ARB on Havana Syndrome Response Pray Tell Who Was in Charge diplopundit net 2021 02 16 arb-on-havana-syndrome-response-pray-tell-who-was-in-charge By domani spero February 16 2021 On February 10 2021 the GWU’s National Security Archive published the report of the Accountability Review Board ARB for Havana Cuba dated June 2018 The ARB document was classified SECRET NOFORN with declassification date of June 7 2043 It was released via a Freedom of Information Act request The report includes a timeline from the Bureau of Western Hemisphere compiled at the request of the Cuba Accountability Review Board We are working on merging that timeline with the personnel churn that occurred around the same time at the State Department We should also note that the report includes other attachments like an unclassified 2-page Memorandum dated April 11 2018 from Deputy Legal Adviser Joshua L Dorosin to ARB Chair Ambassador Peter Bodde entitled “ARB Questions Related to the Exercise of M Authorities from January 21 2017 to present This memorandum was redacted under B 5 A 2-page document labeled SBU Department of State’s High Treat High Risk Post Review Process effective January 2 2018 was released with the ARB report but also redacted under B7 F Take aways from the ARB-Cuba Report — ARB 1 6 The Cuba Accountability Review Board was convened on February 8 2018 some thirteen months after individuals first visited Embassy Havana’s MED unit reporting of various symptoms including headache ear pain dizziness and hearing problems in late December 2016 The ARB report is an interim response findings The ARB says “a final review should be undertaken ” Also see Coming Soon – Accountability Review Board Havana For Mysterious Attacks in Cuba — WHAT WE DON’T KNOW According to the ARB the last Havana incidents resulting in medically confirmed injury took place at the end of August 2017 As of June 2018 the date of the report the ARB writes “We do know that USG and Canadian diplomatic community members were injured but we do not know how We do not know what happened when it happened who did it or why ” — CLOSE IT AND FORGET IT According to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere’s WHA timeline Secretary Tillerson ordered the Departure of Non-Emergency Personnel from Havana on September 29 2017 OD can be initiated by chief of mission or the Secretary of State But According to the ARB “the decision to draw down the staff in Havana does not appear to have followed standard Department of State procedures and was neither preceded nor followed by any formal analysis of the risks and benefits of continued physical presence of U S government employees in Havana After six months of ordered departure Havana was designated an unaccompanied post in March 2018 ” Also see US Embassy #Cuba Now on Ordered Departure Over “Attacks of an Unknown Nature” Can we revisit this for another blogpost Reach out if you have some thoughts about our continuing presence in Havana The ARB adds “Neither the Department’s High Threat High Risk Post Review HTHR Process nor the former Vital Presence Validation VP2 Process were enacted ” No risk benefit analysis has been done for Cuba as of June 7 2018 “Many Department leaders interviewed by the Board no one could explain why this has not happened except to suggest that REDACTED — LACK OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP AND ALL THAT “The Department of State’s response to these incidents was characterized by a lack of senior leadership ineffective communication and systemic disorganization No senior official was ever designated as having overall responsibility which resulted in many of the other issues this reports presents The interagency response was stove-piped and largely ad hoc In our report the Board makes recommendations on accountability interagency coordination communication and information sharing medical issues risk benefit calculations and security operations ” — SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES 2 6 “For the period after February 15 2017 the Board found serious deficiencies in the Department’s response in areas of accountability interagency coordination and communication at all levels both at Post and in Washington These deficiencies contributed to the confusion surrounding the events and delayed effective coordinated action The Board finds the lack of a designated official at the Under Secretary level to manage the response to be the single most significant deficiency in the Department’s response — NO ONE IN CHAAAARGE WHHHHY The ARB report says “To this day no senior official at the Department has been assigned responsibility for leading and coordinating efforts to assess past incidents and prevent mitigate future events No Department of State task force was formed There was no interagency working group REDACTED ” Nor was a dedicated internal State Department group was created — EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE EAC The WHA Timeline indicates that Embassy Havana held an Emergency Action Committee EAC meeting 17 HAVANA31 on April 3 2017 to assess the threat and holds an all hands meeting for cleared Americans First Post EAC Meeting conducted more than 4 months after individuals believed they were first impacted Wait and it was over 6 weeks after officials at Post and in Washington had the first unverified information of injury The ARB says that “The Emergency Action Committee EAC an Embassy Front Office responsibility is an essential element of security policy infrastructure REDACTED ” Still “once the EAC cable was received the Department’s response tempo increased although in a stove-piped and inadequately coordinated manner in the absence of an Under Secretary for Management or a designated responsible Department official ” — FIRST BRIEFING DELAY AND EXCLUSION OF FAMILY MEMBERS The ARB report says “The Board finds the delay of almost six weeks between first knowledge of injury and the first briefing of Embassy staff to be unfortunate and the exclusion of family members from this knowledge to be unjustified given the incidents were taking place at residences According to the WHA timeline on April 17 2017 Embassy Havana held its first meeting with Embassy spouses REDACTED – UGH WHAT WERE YOU THINKING PEOPLE That Eligible Family Members occasionally known as “just spouses” have no need to know anything that may turn their brains to mush -— DOMESTIC MEDEVAC AUTHORITY WHO DIS The ARB report says that “The lack of standing authority for the Department of State Medical Director to approve medical evacuations between domestic locations when required added additional steps and bureaucratic time requirements to the medevac process ” It also says that “To accomplish these medevacs the Medical Director was required to request special 3 6 authority which was then granted specific only to the Cuba events In the future when another event occurs which requires domestic medevacs State MED will need to repeat the same administrative process specific to that event ” Required by whom Request special authority from where — DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FIASCO In July 2017 this was posted on the blog Tillerson Rescinds Delegated Authorities Department-Wide Further Gums Up Foggy Bottom Yep remember that Also Making Sense of Tillerson’s Rescinded Delegations of Authority @StateDept Now we’re reading about that decision in the ARB report “The July 2017 decision rescinding many delegated State Department authorities by the then-Secretary of State followed by the limited and poorly documented re-delegation of some of those authorities created widespread confusion about authorities It resulted in understandable concern and hesitation on the part of persons in acting positions who feared exceeding their authorities ” “Vacant senior positions and lack of clarity regarding delegated authorities delayed an effective response ” “Individuals filling Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary Positions in an acting capacity during an extraordinarily prolonged transition were hampered by the rescinding of delegated authorities and the ensuing confusion regarding those authorities that were eventually redelegated ” — NSDD-38 PROCESS One of ARB-Cuba’s recommendations says that “The Department should convene a high level review of the NSDD-38 process as it is currently implemented Following the review the Department should issue guidance to all employees and agencies regarding requirements and should hold agencies accountable In another recommendation it says “The Department should ensure that the NSDD-38 processes are followed REDACTED ” Per 6 FAH-5 H-350 the National Security Decision Directive–38 NSDD-38 process is the mechanism by which a COM exercises his or her authority to determine the size composition and mandate of U S Government executive branch agencies at his or her mission — WAITING FOR THE TICK TOCK The ARB report says that “Given that this is an unprecedented event it would be helpful to have an accurate record of what was done by whom when and why In order to learn the right lessons from this incident it is essential to have an accurate written record ” Also that “WHA and S staff should create a timeline tick tock of communication decisions and actions taken to date June 7 2018 in response to the incidents The investigation into the incidents and Department’s response should remain open until the Department 4 6 determines what happened This timeline is a critical part of the discussion and lessonslearned process ” — CHIEF OF MISSION The ARB report reveals “In exploring the guidance given to the COM regarding his responsibility for the security of all executive branch employees the Board learned the COM did not have a letter of instruction Presidentially-appointed Senate-confirmed ambassadors all receive a letter of instruction from the President detailing their responsibilities Typically the responsibility for the safety and security of American citizens and U S government employees features prominently in these letters In other posts where a COM is not Senate confirmed the Department sometimes issues a letter of instruction from the Secretary of State which serves a similar purpose ” Wait Secretary Tillerson’s top notch advisers did not know enough to advise the issuance of the letter of instruction — BUREAU DE-FACTO LEADERSHIP The ARB report says “The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs was frequently cited by those interviewed as the “de facto” lead bureau within the State Department WHA leaders attempted to fill some of the gap created by the lengthy vacancies at the Under Secretary level and convened a number of meetings for the purpose of sharing information They were largely unsuccessful at actual coordination in part because they did not have the authority to direct action on the part of other bureaus They were almost invariably in a reactive mode and never put forward a cohesive plan of action for the future They were also hampered by their very limited access to the senior leadership of the Department ” — EXCESSIVE SECRECY Ah the ARB report says that “Both at Post and in Washington response to the incidents was characterized by excessive secrecy that contributed to a delayed response ” Also that “WHA’s reliance on informal consultation with the Department’s leadership made it difficult for the Board to develop an accurate picture of decision making regarding the incident ” The report says “Informal communication between WHA and the senior leadership of the State Department contributed to the lack of coherence in the response Normal Department reporting channels and methods were routinely disregarded in the response to the Cuba incidents WHA officials were instructed to limit distribution of information to a select group of officials As a result accountability was never clearly established and there was no coordination within the Department The most frequent communication with the senior leadership was to the Secretary of State’s chief of staff via email Contemporaneous documentation of these interactions is scant ” Now don’t we all want to know who kept this very very quiet Why would WHA rely on “informal consultations” Who gave instruction to WHA to limit distribution of information to a select group of officials State gov emails are government records How is it that the ARB had no access to the most 5 6 frequent communication on this matter with senior leadership at State What about Tillerson’s chief of staff’s emails Wait are these state gov emails Why are contemporaneous documentation of these interactions scant What happened to memcons Were there instructions not to put anything about these interactions in writing If so who gave those instructions Who were the officials who downplayed these attacks Curious minds would like to know 6 6