AII' xIolIA 'hill xl I ' THE XVIIITE HOUSE I'ASIIIX 1 COX MEMORANDUM PARTICIPANTS OF CONVERSATION - NSC'MEETING — CIIILE NSSM 97 The President The Vice President Secretary of State William P Rogers Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird Dix'ector of Emergency Preparedness George A Lincoln Attorney General John N Mitchell General William Westmox'eland Actmg Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helxns Under Secretary of State John N Irwin II Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert A Hurwitch Assi stant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A Kissinger General Alexander M Haig NSC Staff Mr Arnold Nachmanoff NSC Staff Col Richard T Kennedy NSC Staff- PLACE DATE Ik The Cabinet Room 'TIME Friday - November 9 40 a m 6 1970 The President opened the meeting by asking Director Helms to brief - Director Helms read froxn the briefing paper which is attached at Tab A The President interrupted to review what Director Helms said about the makeup of the Allendc Cabinet Scc page 9 Hc wished to emphasize the degree to which the Cabinet ministries were controlled by Marxists Thc President then asked Dr Kissinger to brief 11'I ' All 1th 'lit yt dth tA11 d t g g socialist State As for our rcsponsc to this thc SRG came up with four options But really basically it amounts to two choices 1 seek a xnodus vivendi with thc hllcnde Government or 2 adopt a posture of overt and frank hostility In bctwccn is a third possibiliI y adopt xvhat is in fact a hostile posture but not from an overt stance ' that is to move in hostiliiy from a low-kcy posfure D gIIBIIIIX D htg pAIh Ixdf t L ItxBII p„IAl BY f tytx 2 A modus vivendi has the risk that he will consolidate his position and then move ahead against us A posture of overt hostility gives strength to his appeal of nationalism and may not work anyway As for in between -- thc problem is that he will know we are working against him and he can expose us anyway even though wc maintain a correct and cool posture All of these options have advantages and disadvantages There is no cleaz choice Ro ers Dr Kissinger has spelled it out well There is general agreement that he will move quickly to bring his program into effect and consolidate his position We are also in agreement that it is not necessary to ma'ke a final decision now Secretar Private business and the Latin Axnezican countries believe that vfe have done the right things up to now If we have to be hostile we avant to do it right and brin him down A stance of public hostility would give us trouble in Latin Axnerica We can put an economic squeeze on him He has requested a debt hdl'g — h without being counterproductive t gh tgh'gh'dpl lip hp The Christian Democratic Foreign Minister thinks we are doing the right thing He sees two possibilities that his economic troubles will genera'te significant public dissatisfaction or second that his difficulties will become so great that there will be military moves against him I think the U S xnilitazy should keep in contact with their Chilean colleagues and try to strengthen our position in Chile ' W'e have severe limitations on what we can do A strong public posture will hand Wc must make each decision in the future carefully only strengthen his in a way that harms him most but without too much of a public posture which would only be countex productive Secretar Laird I agree'with Bill Rogers We have to do everything we can to hurt him and bring him down but wc must retain an outward posture that is correct ' We must take hard actions but not publicize them We must increase our military contacts We must put pressure on him economically He is in ' the weakest position now that he will be in we want to prevent his consolidation Moorcr to Ro czs What is the reaction of the Congress Sccrctar Ro crs There is very little but if he consolidates his position thc criticisxn will build up Attitudes arc thcrcforc favorable to our policy I Ivioorer What would be the reaction we have given more aid if he resorts to expropriation ers Wc shouldn't give any more credit guarantees cvcry hing wc can to show hostility without publicizing it Secretar Ro later after We should China and USSR are watching our approach to Argentina we show undue interest before anything happens for example if we sell F-4s to Argentina it could trigger massive support to Chile from the USSR and China We should act principally inside Chile Vlcc President Director Lincoln Copper accounts for 80fq of Chile's exports They are expanding production rapidly Other producers Zambia Australia etc are also going up in production So there could be a price decline in the future with an adverse economic impact in Chile They blame us We have a stockpile If we are adopting a'hostile posture maybe we have to increase the stockpile or alternatively to sell if the market eases in the future The President Now we can do I want something in a week on it Cutting the stockpile would Director Lincoln 'We' ll do this how we can sell from the stockpile hurt Chile and also save on the budgs We' ve been studying this on a priority basis The President This is very important -- will it hurt anyone else and Defense and everyone to study it It could be the most important can do I want State thing we Director Lincoln Th'e law says we can't sell fro'm the stockpile unless we do it to stabilize the price The copper price is down in the world market We' ve already sold 50 million tons before the prices dropped Secrctar Ro crs Can we help others build up their production to help our friends Thc President i We should do this if we can Director Lincoln If' we sell anything too fast it will destabilize the price Most things don't sell fast I M ' tit Th p hi t h q h th d i h tqq« ti i ' i i t Chil p itiiity t d t th ti iy y Th q is how best to influence the internal forces to create the con litions for change He will need to consolidate his position and probably hc will move sloivly for the sake of rcspcctability as hc moves It will bc soon that dissatisfaction it Q ' begins As hc tries to consolidate hc will inevitably have strains If' wc znovc too quickly in opposition to birn we will help him consolidate quickly As ive move to consider specific issues either overt or covert we should be hostile only if we can be sure it wi11 have a significant effect on the internal forces there in a way that will hurt Allendc and prevent his consolidation This may mean we may have to do things we would not want to do -- it depends on the effects on thc internal situation in Chile Craham Maitin would like to see us move along as we have The President It is all a matter of degree If Chile moves as we expect and is able to get away with it -- our public posture is important here -- it gives courage to others who are sitting on the fence in Latin America Let's not think about what the really democratic countries in Latin America say -- the game is in Brazil and Argentina We could have moves under the surface which bring'over time the same thing ' I will never agree with the policy of downgrading the military in Latin America They are power centers subject to our influence The other s the intellectuals ' are not subject to our influence We want to give them some help Brazil and Argentina particularly Build them up with consultation I want Defense to move on this We' ll go for more in the budget if necessary Our main' concern in Chile is the prospect that he can consolidate himself and the picture projected to the world will be his success A publicly correct approach is right Privately we must get the message to Allende and others that we oppose him I want to see more of them Brazil has more people than France or England 'combined If we let the potential leaders in South America think they can move like Chile and have it both ways w'e will be in trouble I want to work on this' and on the military relations -- put in more money Qn the economic side we want give him cold Turkey Make sure that EXIM and the international organizations toughen up If Allende can make it with Russian and Chinese help so be it -- but we donot want it to be with our help either real or apparent We' ll be very cool and very correct but doing those things which will be a real message to Allcnde and others This is not the same as Europe -- with Tito and Ceaucescu -- whore we have to gct along and no change is possible Latin America is not gone and we want to keep it Our Cuban policy must not be changed It costs thc Russians a lot we want it to continue to cost Chile is gone too -- hc isn't going to mellow Don' t have any illusions -- hc won't change If there is any way we can hurt him whethe'i' by government or private business -- I want them to know our policy is negative There should bc»o guarantees Cut back existing guarantees if it's possible N t No impression should bc pcrInittcd in Latin America that they can get away it's safe to go this way All over thc world it's too much thc fashion to kick us around We are not sensitive but our reactions must be coldly proper We cannot fail to show our displeasure We can't put up with 'Give Americans hell but pray they don't go away There must be times when we should and must react not because we want to hurt them but to show we can' t bc kicked around with this that The new Latin politicians ar'e a new breed They use anti-Americanism to get power'and then they try to cozy up Maybe it would be different if they thought we wouldn't be there We must be proper on the surface with Allende but otherwise He is not going to change only self-interest will affect him we wi11 be tough ' This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article Allende and Chile 'Bring Him Down' 2020-11-03