I I ' ACTION EUR IlfFO s u 0 A-B A-0 A-D SA SPA Ulf O � P M-X-M 11 DEPART lENT OF ST� INCOMING TELEGRAM 896� Jlo paraphrase neceasar1 INFORMATION COPY ACTION MUST BE ENDORSED ON ACTION COPY Moscov v1a War Seereta rJ ot State Washington 511 Februar 22 9 p m - Datetl Febru rJ 22 1946 p m ��­ Anaver to Dept• s 284 Feb 3 1nvolv 3 questions 80 intricate so delicate so strango t•J our tol m o thought and so important to o n lJsis or our inter national environment that I cannot comp-i10ss ansveJ 8 into single br�er message vlthout Jleldjng to vhat I feel vould b e d ngol ous degree or over J1mp11t1cation I hope therefore 11 Dept v111 bear with me 1r I submit 1n answer to 'this question tive parts11 su· jt ots or which vill be rOU$hlJ as follows one �sic· reaturos or post-var Soviet outlook Tvo Background or this outlook Three Its projection in practical policv on ott1c1al level Four Its projoct1on on unotticial level Five Prar t1oal dedt ict 1ons troa etcs ndpo1nt ot US policy I apologize in advance tor this burdoning o telegraphic channel but questions involved aro a� such Ul'gent importance pa rtjcularly 1n viev ot recen� events that our ansYero to th�� if thsy deaerv' atten tion at 11 seem to me to deserve it at once � ERE POLL0 15 PART ONE BASIC f'F ATURES OF POST WAR 50 jET OUTL· OK AS PU'l FORWARD BY OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA MA1 1IlfE ARE AS FOLLOWS A USSR still lives in o ntagonistic 11cap11 �11at encirclement v1th vhich in the long rWl there ci 1 bo no permanent peacetul coex13tence As stated by Stalin 1n 1927 to a delegation or Amorican tol ke1· � IUI IH lrll I MOl t nrm 111 u MlrlU O 11 IU Sec Jal - d 5 IJJ • l'Q Dept Qf late A119- 10 1m - - In couroo -2- U5 u F�hrum•J 22 9 p m from Nuooov via War In oourae or rurthor tovnlo Wlent or 1nterno t1onal rovolutj on th9r1� vlll emnrge two r 111Jnter of vorld algn 1f1canee a so lo li�t r �c te1• dro ving to itself the count -leo IJ1 leh teml t own r l eoe1al1nm and a CR Pi tali pt ent4 r rll' VinB to i t�lr the oouotriea tbnt 1neJ 1ne tmro1• l cap1 taliem BattlA betveen thl'ae tvo cent9 t-B fot' couun '1nd r vo1•ld noon0117 v111 deoide rate or �o pl tal� RDI oud or c011111Un1or a 1n entire vorld B CnpJ tn 1et �•orl•l is beoet v th 1nt-�rnal con tlicte inherent tn nnt uro or cap1t ol iat aoa1ety ihese conrlicts nr� lunoluble by rneane of pencetul compromise Ort�ntoot of them 1a that between B nglanll and us __ - - C Internal confl1ota or anp1tal 1am lnevltablJ generate vat's wa�o thue generated ma y be of tvo ldndas 1ntra- ca p1 tnl1e t vare betvoen tvo cnp1tallet 'etatea eDd vars of intervention againot eoolaliet world smart cnpit alleta vainly aeeklog eeoape tt-oau 1 Dner oonfilcta of' cap1W1am 1noJ lue tovo rd latter D Int l'l'VE nt ton 4£R inat US Sr vhlle it vould be dieaatrou a to thoon vho undertook 1 t vould cause reneved del J in ppogreoo of' Soviet aoo1al1sm and mu at therefore be ro1'ostalled at all oosta B Con1 11cte betvoen cap1tal1ot atates though 11 koviae fraught· v1th danger ror USSR neYorthelesa hold out great i osnlb1llt1oo for o dvanoe1Mnt or aoo1al 1st cause pn rtlculnrl r 1t USSR relDGJ ne 11111tnr11J' - o_�r flll 1deolc gica l ly 1t1011011th1c and falthruJ to its preeent brilltar t 1'9adersh1p F It must be born� ln mind that copitallot world la not all btld Iu tidd1t1on to hopeleaal7 reactionary and bo1 D'geo1a elemento it 1nclwlea one oerta1n vholly enlightened o nd pouitlv� olementa united in acceptable coamm1at1c pa rt1oo cmd 'L 'Wo certain 0th er elements nov described for liact1cal rea3on3· as progressive o� •cusrn1 __ 0 I 11$J s c JID _ r m - democratic Wftllf -3- #511 l'eb1 UAl7·22 9 p 11 t'rom Moaoov via War demoorat1o vhoaa reaotion a aep1rat1one and aot1vtt1ee happen to be objectively favorable to interests or USSR Tbeae laat JDUat be enoolll'aged and utilized tor Soviet purpaaea G Amons negative elemeuta ot bourgeoia-oapitaliet eooletJ' moat da Dgeroua ot all are those whom Len1 n called talee ti-1enda or the people namely moderate aoo1al1at or eoo1al-demoarat1o leaders in other vorda non-oomanmiat lett-ving Theae l'e more dangeroua than out-and-out reaot1onar1ea tor latter at leaat ma rob under their true colors 'Vherea• moderate lett ving lead era oon1'U 8e people bJ employ1ns devioea or eoo1al1am to eerve 1ntel eata or reaotion rJ capital So muob tor prmnlaea To what deduationa do the7 lead tram atandpaint ot soviet pol1oJ' To tollov1ns1 A Bverything must be done to advance relative atrengtb ot USSR aa tnotor 1n international sooiety Couveraely no opportun1cy must be missed to reduce strength and tnnuenco colleot1velJ' aa vell aa 1nd1v14uall7 ot cap1t al11t povera B SoT1et ettorta and those ot Ruae1a11 friend• abroad 111U Bt be d ireoted toward deepeniDg and explo1t1Dg ot d1tterenoe11 and oonfi1ote betveen oapltali•t povel'e It th e•a eventually d£epen into an 1mper1al1et var this val' muat be turned into revolutionary upheavals v1tb1n the varioue capltal 1at oountriea C 111 emoorat10 progree11lva elements abroad are to be utilized to 1l18lt1mum to brlng pressure to bear on oap1te 11et governiaenta along 11nea gr'eeable to Soviet 1ntereeta Dl Relentleea battle mu at be vaged against sooialiat and aocial-d aaaocrat1o leaders abroad PART 'lVO HSMI BFIRM' -Ji- #511 Pebru l'J' 22 9 p 11 from Moeoov Yi Val P AltT TW01 BAC OROUID OP OUTLOOK Bet'ore examining ram1t1cn t1ona ot th1e p J'ty line 1n praot1oe there are certain aapeote or it to vhieh I v1eh to drav attention F1rat 1t doee not repi-eeent natural outlook of Ru11s1an people Latter are by and large friendly to oute1de vorld eager tor exper1enoe or it eager to 11eaeure against it ta lente thoy are oonacioua ot poaaea111Dg truite of their eager above all to live 1D peaoe and enjoy ovn labor Po rt� 11 De onl7 represents thesis vb1ch ott oial propaganda machine puta forward vitb great llk 111 and peraiatenoe to a public often remarkably reeiatant in the stronghold ot 1te innermost thougbta But partJ' line 1a b1Dd1Dg tor outlook and oonduct or people vbo make up apparatus ot pover--­ pa rty eeoret Pol1oe and govermaent---and it la ez olua1vel 7 v1th these that ve have to deal - Seoon4 pleaee note that prem ieea on vhich th1e pa rey line 111 baee4 are to't' moat part a1 mpl7 not true Experience haa ahovn that peacetul and mutually profitable coexistence ot oap1tal 1at and aoo1al1at atatea ia entirely poaa1bla Baalo 1ntei-nal oonn1ota 1n advanced countries r$ no longer pr1mal'117 those ar1a1Dg out or capitalist ovn erahip ot aeane of Pl'OclUotlon but are ones arising f'rom advanoed urbaniam and 1n4uatr1al1am aa suoh Vh1ch Ruaaia haa thuo tar been ep red not b y aoo1al1am but only b7 her ovn baokvardnesa Internal r1val r1ea or oap1tal11111 do not alva ys generate vars and not all vara are attributable to tbia oauae To speak or poee1b111� ot intervention againat USSR tod J' after e11m1M tlon of OoJ IB D J and Japan and arter example ot recent VB I' le llheereat noneenae If not �o•oked b7 foroee ot 1ntoleronoe and aubvere1on capitalist vorl4 ot tod 'J' is quite capable ot living at peaoe vith iteelt and vlth Rueela Plna117 no sane person ha11 reaaoa to doubt e1noer1tJ or moderate eoc1 11at leaders 1n veetern oowitrlea nor ls 1t tair to deDJ euoceea or their ettorta to llllprove oond 1t1one tor vork1ng Population llhenever� aa 1n Soaud1nav1a they t-·1 £ -- - • • OlGll • •• ··c c � a nd £0 Uv--·· � 10 1'171 ·�··· ' l1• • I �Q • _ t r�I ' - �--- r Hll� -• LT C f - ·• have been ·· s- 1511 Februar1 22 9 p a from lloaoow via War ban been g1Ten chance to shaw wbat they could do hl aene11 ot theae preld aea eve17 one ot whiob pre-datea recent nr wu aapl J demcmatrated b7 that conruct 1taelt Anglo-A mrican ditference1 did not turn out to be •Jor dltterencea ot at ern world Capitalist countriea ottM lr than those ot Az la 11bowed no cruaade aaainst mSR Instead ot imperiallst di11po11ition to aoln their dittennoe11 b7 jolnlq S U nr t lJ Jl q into ciril nra and revolution USSR t'ound it•l t obllpd to tigbt aide b7 aide with capitalist po911r1 for an a1'owd oomunit1 or ai• NeTerthelea1 all theu the1ea hManr baael111 and dieprann are being boldl 7 put ronrard ap 1D toda7 Wbat doea th11 indicate It 1rd1catea that Smet part 7 line 111 not baaed on aey objective anal 1'8111 ot situation be7ond Ruaaia1a borders that it has 1Dlleed little to do with conclitions outside or Ruasi J that it ar1ees minl 7 tro• basic inner-Ruaa1an necea litiea which existed betore recent nr and exist tcda7 At bottom or ltrelllin1 a neurotic rlew ot world attairs is traditional and 1nrt1net1Ye Russian sense or insecurity Originally this was in HC'UJ ity ot a peacetul agricultural people t 11ng to live on vast erpoaed plain in neighborhood ot fierce nomdic people a To thia na added as Ruaaia c _ into eontaat with econollica lly advance6 west tear ot 110H co tent mare powrtul more highly organized l llocieties in that area But thia latter t 119 ot ineecur1t7 was one which atnlotttd rather Russian rulera than Ru11s1an people J tor Ruaian rulertl havo invarimly sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in tor• tragtle and arti ficial in its ps7chologioal tmmdation unable to stand compariaon or contact with political ayst e• ot western countrie1 For this reaaon the7 have aln teared tare1gn penetration teared dJ reat contuct bet n wet ern world and their on teared what would happen ll' Ruaaiane learned truth about world without or lt toreignera learned truth about world within And they have learned IRUSSIAU l Q 1 IU2 S C Tl cmd 5 D CS CID Po t d Slow AUQ LO Lm Z ICAU DoM J •II ·J - lr • ---· to aeek 6 1511 PebrUDl'y 22 9 p m from Moacov via War to seek •eeurity on17 in patient but deadly stt-ugsle tor total destruction of rival pover never 1n OOIUP cts o nd o ompl'omiee a v1 th 1 t It vas no coincidence that Ne r tiom which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Wostern Europe caught hold and blnzed for ti rat time in Russia OnlJ in thio land vh1ch had never knotm a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolorant equJ librium ot sopo rate paveru either inta rnnl or international could a doctrine thrive vhicb vieved economic con tlicts or soc1e1 J' aa insoluble by peecetul means Arter estab liabmftnt ot Bolshevist regJmo MnJtxist doEPJ reuderod even more t�ucul ent and 1ntole� nt bJ L n 1n1a inte�­ pretat1on became a portect vob1cle tor sen�o or in aecuri ty v1th vhlch Bolehev1 k31 even core than previouo Rusaian rulera vere oftlictad In th ta dogmc vith its baaic alt ru1mn or purpose they found just1t1oat1on ror their 1 nst1nct1ve rear of outside vor�d for the d1otatorab1p v1thout vhich they did not knov hov to i'lll e tor erueltiea they did not dare not to infliot for eaor1t1cea they felt bound to dAma nd In tho name of M Mtiem theJ' aacr1f 1cod evory sinele ethical value in tbeil' methods and tactics Today they cannot d1spenee vlth it It ia fia leaf of their moral and 1ntelleotual raspoctab111ty Without it they llould stand betoro hiatol'J' at beat ns only the last of that long nucceosion or cruel ond wnstatul Rusa1on rulers vho have relentlessly orcod countrJ' on to ever nev heights of nallitary pov r in order to guarantee oxternal aec�1 qr ot their 1nte 1nn llJ· veak regimes 'lh13 is vhJ' 5ov1et purposes muot nlvayn be solemnly clothed in trappiDSe ot Mm- xlsm JU1d vhy no one should underrate 1 mportanoe of dogD a in Soviet 4ffa1rs Th11u Soviet leaders are d J'ivan necass1t1os of their ovn past ond present poa1t1on to put tcr11ard a dog na vh1ch • outside vorld aa evil hoetile and menacing but ne bearing v1th1n 1teelf germs or croep1ng disease nnd destined to be vracked v1th srov1ng 1nterne 1 convulaiono until it 1s given tine 1 coup de grace by rioing pover or aoolallam and yields to nov and hotter vo rld Thia WU IECUalnD ·--- E O 115 52 Sic XD md 5 DI C11 CIQ D9pt al SlaN Ai 19- 10 117'1 Ir t r __ MAU � a ·II - thesis ·- SBSR I -7- #511 February 22 9 p m from Moecov via War thes1o provide• Just1f1cat1on ror that increase or m111tarJ' and police po�er or Russian etate tor tbat isolation or Russian population from outside vorld and tor that fluid and constant pressure to extend 11111te or Ruaeian police pover vhich are together the natul al and 1nst1nct1ve urges or Russian rulers Baa1call J' th a la onl 7 the atea ly advance or uneaa1 Jtuaa1an nationalism a centuries old movement 1n vhich con ceptionn or ottenae and defense are 1D8%tr1cably oon tuaed But in nev guloe or international Jlarxiam vitb its hone�ed promlaen t o a deeperate and var tol'D out•ide vorld It la more dangerous and 1ne1d1oua than ever betor0 It ahould not be thought Crom above that Soviet partJ' line la aecesu -rllJ' d 111ingenuou11 and 1na1Dcere OD part of all thoae llho put it forward lll8DJ' Of them are too ignorant or outside vorld and mentallJ' too dependent to queation • self-b J1 not1em and vbo h n no d1ff1oult making themselves believe vbat theJ ft n4 it oomtortlng And convnnient to believe Pin ally ve baYe tho unsolved lllJ'Stery as to vho tr IQ One 1D thie great lond aotually rE ceivea accurate and unbiased 1nt'ormat1on about out111de vorld� In atmosphere or oriental aecretlv�ne1s aud conap1racy vh t oh pervad ea this gov�rnment poaslbilltiea ror diato�tlng or Poisoning eourceo and currente or information are 1rd'1n1 te The very d1oreapeo t or Rueaiane tor objective trutb--- ndeed their d1abel1et 1o its exietenoe--­ leada them to V149V All stated rn cta aa 1Detrumente tor turtherance or one ul t orior purpose or another Dlere la good reason to auapnct that th1a govermaent 1• actually a oonapiracy v1th1n a conap1 rao7 �d_IJQr OM II reluo��- to_belle ve �t � tal 1n h1maelt cea e 1 na �t J4� _l� ll- bJe ��Y P 1ct�JL O f put11de var14 llere there i• ample acope tor the 't7Jfe or eubtle 1 ntripe at vhioh Ruasiane ai•e ps8t masters Inabili tJ or f'oreJ gn governments to place t beir aase aqua rel before Rueei n Policy makera---extont to vhich th•T are delivered up 1n their relationa vith Russia to good graoes ot ob•oure and unknOVD advlaero vbom tb e7 1 n1 1 uence---th1a never aee Dd cannot to 1lI1' mind ls most d1equ1et1ng teature or d1plomao r 1D Hoacov and one vhioh western atate n vou1d do vell to keop in m 1nd 1r they would underataD4 nature or d1tt1cult1eu encountered here DECUSSlf IED PART DR EB p i -- ' ' • t ' t SIU -8- 1511 Feb�J' 22 9 p 111 trom J toocov Via War PART mmms PROJBCTIOH Oi ' SOVIET OUfLOQE Ill PRACTICAL POLICY OB OF'Ji'ICIAL n� Ve have nov aeon nat ll'e Cl' d background ot Soviet program Wh o t ma r vo expect b vay of ta praotlcal 1 mplementatlon Soviet Policy as Departrnnt implies 1n its quer1 under reference la conducted JD tvo planes one ottlaial plane ropresented by cctionn undertaken otticl lly in name ot Soviet OoverDJDent nd tvo aubterJtenean plane of actions undertaken by cgenc1ea tor lh1ch Soviet Government does not admit respon11b1lltJ' Polle - prcnulgated on both laneo ¥111 be cal oulated to serve baelc policies A to D outlined in part one Act1ona taken on dJft'erent planes v1ll dltte� conelderabl7 but v111 401ota 1l into each other in JJUl'Po e t1JD1ng ond effect on ottlcial plane ve must lcok fL� tollovlng A Internal policy dovoted to �nci aeing in evory vo � atrerurth and prestigo of Sov1ot lt t 1 intensive 11 litar --lndustri armd roroas great lllizotion maxmLDD devol•l ment ot dioploys to im nprnsa ol· tsidore continued aecretivenons about internal mnttora designed to conceal weolcneesea and to k�ep ·lpponents in dark B Wharevor 1t ls considered timely n d prom1a ng efforts v1ll be made to advance official 11�lts of Soviet power For tho l lomont these e rtort a re restricted to certo1n neighboring points coL�o1ved of here ao being ot 1Deed1ate ntrateg1o necessity such as llorthern Iran Tl trkoy posalbJ 7 Bornholm novover other Pointe may a t ony ti ae come into quau ·Lon it and ae ooncealed soviet political po�er is '�tended to nev areae Thus a f'riendly Persian Oove1tnant might be asked to grant Rusala a port on Persian •ult Should Spain tall under oommuniet cont1•ol question ot Soviet 8118•1 � 11111 IUD ·- Im ICDt Ir • ' 4f1J r__ _ a L· J· 2- s bose at 8B8IUI -9• 1511 Pebl'UBl'J' 2� 9 p m trom Moacov via Var baae at Olbralta I' Str iolt might be activated But· such claims vlll appear ou·ott1o1al level only vhen unotf1c1al preparation ls oomplute C Ruesiana v��l participate of�1e1all� in 1nternat1onal organizations vhere tboy see oppartunitJ' ot u tending soviet pover or ot 1Dh1b1 tins or diluting paver ot other• M• ncov aees 1n ono not the meohaD 1sm tor a permanent and e1 able vorld aocioty tounded on mutual interest anc' alms or all nations but an arena 1n vbicb a1ma just mentioned oan be favorably pursued Aa long as U IO 1� considered here to serve thie purpose Soviets vill rernln with it ·But it t GJl1' tir i� they come to conolue o�'l that it is serving to embo rase or truatrate the l' c 1 ma tor power expannion and if they _ eee better prcspecto f or �suit or these al ms along other lines t heJ v111 not hesitate to abandon lJBO 'l hie voul4 1rt1'1J' iovever that the1 �e 1 t themae l vea atrons enouza to pl1t unity ot othat• nation a bJ' their v1thdraval to ran o r 01'0 1nettectlve aa a threat to their a1ms or eeou··ity and to replace 1t v1th an inter national veapon mo O efteot1ve �om their v1evpo1nt Thus Soviet att1tUl� tovard UBO vil1 detend la rg0l7 on lo -alt ot other netlone to it and on degree or visor deo1a1veneee and cd1ea1on vi th vhioh those nations detend in UBO tha tncetul o nd hopef'Ul concept ot international l J fef vhtch that orsaniz atlon represents to our va7 ot t111D � ng I rel terate Moaoov has no abetract devotion ¢ UNO idanl s Its attitude to that organ 1i at1on vil 1 · iroa 1n eeDentlnllJ' pregmatio and tactical D Tova rd col M1al arena and bockvard or dependent peoples Soviet polj'�' even on official plane vill be directed tcvard ll·'l llconlng ot paver nnd lntluenoe and oonta cta or advanced ootern no tj_one on thoory that in ao tar ae � ts pol lr J' ls 3ucoeas ru1 there vill be created a V80 IU T1 vhidl li111 rovol oommun111t-Soviet penetration 1ov1et 'r·easure to ' pnl't1c1pcLtlon 1n trusteeship ar�·a ngeme a�s thus repreeonte ln my op1n1on a deelre to be in a P·nlt1on to compl1cate o nd inhibit exertion or vea orn 1 a i luonoe at auch po1nta rather thnn to provide majo ' o�l 'fr •• ezert1nc of Sov1ot pover llUllD 8 811lfl O llM a c am am 5 DI or CD d � Iii -� A IQ 1171 ca r D h ·1 _ LD tte r motive -10- #511 Pebruary 22 9 p m · trom Moaoov via Wor Latter motive is not lacking hut to r this Sovleta prete r to rel7 on other chonnele than ott1o1al truateeahip ar rangemente Thus ve may expect to find Soviets asking tor admission eve ryvhere to trui teeehip or a1mi1Bl' arrangements and using le •tors �-hus acquired to weaken western 1ntluanoe among such poo1•les I Ruaa1ana will strive ar orgetloallJ to develop Soviet representation in and o rttcial ties v1th count r1ea in vhich they aei se strong poas1b1li ties ot oppaa1t1on to vaotel'n centere llf paver Th ls applies to such v1dely oeparatAd po1nts a� Ocrmany Argentina Middle Eastern countr1eo otc P In intel'nat1onal economic l 'lttera Sov1ot policy vill really be dominated by pul'nuit r e utG rcl� �•· Soviet Union and Sov1et-dom1natod adJ �ent o rena taken together That hoveve r vlll be undl• •l11ng pnl1c7 Ae tar as ott1o1Al line 1a concerned Oa1t1on 1e not yet cl88 1' Soviet Oova rnm ent hae abov11 strange ret1canoe since termJ nat1on hoet111t1es on subject foreign trade It la rse acale long te1tJD credito should be rorthcoming I believe Soviet Go rernment may eventu1�11y again do lip eerv1ao aa it did 1n n1neteen-thirtye �·o deo1rab111ty or building up 1nternnt1onsl econotr11c ex- ·hangeo in general Othel'Vloe I think it possible �oviet foreign t�ade may be restrlctod largol7 to Sov1eia ovn security sphere• including occupied oren3 in Oe111tnny and that a cold ott1o1nl sbouldel' may be turned to J l'1nc1ple ot geneJ'al eoonom1c collnbornt1on omong nations 0 With respect to cultural collabl l tlt1on lip service will 11kev1ae be l' nderod to dos1i•ab111 ty of deepening cultural contnots betveen peopl ' J but thls vlll not in pra ot1ce Im lntal preted in an 1 vay vhl�h '3oul4 veaken security poo1ticn of Soviet peoples Actual mnn1teetat1ona ot Soviet policy in this respect v111 be reet�1oted to arid chonnels ot closolJ shepherded oft1c1al viaite and tuoct ona vith euper-nbundanee ot vodka and speechee and dearth ot perl 8n ent ettects ll tlSSlrlEI il Cltl JT E O 111u s c icn ODd MD ar ti D pl cit s '° '· A� 10 1172 � ·- -�1wu· __ _ _ __ I H Beyo� 1 'ti f � · • BZRZT -11- #511 Pebrual J' 22 9 p m from Moecov via War B Be7ond this tl viet ott1c1Bl relations v111 take vbat m gbt be cal l'Jd correct course V1th 1n41 dual foreign govo· �nmenta with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Un o n and its representatives and v1th punct111oua attention to protocol ae d1et1nct l�om good manners • PAR1' POURa POLLO fl CJ MAY BE 5AID AS TO llBAT WE MAY BXPBCT BY VAY OF Dll ' EMEN�TIOJI OP BASIC SOVIET POLICIBS 011 UllOFPICIAL_ l'i1 SUB'l'B RRARKAft PI Alm 1 e on PLAD POR wmcn SOVIE'l ' OOVBRnMBRT ACCEPTS 110 RBSPOltSIBILITr Agencies utilized for ·proraule htion or policies on thla plane are tollovlne One Inner centra 1 core ot oonmn m1st parties in other oountriea Vhile mo DJ nt persons vho oompoae th1a oatesottJ' may also appo and act in unrelated public capao1t1es they are ill reality working olosel7 together aa an undergrotmd ope�·atlng direotornte ot vorld communism a conceBJ ed C1 c1intern t1ghtl7 co ordinated and directed by Moeoc i· It is 1 mporttlnt to remember that this innor core 1 actually working on und ergl'ound lines deopite legc llty or parties uith vhich it ia aeeooiotod • 'J vo ftank' nd f1le ot' conn•·u1at parties Hote d1et1nction la dl'a m betueen theft and persons det ned in paragraph one This distincti·m hoe become much ah J'per in recent 7enra lherese 'orinerl7 foreign com aunlet parties represented a cu�tous and tram Moecov•e stand paint often inconver �nt mixture or conspiracy and lcgit ma � oct1v11�y nou the cocep1ra tor1al element haa been neatly C •nc-r1ntrated in inner circle and orderod Wldel'ground i 'hile rank and file-- no longer even taken into confidlncu about realities or movement---al e thrust forward as booa fide internal part1ean a of certain political tendencles v1th1n their nepective oountrlea genu1nelJ luaooeut or conspiratol i l IRWSlflU SBCidM6 a o nw s c 311 cat 5 D9 • 11D Dlipl lllM A- JO lm - NL-r • u a rw l' 1 •ll ·J r connection -12- 1511 February 22 9 p m hoa lloacov via Var connection vith foreign states On17 1n certain oountriea whel'e oommuniats are numerlcall7 strong do the7 nov regularlJ appear and aot aa a bocf7 Aa a rul e theJ are uaed to penetrate and to lnfiuenoe or dOll nate as oaae ma7 be other organ1zat1ona leas l1 kel7 to be suspected ot being tools or Soviet Govermantt vith a viev to accompl1eh1 ng their purPoaee through • organ1zation11 rather than by direct aot1on a11 a aeparate political party Tbl'ee A Vida variety or national aaaoo1at1one or bod1ea vh1ch can be dominated or 1 nfiuenoed b7 auch penetration 1b ese 1nolude1 labor Wliona 7outb leaguea vomena orsan1zat1ona rac1al soo1ot1ea relig oua aoo1et1ea 11oc1ol organizatloD S cultural groups liberal megazinea publishing houses etc Pour International organizationa whiob oan be aim 1larl7 penetrated through lntluenoe over various national componente Labor youth and vomena organ1- zat1ona a re prominent among the111 Particular almost vital 1mportanoe la attached ln thla oonneotlon to international labor movement In th la Moaoov aeea poaa1b111ty or e1detrack1ng western governments 1D vorld arr ira and bulldlng up international lobbJ capable or ocapelling governments to take aotlone favorable to Soviet 1ntereets in various countries and or paral J'zlng actions disagreeable to U3SR Five Russian Orthodox Cburoh v1th 1ta foreign branohea and through it the Zaatern Orthodox Churah 1n general 51 x Pan-Slav move�nt and other movement• Ar erb61jan Armenian Turcoma n eto baaed on racial groupe v1th1n 9nvlot Onion Seven Oovernments or governing groups vill1Dg to leDd them elves to Soviet purposes 1n one degree or another eucb ao present Bu lga rlan and yUgoalav govern ments lorth Peralan regime Chinese Conaun eta eto l tUS$1rlEI MiRRI E O 11� s c XD aad 5 DI s cm � __ ··- ' '-- not on17 • Dl' lSION OF • CENTRAL SERVICES tn EGRAPH SECTION ACTIOK OR llJl'O s u c A·B A-C A-D SA SPA Po 1'# ·- DKP All'rHENT 01'� STATK DCG Ko paraphro ae ncce� 1 r7 B R fr INFORMATION CoPT ACTION MUST BE ENDORSED ON ACTION COPY -13-#511 February 22 9 p m from Moeoov via Var lot on17 propage nda Dlflehfnee but actual pol1ctee ot these reg1mee caa be placod eztena1ve17 at dlapoaal ot USSR a t nmv h#t expector1 tlm t componont parts ot thla tar- tlung PJ' ' r tue v• lJ bo ut� 11 zed tn �coordanoa v1 th their 'odt vi dual aut tab·J 1 t t7 '1 rollovs t A To und trm1ne �n ral poltt1cal and atrategto potent1aJ Of n1 jor V'30tern povere Efforts Vill be -de 1n auob countrteo to d1erupt national eelt con1 1dence to bamstr1ng ••a sureu or unt1onal detenee to fncreaee aoc1al and tn�ust�1AJ unreet to ot1mu1Qte all tol'llB ot df aunlt7 All persons vith gricvAncan whether economic or racial v'll be urged to soelc redMno not hi mediation and oomprom11e but t n def1 DI' t v 1 olent atJ 'Ugg e tor deatruett on · o� other elements or noct�ty Der� poor v1ll be sot aga1net r'ch black g8 1nat whl te young Agalnat old oevc0B1ers agafnat eetabl1ohed rectdente et� B On unoff1efa 1 pllUlG p rtlcularl7 vtole nt efforts v111 be made to veA c�n power and influence ot veatern povers or colon1al backv�rd or dependent peoplea Ou th1s level no holds v111 b� barred Mfetakee and veakneaaea ot veatern colonial allin'u•stre tton v111 be merollesel7 exposed and explo ted Libern l op•n1on in veatern oountrlea v� 11 be mob111ze1 to veaken �nlon'nl pol1c•ea Resentment onong dependent peoples v111 bo nt1mulated And vhtle lat·ter are being encouraged to aook 1ndepcndence of veatern povere Sovlet domlnn ted puppet polJ tlcal machlnee vll' 1 be undergofng preparation tn take over domeat1c paver 1u respective colootal a reo u vlten 1n lopende11ce 1a ach1e letl · C Where Jndlvhlnal governments stand tn path or Soviet purpoaeo pres�ure Y111 be brought tor tbetr removal trom ottlce 'l'h1 o cl D hn11pon where govornmenta d1reotl7 oppose Suv1 et foreign po1·1 c r al mo Turke7 Iran • vhero a nzr IRWSlflEI t o 11�1 Src 3'D - DI or � tbo7 aeo l oa CRBft -13 -#511 Pebru l'J' 22 9 p m from Mo1oov via V 111 l' th•J eeal the1 r terr1 tor1 ee ott against Cnn-uniat penetratf on Sv1 tzerland Portugal · Ol' vhere th97 c mpete too atrongl J' lfke Labor Oovel'JUlent 1 n Bnglaod tor 1D ral domtnatf on among alement11 vh1oh 1t is I mportant tor COlllllUDf at11 to dcn1 nat e Sometimes tvo � thet ·• e t e- sont• · are present fn a sf ngle caae Then Coammi at oppoe 1t1on becomes partf cul l'l7 abr1 11 ad aavag� D In foreign c ountri es COlllDUD1 ata vlll aa a rule vork toward de11truoti rJn ot all rorma ot per1onal f ndependence eoonomf e �lf t1oal or aoral 'l'b ei r 17atem c D handle mly f n lf v � i uale vho have been b rougbt tnto ocapl ete �ependence on h1 Rher pover Thu3 per1 ma vho are t1 nanc1 allJ' S lldependent• - auob as 1 nd1v l dual bua1neaa men eatate ovntjr11 l lcn eae1 ul t 1'IJl' �a art l 9Ull8 RDd all those vho xerc t ae l ut Ja l J eaderah1 p or have loo l p1•A � ge auch as p�ular l ooal olargJD1en or pol � t� ��l �1 gure a are anathema It la not bJ' ob a nee that even tn tJSSR l ocal ott1 c 1 ale are kept eonetantl7 on move trca cme job to another to prevent the i r tak ng 11 ius nE1 il liG'AR E o i u u_ s c n mad� m � Depa cJ Sim Maei AUIJ ID H71 tr ILJ_ _ u·11·Zc B EverJtb ng II Ill' - 14 - #511 Fe bl'Ual'J' 22 9 p m from Noocov v 1t- if w- E Bwl' 'thlng poss ible v111 be done to ae t 11Ajor ves tern pavera against each other Ant1-Br1t1ah tallc vill he pl�ed among J mor loane ant1- Amer1can talk among British C ont1nental s 1noludin g Oerma ns vlll be taught to abhor both Anglo-Suon povera Where sua p1o1ona ex ist they vill be tanned vb ere not ignited lo effort vi� bo spared to discredit and combat all e rtorta vhiol threaten to lead to an1 aort or unltJ' or oobealon at1ong othor • f 'OID lhiob Ruaaia 111 Sgbt be u oluded ' thus all rorma or 1nternat1onal organization not amenable to cooaunist penetration and control vhether it be the Ca tbolio lnterno tional eaonom o concerns or the international f'ratern1CJ or roJal tJ' and tire f'rom m D 1' arlatocrac7 must expect to find themselves under and often • P In senerol Bl 1 Soviet etrorta on unott1o1al international plane vlll be negative Bild destructive 1n cbaracter dealgned to tear dovn aouroea ot a trength beyond reach or Soviet control Dll • 1a onl J' in 11 De vitb baaic Soviet 1nat1nct that there can be no OOUl prca 1ee vith rival paver and that constructive vu1•k OJ D etart onl7 vhen oOlllllUJliat pover is dominant But beh1Dd All tbJ a v111 be applied insistent unceaa1Dg pressure for penetration and COl IN'U d Of ke7 Poait1ona 1D ad•1 n1 stration and eepeoiall7 in police apparatu� ot fore�E D couu�r1da 'fhe Soviet reg1 ma 1e a police regime par excellence reared in the dim halt vorld ot 'aar1at Police intrigue Mcuatomed to think primarilJ' 111 terms ot polloe pover Thie ahoul d never be lost a1gbt or 111 sa ugiug S oviet motives f' AR i' PIY B I In ewnmer7 ve have hore a polit ical toroe ooaattted ranatioally to the belier thn t wl th US there can be no permanent modua vivendi thftt it ie desirable and necoasa17 that the internal ba t'lnony or our aoc1etJ' be diarupteG �ur trad1 t1oonl vay or lite be destroyed the international authori t- - or our s tate be broken it Soviet povor 11 to he secure Thie pollt1oal force be e o omplate pcwer or dlepo9 t1on over energies or one or vorld ' e greo tll11t pooplt l 1· 1 d ros 'uroea ur ffOJ ld 1 s richest national terr tory and la borne aloq bJ' deep w ua ro O ' _ •rt _ ··- - - and poverrul ACTIOR EUR IllPO s u A--8 A-C A -D SA SPA UllO 8# CORRECTED PAGE FIPTEKft MB fto paraphrase nece s 3a17 R8RIK' -15- 1511 �ebrunr1 22 9 p m from Moeoov •la W r and povortul cu T'lnts or RusslBn nat1onallm In addition lt baa nn el�born te o nd fo r nung apparatus tor exertion of 1 f e 1 D flnence ln o ther countrie a an managed apparatus or 811Mlng flexibility and vvreatilit ' by pe ople whose experience And eld 11 1n und '9r crouad methods a re ·prasumn bl7 vltbout para J le1 1 ll hl e to17 P1 J aallJ lt 13 a eemin�7 l naoeeaaible to cona1deratlona or r al l ty lo l te be e1c reactio aa Por 1 t the Yaat rlllld of' objoc tivo Co c t about bnWlD s oc J ' l tJ 111 not ae vlth uo tbo me uu N qniDat vh1ch outlook la cona tentlJ be lug t ee ted 8J1d re -rormed but a grail bag trolll vhich 1nd1v1 luo l l teras Qf'f selected arbl t •1 ril r and tend en 1oure1 v to ho 1 � to r sn u tlook al ready preconc s lvad Tll 6 s 111 admltt Qdly a ot a J-•J ea sum� p1o tuN rrooJ em of hv _ to cope 'Vl i° b th t r� ' orcf1 ln WJdOUb e«i LJ 81 tUl Utf i taak our dlplomn cy h�a eve r fl ced Rl1d probabl7 crest ea t it vill ev r have to race � It e bouJ d be pol nt of 4epartw·e rrom vhlcil ou r pol tico l general atatr vork at presont junetu m ah'lttll• pronf ed It should be appl'Oaclled v1th nnnn thorougllll'J sB � ca re aa aolut lon or 11ajol' P trAteglc proble111 1n vo r ADCl 1t nece•s rJ vi th no e11111l ler nul•Jo 7 ln planning at fort I canno·t attempt to ouggu n t fl 1 1 sn11 vern hero But I vould l llce to reoord JrQ convlc t1on that p�blem la vitbi D our power to a olve -- D4 tltnt vi thout 1•acourfte to DJ' general mJ lit r'J' conrl ict And ln support or thia conv1ot1on there a re cer tB 1 n ohnervat iona of o more encou raa' nll nature I should l ke to me ko One Zovie t pouer U tlike tho t or Hi tler1ta Oerman7 1e neithor •H�belll8t1c nor a d von tur13 t1c It does not vork by 1 1xed plans It dooe not toke wmecoaaar7 ' -l ake Impervious to logic or roa so o and it ia h gbl y a·en iitive to logic of force For thio reaaou 1 t oan eas117 T th drav ---- o nd uaWlllJ' does ----vhen a trong rea1at8 JlCI • 1a 1ca J 1m1 - - · · · r • -c m t 5 Dt ii El 1 encow1t ared -15' - 1511 February 22 9 p m troa Moa cov via War enc ountered at any poi nt Thuo 11 the adyera rJ has 1 sutf 1cient force and mnlats clear bis reacH 1s to uae 1 t he rarely bas to do so Ir el tuatiOJUt are propel'l 7 handl ed there need be no pres tige engag1 ng abovd 011118 Two Oauged nga nst vestern vorld aa a vhole Sovie ts are s till b7 far the vealmr rorce Thus thetr e ucceee v111 re a 1 ly depend on degree or cobea1on t1 rmea1 and vigor vhi ch veetern vorld can mus ter And thia 1e fal'ltor vbich it ia wi thin our pover to influence Three Suc ceoa or· Soviet a 7s tem aa form of lnternal power ls not 1et f1nall7 proven It baa 79t to be demons trated that 1t can survive supreme text or auccea alve transfer of power from· one 1D41v1d u l or group to another Lenin ' s death vae t1rat auch tr D11ter am its effects wracked S oviet state for 15 19ara atter Stalin ' s death or re t rement vill be second But even th1a vill not bo final te� t Soviet internal aya tem will nov be oubjocted b7 vir tue or recent territorial expansions to series or additonal s trains vhtch on �e proved aevero tax on Tsardom Ve here are convinced that never since term1 nat1on or e lvil var bave maa e of Ruaaian people been umotional lJ' rartbar removed t'i'om doctrines of comuni et J Ort7 �bo n t huy are IUP SECIWP IBUSllf1EI S O 11111 le � ad S D cs cm DilpL ol llale A- lG Im ar All I ua J Y toda7 -16- #5111 Pebru rJ' 221 9 p m 1 1'ca Jloaoov via War tod J' In Rwl e1a party baa nov become a great 8114- -­ tor the ent---hSgbl y auooeestul apparatu or d1otator1al adm1 nS atrat1on1 but it baa oea eed to be a eouroe ot emotional 1n 1p1 rat1on Tb u11 1nterD8l soundnees and permanenoe or movement need not 7et be regarded aa usured Four All Sovie t propa genda be7ond Soviet eeovlQ ephere ia baaioallJ' nesative and destruat1ve It abould there1 ore be relatively eae7 to ocmbat 1 t bJ' aJQ 1 n�ll 1- gent 8 nd 1'98 1 17 o onetruot1ve program For these reasons l thlDk ve m J' •PPI'oa oh oaJ ml y and v1th good heart proulem of' hov to deal vith Rueeia As to hov th 111 approach ahould be - de I onl7 Viab to advance b7 V J' or oouoluaion tollovi Dg ooaaente 1 One our ti rat e tep must be to apprehend and reoosniee tor vhat it la the nature ot the movmnent vith vhloh ve are d M1 1ng We IDU8t stud7 it Vith aw oourage1 de taohment objeot1v1tr and same dete rm1natlon not · to be emotioMl lJ' provoked or unseated by 1t vi th vhich doctor atwllea 1ua rul 7 and unreasonable 1nd1v1� ·· Tvo Ve mu at eee that ov Efbllo is educat•ul to realitie illll o s 01 Russian oituatlon oannot ovar-empb••iae rtanoe ot tb J a Presa oai mot do th1 e lone It lllU8t be done •' nl7 bf' government vhiah ie neoe•e l'il7 more experienced and better 1 Dtormed on praotloal problems involved In t his ve need not be deterred bJ' tallnnee11 of picture I am conv1Doed t hat 1ihere voul4 6e toda7 tar leas lqeterioal ant1-Sov1et1em 1D our ooUDtrJ if realities or th1a e 1tuat1on wre better UDder atood b7 our people Tbere 1• nothlna aa dangel'0 18 ar aa terr1tJ1 ng aa the wilm ovn It DBJ' alao be argued that to reveal more information on our 41tt1cult1ea v1th Rueaia voul d reflect W favorably on RuaaiaD American relat1ona I reel that it there ia IQ real rillk here involved it 1• one vhlch ve should have oourage to race and aooner the be tter But I cannot see vbat ve vould be r1•k1 ng OUr atake 1D thle ooUDtl'J' even ocwJng on heele of tremendous deJ11onatrationa of our tr1en dah1 p ror If ASS if 1£1 l O llC �2 S llD and 5roJ ar a ftu 81 n people 0 °' i w1r r A 1zs91T •r N'l T � 10 l r7J ACTI01' a Iftli'O s u c A-B A-C A-D SA SPA UllO �# BUR AMII · coRRBCTIOR PAOB SBVERTBKll lo i araphraae neoeaaary -11- 1511 Pe'bru ary 22 9 p m from Mo acov via War Russ ian people la remarkabl7 a mall We bave here no 1n ve11 taent11 to guard no aotual trade to lo ae virtually no o1t1 aena to pro tect tev aultural oontaate to preserve OUr onl7 s take lies in vbat ve hope rather than vbat va have and I am oonv1naed ve have be tter ohanoe of realizing tbo ae hopea it our publio 1e enlightened and it our deal1 Dga vitb Ruaa1ans are placed entirely on real1st1o and matter ot tao t bae1 a 'lbree Muob dopou de OD health and VigoZ Of OW OVD society World co•nnnt am is like malignant pu-aalte vhich reed a onl7 on diseased t1 aaue Th l a la point at vb lob 4o•at1c and foreign po lloiea aeet Ev•J'J' oourageoua and 1no1a1ve •aaure t o solve internal problema ot our ovn aocle t7 ·to improve a elt contldence d1 e o1plJ ne morale and oomuni t7 ap1r1 t ot our ovn people 1• a diploma tic vie tol'J' over Mo aoov vorth a thousand d1plomat1o notes and Joint 00J111111mique11 It ve canno t abandon tatalim and 1nd1f terenoe in race ot det1o1enc1ea ot OU I' ovn aooiety Moeoov v111 prot1 t- · ·Moaoov canno t help protl ting bJ them in 1ta foreign pol1o1e a Four Ve mua t formulate and put torvard tor o ther nations a muoh re pas1 t1ve and conatruotive pic ture ot aort ot vorld ve vould like to aee than ve have put forward in pa et It 1e not enough to urge people to develop po l1 t1· oal prooeaaee e1m1lar to our ovn ManJ foreign peoples in Europe at least are tired and f rlghtened bJ experieaoea or paa t and are lea s interes ted 1n abstract treedoa than 1n aeouri tJ Tbe7 are seeiting gu ldanoe rather than reap na1b111- t1ea We ahould be hotter able than Ruaa1ana to give them thi s And unleaa ve do Rusalana certallll J vill Pive Finally we muo t have oourage a nd aelt contidenoe to oltng to our ovn metboda and oonoeptlona ot human aooiet1 After all tbe greatest danger tbat can befall ua 1n coping vith thla probl• ot Soviet Commmiam 1• that ve shall allov oureelvea to be come 1 1 ke those vi t h whom ve 8 l e cop1 Jla ABHnAR