I I I c l o r i I c I I_ r_ r I I_ I I Ill Ill_ I I I g i I l I 'i i ' r lf- 2 z_ DOD I DFOO lt TOPSECRETCONTR OL Copy No ____ _ Case No OZ-- F- l'-l-50 T S No 02 -T'S-0' 2 Document Ne I HISTORY OF STRATEGIC AIR Ca-tlAND l JULY 1975 - 31 DECEMBER 1976 HIS'IORICAL Sl'UDY NO 161 U VOI u 1E I NARRATIVE CLASSIFIED BY CIN S C RESTRICTED DATA This nuterial contains Restricted Data as defined in the Atanic Energy Act of 1954 Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited _QL ·9- fO OFFICE OF THE HISIORlllN HEACQUARIBRS STRATEGIC AIR 15 JULY 1977 Fl lSSELL E • Mi lfJERI l al USl F C'aml3nder in Chief 77-HA-404 CY20F7CYS -- N r ' March as contingency mobility units in the CONUS while the 43d Strategic Wing at Andersen and the 376th Strategic Wing at Kadena were the Pacific contingency mob'ility units 71 -'- B' S -The_B - 52D_ _th- - l' timary aircraft for concingency operations ----I 'could deliver weapons in a wide range of contingency missions including aerial mine-laying operations reconnaissance surveillance operations psychological operations and show of force Because rapid contingency support was essential to the deterrence of aggression units were to deploy withinLl I J after notificatiru J 2 S XGDS He dquarters SAC made the important assumption that the - ----- I -- --world -trouble spot the U S had included it in theater iarfare plans i 0l As recently as October 1975 Headquarters SAC and 3d Air Division reviewed - ---- ---- - I · af' t _ the SAC forces necessary to support the· U N in South Korea 74 ln August 1976 the nearest B-52D bombers and six KC-135 1 s TDY to Andersen were 1 11 pl$l 1 I• · c assigned to the 43d Strategic Wing and ssigned to the 376th Strategic Wing - · ' additional KC-135 tankers were The Korean Incident c_uS On 18 August 1976 North Korean soldiers murdered two U S Army officers who were supervising the pruning of a poplar tree in the Joint Security Area JSA of the United Nations Command in Korea The next day the JCS declared DEFCON Three for U S Forces in the Republic of Korea The U S protested the killings and served notice again to 'yongyang that the U S was not ready to pull out of South Korea Consequently the U S directed a number of military show of force actions in which SAC played a principal role c - - -_0 Refuelin port At OO J2Z on 19 August the JCS alerted SAC to provide inflight refueling for an F-111 squadron deploying to Taegu Korea 75 Within hours SAC rapidly established three TTF's to support the F-lll's The Fairchild TTF was composed of 10 KC-135's and two spares The Eielson TTF was composed of 20 tankers and five spares while the Ks dena TTF was composed of 13 tankers and two spares The · ·· - t 1 1 Mti J' - · · i f A ss· 1F p··IR i'L- -CC'-f2_f 2_ D _ f1 · - F @ Ii i w u -- __ ___ - -· · - - ·-_· -- ' ' ' ' · ' · · · i•'' - · i @ · inga were completed and the 1B F-111 'a were in place at Taegu by 0855Z on '11 ----v- --20_August -12_J l_cl__2 e half hours after the last aircraft departed from Idahc 71 Genernl Dougherty expressed hi -appreciatl Oilto TA a'e com- i N 78 I' mander Please convey my personal congratulations and the admiration of the men and women of SAC to the tigers of the 366TFW The timely movement of all scheduled aircraft over a difficult and demnnding route has again proved that TAC posffessea the best f ghter aircrews in the world SAC is pleased and proud to have participated in this noteworthy achievement and we continue to commit our tankers to be 11 ready for contact'' -when __ -- and 1i1here needed lA z This refueling commitment of SAC's was further tested 20 August The F-111 aircraft needed logistical support MAC began airlifting mate- -- --·--- riel to Ko -_-1 - suppori h se- flgnters vii r-C-14 - and c-5 aircraft -·-SAC - provided the 12 KC-135' s to refuel these C-5 'a fly ·ng non atop from Mountain Home to and refueled the 79 on 20 August Taegu C-5's Nine of the tankers came from the Eielson TTF southeast of Alaska shortly after takeoff at OB30Z Three KC-135's compromising the Yokota TTF refueled the C-S'a east of Japan and then recovered at 80 0248Z on 21 August at Kadena General Carlton praised SAC's flexible response which made possible the short-notice C-5 deployment that began even before the F-111 deployment Bl was completed IA_ In the meantime on 19 August with tropical storm Dot threat ening Okinawa the 376th Strategic Wing made plans to evacuate its air 82 craft from Kadena With the approval of Headquarters SAC the 376th 83 removed its four KC-135's tram alert to prepare for evacuation The evacuation which began at 2355Z on 19 August involved relocating seven KC-135A's five KC-13SQ's and three RC-135M's to Yokota three KC l35Q's and one RC-135T to Clark and three KC-13S's to Andersen 84 With the storm passing 60 85 only 47 knots miles sou h-southwest the peak winds at Kadena reached 86 The aircraft returned to Kadens on 21 August Three of the tankers evacuated to Yokota participated in a refueling misoion that had begun on 20 August when SAC provided nine KC-135'• to refuel t1'0 GBU-15 equipped F-4E fighters deploying from '• -1 ' -'· - ' -· ·' - - i r rwf'2sfrr kil·n ' _ - # i 1 U· t 0 c c 87 AB Korea via Elmendorf AFB Alas_ka One Eglin A FB Florida to Os n KC-135 from·B1ytheville and two from Grand Forks refueled the fighters on their way to Alaska Then three Eielson 'ITF tankers refueled the tactical fig tera as they began their flight across the Pacific At the half-way point the Eielson TTF tankers were relieved by the three Yokota based tank- 88 era which then refueled the fighters as needed on the final leg to Korea ' l SAC maintained a KC-135 tanker on strip alert at Kwang Ju Korea to provide support during any contingency ·On 20 August the 314th Air 89 Division at Osen required another KC-135 be deployed to Kwang Ju Head quarters SAC responded on the same day by moving one of the 43d Strategic Wing tankers from Yokota to Kwang Ju The two tankers provided inflight 90 refueling support for F-4E F-4D and F-4C aircraft The second 91 tanker remained at Kwang Ju until 7 September when it returned to Kadena l u ys 'JtSBo B-52 Operations With the F-111 ·squadron C-5 and F-4E deployments the move of the KC-135 to Kwang Ju and tropical storm Dot all cc curing on 20 August SAC units were quite busy In the meantime on 19 August the JCS alerted SAC to conduct B-52 bombing operations SAC considered Nightmare Range but it was too close to ·in Korea the DMZ 92 93 A second choice Koon-Ni was too close to a village The Chik-Do range could be used for B-52 1 s ·to drop I K 117 750-pound bombs from 25 000 feet after the Republic of Korea cleared the range 94 Headquarters SAC directed however that no live drops be made on any 95 range in South Korea unless it so directed · l' -'- On 19 August Headquarters 3d Air Division directed the 43d Strategic Wing to commence a pr_actice contingency generation exer cise that included the installation of conventional bomb racks in the B-52D'a 96 The Category A sorties were not taken off alert Later the 3d Air Division directed the 43d to load flares and ammunition 97 aboard the generated B-52D 1 s q -8-J The JCS directed the 43d Strategic Wing to fly B-5ZD training sorties over South Ko ea using two or three B-52's per cell during daylight While the B-52's would not carry bombs th y would I· I I I I · I I I 0 c I I I I I I I I I I I r fly high enough to be easily detected by North Korean radar which '1aa located north of the DMZ 98 SAC established the route low altitude profiles bomb runs rules of engagement and recall procedures for 99 the aircraft J Headquarters 3d Air Division then requested that the Jl4th Air Division at Osan furnish six MIG Combat Air Patrol CAP capable of shooting dow MIG' s--ai r_craft to fly between the 37th parallel and the DHZ during the inclusive time of 2146Z on 21 August and Oll4Z on 22 August to provide fighter support to the first three B-52D aircraft 100 flying over South Korea SAC planned the times to coincide vith Oper ation Paul Bunyan the joint United Nations Command operation in which the 101 remains of the poplar tree in the JSA were chopped down s · Three B-52D aircraft flaw from Andersen over South Korea with three buddy KC-135 tankers and recovered at Andersen The 1 -_5 _ · made their first bomb run from a high altitude 31 000-32 000 feet with the second snd third runs at medium altitude 15 000-16 000 feet Head 102 quarters SAC had cancelled the low level altitudes for these B-52 sorties Detachment 9 1st Combat Evaluation Group scored the synchronous simulated 103 release mission SJl i DS On 22 August 1976 Headquarters Jd Air Division notified Headquarters SAC that it needed a total of nine B-52' s and crews to continue flying the three B-52 sorties per day and maintain its aircraft on ground alert The 43d Strategic Wing also needed KC-135 support and consequently readjusted the redeployment of KC-135 aircraft and crews 104 from Andersen SAC to Andersen to support ency management appreciation for 108 the n t'Y• group SAC's then moved an additional tanker and crew from Okinawa 105 the B-52 missions That same day SAC's contin 106 inactivated General Dougherty expressed his 107 accomplishments with General Jones adding his S The 43d Strategic Wing made plans for a standdown for maintenance and planned to fly between one and three Korean training sorties per week afterwards The 3d Air Division requested th lt SAC permit the lat CEG personnel to provide a Korean low level terrain 109 avoidance route for B-52's flying RBS miasiona over 3outh Korea 213 i' N 0 c c J r itf' Then on 24 Auguot JCS indicated additional B-52 oortiee 110 were necessary and the contingency management group reconvened Headquarters SAC directed thc e B-52 sorties per day be flown and that one ground spare m1Utned and with engines cocked unmanned ground spare be maintained 111 running and one The 3d Air Di'llision then requested ·an additional tanker and two crews be oent to Andersen 112 £or ten days to support the B-52 sortiea On 26 August Headquarters SAC missions O'ller South Korea would continue declared that the training single ship if the cell mates aborted the mission • There is a sense of urgency concerning these missions however judgments are to be made with safe operations as the primary consideration and ultimate goal Major General John I 113 Burk11J · DCS Operationa cautioned if f To meet the 43d ·strategic Wing's need Headquarters SAC directed the 96th Bomb Wing to deploy two B-52 1 s and crews and the 114 7th Bomb Wing to deploy one B-52 and crew These aircraft deployed late on 25 Auguet and arri'lled at Andersen the next day Three tankers staging from Travis one tanker each from the 916th AREFS 96th Bomb Wing and 320th Bomb Wing pro'llided refueling sup port When the tankers arrived at Hickam one of them could not off load fuel A strip alert tanker from Hickam launched and assumed the mission 115 After the three additional aircrews arri'lled st Andersen Headquarters SAC recommended the 43d man the ground spare 116 B-52 whenever aircrew resources permitted The 3d Air Division also changed the launch times of the B-52 1s to permit launch and reco f during dayligh hours 117 SAC also pro'llided two B-52D and two KC-135 officers TDY to the 314th Air Di'lliaion at Osan The B-52 officers provided expertise on B-52 conventional matters and the coordination of B-52 and fighter tactics whice the KC-135 personnel provided experience with complex fighter refueling operations and the manual GCI environ 118 ment In addition SAC shipped four·J-57 engines to Andersen aboard C-141 air craft that ferried the augmentation maintenance personnel to the 43d Strategic Wing 119 I I I I I I I N I I D c I c - I C ' I I I I I I l Ll As the B-52' s flew from Andersen to Korea and back they passed over part of the Japanese islands Political sensitivities in Japan could be affected by bombers- flying over Japan On 26 August the American Flllbassy in Tokyo asked if the B-52's were flying across 120 Japaneae territorial air apace Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 121 replied that they were Aa a result SAC directed B-52' s not to f · U2 Y or y Japanese land mass DS SAC planned to continue the bombing runs after 31 August 123 ou on 30 August the JCS directed the sorties be terminated How ever the JCS notified SAC the ne t day that B-52 Korean training sor- 124 On 31 August SAC relieved the ties would commence 2 September 43d Strategic Wing of its four ground alert sorties in order to support 125 The mission waa flown 2 September with the B-52 training missions 126 three B-52's scheduled and two across the target The 3d Air Divi sion planned three oissions the week of 4-11 September 127 but on 7 Sep Korea 128 tember the JCS directed return to DEFCON Four for U S forces in On the following day they terminated the B-52 training flights over South Ko I • 129 f h ®s During the ten days of the B-52 Korean flights Head quarters SAC did not know if the JCS wanted the B-52 flights to con tinue 130 Therefore it explored several po ssibilities to continue 131 and e nd _these flights with recommendations from 3d Air Division The redeployment of he three B-52 1 s was originally scheduled _Jr 1 September 132 but when the JCS directed continuation of the B-52 training missions beyond the tenth day SAC postP oned the B-52D redeployment while the KC-135 and augmentation personnel red eploYJ lent l33 continued as scheduled After the JCS cancelled the B-52 sorties 134 the B 2D's redeployed on 3 September · On 20 October General Keck informed Headquarters USAF of some of the problems encountered during the Korean Incident At the beginning of the crisis too many channels of communications were open U See Busy Hurdler this chapter · f' N c 0 c r • between the·JCS USAF and SAC Since this had been a JCS directed action he suggested having all official calls channeled from the JCS crisis action team directly to the SAC contingency management team Aoother problem concerned the identification of Korean Training Sorties for the B-52 vie-a-via show-of-force sorties General Keck stated In future crisis situations consider tasking B-52 assets in a role consistent with the overall intent of the operation ·Better tasking might have been achieved if no reference to training had been made A third deficiency he identified con cerned the composition and requirement for tanker task forces these were not fully identified and therefore taxed the resources of the 6th Strategic Wing General Keck recommended that as much warning as possible be provided on' total refueling requirements necessary Finally the late decision to continue the B-52 missions past Day 5 and er 1 on Day 10 had an impact on the management of SAC resources causing a delay in deployment of B-52D aircraft to Aodersen General Keck recommended that lead time be considered before sending 135 out execution messages Sea ReCQnnaissance Surveillance JI SAC had long possessed anti-submarine watfare mine laying and sea search responsibilities as collateral roles in support of the U S Navy The 509th Bomb Group flew one of the first SAC sea·surveil lance missions with B-29 aircraft in 1946 Since the Cuban Crisis of 1962 when SAC's B-47's sighted Soviet vessels enroute to Cuba however SAC's activity had been negligible while it still kept up the plans for maritime operations during war times In the 1965-1973 time period the B-52 which had been regarded as a at ategic bomber in its first decade of service in SAC assumed another role that of a conventional bomber After conclusion of the war in Southeast Asia I