MEMORANDUM WHITE HOUSE 5' via-11111101011 - Novembe'r 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM Henry A Kissinger I SUBJECT NSC Meeting November 6 -- Chile This meeting will consider the question of what strategy we should adopt to deal with an Allende Government in Chile DIMENSIONS or THE PROBLEM The election of Allende as President of Chile poses for no one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere Your decision as to' what to do about it may be the moot historic and difficult foreign effairs decision you will have to make this Year for what happens in Chile over the Inext- six to twelve months will have ramifications that 'will- go far heyond just US- Chilean relations They will have an efte t on what happens in' the rest of Latin America and the developing world on what our future position will be in the hemisphere and on the larger world picture in eluding our rela on e with the USSR They will even affect our Own con- caption of what our role in the world is Allende is a tough dedicated Marxist He comes to power with a profound anti- US bias The Commanist and Socialist portion form the core of the political coalition that 1s his power base Everyone agrees that Allende will seek - to establiSh a socialist Marxist etate in Chile to eliminate US mflnence from Chile end the hemisphere to establish close relations and linkages with the USSR Cuba and other Socialist countries The consolidation of Allende in power in Chile therefore would pose some very serious- threats'tol-our interests Iand position in'the hemisphere 'and would affect developments and 0an relations to- them elsewhere in the world -- US investments totaling some one billion dollars may be lost at least in part Chile may default on debts about $1 5 billion owed the US Government andprivate US banks I DECLASWIE WRELEA 170 ON 9 by 11 on me recommenoatlon of the NSC SECRET under prtvisiuns ntt 12958 mi - - -- Chile would probably become a leader of Opposition to us in the into American system a source of the rupt1on1n the hemisphere and a focal point of support for subversion in the rest of Latin America -- It would become part of the Soviet Socialist world not only philosm phically but in terms of power dynamics and it might constitute a support base and entry point for eXpansion of Soviet and Cuban presence and activity in the region -- The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact even precedent value fora other parts of the wo_ r1d especially in Italy the imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the World balance and 0111 own pos1tion1n it While events in Chile pose these potentially very adverse consequences for us they are taking a form which makes them extremely difficult for us to deal with or offset and which in fact poses some very painful dilemmas for us - a - Allende was elected legally the first Marxist government over to come to power by' free elections He 11 5 1 5 legitimacy in the eyes of Chileans and most of the world there is nothing we can do to deny him that legitimacy or claim he does not have it h We are strongly on record in support of self 'determination and reSpect for free election you are firmly on record for non- -intervention in the internal affairs of this hemisphere and of accepting nations as they 11 e It would therefore be very costly for us to act in ways that appear to violate those principles and Latin Americans and others in the world will View our policy as a' test of the credibility of our rhetoric on the other hand our failure to react to this situation risks being p01 - ceived in Latin America and' 111 Europe as indifference or impotence in the face of clearly adverse developments in a region long considered our Sphere of in uence g Allende's governn mnt is likely to move along lines that will make it very difficult to marshal international or hemisphere censure of him--he is most likely to appear as an independent socialist country rather than a Soviet satellite or Communist government Yet a Titoi st government in Latin America Would be far more dangerous to us than it is in Europe precisely because it can move against our policies and interests more easily and ambiguously and because its model effect can be insidious SECRET SENSITIVE SECRET I SENSITIVE - - 3 -- A Dimensions of the Probilegi continued Allende starts with some significant weaknesses in his position -- There are tensions 'in his supporting coalition -- There is strong'if diffuse resistance in Chilean society to nioying to a Marxist or totalitarian state -- There is suspicion of Allende in the military There are serious economic problems and constraints To meet this situation Allende's immediate game plan is clearly to avoid pressure and coalescing 'of opposition prematurely and to keep his opponents within Chile fragmented so that he can neutralize them one by one as he is able To this-end he will seek to be internationally re spectable 7- move cautiouslyand pragmatically ' - - avoidimmediate confrontations with us and -- move slowly in formalizing relations with Cuba and other Socialist countries There is disagreement among the agencies as to precisely 'how successinl Allende will he in overcoming his problems and weaknesses or how inu evitable it really is that he will follow the course described or that the threats noted will materialize But the weight of the assessments is that Allende and the forces that have come to_power with him do have the skill the means and the capacity to maintain and consolidate themselves in power provided they can play things their way Logic would certainly argue that he will have the motivation to pursue purposefully aims he has after all held for some 25 years - Since he has an admittedly profound anti US and anti-capitalist bias his policies are bound to constitute serious problems for us if he has any degree of ability to implement them 4 - at THE BASIC ISSUE What all of this boils down to is a fundamental dilemma and issue a Do we wait and try to protect our interests in the context of dealing with Allende because welbelieve we cannot do anything about him anyway he may not develop into the threat we fear or may mellow in time -- we do not want to risk turning nationalism against us and damaging our image credibility and position in the world AND thereby risk letting Allende consolidate himself and his ties with Cuba and the USSR so that a year or two from now when he h_as_ established his base he can move more strongly against us and then we really will be unable to do anything about it or reverse the process Allende would in effect use us to gain legitimacy and then turn on us on some economic issue and thereby caste us in the role of Yankee imperialist _ on an is sue of his choice b Do we decide to 'do something toprevent him from consolidating himself n_o _wwhen we know he is weaker than he will ever be and when he obviously fears our pressure and hostility because we can be reasonably sure he is dedicated to opposing us he will be able to consolidate himself and then be able to counter us in increasingly intense ways and -- to the extent he consolidates himself and links to the USSR and Cuba the trend of events and dynamics will be irreversible AND thereby risk -- giving him the nationalistic issue as- a weapon to entrench himself -- damaging our credibility in the eyes of the re st of the world as interventionist -- turning nationalism and latent fear of US domination in the rest of Latin America into violent and intense opposition to us and perhaps failing to prevent his consolidation anyway 5 - G OUR CHOICES There are deep and fundamental differences amongjhe agencies on this basic issue They manifest themselves in essentially three possible approaches l The Modus Vivendi Strategy Thisschool of thought which'is essentially State's position argues that 'we really do not have the capability of preventing Allende from consolidating himself or forcing his failure that the main c0111 se of events in Chile will be determined primarily by the Allende govern ment and its reactions to the internal situation and that the best thing we can do in these circumstances is maintain our relationship andoui presence in Chile so that over the long haul We may be able to foster and in uencing dome stictrends favorable to our interests In this View actions to exert pressure on Allende or to isolate Chile will not only be ineffective but will only accelerate adverse develoPLnents in Chile and limit our capacity to have any in uence on the long- 1 ange trend In this view the risks that Allende will consolidate himself and the longurange consequences therefrom are less dangerous to us than the immediate probable reactiOn to attempts to oppose Allende It's pcr ception of Allende's long-term development is essentially optimistic and bentign- Implicit is the argument that it is not certain he canovor come his internal weaknesses that he may pragmatically limit this Opposition to us and that if he turns into'another Tito that would not be bad since we deal with other governments of this kind anyway -2 The Hostile Approach DOD CIA and some State people on the other hand argue that it is patent that Allende is our enemy t that he will move counter to us just as soon and as strongly as he feels he can ahd that when his hostility - is manifest to us it will be because he has consolidated his power and then it really will he too late to do very much -the process is irreversible - Inthis view therefore we should try to prevent him from consolidating - now when he is at his weakest Implicit in this school of thought is the assumption that we can affei events and that the risks of stirring up criticism to our position else- where are less dangerous to us than the long-term consolidation of a Marxist goirernment in Chile - 6 - Z The II-Iostile Approaclgcontinued Within this approach there are in turn two schools of thought a Overt Hostility Thieviewargues that-we should not delay putting pressure on Allende and therefore should not wait to react to his moves with counter-punches It considers the dangers of making our hosti- lity public or of initiating the fight less important than making unambiguously clear what our position is and where we stand It assumes that Allende does not really-need our hostility to help consolidate himeelf because if he did he would confront us now Instead he appears to fear our hostility This approach therefore Would call-for 1 initiating punitive measures such- as terminating aid or economic embargo 2 making every effort to rally international support of this position and 3 declaring and publicizing our concern and hostility I jg Non-overt Pressure Cold Correct Approach This approach concurs in the view that pres sure should be placed on Allende now and that we should oppose him - But it argues that Iggy we package that pressure and opposition is crucial and may - make the difference between effectiveness and ineffectiveness It argues that an image of the US initiating punitive measures will permit Allende to marshal domestic support and international sympathy on the one hand and make it difficult for 33 to obtain in- ternational cooperation on the other '_It further argues that it is the effect of pressure not the posture of hostility that hurts Allende the latter gives him tactical opportunities to blunt the impact of our opposition Irnplicit in this approach is the judgment that how unambiguous our public position is and making a public record are all less important in the long run than maximizing our'pr'es sure and minimizing risks to our position'in the rest of the world This approach therefore calls for essentially the same range of pros sures as the previous one but would use them Quietly and covertly on the surface our posture would be correct but cold Any public manifestation or statement of hostility would be geared to his actions to avoid giving him the advantage of arguing he is the aggrieved party - 7 D - ASSESSMENTS As noted the basic issue is whether we are to wait and try to adjust or act now to oppose The great weakness in the modes vivendi approach is that it gives'Allende the strategic initiative -- it plays into his game plan and almost insures that he will cons elidate hims elf -- if he does consolidate himself he will have even more freedom to act against us after a period of our acceptance of him than if we had opposed him all along - - there are no apparent reasons or available intelligence to- justify -a benigh or optimistic siew of an Allende regime over the' long term In fact as noted an independent rational socialist state linked to 'Cuba and the USSR can be even more dangerous for our long-term interests than a very radical regime - There is nothing in this strategy that promises to deter or prevent ad- v'ers e anti-U actions when and if Chile Wants to pursue them and there are far more compelling reasons to believe that he will when he feels he is established than that he will not The main question with the hostile approach is whether we gag effectively prevent Allende from consolidating his power There is at least some prospect that we can But the argument can he made that even if we did not succeed -- provided we did not damage ourselves too severely' in the process -- we could hardly be worse off than letting him entrench himself that there is5 in fact some virtue in posturing ourselves in a position of opposition as _a means of at least'containing him and improw ing our chance of inducing others to help us contain him later if we have to - Indoin nothin are reater than the risks we run in tr toido somethin especially since we have exibility in tailoring our efforts to minimize those risks I recommend therefore that'you make a decision that we will oppose Allende as stronglykeep him from con- solidating power taking care to package those efforts in a style that gives us the appearance of reacting to his moves SECRET -3- E THE NSC MEETING Contrary to your usual practice of not making a decision at NSC meetings it is essential that you make it clear where you stand on this issue at today's meeting If all concerned do not understand that you want Allende opposed as strongly as 'we can the result will be a steady drift toward the modus vivendi approach This is primarily- a question of priorities and nuance The emphasis resulting from today s meeting mustbe on Opposing Allende and preventing his consolidating power and not on minimizing risks I recommend that after your opening remarks you call on Dick Helms to give you a briefing on the situation and what we might expect I would then outline the main issues and Options along the above lines latter which you could call on Secretaries Rogers and Laird for their Views and observations YOur Talking Points which are appended are written along the se lines Also included in your book are A State DOD options paper I An analytical summary of that options paper SENSITIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Allende and Chile 'Bring Him Down' 2020-11-03