C o1ssBfRMe 0 XC REPORT TO The Prosident‘s Sclonce Advisory Commiteo 2 ‘® FROM Adlssites Panel CJ SUBIEGH —— The Skybolt Afr—Leanched Ballistic Missile Program I 20 rety 1960 Introduction 1 In January 1959 the Ale Force fooned a General Operational Require» ment for an atr—launched ballistic mlosilo with the following chasacter Hatten Carry cxpability by B 50 B 52 and Unifod Kingdom V—bomborst range of 1 000 nm following Ioanch by a B—52 tanget overpressure relationships established by 217 with a CRP of nat over 3 000 feat equtzpage in operational units not lates than 1963 2 Subsequently the technical foastbility of the mlsaile was studled by an ad hos DOD committes chaizod by Dr Jamos Fistchos That come mitten concluded the aforomontlonad requiroments could not be met on schedule if at all but that a mlsaila could probably be built to meet the following loos demanding roquiromento Rango of 600 n m with a 1 1 fwarhoed or alternatively a range of about 1050 nm with a 211 warhead CEP of 1—1 2 nm Intffat operational capability in 1964 ‘The Fietcher committee also concluded that the Ar Fore cost estimates 1 were unsealtstically low that the RLD costs would yeobably b about 1 2 billion dollars 1 0 about threo times the Als Force estimates and that the total costs would run one to two biilten dollars for a 1 000 j Celle 1 wy ce AFC—EIT—Om secret — pavitzomp Gy 4 ot 4 ee ees tfiln u missile program The Fletcher committee was not asked to address itself to the questions of operational employment and need for the Sky— bolt or comparative meito of the Skybolt and other mlosite programs 3 The Micslles Pansl has reviewed the Skybolt program and at this time beltoves that the findings of the Fletcher committee with respect to technical feasibility and cot estimatas are probably still valid However the Panel has also addronsed Itsolf to the question of the comparative merit of the Stybolt and othor programs and on the basts of this has serious doubt about the wisdom of continuing Skybolt Discussion 4 It is expected that the misolle maight be employed to dostroy com paratively soft primary targets which aro sufficiently defended so as to make direct attack by bombers difficult or impossible or alterna tively the Skybolt might bo used to reduce enemy defenses to permit penetration by bombers to primary targets the dastruction of which to best accompliahod by delivery of largo weapons with emall CEP Other missiles e g Minuteman olther fixed or mobile based in the U 5 can also be used for efthor purposs For the Iatter role t o reducing defenses Shybelt may have some advantage in that coordinatf on of attack against defenses and the bember ponstration C skonbt‘—privicecen —s— may be somewhat simples if the miseilas are Isunched from the bomber The Panel ts inclined to view this as a marginal advantage which will be at least partially compensated by the fact that bomber xango and or pay« load could be Increased if the miostlos were not carried on the atreratt 5 The Skybolt B—52 combination can of course be deployed with the air craft on ither ground alert or airborne ale alert In the ground alort mode its effectivensos is entirely contingent on receipt of and response to early waning Because of the great uncertainty with repoct to the adequacy of such warning it is difficult to compare the B—52 Skybolt combination with such mobilo systems as Polaris or train—basod mobile Miztema which need not depend on early warning or with the fixed missiles which one would not like to fize on the basts of carly wazning because of the impossibility of recall It is perhaps worth pointing out that the ground alert Shybolt B—S2 combination will probably be a somewhat less expensive system on a por missile year basis than the mobile ystems though this might woll not be true if some of the costs of the warning system were charged to Skybolt it will be more expensive than the hard dispersed Mizstoman on a per mnfeollo year basis 6 If the Skybolt B—52 combination Is kept on continuons atzborne alert it can be accumed that it will survive ourprize attack and in that case comparison with the other mobile systems at leant to more straightforward Costs on a per missile year basis for the alzbome Skybolt—B—32 combination will secret — Priviizcso 22 om —4 probably be at least as great as for either mobile Minuteman or Polaris Because the wathead size and yield will also bo about the same for Skybolt on the one hand and Minsteman and Polaris on the other the Skybolt cannot be expected to pase any significant now problem for Seviet anti—missilo defense systema should such system be deployed ‘The Aix Force has argued that Skybolt will pose a now threat in that it will force a 360° defense af each point target ance the atreraft may approach from any dizection The Panel believes this argument to unsound By the time Skybolt 4s opera— tional the Soviets will probably have to face the prospect of Polazis submazines operating from the Indian and Arctic Oceans as wll as the North Atlantic and Mediterranoan and also porhaps the possibility of mobile NATO IRBM‘# and of ICBM attacks from the long way around so that a seo defence will be required anyway In fact the Panel belteves that the Skybolt may be a less serious problem for Soviet defenses than the mobile Minuteman since it will probably be more difficult to coordinate fire so as to ssturate defense capabilities 7 It is true that the Skybolt atzcraft combination would confront the Soviets with one more mobile system which they would have to tzy to cope with before missile Inunch assuming on imporfect balltetic missile defense Agsinat mobile Minuteman trains the Seviete could uso balltetic missiles but this requires either vary good Intelligence or a very large blanketing poring pine P SECRET — PRIVILEGED noerrectmirl secase oenminecen —— a —4 © barrage Agatnet Polaris submarines ASW would bo needed Against the aizplancs loigerange fntercaptors ond atzborno carly warning could be used Of theso problems for the Sevicts the lact coome the enoloct particularly considering the limitod raage of Skybolt and the fast that by the time t could be oporational Polasis will probably have a 2500 nem range 8 Should it bo docided that anothor mobile oystom io needed it ts by no meano clons that Skybolt to to be preformed The Hound Dog which we are now procuring will pose a serious problom for Soviet alr defenses By 1964—65 when Skybolt is supposed to bo operational the prosent version of Hound Dog will have soen four to five years of operational use Advanced versions of this missile could be developed and deployed during this period and because of the experience with Heund Dog could bo expected to have a Mgher rollability than Skybolt Tusther advances in cuporeonte lowealtitude aerodynamic missiles would probably bo a logical evolution out of the basic Hound Dog program Such high—spood loweoltitude davices would in the Panel‘s eptaion croate a greatly expandad«—if not a wholly new——air defonco requiromont for the Soviets Even theagh our alrcraft may thomselvas pose a significant lowesltitude threat ouch advanced mlooile developments would grontly aggravate their defence program Siybolt by ftsolf as pointed out above posse no new requirements for dofonso expabilitics 9 The Pano ts aware of t fact that esncollation of Skybolt may poostbly i 6 result in embaszassment to the United Eingdom in view of the fact that 1 its development appears to have been used as a rationale for cancelling Blue Streak While we have not examined it in any detail we would point out however that the case for Skybolt for the RAF appeaze weak anyway Their bombers have such short range that an als alert to almost cortainly out of the quastion for them and they are loos likely than we to have carly warning that will be adequate for a ground alort It may bo noted however j that various conversations agroements ant the intorchange of personnel between the U K and the U S are having and will continns to have the effect of solidifying and deepening the U 5 commitment to the U K in connection with this program as time progresses Conclusions 10 In view of the number of other missiles that will bo available in the mid and late 60%0 Including two othor mobile systems the Panel questions the need for another system that doss not confront the enemy with a signifi cant new defense problem Serious consideration chould be given to can« celling Skybolt before more effort and money to expended Two to three percent of the total expected system cost has so far been spent 11 Lowealtifude aerodynamic alr—lounched mlsollos would soem to bo a more promising line of devolopment than atr—laanched ballistic ystems Even f Skybolt should be continued wo feol that R D on low—altitude U fponericpapricedad scored Ffzomp € UANEpOBENY O «t nerodpnamic missiles should bo pursued 12 If it is decided that Skybolt should bo continued It is important that it be pushed as rapidly as poostblo particularly so that we can capitalize on what may turn out to bo a zelativaly short useful life ‘To achieve even the 1964 operational date will require really firsterate management Pronk Leng Acting Chairman Rendrik w Bode Harold Brown Tames Fletcher Donald Ling Alternate John Rubel Gonputtant George W Rathjens Staff Assistant prrsp ¢ mp mera e secret — ravinecso