Sr ————————I Tigh ye meam o — wa — rahe Autany % m fpfiee mw x somemon ors H6 mim fne R3 F V Ramebanin‘ — Tor secrer cover seer — co s s marfas — mmmmmprrmemmmmmnamm s — et Report to the President and the Peine itsdaten an — TC 900t at— gttaare qurtes Air Bixin Plowden and Six moves gpeom T 2bom ths Tumis 3 hike an ir aimeringns r F _—niigt __ —Whaghifho ___ s s ddd ritaner e e L f 2 P P O OOC — ——— —— ——— p — 4#AK __ p iga —tt — I » 0U—tft—— __ E __ di —_ ts AY ___ 4 PF PQ L_ __ OYC LOG — awe ——— —I7 ——B — _f5 tee ________L2 A Ald C_ __ Z % ond for __ F Fema ——— Sf nninounemonnoun 74 DECLASsIED _ 4 — e CFryomm fin ze %2 miten f ax ©o9% m7jah age Jis o a 6 This decuont coustots 2 pages Copy no chert in gees a ret 24 October 1957 REPORT to Tux Parstomt AnD rus Pame »nizsren FRoW Lzvrs Staauss DomLp quaatrs Sig ED#IN Propan amp StR Rtorazp Pomme # t 1 we have concluded that there has been a good measure of Cooperation between the Untced States and the Untced Kingdon in the overall fold of weapons research and development under such instruments 48 the Burne Tenpler Agreement and the Sendya—HL1 son Agreement of 1954 There to #E111 much room for Aoprovenent In addicton to exchanges of information there should be allocations between the two counties of resources and efforts extending to Specific projects so 48 to perate the mose effective use of available funds facllittes and scarce sktlieq manpower ae vital points in the weepone research and development Spectrum there have been serfous blocks owing to Lestolattve restrictions on the exchange of atonte energy Restricted Data These blocks have uerfously Anpeded 1nportane cooperation in other weapone Llelds 9 8 in the development of missiles ang other vehicles to Carty nuclear warheads The heart of the whole problem of achieving fuller cooperation in MBT gy rmemins Bite 21 _ usp Tpit I 0 fry mul APs oie £ 237 a Orfeo sed sve ioon— moonstone Ls prigarn m s tx XC umootinky § iv f 2 — the overall weapons field is to renove as many 45 possible of the blocks exteting in the nuckeat weapons fiend 2 — On the assumption that the necessity Legisiative authority can be obtained we concluded thet 1t vould eubstantialiy advance the comon securtty f programs could be carried out in the following Eleldst ta Such tranofere and exchanges of muctear materiale for military purposes as may be agreed to be of mutual advantage For exeaple both the United State® and the United Kingdon have plants for enriching wrentun which historically they procure Jointly to some extent The cost of enciching urantim is substantfally higher in the United Kingdon because of electric Pore® costs inter alta The United Kingdon hee plane for sub stantially expending its entiching capectty uP to a total cost of some $400 million This Leté® cepttal expenditure and use of scarce engineering skilie and electric power could be avoided 1f the Untted xingdon procured the requized addtttoncl matertal from the United States b Exchanges of weapons Anformation and rattonaltzetion of weapon design projects both offensive and defensive of the tvo countries looking to the most efffotent use ot 3 NA sul — vege id nnonounsmenonet %g ase Listted facflttte® and scarce ectentific and engineering skills In this latter respect we have in mind some allocation of speci¢te weapons design and development projects between the two countries to make the sost effective use of their Joint resources For exsaple fuller exchange of information and coordination of research efforts would pernte progress in achieving advanced weapon systems such as those for defense ageinet missiles of subsacines At ® further exemple» mubstantial savings might accrve from # joint use of facilities for the testing of weapon systeas including nuclear weepone« e T° reduce wasteful us of treasure and talent witch must be 0uF constant aim the United States 48 the most advanced in weepon® technology could supPy complete weapons systen® for the United Kingdon with custody retention in U 8 hands as necessary and with assuzance of use only as jointly determined by the c two countries ¥or example the United Kingdon 18 presently developing und producing nuctear weapon ot both Large and suall yield cectical » 1f the United kingdom procured so—called ceotical weapons in the United States even subject to residual custody in VS 3 j onsge cmm ent « sinti — § ss 3p ¥ C mm ow lop seg __ s hands 1t might be possible to modify or terminate production of such weapons in the United Kingdom with substentiel savings in money and manpower As a further example the United States has developed and produced efficient submarine propulsion plants The United Kingdom is devoting substantial sume of money and skilled personmel to developing a nuclear submarine capability There 1s presently some information exchenge on this subject between the two countries It appears that it would be to the advantage of both countries 4f the present U K effort in this field could be diverted to other Amportant militery technological developments This would be possblé 1f the U K could procure in the United States complete submarine propuleton unite and perhaps submarines @ Training and operational planning for utilization of nuclear weapons would be facilitated by removal of existing restrictions on commntcation of weapons data € IntelLgence ® 3 We have concluded that 1f extensive cooperation along the lines discussed above is to be undertaken some pla s A veg ig antignes oe wenn 4t gg mary J x ot igitiong more j eg on w e a inscituttonal framework Lo necessary It is suggested that a committee of experts look into the question of whether the Conbined Policy Committee should be revived for this purpose with necessary revision in its terus of reference or whether alternative instituttonal arrangements should be established Canada is a menber of the CPC 4 It is suggested that the areas and types of cooperation touched upon in this paper need to be fully blue printed To this end a technical conntttee of U 8 and U K experts should meet as soon as possible in Washington under a directive to report thet findings by December 20th 1957 5 In the meantime ond while exteting Legislative restrictions still obtain there should be the naimm cooperation possible within the exteting law 11 1 We recognize that there has been extensive and profitable cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy However we have concluded that the most efffctent use of our econonte resources may call for even greater cooperation For exenple we have in mind the possib lity of nuclear material transfers and exchanges as mey be mutually agreed h 3