RICHARD HELHS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE for the NATIONAL 6 t1ouember SECURITY COUNCIL 2970 CHILE 5 November 1970 DCI 'BRIE FING FOR 6 NOVEMB ER NSC MEETING CHILE I Mr President Marxist has Salvador Allende now taken ' the Chilean office as President in that country with virtually no significant opposition to hold him in check and with a cabinet dominated by the Communists and his own even more extreme Socialist Party II Allende ' was a narrow winner in the threeway presidential elections on September 4 when his Popular Unity coalition got him 36 6 p rcent of the vote A The orthodox proMoscow Chile put together chose'Allende as th the organizatiorial Communist Party of the Popular Unity 'coalition candid te ' ' and provided base 'for his election to the Socialist Party This is a Marxist na ionalist party with a strong faction co tted to violent revolution B Allende himself b longs rather than the parliamentary vored by the Moscowline road to power Chilean Communist' fa Party 1 Socialists in fact earlier this year appeared to be ready to jettison Allende The He has been the perennial Marxist candi' date but the extrem left wing of the Socialist Party mistrusts him This feels that he has not been a firm supporter of violent revolutioni but has favored alliances with the Communists victory with a view to parliamentary radical 2 The wing could gain control leftwingerswho of the Socialist Party in coming months feel that Allende under Communist tutelage would move cautiously to turn Chile into a Communist stato In contrast they believe that the current situation is favorable for a massive radical and III that wnen nd'pr'esi dential candidate receives a majority the president will be chosen in a run —off by both houses of Chilean election law provides Congress A The meeting jointly forces which might hav in that Congressional vote opposed Allende on October 24 were not only fragmented leaderless 1 left but were before the Congress met Tomic the candidate of outgo' ng Eduardo Frei's Christian Demo Radomiro president crats recognized Allend on the heels of the popular vote as presidentelect because of his plurality 2 In a special Christian Democratic congress other leftwing Tomic and moderate elements leaders overrode and voted to support Allende 3 Conservative by only 40 000 in the popular vote at'first who to planned make had fight'in the October 9after the a strong runoff But on Christian Democratic not to vote for followers The Allende forces quickly inauguration and asked his him even before t'h e runoff were force ully to ensure his to consolidate control and to caucus decided AllendeAlessandri support moving Jorge trailed Alessandri IV former president ' A Methods terrorist threats make to used effectively to from soothing ranging were his presidency persuasion appear palatableand inevitable 1 exerted major influence His supporters on the information vering their way their authority 2 media either maneu in or simply declaring in the name of the forthcoming regime Allende his close associates contacted many and important economic education would political professional fields Chileans in and such to reassure them that cooperation pay 3 Grassroots up by some support for Allende originally was whipoed 8 000 Popular Unity Committees in factories and neighbornoods popular as as campaign elec ion organized forces for Allende's largely Party will These groups controlled by the Communist apparently b kep in b ing and expanded to provide loc 1 propaganda intelligence control and B October 24 195 of the 200 Qn the full Congress up showed legislators Allende did not vote and four others were 1 Allende got 153 votes74 of the Christian tors Democrats national and 55 in himself ill them from Their 19 sena deputies followed party orders to vote for Allende 2 Alessandri got 35 votes from the National party 3 of the Cohgress abstained V Even before the 'election there had beenspeculation that as a last' resort the Chilean military would not permit a Marxist government to take offic A Seven members Many highranking officers had expressed to Allend and a few had told United States offic' als tha as a Marxist he would not be allowed to become president opposition if B he should win Allende won When his plurality a number of high officersincluding troop commanders and the head of the Air Forcewere casting about for way's means and suoport to preve'nt a'Marxist government 1 This grouo included sem General Vicente Hu™rta of the carabineros been replaced commandant now 2 A number of that Allende To sum up the September expressed optimism be d would has feated in the Con runoff gressional C still them who situation between the election on the inauguration 4 and on November 3 there were some important clem nts in both the military and political establishm nts which that Allende should not be allowed to bring a Narxist regime into office Also present there w s an array of power factors whichif it had been united and totally perceived committed Allende's l As to a plancould assumption the situation of the presid ncy developed faction which controlled Democratic Party an accommodation was d 2 however the the Cnristian terr dned to reach with Allende not consider an ad hoc with the National have prevented and would political alliance Party to stop him for its p rt was committed to support the constitutionallyelected president both by its nonpolitical tradition and through the firm conviction 'The military explicit policy of the Army commander inchief General Rene'r Schneider 3 Those diverse groups of military and political leaders who did wish to prevent 'an Allende presidency at no time acted in concert nor demonstrated the courage to move D This immobilism can be attributed in a cohsid erable degree to the existing climate of public and opinion The Chilean up and'conditioned revolutionary 1 Th for six years to accept language the Communists by the ruling people had been softened and Socialists Christian Chilean not only coming from governm but generated ives permitted the Democrats nt had thems Soviets and the local Parxists'to carry' bn their political action and propaganda acti vities without hindrance 2 As a result the Chileans viewed the coming of Allende with apprehension and unease ' but not with the epugnance and gut concern which could have led to action E Essentially each element in the power structure the political and th militarylooked to the other to provide the leadership re iri Disgust but no leader rgn rsr with the clout to bring it off willing was step forward at the crucial moment the negativ Among the military l of Army commander Schneider to attitude was a blockihg factor whether it stemmred from dedication to the constitution or 'a reported preference for Allende It influenced G neral Carlos Prats who became Army commander when In early stages Schneider was assassinated some officers had considered Prats the best potential leader against Allende Retired Army General Rob rto Viaux who had led an earlier abortive military revolt to improve the position and p requisites of tha military was actively seeking support for a coup attempt F of the senior active o ficers however feared the risks involved in th corns«munication and coordination essential for choosing a leader and ensuring support from th ir fellow officers G Most and troops ' l for action approached the cooperation of troop co mrand'rs in the Santiago a reaconsidered a necessitywas As the deadline not assured became more Divisions evident 8 $3 among leading for example by officers the calls several admirals which Schneider's H paid on Allende assassination but the shock of it unified the militaryry unified against them 'any of a coup to keep Allende from office In addition the assassination provided an excuse for some to take no action likelihood VI Allende announced his cabinet a few days b fore his takeover A Allende himselfand the Communists —— probably prefer for the time being to project a nonradical image would B Let us make no mistake hard —line militant however This is a It reflects cabinet the of the Socialists to assert their radical policy from the start The Commu determinati'on more nists have countered by holding ministries economic and patronage both Allende has by the other members attainment wound up wit1 o th 35 years a cabinet coalition of tne presidency about one third of the country's a highly In satisfying clearly these two parties 'at the expen se of dominated VII Allende's out for the'key successful political with'only vote climaxes career of nearly A to achieve his ends He the political forces of the country The man knows knows inside and how out with the governmental he plans building Chile's 1 familiarity economic structures has a thorough He and to revolutionize in the course of the socialism he claim will solve serious problems is tenacious and singleminded many He but to dissemble his determi nation with a flair for maneuvering a quick wit and an instinct for when to reassure and when to challenge he knows how 2 ' He has also demonstrated xn the p st — that he is adept at remaining in command of a quarreling coalition by playing off rival 'forces against eacn othera balan cing act he will have to rely on to set his own pace for change when the Soci 'alists want to proceed full tilt with the proclam ation of a Harxist Chile while the nists call for a more Commu delib rate construc tion 'of the foundations 'B ' We diate flood of radical revisions to consolid te his do riot expect an constitutional political imm and economic control The consti tution'already gives the president broad powers enlarged by the of executive decreerecently Frei government With the n xt congressional elections set for 1973 he has ample time to obtain the legislation he may need without triggering opposition by hasty and alarming demands C We expect that his first will economic moves be aimed at control of the major mining indus trial financial enterprises siders essential to his plans 1 Thes'e assets combined from the outgoing put his regime h government inh Recent high copp prie s recent U S investment and rits'' will in good financial at the outset production substantial with th foreign exchange res ryes 2 that he con and shape extensive in expand in Cnile are additional d copper bonuses for the new regime although world copper prices have been dropping and there are indications that supply is approaching 'demand 3 He and his concerned hb main economic advisers however 11 ' are about the deterioration D He of the internal economy since his election has described inflation as the most urgent of the problem E moment for socialism will be facilitated by the already preponderant role of the Chilean government in nearly every field of economic His program activity private enterprise system has already been distorted by 30 years of rap'id The inflation and government intervention VIII In the international economic field we expect that Allende at the start at least will'move with caution and with realities capital He considerable regard for the has asserted his and technology interest in foreign as long as the ben are mutual A Understandably 'fore' gn investors will fits b wary of a professedly Ha xist regime and new foreign credits will be harder to come by B Allende and his represents tives have 'reiterated in public and in private their hopes of' retaining Chile's traditional hard currency markets in Western Europe Japan and elsewhere for their copper iron and oth r exports as wall as ' plans for expanding 12 into Communist markets ' 1 C that Fidel Castro has advised Allende to keep Chile's copper sales in hard currency U S private assets in Chile total about one We know half billion dollars of which slightly less than half' consists of Chilean government and a notes issued for nationalization of holdings public bonds and long and shor term loans 1 We estimate the book value of direct U S at 8800 million investment re although be considerably placement would More than half$480 million —is in mining higher and smelting 2 As of September U S 10 current investment investors insurance propriation amounting and standby coverage had A against ex to $293 million fo ano her $355 million for foreign relations many covernments are skeptical of Allend 's aims bu anxious to avoid an appearance of prejudging him As A The pleas he has made so national understanding contradicted far for inter would by the appointm radical Clodomiro Almeyda 1 3— — apoear to be nt of the as Foreign I D Minister 1 is so far to the 'left that Almeyda his admiration nists and for the Chinese Commu the Cubans in the past has to placed him in opposition Moscow B Several Latin American governments in eluding 'in particular Argentina are of the Allende government stability 'inside their l 1' bl QA effect political over the possible deeply concerned 1 d own t' on countries Q p t that in late October Allende promised representatives of revolutionary guer' rilla groups in Latin America that them a caste of support as soon as he is firmly in Chile would becom for d control C There is every indication expect thatwhatever and every Allende may reason to say or in— forces around him will use every opportunity to exacerbate relations with the'' United States 1 The personal emissary Allende sent to tendthe 'our Embassy in San iago said there was 14 AO OfZII S little presid nt could do to curb the constant attacks on the United E As the new States in the Chilean press for' the Soviet Union Moscow is showing caution in dealing with the In turng to th Chilean Socialists vill avoid excessive dependence the Chilean Communists new government want on Moscow for the sake of and their domestic appealvill exercise restraint in promoting closer ties with Russia 1 The USSR extended a credit of $57 million to Chile in 1967 none of which has been used ' Chilean economic problems create the opportunity for to use this for leverage with the will inevitably Moscow new however Marxist government 15 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Allende and Chile 'Bring Him Down' 2020-11-03
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