uy sey 3 5 » EXhompronimee secasrEVC$ o Wann mecepight ¥ yA y « berarteent or state — dam of C v — corms Memorandom of Conversation R bate December 19 1962 sveer Sbott pareicinwers U S WX The President The Primo Minister Secretary MeXNemaza Lesa Hone ar Bal Mz Thommeysrot Ambassador Bruce Ambassador Ormaty Goze commun Mr Bundy Mz do Zuleta Ambassador Thompson Mz Bligh Copies to s au ® ___ T The 7 »Ime Minister began the conversation with an expresstuc of spprecia tion tor the handling of the Cuban affatr by the United States In reply the Pre ‘ont expressed his appreciation for the attitude of the Prime Minister and o British Government which was in striking contrast with that of the Brit in press The Prime Minister sald that ne regretted that the wide range of the talks in — which he had expected to engage at this meeting had been overshadowed by the Sibolt problem He thought he was probably the oldest of those present and knew the story from its beptaning which he would like to recount He fully appreciated the U 8 feeling of the danger of doing something which might be considered obnoxlous or unfriendly by the other Buropean powers He ald not want to cause trouble with the Germans the French the Rtalfans and others or to impede developments which were wanted both by the United Stetes and the United Kingdom In the first place he wanted to mention that the atomic bomb had been de— veloped almost entirely in the beginning by British selentists The British Isles had been found too small to carry out tests Churchill and Recsevelt hax agreed that the development of the bomb should b carried out in the a rom neciassirizn seme fmose to memszess nt 018—230 5 1 3 who omi secrer a f —— 0 OBC sted States The whole world know about tis portnors io in this matter sich was governed by agreomen Ho was not referring to a logal doow ment but rather to the nature of te agreement Then there had come she Incidents of sples in Great Britsia and th» McMahon Act There were many including some in the United State who felt that Britain had been treated havally Amendments to the Mc# son Act had bean rado which made greater cooperation possible A this time the emohesis was on the bomb Later the emphasis shifted to the means of delivers Britain i spent about stity million pounds on the Blue Streak micsile Then e arose the decision as to whether the development of this missile 5 wld be continued Britain was a small and hearily populated fslani d the missile would have to be situated near towns whore it would be fect to observation and would be exposed to agitators ‘The Prime «ster had talked to President Risenhower about the problem and had sated the British were going to chuck It If they could ost anything else a9n Siybolt came along as well as Polaris ‘The British made an agre ment to buy Skybolt He was not basing himself on the terms of the s3me— ment but rather on the gentlemen‘s understanding Risenhowes had ss he wanted something in return namely the sut carine base at 35 4 Loon The British had favored another location but had agreed on Holy Loch which was more remote and harder for Russell and Ro frieats reach The Prime Minister seid that seom time—to—time 2 rad tn «st on the Skybolt development and he had assumed that — Ls ilt ‘es as in England thore were always these ramore ctrousre 1 ty rive —s or services He went on to say ‘t did now seem that Srybalt wes Die Prime Mintster said he understoon the Y andety for s fect 7 US—UK agreement migat have on othor alites He though the main ‘ss understood the US—UK relationshl os a kind of founder company us well as the special arrangement brought shout by the amendmct the MeMahon Act He sald the other problc«c was the possibNity of binging fato being a larger grouping of powers as well as the posstbic effect of any such agreement on the Common Market negotiations Thc Prime Minister sald fatly that he thought the affect of a new agreems « on the Common Market agreement would be ‘ ranidy absolutely none These negotiations now depended on whether sae French could maintain 2e good deal they have in agricultural procucts vis—a—vis the Germans t it failed it would be on that basis The French and the British have different concept about the Common Market the French favoring an «archical system _ There was the question as to what effect an agres— ment would have on European multilateral arrangements It was secren Transcript of page 2 drawn from Foreign Relations of the United States United States The whole world knew about the partnership in this matter which was governed by agreement He was not referring to a legal document but rather to the nature of the agreement Then there had come the incidents of spies in Great Britain and the McMahon Act There were many including some in the United States who felt that Britain had been treated harshly Amendments to the McMahon Act had been made which made greater cooperation possible At this time the emphasis was on the bomb Later the emphasis shifted to the means of delivery Britain had spent about sixty million pounds on the Blue Streak missile Then there arose the decision as to whether the development of this missile should be continued Britain was a small and heavily populated island and the missile would have to be situated near towns where it would be subject to observation and would be exposed to agitators The Prime Minister had talked to President Eisenhower about the problem and had indicated the British were going to chuck it if they could get anything else Then Skybolt came along as well as Polaris The British made an agreement to buy Skybolt He was not basing himself on the terms of the agreement but rather on the gentlemen’s understanding Eisenhower had said he wanted something in return namely the submarine base at Holy Loch The British had favored another location but had agreed on Holy Loch which was more remote and harder for Lord Russell and his friends to reach The Prime Minister said that from time-to-time doubts had been cast on the Skybolt development and he had assumed that in the United States as in England there were always these rumors circulated by rival firms or services He went on to say it did now seem that Skybolt was in trouble The Prime Minister said he understood the U S anxiety for the effect any US-UK agreement might have on other allies He thought the main allies understood the US-UK relationship as a kind of founder company as well as the special arrangement brought about by the amendment of the McMahon Act He said the other problem was the possibility of bringing into being a larger grouping of powers as well as the possible effect of any such agreement on the Common Market negotiations The Prime Minister said flatly that he thought the effect of a new agreement on the Common Market agreement would be “frankly absolutely none ” These negotiations now depended on whether the French could maintain the good deal they have in agricultural products vis-à-vis the Germans If it failed it would be on that basis The French and the British have a different concept about the Common Market the French favoring an autarchical system There was the question as to what effect an agreement would have on European multilateral arrangements It was — seer NMB ONLY »#« difficult to know what was meant by a multilateral deterrent The Prime Minister saw no conflict betwen Independent and Interdependent forces Until a supernational authority developed it dld not matter wether it was army troops or ate force Any contribution would be under the control of the Government contributing it He remarked that the problem of control ot ailted forces had been with us since Marlborough® and really was not difficult H was aware that the Frouch would go on and spond a lot of money They were grateful for the ald the United States had given and ho had tried to explain this to de Gaulle He gave the example which he had not cited to General de Gaulle for reasons of tact of British forces in the last war which were pat under the command of the French General Gamelin but at a certain time Churchill had to issue orders to Lord Gor °o save the British forces and any French who wanted to come along by going to the channel ports This enabled the alr force to save Britain Until there was a single state developed there must be a combination of Anges »ndent and joint forces The question was whether the sultch of horses from Siybolt to Polaris would upset the principal allies _ He egen even eran nace ane antal niinse MWere discussing were gestures in a sense since the only reality was 8 power Jit present Britain had « powerful bomber force wien was importunt strategically particularly because of ts location in England It © te were to be a role for the bomber in the future it would probably pr wom a strategle one to a tactical one Why should they not hand oves ore «quadron to Saceur They could ask the French to do the seme This ve 4 show the purpose of developing the philosophy of building a joint fo—e — They could inform the others what the targets of such a force were to — He thought that at present others wore feeling left out and could w—2 se brought in and given more information about these matters He att sot see the difference in principle whether one fired a ballistic mis— sile from the see or the air He pointed out that the Skybolt was a ballis te missile Meny in Britain thought that Great Britain should not be ir this game but Britain could not have such a dectslon forced on them R The President said he agreed that there was a danger that some would thirk that cutting off the Seybolt was an effort to out off the British national deterrent He pointed out that the United States had alternative nc ins In considering this matter we were conscious of the importance of the British to our relationship to Burope He had told the Prime Minister last night that the United States would divide the cost of Stybolt w ch would amount to some $200 million It was possible that we could use it in the future if we could develop an atzplane capable of staying in secher secrer —— fe gay the sky for several days but we have no great need for Skysolt We were prepared to join equally in finishing it He pointed out that this was a new position beyond that which had been given to Mr Thomeyeroft All of the U S Judgments in regard to Sybol were made in consideration of the ex— istence of our other systems He pointed out that for $100 million the British could get $400 million worth of work which we had put in it Siy— bolt should be capable of deterring Mz Knzushchev He pointed out that twenty missiles in Cuba had had a deterrent offect on us For an amount of money that was not large the British could maintain a deterrent that would take them through to a later period For $100 million they would got 2 $500 million system The second point the President wished to make was that he was aware of the history of the atomle weapon and wished to point out that we were still cooperating fimaline the French in this Held and this ured our relationship with General de Gaulle The reason for this was Germany _ We had pald more attention to the German problem than the British and particularly the problem of Berlin We had supported Britaln‘s entry into the Common Market although this was bound to have adverse effects upon us The reason was that ie felt thas Sntvisn Influ— ence was important in the balance and that Beitain would contribute to the stability of Burope We had refused help to the French because of our concern of what might happen in Germany If we should assist the Rrench this would not change do Gaulle at all but pressure in Germany would rize t we helped the French it meant that any other country which became an atomic power would expect help from us We hoped that we could use the time available to develop a multinational force The President wont on to point out that there was a great difference be— tween Polaris and Skybolt Moreover the problem was what these things looked like and not what they were This point had been illustrated by the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba These missiles had been less a military threat than a mejor political act If we join with the British in Polaris and refuse de Gaulle atomic or missile cooperation we would feed the concept he already has of America and raise now problems The President said he did not believe that if we went ahead together on Polaris that t would not shake our Buropean allies All of our people who had recently been in Burope and this included Secretary Rusk Mr Ball and Ambassador Bohlen were convinced that such action would cause great difficulties He did not want the British people to think that because of our view in opposition to the proliferation of atomic weapons secrey secher E¥E3 cu 2s HLy thes we had opposed a British deterzent If we could work out a solution in regard to Polaris which would move Buzope away from national deter— rents we would be prepared to consider such a move but it should be in that context The President pointed out that all the implications would have to be considered and that this was a new problem on which study was needed The United States had made a fate offer on Skybolt so that the Beitish people should not think that we want to out them down The Prime Minister pointed out that it might not be a shotgun wedding ‘oat we had destroyed the vieginity of the bide The President suggested this might be because we had access to other girls ‘The Prime Minister said we ought to think about what a multilateral deterent is ‘It need not be one in which the weapons are manufactured by the others The President said the question was one of how these weapons should be put in and how they could be taken out As the Prime Minister had described the matter last night it seemed rather synthetic Of course in extremes they could be taken out He pointed out that there was a question as to whether we could get the French in and what the effect on the Germans would be of United States British and Rronch peeucipation The Prime Minister said we would create a force to which the United States the French and British would contribute The President ponied out that if others developed atomic weapons they would expect us to give the delivery system The Polaris was not Just an extension of Skybolt which was not much good after 1970 when bombers would fade out The Prime Minister pointed out that Skybolt would be good Into the early seventies The Prime Minister asked if there wore a multinational force was 1 the case that the United States would contribute pert of their force while the others would contribute all of theirs ‘The President replied in the affirmative stating this was the greatest hope for a Polaris arrangement which would not upset other members of the alliance He thought we should discuss two possibilities The first was Skybolt If the United States did not have Polaris we would take Skybolt but we had two other systems The British dld not We were continuing our bomber force with the Hound Dog missile He pointed out that we would have to discuss this whole problem with Con— gress and he suggested that we and the British should set up a group to discuss these two problems and reach a Judgment during the winter sechey ‘ u secast pYf§ OHV #« Mz Bell said that this should be done in a multilateral context We had a different consept of a multinational foree from the British We had in mind mixed manning and that the right of withdrawal would not be en visaged but a commission should consider this problem The President said that if after study the British juigment of the effect on Burope was correct we could consider the British consept or that de scried by Mr Ball Lord Home said he did not share the anxiety the President had expressed France was going choad anyway Sven if there were a row with France it would be far less damaging to NATO than a rift between the United States and Great Britain The President asked if we should make a similar offer to the French Our cooperation with them now was minimal De Gaulle was beginning to realize that the problem was not the atomic warhead but the missile If he asked for the missile what do we do Lord Home pointed out that if the proposal was a multinational force as described by Mr Ball it would be voted down because it was impossible to have fifteen fingers on the trigger ‘and the Buropeans did not want any Gorman finger on the trigger Ho thought that the U S and the U K and later the French should have a joint force with NATO targets Mr Bell pointed out that we had different assessments of the German problem We thought that siter Adenazer pressure would mount for some kind of participations The Germans would not be seconceclase C citizens forever ___ ——— Lord Home thought that the pressure would be for participation in politl cal decisions Mz Ball repited he thought we should face the situation and enable Ger— many to have participation in a manner that is controllable The Prime Minister asked what we meant by participating He doubted if Germany would be satisfied with having one of fifteen sailors the President asked what was the alternative to national deterrents secrer R secrey EES tn 29 LY The Prime Minister said that he had taken his country a long way in participating in Europe in the economic fold This was not all very agreeable for Britain but he had done it But if the whole of Burope was to be dependent upon the United States why should they do any» thing It was not satisfactory to have one out of ifteon sallors The President pointed out that Europe could use the same argument — against Great Britain though he agreed thero was moze logle tn the present arrangements than in a multilateral force Lord Home thought that the Ruropeans would be satisfied to see the United States Britain and France cooperate in a nuclear force it the Buropeans knew about the deployment targeting etc None of them wanted Germany to be in and Germany did not want to bring this fact _ out into the open — De Gaulle had made clear his view that it Germany wore to get atomic arms this would unite Rastern Burope The Burs— peans did not want Germany to have atomic weapons and were opposed to a multilateral force — The Prime Minister said that de Gaulle wanted to keep alive his distant hope that the Rastern European satellites whom Gormeny had treated badly could achteve freedom The President said Adenauer had expressed the hope that we would not give atomic weapons to France because of the pressure this would arouse in Germany The Prime Minister remarked that de Gaulle had quoted Adenazer as saying exactly the opposite Mr Bell said we shared the apprehensions in regard to Germary‘s dEdulzing atomic power but it would be worse it Germany became an Independent nuclear poser Hlistory had demonstrated that we could not keep Germany in an Infefior position forever and any attempt to do so would stir up Intent forces in Germany For fais reason we sup— ported a NATO approach Mz Thorneyroft said we should not force the creation of a multi— natlonal force which was not wanted but rather have the Europeans come in at the shallow end of the pool informing them regarding targeting etc — Mr Bell remarked that this would not work soren secass — HB OW we P ontg —s— CT Lord Home said we dld not have a single ally in Burope that would allow At Germany to have its finger on the trigger Germany would be in an tn ferior position but we must contrive something to cover this up shoes The President referred to the diminishing cost of atomic weapons and said they might become attractive to the Italians and others If we gave the French Polazis submarines we would save them a good deal of money and some time H sald that Secretary McNamara did not think the time saved would be very great but the saving tn money would bo considerable Secretary McNamara confirmed this statement He thought the great protection with respect to delivery systems was their cost He thought that it was Important to keep the attention of the Germans in particular on conventional weepons because of Berlin al— though if It were not for Berlin Burope could be defended with four divisions and a nuclear strategy The President asked what the argument was against giving such asslst— ance to the French The Prime Minister sald the British had made a contract which had not worked out The President observed that France had objected to our 1958 decision and to the Norstad proposals For two years we had been opposing @Nerstaq and de Gaulle _ Now it was suggested that we come up with a new position which would represent a change of policy and it would be wise not to hasten this deciston The Prime Minister said it was simply a question of one horse being lame while the other was able to un —The President refoined that these were two different races The Prime Minister said he dld not nccept this Lord Home suggested that if we got a multinational force we could give the French Polaris at a later date The President suggested we should consider the whole situation and perhaps have a statement that should state soren a seorss — BBS OY 1 We had offered to make the Hound Doy missile available and he referred in this connection to the treatment of our position by the British and American press which had made it look as though we were being untatz 2 We had offered to continue the Skybolt program and to put $100 million more into its development which would enable Britain to continue its national deterrent 3 — We discussed the problem of Polaris which was a new Held and which should be looked at with care ‘The President went on to say that we should look at what we meant by multinational force How should control be exercised Whether a similar offer should be made to France And finally we should make judgment on what the effect of our action would be in Europe ‘The statement he had outlined would answer the charges of United States bad faith and the charge that Beitain wes without any alternative He ld not think however that we could decide these matters here Lord Home expressed some concern at putting all this on papery as this would highlight the inferior position of Germany and stiz up the Germans Mz Ball said this should be on the basis of a private discussion The Prime Minister asked that if the present position had not arisen when the Skybolt would have been operational Secretary MeXamara replied that it would have been operational in 1986 The Prime Minister asked If the Skybolt was likely to be reasonably effective and If it would be safe to carry Secretary MeNamara replied that it would be safe to carry and would be an effective deterzent but would have low reliability —— something on the order of twenty to thirty percent operational reliability The President pointed out that if we did not have other systems avail able we would go ahead on Skybolt Secretary McNemare said that in such circumstances we would cortainly consider going ahead but he did not feel that we could do so in view of the availability of alternate systems and the low reliability of Skybolt sechey j secer i bsoy —10— The Prime Minister inquired if the record of failure was worse than normal t McNamara replied in the aftiemative stating that this was the most — aplex system we had yet attempted He polined out that an error of 3 foot per second meant an error of one thousand feet at target I Prime Minister said he was terribly to blame for the situation smtatn was in as he had made an error of judgment and should have 4—ae on to develop the British missile — The President observed that the British had lost time whereas we had lost $00 million Ate MeXNemaza pointed out that he was in a difficult situation in explain— fng to Congress why we had spent $200 million since 1061 He had asked Congress for $100 million for 1962 and for $180 million for 106% ‘The President suggested that theso figures miget be useful to Mr Fromeyeroft in explaining the situation to Parlier on iis Thorneyoroft said that his difficulty in Parliament was that the Siy— boll would be late expensive and unreliable and these facts had been made public s President said the British press had been carrying stories he affect that our action had not been taken on technical grounds but ca potitical ones a Thorneeroft said the British press was looking at me aiternative The Prime Minister seid he agreed that the press muss oe dows with ond not ufiltzed He pointed out that the Hound Dog was diiult to use 0 British planes wiz McNamara pointed out that the Hound Dog could be «dupted o Brus wanes although some changes in the missile would have to be made Mr Thomeyeroft pointed out that this would take a loag time and even when accomplished would scare only eichteen Inches of clearance at take— 0% In any event this could not be accomplished until about the dime when bombers would no longer be used sere secrer hse The Prime Minister said the probler was for him as it had been for Britain in 1040 whether to chuck it or go on Churchill had told fim in 1940 that in logic it was impossible wo win the wary but they had gone on There were lots of people in Britain who would like to chuck it which would enable them to have better pensions and a more satisfactory life The other altornative was to say that this is a complicated system —— the Americans won‘t give it to us —— we will go on and make it eventrally and be free This would be better than putting a British sallor on board ship o have tea with the Portuguese ‘to give up would mean that Britain was not the nation that had gone through its glorious history We should consider that if the people who wanted to give up in Britain came to power who would make the better _ ally Those were the ones we were supporting in Bzitain by our poll« cles It was true that Germany was dangerous but not as much as be— _ foreche war because the wholo balance had changed and there were now two super powers They must find some method to deel with this problem Bither Britain must stay in the nuclear club or he would re— sign and we would Rave a permanent sories of Gatesidiis ‘he would not engage in anything petty We could stay at Holy Loch ‘He pointed out that he had taken big risks in his poltefes People had sald that Britain was in the front line where they were all targets but had none of the powers He would be prepared to put in all of his part of a Polaris force provided the Queen had the ultimate power and right to draw beck in the case of a dire emergency similar to that in 190 He thought the United States would do the same if we dld not have a super— flutty ot weapons Britain could make submarines —— not nuclear ones —— to carey mlsalles This could be accomplished in six years but the cast would have to be compensated elsewhere Re hoped not in the Far Best where the British contribution was in some ways more important than in Europe ‘They would have to tex their people more as well There was no use prolonging the life of the bomber which was bound to dle in any event Submarines were much more sultable for an sland — ike Britain which also had a great naval tradition Such a course however would lead to a deep ift with the United States e sald he wold not accuse America and reminded the President that he was one— half American himself The President said that in the first place we were prepared to do what we seid we would do He pointed out that we had spent a great deal of money in carzying out the commitment which Sisenhower had made and thet there could be no suggestion of bad faith We placed great secrer — secret ssnet in EVES OMY —1— yalze on our relationship with Great Britain He pointed out that the British had their own sclentists at the Douglas Plant and asked what _ they had been saying during the last stx months ‘ e recalled talking t ulan Amory about this problem who had been so affected he had — taiton to his bed The President had not before realized what the British resetion to this problem would be Amory had flown out to the Douglas Plant and on his zeturn had thought things were not in smae but metin selentiats at the Douglas Plant were apparently say« trouble was not technical but political Mz Thorneyoroft suggested that such reports might have come from U S personnel particularly those interested in continuing the project n reply to a question from the President as to his oun optnlon on S bolt Mr Thomeyeroft said he had to rely on Mr MeXNamaza‘s Julg« mnt as he had gone thorough into the matter and had publicly said § that Skybolt would be late expensive and unreliable The President pointed out that MeXemara‘s fudgment was based on the frst that he had alternative systems He pointed out that for $250 million investment the British could get a good buy which would deter Xnrushche Mz Thomeyeroft pointed out that his oun experience was that systems ot this kind could be successfully developed only if you went fat out in your effort and there was the prospect of a good order at the end of the line The Prime Minister asked the President what he would do if he were in ‘ Macmillan‘s place — The President thought our only difficulty was the different judgment we had on the effect a bilateral arrangement would have n Europe and he § repeated that all of our exports thought this would be very serious The Prime Minister said this appeared to be based on the assumption that this was a different weapon The President said we could not setile this matter today and then read excerpts from a 5 draft paper which listed 1 our offer of Hound Dog 2 our offer to share equally in cost of completion of Siybolt @ a pln for the two governments to cooperate in a NATO missile force seonen — Sbstomice — — — sedge 0 bue mn S9 __ EBS CAY —8— The President said that after consultation with NATO the to governments might agree 2 that the forces developed under our agreement would be assigned to the NATO deterrent forces and assigned targets under agree ments approved by NATO 5 the U S would undertake to make similar assignment of parallel and equivalent forces s the U S and U X would support the creation of a NATO multilateral foree 3 the U and U forees would be Included in such a NATO multilateral force The Prime Minister inquired what would happen about SEATO The Bzitish would be contributing all of thete force to NATO and ho inquired what would happen If the Chinese altacked Hong Kong He threw out the suggestion that the British contribution might be made proportionate to that of the United States He said that the British force might be of the most value in the Far Rest The President sald the same assistance might be made available to France which probably would not want it The Prime Minister thought the French might be tempted by the time that would be gained At this point the meeting broke up for lunch — secrer