increase in the manpower assi ned to these inves- tigatm' us would faciuW gghiadditi on there are several key leaders involved in virtually all an 1 ar actiLitles including international contactsI against whom electronic surveillances and mail covers would be particularly effectiv_e Improvement of intelligence gathering against New Left terrorists depends on a combination of live informant coverage among key leaders and selective electronic surveillances Because of the nature of the Weatherman groups live informant coverage will most likely result through the defect mn of a key leader -7- Page 13 l i Extensive efforts have been undertaken which should produce a live informant capable of furnishing information as to the location of Weatherman fugitives and planned terrorist acts In the event a commune is located prompt installation of electronic coverage should produce similar results Utilization of additional resources to expand and intensifyr this collection would be beneficial 111-1145 Page 14 II BLACK EXTREMEST MOVEMENT A Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 1 Black Panther PartL The most active and dangerous black extremist group in the United States is the Black Panther Party BPP Despite its relatively small number of hard-core members-- approximately 800 in 40 chaptersmationwidenthe BPP is in the forefront of black extremist activity today The BPP has publicly advertised its goals of organizing revolution insurrection assassination and other terrorist- type activities Moreover a recent poll indicates that approximately 25 per cent of the black population has a great respect for the BPP including 43 per cent of blacks under 21 years of age The Panther newsPaper has a current circulation of approximately 150 000 copies weekly Its pages are filled with messages of racial hatred and call for terrorist guerrilla activity in an attempt to overthrow the Government The BPP has been involved in a substantial number of planned attacks against law enforcement officers and its leadership is composed in large part of criminally inclined violence - prone individuals Weapons are regularly stockpiled by the Party During 1968 and 1969 quantities of machine guns shotguns rifles hand grenades homemade bombs and ammunition were uncovered in Panther offices New Left Support for BPP The BPP has received increasing support from radical New Left elements During 1970 the BPP formed a working relationship with radical student dissenters by injecting the issue of Government repression of Panthers into the antiwar cause Students for a Democratic Society SDS supported the BPP in a 1969 united front against fascism The probability that black extremists including the BPP will work closely with New Left white radicals in the future increases the threat of escalating terrorist activities It 1would be safe to project that racial strife and student turmoil fomented by black extremists will definitely increase 3 BPP Propaganda Appearances Despite its small member- ship the BPP has scored major successes in the propaganda arena In a 9 - Eff- 146 DocId 21D1 Page 15 Hill-146 Page 15 1969 BPP representatives spoke at 199 colleges throughout the Nation while in 1967 there were only 11 such appearances Although no direct information has been received to date indicating that the BPP has initiated any large -scale racial disorders the year 1970 has seen an escalation of racial disorders aeross the Nation compared to 1969 This fact coupled with an increasing amount of violent Panther activity presents a great potential for racial and civil unrest for the future 4 Appeal to Military The BPP has made pointed appeals to black service men with racist propaganda High priority has been placed on the recruitment of veterans with weapons and explosives training The BPP has also called for infiltration of the Government These activities should they achieve even minimum success present a grave threat 5 BPP Philosophy and Foreign Support The BPP relies heavily on foreign communist ideology to shape its goals Quotations from Mao Tse -tung were the initial ideological bible of the BPP Currently the writings of North Korean Premier Kim are followed and extensive use of North Korean propaganda material is made in BPP publications and training The Marxist-oriented philosophy of the BPP presents a favorable environment for support of the Panthers from other communist countries BPP leaders have traveled extensively abroad including visits to Cuba Russia North Korea and Algeria International operations of the BPP are directed by Eldridge Cleaver a fugitive from United States courts Cleaver has established an international staff in Algeria from where communist propaganda is censtantly relayed to the BPP headquarters in Berkeley California He has also established close ties with Al Fatah an Arab guerrilla organization whose leaders have reportedly extended invitationsto BPP members to take guerrilla training during 1970 Cleaver in a recent conversation -indicated that North Koreans are conducting similar training for BPP members Radical white students in Western Europe and the Scandinavian countries have organized solidarity committees in support of the BPP These committees are the sources of financial contributions to the Party and provide outlets for the BPP newspaper 6 Other Black Extremist Groups The Nation of Islam N01 is the largest single black extremist organization in the United States with an estimated membership of 6 000 in approximately 100 Mosques The N01 -10- sees-seesaw HW 116 preaches hatred of the white race and advocates separatism of the races The N01 as a group has to date not instigated any civil disorders however the followers of this semi-religious cult are extremely dedicated individuals who could be expected to perform acts of violence if so ordered by the N01 head Elijah Muhammed When Muhammed who is over 70 years of age is replaced a new leader could completely alter current nonviolent tactics of the organization For example Mohammed's son-in law Raymond Sharrieff now among the top hierarchy of N01 could rise to a leadership position Sharrieff is vicious domineering and unpredictable There are numerous other black extremist organizations small in numbers located across the country There is also a large number of unaffiliated black extremists who advocate violence and guerrilla warfare One partiCular group the Republic of New Africa RNA headquartered in Detroit Michigan calls for the establishment of a separate black nation in the South to be protected by armed forces These groups although small are dedicated to the destruction of our form of government and consequently present a definite potential for instigating civil disorder or guerrilla warfare activity 7 Black Student Extremist Influence Black student extremist activities at colleges and secondary schools have increased alarmingly Although currently there is no dominant leadership coordination or Specific direction between these individuals they are in frequent contact with each other Consequently should any type of organization or cohesiveness develop it would present a grave potential for future violent activities at United States schools Increased informant coverage would be particularly productive in this area Black student extremists have frequently engaged in violence and disruptive activity on campuses Major universities which made concessions to nonnegotiable black student demands have not succeeded in calming extremist activities During the school year 1969-1'0 there were 22' college disturbances having racial overtones There were 530 such dieturbances in secondary schools compared with only 320 during the previous school year 8 Foreign Influence in the Black Extremist Movement Although there is no hard evidence indicating that the black extremist movement is substantially controlled or directed by foreign elements there is a marked potential for foreign-directed intelligence or subversive activity among black extremist leaders and organizations These groups are highly susceptible to exploitation by hostile foreign intelligence services -11- Doc-Id 2107 Page NIH-116 DocId 21D7 Page 18 Currently the most important foreign aspect of the black extremist movem'ent is the availability of foreign asylum especially with regard to black extremists subject to criminal prosecution in the United States Some foreign countries such as Cuba provide a temporary safe haven for these individuals Information has been received that passports and funds for travel have also been furnished by countries such as Cuba North Korea and Algeria Communist intelligence services do not at present play a major role in the black extremist movement however all such services have established contact with individual black militants Thus the penetration and manipulation of black extremist groups by these intelligence services remain distinct possibilities Communist intelligence services are capable of using tneir personnel facilities and agent assets to work in the black extremist field The Soviet and Cuban services have major capabilities available B Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures There are some definite gaps in the current overall intelligence penetration of the black extremist movement For example although there appears to be sufficient live informant coverage of the BPP at the rank-and-file level additional penetration of the national leader- ship of the BPP especially at a Central Committee level is needed High eChelon informant coverage could conceivably prevent violence sabotage or insurrection if such activity was planned by BPP leadership Insufficient coverage of the national leadership of the BPP is offset to some extent by technical coverage of BPP headquarters and various branch offices Penetration oi leadership levels has been hindered in part by current BPP policies which prevent rank-and-file members from advancing to leadership roles Improvement in coverage of BPP financial activities could be made particularly with regard to sources of funds and records Information received to date indicates that financial support for the BPP has been furnished by both foreign individuals and domestic sources Thus a deeper penetration and correlation of foreign and domestic information received is essential to a full determination of BPP finances Coverage of BPP finances has been hampered by fact that BPP leaders handle financial matters personally In view of the increased amount of foreign travel and contacts by BPP leaders abroad there is a clear-cut need for more complete coverage of foreign involvement in BPP activities -12- NW 146 1 Other Black Extremist Organizations Informant coverage of the N01 is substantial enabling its activities to be followed on a current basis Coverage of militant black student groups and individualsis very limited because of the sensitive areas involved An effective source of such coverage would be reliable former members of the Armed Forces presently attending college Live intermant coverage particularly with respect to the activities and plans of unaffiliated black militants needs to be increased More sources both in the United States and abroad in a position to determine the amount of foreign involvement in black extremist activities need to be developed Maximum use of communication interceptions would materially increase the current capabilities of the intelligence community to develop highly important data regarding black extremist activities ix - 13 - Doc-Id Page 19 INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES A Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat The threat posed by the communist intelligence services must be assessed in two areas 1 direct intervention in iomenting and or influencing domestic unrest 2 extensive espionage activities Taken in complete context these services constitute a grave threat to the internal security of the United States because of their size capabilities wideSpread Spheres of influence and targeting of the United States as enemy number one The largest and most skilled of these services is the Soviet Committee for State Security KGB which hasroughly 300 000 personnel of whom some 10 000 are engaged in foreign operations 1 Intervention in Domestic Unrest There have been no substantial indications that the communist intelligence services have actively fomented domestic unrest Their capability cannot hovever be minimized and the likelihood of their initiating direct intervention would be in direct relationship to the deterioration of the political climate and or imminence of hostilities The ingredients for a first- rate capability are present including both the personnel and the ingrained philosophy and know-how for using such tactics Communist intelligence has shown a real capability to foment disorder in a number of trouble spots The dissidence and violence in the United States today present adversary intelligence services with opportunities unparalleled for forty years While fostering disorder and rebellion through communist parties and fronts is a potent weapon in the communist arsenal their past success has been evident in clandestine recruitment efforts on campuses during times of unrest H A H Kim Philby Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean were all students at Cambridge during the depression period of the 1930's and were in the vanguard of what was then the New Left Their recruitment and cooperation with Soviet intelligence wreaked havoc on British intelligence and also compromised U S security in those sectors 'where they had authorized access Although these services have not as yet directly intervened in domestic unrest the Cuban and Soviet intelligence services have major capabilities in this area based primarily on the accessibility of -14- aw 146 DoeId 21nv Page 20 members and leaders of protest groups For instance about 900 members of the Veneererr-os Brigade 1 group of American youths recently completed a round trip to Cuba This travel was financed by the Cuban Government While in Cuba they were exhorted to actively participate in United States revolutionary activities upon their return to the United States The organizers of the Brigade were instructed to direct any questions to an individual assigned to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations who has been identified as a member of the Cuban intelligence service A sabotage manual prepared in Cuba turned up in the hands of individuals responsible for recent bombings in Puerto Rico and New York City While the potential for widespread well-organized incidents of violence generated and controlled by the Cuban intelligence service is considered minimal isolated occurrences of this nature must be considered probable The Soviet services appear to have assumed the passive roles of observers and reporters The communist intelligence services maintain contacts and exert influence among a variety of individuals and organizations through the exploitation of ideological cultural and ethnic ties Most of these liaisons are maintained with some degree of Openness with individuals associated with the Communist Party USA various of its front groups other pro Soviet organizations nationality groups and foreign-language newspapers These contacts are exploited as sources for and propaganda outlets of communist intelligence services Regarded individually these efforts cannot be considered a major threat to our internal security however in total they represent a sizable element of our population which can be influenced in varying degrees by communist intelligence service operations 2 Intelligence Operations_ Persistent and pervasive intelligence operations which have their inSpiration and direction supplied by communist intelligence services represent a major threat to the internal security I e ml -15- NH 146 DocId 21 J Page 21 7 1 To v l rm EOthl The threat posed by such numerical concentration is readily apparent Specifically the damage these operations can inflict in any given circumstance can be extreme In addition to their efforts at collecting extensive intelligence data thmugh both overt and covert means their chief and on-going aim is to gain high-level penetration within the U S Government including U S intelligence services The recruitment of U S military personnel is high on the list of adversary intelligence services In a recent instance a Soviet diplomat did his utmost to recruit a U S Air Force field grade officer with access to sensitive information Of particular interest the Soviets appear to censider the U 8 Air Force as a prime source of information relating to Communist China In addition to the legal representation of SIS it is believed that as many as 20 SIS illegal networks may be operating in the eastern portion of North America Our current lack of definitive knowledge regarding both the individuals involved and their targets makes a threat assessment difficult however one such network exposed in a friendly foreign country determined that SIS through the efforts of the illegals had access to construction plans of an atomic submarine Two of the four agents surfaced in this operation were Americans Information developed by a U S Air Force-controlled double agent operating against a bloc intelligence service has given indications that the bloc service has shown willingness to progress to the eventual establishment of an illegal U S -based operation These deep cover operations with little or no tie-in with official Soviet and bloc establishments would continue to function following a break in diplomatic relations The threat posed by Such operations is considerably heightened by current lack of knowledge about their identity - -15- 146 Page 22 r l l __hl f The Chinese communist Chicom intelligence service lacking a legal base in the United States is considerably handicapped in any extensive intelligence undertaking however the Chicoms do have a Canadian-based intelligence apparatus directing operations against the United States Among the large ethnic Chinese population in the United States are 3 500 scientists employed in sensitive positions many of whom have relatives in Communist China Current intelligence pinpoints the United Nations Secretariat where there are a number of pro-Chicom employees as being the hub of their domestic activities The potential for increased Chicom activity in the United States is a considerable factor but is dependent mainly on the estab- lishment of legal Chicom establishments in the United States B Assessment of Current Intelligencipyo llectiovn l Egope and Effectiveness The scope of overall intelligence efforts is encompassed in the threefold goals of penetration intelligence and prosecution Domestic implementation of these goals is delimited by agreement among United States intelligence agencies Intelligence components of the United States military services are immediately concerned with protecting the integrity of their personnel and instal lations Although this is primarily a defensive stance they have furnished a potent offensive weapon in the controlled utilization of their personnel in double agent operations directed against hostile intelligence services Central Intelligence Agency with basic foreign responsibility nevertheless uses similar tools mentioned below to achieve the same end the collection of intelligence primarily related to hostile intelligence services - Methods used in these endeavors employed in varying degrees by U S intelligence agencies dependent upon their specific tasks are penetrations defectors double agent Operations physical technical and photographic surveillances examination and analysis of overt publications information supplied by friendly intelligence services and COMINT -17 NW 1-16 DocIci 2101 Page 23 LUZixi 2 Gaps in Current Coverage-J NW 146 DocId 2107 -13- 5W Page 2 4 ear-seem I 1 r- 7 There is currently a serious void in knowledge operations in the United States Sophisticated coverages have in the a past proven most effective in developing this type of intelligence 55-2531 l - 5'1 TSC i-Crle - Agency Organifmf'l m function or I i 19 - 146 DocId 210 Page 25 OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS A Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat l Communist Party The Communist Party continues as a distinct'threat to the internal security because of its extremely e- close ties and total commitment to the Soviet Union There are many I I thousands of people in the United States who adhere to a Marxist philosophy and agree with the basic objectives of the Communist Party although they do not identify themselves specifically with the organization The Party receives most of its finances from the Soviet '4 Union adheres to Soviht policies explicitly and provides a major out- let for Soviet propaganda The Party will without question continue to implement whatever orders it receives from the Soviets in the future There is little likelihood that the Communist Party USA will instigate civil disorders or use terrorist tactics in the foreseeable future Its strong suit is propaganda Through its publications and propaganda it will continue its efforts to intensify civil disorders and fomentunrest in the Armed Forces labor unions and minority groups The Party is on the periphery of the radical youth movement and is striving to strengthen its role in this movement and to attract new members through a recently formed youth organization but it does not appear this group will achieve any substantial results for the Party in the future 2 Socialist Workers Party and Other Trotskyist Groups These organizations have a estimated membership of 2 500 The L- major Trotskyist organization the Socialist Workers Party has attained an influential role in the antiwar movement through its youth affiliate the Young Socialist Alliance which dominates the L Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam and which has more than doubled its size on college campuses in the past year Trotskyist groups have participated in major confrontations with authorities both on and off campuses and have consistently supported civil disorders At this time they do not pose a major threat to instigate insurrection or to commit terrorist acts The propaganda of these groups while emphasizing student unrest is also aimed at creating dissatisfaction in labor organizations and in the Armed Forces The Trotskyist organizations maintain close relations with the Fourth lnte rnational a foreign -based worldwide Trotskyist movement -20 145 oocld 21m Page 26 3 Pro-Chinese Communist Chicom Groups There are approximately ten organizations in the United States which follow the ideology of Red China and their total membership is estimated at 1 000 Most of these groups are seeking ties with the Ch icOm Government but there is no evidence to date that any are receiving Substantial Chicom support These groups are extremely militant and therefore attractive to youthful activists In fact the Progressive Labor Party the principal pro-Chicom organization controls a faction of the Students for a Democratic Society These groups generally advocate revolution Some have marked potential for terrorism and sabotage although it is likely that such acts would be isolated instances of adventuristic violence All of these organizations stress the use of propaganda to foment unrest in the Armed Forces and among labor minority and student groups 4 Puerto Rican Nationalist Extremist Groups The radical Puerto Rican movement has spawned approximately ten violently anti American groups committed to Puerto Rican self- determination Revolutionary violence is a major aim of the estimated 1 000 members of these groups and if Sufficiently strong they would not hesitate to mount armed insurrection Since July 1967 some 130 bombings in Puerto Rico and in the New York City area have been attributed to these extremists American owned businesses have been the main targets but there has been a recent upsurge of violence against U S defense facilities in Puerto Rico The leading groups have reportedly received guerrilla training and money from the Cuban Government and in one instance funds were received from Communist China for use in sabotage activities One group organized and led by Cuban espionage agents is reported to have committed numerous bombings in Puerto Rico and New York City in the past 18 months B AssessmentoLCurrent Intelligence Coverage 1 Scope and Effectiveness Coverage of the Communist Party is considered excellent through live informants and limited electronic surveillances This coverage affords access to leadership -21- NW 146 Donn-1 219 Page decisions and should provide information concerning any plans developed for insurrectionary activity There is effective penetra- tion regarding the Party's receipt and expenditure of funds Coverage of the Trotskyist and pro-Chicom groups is less effective Access to their top leadership levels is limited because these rroups are heavily splintered and often have very small memberships Current live informant coverage can furnish information on the general activities of these groups and it should serve to warn of policy changes in favor of insurrection or sabotage It is doubtful that advance warning of isolated acts of violence would be received however i- Informant penetration of the Puerto Rican independence groups provides information on the objectives of most of these organizations as well as the identities of their members However these sources have limited ability to provide advance information regarding violence committed by these groups or by individual members a 2 Gaps in Current Coverage I 14 I ozsx Better coverage is needed of the high-level meetings and sources of funds of the Trotskyist and pro-Chicom groups The limited penetration is due in part to multiplicity of these groups and their generally small memberships Closer coverage at the policy-making levels of the Puerto Rican independence groups is needed to obtain more comprehensive information on persons involved in terrorist activities The small memberships of many of these organizations is a major reason for the limited coverage 3 Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection The selective use of electronic surv illances would materially enhance the intelligence coverage of the policy-making levels of these organizations A particular benefit of electronic surveillance in the Puerto Rican field could be the development of information identifying persons involved in is terrorist activities Communications intelligence coverage and travel control measures could be improved to provide greater awareness of the travel and other activities of individuals of security interest Through the establishment of additional informant coverage on college campuses the involvement of these organizations in the radicaliaation of students could be assessed with increased accuracy - 22 uses-sesam- NH 146 Page 23 'li r I I I 4' PART TWO RESTRAINTS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION The Committee noted that the President had made it clear that he desired full consideration be given to any regulations policies or procedures which tend to limit the effectiveness of demestic intelli- gence collection The Committee further noted that the President wanted the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth so that the President will be able to decide whether or not a change in current policies practices 0r procedures should be made During meetings of the Committee a variety of limitations and restraints were discussed All of the gencies involved Defense Intelligence Agency BIA the three military counterintelligence services the Central Intelligence Agency CIA the National Security Agency NBA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI partici- pated in these considerations In the light of the directives furnished to the Committee by the White House the subject matters hereinafter set forth were reviewed for the consideration and decision of the President I SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS A Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence Preliminary Discussion 35 - '54 was Agenry organizer-ion funcLL-m or personnel -ZJ- NW 146 DocId 2107 Page 29 NH t xi 31 - 50 3603 - A-je'lurz' function activities or personnel Nature of Restriction Advantages of Maintaining RestrictiOn 146 Page 30 Advantages of Relaxing Restriction l Circumstances have altered considerably since the original intelligence directive was written Subversive activity has materially increased and now represents a significant danger to public order and stability -24 E'Oli t b5 W- an 3602- an-Jncy crqanization Emu-Lian chivizies or 25 - NH 146 Dchd 2107 Page 31 l _l 201le 80253 3 Fir 36115 noon-3v organization activities or personnel 13 Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations Preliminary Discussion The limited number of electronic surveillances and ipenetrations substantially restricts the collection of valuable intelligence information of material importance to the entire Eintelligence cemmunity Nature of Restrictions Electronic surveillances have been used on a selective basis Restrictions initiated at the highest levels of the Executive Branch arose as a result of the condemnatiOn of these techniques by civil rights groups Congressional cancern for invasion of privacy and the possibility of their adverse effect on criminal prosecutions Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 1 Disclosure and embarrassment to the using agency and or the United States is always possible since such techniques often require that the services or advice of outside personnel be used in the process of installation 3 3 Certain elements of the press in the United States and abroad would undoubtedly seize upon disclosure of electronic coverage in an effort to discredit the United States 4 The monitoring of electronic surveillances requires censiderable manpower and where foreign establishments are involved the language resources of the agencies could be severely taxed -25 a SEJIHFP EHIIFHEIB GEHEF H 146 DocId 21l T Page 32 Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions l The U S Government has an overriding obligation to use every available scientific means to detect and neutralize forces which pose a direct threat to the Nation 2 Every major intelligence service in the world including those of the communist bloc use such techniques as an essential part of their operations and it is believed the general public would suppert their use by the United States for the same purpose 3 The President historically has had the authority to act in matters of national security In addition Title of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides a statutory basis 4 Intelligence data from electronic coverage is not readily obtainable from other techniques or sources Such data includes infor- mation which might assist in formulating foreign policy decisions information leading to the identification of intelligence and or espionage principals and could well include the first indication of intention to commit hostile action against the United States 5 Acquisition of such material from COMINT without benefit of the assistance which electronic surveillance techniques can provide if possible at all would be extremely expensive Therefore this approach could result in considerable dollar savings compared to collection methods -27- NH 146 DocId 210 Page 33 - DECISION ElectrOnic Surveillances and Penetrations Present procedures on electronic coverage should continue - Present procedures should be changed to permit intensificatiOn of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coveragel Fa - I H xtal More information is needed E szj - is USC 3605 - Agency iunction activiZLes or personnel NOTE The FBI does not wish to change its present procedure of selective coverage on major internal security threats as it believes this coverage is adequate at this time The FBI would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of the Attorney General for coverage required by them and there- after instituting such coverage themselves -23- FIN- 146 Page 34 C Mail Coverage I Preliminary Discussion The use of mail covers can result in the collection of valuable information relating to contacts between U S nationals and foreign governments and intelligence services 1s and the military investigative agencies have found this information particularly helpful i in the past Essentially there are two types of mail coverage routine coverage is legal while the secondncovert coverage is not Routine coverage involves recording information from the face of envelopes It is available legally to any duly authorized Federal or state investi- gative agency Submitting a written request to the Post Office Denartment and has been used frequently by the military intelligence services Covert mail coverage also known as sophisticated mail coverage or flaps and seals entails surreptitious screening and may include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail This techni us is based on high-level cooperation of top echelon postal officials I Nature of Restrictions L _l Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal proceedings and publicity afforded this matter in Congressional hearings involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy l Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions I Routine Coverage 1 Although this coverage is legal charges of invasion of privacy no matter how inn-founded are possible 2 This coverage depends on the cooperation of rank-and-iile postal employees and is therefore mere susceptible to compromise -29 145 DocId 2107 Page 35 Cove rt Coverage 1 Coverage directed against diplomatic establishments if discloSed could have adverse diplomatic repercussions 2 This coverage not having sanction of law runs the risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government agency 3 Information secured from such coverage could not be used for prosecutive purposes Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions Routine Coverage 1 Legal mail coverage is used daily by both local and many Federal authorities in criminal investigations The use of this technique should be available to permit coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a threat to the internal scouritv Covert Coverage 1 High-level postal authorities have in the past provided complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program 2 This technique involves negligible risk of compromise Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence and involved are highly trained trustworthy and under complete control of the intelligence agency EOinxl Boas-at 5'37- 3 This coverage has been extremely successful in producing hard core and authentic intelligence which is not obtainable from any other source An example is a case involving the interception of a letter to al lestablishment The writer offered to sell information to the land enclosed a sample of information available to him Ana ysis determined that the writer could have ivenI information which might have been more damaging EOEEXI Hill- 146 DocId 210 Page 36 i DECISION Mail Coverage Present restrictions on both types of mail coverage should be continued Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed Present restrictions on covert coverage should I be relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign HI intelligence and internal security interest I - More information is needed NOTE The Committee noted that a change in the basic structure I of the Post Office Department into a corporation wherein the Government would not exercise administrative control could I make this technique too hazardous to use The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal and it is likely that if done infor - mation would leak out of the Post Office to the press and serious damage would be done to the intelligence community The FBI I has no objection to legal mail coverage providing it is done on a carefully controlled and selective basis in both criminal and security matters -31- NW 146 Page 3 so hi 1 E$ hx3 - 55 USC 3605 - AQELCT functiuL activities or persULLn D Surrep'titious Entry Preliminary Discussion Nature of Restrictioas Use of surreptitious entry also referred to as anon mous sources and black bag jobs has been virtually eliminated I Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions l The activity involves illegal entry and trespass 2 Information which is obtained through this technique could not be used for prosecutive purposes 3 The public disclosure of this technique would result in widespread publicity and embarrassment _The news media would portray the incident as a flagrant violation of civil rights and or diplomatic immunity Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 1 Operations of this type are performed by a small number of carefully trained and selected personnel under strict supervision The technique is implemented only after full security is assured It has been used in the past with highly successful results and without adverse effects -32- HW 146 DocId 21D Page 38 EOEDXB - 50 USC 369 - Agency iuncLion an ivities 'r 5 2 Benefits accruing from this technique in the past have been innumerable l 3 In the past this techniQue when used against subversives has produced valuable intelligence material I DECISION Surreptitious Entry Present restrictions should be continued procurement 1 Present restrictions should also be modi ed to permit selective use of this technique against other urgent and high priority internal security targets More information is needed E02 '32 1 E02533 - 5C do b - Agcniy srganiastiun lune ion artivzties c Present restrictions should be modified to permit NOTE The FBI is opposed to surreptitious -33- NH 146 D0cId 2107 Page 39 1411 I NW 146 E Development of Campus Sources Preliminary Discussion Public disclosure of CIA links with the National Student Association and the subsequent issuance of the Katzenbach Report have contributed to a climate adverse to intelligence-type activity on college campuses and with student-related groups It should be noted that the Katzenbach Report itself does not specifically restrain CIA from developing positive or counterintelligence sources to werk on targets abroad Restrictions currently in force limit certain other elements of the intelligence community access to some of the most troublesome areas campuses college faculties foreign and domestic youth groups leftist journalists and black militants It is recognized that these are prime targets of communist intelligence services and that the opportunity for'fOreign communist exploitation increases in proportion to the weakness of a U S counterintelligence effort Nature of Re strictiOns The need for great circumSpection in making contacts with students faCulty members and employees of institutions of learning is widely recognized However the requirements of the I intelligence community for increased information in this area is 1 obvious from the concern of the White House at the absence of hard information about the plans and programs of campus and student related militant organizations At the present time no scurces are developed among eccendary school students and with respect to colleges and universities sources are developed only among individuals who have reached legal age with few exceptions This poliCy is designed to minimize the possibility of embarrassment and adverse publicity including charges of infringement oi academic freedom -34- Docld 2101 Page 40 17 - NW Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 1 Students faculty members and others connected with educational institutions are frequently sensitive to and hostile towards any Government activity which smacks of infringement on academic freedom They are prone to publicize inquiries by governmental agencies and the resulting publicity can often be misleading in purtraying the Government s interest 2 Students are frequently immature and unpredictable They cannot be relied on to maintain confidences or to act with discretion to the same extent as adult sources Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 1 To a substantial degree militant New Left and antiwar groups in the United States are comprised of students faculty members and others connected with educational institutions To a correSponding degree effective coverage of these groups and activities depends upOn development of knowledgeable sources in the categories named In this connection the military services have capabilities which eculd be of value to the FBI 2 Much of the violence and disorders which have occurred on college campuses have been of a hastily planned nature Unless sources are available within the student bodies it is virtually impossible to develop advance information concerning such violence 3 The development of sources among students affiliated with New Left elements affords a unique opportunity to cultivate informant prospects who may rise to positions of leadership in the revolutionary movement or otherwise become of great long-range value 4 The extraordinary and unprecedented wave of destruction which has swept U S campuses in the past several months and which in some respects represents a virtual effort to overthrow our system provides a clear justification for the deveIOpment of campus informants in the interest of national security -35- 146 DocId 21D Page 41 t i 1 HH 146 5 Contacts with students will make it possible to obtain information about travel abroad by U S students and about attendance at international conferences DECISION Development of Campus Sources Present restrictions on development of campus and student-related sources should be continued Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups CIA coverage of American students and others traveling abroad or living abroad should be increased More information is needed NOTE The FBI is opposed to removing anyr present controls and restrictions relating to the deveIOpment of campus sources To do so woold severely jeopardize its investigations and could resalt in leaks to the press which would be damaging and which could result in charges that investigative agencies are interfering with academic freedom DocIdl21DT Page 42 F Use of Military Undercover Agents Preliminary Discussion The use of undercover agents by the military services to - develop domestic intelligence is currently limited to penetratiOn of - organizations whose membership includes military persmmel and whose I activities pose a direct threat to the military establishment For example although the Navy has approxirnately 54 Naval ROTC units and numerous In classified Government contract projects on various campuses across the country the Naval Investigative Service conducts no covert collection - on college campuses The same is true of the other military services Nature of Restrictions The use of undercover agents by the military investigative services to develop domestic intelligence among civilian targets is believed beyond the statutory intent of the Congress as expressed in Title 10 U S Code and in current resource authoriza tions The Delimitations Agreement 1949 agreement signed by the FBI Army Navy and Air Force which delimits responsibility for sach agency with regard to investigations of espionage counter- espionage subversion and sabotage reflects the current missions of the FBI and the military services Further there is a lack of 1 assets to undertake this mission unless essential service-related I counterintelligence missions are reduced There is also concern for morale and disciplinary reactions within the services should the existence of such covert operations become known Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 1 If the utilization of military counterintelligence in this missioa is contrary to the intent of the Congress discovery of employ- ment may result in unfavorable legislation and further reductions in appropriations 2 Lacking direct statutory authority the use of the military services in this mission could result in legal action directed against the Executive Branch 3 The use of military personnel to report on civilian activities for the benefit of civilian agencies will reduce the ability of the military services to meet service-connected intelligence responsibilities - 37 - NW 146 DocId 210 Page 43 LU-nlrr JI 4 If expansion of the mission of the military services with regard to college campuses is to provide coverage of any significance it will require corollary increases in resources 5 Prosecutions for violations of law discovered in the course of military penetration of civilian organizations must be tried in civil courts The providing of military witnesses will require compli i cated interdepartmental coordination to a_ much greater extent than the present and will serve in the long run to reduce security 1 6 Disclosure that military counterintelligence agencies have been furnishing information obtained through this technique to nonmilitary investigative agencies with respect to civilian activities would certainly I reth in considerable adverse publicity The Army's recent experience with former military intelligence personnel confirms this estimate Since obligated service officers first enlistees and draftees are drawn from a peer group in which reaction is most unfavorable morale and disciplinary problems can be anticipated Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions l Lifting these restrictions would expand the scope of domestic intelligence collection efforts by diverting additional manpower J and resources for the collection of informatioa on college campuses and in the vicinity of military installations 2 The use of undercover agents by the military counter- intelligence agencies could be limited to localized targets where the I h threat is great and the likelihood of exposure minimal Moreover controlled use of trusted personnel leaving the service to return to I college could expand the collection capabilities at an acceptable risk - 3 The military services have a certain number of personnel I pursuing special academic courses on campuses and universities Such personnel who in many instances have already been investigated for security clearance would represent a valuable pool of potential sources for reporting on subversive activities of campus and student-related groups -33- 1411 146 DocId 210'J Page 44 DECISION Use of Military Undercover Agents Bresent restrictions shoold be retained The counterintelligence mission of the military services should be expanded to include the active collection of intelligence concerning student- related dissident activities with provisions for a close coordination with the FBI No change should be made in the current mission of the military counterintelligence services however present restrictions shOuld be relaxed to permit the use of trusted military personnel as FBI assets in the collection of intelligence regarding student- related dissident activities More information is needed NOTE The FBI is opposed to the use of any military undercover agents NW 146 to develop domestic intelligence information because this muld be in violation of the Delimitations Agreement The military services joined by the FBI oppose any modificatiOn of the Delimitations Agreement which would extend their jurisdiction beyond matters of interest to the Department of Defense -39- Page 45 II BUDGET AND MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS The capability of member agencies NBA CIA DIA FBI and the military counterintelligence services to collect intelligence data is limited by available resources particularly in terms of budget and or qualified manpower For some agencies fiscal limitations or recent cutbacks have been acute Budgetary requirements for some agencies other than the FBI are reviewed and passed upon by officials who in some instances may not be fully informed concerning intelligence requirements The military services noted that cuts in budget requirements for counterintelligence activities have the effect of severely hampering the ability of these services to accomplish missions relating to coverage of threats-to the national security Budgetary deficiencies have occurred at a time when investigative work loads are increasing significantly Manpower limitations constitute a major restriction on the FBI's capabilities in the investigation of subversive activities The problem is further complicated by the fact that even if substantial numbers of Agents could be recruited on a crash basis the time required to conduct background investigations and to provide essential training would mean several months' delay in personnel being available for use against the rapidly escalating subversive situation -40- 146 DocId 21lJ'J Page 6 ECESRI p In the event as a result of this report additional - collection requirements should be levied on the agencies involved it would be necessary to provide for essential funding For example DocId 2107 DECISION Budget and Manpower Restrictions H Page 4 Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs in the event the various investigative restraints herein are lifted Each agency must operate within its current budgetary or manpower limitations irrespective of action required as result of this report More information is needed PART THREE EVALUATION OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 1 CURRENT PROCEDURES TO EFFECT COORDINATION There is currently no operational body or mechanism specifically charged with the overall analysis coordination and continuing evaluation of practices and policies governing the acquisi- tion and dissemination of intelligence the pooling of resources and the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field Although a substantial exchange of intelligence and research material between certain of the interested agencies already exists much remains to be done in the following areas 1 the preparation of coordinated intelligence estimates in a format useful for policy formulation 2 the coordination of intelligence collection resources of the member agencies and the establishment of clear-cut priorities for the various agencies and 3 the coordination of the operational activities of member agencies in developing the required intelligence II SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION 0F DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION It is believed that an interagency group on domestic intelligence should be established to effect coordination between the various member agencies This group would define the specific require ments of the various agencies provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence develop recommendations relative to policies governing operations in the field of domestic intelligence and prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which would incorporate the results of the-combined efforts of the entire intelligence community Membership in this group should consist of appropriate representatives named by the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation the Central Intelligence Agency the National Security Agency the Defense Intelligence Agency and the counterintelligence agencies of the Departments of the Army Navy and Air Force In addition an - 42 - NW 146 DocId 2107 Page 48 NH 146 appropriate representative of the White House would have membership The committee would report periodically to the White House and a White House staff representative would coordinate intelligence originating with this committee in the same manner as Dr Henry Kissinger Assistant to the President coordinates foreign intelligence on behalf of the President The chairman would be appointed by the President This interagency group would have authority to determine appropriate staff requirements and to implement these requirements subject to the approval of the President in order to meet the responsibilities and objectives described above DECISION Permanent Interagency Group An ad hoc group consistingoi the FBI CIA NSA DIA and the military counterintelligEHce agencies should be appointed and should serve as long as the President deems necessary to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates and carry out the other objectives indicated above The ad hoc group should be tasked to develop a permanent organization to carry out the objectives of this report A permanent committee consisting of the FBI CIA NSA DIA and the military counterintelligence agencies should be appointed to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates and carry out the other objectives indicated above No further action required More intermation is needed NOTE The FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent committee for the purpose of providing evaluations of domestic intelligence hOWever the FBI would approve of preparing periodic domestic intelligence estimates -43- DocId 2l T Page 49 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 WŚŽŶĞ͗ ϮϬϮͬϵϵϰͲϳϬϬϬ͕ Ădž͗ ϮϬϮͬϵϵϰͲϳϬϬϱ͕ ŶƐĂƌĐŚŝǀΛŐǁƵ͘ĞĚƵ