secret noforn-nocontracl-orcon March 1979 Israel Foreign Intelligence and secret This Foreign Intelligenoe and Security Services to rue ts prepared and-published by the lnlelligenoe Agency Directorate of Operations Counterintelliaenee Staff and coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Alem- It is the successor to the National Intelligence Survey Section ESE-Intelligence and and ti be revised and reissued at approximately the same intervals as was the National Survey or as development ma I warrant Intitial dusetnination or additional copies of this publication can be obtained through established channels from the Central lntelliaenoe haeney Warning Notice Intelligence Soure and Methods Involved I National Sororityr Unauthorized Diseloeure Information Subject to Criminal 5a notions Dammit-Etna Cotter-oi no Nm_RuaJhL to Foreign Nationals NDCONTRACT Not Rinaahle to Corn neton or PRDPIN Caution Murat Information Involved LY NFIB Only ORCON Dissemination and Eatraotitnol'lnfotmation Contmled hr Orieinator This Information Has Been Authorised for Helene Foreiln Government Information This Fairlie- ion i available Derivative hr Dml on micro che Review mm from date To get a micro che top of this Derived from WM publication call 111 l'm future issuance in addition to or in lieu ol' hard copies eall 5101 The Foreign Inteiligenee and Security Se ioea survey is Nati tll Intelligence and may nettle relented or shown to of any foreiln lmrl l lt ll or international hotly ell- ll by speci c autimrintioa ol the Director of Central Intelligence in aeoorthnee with the proviaiona of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No l 2 All materiel on this page it Con dential TABLE OF CONTENTS I m of mica 2 Didactics Ind ltl'ldm a Poll cll Israels I Balationshn between the and the cervical chtiomhlp between the when and the pnpuhcc I Malian-l W Security d Morale Ind methnd Hand sum Inuit-me Service 1 Organization 3 Administrative mcticc I Training Funds and I Hal-twin with other services It Lilian with Emiun service 1 Shin- Ind Internal Security Set-win 3 Administrative talcum-I I Ninth-II ol creation I Functiclu _ 2 DrnnizllinI-I-H M pm mac b Naval Intellinencc 3 Administrative practicu if 1 Methods of Operation 5 net-1m with other mica E limb and Political Plan-ht Cutter F The Hilton Police t 6 Rev 1-55 4 SECRET HUI-UN Page H Comments on principal sources 4i 1 Source materials 40 2 Supplementary overt publications 4i FIGURES Page Fig I Soviet Agent Israel Beer Fig 2 Orientation oi Israeli intelligence and Security r Services 19'1 chart 9 Fig 3 Organization oi Mossad 1977 fehrt i 11 Fig Ii Eliahu Ben Shau Uohens transmitter on dimlai r in Damascus 1965 photo 12 Fig 5 Johann Wolfgang Lou illustrates me use oi a transmitter during his trial in Cairo July- ueust 1965 photo 1 13 Fig 6 Organization of Shin Beth 19 chart-20 Fig Organization oi Military Intelligence chart 25 Fig 3 Orientation of Nova nteliigeoee chart 31 Fig 9 Organization of israeli Natimlal Police 19 chart Fig ID Israeli National Police headquarters Jerusalem November 1972 33 Fig li lsraeli Border Guard post under construction at Kefgr Rosenwaid Zarit June 197i 3 SECRET Hem-I1 I Hem His admt Filmach MFI PM 51m SIAH Shin Beth Ve'edat II CIET Tuna H H ul menu Remnant-ill I'll-re 'ei Mt t et Po'n m Hindu malt Famcn rpm Hu epm dune ell-El Hu'ondlm Beard nun Humnh Le rumel diesel Re ned- Hul'm'el Ir m Tm Machine Hee ehr - Mechkhel Medial Ml met Pu'ele Em Tm d m Mad n Iii - Hound Mtufhdim Wm Hula Hakim Pa'eJe Three Bedtime Kumunm Hedazhe Sher-Ht radian 5nd and Hndu l she-mt Hamil-m Sled Sim-Hi Mnd n Shel Mate Auk She-nu Medan me When Kuhn a Tm Va'ndnl eehet Heehem m 11nd mull Putt SECIET EunLllI lei-em all-ninth - Freedan Have-men Gene Fednllim ul Lehr 1n Ital 11nd Meme Fol-eel I ld Labor Fem N- nml Hiliunr Owl-Ilium Hum-ch Din-Hen 11nd Wakeu'hmr United label-l hm Hilitlrr Intellinm Secrei Inn-Hm Eunice LIenlhr cm- Institute for hh h l Ind Spud-l 11min Spa-Iliad Gram Bulk-cue- Incl Pradue m Israel Fulani Lid New Columnist Li Infumletlun Service New and Left Chum Ind Inlet-ml Seeurilr Service Felice Brandi ul Military Intel Navel Mien-nu Ind Service Committee cl lite Hulk oi Seminal rrl uni fin secatr Moron neocoyrnacrroaconr Intelligence and Security A General Israel's principal Intelligence and security authority la the ail-her Hurherutim the Committee of the Heads of Services uently known as Va'adat It etarrdinattn the operations and activities of its mem bers Massed Leto idim Mmachddim the Secret intelli eme Service or Mound name hat the primary responsibility for foreign operatioru and it mherdinate to the Prime Minister Sher-oi Kick 1 0th and internal Security mou- larly known as Shin Beth is responsible for security and it directly mbordinate to the Prime Minister Ana Matti-rt Brilliant Intelligence has the main reap-unai- hility for atratelic military intelligence and commuti cations inteliieence and it under the command of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides support in research and political planning to the lame intellie oer-ice commonity The Ministry of Interior assists the National Police with police toyer aatiore and the maintenance of border security I Background and development of services In 1948 when the British Mandate ended the Jewish popuhtion of Palestine established the State of ltrael Amer-Ia the agenciee' of goyemment to emetic was the intelligence and aecurity unit known as the Information Service Silent Yedioth popular-Iy brown at Shay This organization which war the intelligence arm of the onittr undernound resist- more force the Hannah durinu the years of the British Mandate had begun to enaaee in operation on a worldwide scale with the founding of the Jewish Agency in 1929 at the Zionist in Zurich Switzerland At that time the IeWish AIency war composed of hath Zionists and Zionists a strong tmerican participation The Iewirit Agency which war created to aid and rupture distracted Jew-t and to attrtain the Palestine lewlah community has been effectively under Ziooirt control over the years rt infornu on amusement-Wham Noforn Noon-titted been SECRET which extended its covert operatltau into Water-n Europe and the - United Staten From 1923 to 1948 Shay't ohiectiym were to promote the enablithment of an independent State of Israel infiltrate Mandatory installations in order to apprite Zionist leaderthip of British attitudes and promoted actiona collect political intellieenee that could be used in Zionist propaganda penetrate hrah and anti Zionist factions in Paieotirre and peripheral notions monitor and control all extremist troupe left and right amen Jewish communities in Palestine and abroad provide security for the arms smuggling and illegal immigration programs of the Hannah and finally collect information on Nazi Germany to guarantee the mostly of the Jewish underaround and encape clunnels throughout Europe before durinl and after World War II Shay consisted of the following components Politi- cal lntelliaence Hedinit Countereepin- nose and Internal Security Sherri attention Ktnti Military Intelligence She-rut Muf n Police Branch of Military intelligence Show Muf n Shel More Artzi and Naval Intelligence and Security Shared _Mod n cc Re ection Kohot Ha Torn Them act-vices worked independently on behalf of the different ministries to which they were individually responsible This intelhtrenoc and security community was com petitiye and frequently noted on its own a product of the general postwar chaos which required the accom- plishment of many urgent tasks wherever and whenever they might arise to some of the West European capitals all terrier were represented and competed for the tame aaentt and sources By April l l the Prime Minister and cabinet seriously alarmed by the atmosphere of mutual ioalourry and mistrust prevalent anion the aenricer at the increasing cost of their uncoordinated effort in the field decided to reorganize completely the Italic EECH ET structure of lsrael's intelligence and security commu- nity The dynamic force behind the plan was the late Heuven Shiloab who reorganized the services accord- ing to functions and responsibilities and established a mechanism to coordinate their activities Shit-nah was chairman of this authority the lCommittee of the Heads of Services Va'cdat Rocket Hasherutirn called 1lil'a'adat He integrated the Naval Intelligence and Security Service and the embryonic air intelligence unit into Military Intelligence Aguf Modiin The Political Intelligence Service was made independent of the Ministry of Foreign affairs and reorganized as the Secret Intelligence Service Messed Letcfiridini Hoyouchadim or Messed The Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained Research Division Muchiehet Huck- eiier Shin Beth remained intact except for intemal changes The Special Taslci Division in the Investigav tion Department of the police became a part of the new apparatus Shiloah's reorganization of the intelli- gence and security structure produced an efficient and well-coordinated community The Israeli intelligence and security services re gained this structure relatively unchanged throughout the Arab-Israel 1War in October-November 1956 the Sieray 1War in june 1967 and the Yom Kippur 1War in October 1973 During the early and midslg s however the Israeli Government had considered changes in the structure and duties of the components of the intelligence and security community hospite Shiioah s earlier reorganization much of what hap- pened in the Israeli services at this time depended on the personal relationships between Ben Gurion and the directors and chiefs In earfy 1963 first before his retirement Ben Gurion appointed a committee to review the situation He was concerned that the intelligence and security establishment which by virtue of his serving both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense usually functioned satisfactorily might deteriorate when he left office He also was reported to be dissatisfied with the lack of clarity in the community's chain of command and functions and ordered the committee to define the subordination and tasks of these bodies In I uly 1963 the committee submitted its report to a new Prime Minister the late Levi Eshliol The committee stated that while the functions of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense did not necessarily have to be concentrated in the hands of one person 3 the Prime Minister must know about all the Idlvl e of the national intelligence and security service Ind be given obiective inteiligence evaluations balanced and based on different viewpoints from more tllalsono source To accomplish these aims the mom recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affair Research Division be strengthened so that it would I capable of presenting independent political walla tions both on Middle East isues and other noti ed subiects By upgrading the Research Division the committee believed that a certain balance tartaric h created for security and political evaluations Which were handled almost solely by the Military Intelli- gence Production Department The committee also observed that the existence of Maud which control secret foreign information gathering anets facilitated to some extent the pcuible formulation of am - independent evaluation unit The committee also regarded as a matter of vitafl importance the appointment of a special adviser subordinate only to the Prime Minister He would be a person of caliber who would aid the Prime Minister in heepiig in touch with' and monitoring the activities of the intelligence and security services The committee's principal recommendations were not implemented at the time except for the establishment of the advinr position and the shift of responsibility for Shin Belh from the Minister of Defense to the Prime Minister There was a brief interlude from September to July 1963 when tsser Harel the former Claim of the Va'adat and Director of Mossad served asa special adviser to Prime Minister Eshhol on intelligence and security matters Harel resigned as a result of internal Policy disputes within the community and he was not replamd at the time Following the alleged intelligence failure in the Tom Kippur War the Israeli Government mtablished the agranat Commission in November 1973 to investigate matters relating to the hostilities and the performance of the intelligence and security servim The commission in its Partial Report in April 1974 proposed reactivating and rengthening the post of special adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence and security matters The commission also recom- mended changes in the intelligence and security forces through the establishment of a research and evaluation unit in Messed and the elevation of the Research Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Theobic 'l SECRET this modification was to avoid rel ing exclusively on Military Intelligence for major estimates and assess- mts The commission also ernphasized the need for hotter operational coordination in the field of collec- tlnr't between the services but it opposed the coordina- of their finished intelligence judgments A iu or final commimton report if there ever was case was meet made rtublic From 1W4 to 1976 the recommendations of the Partial Repair of the Agranat Commission were implemented The Prime Minister Reserve General Rel-tavam Zeevi as his intelligence adviser a written that was purely advisory and carried no authority Zoevi assumed this new iob in u ltion to serving as the Prime Minister's adviser on mterterrorism Zeevi was also to be the Prime miner s liaison with the Director of Military Intelligence and was also to keep the Prime Minister alerted to differences of views among the intelligence and security services In Etctoher 1975 however Zeevi ned from this post and was replaced by Brigadier that Yehoshafat Harkabi a former Director of Military Intelligence The Research and Political I'Ianning Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -ame into operation in January 1915 Changes in the Military Intelligence structure were being carried out A new research and evaluation unit for assessing Information was established within Messed New appointees had taken over in most of the intelligence and security components In June 19 the Israeli Government established a Ministerial Committee on Hecurity Affairs 2 Objectives and struettl'e The principal targets oi the Israeli intelligence and urity services are I the Arab states their capabilities and intentions toward Israel their relar 1mm with the USSR and other powers their official untallations and representatives throughout the world their leaders internal and inter-Arab politics morale military preparedness and other order of battle nllection of information on secret US policy or decisions if any concerning Israel collection of intelligence in the US and other developed rims-tries l4 determination of government policy Inward Israel in the USSR and East European nations and the problem oi Jewish emigration from these arr-as 5 close monitoring of anti-Zionist activity EEC RH SECRET throughout the world and ii collection oi political and economic intelligence in othet areas of interest to them such as Africa The Israeli services also make special efforts to counter Arab propaganda and tr neutralise anti-Zionist activity Within recent years the Israelis have devoted much operational activity to combating Arab terrorists which has grown over the years irorn isolated cross-border raids by Palestinian Fedayeen to daring and deadly attacks oiten interna- tional in scope on Israeli personnel and property The Israelis also have undertaken widest-ale covert politi- cal economic and paramilitary action programs diar- ticularly in Africa Authorization for foreign intelligence and internal security organization while not defined by specific charter is in Israeli legislation Paragraph 29 oi the Basic Law states The Government is authorized to carry out on behalf of the State lniaccordanoe with any law any act whose implementation is not lawfully entrusted to any other authority This implies that the government is entrusted with the management of intelligence and state security affairs since no other authority is empowered to act in this sphere by any Either Attempts have been made over the years by officials within the government and the community to have an act passed defining the status oi foreign intelligence and Security organisations and their omntions but nothing has come oi these efforts Internal security1 on the other hand is more clearly defined in law The Defense Emergency Regulations of 1345 established during the British Mandate the Military Lew of 21 June 1955 and the Penal Revision State Security Law of 31 July 1951' the Israeli equivalent of the British Official Secrets Act all are concerned with internal security The Emergency Regulations of 1945 gave the military administration the power to arrest and deport troublesome elements and to designate certain locations as closed areas thus requiring local inhabitants to possess travel permits to transit such places While the regulaticms originally applied to both Jews and Arabs in Palestine they are now used largely to monitor the drab community in Israel Administration of the regulations was transferred from the military to the police in 1966 Internal security organs reportedly increased their agent actiylty to meet this responsibility Israeli laws require more punishment ranging from the death penalty or life imprisonment for treason or 9 SECRET assistance to the enemy to terms of incarceration from three to 15 years for espionaIE contact with ioreian scents aiding and abettinl a crime against state security and unauthorized diseloosre of informa lion by a public servant There is no statute of lisnitations regarding the unauthorised disclosure of ebullient information The central body in Israel's intellilence and security community is the 1ti'a'itdat which has as its primary function the coordination oi all intelligence and security activities at house and abroad The Va'adat consists of the Director of Massed the Director of Military Intellhence the Director cl Shin Beth the rupector General of Police the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign attain the Director of the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministri for Foreign nffairs and the political military intelligence and antiterrorist advisers oi the Prime Minister The Head of the Special Tasha Division in the Investigations Department of the Police also ceusicrta y attends the meetings with or in place of the Inspector General of Police Meetings must be held biweekly but may be held more frequently t these meetings each director usually provides a briefing on the key activities of his service during the preceding two weeks The Director of Mossad chairs Iii'a'adat and in this capacity is directly responsible to the Prime Minister The members of 'v'a'adat are quasi-equal in status and the term mrmune referring to the Director of Massed aschairrnan is designed to denote a concept of preeminence amooa Burials In actuality however the Director of hillitanr Intelligence now overshadows the Director of blitz-sud in power and importance This development resulted from the continuing Israeli reliance on military preparedness for national survival Hound is charged 1with the collection of foreign intelligence and the conduct of covert action programs outside lsrael Shin Beth is responsible for counterintelliaence and internal security it functions as the governmental authority on personnel security matters It is also responsible for the personal safety of the Prime Minilt ' and other high ranking Israeli officials Shin Beth is in charge of physical security for ports airports and key militaryfindustrial installations in lsrael and for Israeli missions and El 1 operations outside lsrael 10 give aid to lsrael operations when needed Shin Beth does not have the poster of arrest tl'tisj function being perlonned by the Special Tasha- Diviaion of the investi ticru Departs-tent of the Police which works in close collaboration with Shin Both in Israel Within the' Administered Territories which are controlled by the Israeli Defence Forces Shin Beth applies to the military to undertake arrests and searches at special component under the inspector Gel'teral of Folios is the Border Guard while mission is that of guarding the ceasefire lines against itrab infiltratim and of detecting and running down Fedayeen terrorists In recent years Border Guard units have been used increasinaly to control and- suppress riots and demonstrations in the West Each area Military intelligence in addition to in remb itv for strategic and tactical intelligence prepares the national intelligence estimates and evaluates all information dealing with the Arabs It also is responsible for developina and protecting communiea- tion codes and ciphers for all the services arid the Ministry for For-ems affairs and for communications intelligence The Research and Political Planning Center whic was fonnerly the Research Division of the Ministry Foreign Affairs analyzes raw intelligence fro if various sources for officials on the policymahintt level Either lsraeli Government oraaniaations that pro-_ vide support to the intelligence and security mmur 11in are the Ministries of Finance tin-'3' Excise Investment and Securities and Tourism the- national airline El Al and the national shipping line 5 Kim Unofficial Zionist organizations based in Isratsr and Jewish communities throughout the world Thete are between LED and 2 000 personnel in Messed of whom almut more officers Shin Beth - about members of whom some 50 hold off - ranli In Military intelliE I-cc there are about personnel oi whom 450 are officers the others bet enlisted personnel and civilian clerics The number officials in the Research and Political Planning Cent of the Ministry for Foreign attain ranges between 'i and 00 The police number about 2 000 and Border Guards around 0 000 Since the financing of the intelliaence and scourit services is a clmely held secret it is very difficult - secs l'l accurate information on the total amounts espelltled for than women The funds remind in the defense budget and has-re to the Prinse thister the Hintster of Defense one or two of their up area-res the Minister of Finance the State and his Defense Services inspectorete Th Coenptroller deals directly with the directors of that year in ArliL The estirnatee of espenaes by the directors who have ertahlshed repritations for honaty and integrity are uerselly acceptable as a starting point for budaet negotiations The of Finance however does require a 10-year protection of expend Iaben The Comptroller holds a series of mentions with the various service director and their Ilffl review their programs in detail Then ions continue throughout Hay and result in a Hateful redefinititm the entire intelligence and it effort and its cost By October the determina- the program analysis completed in May This it then submitted for hioher approval and the planning and Medina cycle i5 upon lauded comm-L molded ill in time to begin Much of the administrative support for the services i handled by the Ministry for Defense Various voles of cover are provided for and funded by the lsraeli Defense Form IDFJ There is close profenional mention between the civilian intelligence and lcurity services and militerv intellilence These Irvices fire all government offices are suhiect to bisection by the State Comptroller's office An Ancient Director-General is in charge of inspecting the defense and secoritir services the Ministrv for fueign Affairs and the police The annual inspection covers bookkeeping financial management and han- dling of administration The Comptroller is required Is see that the services are operating economically ificiently and with irreproachable nrorality Israeli governmental offices and departments are contimrousiv borrowina money personnel equipment and material from one another and salariu are paid by the office to which the individual is assigned An intelligence officer or a Ministry for Foreign Affairs cilieial stati lntl in New York and statehood to the Jewish Agaencir is paid ralar'ir and allowances bv the 5E CIET Agency hut lines neither seniority oer retirement status while in that capacity Eunice aspects a aa-rsreerr oovaarrsresrr silo Till satirical The intelligence and security commu- and their affairs are 1well integrated into more eeneral durations titemlsers If the micro Ifll'ch for illegal immigration and arose-rennin Many of the currentleaderscame uptl'umhtheranhofthe militarvina politics through affiliation with one of the maior poli l parties All of there had some espertenoe in clandestine matters and have been permaly cors- vinood by stern Iuona of the value of good intelligence and security The intelliuenee and security services recite excellent support from the Ministry for Forth Affairs Many senior diplomats are former intelligence officers and therefore conversant with intelligence problems and operations 1With their esperie'I'tc-f observations and manifold talents they serve as valuable ausiliaries to their covert colleagues when diplomatic cover is dilieently nrstained by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Furthermore almost every ls eli diplomat abroad has good language and area knowledge or some specieliaatirer which enables him to pursue a much broader social life with its resultant contacts than is thecase in foreign services In many instances emhasy officers including chiefs of diplomatic missions Irene former citizens of the criuntries to which they are accredited Information developed by Israeli diplornats is made available to the intelligence and security conimunity for immediate ice of operational intelligence or inclusion in archives As a final boon to covert intelligence personnel the vigor and variety of a normal lsraeli diplosnat's life outside his installation uasiralli r renders detection of intelligence officers by the host country eatrensely difficult The same kind of effective support regarding operations is given by the Ministry of Defense and the Jewish Am The Israeli intelligence and security services play an important role througtmut the eovernment and private 11 SECRET sector Many leaders in both the civil service and industry have at some time in their careers been directly or indirectly involved with the intelligence community Service assignments are not regarded as the end of a career as persons with intelligence and security backgrounds frequently are selecled for other tabs in the government Thus the services are supplemented by persons who know and continue to relate their minions to intelligence and security responsibilities in senior posts in both the public and private sectors Officially the services are nonpolitical and members of the community are not encouraged to enroll in any party or engage in political activity The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of Knesset is - normally the government's point of discussion or the review and resolution of sensitive policies and activities The Director of Massed and the Director of Shin Bath are often present at sessions which are of concern to them Tween rite senvtcas also 11 mueszhe current state of relations between the services and the populace is good as a result of the present oration of the service as protectors ot' the Israeli state and people in the forefront of the struggle against drab terrorists and military forces Most Israelis are acutely aware of this situation and therefore support the services and their operations The historical dmlopment oi Israel and the Long oontlnuitla struggle milist the Arabs have contributed to this harmonious atmosphere At times in the past as a result of political rivalries and disagreements on the kind ct order that was to prevail in IsraeL there have been occasional verbal and jourml'e e attacks against the services as instruments of a police state In several imtanccs service representatives had to appear in closed court sessions to defend the intelligence and security community against accusations of kidnaooirla brutality and illegality Although debates in the Knesset occasionally have re ected probably illegal practices or procedures by the services the intelligence and security col nmu- nity is completely loyal and if the government requested the execution of a certain task legal and illegal it world be accomplished Confidence in the intelligence and security commu- nity also received a boost after the Sis-Day War in I967 The part played by Military Belh and the police in contributing to the Victory IM controlling the newly-occupied Arab areas talc-n 5 Israel was followed by a plethora of praise in all l leli media The air called intelligence failure in the Tm Kiopur War in 1W3 however weaiened mm I trust in the services The subsequent worlt of uh Agranat Commision undertaken to evaluate the community and its shortcomings and to imm I cooperation among its members contributed to - partial renewal oi public confidence The continuing battle by the services against terrorism has also Imps Israelis loyal to the community The Entehbe raid in July 1976 which resulted in the rescue of hijacked Israeli hostages was one action in recent years which - fired the public imagination and served as an example of -a well-coordinated and well-oaecuted Israeli opera tion This raid and its success buoyed up the moral of the Israelis as nothing else has in' recent years and certainly showed the intelligence and Security coming I nity in a good light 4 Professional standards a lN'reonn'r-wThe directors and sonior staff mem- bers of the intelligence and security community 2 conform to the hittl'test professional standards of integrity and honesty and impose these standards on the lower echelons There is relatively little difference between the basic salary of a new employee and the staff member who enjoys a top position The '5 insignificant disparity has resulted in the granting of compensatory amenities and privileges suchas expense accounts purchasing of foreign goods that enter the country through devious tar-free channels and pro- telrtsie a magic word in Israel which means that one can get itEms housing or privileges at low cost through influential governmental connections This is common practice throughout the govemment establishment however Because the intelligence and security scr vices especially Shin Beth maintain a very tight cover within their own community information on person- nel budgets and accounts is closely held by a few top people in the government and not subjected to widespread bureaucratic poem and control The - higher echelons scrutinize the expenditure of funds by I the lower ranlrs and - if financial dishonesty is discovered the etultv individual'receivcs very severe treatment sscasr b intelligence and security services are among the best in the world Their espert personnel and sophisticated techniques have made them highly effective and they have demonstrated outstanding ability to organize scream and evaluate information Obtained from recruited agents Jewish communities and other sources throughout the world Israelis intelligence capabilities give it a significant ldvantage over the Arab states an advantage which was an important factor in the 1967 war These members of the intelligence and security community who were identified with the Information Service and other components of the Haganah before and during World War 11 develorred a high standard of efficiency and level of competence The organiza- tions succeeded in recruiting a core of capable and highly-educated individuals from Europe and the Middle East whose equal has been difficult to find let alone attract since the founding of the state The corps of the old guard for erranrple is fluent in four or live languages an accomplishment which alone raises their general average of efficiency The younger generation has been given intensive training including study abroad to assist them in gaining these qualifica trons It is not uncommon for students to engage in clandestine operations while pursuing their course of studies - Israeli signal intelligence successes against the Arabs in the past were of such high order that the tsraelis had less need than at present for good agent operations against the enemy Part of this success was due to poor Arab communications security The Israelis now face me problems since Arab communications security is grudually improving The Tom Kippur War intelli- pence failure is an example of inadequacies in their communications intelligence capability at that time in recent years as well there also have bBen indications that lsraeli intelligence on the Arabs other than mmunicatiorrs intelligence has been somewhat tnldequate in quality and their agent operations Inciting in success One of the principal weaknesses of Israelis intelli- gcnce and security system appears to he that the production of most finished intellioenoe and the preparation of national estimates is dime by Military Intelligence rather than by an independent service Inherent in such an organizational arrangement is the SECRET srcari danger that the armed scrvices will not be objective in observing and reporting foreign developments and in making national intelligence estimates-ma major prob- lem in the Yom Kippur War and their vested interest in military operations will influence intelligence assessments The Agranat Commission has recognized this problem and recommended changes c SeountrruThe physical security of the civilian and military intelligence and security headquarters in Tel Aviv is reported to be excellent Two Services Mossad and Military Intelligence were formerly located within a general army compound in the heart of the city The buildings were protected by high wire frame and military guards Military Intelligence remains in this location but Mosmd now Occupier a wing of a multistory commercial office butlding across the street from the compound Shin Beth which was formerly locan in a building in Jaffa occupied new quarters just north of Tel Aviv in June 1970 This new building which was designed for their use is fenced in and contains a technical laboratory as well as regular officea Guards control the entrance and badges baaring a photograph of the employee are worn within the compound There is an elaborate protected government guest house for the training and accommodation of visiting foreign intelligence officers foreign dignitaries and Sensitive agents There are a little over 1 000 persons working as staff officers for Mossad and Shin Beth all of whom have been given a long thorough scourity check If there is the slightest doubt raised against an individual the application is rejected Personnel with leftist back grounds generally are not trusted by leading members of the intelligence and security services This attitude did not always apply to former members of European Communist parties some of whom were eminently qualified for clandestine service especially if they had renounced their Communist ideology and affiliated with the Israeli Labor Party This exemption how- ever has not applied since the exposure of several high level espionage cases in governmental and political circles in the late 195% and early 1950 s The cases of Aharon Cohen a MAPAM party expert on the Middle East and l'srael Beer Figure a Defense Ministry contract employee and IDF Reserve lieutenv ant colonel who mind for the USSR and Dr Hurt 13 SECRET Figure l 5oyilt Agent Israel Ills a tientile professor of physics at Hall Tet'hnion who Wurh l for the Czech Service caused Shin Beth to reconsider its own security procedures while stimulating considerable doubt about the reliability of recanted Marxists The services have devised internal security systems to expose ideological wealtlings by more thorough periodic security checlts The Israelis believe such individuals constitute a possible lone-term security threat Israeli citizens are sublected to stringent registration requirements and must carry identification papers Within the intelligence and security community great pains are taken not to reveal the identities of permnnel even to the average Israeli employed in the government at large Compartmenta- tion is strictly maintaintd between services with only designated individuals usually members of the hard- core crossing lines Intelligence and security periton nel widely use and frit'iztuenllir chance pseudonyms The national practice of Hob lcizing European or Yiddish birth mute-s also matte the identification at some Israelis difficult Visiting foreign officials and agents never use the same car twice when rnectina l4 clarldes tinely with Israeli of cers within the country Certain unlisted official and person telephone numbers are only to relatively few people This type of professional demeanor at home provides excellent daily traininl tor intelliienoe and security personnel before receiving foreign assignments Classified information may not he discussed user the telephone Despite their telltively hiih standards of security however Israeli officials reportedly are occasionally careless in observing this restriction They also have an old boy network much tilt the British Israelis in the network are willing to discus classified subjects whether or not there is a teed to know The Israelis also have problems dealinl with tn'crscas Jewry whose support they need hut whose security is questionable because at the possibility of divided loyalty Installations and storage control-ups must conform to rigorous security standards institution terms Too Secret Secret Con dential and Hert cted compul- ble to For flicial Use irty are tired Top Secret and Secret documents are transmitted by courier only in double envelopes and two receipts are required one for the pachale and one tor the contents The-re documents are hugged in and out by date document number title or suhiect and the office amput- responsibility for them At tell three periodic inventories are held each year It registry Brads-cu a computer printout four times a year listing all Torr Secret material for which each unit is mettle Electrical communication is handled entirely by teleprt'nter and oth mirt'imunioation security deities a record is made of documents to be destroyed antl- security officers must witness the destruction of all Top Secret and Secret material All rersonncl reouirinl a clearance Ill t couplets a personal history statement and undergo I routine investigation For higher clearances the inv tiaatiom could include the applicant's entire lamily and I lull field investigation New immiarants from the USSR and East European countries are normally denied access to classified information for a minimums of tour or five years This ruling is not always ponible to enforce becauso of protehtsia Within the IDF security risks are reported to Shin Beth and are closer supervised by the unit security office-n who is required to make periodic reports on the individual's activities To stimulate and evaluate the security consciousness of 5E Clt 'l' llu' cadre Field personnel ulate mm the troops and attempt to elicit militarv mlormation cl Morrow mo prams-unlit umons Moesad Shin Beth are omnponents of the Israeli civil prairie structure and applicants trunk in I civil mvioe examination Those in their twenties with a university desree are preterred althoudt other indivi- duals who have eapeeiallr desirable qualification are mooted The intelligence and security servioea in dun-ct oornpetition with the Ministrur for Foreim attains and the rapidlyr earumdina business commun- in are at a disadvantaate Moat noun Israelis do not hr the anonymity oi the secret service and prefer the remunerative scales of the hudneu world Intelligenoe and securitr meet who do not or annut to the circumscribed limited m uritv restrictions and operational eoatsideratiorll are nther dropped or if their actions should mrdiae tltt' service- or the ante are soverely punished To boost the morale of staff intellis m officers the services in the early sought and secured from the Knesset a 30 percent annual Ilnr their personnel to compensate for the risks and the anonrmitr invohved Figure B Mound Secret Intelligence Senioe' l Ftsnetiona Housed la rumble for ole n intelligence collec- tion political action and emanterterrnrimr In ful ll out its mission to collect puttive intellhenoe the principal function at Hated it to conduct agent attentions entrust the Arab nations and thelr ditch representatives and tnstallathna the Itlrtio-Irlarhnr in Western Europe and the United States where the national intueets of the traits in the Near East oon iet with Israeli utter-Ht hlolsatl outlook information on the dim-idea mule armaments uteuuld heealledimoao oniatheeamdmher round oi Milli and all information that illuminates out internal polities and relationship amen the nine-ind Arab leaders and the diplomatie Idli itr of all enuntrles in the Arab win-Id Hand m-wm-1 mm Mammal-teemi- 'mnmm-1 I Marl-or We I methi hintin- I I Cilia l hunch-Deni lithe-r Bile-vet I PM Claim Hill ml are m sis-are Hayes-pa n-uqc-u- I lip-Hid Division erratum ll'll'l' as mm Figure 2 Grannies-titan oi Israeli Intaliganee mo Security Sat-vines - 15 SECRET monitor that commercial activiti' p'rtieularly in the field at arms purchases in the West and attempts to Merlot Arab recruitirl of military economic and desiteisto recrt l these meets or tailina that either to dissuade them from aidiru the Arabs or to dormer their precise function Hostad also is chatted with Inciting disturbances calculated to create mutual distrust anyone the Arabs and to draw Western sympathy away from the Arab cause and monitoring and counteracting Anti womanda and detecting and countering Arab terrorism to the area of counterter- rorisrn at times the Israelis have carried the light to Arab terrorists by taking executive action against them especially in parts of the Near Fan and Western Europe In particular the fact that Lebanon has a mixed Christian Drone and Mosletn population has made tl-att country attractive for intelliaence projects The Israelis have covert assets and run operations in their northern neighbor In the past they have mounted paramilitary and action operations against Palestinian terrorist leaders personnel and installations in Lebanon They hate also provided support to Christian riahlists in the Lebanese civil war In addition to running operations aa ainst the Arabs Moe-sad collects political economic and scientific intelligence in both the Eastern and Western worlds for the protection of the State at Israel Zionism and Jews aenerally Their collection efforts are especially comentratcd in the Soviet Union and the United States as well as at the United Nations where policy decisions could have reDErClt ions on lsraei and Zionist seals Intelligence Ohiectives in the USSR and East Europe consist of determining governinental policy toward Israel and the problem at Jewish emigration recruit- ing persons strategically located in Soviet and East European bureaucracies who motivated either by conviction or corruption are 1Willing to assist Zionist action in those countries and ascertaining the degree and quality oi assistance made available in Near Eastern groups whether in steel or the Arab nations by Soviet and East European Governments Obie-dives in Western countries are equally impor- tant to the Israeli intelligence scryioe Hossad collects intelligence regarding Western Vatican and UN policies toward the Near East promotes arms deals lot 16 the benefit of the IDF and acquires data for use i silencing anti Israel factions in the West 2 Org- l'I tuition Motsad has eight departments Operationa- Plannina and Coordination Collection Politics - Action and Liaison t4 Manpower Finance Logistics and Security Training t5 Research - Technical Operations and Technoloar Figure I The Operational Planning and Coordination De- partment is concerned with the management of Mossad resources and responsible lor interdirectorate operational and administrative coordination within the organisation and interseryice liaison within the Israeli intelligence and security community This department also deals with requirements and the development of overall collection plans The Gollection Department 'a responsible tor foreign covert operations and the processing and- productlon of reportini from clandestine sources Th' component is the largest unit in Mos-sad department has offices abroad under Israeli diplo-i rustic and nonofficial cover and is active mainly i Europe where it concentrates on Arab targets throng - third-country operations The Political Action and Liaison Directorate is i charge of political action and relations with friendly- foreign services This component also maintain - eontact with those nations and political groups wit whom Israel does not have normal diplomatic relatlo - that is hfrican countries Lebanon andf'or Christian rightist factions and Indonesia There is also a Warfare or Speciai Operations Division probably in the Political scn - and Liaison Directorate which runs highly sensitive mveri action operations against oral terrorists and eat-1 Nazis and sabotage paramilitary and warfare projeCts such as character assassination an black propaganda in the absence of the Director of Messad the Director of the Operational Planning and Ioordinau tion Department now becomes acting Director whereas in past years the Director of the Psollectioll Department acted for the Director of Mossad With the driye for greater and improved coordination within the intelligence and security community the SECRET SEER ET I I I I I lilirlclor Dill-clot Dire-tit Director Fellini lath-n Dina-tor Collection Uni training no Logistics Phil UH Liaison at-rd Sena-it tea- int HG lit-Eurasia a Training Strait seats suit rut-ow caption m Mao-e logic-ant liatri Cam-liar Carat-altar larval b19211 Figure 3 Organisation ol Messed Director of the Dperatiotnl Planninil Ind Coordina- tlurl Department has apparently taken precedence over the Director of the Collection Department In headouarters the department directors direct the area functional administrative and financial oitrollers The area departments under- the oontrni oi Jolleclion and Special Political Action and Liaison 'h tlariments itre ll CenHaI America South tum-nos Eastern Europe including the USSR tI-ica Asia and Oceania the Mediterranean Ilttl Near East arm Europe and North tum rice Under each controller there are branches or dr-slts which are responsible for one or more countries Positive intelligence and counterintelligence reports or sent back to Mossad headquarters in Tel Ayiv ryaiuated by the Research Department and dissemi- to various government offices Intelligence CRET reports on the Arabs are Iorwacded by Hand to the Research Department of the while counteresnio- naae reports are sent tl'tt'ol h Massed to Shin Beth where they are given special processing by counterin- telliacnce investigative departments Mosad controls Israeli foreign intelligence activities except for operations launched from Israel against military objectives in peripheral areas of surrounding Arab countries which are under the jurisdiction ol Hoorad operations abroad all into two principal categories those in the Near East as a first line of dclense and those elsewhere The Israelis have desianated Egypt as the main target area for establishing intelligence networks In 197i the Israelis estimated that about 50 percent of thEir operational effort was directed against Egypt The nest priority is Syria Much at this activity against the Arabs in the Near East is based on deep cover operations by lsraeii 17 ET illegals or the recruitment of Arabs in third countries followed by their dispatch or normal rotation haelt Home to an Arab area Two good examples of Israeli teen cover illegal operations are the Cohen and Lots ass Eliahu Ben Shaul Cohen was an Egyptian-born Jew who was involved in small sabolaae operations asainst American and British installations in annt in Iii-52 Cohen mocceded in escapism detection when most members of the ring were arrested by the Egyptians and went to Israel Eventually Mossad recruited Cohen for an illegal operation designed to develop intelligence networlrs and acquire political and mili- tary information in Syria He received intensive training adopted the identity of the late Kamil Amin Thahet a Syrian-horn merchant and emigrated to Argentina where he became an active member of the Arab emigre community Cohen eventually went to Syria where he was assisted by two Arabs who had previously been recruited by the Israelis From th'iI until 1955 Cohen was active as an illegal in Damascus where he mcceeded in makinc numerous corttaets with political and military personalities in the Syrian establishment He made occasional trips to Europe and Israel for extensive debriefing Eventually in January 1965 the Syrians did detect and locate Cdten while he was in the act of transmitting information to Tel Aviv One cause of his downfall was that he was using hand morae radio equipment and had been on the air for an hour when he was caught Figure A Syrian court tried Cohen and found him aruilty of espionage He was publicly hamed in Damascus in May 1965 Johann Wolfgang Lots also itnorwn as Zoev Gut Ariehl was an oIIicer in Military lntellicencE In 1959 during a Va'adat meetina Mossad announced its need for a man to be a new illegal resident agent in li'i'airo under cover as a former Nari officer Lot accepted the assianment which was directed primarily special weapons activity by Gennan scientists in Egypt He received intensive training in Israel1 including equestrian instruction and in early 19m he went to Germany and surfaced as an East German refuses and former African Corps officer Although Lots had a wife in Israel he eventually married a German woman to develop his legend In 1961 he went to Cairo where he opened a riding academy Through his activities Lot made a variety of contacts in the German community in the Egyptian capital and 18 as Home I Eiohu hon Shoal ColIen's on display in Dom in time made the acquaintance of a number of prominent and Egyptians He made a number of trips from Egypt to Western Europe for debriefings Finally in 1964 Lots breast to mail threatening letters to selected German experts in anut In February 1965 he was arrested by the Egyptians who tried anrl imprisoned him Eventually he was released and returned to Israel in 1963 The lsl'aelis have stated that the operation cost them a - - 5250 They have also admitted that errors by Lots in handlinc his communications and his use in erecutive action operations may have led to his downfall During his captivity Lots was also forced to reveal the whole operation Figure Mossad stations outside of the Arab areas in the Near East are generally under diplomatic cover within the embassies and consulates of israel There arr- stations in the United States most of the Europea eanitalS Turkey Iran and strategic centers in Latin America Africa and the Far East Operations ra t'rorm formal liaison exchanges with host servi -- through unilateral protects to special executive actio directed against Arab terrorists There are also smalle stations which run mostly unilateral oDErations a I handle local liaison on such matters as Arab terrorists - The Collection Directorate and the Political Acti i and Liaison Directorate are separate comraments - seeker figure 5 Johann Lot ilntrotar the u oi during his trial in Cain July-Aunt I955 Klimt and are carefully compartmenlecl at head- quarters Collection MEI Pdil'i Adlai and Liaison trialnlli separate Ill- 3 outside in larger stations There are thus either two Messed cations or two ccmpartmentetl components in ench union in some counties one or unilateral clandes- nm collection and one for liaison For example at present in Park the Israelis have an Embassy umuIate-G lerai and Minisu'v of Defense Minion mnbassy cover Home has a Collection Directorate rcaional controller and a Political ction and Liaison Directorate reaional controller in the l- u nch capital which has more or less over the years u-mainetl the fulcrum of Israeli intelligence ac'tiil'itgtr on tlit' of Europe In Switaerland the Israelis have an Emblem r in Bern a Stimulate-General in Zurich which provide mer for Collection Department officers involved in unilateral operations Thence laraell diplomatic installa- m-ui also maintain close relations with the Swiss on a SECRET local level in regard to overt fimctiona such as physio-l accuritir for Israeli official and commercial malla- tiona in the continlriIr and the protection oi staff numb-imam collaboration between the Israelis and on scienti c and technical matters pertainina to intelli- lcnce and recur-iti- operatimn Sarita official have made frequent trips to Israel There it aounttnual flow of to and through Switzerland These Vinita however are natal arranged through the Political Action and Liaison controller at the Eminent in Paris tiil octliI with the Soil and not that the officials in the Israeli Earthen-r in Bern althotuh the latter are kept informed of cial or aernioffictal Taraeli titatallatim There have been mntacta however between Political Action and Liaison Directorate ol cialsof mailed the Spanish there haveth contact in Madridantl Therein a pouibilitr that Mound may alaohavea Collection Wt mum in Spain In January 1913 Baruch Asher Cohen a Hand officer was rated in Madrid in Araha hcchalla Headqoarten directs the effort from Israel and employ Mound officers and agent on medal temporary duty In julv 1973 In and lunatic-I'm waldo I waa involved inthe murderdahlm hrahin Lilleharnmer Norway Norweatanauthort ea captured tried and inter-trotted at at the m the reet caped It hmamecharin themraed thetrial thallium-ind who recruited for the mission didmuchot itaprepcratanr work in Paris and entered him on a installment the elimination of Arab terrul'llta ll the murder two of the squad much retina with an Israeli Embassy security affirm-r The Wan dBCIareti the officer personna Mn Irate although he intnloarcl'ithnr was not privy to the operation 3 Administrative uracil-H The Israeli Prime Minister appOintl the Director of Mossad The Prime Minister dos not med the approval of the cabinet or the Knesset for this appointment l9 SECRET Chiefs of station and their staffs are Mossad career officers but they function abroad on behalf of all the intelligence and security services If a member of Shin Beth or the IDF is considered the most qualified individual in the community to do a particular foreign job he still below to his parent organization but he is aslgned to and subject to the control of Mossad as long as he remains outside the borders of Israel This rule does not apply however to military attaches an'ny air navy who remain subordinate to the Director of Military Intelligence Mound does not have a logical career progression- program The organization promotes case officers who have been successful in the field to top managerial iobs The results of this arrangement are mixed as some of the successful operators are often not necessarily the best managers or administrators a Mined training cycle encom- paaes a Basic perations course for recruits and lower ranking personnel and Donations cmrse and a Fig-dd Operations course All new officer candidates are required to take the four month Basic ODErations course before actually enteritis on duty The entire training cycle taltes almost two years and is generally given to classes of 12 Most of the training taltes Place in the Tel rtviv area The instructors in these Mossad courses are teachers on permanent assignment intelli- gence officers on temporary tours of duty and headquarters personnel including the Director of Massed and department directors who give occasional lectures on their specialties The three services run a ioint advanced school in Jerusalem that client specialised courses of tire to three months duration on world political affairs Israel's political and economic objectives new techni- cal operational aids and the latest information on foreign intellieence services all officers who are midway in their careers are required to attend this advanced school upon their return from a foreign assignment His many as all to 50 students arc reprint-ti to have been enrolled in a single running of this course The faculty is 51111 le of representatives of the three services and is directly subordinate to the Director of Mossad The Prime Minister or some other high official has addressed graduating classes Some younger Messed officers who may be weak in certain fields of higher education or language-'5 are 20 sent to univerSilies abroad wlir rc- their Wrsuil of un advanced degree simultaneously serves as rover for their extracurricular operational activities One of the established goals of the intelligence and securits I services is that each office be fluent in Arabic it nine-month intensive i'trabic language course is given - annually in the Tel Aviv area to students from each service The Ministry of Foreign hffairs also sends two or three officials to each course Messed officers who - are going into Arab operations take the sonic arable language training as Shin Beth officers As further training the-ac Messed officers worlt in the Adminis- tered Territories for two years to sharpen their language skills before being posted abroad During this period they usually serve in the Sinai and often run Bedouin agents into Egypt in conjunction with Military Intelligence All Messed officers are trained in the use of small 5 arms and required to fire them at regular intervals b Fuses also saunas The Director of Messed is a civil service Glam 1 officer He receives generous expense and entertainment allowances There are - reported to be several Class 2 and Class 3 officers in Massed as well The take home pay of a j ranking Mossad officer after taxes but including bonuses and cost-of-living and family allowances is about IDLING per month They also receive expense and entertainment allowances and are pro- vided with a car and gasoline allowance as well Higher academic decrees place intellieeme officers in a higher pay bracket thus a directorate director with an advanced degree maltes the same as the Director A - middle-ranking officer with allowances for a large 3' number of dependents would receive more than his seniors In general higher grade civil service salaries are roughly comparable to those of higher-ranking military officers The rather insignificant differential between grades is compensated by fairly impressive perquisites especially in the senior ranlrs Officers abroad are Rift en generous cost-of-living allowances - that conform to the allotments if the regular Foreign Affairs officers For rover these are paid by the Foreign Affairs Ministry if however an intelli- I genre officer needs a larger apartment or httusc for - representation omraliouol punt-tors or family rc-' quircrnenls his service quietly pays the difference ificers and their families Usually travel tourist class on Israeli carriers whenever possible but the absence of SECRET dad- II- an - firm rule permits them to travel on any air or unmet-rip line at their discretion Clerical employees aural tourist Ell Each station abroad is granted funds for operational and entertainment expenses ttesponsible individuals do not entertain any more than is necessary but when they do it is done lavishly Efforts to extend hospitality unstintingly are made at headquarters in Israel when favored attents or ranking foreign inteltir pence officers are guests 4 Methods of operation Mossad over the years has enioyed some rapport with highly-placed persons and government offices in every country of importance to Israel 1Within Jewish communities in almost everr of the world there are Zionists and other sympathizers who render strong support to the Israeli intelligence effort Such mntarits are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information deception material propaganda and other purposes Mossad directs clandestine operations throughout Europe including the USSR and East European countries North and South America the Near East Africa and the Far East including South Fast Massed activities are generally conducted through Israeli official and semiofficial establishments cover enterprises in the form of firms and uraanizations some esttiolliall'ir created for or adapt- able to a specific objective and penetrations effected nilhin noninonist national and international jewish organizations The function of intelligence officers under cover of diplomatic establishments is to arrange information exchanges with officials of local services manage urrmiunications serve as accommodation addresses funding channels and direct agents toward targets -1 interest t'Jfficial organizations used for cover are I--r n-li Purchasing Missions and Israeli Government tourist El Al and Elm offices Israeli construction Innis industrial mumps and international trade organi- s-ilions also provide nonofficial cover Individuals I Iltll'l under deep or illegal cover are normally nith penetrating riblf t tiyos that require a i- I it' sauce more subtle approach or with activities in 'Ilitt'll the Israeli Government can never admit Kinny Israelis hawt-umc from Aral countries where ll r-t stern and educated and appear more Arab SECRET than Israeli in speech demeanor and attitude 5 forging pastports and identit'iI documents of Arab and western countries and providing sound hackswimtl legends and cover Most-ad has mess-fully sent into Enrol and other drab countries Israelis disgui d and documented as Arabs or citizens of European W ntrl There are numerous persons in Israel who have a thorough area and language knowledge of any area of interest to the intelligence services These area exports can render estret'nety valuable assistance in analyzing intelligence information and formulating country requirements thus contribution to the total ope-ra- tional potential since they enable Israeli inteltiaence officers to estimate rapidly the efficiency and reliability of their agents and informants Tl'Ie-se persons are also useful for their ability to m' for a citizen of the nation in Question The Israeli talent for counterfeiting tor foretoa passports and documents ably supports the agent's authenticity The Israeli intelligence service depends heavily on the various Jewish communities and organizations abroad for recruiting agents and eliciting general information The aggl'esslvely ideological nature of Zionism which emphasises that all lows belong to Israel and must return to Israel had had its drawbacks in enlisting support for intelligence operations hows ever since there is considerable opposition to Zionism among Jews throughout the world Aware of this fact Israeli intelligence representatives usually operate discreetlr within Jewish communities and are under instructions to handle their missions with utmost tact to avoid embarrassment to Israel They also attempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition Despite such precautions the Israelis frequently experience setbacks and there have been several cases where attempted recruitrnents of Ameri- cans of the Jewish faith have been reiected and reported to US authorities lsrael s program for accelerating its techrtolilitlt'al scientific and military development as rapidlr as possible has been enhanced by exploiting scientific exchange programs Mossad plars a hey role in this endeavor to addition to the large-scale acquisition oi published scientific papers and technical journals from all over the world through overt channels the Israelis devote a considerable portion of their covert otK'r to obtaining scientific and technical intelligence 21 EECRET This had included attempts tn penetrate certain classified defense projects in the United States and other Western nations The United Nations is a maior target for Messed penetrath because it is a maior scatter of internar tional exchanges in all fields and because of its importance in settling disputes between Israel and the i'trab states Israeli agents operate at the UH under diplomatic and ioumalistic cover Mossad recruitment training and control of agents varies widely depending upon the target area of operation and the desk in headquarters While there is a certain amount of standardization in the handling of operations Israeli intelligence officers appear to have considerable freedom in running operations There is no hard rule requiring specific headquarters approval prior to the recruitment of an agent except in the case of lEommunist countries Name traces are requested of headquarters voluminous files but this is not a consistent routine Contemplated operations against the USSR and the East European countries however are approached very cautiously and entail a great deal of baduuarters planning and control and a special branch composed of area experts is responsible for authorizing and directing this activity Mossad is especially interested in early warning regarding such developments as the dispatch of Soviet military units from the USSR to the Near East There also elists within or affiliated with Massed a small unit whose sole objective is to remind the Soviets through propaganda and contacts about the Jewish question at any point throughout the world All sorts of people even Cyrus Eaton have hem stimulated to raise the subject Israeli efforts must at times be effective because the Soviets often attack the Israeli service in their propaganda with detailed revelations of Israeli plots against allegedly innocent Soviet citizens The Israelis select their agents almost exclusively from persons of iewish origin However there are security hamrds involved in cases of divided alle giance between dedicatiOn to the Zionist State of Israel and loyalty to a homeland The recruitment of Gentiles is comparatively rare Many Arabs especially walk-ins have directly or indirectly helped the services usually as a result of monetary inducements but the Israelis do not consider these Arabs good sources of reliable information More 22 often they recruit Palestinians over whom they may have more control because of hanlt assets frozen in Israel since the war in 1945 In certain cases these hanlt anets have been released for intelligence services rendered The Israelis are prepared to capitalize on nearly every kind of agent motivation A substantial effort is made to appeal to fewish racial or religious procliv- ities pro Zionism dislike of anti-Semitisrn anti 50viet feelings if applicable and humanitarian instincts Blackmail is also used Either recruiting techniuues include the proffer of money busin- opportuniti or release from prison Among the Arabs money has been especially effective Appeals have also been made successfully to other Arab vulnerabilities such as jealousy rivalry fear and political dissension The Israelis have used false-flag recruitment pith extensively and successfully In several cases they approached citizens of Western European naticais under the cover of a national NATO intelligerce organization for operations in Arab target While intelligence officers in the field mine the importance of security they tend to be careless Although otherwise well trained fmeli intelligence officers occasionally have been lax in their me of the telephone abroad also they often have given away a considerable amount at information by confiding in agents and contacts with whom tl'reyr have had only a slight relationship lertheless they recall the basic principles of their Weston and for awhile complicate the lives of their agents with a welter of security regulations that they themselves eventually Marionally a rendezvous IP- ranged between an officer and an agent is countersur- veilled by two or more officers both to spot possible surveillance of the meeting and to protect the officer In the recruiting process the officer generally uses a fictitious name executes a secrecy agreement with the prospective agent and provides him with a pseudo- or alias Whenever money or other gratuity is given to an agent an attempt is made to secure a signed receipt in the agent's handwriting i'tlthough an agent occasionally may he sent to Israel for special training this course of action is neither easy nor inexpensive to accomplish Therefore the intelli- gence officer himself is usually responsible for training the agent in the fundamentals of tradecraft security SECRET measures and the use of radio and code communica- tions If the eaigencies of the situation demand special training the Israelis rent an apartment for this purpose in places like Paris and New Turk Agents who have been so trained were taught to mi and use secret inlr conceal documents and letters on the person deliver information to secure hiding places and to com- municate otherwise with the case officer and or headquarters The methods of communication vary pearly de- pending on locations and circumstances Personal meetings between the agent and his case officer are arranged by secret writing open mail or oral message by couriers The cities or towns to be used have code names and the meeting places are at specified times with alternative times and places In case of emergen cy the agent can alert the intelligence officer by use of a prearranged open code in cable-sor letters or if time permits by secret writing or courier The Israelis place considerable emphasis on personal relationships with their agents They have been known to be generous in granting personal conceuions and monetary amistance to keep their agents happy One such individual a journalist in Paris who recruited French officials and elicited informa tion from wittina and unwitting informants in the French political world was paid the equivalent of per month After years of steady employ- ment and a succession of Israeli case officers his services were gently but peremptorily terminated Severance pay was calculated at the rate of one month's salary for each year of service to assuage any hard fee-lines On the other hand the Israelis can be absolutely ruthless to both the intelligence officer and the agent if the Iatter's disaffectiun or treachery should threaten a sensitive operation or endanger the security of the state There are several cases-oi Jews in Europe who while or alter working for the Israeli service trafficked with the Egyptians for substantial sums of money These Jews were enticed into traveling to Israel or abducted tried in camera and given stiff prison terms of It to II years Massed headquarters controls the acquisition flow and dissemination of reports in a rigid manner which contrasts with the considerable freedom allowed in running operations An Israeli intelligence officer abroad must accept all inforrnatiun reported by an scent and may not change a single word The SECRET SECRET intellbence officer receives detailed prepared Iques from headquarters and is allowed little leeway hi terms of what he submits to a meeting with an agent many of whom are low-level the intelligence officer dehriefs him on the basis of headquarters questions The intelligence officer must then forward all the agent says even overt information The intelligence officer may if he wishes add his own remarks to the report Mound headquarters does not disseminate agentsI reports to all customer agencies The overwhelming hull of the reports goes to one specific analytical unit for eaample usually reports on t'rrab affairs are sent to Military Intelligence counterintelligence reports to Shin Beth However an exceptional agent report i disseminated to Israeli policymakers The Hound intellitrenoe officer abroad does not show copies of his reports to the Israeli Ambassadorlbut sends them outsr tu Mossad headquarters in Tel hviv The Israeli services have a very Ireen interest in the use and development of technirssl equipment As far baCl as the Information Scrvice conducted technical surveillance operations Arab and British delegates to the UH Mossad with assistance from Shin Beth has provided technical training to the Turkish and Ghanaian security and intelligence services Enhances of technical equipment and information have also been carried out with the Japanese intelligence and security serVic Mossad receives support in external technical operations frtom Shin Beth and Military Intelligence The technical capabilities of the Israeli services are adequate for normal demands Moreover the very close coordina tion eaisting between the services and the industrial concerns of the country ensure that technical ear-sp- ment to support continuing audio operations is supplied and developed as needed The esistence of a limited research program coupled with high Israeli competence in technical matters indicates that the Israelis intend to remain abreast of advances in auliosurveillance and countermeasures a wrra orsra-a misread Messed has good relationships with Shin Beth Military Intelligence the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Special Taslrs Division of the police Successes litre the Entebbe raid are illustrative of well-coordinated 23 SECREI planning and eat-mition a Ieatirnonial to mod rela- tions among the services The Agranat Commission advocated greater com-di- nation between the services and revived the post of intelligence adviser to monitor inter-directorate dis- putes The exchanges between Mossad and the other sErvices through the coordinating mechanism of the Va'adat and the use of ad htic committees however continue to ensure ermrdination and cooperation between the services b Lula-on war-st Pontoon sources Massed has liaison relationships with manv of intelligence and security-services throughout the world With a few exceptions the Directorate oi Foreign Liaison and Political Action is responsible Ior relations with most Ioreign organizations In most instances the point of contact is abroad in foreign capitals although some Ioreign services insist on liaison in Israel fit present Mmsad in coordination with Shin Beth maintains liaison with foreign intelligence and securitv services through membership in the Kilowatt group an organization which is concerned with Arab terrorism and is comprised of West Germany Belgium Italv the United Kingdom Luxembourg Netherlands SwitIErland Denmark France Canada Ireland- Sweden Norway and Israel The Israelis also have informal connections regarding terrorism with other European nations including Spain Portugal and i'tt'istria The Israelis have over the vears made eIIorts to break the Arab ring encircling Israel by Involvement with non Arab Moslem nations in the Near East it formal trilateral liaison called the Trident organization was established by Mmsad with Turkev's National Security Service and Iran's National Organiza- tion for Intelligence and Security Savant in late I938 Since the original agreement there has been an addition to Mossad's bilateral relationship with each service The Trident organization involves continuing intelligence exchange nlus semiannual meetings at the chief of service level The general terms of the original agreement with the Turlts aside Irom legitimiaing Israeli liaison with Torlrev stated that Mossad would furnish inlorrnation on the activity of Soviet agents in Turkev and those working against 'I'urloesr throughout the Middle East In return the Turks agreed to sunnlv Israel with 24 trends and developments in Iraq and Comment usuallv been carried out under the cover oi military information on the political intentions ot lhe Ari- 1 countries which could allect the security of Israel and the aetivitv and identifications of UAR agents worhiu I against Israel The Israeli service has also liven Ill Turks oounterespionage and- technical lining The main purpose of the Israeli relationship with Iran was the development of a era-Israel - Arab policv on the part oI Iranian officials Maggi origaged in him operations with Save In vears since the late 195th Mmsad aided 51 th activities and sunnorted the Kurds in Iraq The also regularlv transmitted to the Iranians into-Ike reports on Eavnt's activities in the Arab activities at I ecting Iran Israeli liaison in stem has varied mama I countrv to country depending on the E nciu at it i situation Israeli intelligence activities in hirioa have and police training arms sales to national unlit Iorees and aid and development program The hub nations in conjunction with the Organization hirican Unity have broull'll great lobar - most African nations to hrealc all Ionnal ties I'illr I Israel Despite the break in diplomatic relation bets-tun Israel and mom of the Alrioan nation the Israelis still maintain 300d intelligence liaison with certain African services The Israelis also have relations with the Kenvan Service In Central lth the Israelis are ill active in Zaire In West Allies the Israelis trained the Liberian Securitv Service and police Thev also helped establish the Giants- I Military Intell'igenoe Scrviee In southern Airing th Israelis have a relationship with the African intelligence and security services The Israelis have been very active in Latin Amt-tin over the years One of the greatest intelligence mull the capture of Adolph Eichniann the former Nani leader occurred in Argentina Hecentiv much at I liaison activity in Latin America has centered I'll training and antiterrorist operations The Israel Consulate in Rio cle Ian-Biro for example provides cover for a Mossad regional station reap-anti Brazil Argentina Chile and Uruguay Of cers from this post have gone to Buenos Aires to sive traininl the hrgentioes in the course of these contacts tl ' Israelis recomrnended greater involvement in it antiterrorist operations The Israelis also maintain hair-mt with security services of Mexico theta Hica and Panama the Dominican Republic t'r-ncauela Colombia Ecuador and Peru Caracas is Regional Center for north and western Latin america and lCentral America The Israelis have operated for sometime in East asia The'v have provided intelligence training to the of the Ilepublic of China and maintain liaison with it The lsraelis also have relations with the lath- 95E Thai Indonesian and South Korean services wll t la l' on terrorist matters The main Hostad rr-cmual center in East Asia is in Singapore The Israeli alatlr'il't chit-f there frequently travels throughout the and conducts business with mrvices in the macllb rin nations Indonesia as a Modem nation ha not have formal diplomatic ties with Israel The relationship therefore is very The Mossad representative in Singapore is accredited to the Indonesian service There are also officers in Jakarta under commercial cover The primary reason'for the tndonesian liaison is to ram aid in efforts The Israelis on the other hand are not only engaging in antiterrorist qwrations but also have an opportunity to collect information and engage in political action in another Irtalrm mel' C Shin Beth Counterespionage and Inter- nal Security Service 1 Functions til-tin Beth has the responsibility in Israel for munterespionaac and internal security and the service it ltasicalli' internallv oriented Shin Beth is primarily for cellectinc information on foreign organizations both hostile and friendly and their activities protecting the security of Israeli rtlfu-ials and installations abroad arid investigating all Ir-rms of subversion directed by either internal or l ilt nlill forces including sabotage and terrorism in Irrar-l and abroad Shin Beth evaluates all information tint-lulled collates it with other material routinely and overtly available from both Israeli and foreign and submits evaluated reports to the appropri government agencies for action Shin Beth tic-crates h- combat two main adversaries the Arabs and the no set and Eastern European intelligence and security EECIET Shin Beth at oneJime engaged in transitive intellir gence operations and immigration affairs in the Balkan countries particularlv in Romania Bulgaria Yugoslavia and in Huuaarv but no longer does Shin Beth is the government's authority on personnel and physical securitv matters is responsible for the personal security of the President the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense Shin Beth does not have the power c at 7 51 which is the right only of the Special Taslts Division of the Investigations Department of the Israeli Police a national force with headquarters in Jerusalem When an arrest is desired Shin Beth submits a detailed report on the ease plus a requ for an warrant to the Ministry of Justice The Local Department transmits the reouest to the Special Tasks Division Which issues the warrant and makes the arrest When more eapeditious handling ia'justified Shin Beth directly notifies the Special Tasks Division which is empowered to take the suspect into temporary custody pending receipt 0 the warrant On occasion a Shin Beth will sit in court with the prosecution staff as a special consultant 2 Drganiaation Shin Beth is organized into eight operational and functional departments Arab Affairs Host- Arab Affairs Protective Securitir It Operational Support Technology ti Interrogation and Lead Counsel Tl Coordination and Planning and Bl Administration Regional departments in the field are located in the GanlSinai area with headquarters in Ashoelon the Northern area with headquarters in Haifa and the West Bani area with headquarters in Jerusalem A unit within Shin Beth national headquar- ters in Tel Aviv serves as the fourth rig-lions department These regional departments are broken down into subdivisions identical to but smaller than those of the parent organization Figure The Arab Affairs is responsible for cuunterespiunage antiterrorist operations control of political subversion research and the maintenanceof a counterintelligence index on Arabs The components handling these activities are organised into offensive and defensive sections This department operates through field offices controlled by regional officers These officers repeat to the regional commanders but rely on the Arab Affairs Department for guidance and 25 EM 3% i 31 gs if in 3 1 mm mail-HIE '3 Wt which includes ttid in eouuterespionaee mntersabolage and Surveillance as well as research and records support The overall headquarters func- tion is that of doctrine systematizinl work and supervising 1h Nut-Arab Department handles counterinhelli- operations dealing with all other countries one component dealing with Corn- munist alloversion the other with non-Chmmunist New Left subversion foreian liaison and research sh unit dealing with these activities has offensive and defensive soctions The Nam-Aral Departmeyu investigates and counters nuisance activity by loreign pow-era both hostile and by all Itnotvn meritods including the penetration t'rl their intelli- gence services and diplomatic installations in Israel rip-entices against foreign minions within lsrael were Icrrnerly conducted by Military lrrtellilenee but with the evolution towards ll' lt ' centralization and maimional specialization since the reorganization at 951 this function has been the responsibility of Shin Both The Non-Aral Allah's Department engages in the tenetration oi extremist political parties such as MAKI ithe Communist Party of Israel RAKAH the New liomrnunist List a largely Arab-supported splinter troop SIAH the New Israel Left and anti-Zionist and extreme riahtist organisations The Department also investintes counterfeiting blackmarlteting the unmiiug of money and goods in and out of the country and violations of the economic control laws It i responsible for tapping telephone lin and inter- nsptina domestic and diplomatic telephone conversa- tions The Non-Arab Allairs Department is oesponrihle for lureign liaison and handles all correspondence by Shin Hath with other foreign intelligence and security services The interrogation of imminent from the and Eastern European nations is also undertaken Irv this department The Protective Security Department is responsible lot the protection of Israeli Government huild'lnes and alum El Al and lint installations and craft industries and scientific establishments and Indirl newlines-This department is also cit-sled with the security of all important industrial plants especially those ol actual or potential military value industrial secrets such as tents pro-limes statistics etc it also carries on lhtson with security cilia-eta ll'lml'ml the Israeli Comma Although stands whit they are their recruitment training and control is a Shin Beth responsihiity The Protective Security Deuterium controls the security of internal communications and the secrecy of information A tanall unit within the department for example handles all matters concernina with Ihe Ollice of Hall and Tait-anti Censorship The Protective Saw l'y Department directs Beth mrity activltseaoverseas includinathe protec- tion oi lsa'aeh personal diplomatic and transport respurslhillty or unilateral operationsant'llaisontl' handles protec ye security and liaison 1with local personnel and primarily I and Zip In nity The Opera'lidlra'llSupport Departmentitremonsihle for assistinc the operational departments with surveil- lance cheery-tires airport security with listen-j in devices special lash and cotutteraudio This departmenthastactieal components whiehaid in counter-intellipenee operation we and compromlm by leftist em oyeer of the Telephoae Services The-Tech Departmenlleadssapporttothe chemistry communications photography my The Interrogation and leanounsel Department 27 SECRET tions for Shin Beth operating departments not handed over to the Special Tasks Division of the police This department malice selective use of the polymoh It also cinch the reliability of Massed retirees fabrica- tors and suspect double agents Personnel in this component travel to the field as required to give polygraph tests and conduct interrogations The department also assists in preparina cases for trial and provides other legal assistance to operating depart ments as needed The Coordination and Plannina Department has responsibility for coordination of cotntterintelligence and security methedetoav training security recruit- ment and the Icit- tltral registry This department maintains the Shin Beth card files with the exception of those on Arabs in addition to ordinary carding procedures there is an entry on every individual in the country who has a notice record This enables all government offices to make a quick check on the police record of present or palerItial employees through Shin Beth All tracing procedures are chan- neled into this department from more check through neighborhood investigations This registry uses a military computer The recistry on Arabs is not yet computerized because of the difficulty with Arabic mm The Administration Department performs the usual functions of personnel management prance supply transport communications and security A policy body within Shin Beth is called the Directorate of the Service it normally meets once a month Membership consists of department directors including the regional directors all of whom are of equal rank 3 Administrative practices The Director of Shin Beth is appointed by the Prime Minister who may seek advice for the appointment but needs no approval from either the cabinet or the Knesset Shin Beth is responsible for the security of all civilian intelligence and security personnel Further- more it also recruits and selects personnel according to specific requirements based on loyalty to the state education capability and potential and psbject to the approval of the indiVidual civilian service The military is somewhat more autonomous in regard to 28 security procedures relating to their personnel became military security components handle roost of tin-g - cases Shin Beth however sets the utilities and- standards for military security controls i Among the 500 officers in Shin Beth ape lame 1m individuals who have been selected mm and trained to serve as security officers throughout the governmental structure These officers are stationed in the Prime Minister's office intelligence and security components itrciudirar lit-sad scientific institutu A1 installations and foreign service pints Most career employees a few of whom are women - have broad educational backgrounds and experienH_ About one-third of Shin Beth officers are assigned abroad early in their careers as security officers where they come under the operational and administrative control of Mound Upon return to Israel from foreign assignment Shin Beth officers revert to the internal security service Because senior Mead and Shin Beth officers are given identical training in a combined advanced operational school their modus operandi is similar maior or colonel on temporary assignment or recruit a- retiring officer on a permanent basis All recruits are- subiect to a thorough background security investiga- tion culminating in a physical examination pulvgraoh tests and screening Security checks on native born Israelis are relatively easy to do for the young Israeli whose life is well documented rarely enjoys the luxury of privacy Police files school records university professors army records yrnith' movements political affiliatfom voting records lain-l' ily history political permissions and friends are scrutinized If the applicant is foreign born detail immigration records may reveal pertinent inlormati which can be cities checked Loyalty to Israel is I principal criterion If the subject was a Zionist fro early youth he belongs to a special category if he hit never belonged to the leftist parties MAPAM AK and HAKAH or to Herut a rightist party hi employment opportunities are considerably enhum'ctl It is almost impossible for a Jew to disguise his was when he is once in the hands of the authorities kiritl' there are in Israel many thoroughly reliable pct-so from every country which has or had a few SECEE ummunm who can be consulted for information on Fumtial recruits The Director of Shin Beth is I civil service Glass 1 Him He has an expense and entertainment Iewance There is a rather inalinificant differential ween grades which is commnsated by fairly impressive perquisites includina livina quarters trans prtation and travel especially in the senior ranks 4 Methods of operation Shin Beth operations within Israel can be broken don-n into the four following cateaorier against foreigners in lenetal millet rahs mimt Commu- slit and alainst Israelis There appears to he little difference in the application of techniques but a greater deal in intonsity much of which is directed aainst the limbs The activities and opinions of diplomats both within and outside their diplomatic establishments in Israel are of primary interest to Shin Beth Generally the Israeli Government tends to regard diplomats as being there to ferret information rather than to promote tordial relations The decree of suspicion and intensity of operations diplomats is conditioned by the prevailing rrlations between countries and their lone term diplomatic objectives Shin Beth Operations with the police and Military Intelliuence are well coordinated The israeli police work very closely with Shin Beth in sardine simian I'mtallations such as embassies and tonsulates and in surveilling diplomats foreign yurrnalists and tourists of special intere Police officers maintain a 24-hour watch in front of all embassies legaiions consulates and amhassarlorial reside-noes They record the comings and goings of foreign personnel especially diplomatic officers who aunt-er after regular office hours or on weekends they also record the license numbers of vehicles in which the officers arrive and depart Diplomatic lit't'tl t plates differ in color from civilian plates and urrv a numerical orefis which idcntifics the country tron-muted The security of the areas and the occupied u-iroritics is mainly the responsibility of Military lutt-lliaence the Border Guard and Shin Beth llil'itllirill the use of informants who may be local limbs or Oriental Jews posing as Arabs Shin Beth has 't'I ItE'l SECRET penetrated subversive Arab elements includin Corn- munist cells and Arab nationalist mm They way back to neiahbo ng countries and doubled them in oom-diuaticn with Hillary Intelliaenee Shin Beth is continually active in the fight animt terrorism Aside from the Arab tareet Shin Beth Is primarily concerned with the nibverstve elemeras of the left and RAKAH owe their allegiance to the USSR but being legal parties they have had representattyeI in the Knesset Shin Beth has thoroughly penetrated the cells of the Communist apparatus followine Ila activities through informants surveillance and techni- cal Operations Shin Beth agents attend many interna- tional Communist front misses Since all foreigners reeardlm of nationality or religion Jews are considered potential threats to the State of Israel Shin Beth employs a lame number of informants among local Israelis who are in contact with foreigners by reason of their employment or activities In this motion are bartenders tote clerks telephone operators secretaries taai drivers caterers maids prostitutes chauffeurs and waiters it also includes trade unionists scientists and others in the educational field There is an lsraeli lawr that authorizes the police and the security services to piclt up and detain for - questioning any Israeli citizen who is in contact with I foreigners without official pcrmission or obviou- reason such as employment or business Since diplo- mats are suhiect to surveillance Shin Beth soon becomes aware of their contacts with Israeli citizens when a pattern develops and suspicion is amused attempts are made to develop further information using wire tapping and other technical aids It is not uncommon for representatives of Shin Beth to call on the Israeli and attempt to enlist his cooperation If the individual refuse the Penal Revision Law State Security is cited to him and he is threatened with dire consequences This usually evokes compliance The lilac-Ii Security authorities also seek evidence of illicit love affairs which can be used as leverage to enlist crupcration In one instance Shin Beth tried to pcoctratc the US Consulate IIlene-rat in Jerusalem through a clerical employee who was having an affair with 1 Jerusalem girl They rigged a fake abortion case against thc employee in an unsuccessful effort to recruit him Before this attempt at blackmail they had 29_ SECREI tried to get the Israeli girl to elicit information from her boyfriend Two other important term in Israel are the U5 Embasrr in Tel Artist and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization with headquarters in Ientsalem There have been two or three crude efforts to recruit Marine luards for monetary reward In the cases affecting UNTSO personnel the oper- ations involved intimidation and blacltmail In 1954 a hidden microphone planted by the Israelis was discovered in the Office of the US Ambassador in Tel Arie In 1956 telephone taps were found cornice-ted to two telephones in the residence of the US rnilitanr attache In Iiltl a microphone was the office of the Dperations Officer in the Iordam Israel Mire-d rtrreirtiee Commission Olfiee Recently the Director of the Shin Beth in testimony before a judicial committee of the Knesset stated that Shin Beth makes entrite and taps tele- phones in Israel with some freouencr Reportedlr the only concern of the committee members was 1with the disposition by Shin Beth of acquired information which did not hear on national rewrite It is noted conducted on the rtetlieritir of the Director of shin esh atom The Israelis have shown themselves lobe most adept at surveillance and surreptitious entry operations Men and women are used together on surveilr Ifaperson under stn'reillanoe stops to use a whlie lolephone the millanee team reports the situation to the control center which irnmesliatelivr notifies the telephone tapping unit and an attempt Is made to intercept the call The conversation or pertinent information is then relayed to the team on street Shin Beth personnel are experts at entrain private quarters where their co through risitors luggage and person papers Special portable camera equipment a used for this purpose and the remit are processed in the Shin Beth laboratory Shin Beth technicians love omstealed radio transmitters in phmmaoh cases in the false bottoms of coffee cam'and in the bottoms of portable cookine stores which can be used as stores without removing the communicathn equipment 30 D Military Intelligence I Funclions intelli ncc is charged with the collecti- production and dissemination of miitanr geogra- and economic intellim especiallr on the Ar nations and securitsr in the Defense Forces a Administered Territories This come-orient is element of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and a of the Defense Forces General Staff The Director hl'tilital'irr Inteliaenoe is a member of Va'ad' Allhoouh Air Force and Navy Intelligence officers a subordinate to their respective commanders titer members of the staff and attend his st - meetings 2 Organization Militantr Intelligence headquarters consist of I following departments in Production 2 the late senor Corps till Foreien Relations and Ft Securitr and Censorship The directs Field Security Units Territorial Cemma'_ Combat Intelligence and Air Force and Navy Inte I sense through coordination with their respective ar' commanders Figure The Production Department is responsible preparing the national intellismoe estimates vets of which appearastheMlddir Easr euiewiirStr - for distribution to friendliur liaison services department also produces daily finished intellia reports and dailyr bulletins which contains raw partiallyr analyzed informatiomlEstimates are prepared by lli'lilitarsr Intelligence h lo ad and Research and Plannina Center of the Ministnr Foreiart Affairs The Production Department about sit percent approximately 2 300 of - personnel in Militant Intelligence About Bill whom 150 are officers and are involved production The number of anal however varies as specialists are coupled by department for societal studies in technical economic matters This department is under eetnmand of a deoutr director of Milli Intelligence The Production Department is divided into following units Geographical or Email I 5 sion' Functional or Technical Division and Documentation or Registry and Records Diois 4- SEC 1 3 Isl ii Ella Iain-Iain ii in 1 l 335 5 135 fin kiss I I 6 53 521 1 1 2 II Illa- 0 ll - laiaxu HE ll It ll iguana-1 Elsi EU 15 51 flu bifb EH wtu SECRET The Geographical Division evaluates information and compiles taraet studies on the Arab countries It is divided into three area deals the Western consisting of Egypt Sudanand Libya the Eastern consistinc of Iran Syria and Lebanon and the Southern cmrsistina of Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula Every effort is made in this division to create the narrowest type of specialist a man who can devote himself to his material for over a period of years For example in the middle 196le the Jordanian Desi Chief had held his lab for 15 years and probably lrnew more about the Jordanian military than most Jordanian Army officers The Functional Division is broken down into substantive units which deal with such subjects as Near Eastern economics inter-Arab relations Palestinian affairs and international activities in the Near East The division produces intelligence on technical and economic matters including weapons and electronics and production and area developments The unit draws heavily on the knowledge of the IDF technical services There is close cooperation between the geographical and functional di sions in producina accurate and timely intelligence The existence of a desk concerned with international activities in the Near East including Soviet affairs indicates that the functional division deals with the militias of Either nations as they affect the area The Documentation Division actually employs over half of the personnel in the Production Department All reports are sent first to this component which keeps a permanent record catty and numbers cards indexes and cross-referencei documents as necessary It then forwards copies to appropriate offices The Documentation Division has mil-r installed computers to aid in the dissemination and research support process The registry component of this unit services the entire Military Intelligence establishment This Division is the repository for ail Military Intelligence reports and publications and is responsible for the dissemination of finished intelligence and also supervises the intelligence operations center which operates 24 hours a day This center is the terminal for all direct access field communications and presumably is designed to provide rapid review and dissemination of information in a crisis situation The Intelligence Corps is responsible for overt and covert collection operations including all signal intelligence activities for the Israeli intelligence 32 community and for operational support The Corps is subordinate to the and is under command of the Chief intelligence Officer This consists of a large headquarters staff which open subordinate operational field elements Mil-such it I no authority over area command tracts the Corps ma l levy requirements on these field elements The -- - supervises the use of technical devices in operas All requirements levied on the Cone must validated by the Deputy Director of stilits Intellicence The Corps is broken down into the follnwi divisions Collection responsible for signals into gence agent operations overt sources and I distance observation units General Headquart which is in charge of the militan intelligence to I I the Technical Development Institute communicat and cartography Training ii-Grannization Logist I and rename and Research and Development The Signals Branch of the Collection Divis - which includes communications and electronic int gentle and landline operations collects commun'- tions intelligence for the entire intelligence - security community The actual collection operation performed by the IDF Signal Corps The Israeli Force also participates and maintains liaison other service components on electronic warfare Israelis have been very successful in their CDMI and ELINT operations against the Arabs Dori -- intercepting locating and disseminating a - dis-us volume of Arab traffic quickly and actors including a high-level conversation between the President Gama hbd-Nasoer of the use and to Hussein of Jordan Over the years the Israelis ha mountcd cross-border operations and tapped It communications for extended periods Israelis have also on occasion boobiFtraDD-cd landlines The Agents Branch is in charge of all operations run by Military Intelligence The Branch not permitted to run agent operations abroad but it sole jurisdiction over agent operations across 4 borders of Israel into neighboring states The Age Branch has executive authority over Shin i - Operations which are run againSl the intellige- service of a neighboring drab State Egypt and 5 are the prime operational targets The Interrosal' ml of the tgents Branch controls interrogation nm which are especiailirr trained and prepared to a ninpany any major IDF military operation beyond wasefire lines These teams are keystones in unitary Intelligence tactical operations Interrogalors at a vitriett r of deception l hnioues in questioning written Although prisoners are usually treated well may give the initial impression that other rminiers have been mistreated or even executed for to cooperate Arabicsspealiing IDF interroga- sometimes pose as Arab officers and circulate mmna prisoners to elicit information These tech- usually produce a lar t I of information li-Iltt captured enemy personnel the Open Sources Division collects and collatcs all Mn-rial from overt sources This cranpooent how ma does not evaluate the information the Long Distance Observation Units are primarily - uni-erned with visual sightings of Arab activity along the borders and armistice lines These units also -n-vnle support to agent cross-border operations and i ult to signal intelligence units based on observations I s rah movements across the borders the General Headquarters Division runs the Mili Intelligence School and the Technical Develop- Institute and is in charge of Communications and - rearraphy DMI has the largest technical capability any of the fsraeli intelligence services It has a some competent component which produces - impinent needed for military intelligence operations lh-ulise it is the largest and at one time the only notion-ring shop in the Israeli intelligence com- il talies on some projects from other services the Communications Branch handles all matters mnlving wireless communication for agent oper- lOfficials in this branch train agent operators I up signal plans and maintain radio contact with nuts in place From time to time this branch also support for Mossad and Shin lit-tit I I'm t'jartographic Branch has rt smtisihilitv for map and works iti close crane-ration with llii the Survey Department in the Ministry til i 'i liere are approximately 3w tit-rained as- ll to the Map Sunny lifter Hurt-cs oi me-ii located tlii- hereunto-n of Lincoln siren-Ix it Til itch PET SEER ET The Training Division is for the intelligence doctrine taught in the Military Intelli gence School and in troop units It has evidentlf absorbed the training responsibilities of Field Security and Combat Intelligence units The Mililtlf t Intelli- gence School curriculum includes combat intelligence strategic intelligence and special studies The school may provide some training for personnel of other tsraeli intelligence and security services The Organization logistics and Personnel Division is responsible for administrative taslts The head of this division functions as the designers on all logistical and personnel matters The division consists of three components LogistiCs Personnel and Finance The Research and Development Division is primar- ily concerned with computer operations and program- ming in support of Military Intelligence production operations and requirements The Foreign Relations Department is responsible for liaison between the and foreign military organiza- tions and for Israeli Defense Attache affairs This department is reportedly divided into two companies the Foreign intelligence Liaison Division and the Attaches Division The Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division conducts liaison with representatives of foreign intelligence scrviees which have agreements with Military Intelligence This division also has control over visits by officers and training of troops from foreign countries in Israel Foreign intelligence Liaison is also the official point of contact for all foreign defense attaches in lane Activities such as visits to installations exchanges of routine information briefing sessions etc must first be cleared with Field Security and submitted to the for a policy decision if necessary i'ittacl'i accredited or otherwise working in Israel on intelligence matters can expect to receive select information concerning other Near East and foreign nations within cerimeters set by the Dlv'll thus an attache seeking information on specific questions of Israeli capabilities and materials would receive the data through this division It is considered s sinlalinrt inf unwritten policy for foreign titililur i personnel in l it'iei to collect this type oi information in any other way in the cast limiter-y intelligence has preside-ti ninth holistic-Jilin Minor-turn sop i-atl to other l-iitli'i'r limit stir-nir- ls the Home nae i'lw it SECRET the walre of the Arab-Israeli War in 1957 when the Israelis captured vast quantities of Soviet material from the Arabs it is believed that Foreign Intelligence Liaison may be divided into at least two components General Intellilence and Technical Intelligence Within or attached to the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division is a Secret Liaison unit which handles all operations outside the normal charter of activities previously described This unit may be involved either directly or indirectly in bilateral intelligence oper- ations conducted by Military Intellieence with other services Thus when a special relationship between a foreign military establishment and the IDF is ar- ranged this unit supplies the officers and controls the activities This unit was involved in the excellent liaison relationship which at one time existed with France Further if Mossad decides that an Israeli military officer is in the best position to carry out a specific foreign operation this unit will handle the matter Operations controlled from this office in all cases are coordinated with Homad The Fore lln Relations Department directs the activities of Israeli Ministry of Defense Missions and Defense Attaches abroad through the Attaches' Divi- sion Ministry of Defense Missions and Israeli Defense Attaches are located in Washington New York City London Paris Bonn Home The Hague Anltara Tehran Bangkok Buenns Aires Tokyo Brasilia and Caracas Several of these attaches are also accreditt sd to adiacent countries The true role of most defense missions and attache posts is to sell Israeli defense industry products and purchase defense euuipment for the IDF There are few pints which are actually attache offices in the traditional sense the principal ones being in Washington London and Paris Israeli defense attaches abroad advise their respective ambas- sadors report on host country military matters troop abreast of all research and development in the host country and in general represent the IDF abroad Attaches also do operational support work for Mossad Israeli military missions have been sent to some countries for training and support purposes but those missions have not been officially accredited to the country concerned The Field Security and Militarv Censorship Departs ment is responsible for counterinteiligence within the IDF and conducts physical and personnel security ititI- ' l li'ltl Security is also responsible for 34 security clearances of all personnel assigned Military Intelligence This Department conducts a liaison with Shin Beth which is responsible for reserve personnel on inactive status and has responsibility in counterintelligence and security In the middle 196th the Security Dctlartrnent incl a Personnel Security Division to assign person-_ supervise and coordinate clearances and cond' surveillance A Counterintelligence Division had responsibility of ensuring security regarding comm cations documents and installations An Educat and Training Division was responsible for security indoctrination A computerized dncu checking office was set up in the early loco to cont distribution and disposal of all Top Secret docum__ originating within the IDF The Field Securi Department coordinates and monitors the activities '1 Field Security units attached to the IDF territor commands to maintain order Each territorial u mander is mponsible for security in his area and Field Security units to preserve law and order fsrael _ divided into Northern Central and Southern mands plus the Jerusalem Tel Aviv and districts Both Tel Aviv District and the Cent Command also heated there are semrate from I General Headquarters which is located in Tel Avi The Gaza Strip although not contigucms to the Cent Command has been placed under that Com because pacification and antiterrorist operations in t1 past few years have succeeded in bringing relati' stability to the area Sinai is under the Scot Command which has two Field Security units Int the Northern Command has three Security units I Field Security officers serve in the territo commands where thetir direct the activitie5 of various Field Security units and serve as points contact for the Commands Security Departments a the territorial commanders Field Security units responsible for implementing and supervising secu directives includinn instructions guidance and iris - - tions In the Administered Territories Field Sec Units cum-crate with Shin Beth and the Border Git to preserve security ppmhat terrorism and counterintelligeme Operations At brigade level in 1 three area commands Field Security has mill intelligence majors serving as security officers of known as such under the command of the tl'pcrat' sec I section til-3 Security officers at battalion and ompany level are coopted from the infantry but are known as security officers only to unit command- an on the battalion level- At the company level uwurity personnel are sergeants The Military Censorship Office within the Field H'curtty and Military Censorship Department is responsible for all censorship In addition this compo- nent by law has extremely wide powers in dealing the Israeli press and other mass media In practice the IDF has found it advisable to operate on i gentleman's agreement basis and depend largely on the good intentions of editors and the like to refrain trult l publishing stories about Israeli military searets this office operates on behalf of the entire IDF three-tors of Military Intelligence in the past have n-ferred to Military Censorship as part of the ballast that they would prefer to see in the Chief of Staff's office The Chief of the Censorship Office is a member of the Committee of Three which acts as a thiard of Appeal and final arbiter in all matters u-lating to censorship The two other members are a representative of the press and a representative of the white at large The last named must be agreed upon in both other parties In effect all information is broken down into three categories 11 items that are permitted without question items that are not permitted under any cfrcu instances and items that must be cleared before publication Blank spaces are found only infrequently in the press owing to a n-autation which forbids this practice for example an entire page must be reset if a single item must be a ithdrawn from publication All IDF publications and press releases must be coordinated with and approved in the Censorship Office Pill information media Inrt-ign and domestic must submit any item having a security or significant political implication to the -nsorship Office prior r to its release Most press have a tctetype lint with the IIJF to expedite this process others must handcarry their Ili fllh to the office In the midslg s this office was - r tfed largely by female soldiers The Censorship Office is in charge of monitoring nutgoing communications from Israel to ensure that no inlurtnation of military value is transmitted If the nmnitnr hears a discussion involving matters of military importance he will cut of the conversation Up one occasion a monitor reportedly listened in on a 5E CRET private conversation and reported gleefully to his colleagues in the room what he heard The monitor was fired on the spot Monitoring activity concentrates largely on international telephone calls from foreign media personnel in Israel to their home offices abroad The Public Relations Office of Military Censorship has responsibility for all IDF press releases and all official contacts with the public The Office handles relations with the press and the public in coordination with the Censorship Office The Office also hosts foreign defense attaches in Israel in conjunction with the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division Its in the case of the Censorship Office Directors of Military Intelligence would prefer to see the Public Relations Office directly under the command of the Chief of Staff I The inteiligence process within Military Intelligence operates largely by means of three egularly scheduled meetings of the key intelligence officers First1 there is a meeting twice a weelt or every three days at which the Director of the Production Department holds a briefing for the DMI and other top officers Depends ing on the nature of the intelligence discussed other production officers may also be present On the basis of this meeting the DMI issues instructions for action or levies reouirements for information to the assem bled staff officers One half dayr after each of these biweekly meetings the directors of Production and the Intelligence Corps meet to work out detailed planning and tactics on what each should do to follow up the DMI's broad directives Immediately after this the Director of the Intelligence Corps gathers together his own division chiefs and gives them guidelines for carrying out their immediate responsibilities The liaison officer assigned to Mossad sits in on this meeting The Dh ll is always given finished intelligence Individual items are summarized in not more than half a page and broken down into three paragraphs it the facts comments and evaluation These are put together on a reading board for selected top Israeli Government officials with appropriate mar- ginal comments from the DMI There are in addition daily weeltly and intelligence summaries which are designed to provide a continuing insight into the development of events or trends of interest to the governnlent These sum 'raries together With spot reports on separate items much of the thl's 35 SECRET responsibilities as the Prime Minister's staff officer for intelligence The Production Department may also generate special research or think pieces Special reports are ako written in r mnse to requirements levied by Israeli agencies other than military intelligence One of the DMI's most important functions is to present the annual intelligence estimate during the latter part of December 1While a precis is drawn up beforehand the presentation is oral and is attended by senior government officials headed by the Prime Minister The uses the weekly summaries in a great extent in preparing his material At the end of his formal mmarlts the opens the floor to questions The minutes of the meeting are then out into finished form and circulated to Itey government officers on a need-to-lrnow basis The Lit-it's maior aid in doing his job is a progress report drawn up every three months by each of his department directors He also reads ravv intelligence reports from time to time for the purpose of getting the actual flavor of information presented to him in the special item reports or to evaluate the usefulness or nature of agent operations Although the DMI has an elaborate computer capability to assist in collating information there is a need for more effective automatic data-processing equipment for the storage and retrieval of information The assigns intelligence officers to the three Area Commands where they are attached to the various intelligence staffs down to brigade level Territorial commanders direct the collection of intelli- gence in their geographical areas and for some distance across the border The Northern Command is responsible for operations again Lebanon and Syria while the Central Command controls operations against Jordan Egypt and perhaps Saudi Arabia Information is collected through border obsorvation reconnaissance patrols Eid- crossborder operations Air Force and Navy Intelligence are small highly specialised units concentrating on items of immediate concern to only the Air Force and Navy commands The Directors of Air Force and Navy Intelligence attend the staff meetings of the Officers from each of these services are detailed to attend the regular meetings of the Research Department in order to 36 naval order of battle foreign capabilities and coordinate reporting resounsibility Officers from both services are also permanently assigned to the tion Department to coordinate requirements which are of particular concern to them a Are Forte Air Force Intelligence isa relatively small but efficient organira- lion Its main functions are to conduct intelligencei' operations necessary to support air activities and to -I coordinate with the DMI regarding its collection_I_ efforts Air Force intelligence is concerned eaclusively with Arab air order of battle and the' collection of Arab aerial target data This information I is largely collected by aerial reconnaissance and if SIGINT with supplementary information provided by agent reports and prisoner interrogations in hot war I situations The IDF relies heavily on photoreconnais- sance for order of battle information The Air Force has two photointerpretation facilities but probably - I does not have more than 20 imagery interpreters 1970 all Air Force Intelligence facilities were permanent although the Israelis planned to acquire- several mobile facilities While Air Force Intelligence does not produce estimates it does prepare intelli- gence studies on air order of battle threats and capabilities The Air Force administers its own attaches abroad Air Force procedures for handling imagery intelli- gence are highly centralized yet flexible Israeli photoreconnaissance capabilities however arelimit-r ed Photographic coverage is not possible below feet and camera systems are not capable of revealing for example whether SAM surface to air missile sites'I' are mounted Additionally Air Force pl'iotolaboratory - ouality control is almost nonexistent Air Foroei Intelligence despite its high standards did not have enough imagery interpreters at the time of the Tom - Kippur War and the overall sltill level of those few was rather low - b Hormones Naval Intelligence is a- small centralised service of approximately lit people operating in Support of Navy units Most of the personnel are located in the Navy headquarters- building in Tel Aviv The service deals mostly with-- threats Naval Intelligence operates as a semiautono-' mous unit of Military intelligence and is not obliged to provide personnel at the national intelligence level 'II Naval Intelligence personnel are not subordinate to the' stcasr Ml elect to I've consultative aariatance in naval matters In the table of organization the Director cl Naval Intelligence falls under the Ollicer Command mg the Hair for operational and reportina matters and support the top new The aerrice is patterned after the Military Intelligence structure but geared to the requirements and scope of navy iunctiona and missions The organization has a deputy director and Collection Targetina Production watch and Securitt r Departments It assim Officers to the naval bases at Haifa Ashdod Elat Sharnt e CIET Shayhh and a commando unit based in southern Sinai There is alto a Protocol Department which deals with foreign naval attaches in Israel and a small organize-5 tion and administration departrnent Figure The Collection Department With about 17 person- nel is one ol the components in the Naval Intelligence structure It has few intearal operational resources and support for moat of its collection efforts must come from or be coordinated through the DHI Exceptions to this arran ernent are Collection Depart- DIHEGTCIH NAVAL MTELLIGENGE Deon- it Or I 91 1 Secqu Production Targeting Protocol Colieenon Department Department Doparlrnam Department Department I Foreign Foreign Marlee Home I Arlbi Soviet i I I Syrlai'LebanuIIntelligence interiagence Inielingence Intelligence Inning-nee 'D icer Dilicer Dinner Dine-r Dlliur Halla air-due Eilat snarm El I Command 3- 9 CIA Coordination Figure 3 Organization oi Naval Intelligence SECRET 37 SECRET ment control of tsraeli naval attache activities abroad small boat coastal operations COMINT ELINT and aerial reconnaissance in cooperation with Air Force Intelligence and a merchant marine program The post-World War II Israeli endeavor in clandestine arms procurement and illegal immigration developed important commercial and shipping contacts some of which may still be handled by or at least coordinated with Naval intelligence The Tameting Department with about person- net is divided into two divisions Syria Lebanon and Africa These divisions are for preparing coastal studies for naval gunfire missions 2 preparing beach studies for amphibious assaults i3 preparing special target studies to support commando operations and preparing and main- taining target folder on lebanese Syrian and Egypt- tian ports The Department has access to all sources of information available to the Div In addition to levying requirements for collection on the Military Intelligence Codection Department the Director of Naval Intelligence is on regular distribution for information obtained by the Dh ll related to naval affairs The Production Department with a staff of about tilt is the largest component of Naval Intelligence This unit is divided into two divisions drab Navies and the Soviet Navy The Production Department handles research analysis production and dissemina tion of informatictn on all mobile forces associated with r'trab Navies and the Soviet Naysr in the Mediterra- nean This component is the primary user of all source material which flows into Naval headquarters espe- cially SICINT information The work of this depart- ment is mainly in support of units operating out of the four naval bases and the commando unit in southern Sinai Production is limited largely to studies on enemy order of battle and special weapons Those studies and others including target folders identifies tion manuals and enemy tactics outlines are dissemi- nated to operational commanders and crews through the base intelligence officers The base intelligence officer disseminates such information by briefing crews or updating a ship's intelligence library through additions updates and changes The Security Department which has a staff of abOut 12 performs a limited counterintelligence function within Navy headquarters at all naval buses 33 Security Department personnel are navy officers and enlisted men who have been specially trained by the Field Security Department of Military Intelligence They perform basic countersubversion and counter- sahotagae taslrs at headquarters and at subordinate bases They do not heurever carry out base scourity or personnel investigations which are done by Military Intelligence Field Security units The Organization and Administration Department with about sil- personnel assigned provides secretarial support for the Director of Naval Intelligence These personnel handle routine administrative duties Naval Intelligence although small is a and evidently highly efficient service Recruiting of personnel into Naval Intelligence is done by means of a very efficient informal system which identifies individuals and matches them to the needs of the Director of Naval Intelligence This system is apparently in force throughout Israeli military intelli- gence organlntions Naval Intelligence officer per sonnel are recruited through several different chanr neis Most younger junior officers enter directly from the universities while others transfer within the Nays from naval operations units to the into- licence service 4 third source is enlisted personnel who have displayed the necessary qualities and have indicated an interest in following a career in naval intelligence l Zince identified such people are sent to a university at Navy expense Upon completion of their training they are commissioned and pursue careers in Naval Intelligence Israeli Navy enlisted personnel both male and female are mostly volunteers who have been screened by the Director of Naval Intelligence The Naval Intelligence women serve 20 months while the men serve 35 months There are no special naval intelligence schools in Israel and naval intelligence officers and key enlisted personnel are trained at the Military Intellinence School In general women receive onlyr on-the-job training however if a woman shows an interest in a naval intelligence career she will be enrolled in the enlisted course of the Military Intelligence School Na val Intelligence enlisted men attend an abbreviated course enrollment in an espanded course depending on motivation and intended utilization There appears to be very little problem with the retention of naval intelligence personnel The primary constraint on the Director of Naval Intelligence is the total number SECRET toIIiccr and enlisted of slots assigned The centralized isle-m with primary area of intelligence interest lends itself very well to the Mid The close knit int igence support rvstem also worlts well considering the tact of integral collection assets Intelligence prior to and during the Tom Kippur was received in the Operations Center at Naval headquarters During the war the Director of Naval Intelligence worked very ckpely with the Officer tlommanding the Navy in the I Taranter during ongoing uperalions Information from SIGINT and other aiurees was received in the Center as raw data thrrelation of all information was then done on the spot by the Chief of Naval Intelligence and passed on to the Officer Commanding the Navy The informa- iron was disseminated in the form of orders or reports In operational commanders and units Processing and dissemination of naval intelligence was accomplished in a highly professional manner with no major deficiencies or Arab naval surprises in the Tom ti'r ar Naval Intelligence also revealed a litiilt-II'I flexibility when the service shifted quickly to a hot WEI situation and handled support for active naval operations including shore bombardment One major area where Naval Intelligence has problems is the limited numtrer of personnel In use of continuous operations similar to the Tom Wat quality naval intelligence work would probably degenerate after a month of steady operations 3 Administrative tin-st - of the Directorate of Military Intelligent There are ei it officers plus a larger number of NCth is tiersonoel and civilian clerical personnel in in the selection of I lied military personnel for intelligence assignment Intelligence prefers t bill-13 individuals to intelligence work while they are young and move tilt-to upwards as they acquire Hperirnt'e and can assume greater responsibility Recruiters Seek promising young people who are studying foreign languages or other subjects of interest to the service in secondary school Prior to graduation Military Intelligence officers contact selected young Iludenls matct and females s and offer them Elsi-t lions as interpreters during the two years of compuls 'i he service has priority - SECRET sory military service which follow at the completion of secondary education Those who accept are assigned to Military Intelligence when they loin the Promising young army personnel are then sent to the Military Intelligence School following which they may he commissioned and assigned as assistants to intelligence officers in the iteld When they attain the rant of captain having served as intelligence officers some are assigned to an area command headquarters or to the Directorate of Military Intelligence to expand their experience and qualify them for more responsi- bility and eventual promotion to higher rants Thu-l 'rnany of the officers now serving with Military Intelligence entered as young men and moved up through the ranlrs Most Military Intelligence personnel are regulars not reservists because the IDF requires career intelligence officers Ml personnel including con- scripts ioin Military Intelligence voluntarlly Female enlisted members who often serve as translators usually scrve only 2ft months whereas male enlisted personnel serve at months Military Intelligence training is professional and extensive Uffioers and are well-trained and competent in their fields The Military Intelligence School is located north of Tel Aviv on the road to Edit Dov airport This school trains both officers and noncommissioned officers Approximately I50 instruc- tors and 9t support personnel train between 2120 and 3 000 students annually The school's usual course runs from September through February This arrangement has been made to talte advantage of new groups of high school graduates This center is a relatively new facility which was established in the late 1960 It was formerly part of the IDF Infantry SchOOl- The commander of the Military Intelligence School is responsible to the DMI for intelligence instruction and to the intelligence Corps for training in general Course content is the responsibility of the DMI The training staff supervises training aids and instruction methods A Combat Intelligence Branch provides instruction for operational personnel and a' General SubieCts Branch trains specialists The General Soloist-ctr Branchr for erample teaches course in field security censorship military drafting photo interpretation research for order of battle analysis collection and aerial otistErvation Other Special courses are taught as needed Field Semirity cotatterintelligence norsonnel 39 SECRET Air Force and Navy students also take courses at the Military Intelligence School and Military Intelligence instructors are responsible to the for intelligence training at the schools of other IDF branches They are charged by the for quality If intelligence teaching These instructors usually have wartime assignments with tactical units Military Intelligence personnel staff intelligence positions down through brigade level line officers with intelligence training at the Infantry School staff the lower echelons Field Security personnel are selected on the basis of strict criteria regarding personal security and loyalty to Zionism and the Israeli State They are trained by Shin Beth In general Military Intelligence although it has a good training program and tries to offer career inducements has dif culty in retaining competent personnel became of low wages and slim opportunities for advancement 4 Methods of operation Military Intelligence is responsible for cross-border operations into the neighboring Arab states Its operations rely heavily on the exploitation of Arabs within Israeli and the Administered Territories Arab students who though residents of Israel attend universities in the Arab nations Arab travelers and visitors Arabs in Israeli prisons and Arab military deserters defectors Bedouins and smugglers Military Intelligence collection requirements cover political and economic subjects as well as military information and uses the information acquired both or policymaking purposes and as basic intelligence Military Intelligence is also active in collecting information from sources outside Israeli terrorist and subversive organizations arid activities Although SIGINT sources acquire some information on these subiects Military Intelligence office believe that only agent sources can really obtain the data needed on various terrorist aroum' policies and plans methods of operation equipment training and relations with other groups Primary Israeli interest in tenorism is to obtain early warning oi impending operations In each regional area of Israel local citizens in some cases Arabs who are Israeli agents act as spotters for Military Intelligence Most of these spotters have long worked for Military Intelligence which alerts them to 40 reported a potential source he steps and and I lyu the rest to Military Intelligence officers Intelligence contacts the potential soroee assesses him and if appropriate attempts to recruit him as an agent This is described as the direct method of recruiting agents for Military Intelligence The inch rect method refers to recruiting sources by or Il'lruugh agents outside Israel Both Field Security and the police investigate the backgrounds of potential agents for Military Intelligence The motives of the spotters and lam support mule are either monetary or a desire for services in the form of aid in reunitlnl families or representation on behalf of the spotter in we problem with the Israeli Government The basic agent motivation is generally economic gain in the form ol salaries loans which are seldom repaid and gilts Another common incentive is a wish to move to Israel and rejoin relatives who reside there In some cases the agent may be a Palestinian refugee who believes that he still has a claim to' property in Israel and wants either recom- pense or a guarantee of the eventual return of his property Other agents are members of Arab minority groups or opponents of Arab regimes Military Intelligence officers do have problems in handling Arab agents who tend to exaggerate and often fail to report accurate details Therefore the Military Intelligence officers encourage their Arab agents to provide photographs maps and other corroborating documents Military Intelligence ofiicrri also crosycbeclr reports often by using other agents in the same region Despite Israeli warnings during training Arab agents tend to tell other members of their family about their association with Military Intelligence Occasionally an Arab agent may reoruit all the members of his immediate family as subagents and try to get his case officer to pay them salaries The Israelis refer to these family suhagents as uranium-- tionalist These subagents sometimes compromise a whole operation as a result of boasting about their activities Occasionally the Military Intelligence case officer will order these unwanted confusions-rials across the border into Israel for security briefings but Military Intelligence has not solved this More completely Military Intelligence trains its agents in tradecrali collection methods security and reporting procedures SECE ET Military Intelligence runs its agents in networks or as singletons the latter are referred to as lone wolves For security reasons Military Intelligence prefers that an agent with good access remain a lone wolf Agent networks cortsist of a primary source and subsotnces Military Intelligence does not refer to sources as such Inns-ad calling both primary and subsooree agents Military Intelligence officers tt'tIr to meet and train each agent personally on the Israeli side of the border Networks usually include a radio operator and in some cases a courier When possible Military Intelligence case officers ureter direct meetinea With all agents inside lsmel in order to receive their reports personally to check rruptirements and to formulate future plans One aspect of the relationship between Military Intelli- arncc officers and agents is unique when compared to the techniques employed by other services In many Military Intelligence headquarters uv-ompany case officers to personal agent meetings in miter to clarify certain details of the agent's reports and give him guidance on certain points or problems 1Fits-sue meetings are usually held in salehouses with both the case officer and the analyst present but if an agent is pressed for time the case officer and analyst may meet him during darkness at a prearranged spot alone the border Military Intelligence also communicates with its agents by SEW letters -posted in third countries by agent radio and by deaddrops Military intelligence nan-rations have been marked by flexibility economy in the use of assets and by responsiveness to require- ments the system worked well prior to the Yom Ktppur War in Dctober Agents reported early warning information which in retrospect contained reliable indications of a coming Arab attacli Direct mmrnunimtion with agents however virtually ceased during hostilities and what little agent restarting there was during the war was of limited value to sraeli Military headquarters and field commanders The problem faced by Military Intelligence in the mttisition and reporting of intelligence by agents is the lack of modern eouiprnent Although many of the agents have radios mainly receivers and cameras and au- lamiliar with secret writing the sophistication level nl techniques and equipment is low This adversely alter-ts the quality security and timeliness of collection SHIFT operations Military Intelligence employs a SIGINT system that is modern sophisticated and effective The DMI is resmsible for providing technica support to other directoratss but the techniul services of the various military intelligence director-ates are interior to the technical groups of Shin Beth The DMl's technical equipment such as that used in audio surveillance or that employed in worlt agent support is generally high although it is last good in some special fields such as miniaturiration In the use and application oi infrared devices however the capability is usually good Military Intelligence personnel are capable of malring ad hoc Modifications of existing equipment and are up to date on technical advances concerning remote control and activation at transmitters and in the field of low-light photography Military Intelligence relies heavily on aerial reconnaissance and SIGINT for timely order of battle information Aerial reconnais- sance is apparently a primary instrument for hosting fedayeen groups although such preparations are well penetrated by field agents Military Intelligence is capable of providing timety and detailed information on Israel's primary neighbor- ing enemies through agent operations that are well planned and highly imaginative The main purpose of Military Intelligence Field Security units is to control the local Arab population in the Administered Tcrrorities and to minimise their participation in terrorism In this endeavor Field Security of the Administered Territorits works closely with Shin Beth and the Border Guard Residents are required to carry ID cards curfews have been imposed suspected resistors have been detained and the houses in the area of persons presumed to know of terrorist activities have been demolished even though the inhabitants were not directly involved In the early 9705 it was estimated that the Israelis had some residents of the Administered Territories under administrative detention Personnel of Field Security units have carried out sweeps in searches for terrorists and arms caches through areas in the West Bank where terrorism has occurred in some occasions Israeli operations have talren place at night apparently intended at least in part to intimidate the populace In December the Defense Minister announced that 516 buildings had been demolished in the occupied territories since the 967 war 255 in the 41 SECIIT West Bank 227 in Gaza and 2A In Jerusalem 1While these Israeli policies and actions have intimidated many Arabs who ntilht other have encased in resistance activities or in terrorism in many cases they have been counterproductive In that they have aroused deep and widespread resentment among the reddeitts of the Occupied Territories In areas where buildings have been destroyed an atmosphere of personal anger and raeentmient has been added to the natural bitterness of a defeated people particularly amonathe younger Arabs 5 Relations with other services There appears at the present time to he a very harmonious relationship between Military Intelligence and the other Israeli intelligence and mourity services Most Israeli intelligence and security personnel especially on the policy and coordination level realise that their very national depends on an effective and smoothly functioning intelligence and security community In addition officers at the department chief and even more so at the division chief lovel all have known each other personally for a long period of time Time relationships have been forged during troubled times seldom experienced by any other nation and now provide a framework for cooperative teamwork and coordination amcna the services Liaison between Israeli Military Intelligence and foreign organizations have varied over the years from good to poor depending on the exigencies of the situation and the demands of policy In recent years the Israelis have provided military and security aid and training to various African nations including Flldopis Uganda and Zaire They have also encased In military and security training and equipment exchanges with Latin American and Asian services The Israelis have maintained aood relations with Turkey and Iran in military and security matters 1While the Israelis do mt have full diplomatic relations with Iran they have an overt official mission whose members have diplomatic titlesI including that of military attache E Research and Political Planning Center The Research and Political Planning Center for- merly the Research Division in the Ministry for 42 Foreign Affairs prepares analysis based on raw intelligence for ioyemment policymakers Its office is located in a separate fenced compound within the Ministry of Foreian Affairs complex in Jerusalem A guard at the compound gate prevents unauthorized entrance into the Center and photo ID cards are required for admittance The Center presently employs fewer than too people both and support staff who were recruited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Israeli universities The lBanter has sis divisions North Africa the Fertile Crescent the Arabian Peninsula other Geographic Regions Economic and Strategic Some Til percent of the lCenter s personnel are employed in the three Arab units The Center prepares its analyses on the basis of raw intelligencc data available to the Israeli intelligence communiti The Center produces short papers on current intelli- aence and lonaer analytical memoranda as required The Center's products are disseminated to all minis- tries of the government The Foreign Minister uses the Center as his personal hraintrust to give him an independent means of judging the products of Military Intelligence and Mossad Although its analyses are sent to Israel's top dccisionmalers the Center's role in the Israeli intelligence and security community probably is still a modest one The Center reportedly has few problems arising from competition within the community probably because of a lack of status in comparison with the established and larger intelligence and security organizations F The National Police The Israeli Police Force is a national organization headed by an Inspector General responsible to the Minister of the Interior The national headquarters moved in mid-lfl g from Tel AyivsTafo to Jerusalem The force is comprised of the following departments Administration which is resmmible for transport 3 supplies communications property and finances 3 Investigations which is concerned with criminal and fraud investigations and special tasks in support of the intelligence and security community and Drierw aliens which is in charge of training patrols and 2 traffic There are also personnel research planning and development offices The Prison Services and the Civil Guard are also part of the Police Figure 9 SECRET If 43 nix Fin a Dull - I a all Eat 5 1 qu a u 1 Fin 213 1 34 Hi 1 SECRET The force is divided territoriallv into districts mbdistricts pone police stations and Wits The three police districts are Northern including Haifa Tel Aviv and Southern includinl lerusulem Attached to the Haifa lubdistriet is I mall eoast guard or marine police force which is based in the port of Haifa and patrols the whole coastline to prevent smuggling infiltration and illeaai fishina This unit also has patrol craft on Lake Tiberias and at Elat on the Gulf oi Aqaha The Southern District includes a special unit at Ben Gurion Led airport Figures and 11 It special component of the national police force is the Border Guard whose missions are to guard the malire lines against Arab infiltration and detecting and running down terrorists It works closely with the hump and patrols the Administered Territories and the border areas The Border canard also trains settlers in deferue measures against inliltrators ward duty in border Military censoripts who elect to fulfill their term of service by ioining the Border Guard are the principal sources of new recruits Figure inouii National Police headquarters Jerusalem frontal-lief view New 1972 44 for this component The Border Guard which nurn - about econ is in ated into the i'trrn'ir in time - WEI The effective strength of _the police force - including the Border Guard reached about 12 001 - the End of 2969 Roughly LIE of the police includi 1'63 Arabs were employed in the Adi-ruining - Territories in 1939' Over half the police force are he of Oriental background and in fact the police force a branch of government to which the assignment i Oriental Jews has been particularly encouraged The police force is capable of maintaining pubi- order and safety under normal circumstances it ha however been troubled by a manpower shorts-- courted by resignations resulting from low pa ovenvorlt and the attraction of hiehcr Divine it - elsewhere Despite the persistent shortage of manpow ET halite discipline is generally satisfactoryr undo in case of the Border Guard excellent The pubi- attitude toward the police has improved since thin-173 hm SECRET Figure it Israeli Border Gourd post under construction at ltetar lmwoid lair June 1910 early dam of statehood daepite scandals involving smuggling and the acceptance of bribes The police Inn-e has worked hard to overcome the traditional lrwish fear of police authority stemming from the Iunmic oppression of Jews The Israeli Police Force in' din-t acts as a were important auxiliary to Shin Beth at the preservation of internal securiti r throughout the unintrv The polioe support Shin Beth in investiga by Providing cover and making arrests ti Key officials Aehi-Tusr Aeraham itachhTu'II became Director of Shin Beth in the returner of 1974 He is a career Securityr officer His reputation was established as chiel of Shin Beth's i'srab lilLiirs Department where he was responsible for irnirlut ling operations in the hdministered Territories rial within the Aral community in Israel He served tum-ll as Deputy Director t'Il Shin Hetlt prior to his mimintnenl as Director Achi-Tuv is of German lei-hgmund He is married and has a daughter He earned a law degree at the University of Tel Elvis in rta- i-arlsr 197th while serving in Shin Beth He is ntnrinelv r bright hard-working ambitious and thor ough He is also known to he headstrong abrasive and arrogant Haiti Titzhal Major General met Titzak Hoffi became Director at Massed on 1 September 1914 He was born in Tel 45 is J SECIIT on 25 lanuary 1921' He joined the Haganah in 1941 and commanded a company in the Arab-lsraeli War in 1919 He continued to serye in the 1sraeli Delerle Forces in a variety of comps-nu staff and training posts including the command at the Paras troop Brigade Hot't'l was Acting Chief of Staff for a brief ported in Aprll'19'H but retired from the IDF at that time apparently because he was not appointed Chief of Staff Hoffi attended the US Army Command and General Staff Collect in the mid-196m He has also visited the US on mll't l' occasions In 1963 he impeded police units and participated in arl'nyr exercises in Uganda He traveled as a tourist to Hawaii Japan Hong Kore Bangkok and Tehran in 1910 and went to Singapore on undisclosed business He inspected Israeli advisory efforts in EthiOpia in 1972 and also went to other parts of Africa Although not an intelligence officer by background or trainina Hoffi apparently demonstrated his flair for intelli- gence analysis as Commander of the Northern Command in the days preceding the Turn Kippur War in October 1913 by sensing the impending Syrian attack and requestina the Defense Minister to reinforce the Golan Heights with an armored brigade Hoffi reportedly has expanded Moss-ad's role in the collection of intelligence on Arab capabilities and the interpretation of such information Hoffi is reserved and quiet but can be warm and genial among friends He is married and has two dauehiers He speaks English Neither as flashy nor as imaginatiye as some of his predecessors in Mossad he is reported to be meticulous and somewhat dour Sagi t'ehoshua Cellos-a1 Yehoshua Sagi born 27 September 1933 Jerusalem Palestine Israel entered the lsraeli De- fense Force in 1951 and was commissioned in 1953 From 1953 to 1m he served in the Southern Command fulfilling field duties During the Sinai Campaign he served as intelligence officer of the Armored Corps and as commander of a reconnais- sance unit Following the 1955 war he served as an intelligence officer with the 'l'th Brigade and later as an assistant otficer Southern Command In 1955 he undiluted from the IDF Command and Staff College Following his graduation he served as commander of an intelligence Officer Training Course and It In Intelligence officer with the 46 Southern Command before returning in an instructor with the Command and Staff Cullen - 19'1'2 he hocarne commander of the Intelligence but left in 19 3 to become intelligence officer with I Armored Division Southern Command in 19 title Sari was appointed Deputy Director Milita Intelligence Production and Estimates in 2 Februa 1979 he assumed the Directorship of Military lnlel gcnce Sagi is soft-spoken direct and bass no-nono outlook He considers himself an Arab expert lie married and has three daughters He speaks Eneli H Comments on principal sources 1 Source materials Most of the information in this publication has derived from a variety of sourms including - -c assets of the Central intelligence A ncy publicati of the Israeli lContentment and re is prepared by United States Department of Defense Research basically completed in December 19m 1 Supplementary overt publications a Aldouby Iwy and Ballinger Jerrold Sheltered Silence the Eli Cohen Affair New Coward McCann and Geochegan 1971 Is Arendt Hannah Eichmonn in Icrmol New York 1Viking Press 196-3 c BanZohar Michel The Avengers L1 Arthur Earlier 1958 d Bap-Zohar Michel Spies in the Pr tend leer Hotel and the lsroeli Secret 5- Boston Houghton Mifflin Company 1912 e Ben-Hanan Eli Our Man in Damascus York Croisrn Publishers 1969 - f Ben-Porat Dan Uri Secret War York Sabra Books 19m g Ben-Porat Dan Uri Spy from far New York Tower Publications 1959 11 Elsl'id d 'i'l 111 1 0113134211 111 James Daft- Tie Honor Chicago Honr y Hegnery 1975 i Eytan Steve Repeated Triumphs Eco Israel Spy System Washington Joint Public Research Service - SEC Harei lsser The Hons an ll'n' Capture of Adolf Landon - A mm It Israel Imminent Year Baal 5735-5 1915- lerusalenl 1975 I Lou Johann Wolfgang The Champagne Spy York Manor Banks 1973 m Pearlman Moshe The Capture of Adolf h hmnn bridal-1 Weidenfeld and 195 n Janna-z Inner Lam Arm I IlnHurt Main Govern 1975 CllT 5E CRE o Rabin lamb Elie Cohen L'espian do Dam Paris Flammarion 1967 p Shlaim Avi Failures in National Intelligent Estinwlas The Case a Yom Kippur War Princeton World'Pulitics April 1975 u Tadmar Joshua The Sileni Warriors Edite and translated by Raphael Hulhstein Tau-unto Mac- Millan 1959 r Tinnin David B and Christensem Hail The Hit Team Boston Little Brown 1976 a Who' Who in Israel 1975 Tel hviv Bran - man and Cohen 1975 47