ssiflo rit i ris scnerany or oerense % je» i» @ 4 icronmoun row mit restount SABJECT — noars a Cignt Suestions ce Suropean Muclonr Hatters i 1 tha chief argument against the Freoch having mwelear infor sation has seen coe affect 1t would have on the Germans ancouraglng then % to desire the sane dra wa certain that cooperation with the French will nave cat effect 1s 1t possible to aake an arrangement with the a Frencn that would int the Germans In thelr demands i wo principal arqumnts are advanced against our siving mctear i alp so the Frenchs 1 we vould be aiding a country hose head of f © sate holds a view of whe MTO Allance in oeneral ant of cuetoar serategy in particular wntch is smarply at varlance with our am vieess f 2 1s would strengthen the Incantivesy irst in Germany and then i «isouere for addtional natlonal nuclear forces £ 4 it oan appears virally certain hat he Front suctear program wil on Carried on poss de Gaulle dur noncsooperation Is nat yoing s sring the program to an and It seme to have enough support in French industry the milizary and parifament for Ita existence to be virally assured waver ibe vigor with witch the progras will oe surnved once the fatclal yout af a alatmal largeiy spbolic operational forom exists Joes resain In question Ard the French assessomt af isa polduleal and mili iary virtues may alter 1t should be an Inportant objective of lar duropean oiler to bring the French rss ca an understanding af ine polltfeal and atlHzary Halcacions of a weak Independent custear arse we nave ade a good beginning on this sut core Is nesded wd meeiude to Influence the Princn to linit ue scale of thair susloar © Aftort and to Ink 1t incrmasingly to our om nuclear farce Tollaliy rartape through coordinated plaming of the use af whe force da frappe ind In thae French partisipation in a A79 mut sHateral force Jne question is sow Sest to bring atout thase desired changes in French atciudes and programs Should we ury io walt for da Soulin‘s Lover o dectine as it seems likely to or co walt for his sussensar mile malalng ta‘a hem poitey of oppoottion to his suctoar paifcles 2d prograsst or should we moderate our position of opposition In ‘awry for concessions on the part of the Fronsh nd IP mme latter Pat xplarations sould so posalble ul thout setting up countar—prodietive apestacions in France and alsennare particularly Germany p tesuppoven v Ia moi chos rnntometine pote Sie Cnaitac I 270 o C afk sbaZ u I © 6052 » wo t L te pla clenfore ttntl ASSIFIED In any cases the continuation of a vigorous f modest french orogras would undoubtedly generate pressures within Germany over time for an independant Seman forca unless the palitical unification af Surope moves faster than now seans 1ikaly Moreover on additional sotive for a Garman program may axist as coupared with the British snd the French the desire to strengthen its bargalning position visear vis the U55 over reunification and Sorlin The Sermons aight be arepered to forego nuclear indupendance as part of a larger daal on inification dut for this leverage to be offective they would have © to have the nuelear option open to then Alltanee opposition to German possession ould be foraldables i avers coreaver the transfer of loyaltios and nationalize foalings c fram individual furepean nations Sermany in this Instance to Europe sax proceed fost ondugh to offset a fooling of mucloar discrinination i he French and ritish nuclear forces say cose to be regarded hi Ape i Jarmsns and other as the Suropman‘s nuclear forces Sut ue should aot 1 cout on this napponing If the United States were to 3ive nuclear aid to Francey it is E probable that va could obtain a comiteant from france rot to transmit 1 weloar information to third countrles without our consent and to sordinate thai targating ate with the 0 3 and the U % he westion is the affect of such an arrangement on the Germans it is sont Inprobable that there would be an immediate dasand within Germany for conparable treatment dut over the longer run e g 3 5 years the Sersans are likely to foal incressingly discriminated agoiast and to feel that their treatment within the AlHance is sot commensurate with their bohavior an sood ‘Turopesns and as nexbers of ATO making a greater contribution to its nownscloar dofenses thon afther dritain or France This fosing of iscrinination could became anita if in addition the 9 3 and the USK were to conclude a uclear nani ffusion sqresment that inovitably vould appear to be directed largely at Germany ven in this situation however the obstacles principally allied snposition to German possession of nuclear anos would ressin fomidable © Yarlous arrangusents are possible which might make it sesier for tne Garmant to be setisffed with and consent 20 an arrangenent under «ch the 0 5 gives nuclear assistance to the French For example If the French ware to increase thelr projected comsitmant of ground divisions to MMO frum the four conteaplated in 16 26 h to aix divisions and to agree to save sone of these divistons into Germany to ald in the forvard defense of the southern part of the lines the Gemans aight be more willing to support nuclear ald to France Similarly if France wore to perticipate in or at least not sbject to a ATO multilateral forse »hich the Germany slght hope vould eventually svaive into a 4» f ¢ 1 nases f FiED uropsen force within M10 ney aight have loss loogeran 4 ffieulty $ «ith our providing weloar ald to France defense AMnlstar Strauss i as Indicated hat ba would welcane as least a mall munber of U 5 — i amed and contrailed iand—based nobt le MMe in Germany n agree i want a go forvacd with such a program aight also sase ihe Garean i situation 1 snould bo cated snat Steams in his distussion with ae at 1 ithena indtcated be would prefer to have us furnish ouclear assist i ance to France rather than to have the currdft situation contious It cay bey novevery that he was merely attempting to souke out unather f a ware cootemplating such an arrangement § f © 4 © Arndt ACLASSIFIED © 2 ta is possible that refusing to sive ihe Information to he 1 franci wil ancourage than to 30 ta the Germans thas naking German £ ussassion sare likely i i ma French amy sual support from the Germans aspecially as one $ conte of the force de frappe mount ‘reaver if the government really i seHleves what Coun de rurvilie has sald what a Garman program is i inavitable the Freoch alght seak to ink up the Gerntna with themselves f in a jolat program rather than sen an independant German program develop $ ‘mavar there is lictle In de daulia‘s policies toward Germany that susposts inat he would cake an action that would make Gervan possession f of cuctear weapons substantially mare likely In any case most of f heir allies would clearly b strongly opposed to such a «ove ind i Sermany in particulars in in oo position to adapt a policy that vould ¢ sont with soveriul resistance in the W 3 Sritain the Lox Countries i and Scandinavia In shart she French nay ake the offer but the Sernans for same clue to come are almost certain to refuse Only iE e If Germany ware to tose confldmon in the U S ablity or will to defend 3 Sernaay‘s vital Interests would such an offer stand much chance of being sscopted over the next several years f 1€ ue continue so dary oustoar information to the French the sore 4 ‘ikaty Javelopmnt In that the Pranch will attespt to weave Girmany more closely Into Suropean as opposed to MAT9 defense planning with tne inducement that in the long run the Gersans will be able to share In Franca‘s nuclor ‘apabliitien through the Suropsan route conceivably If Mdenmuer‘s fosulties deteriorate enough be aight adopt a sollcy that would run dfrestly counter to a main and constant onjective of hia forelgn policy o keep the U 5 Intimately Involved in furope‘s ind Garmany‘s Jefense it iketiest mscessore bowever Erhard or e ichroudar are sat likely ca agruptly reverse tnis policy 44 Cager R Sim cp $ 1 1s oat we antey of che British lato the Comen arket 7 #1slmataly poing 19 ring she Francn into sucloar discussions cither f itrestly or tndiresciy i fin Fronch nave sade it culte clear chat thay do sot consider f Iritish comersnip in ine Comon arket 10 be consistent with nuclear necuali ty batween France and drizain 1t is probable that do Gaulle i «ill salatain Ms present posttlon that it is beneath Mis dfgnity ta G ‘nk for ructear cooperation aithar from the Sritish or from the 0 5 i tn associates ammevery have In the past and can be expected Increos loaty in the fowee wa bring hame ther view of the Inconsistency £ and of n unacceptability to han of a continuation of differential i 1 5 0 4 and ¥ 3 —Feench cuelear relatlonships particularly in the i ootext of joint Fremch—¥ % partlclpation In the Compa Market ¢ a ua were in a slear distinction between our relationships with na U A and our celationships wlth France Zxcept for several shorts Lived opiaodes such an the abortive Suez affair Srittsn forelgn policy 3 © for a century has rested on the proposition that Tt canoot affard a i fundaomotal split with toe U 5 his demeing sogether has becous far f ace snpllstt in recent tious in view of the overeriding ingortance i the aritish attach to the Anarican Alllance the Seitish have accepted £ me stats of Sunlor partrar In the firm in‘sachange for a spacial elationship salch tey believe affords thas a unique oprortusity o influence 4 5 yaltey It in wishin tne context of the vital relationsitp tnat ihe Iritise ave created inale wsioar pailey first in the anviroment of five vars of wartioe cal iatoration ihan durlog maive years of Independant fforts and ieally during four years of snjoring ihe frults af ssn peracion with e 3 5 ander sections 31 0 tnd lin of the Atomic marge st an amended in 1958 Cocernlouous with this 21 year period ia ihe capld shelnkage of the colonial sepire and a return to the Listle Zngland volicy of dladatone the adeission af yrving dependence upon 1 4 security forces and a Inaneiat situation wilen did not peraft tavisn expand ures apon atoute programs © ma advantages of this cooperation to the Iritis are sant fest or a celatively sual axpendlture thay have acquired a puter warhead capabd ity which compares favorably with wnat of the 0 5 on a oall lative bat aot mantitazive basin the possession of na Somber Zumand sas seened to sha Oritish to be an Ingortant actor In stving he ariclah the secand plaze in mma ayes of world optalon in che owetis of the Free cord 3 4 lent iesimen G in shis connsctions however» it is to be noted shat the Dritish £ rasition is untramalod ercopt with respect to actions which they 5 maw wilt dlsturd Woshinstom or the American publie They can buy from f the U 3 or manafacture thonselves as ouch nuclear suterial as they i an afford hare are no U 5 —Inpoued intzationss sxcent retrans £ mission span the size of thalr technical—selantifie establishsant upon H ‘he nature of their ressarch progran upon the number and type of $ «weloar weapons systems or upon thair test prograas vithin tha 1980 bi laterals the British have enjoyed great avers % tegen» Cxcnpt for sasenus diffusion dates thay are privy to virtually $ wery U 5 dovelopaont in the nuclear meatons Feld They had the rua af almost ovary ¥ 5 research institutions access to a large part of 1 8 intelHigence datas and they could if thay chose to do so conn i struct almost any one of the U 3 weapon designs in addition they % are able to aechonge thair surplus of plutontun for American 235 ¢ That thay choose not to apply such of this sharing Information to i development of thal oun weapon systems is dus to their oun polfcy f fecizions and nat to any contral anarefsed by the 0 3 ® This is va6 to saye haveven that the British have rot nad to pay i for this special relationship The size and nature of ¥ 5 —based f fseiiftfen in the ¥ % have been a difficalt probles for soveral rttish £ rvermants tha most recent Incidents helng the Holy Loch affair ituilarly the Sritish have accomedated the U3 on a musbor of colonial sues in a vey thay sould have falt no cbMsation to do if it had sat seen for tha hishar stakes of the Anartcan Allfance in shorts by their oun volition Judged in tens of thair om national interests she Sritiah are able to profft from the fruits of their snlque maring relationship with the ¥ 3 To give ap this relationship would a costly to aritish prestige sulte apart from tha losses which vould ve Incurred for Shai security forcasy their research organtzatlons ond thalr snginonring Industries Jn the other hand with a possible ar ception of conditions which would govern their antrance into the CHC hare are aa forces Inpelling them to disturh their harmonious nucloar ralationships with the 0 5 o A cungarable relationship betwen the 9 3 and the Zranch is Aifftenls to inogine Y lack the lang expertance of close partnership ‘nt only de Gaulla‘s Ideas but Zranch Ideas enaraily are sot costly anslal lable to our ideas ‘it ia probable therefore that sane differance a ¥ 8 —0 %« and 0 5 —french relationships will persist aven though ve sare to save quite far don the road of attempting an squalfzation by Incrossing our cooperation with France and playing davn the spectal relationship with the ¥ ¢ it ins tharefores almost inevitable that the question of mucloar retationship wiil arise between the Y % snd Frunce If the ¥ X anters tha Common darint v tin‘t oue presuoption shat »e could attract French support «tctnately purnape yost de Gaulle wo a Suropean deterrent beconing i asreasiogly stint i wo separate questions arise under wnia headings one is she f prospect af French support for a Suropaan deterrent te ather 1s he prospect af Premch support for‘a MTO deterrent 5 If ine 8 and thm WX do oat in the meantime Ind sone tel £ areral or MTO—wide solution acceptable to the Freach to he rucioar f problen it 1s rot at all unithaly that tha French will in claw i sarticipate in same type of Suropamn deterrent ‘dil de Sauiie is opposed ta mciiataral solutions the centar of aravity of French H wile optnion 1% mush mare provturapean and pro—Td than 1s the i Saneral Toure is an Innereat Inconsistaney in an independant French f ationai mucloar deterrent and a Rurapsan Community saining depth in re poiltical and scanonts elds» 1¢ seens probable that any suse 7 © cessor to de Seatla vould be 1ihaly to support a Guropean deterrent f wan though hna may sot sbandan che capacity or Ladepandant French i setion In an emergency i 4 s anprern a sycoasen decarrons eneluding a 0 5 vote or pree ‘omderank influence and a nata deterrent Including a 0 5 vate or preponderant luftuence he fremsh position will depend sri leally m the state of snelr undarszanding of nuclear merfare and thelr scopnition of sha inpiications of this sholce on he nature and extent wf n comnt iment of ine 9 3 to Suropa‘s defense Tha Fromch and ve otser turspeans ace aili1 In wha slemntary stages of leatning wout wuetoar warfare 1% vould appear to e In ha 4 5 Interest ind shat af the Vest generally that edbcation and action wake possible a MiTOwide solution to tha problen rather than a division setvemn a 9 5 deterrent and a Curopean deterrent in she sad If we bavdle cursalven lateliigently Surope and the French snould coue out strongly in avor af slose assoclation with che 1 5 on musloar satters © ag f z Cassitien — § I1 Sign 5 Isa‘t it obvious wnat ine frencn are now going to have thts $ usiear devarrent that they wii have no obligations to us and that sn wlld Jack she atament of contrat that our cooperation witn the Jrition has given ust i t would be difficult co contend that the U 3 controls the British f wwslaar program in the sense that we sake or Influence the Sritish to Jan wilogh to which they really object ather the sore reasonable i interpretation is tnat use harvanization of thate suclear poitey with i hat of the 0 3 caused Gham no paln and that the atouic assistance i scalved from whe U 3 bas been sheer profit f for ceasont wnlch are unnecessary to spell out Us French relation $ snip sa the U S 1s vastly different from tow 3rtzith — Tere is so cackground of a sontury of barmaaization of policies hare is 1a $ ounterpart in a ¥ 3 —Freach alliance Yalibe the British the Frencn i oder da Gaulle are determined to revestabilsh a poiltical position f vay save cat nad for omarations furtrersore the negative French $ ® avcltude sarard XTO and thelr wal ilogness o recelve 0 5 muciear f arces on French territory are lapartant sbatacies to hareontzation of i 3 3 relations with France — ernaps U 5 —Franch nuclear cooperation $ «ould dininiah or rexove these obstacles but there is sot a firm and i «ali—estaslished foundation of mutual confidence and trust which would seen to be an assentlal for an activity so dailcate and Inportant as welear sharing« it 1s perhaps iikaty nat the French mould glve up ‘hair atonic cooperation with Israet In return for substantlal progress sarlng with the 0 5 dut in this matter as in the cases of disarna sent and the cost San dn Saule has shown insalf to be snceptlonally »analtive If not to say Intransigent with regard to actions which tnt hia‘ freedom of action _ ma Srlitsh have Seen willing to live «ithin the mclear soley favored by the ¥ 5 and they have done so «iout having to sign any written comainants to this affect beyond ‘ha arrangesent not to retransit data and atonis aaterials in the ower hand there s reason to buiiave that do Gaulle s usrliling staitarly to restrict nis policy options whether this lodge mould e written or wneritten n for control over the Slow of weapons Jestgnts custear oaverialy and nlssfle reshnotogre 16 the French ware © to shift selentists and tichnlclans to other activities and not expand uclear production plants the ¥ 3 would have the pover to dfsrupt the Zranch program by cutting off ald ‘ Sovaver fy as is 1ihaly the Franch mere to continum to Invest sclantifie talent and nooey heavily in cuctear and missile technology despite ¥ 3 supports the extent of U 3 direct contral sight be soall In shart tha Srithuh have aot surrendered thele independance evever little it cay ba vorth And the French are »o sare likely ‘to Finally sinew the 9 5 1s tha groat nuclear paver the French have wary Incentive to seek coordination with us whether or rot we assist ‘hem eather than the other way around Tha problen to be overeson is in Saultats sense of pride aa s l_ HEAT Lasgieye § ©Fikp — f 5 _is it sot a fact tnat the MAID muclear concept 1s stiiibon f sally vot wavalcping in any may and no longer a likely prospect 1 nm Femeh and ritish ascivaly oppose the MAT sustoar forse 11 2 111 vot come into being If they both abstain from oppostog but re f ‘use to participate the prospesta would be sifghtly setter iu still $ zoor given the nigh‘cant of such a force A farce of 200 250 f »instles in strength would probably cost‘slose to 12 billion If we d fant this force to coun Into being we may aot only have to put up i out of the money but also push the progran vigorously within A79 i me sesie reasons for the sepidlty of Suropean Iaterest in the i ‘A10 sultiateral forse would seem to be tao a confidence in tha i ‘oun aint of ine 9 5 to Surope‘s defense and a consciousness of i 1 5 cuelcar paver ‘and b a denire for greater freedom of action and § iaza dependence on‘ the United States which a 1A19 force would ot i provide Sut which thay think a Suropeas force would provide f © the ¥ 3 nas attempted with shat appears to be considerable I uecess o make clear to the Suropeans that the major nuctear forces i hak deter the USSA from actacking Europe and would ast If Surope are actackad are and should be Iocated all over the world A i «parate question has Seen the wiiHingness of the 1 5 to act n mia we have reluarated our intent and backed this ‘up by contiaulig a station several hundred thousand troops In furope plus several ‘ouzand wslaar weagons 1t vould appear that on thase crucial acters there 1s 10 serious widaspread European concern about the ature and axtent of the 4 5 count taant tany of the ceasons wy cany Europeans would today prefer a sropman force to a MTD farce may turn out 10 be 11lusory here culd remain tne sruelal matter of the control t mould nat seen to va such sasier to work out a systen of control which aneluded the 3 5 shan one which included 1 in the typleal problen of a European Suntry one af trusting the 0 5 lesa than other allies tn Suropet lnd stoce the ¥ 5 would aleose certainly 5o forced to consider ren o uctog or Hnlting ts comet mance to furape If such a force were created and not closely Integrated with A79 ine oat affect of tha zreation of a Suropean force alyht Se of mer ‘a sharp reduction in ina elt security of at least the nose exposed Suropean asabers of 19 or na greater freedom of action than Curope naw snfoys in any case 1t seens ualiiaty that the MATQ maclane concept can a sranslated lato reality in she sear futures ia the longer run 1s ione be possible If the continuing sxploracion af alternatives pare «ades both the U S snd the Suropmans that no alternative offers a setter solution o ihe manifold conplam of problans Iavolved ig» ime ¢ r ECLASSIFR 0 in in a ace shat if we halp France at cals point t will © sreourase other national deterrents ions our refusal to belp her 5 «aally discourage the devalopomet of omer national deterrents H nich countries are iikely to follow the French cumple i tzhin #iT0 Ware is a fately wetl established pecking order f af satiooal paver and prestiges A partial ordering runs after the i 9 5 4 tha U R Feancey Garmaays Italy tha Low Countries in general i v2 cin expect those laver In ima Hist sot to aspire to or even i consider baviag ouelear veapons until the country nant hisher up f ma scala nak tham me reason is not one of tecnaleal competence f or oven of resources Sather ine motives for having then ars arouly and vaguely poll uleat ant with strong Inklbitlons against i hele sossesslon nless the domestic political pressuee bas built ¢ ip Thus today thare are same in Garmsmy besinaing to antleipate © ‘ermm soisession but thare is virtually no one in Italy the tow f ‘ountries as say visibly contemplating mational possession ‘hen i e frmen is ctaarly in tha alub it vould be comi to spect ins process ta zo on to Servany In ight of Geraamy‘s special history i led postion it is i1haly bawever that whe process will stop at f Trance or at leant be delayed for a long time before pressures in ‘ermany sulld up sufficiently straogly to overcame ine counter pressures at operate on the Senin situation Ths affects outside of MAT of tha French program are italy o vn snail if sha process of cuctear diffusion stops at France ne 153% meald mat thereay be sutivated to help any of Its allies me wine and vedas both with the tachalcal conpatence to carry out rogtas and having avidanced some Interest In natioat prograns font come to consider nae the shape of the world called for nattonel yovsesslon wus mare in iltsle avidance that mey are close to maklng the deetston a go ahead Than there 1s Frencn assistance co srael ix seams on the face of it Incredible that arse vould 50 so far an ta try to obtain cuetsar weapons alven its wuloerability Ir hat she French would malp them to In ihe unithely event the o israel1‘s atteast @ get cuctears we should sack to dissuade then a a of 1 ith tne French reluctance to count croops to Germany and i he Garman troops held at 12 diviatons 1s it going to bo zossible for i ia ta inplenant the famard strategy if nat should we consider whether 3 is is possible far un to reduce our forces In‘the Curopean theater i t present the french rave 21 3 divisions stationed tn Strmany f hay ares haviver stationed stose to he Shine in positions tat do i we support the foruard strategy The Prench have agreed under NZ 257% i o comit i divisions to 1479 — furthermare they have recently indicate 1 sale willingomas to save sheir force forvard i ‘a Implement the fomard strategy Senarai rocstad believes tat f ve needa at lease ine full outer of divisions called for by At 287% i 33—M 3 division an the central front me Sermant povever belfeve i he allocation of a requlrmmnt far 50 brigades co then and 4 divistons ¢ a me french 1s Insultable Strauss haw Indicated tnat ba wlll i rest or a revision upeard af tha ranch connl tome to 6 divisions f —oupled wiih a doemaed revision of tha Sarman requlcament @a would i prefer 1a sen tha French countt o divisions to KMD with o cut in the 5 © ‘eran allocation from the present target of 50 brigades @a do P wovever aree with the Germana that the present allocation Seonten i Zermany and France is inagul table i Sarrylng out sm forvaed accatagy would be greatly assisted by rench «illinguass to coontt additional forces o Germany and pare cularly o accelerate the equipment of ase dfvisions and thair ovenint io forvard position in Sernany Nvever sven witiout rennis cooperation beyond that aw forssenabie there In score for inproveasut in tha placement of Central iaglan forces the U 5 forces are soarly locased in Savariay the 3ritish hold tan wide a portion f cha frants ihe Balglans and utch forces are ton far a the rear are ia aed for a screening force along the order In he rth vase changes can be dane independently of the Frosch lmvar tha slow sace of the French affort ta strengthen chair anmnucloar force and ca put than where they would be sont effective is «out hurtful to A470 1¢ leaves AAT In a weak ali cary position tha © 43 and Germany are hereby farond to carry a Atsproportlonately fah burda If the at 267% yoals cecsasary far ina forvard serateoy ire ta be set In order co lepress upon the Germans tha inportance of the use of alr lofluense io gst a shange In the French soultion «o bave sold hem that inless adeqate forces are produced for thn‘ forvard seratagy in wilh Save io consider reducing our forces in the Zuropsan water 70 actually ceduen our forses would ou a sost serious stap nas s DEC fame cant stoner DECLASSIFI ¢ SHL I whish could well bring stove a fundamental weakening of the Alliance 5 less tha sftmation becasen less tense and threatening than at i prosent To start reducing our affective combat forces at this a juncture would collapse the currant effort and make the U3 desire i far options other than the nuclear option in that part of the orld sopetess 1 i Aegnid beg WW the Ytrmana ¢ Aaugs # Lise dacs f o 124 G tn Bellone 7 4 cars _ § mL