M E M O 1 ii Tl I l-1 TOI Tl ROUOll1 -- n - c nirto tl ' r ick and 5 AE - Cerard C Smit h 1 At the Foan srial Moc 1 ing of the Rorth At 1Ant1c Council in connootion vith tbe d1acusa1on or the Fourth eountr r' problClll Pinsau flUl 1test ed the idea o an oointegrat nATO Qtollli o capal-illt y nt the d1spoll1t1on or the W TO Sup emc QoxaUldcr You exprc ed 1nteroot 1n the 1 doa and aaid e ould e ivo 1t study Since then Tho French nave b en prci a1ng or our viG11Bo Tlioybave 1nd1catod thllt thay aro th1nldng of f'1rm aasuriincoe or tho nvnilabillty or wclear veapons to tb0111 lh1ch could o be aCQOIIIP11 Ghed by a cl mlge in tha Atolllic Energy Act so es to author-be the po4ceti 1 o tranafer or rrucloar wrhendG 2 3 Wo do not canoider 1 t demublo or realistic to OO tGlllPlat c ouch a change in logialation at this thue lt is pot llevcd that tho Congress is preparvd to go that tar at the p resant tJ me Serious rieka or 1rre1Jf Ons1ble uae or rmclenr woaponei would bo created it II le'1 sl at1 vo cbaog1J led to actunl trnna t l 'S ot vespons to individual rorcigri nations i 'hilAI tedmicnl devel 0 8 in the na xt you or two wiy then faco us lli th tho question or the il a iledicte avai1Auil1t7 to other raTO countri 8 or nucl 61 1 weapons or air defonao thie question 1o not yet bo ore us Ii bwewr a pat tern or 1110tion tovard on inte tod llATO nuclo ir defense baa been e Jt obUahod 1n Doce nbcr 19$1 t tho Council accepted tho concept or pl annini on the uee of nucloar veepona in M c 48 which was ro aff1rlQSd 1n tho Political D1 roet t ffl or 19$6 Wo huvc Wormed the North Atlantic Cou lc1l thnt nuolonrliiual-purpos leapons rmch 11 1 nm Corporal and Roncst John 111 included in our current eid progruna for tbcm We ha -o told tht lll tb ' t WQ 8N prepared to tTain their farcoo in the use o t' these veopone 6nd in the Cll IO oi' 1- rr nco hev0 or ered to train the111 in the tccha111ue or doll very b nircra ct of ato 11c I r f ' - - 'o t ' 'i- -2bombs if ve t-ot nuoloar at orilgo rifhts 'l'ho inevitable no xt Gt op in tbo prog r isi to nsauro our allloa tlult thoir forcos- trained 1n tho dellvo17 thereof wuld bavo nuclear warheads av iiluble to tb ll11 1n tiir o of hoot111t1co Tho French bave alread y asked for auch nesuroncea o To ncoo111 llch th1o within the t'rarn8WOrk ot present lcgiolat ion we could cit hors a i1vo bilateral 4DWI'Dn 'ca that the United St 11tao uould otockpllo nuclnar varhondo tor uoo by our roopectivo allies keeping tllf' 111 in e s cuotody Rnd turning thom ovor in time or wnr or b Gll o thin but i ivo it tho flavor of a W TO stockpile to the extent that tha llr dtlltions of tho prosont lof 1Gl nt1on - rould pcr 1t Do the 6 Thoro nre certain poBaihle advo 'ltnges 1nvolvo l in the lattor courso or aation which tho omer cocroo of i ot1on would not offord t o It is poeoiblQ - but it 1a no DIOro than a poseil i1lit1 - that such n arrt1ni cnent would bavo eos 10 influence on tho French docioion to cmhark on o nuole or venpons pro ranc F rt snce ie the only NA'i'O country which could abar' c on ouch n pror ro ll 1n the near future Qumions of prCl$t 1 e i re primarily involvod In addition unroalisiic though it may l le in liltht o tho limited Froneh oapacit 7 the queation of lossenod dependence upon t bo llnitcd Stat co in tlmoa when tho United St atoa ctl c t be roluct mtt to u110 nuclear nopons 1B cleo a factor The Itallon Amooosador recently indicated su J Ort for a French nucle r effort on those 'l'011rx le If wa wore to 11oelc II plodco or ebstontion f'rOl'I Fronce 1n return for tho nuclo i r st oclcpilo it is bol1 ovod thia would be count er-product1 Vft unlasa WG -woro proporod to trarus ci-r l'o lpona to J rr ne4 i1n111ed l ntol y vithout Any contlit1ons on their u110 The l'ronch Defense llinistor ha11 spoken of tho ncr f governo r iont 1 c policy to mve rnpj dly in tho fiotd of nuclear ' leapona davelof'7 11 mt and r rodu ct1on md this 1 the likely attituc o or thlo Cal inct b We mir ht bo a' llo to obtain c ouncil agroeraent to nuclOlll' storago rlP ht J for cmr own torcCJc a s vol 1 as for other NATO forces thus obnatini t ho very di f ic ult probler i o bil tor1 1l ll1T1 1nncr 1ente c We 111ihht le able to ohtnin SOll e nolllinnl contrlb1 1tion to tho itocl p1le froat i 1r1tatn utl10Uth th1o 'WOuld JTOb-'bly r a of mnq innl vnl1 1e onzy SECHrT i u Ptioouceo AT e cw-iAlAllc n iE ' __ __ - I SKltffln'- - - - - d Sbo11ld the SCtdeta n u- their poa1t1o n and accept our propoAJ tor C21t -ot of molar weapODI pr ltion ve abla to deal 1fith the l l'itish NqUircraent tor rmc letir napona otaru J thzough the laTO stoclcpill8 7o 1cb a Ol lllll G would al ao have co owrri d1 op j ontegeas a b 0tzlo oJJ1eo vou1d 'ti ae8 1Z'ed ot the a-va1leh1 1t-7 or nuclear to the est ct tbe PNNnt law aUawe 'l'1le rishto o the Un1 ted Stateo to un nuclear weapons 1n the d eteme or its OIIJl forces particul rl 11n Goniaq could be p Clet'vvd c Tbe 1 rrcepoosiba w e o nueleai- the d a a extent- at preaeat V$AJ OD O could bG controlled to Ve pther b'oll Dotmae that Adlliral Jlltdlord 1a concerned J on n aulead our al Uu that tbe lJJ UNte cS cdaion uae would rest other tbt 1n the PNsidmt oa bando cd lest ve create precedaat tar the S AfO and tleabdod r' ct 8l l'Upllent1 M to the first paint oar allJ o11 are alrecady' CGllCa'Ded at th1a ntuaticm am our proposal 1a an at tac to allrdate that concern To GJ1Phuiue l'red dalUal coDtrol the sit uatton vould be to aaoerbate our al11eeo nact 1 on to tbu 1nncaJ Qb1 problu As to -precodent tor 9Al'0 or tbo Baghdad Poet this 1a true ollly to a degree and C8ll be Nid or all aativ1t1ea 1n HA TO 8 The tollouing ciut line plan 1a tberetare auggestedr a tor miclenr warheads and alaot to the atent poal d blo BACEUa ahould develop 111 litar - NQ lJ rtllment or hie whole area of e Mmif 1td ltn l ritieh torcos 1n tho UD1 tod J1np J These Nqlliromcmto shoald take into consideration tho au te ol readine11S or force# to uae nuclear va rtlead t b Taking aocount ot such lim1ted contr l btlUana aa the Unitod Kin ylol 1 would 1118U SACEUR abould fonrAr d these requirements to tho Unitoo states 1111 litm7 lllthoritiee throu ab CINCEUR General Uoretnd io both 5AC2tllll and cmlElJR o o 'l'ba Unttod St ates woultl engage to placo 6UCh roquircd warhenda 1n looaeona nquellkd b r SAClilJR tOi nthe read7 use ot NATO rorcee able to use them theuo remain t he property or t United st ate and t o reMin in the custody or CIHCEUR SliCRbT I- - ---- ---- - u r nOOUCt oAr THG NA l10NA - o Mcrnves ---- -- oo- --- 1 I - ' -4- n d 'l'rana r ot T Sfq Ol S t 1 u of l'w at1l1t 1 e n-aa c mCIWR to the national ld ll antbcrit icia or other a lllberii would talce pl ace oalya 1 11 Upon_ 1Jt the fbrth Atl enUc eounc11 or In the ewat of 8Uddezl boat1 l 1Uos in A J1ect 0 mliiand Burope or United r requ 1r1ng aatian prior to the d c laion of tbe mo n Uom 1D accordance vith Article S ot the North Atlantic Treaty at the diroClticm ot SAClMl 1n COUBOQADCO 111th the spirit or tho PolltiCAl D1 rect 1Tit Eoat 1 lltiea in tlarlin vauld bo aubjoet to opedal arrangemento u the COnnc1l acto onq b7 unan1 nd t7 invol'fini United States aJld as SACEDR CIIOmR tar tho roreeeeable future llill bo a 1 lnitad St atff omcer tba re luil 'clmenta ff11 ' u s control voal d appear to be 1JlCt by the tore Qing oniul a conacrt e cceptanoo ot otoreGBPo rishte subject only to techn1cal arranseobtained llB s ahould be 9 The ollly at hair alt ernat1Te concdvable vbich sd ribt ha'Ye a chance oE being accopkble both to t bo ngrop and to our oJUu would be to ic les1elat1oo '6bic h crathor1 o too f Ollcet iae tnnarer or nucle ar wa-heads aub 1ect to qxer nt that tbq vill no be u ed ac pti d a Aa dJ Nct-1 by the Soi-th lt l autic Coancil or b In cue Thia voald i a ot eaerpney aa tu- to dlnotcd by SAaruR meat tbo deairoa ot our alllco whl wish to ba1'9 nuolo11r veapomi in theil' sole control Praat1call7 ho teve r it doo11 mt ovicle other thml puper Nteeuarda And it 1e doubU'ul whether it would bo oapletol r acceptablo u a bal t viq h0U80 to either u e or to tbelll R iCmtoofl'lATION1 'l bat you sign t be att adlad drart lettor to Deteme settill i'orth th1JI concept to 1naui- that it is c onaiderod in tho current JCS 11t ld y o th1s otter TAD W abould an er aereGDent vith Detenao havu to aplo r9 this 'Id th the Atold c illeray CoilDdaaion and it vould be advia lblG to have wroprS te Congrua1anal 11Aison We might then discuGa tblo bilate1 1a11Y vitla tho French Gerwma Md l'tritish beforo d ac1d1 ng to present it to the tbrth 1t 11mt1o Council - -sCONCURRENCr s S P - Hr UOW1e C o Mr Reinhardt RA - 1 r Timmns E Jil tRAsJ ol sceh '' Dear Hr Seciretal7 I t it lli ht helpt'ul to Jlt'C vide 1011 vitb tbc prel1DdDAJT th1nJdng or tbio Dlq Utmord ou the aubJect or tho atocJcp111 ng ot nuclear cc ap-etentn tor at cmd o Qapono tar mo forces both u s and t'oreio s eo thn theae ctatiff 1111ebt l e i1 '90ll conuidarat1an 1D the noo atud'oa 11b1ch our Dep rla ant ie now pursuing on thia J1111tter l'OLTO 2765 cc nt a t ned the t 1 o n of our Jll1 saiona in thil 1'1Mld on th is n l-oJoct is our not that Clt the PN11$1lt tiJl 8 it 1 a neither easilole nor c le81 rable to eoek o cbanp in tho ltoiaic llnerBY Act or 1954 eo as to provide or the peACet iJw tl'II MCer or maliear ooir ononta to our allies At tho t11D19 hcN9vor ve 'baUeve that 1t 1111 gbt be poaaihle id thin tho ttw uoric of preaent loglalat10P to Co aa far aa poaaibls to aasuro our allieo that we will have nucloar 11a 'baado rea aw11Ahle for tbd r -aee in U oftllt ot boetil1t1oeo Thia 1o o aaturnl deirelu-pt1eU-t f'olloviDg upon the adoption ot a mcloar etratea by' UlTO and our progrua ror J L Orid1ng our HA'tO allies uit h equipmQnt and trein1 ng 1n dell'flll'T or nnclor weapons Vo haw betlll th1nk nti that the United Stataa and to a 1 11Sn l ext the ODitod K1 Dadm II01lld utntain miolear 11aapcna at appropriat aites 1n the theater to 111Nt nuc lear a r dnelopad by- SAC Uft for XlTO Jl ed ona in A 1 1-d C'clo 18 J J llrope and also to tho eztent po11aible tor l ritl ab forc ea 1n the tcd 11ngdam suworUnc the NATO aiaaion While ve vould call tbia project a 11 1LlTO Atosrd Q atockp1lo11 in tact the Oll1ted stat am tbe united Ungdm voul d MIS n such xmclear weaporw in tbeir own respecU Ye cuet ody cul control RnaJeQ- a woul cl be t1US Bri ed bl the torcd or ot h r BU mat ioms oftl' md above those earmartced b - the tlDited atatea and tJnited nnedom tor tb8'r 01lffl forcelJ the United statu and tho U111ted JSnwtom 'llllit ar ' authoritioa '4ho 11ld ro pocts vel y ret dn custody of their OIIIZl rmclear colliJ Ontlnts 1n the tockplle 'WOUl d turn tbela owr o 1n t be event ot bost1llt1on a upon qrewnt in tho forth J t l mltic ar b 1n the event ot sudden bost1lit1eo at t ho direct ion ot CF ClifCltlCi- uR AI tho C' ouncil r c oncy The Honorable Ouu-les E i lleon oCIJe 'oose SECRE1' - OECLASSlflED AuL'1orit J By A J 1 1t'7 2 S l - NARA OJ 11 Ji_ - IINl i l i b y UDPldait7 inYOl id nc l1a1t e l GBPt atcs CODN lt and U 5 lCE lm CDiCim for the orec eablo tut vo lli 11 boa v D oU1cor the uu- imeot a tw Uni tad Std ea control would G pear to bo iatrt U ve 11ere to pve t h1s ea ICU ch ot II HATO flAvor as possible aubj to t he llld tat icna ot present lcgia1At10 n fo lld eht obt larea pollt1c u l boEJPYil1'1to t Mrotro111 vhilo at tbo o o t illlf no1 uc rlt1c1ni aey or tho Aapect e o u s control which tlle prc scnt situation now affords Suob a 1'oniula oppro ir 1'1t e JPY portra -cd tS a J A TO i tockpUo Micht to o amatanco to us llit h r oM11ot to t he or obWnillf nucloii r ot o r t o ri hta or our o m tor cea ond al101ud tho a1tunt 1on l0 require t ho nritieh de 1re ror on nGGUrAJ1oe or nuoltuuo voAf ona 111nt al in tho event t he Sov ets Ghould 11ccept our die aent propoDal f - r cut -orr of nucl6t1r t ospona i roduct ior real1 e t his io a c o - l x problolll 01 1t it 1a our t boue bt mtbjcct to 'O' U' Ti ewe tho thero d lo not ap ca1o to be overr l dinR d1esdvant4 cu Fourth Count 17 riroble n tho proble I I r opo tbr t t hu utlino or a plM c 01 1lll r Cm '0 thu attlillt i On or your t It - ould JPYGIil to tt eat General utll do i viwD oa eet forth 1n Parla' 6651o Roproae -ita ti Yod o thia Dep l'1 111ent v ill bo pro iarod to dieau11a t h 1Ti11tt cr in detail vi th 'Our roprcscnt11t i vo 1 t' th wuld be holptul EIJR1RA1JJWoltsceh This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu