C00496547 Lj S Approved for Release 2015101 29 000496547 Z42 -1 2 Ll c3 r ca a en ea cl í J es m m EO 13526 1 4 c 25Yrs Intelligence Report Ofce ofAsian Pacic and Latin American Analysis 2 December 1997 Colombia U date on Links Between'Military Paramilitary Forces Summary reports linking members of the Colombian Army to ¡llega¡ paramilitary groups including security forces-possibly including units that receive or may be eligible to receive US aid-did nothing to stop two massacres of civilians perpetrated by paramilitaries - and may have facilitated the arrival and escape of those involved in the attacks Despite the recent retirement of at least one Army offtcer linked to paramilitaries and human rights abuses prospectsfor a concerted effort by the military higle command to crack down on paramilitaries-and the officers that cooperate witlt them-appear dim Tlie continued presente in the military of an Army general ivl o is widely regarded within the military as having Links to paramilitaries is likely to be perceived by otiter offwers as tolerante for paramilitary links APLA IR 97-41037 Approved for Release 2015101129 000496547 EO 13526 1 4 d 25Yrs EO 13526 3 5 c C004 96547 Approved for Release 2015101129 000496547 Military links with these illegal groups will continue to complicate US efforts to provide aid to military units engaged in counternarcotics efforts x Approved for Release 2015101129 000496547 C00496547 Approved for Release 2015101129 000496547 reports linking members of the Colgmbian y operating in various parts of the country to naramilitary roups particular those affiliated with Carlos Castano ' however the reports appear to portend efforts by paramilitaries to establish relationships with local commanders in new arcas where the groups seek to expand their operationg such as in the southern departments of Meta and Caqueta Indeed the expansion of paran litary groups into arcas long considered to be strongholds of Colombia's two largest guerrilla groups-the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC and the National Liberation Army ELN -is the most significant change we have seen in recent months and one which has further degraded Colombia's already poor security and human rights situation Setting the Tone Like his predecessor Harold Bedoya Military Forces Conunander Ma' Gen Manuel Bonett shows little inclination to combat paramilitary groups This report was prepared byl bfíCe ofAsian Pacific and Latin American Analysis with contributions from JAPLA lt was requested by a senior Department of Defense official Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the author on and to the Latin America Regional lssues Manager APLA 3 Approved for Release 2015101 29 000496547 C00496547 Approved for Release 2015101129 000496547 a -Srent_ Approved for Release 2015101 29 000496547 C004965 47 Approved for Release 2015101 29 000496547 Renorts of Cooueration DurinLy Recent Onerations paramilitaries provided assistance to the military during two recent large-scale operations against guerrilla strongholds s Approved for Release 2015101 29 000496547 C00496547 Approved for Release 2015101 29 000496547 paratnilitary forres loyal to Carlos Castano moved into Arauca Department as of September to assist the military there Possible Complicit v of Security Force Members laim that at a minimum Army and antinarcotics police units did nothing to stop the two massacres of civilians that presumably were regarded by paramilitaries as sympathetic to the guerrillas and may have facilitated the arrival and escape of the paramilitaries Mapiripan In July members of Carlos Castano's aramilitax rou d between kill The 15 and 30 civilians in Mapiripan Meta parámilitaries arrived by chartered planes at the San Jose del Guaviare airport and apparently were not subjected to identification or cargo checks by airport police who control the con mercial sector of the airport the counternarcotics police control the other ector of the airport • 1 Ithat Castano would not have forces a flown and weapons into civilian airport known to have a large police presence if he had not had received prior assurances that they would be allowed to pass through During the paramilitaries' five-day stay in Mapiripan the commander of a nearby military base-Maj Hernan Orozco then acting commander of the Joaquin Paris Battalion-received several reports of a problem in the town including killings but offered a variety of excuses such as not enough troops or transport to explain why he did not respond Colombian officials are currently investigating Orozco Brig Gen Jaime Húmerto Uscategui---commander of the parent unit ¡he 7th Brigade-and other officials including the mayor and other civilians who live in Mapiripan presumably for complicity in the massacre 3 ' Under the recent command changes Uscategui will soon assume command of the 4th Brigade which is headquarted in Medellin Antioquía 6 Approved for Release 2015101 29 000496547 C00496547 Approved for Release 2015101 29 000496547 ss Nmv heliconters extricated the naramiiitaries in the daos followina the attack Miraflores Officials of the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross ICRC paramilitaries killed six civilians in Miraflores Guaviare in October and that security forces in the town did nothing to prevent the massacre or to pursue the killers • An ICRC official claims that an unknown number of gunman arrived by air in Miraflores and that the proximity of the airport to the town and military facilities suggests there was at least cohabitation between the naramilitaries and the security forces j • In addition a human rights group has alleged that unnamed soldiers facilitated a etawa b air for two of the killers a counternarcotics police company that receives US aid is stationed at Miraflores and that Army units in this area are subordinate to the 7th Brigade Outlook Prospects for concerted action by the military high command to crack down on paramilitaries-or the officers that cooperate with them-appear dim Although steps against some egregious human rights abusers such as Lieutenant Colonel Rubio will continue the presence of others like Major General Ramirez in key positions suggests that achieving results against the guerrillas-rather than rooting out paramilitary links-remains the top priority for the Colombian military Scrutiny by US and other international observers will continue to play a key role in encouraging the military high command to focus on human rights and take steps against violators but some links-particularly those involving turning a blinde e to paramilitary activities-are longstanding and will not be easily reversed This situation will complicate US efforts to provide aid to military units engaged in critical counternarcotics efforts in southern Colombia The number of paramilitaries operating in these arcas is likely to remain relatively small and their activities sporadic unless and until they are able to gain a foothold there This limitation however suggests that they will continue to seek out links to security forces operating in the arcas to facilitate their transit and activities 7 Approved for Release 2015101129 000496547 C00496547 Approved for Release 2015101129 000496547 Fugitive Warlord Carlos Castano More Than a Mercenary uParamilitary leader Carlos Castaiio Gil appears to be trying to cloak his notorious outlaw persona with some political legitimacy Despite the $-1 million government bounty on his head Castano has recently conducted press interviews to explain the actions ofand possibly to cultivate a legitimate political image for-bis Peasant Self-Defense Group of Cordoba and Uraba ACCU Colombia's largest and most widely feared paramilitary force Castano-who has been described by journalists as a short surprisingly normal-looking 32-year-old- has cleverly manipulated his media image to strike á chord with the average citizen's disgruntlement over the decades-long war claiming that his troops are not ruthless killers but men with principles and fellow victims of the insurgency According to press reports Castano has also tried to maneuver for a role in any peace process maintaining that the paramilitaries have been a stron force throu hout the war and should be involved in its resolution t warlord's strategic paramilitary goal is to control all of northern Colombia Some journalists speculate that Castano's fight against the guerrillas may be motivated at least in part by revenge Nine siblings have been killed in the insurgency and according to press reports he and a now-deceased brother started the ACCU shortly after guerrillas kidnapped and killed their father Castano-who travels with several well-armed bodyguards Ifearing for his wife and oun child he is exploring the possibility of getting his family out of Colombia The Jure of illicit financial gain also plays a role in Castano's paramilitary objectives despite the warlord's public denials He has been involved in various asects of the narcotics trade since the late 198N Pastano's organization currently provides logistic and security support to traffickers in Valle del Cauca Antioquia and Atlantico Departments 'and that ríó tráfficker can o erate within Castand s sphere of influence without his approval 0 Approved for Release 2015101129 000496547 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu