' SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM f fi 1w i ulte11tolt£1nda1'1t U S DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH REU-7 February 25 1965 To The Secretary - Thomas L Hughes - ' - Through From Subject Major Factors Underlying British and German Positions Regarding Nuclear Weapons For much of the past two years discussion of the organization of nuclear arrangements within the North Atlantic Alliance has centered almost exclusively on the MLF proposal The positions taken in these discussions by the two major European participants the United Kingdom and West Germany have reflected the concerns of these two governments over their future relations with the United States as much as they have reflected their own basic needs and desires in nuclear matters The United States government has now made it clear that it wants the countries of NATO Europe and in particular the UK and West Germany to take the lead in developing nuclear proposals of their own before the US cODlllits itself to support any specific plan It is therefore timely and relevant to examine the fundamental interests and outlooks of these two countries so as to understand the actions they may take or equally significantly may fail to take in this field Such an examination will also contribute to an appreciation of the attitudes they have taken thus far towards the MLF idea and of those they can be expected to take towards related proposals ABSTRACT The two major European participants with the United States in discussion of Atlantic Alliance nuclear affairs are the United Kingdom and Germany The positions they take regarding nuclear weapons spring from their own perception of national interests and requirements as follows Germany The most important elements underl ying the nuclear weapons policy of the Federal Republic of Germany are related to the military security of West Ge rmany's own territory Because of Germany's expoaed geographical DECLASSIFIED Authority D101tA SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM IJ tOUP 3 wn«radod at 12 year btervals not aut omatically declassified SEX RET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - ii - positi on vis-a-vis the Soviet Union Germany's disbelief that the territory of the FRG can be def ended by conventional means against a large-scale Soviet attack and Germany's fear of a tactical nuclear battle along NATO's Central Front that is in Germany the Germans consider that credible strategic nuclear deterrence is their only real defense They rely for that defense on the United States The Germans recognize that the American commitment to the defense of Germany is secured by the presence on German soil of the equivalent of six US divisions But Bonn wishes to reinsure US protection by finding new ways to involve American nuclear power even more inextricably in ope This primarily security-oriented aspect of German nuclear weapons policy involves questions of the deployment and colllll8nd of nuclear weapons but not of their ownership and control which are as much political as military in nature As to ownership and control although the German Government and most articulate opinion in the Federal Republic reject a national solution some Germans in part because of past prodding by the United States are coming to feel that Germany ought to have a share or voice in the control of nuclear weapons in the Alliance Such participation in the view of these Germans would increase Germany's ability to influence important Alliance decisions particularly as to strategy and would remove the threat of permanent second-class status for Germany behind the UK and France There is no agreement in Germany as to what changes if aey should be •de in existing Alliance nuclear arrangements in light of the foregoing considerations SPD opinion tends to favor an approach baaed on greater participation in Alliance nuclear-strategic planning and policy making CDU CSU opinion espoused the DECLASSIFfED Authority N D1014Cf S E1 RET NO FOREIGN DISS EM • DECLASSIFIED Authority 1014g SFJ jRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - iii - shared nuclear ownership and control approach but was divided as to the eventual place of the United States in the force However positions taken within the CDU CSU on the nuclear question were to some degree distorted by a party power struggle and by other foreign policy problems With a national election not too far off Bonn seems content to shelve the nuclear debate for a while When the nuclear question again comes up for active discussion in the Alliance Germany will seek arrangements that provide for the conmitment t o NATO of strategic nuclear weapons to cover SACEUR1s targets accord the Federal Republic an important role in nuclear planning and decision-making and thus greater status in the Alliance engage US nuclear power irrevocably in the defense of Europe and are tolerable to France or even contain induce ments to eventual French participation in some form Si nce Bonn committed itself heavily to many of the specifics of the MLF proposal deft presentational handling will be required for any plan that does not incorporate these specifics notably mixed manning of delivery systems and multilateral ownership of weapons The passage of time will eaee this problem for the Germans If as now seems likely no new plan can be realized that gives the Germans all they want by way of new arrangements both militarily and politically then the Germans will cling most strongly to satisfaction of their military security requirements In the final analysis the1 will have to eettle tor whatever t he US finds acceptable At bottom they are aware of their dependence on the US for security and this assures the US a dominant intluence on German defense policy until there is a great shift in Fast-Vest relations or until the Federal Republic is given serious reason to doubt that the US continues to regard Ger - n and American security as indivisible SFX RET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - iv - The UK The British strategic nuclear deterrent now consists of a force of medium bombers many of them assigned to NATO Under the Nassau Agreement with the United States the UK will in addition acquire four nuclear powered POLARIS-armed submarines which unde'r the Agreement will also be NATO assigned Although the present Labor Government during the election campaign in the fall of 1964 called for the elimination of the independent British nuclear deterrent it now appears to have decided that the UK will remain a nuclear power which the Conservatives also advocate Labor in fact apparently intends to withdraw some of the bombers from their NATO assignment for deployment East of Suez As to the POLARIS submarines Labor may be pre pared to conuni t them to the Alliance in some optically irrevocable form but it will almost certainly not 1surrender all title to the111 or place them beyond the possibility of recall Britain retains extensive and pressing military obligations outside the NATO area To honor these obligations the UK is trying to eke out its limited resources with strategic nuclear weapons Four nuclear bombers have recently been deployed in the neighborhood of Indonesia obviously in the hope that this will deter Sukarno from intensifying his attack on Malaysia however doubtful it may be that Britain would actually use nuclear weapons against Indonesia In the longer term the UK believes its nuclear power will be needed as a counterpoise to an eventual Chinese capability that threatens South Asia and the British argue that in this role the deterrent also serves an anti-proliferational purpose India in particular might more easily resist pressures to develop her own nuclear weapons if DECLASSIFIED Authority Nt JQ1014C SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - v - Indian security against Chinese nuclear attack were to be guaranteed by the UK as Mr Harold Wilson has argued As to the British weapons that will remain NATO-committed their continued existence Labor may well be concluding is necessary to assure the UK's status as a first-rate power with special relations to the United States and special influence in the Alliance The terms on which the British may eventually commit these forces to NATO even in an ANF type of arrangement will be such as to perpetuate this special status as a nuclear power even if it is played down optically The British do it is true favor some sharing of responsibility in nuclear matters with the non-nuclear meni ers of the Alliance particularly the Germans in proportion bo their contributions to the military strength of NATO But they do not believe that this objective can be reached only through measures affecting the ownership and real control of nuclear weapons They believe that the effort to achieve this goal should be directed toward giving the non-nuclear countries a larger role in shaping strategy and in nuclear policy planning and targeting The readiness of the UK to accord others a greater influence on strategy and on nuclear policy however is limited by British perception of a basic difference between the security situation of the UK and that of the Continental countries based on geography In spite of its campaign pledges the Labor Government in the UK is not under great domestic pressure to eliminate the British nuclear deterrent It can defuse such pre1sures if they do arise by emphasizing its disarma ment objectives These objectives which are genuine further condition SECRBT 110 DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - vi - Labor's attitude toward Alliance nuclear arrangements At the moment reluctance to jeopardize the possibility of a non-proliferation agreement with the Soviet Uni on for example is one of the factors generating British coolness toward an MLF component within their proposed ANF On pages 16 and 17 we list the general British criteria emergent from the foregoing analysis for any new Alliance nuclear arrangements This is followed by a brief description of the tactics we expect the UK to employ in pursuing its objectives SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority N D10f SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 1 - The three major European partners of the United States in the North Atlantic Alliance the United Kingdom France and the Federal Republic of Germany differ markedly in their positions on the relationship of their respective nations to nuclear weapons France is set upon creating a national nuclear strike force that will be completely under its own control Although there is some opposition in France to this concept this opposition is not nor is it expected for some time to be important enough to produce any change in French nuclear policy In the United Kingdom the question of whether to retain the existing independent British nuclear deterrent has seemed to be a major issue between the two principal parties but their differences may be more polemical then real The Conservatives want to maintain the deterrent and the narrowly elected governing Labor Party which attacked the Conservatives on this score during the recent election campaign now appears to be moving in a direction that in substance is close to the Tory view In Germany discussion centers not around the question of creating a national nuclear force which all responsible elements oppose but around what military-nuclear role Germany ought to play with other NATO powers individually or collectively It seems clear that as far as the emerging French nuclear force is con cerned United States policy bas little room for maneuver France will have its force and is able to get it without outside assistance though external aid would ease and accelerate attainment of goals As to other nuclear arrangements within or outside the North Atlantic Alliance France's acceptance or rejection of them and its readiness or lack of readiness to cooperate with them will depend upon the extent to which in Paris' eyes they support hinder or leave unaffected the political objectives which the French force is designed to serve Since these objectives are relatively open and clear in making evident President de Gaulle's insistence on the appearance of France's independence of reliance on U S nuclear power it should not be hard to estimate how any particular nuclear proposal that might be advanced would be received in France Unlike the rather straightforwardly nationalistic motives behind French nuclear policy the rationales for British and German nuclear policies are both complex and involved in domestic political controversy Moreover developments of the past few years principally those connected with the MLF proposal have tended further to obscure the essentials of the British and German positions on nuclear weapons Indeed these developments may them selves have altered those positions in some respects It seems useful at this stage of affairs therefore to set forth the elements that underlie British and German policies and attitudes relating to nuclear weapons ao that these elements can be taken into account when the possibility of devising new nuclear arrangements in the Western Alliance is being explored For a discussion of French nuclear policy see RM-RBU-2 Notes on French Strategic Doctrine January 15 1965 For an analysis of the motivea for France's strong recent opposition to the Multilateral Force concept see RM-REU-70 December 17 1964 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFf ED Authority 1 HJD 10f lf1 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 2 - Germany Primacy of security considerations Among the NATO countries of Western Europe Germany is the one most preoccupied with the physical problems of national security The long eastern border of the Federal Republic is also the western edge of the Coumrunist world Within less than 150 miles of that border in East Germany alone twenty or more Soviet army divisions -- and a number of Kast German divisions -- are deployed in a high state of combat readiness these are supported by many more Soviet and other Warsaw Pact country divisions and by hundreds of MRBM's deployed in the western USSR and targeted on Western Europe Within West Germany itself the troops of six other NATO countries provide a constant reminder of the central position which Germany holds in the East-West confrontation In the event of a conflict in Europe any Soviet advance would from the very outset mean the loss of West German territory and that territory could be recovered only at great cost to German lives and property Thus for the Germans NATO's official forward strategy that is the concept of maintaining the territorial integrity of the NATO area without any intention to make a major withdrawal is a matter of stark survival German view of a credible deterrent strategy The Germans apparently have come to accept the general thesis of the United States that Western strategic nuclear power alone given the strength of the Soviet nuclear arsenal can no longer be considered fully credible as a deterrent against any Soviet attack on Europe that is not of an all-out character They agree that strategic nuclear deterrence can gain the additional credibility it needs against this type of aggression by increasing the West's capacity to fight at a lower level thus demonstrating serious intent This lower-level capability as they see it must be so constructed as to 1 prevent a rapid enemy advance into Germany and 2 clearly threaten escalation of the conflict The Germans do not think that their territory can be credibly defended by conventional means against a large-scale Soviet attack even a non-nuclear one Tiley therefore hold that the forces defending the West German border must be armed with nuclear air defense interdiction and battlefield weapons They assert that nuclear air defense and interdiction weapons must be used virtually as soon as an enemy advance begins If these fail to halt the enemy advance it will be necessary to oppose him with battlefield nuclear weapons The attacker will then supposedly become aware that if he pursues his attack further at this stage of hostilities escalation to the tactical-strategic nuclear phase will be swift and inevitable so that his choice will lie between discontinuing his attack without having made a significant gain and all-out strategic nuclear war This is not to imply of course that the Germans actually expect the use of any nuclear weapons on their territory in an East-West conflict They are aware that this would cause great devastation Rather they believe that the forward deployment of smaller nuclear weapons credibly supported by the threat of escalation to the strategic level would en sure that there would be no hostilities In other words there would be effective deterrence DECLASSIFIED Authorit t JtJQ101L 1 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 3 - Key role of nuclear weapons The difference between the German emphasis on the early use of nuclear weapons and the US insistence on a build-up of non-nuclear capabilities is more than a difference of tactical doctrine It is also a divergence in political approach and in the analysis of the military problem The Germans probably fear that too much emphasis on non-nuclear capability will convey to the Soviet Union an impression of unreadiness to use strategic nuclear weapons an impression that might lead to a miscalculation The German motive in emphasizing smaller nuclear weapons is at least in part an expression of a determination to keep nuclear deterrence in general and strategic nuclear deterrence in particular in the forefront of defense There are also German-American differences on command and control arrange ments for smaller nuclear weapons If nuclear weapons are deployed far forward as the Germans see it it is essential that they be and be known to be under command and control arrangements that enable them to be used on short notice Although the Germans do not dispute the ultimate decision-making power of the President of the United States respecting the use of nuclear weapons they have expressed concern lest the arrangements for executing this decision once taken be too cumbersome Former Chancellor Adenauer on several occasions publicly expressed his unease on this score He even proposed giving NATO the authority to order the use of atomic weapons without specifying what NATO instrumentality he had in mind Problem of assuring the US commitment Our analysis has so far dealt with German views as to how to create a defense that will be credible to the Soviets This defense re t on strategic nuclear deterrence and thus on an outside power the United States This leads the Germans inevitably to ask themselves how secure and durable the American coumitmenti No German in public life likes to raise this issue To question the American commitment might antagonize the United States and would also seem to cast doubt on the wisdom of Germany's security policy based as it is on American power But among themselves some leading Germans do express f ear of an eventual American disengagement The Germans consider that they now have with the presence of six US divisions on their soil adequate assurances of Americal s commitment to Germany's defense But they cannot be sure that all or any of these divisions will always remain in Germany Although they seek to conceal their insecurity in this respect it comes to the surface each time there is talk in Washington of such matters as the balance of payments problems allegedly connected with US troop deployment abroad and the new mobility concepts that would enable American combat troops now deployed overseas to be concentrated in the US Although Ge rman f ears have been calmed in each past case a residue of worry remains Thus the desire to nail American nuclear power down more securely permanently and inextricably in Europe is another object of German policy SACEUR's MRBM requirement The prospect of achieving this aroae for the Germans when in late 1956 a meetl_n_g of the NATO Heads of Government decided that MRBM's then IRBM's ought to tffit at the disposal of SACEUR These MRBH's were thought necessary to counter the increasing numbers of Soviet MRBM'• DECLASSIFIED Aurhority NtJD101Lfi SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 4 - deployed in the Western Soviet Union against targets in Western Europe Implementation of this Heads-of-Governments decision was to give SACEUR a strategic in addition to t ctical capability and to provide against the eventual obsolescence of the command's manned strike aircraft SACEUR welcomed the Heads-of-Governments decision and has since it was made submitted requirements for increasing numbers of MRBM's of several kinds But for various reasons that will not be examined here SACEUR's stated requirements have not been filled or even formally approved at the political level The Germans have strongly and consistently supported the filling of SACEUR's MRBM requirement They agree with SACEUR that a good proportion of his MRBM's should be land-based and thus lUlder his imnediate control Achievement of this objective would place in Europe itself under the same NATO conmander to whom all German armed forces are assigned and in whose planning efforts German officers participate more of the means necessary to defend Germany It would also assuming that the US would provide the MRBM's or at least the warheads engage the US even more deeply in Europe The United States while making gestures toward SACEUR in the form of assigning a few POLARIS submarines to his conmand has by and large dismissed his MRBM requirement as not militarily urgent The US has contended that its own strategic nuclear forces not committed to NATO but available for NATO defense adequately cover SACEUR's strategic targets • In the face of past American coolness toward MRBM's for SACEUR especially HRBM's land-based in Europe the Germans have found it politic to mute their support for them Never theless they continue to find occasion to remind others that the requirement is still unsatisfied and ought to be met Since SACEUR's requirement however was sometimes adduced as one argument for the MLF--and ANF--which the U S has backed the United States position on SACEUR's nuclear needs is now ambiguous The conflict between the British ANF proposal that the new force be placed under a separate con and and German-Italian insistence that it be subordinated to SACEUR may push the U S to take a stand on this matter in an effort to resolve the dispute DECLASSIFf ED 4G Authority D1-lJ3 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 5 - The nuclear ownership and control guestion SACEUR's MRBM requirement involves questions of camnand organization am of the deployment of nuclear weapons not of their ownership or of the ultimate control of their use Insofar as the ownership arxi control of nuclear weapons are concerned German attitudes are harder to pin down It bears repeating however that the German Government and the ovenihelming bulk of the articulate German public have not sought national ownership or control of nuclear weapons There is a very widespread w' derstand ing that the possibilities open to West Germany on this score are decidedly different from those open to France and Great Britain The Germans lalov that a German nuclear force or even a Franco-German force• would not satisfy Germany's nuclear defense requirements but could easily alienate the US arxi lead Washington to distance itself militarily from Germany Almost everyone in the Federal Republic is also aware that German possession and control of nuclear weapons would strongly antagonize the Soviet Union and that this in addition to increasing the threat to Germany's security would dash any hopes of progress toward reunification A German nuclear force would moreover immeasurably damage Germany's caretully cultivated relations with its Western European allies ard set at nought German efforts to build new bridges to F astern Europe Germany's wish for a •share in control This situation in Germany in regard to national nuclear arms is likely to continue to prevail for a long time to come At the same time it is by no means inconsistent to note that there are signs that some Germans owing in part to past prodding by the US are coming to feel that it is unnatural for Germany not to want sane share or voice in the control of nuclear weapons in the Alliance whatever this may mean To the extent that this feeling exists it is probably traceable to two causes 1 the belier that Germany given her sizable military contribution to NATO ought to have more influence in NATO councils particularly in respect to overall strategy arrl that this can be obtained only by meaningful participation in basic decisions involving nuclear weapons 2 the fear that Germany will sanehow lapse into second-class status Wlless it acquires some role in nuclear control -- in act a role equal to that of the UK and comparable to that aspired to by France The first of these two factors influence in the Alliance bas or course both military and political aspects Germany wants not only recognition of its own contribution to NATO but also a greater ability than it now has to naure that major Alliance decisions are not prejudicial to German interests as Bonn sees them The status factor The secord factor status is almost entirely political arrl it is highly elusive Before the French force de fra e got of the drawing board the Germans were not talking about first- and secon-class status The • A Franco-German force is mentioned here purely as a theoretical possibility In fact France has clearly stated its adamant opposition on both political arrl security grourrls to any close German association in the control or nuclear weapons Any French offer to the Germans of a partnership in the f'orce de frappe would be on t he basis of continued and absolute French control DECLASSIFfED Authority D101Lfi SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECREI' NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 6 - f act that the British had their own nuclear force did not then disturb Germany Only t he incipient emergence of the French force into being seems to have produced some German grumbling over status There is no clear answer as to why this should be Since 1945 the Germans have not sought national prestige for its own sake On the contrary they have been notabzy unassertive And it is highly unlikely that the Germans think that the French or British forces could ever be directed against them mill tarily The Germans who worry about nuclear status have not explained precisely what lies at the root of these ruminations Perhaps they believe that the French will derive from their nuclear force a psychological advantage of some kind that will ensure for them undisputed leadership and commensurate advantage in Western Europe a leadership that these Germans are not prepared to concede Perhaps -- arrl this is related to the factor of influence in the Alliance -- they believe that a nuclear France will eventually be able to bring about the formation of the tripartite US-UK-French directorate which de Gaulle has advocated since 1958 or even a US-French duumvirate running the free-world show Perhaps they believe that Germany cannot affo rd to miss out on the special technological benefits which as the French contend may accrue to countries with nuclear weapons program In any case German uneasiness at continuing total isolation fran Alliance nuclear weapon affairs despite existing two-key bilateral arrangements with the US on tactical nuclear arms is likely to spread if' there is significant additional proliferation in the world to such countries as India Sweden or the UAR which are obviously inferior to the FRG in overall national strength No German consensus on the solution As a result of all of these considerations military and political many Germans conclude that there is need for some change in the existing situation in the Alliance regarding the control of nuclear weapons Yet there is no consensus in Germany as to what form the change should take The Socialist Party sees no need for major changes it believes that ownership and ultimate control or nuclear weapons should reside in the United States with the other allies given a larger role than at present in planning and policy formation regardJ ng deployment and use The Socialists were prepared to accept the sharing of ownership approach incorporated in the MLF but without enthusiasm and only because they thought it was wanted by the United States In the CDU opinion is divided although not to the extent sanetimes thrught The Schroeder-von Hassel school the so-called Atlanticists came to favor the approach embodied in the MLF acauisition of a share of nucl ar ownership and or a vote on use symbolizing Germany's equality in NATO Although some members or this group notably von Hassel at first toyed with the idea of eventual t ermination of the US veto over use of the force and its ultillate Europeanization they soon came to see that this could not be reconciled with another objective of the MLF that was tun lamental tran the German point of view viz the creation of an institution that would permanentl 3 tie US nuclear power DECLASSIFIED Authority i-014'1 SECRET NO FOREmH DISSBM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 7 - to the defense of Germany Hence these same people subsequently grew very vague about any possible f'uture withdrawal or the US veto This well illustrates the German security dilemma as a whole a desire to become less evidently dependent upon the United States coupled with a horror ot losing American protection Another group in the CDU CSU led by Strauss and Guttenberg the so-called Gaullists has advocated different things at different times As nearly as can be discerned their present position whose formulation was stimulated by the MLF discussion is this Europe ought to pull its weight and increase its influence in the Atlantic Alliance by having its own nuclear force which should be coordinated with US nuclear power in a sort or nuclear dumbbell Such a European force will be possible only when Europe is politically unified am therefore able to control it That time is a long way off In the meantime some such scheme as the MLF might be acceptable but only if it were clearly to provide for evolution t wards eventual European control with or without continued US participation In this way it might better allow for later collaboration with the force de frappe and might thus contribute to the achievement of European unity rather then to its retardation Confusion of the nuclear guestion with other issues It is bard to say how genuinely either of these two CDU positions is held Even as the nuclear question was being actively advanced for consideration by the United States in late 1962 and early 1963 it got snarled up in what was widely viewed as a Franco-American contest over the future organization and orientation of Europe Support of the MLF led by Foreign Minister Schroeder came to be identified in Germany with backing for American leadership of the alliance Opposition to Schroeder particularly as personified in Strauss assumed the guise of coolness toward the MLF and was equated by scne with support of France against the US In fact Schroeder supports Western E lropean political integration •s strongly as his opponents in the CDU CSU while they appreciate as much as does Schroeder the importance to Germany of the security tie with the United States Schroeder's opponents were helped by the French who warned that a nuclear role for Gennany could not be reconciled with German reunification As it worked out Schroeder ended up heavily committed to a project that caused trouble with France and thereby ran afoul of another major German foreign policy objective Franco-German rapprochement and Etu-opean unity Schroeder's opponents having neither endorsed nor really attacked the MLF can now enjoy Schroeder's discomfiture to them a pearl of greater price than the creation or non-creation of the MLF The nuclear question has now beccne mixed up with so many other things in Germany that most Germans are probably content to relax for same period be fore it is again tabled for active discussion Although this issue has still not aroused much public interest an l is not a matter of debate on substance between the major parties the attention which it focuses on Germany's position between France am the US is particularly unwelcome with a national election in the of'ting in t he autumn of 1965 If nothing else it exposes the Bonn Government to charges of ineptitude SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM ---- ---------- DECLASSIFJED Authority D1014 1 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 8 - Sooner or later however the question of new nuclear arrangements will almost surely again come to the fore on the agenda In fact low-level diplomatic exchanges among Rome Bonn and London on ANF issues are even now taking place and could lead to multilateral meetings with US participation even before the West German elections However Chancellor Erhard has declared that his government will make no commitment on the ANF until after elections and it is too early to say whether in fact the problElll will be pressed towards sane early resolution even after that event This will depend on a variety of develo Jlents on which predictions cannot yet be made such as the election r esults the standing of the Labor Government in the UK the result of efforts to create political and possibly defense consultative institutions among the Six de Gaulle's position nine months hence the evolution of the FRG's policy towards East Germany Eastern Eur ope and t he USSR and overall East-West relations German nuclear desiderata Nevertheless whenever the nuclear problem again returns to the limelight the Germans will certainly want any agreement to involve a number of key elements 1 They will seek the inclusion ot strategic nuclear delivery systems committed to NATO and used to cover SACEUR's targets preferably in the form of MRBM's deployed on or near continental Western Europe arrl assigned to SACEUR 2 They will urge the creation or new organizational st ructures or modification of old ones so as to ensure that Germany will play an important role in strategic planning and in the making of basic decisions involving nuclear weapons thereby gaining status in the Alliance am narrowing t he gap between Bonn's present position arrl that of London am Paris 3 They will at t empt to make engagement of the United States as irrevocable as possible in the nuclear defense of Europe 4 They will try to find inducements to attain eventual French participation or association or at least French toleration of the scheme so as to prevent its becoming an obstacle to progress toward European political unity and Franco-German entente There are evidently several paradoxes within this list of criteria Inextri cable involvement of the United States implies a perpetual US Teto over the use of t he nuclear weapons involved Yet this imposes limits on the extent to which other countries could share or even appear to share in control over the weapons As another example the willingness of France to participate in the arrangements or even to tolerate them would be reduced by the extent to which a they decreased France's edge over Germany and b they enhanced the role accorded SACEUR Presentational problems The handling of the presentational aspect of any proposal will be very important for the Germans They canmitted themselves heavily and publicly to some of the specifics of the MLF scheme especially mixed marming and multilateral ownership It was these two aspects ot the MLF t hat seemed to them to offer the most in terms or gains in status Heither was fundamental in tenns of security nor was el ther in principle essential to obtain a greater share in nuclear strategy decisions Yet it was these saae aspecta DECLASSIFfED Authority Dt01Y 1 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - - that caused the most trouble elsewhere notably with France and the Soviet Union It is thus possible that the Germans may conclude that getting a degree of ownership of and manpower participation in operating strategic nuclear weapons creates more problems for them than it solves At the same time we recognize that their vigorous public commitment to multilateral ownership and manning during the MLF discussions will make it awkward for them to drop these professed objectives unless perhaps the SPD acquires a major role in policy making after the fall elections On the other hand if a certain amount of time elapses before the nuclear dialogue is resumed in earnest as Germany now hopes it will becane easier for Bonn to revise previous positions Security requirements limit German power of choice In the last analysis the Germans will have no choice but to take whatever they are finally offered at least by the US If they must choose among desiderata they will probably go after the security objectives first maxflaum visible assurance of coverage of SACEUR's MRBM targets in a form binding on the US They will also try to salvage some appearance of a gain in status If they get disappointingly little they will have to live with their disappointment • No one but the United States is likely to offer thE IPl or can offer them arrangements which will give more national security than they now have This is a central fact of life in Germany It assures the US a dominant influence on German defense policy until German perception of basic security requirements changes which would entail a great shift in overall F ast-West relations or Germany is given serious reason to believe that its security is no longer a vital interest of the United States The UK A description of the British nuclear deterrent The British independent nuclear deterrent now consists of Victor and Vulcan medium bombers so-called V-Bombers each of which carries one nuclear bomb The range of these bombers enables them to reach the western part of the Soviet Union Of a total of 177 V-Bombers now in the inventory 120 are assigned to NATO under SACEUR but the UK retains effective control over them A program of technical modification has been carried out to prolong the effective life of the V-Bombers as a credible weapons system into the early 1970's Under the 1962 Nassau Agreement with the United States the British are also building four nuclear powered missile submarines for which the United States has agreed to sell POLARIS missiles The nuclear warheads for the missiles will be produced by the British Under the US-UK agreement these submarines when built are to be assigned to NATO It cannot now be said how long POLARIS sub marines will remain an effective deterrent weapore system but it is currently thought that their useful life should extend at least into the late 1970's or 1980's • It goes without saying of course that it would be contrary to US interests to foster sentiments of disgruntlement with the US and other allies in German public opinion This factor will therefore presumably be of saae importance in the terms finally offered to Bonn on nuclear matters SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFfED Authority N D1lTfLA SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 10 - It now appears that the British Labor Government intends to withdraw some V-Bombers from NATC assignment in order to use them for other purposes related t o UK military commitments F ast of Suez As to the submarines Labor pr e- election campaign talk of renegotiating or denegotiating the Nassau Agreement with the implicati on that the sutma rines might not be acquired at all or if acquired might be converted to an exclusively hunter-killer role has not been hPard since the election As it turned out the debate within the Labor go ernment soon centered not on whether to acquire the POLARIS subs but on how many to acquire Five was the number foreseen in the Nassau Agreement The keels of two of them had been laid at the time the Labor Government took office The decision to complete four has just been made A t hird nuclear delivery system with a potential strategic capability is the controversial TSR-2 aircraft Before the Labor Party came to office it denounced the TSR-2 project as a colossal waste of money and it still considers expenditures on it to be militarily unjustifiable but it bas now deferred a decision on liquidating the project because of domestic political and econanic considerations The decision is of course tied in with the general question of the future of the British aircraft irrlustry a sizable employer with a voluble well unionized arrl influential labor force This and the considera tion that the TSR-2 is primarily designed for a high-altitude reconnaissance and tactical strike role make it an imperfect touchstone for Labor policy on the strategic nuclear deterrent and it will therefore not be considered further in this study The Labor Government's ANF proposal Labor then given its apparent intentions in regard to keeping the V-Bombers and the POLARIS sul marines is showing no si gns of dumping British strategic nuclear weapons into the sea or even of allowing the deterrent to waste away through obsolescence If its present views can rightly be read from its proposal last fall of an Atlantic Nuclear Force ANF its desires seem rather to involve these elements retaining an indepeooent nuclear deterrent for use outside the NATO area in the fonn of a sizable mnnber of V-Bombers assigning to the ANF and through it to NATO t he POLARIS submarines when they become operational and the remainder of the V-Bomber force with the possibility of multilateral mixed manning for the V-Bombers arrl making this assignment irrevocable for the life of the Alliance The British apparently contemplate UK national manning for the subnarines and they would retain at least residual title to them Thus even apart from the V-Bombers the sutmarines and the continued manufacture of nuclear warheads for their POLARIS missiles would seem to guarantee the UK's status as a nuclear power Indeed it has been openly doubted in Britain whether any nation in a supreme national emergency would forego the use of weapons owned by itselt and manned by its nationals such as the four suanarines however irrevocably they may have been assigned on paper It is true that in British-American talks on nuclear utters during the last few months consideration has been given to the installation or permissive action SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSBM I DECLASSIFfED Authority NtJD'Wl SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 11 - links PALS in the nuclear warheads to be put on UK POLARIS submarines so as to make i t technically impossible for these to be armed for firing by British decision alone without authority from the ANF command and control center But in view of the factors considered further on in this paper it seems probable that the UK even if it finally agrees to the installation of PALS in the warheads will nonetheless reject arrangements that would place the suhnarines themselves beyond all possibility of British recovery In fact any such arrange ments would be inconsistent with Britain's ultimate reversionary or residual rights in the submarines And if the UK goes on producing its own nuclear warheads it could always use new ones to replace those warheads on the POLARIS missiles into which PALS had been built In this light although London's tactic will probably be to seek to torpedo any PALS proposal by technical ar@uments by demanding an exorbitant price or simply by stalling rather than by a refusal on the principle it cannot be excluded that the UK might ultimately accept some such system It would in any case be more a gesture of political solidarity with t he US and a visual accommodation with Bonn than a meaningful military move especially since the idea of British use of its strategic nuclear capacity without prior concurrence from Washington taxes the imagination UK to remain a nuclear power To cut through the rhetoric the Labor Government is in practice hewing to the nuclear policy of its Tory predecessors as reflected in the Nassau Agreement and subsequent actions with these differences it would withhold from NATO assignment for purely national purposes as many as half the V-Bombers whereas the entire V-Bomber Force was in principle -- though not in fact -- committed by the Conservative Government it would entertain the idea of mixed-manning of those of the V-Bombers that remain NATO-committed a concept that was not expected to arouse am has not aroused enthusiasm in other countries such as Germany it would assign the NATO commi tted V-Bombers arrl the eventual POLARIS sutmarines irrevocably for the life of the Alliance an undertaking of questionable military significance am enforceability though presumably of some politi al utility and it seems even l ess receptive than the previous government to the idea of British participation in a multilaterally owned and manned neet of POLARIS-armed surface ships For the purpose of this analysis it is not necessary to judge whether the Labor Governmemt views its ANF proposal as a serious one or as a tactic to sidetr act the MLF while at the same time giving the appearance of a major effort to fulfill a campaign pledge to get rid of the independent British deterrent It is not necessary to judge this because the effect or the AD' on the UK ' s own nuclear situation even if it were implemented would not be fundamental the UK would retain de facto ultimate control ot a strategic nuclear force for a long time to come It might it is true agree to some impairment of its national control over parts of this force In return it would expect to acquire major influence over any ANF components in which it did not participate In the f ollowing discussion we attempt to bring out the underlying reasons why the Labor Government's nuclear policy has not deviated sharply from that of the previous Conservative Government an i will probably not change drastically in the future SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSBM DECLASSIFIED Authority NND LA I SF CRE J' tlO F'Orji IGN DISSE - 12 - British military oblieations and resources Unlike the other countries of ATO L uL'·ope t he UK still has extensive arrl pressing military oblig e L ons out5ldc t he NATO area There is agreement in the UK that security commitments in theCoinmonwealth arrl in the remaining colonies must be honored '9ut t here i s al so agreement t hat t here should be no increase in th share of nat ional product dovoted to defense and that ev ry effort should be niCtde to avoi d reintroducing conscription 1tny British Rovernment constrained by t hese considerations must do a lot of jueglint of existing military re ources and can spare none The Uf has witb irawri SOlne fo rces princip illy naval units from t1ATO commitment fvr use east of Suez but there are political limits on the extent to which the lJritish can draw down their military accow1t in l urope which includes principally the Oritish Annr of the Hhine Moreover t he TJK is in any case simply not large and populous enough to meet foreseeable Ccxrunonwealth security obligations with conventional manpower alone especially under peacetime conditions trel ur pean role for nuclea eapons The Labor Goverrunent has cecentl deployed a small number of V-D001bers to the Southeast - Sia area although it seems most doubtful that the UK would ever use nuclear weapons against Indonesia Deployment of the bombers may in this case be a stop-gap an att empt to bluff Indonesia out of intensifying the campai gn aeainst Ealaysia anrt t hus i ncreasing the prcnsur cs on Uritain's already overtaxed conventional strength Whatever the intent of the move it ir11plies that Labor is pr epa red to make use of what it has nuclear if need be where vital security inte cests are at stake Hhen Prime · ir1ister lilson in a ec nt t elevision interview was questioned about the policy imDlications of sending the V-Bombers to the Southeast Asia area he reportooly r eplied in these terms 'l'his country's strengU is r oing to depend on our world role and not beinti corralled i n l urope • Wo r ow have the situation of the Chinese nuclear weapon Uc have non-nuclear countrjP s including Indi a wl10 want sooie safeglld rds against that otlienJise we are 1 oing t o find Iridia Paki Jt m and all countries in i sia arn perhaps Indonesia bef'ort t long ard the l1iddle t ast bec001ing nucl ear pm1ers Once this happens world nuclear war is inevitable ••• We attach the greatest priority this year to working out with our all ies sa11e kioo of force to prot ct non-nuclear powe rs against the thr at of the Chir1ese bomb DECLASSIFIED Aurhority f'J 0101lf1 ' i l i SEClt T NO FOO hIGN IJISSEM - 13 - DECLASSIFf ED Authority N D'i-014 1 Labor and Tory rationales compared -lhat Labor now seems to be sayillg in effect is that the Tories erred not in having an independent nuclear deterrent but rather in the strategic role to which they assigned it f'or the ConsGrvatives the strategic considerations justifying an independent British nuclear deterrent centered bout defense of the UK itself They argued publicly that Britain's force added measurably to the credibility of merican nuclear power as a deterrent against Soviet aggression in the West In addition less officially some Tories hinted at acceptance of the Gaullist line of the possible unreliability of American promises to p 'otect NATO countries with US nuclear weapons which required an independent British capability for use in extremis l''or Labor tho strateeic justification is ext1·a-HA'l'O arrl extra-European nucle ' lr deterrence to defend the Commonwealth Whether or not the dispatch of rour V-Bombers to Australia doters Indonesia there is still -- and Labor has al 'eady made this argument -- the Chinese bomb and therefore a long-term nucle ir deterrent role for the British in defense of India That this cnn be enuniciated in the name of anti-proliferation and presented as a temporary n ccssity perxling international guarantees makes it a little easier for Labor to S Jallol-J And whether the United States approves or not the u t·1ill not be in a position to object unless it is prepared at the same time to assume some current British responsibilities in the Indian Ocean-Southeast Asia area somethin t m Dritish would very much lilw lmt a commitment from which iunerica has so far shied away 'rhe Labor Goverruuent is now talh ln1 of r cservine about half the V- 3ombers for the oxtra-l uropean uses just discussed 'fhere remains the question of the rationale for the other V-Bombers and the POLARIS submarines to cane 1'aking account of Labor•s offer to commit the planes and submarines to NATO ''i rrevoca bly under certain circumstances 9 and of Labor• s view that Brita in• s main military role lies outside 'urope what British interests are served by the existence of these systems SECflli'T NO lt'Ol-t IGN DISSEl1 I SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 14 - Nuclear weapons and status The answer for Laborite as for Tory before him lies in political power and influence Although Labor scoffed at Tory claims that the British deterrent gave the UK a seat at the top table in international negotiations the Labor Government has already learned that it does exactly that The key role that Britain is now playing in the Alliance nuclear discussion and London's ability to influence its outcome stem in good measure from the possession of a significant present and future nuclear capability No British government is likely to throw such a card away The Labor Government is also observing with some nervousness indications that the US motivated in part by a desire for coordination of the force de frappe with SAC may wish to work out ade facto accommodation with France in the military field The UK does not object in principal to nuclear cooperation with France Indeed it hopes for the eventual coordination of the force de frappe with the other nuclear forces of the Alliance But as London has told Washington the UK would be greatly embarrassed by a US-French agreement through whicq F rance gained status and bettered its position with the US by virtue of possession of its own national nuclear force if Britain were at the same time relinquishing control of the UK deterrent No matter what reassurances may be forthcoming from Washington the lesson will again have been driven home to Labor when it comes to status in the Alliance a nuc in the hand is worth two in a pool The British are not willing to run the risk of finding themselves seated with the non-nuclear NATO powers below the salt or half way between them and the nuclear powers at the head of the NATO table the US and France And they may well conclude that they can foreclose this possibility only by retaining control over all or most of their own nuclear arsenal Even if they eventually agree to some sort of optical sharing of control of the larger part of their force with others in the Alliance it will be on terms that accord de facto recognition to the UK as a nuclear power and assure the UK continued close and special partnership with the US In the nature of things this cannot be expected if the UK really gives up an intimate relationship to its nuclear weapons whatever the external guise in which this relationship is clothed Sharing nuclear responsibility in NATO It remains true however that the British have argued for a greater sharing of responsibility in nuclear matters among the various members of the Alliance Neither the Conservatives nor the Laborites have espoused the view that an alleged present or future German lust for nuclear weapons which London does not in any event accept as proven can only be met by the adoption of measures affecting the ownership and control of nuclear weapons themselves Rather the British have felt that the effort to meet the basic problem of harmonizing the positions and responsibilities of the nuclear and non-nuclear members of NATO should be directed toward the sharing by the nuclear countries with the non-nuclear countries in proportion to the contributions of the latter to NATO defense of participation in Alliance strategy and nuclear policy planning and targeting Moreover the British are well aware of their long-term political and economic interest in good relations with West Germany and Italy and are prepared to demonstrate London's bona fides by a certain show of forthcomingness in regard to Alliance nuclear matters A concurrent desire to avoid undertaking DECLASSIFIED Autt ri 1J3'jg SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM ---- SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 15 - new nuclear arrangements which might seriously disturb UK-French relations will also play its part in Whitehall's calculations but for the most part the British fear of antagonizing de Gaulle will be less acute than Bonn's and London can therefore be guided on this problem by German sensitivity to possible reverberations that would be likely to be caused in the Elysee by any specific ANF-type nuclear accord Limits on sharing control of strate At the same ' time the UK's readiness to accord other West Europe greater influence in nuclear-strategic matters has its limits and they are probably quite low These limits stem from British perception of a basic difference between the security situation of the UK and that of Contin ental countries Britain is an island able to be destroyed by a strategic nuclear strike unthreatened by limited attack The British there fore do not want vital Alliance strategic decisions to be bound up too closely with the tactical problems of NATO's Central Front in Germany This is reflected in the UK's opposition to a strategic nuclear capability for SACEUR the NATO commander whose major concern is the defense of the Central Front Although the British did nominally assign strategic V-Bombers to SACEUR in 1963 under the pressure of the Nassau Agreement this must be regarded as an enforced aberration from British policy not a change in policy These considerations check British willingness to parcel out shares in nuclear strategic planning Domestic pressures manageable In plotting its nuclear course Labor is relatively free of strong domestic pressure to make good its pre-election pledges by getting rid of the British deterrent The election itself was surely no mandate from the people to do so And there has been as yet no serious out cry from unilateral disarmers or ban-the-bombers in Labor's own ranks although this may be a honeymoon phenomenon Moreover those in the UK who are most likely eventually to chafe under a lack of progress toward abandonment of the nuclear deterrent are for the most part the same people who would most strongly oppose any solution that seemed to bring Germany closer to nuclear weapons These people would probably accept a continuation of British control over nuclear weapons in preference to new arrangements that involved acquisition of any degree of real control by the Germans Moreover these leftist and pacifist-inclined circles in Britain could be further mollified if the British Government at the same time emphasized international disarmament objectives as the ultimate solution and offered proposals along those lines Alliance nuclear arrangements and disarmament British interest in progress toward arms control and disarmament agreements shared in all three important political parties is the last of the factors we have to consider The UK has a realistic appreciation of the relationship between disarmament and security and it recognizes that Western and Soviet security interests differ widely and make general disarmament a remote prospect It understands that limited agreements such as the partial nuclear test ban treaty do not in themselves constitute much in the way of movement toward arms control and disarmament Nevertheless it values such agreements highly despite their shortcomings aa disarmament measures It considers that they improve the East-West atmosphere and thereby produce better conditions ·in which negotiation of more important agreements hopefully including those on disarmament can be conducted DECLASSIFIED Authority DW1lf SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 16 - These considerations although they are not decisive are among those thrown onto the scales when the UK weighs propositions involving nuclear weapons arrangements in the Western Alliance Just now when steps to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons are a major object of disarmament negotiations the British would be reluctant to muddy the waters with any new Western arrangement that might appear inconsistent with nuclear non-dissemination Since Britain is already a nuclear power a decision to retain the deterrent would not need to interfere with the conclusion of some sort of non-proliferation agreement nor has the Soviet Union ever hinted that it would Bue the British fear that new Alliance arrangements whether or not they involved British weapons could make the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement difficult or impossible if these arrangements involved any real sharing of control with non-nuclear powers This will be another factor of which the British take account in the Alliance nuclear discussion and it reinforces their reluctance to have an MLF created within the ANF even without British participation in this MLF British criteria for Alliance nuclear arrangements In accordance with British interests as we have analysed them in this paper it is to be expected that the UK will seek to have any new Alliance nuclear arrangements meet these criteria with allowances for possible modification of some of them in the course of negotiation 1 the arrangements should leave the UK with uninhibited national control over some portion of the British deterrent arrangements for the remainder s hould be such that British national control would not be beyond the power of the UK to reassert even if its outward appearance were minimized 2 the arrangements should increase the participation of non-nuclear NATO countries especially Germany in nuclear planning targeting and deploy ment as well as in the formulation of Alliance strategy but without diluting t he ultimate control of the President of the United States over the use of nuclea r we apons in defense of NATO territory 3 the arrangements should involve the assignment of British components t o an ANF particularly POLARIS submarines if a Labor government is in power the erms of this assignment should take such a form optically as to allow the Government to claim some degree of fulfillment of its campaign coDIDitment t o abandon t he British national deterrent 4 genera lly in return for its contributions the UK should be de facto a senior partner in the enterprise that is its status as a nuclear power and t he special relationship with the United States that this status has brought in t he past should be at least tacitly recognized in the arrangements 5 specif i cally British contributions to a new force should secure for t he UK a maj or role in its direction and a veto over its use 6 t he arrangements should not result in an increase in the Britiah defense budget it should preferably result in decreased UK nuclear espenditurea if f or examp l e mixed manning of British V-Bomber1 is provided for the SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM I DECLASSIFf ED Authorit D 1-0 '· SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 17 - British will want others to share the opemating and maintenance costs 7 the arrangements should not involve participation in the ownership of nuclear weapons by countries that are now non-nuclear although it could involve their joint ownership of delivery systems preferably this latter enterprise should not involve the creation of a mixed-manned fleet of POLARIS armed surface vessels 8 non-nuclear members of the ANF should undertake a pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons Probable British tactics Tactically the British will for the immediate future probably show continuing and honorable but not urgent interest in discussion of new nuclear arrangements They will avoid final cODllli tments on questions involving British weapons and delivery systems in order to retain maximum options for the time when hard negotiations begin if and when that point is reached If no new arrangements evolve the UK will then probably coumit its POLARIS submarines when it has them to NATO according to the Nassau Agreement A Labor Government might even go beyond Nassau and make such a cotranitment irrevocable In the meantime through its ostensible interest in pursuing new arrangements it would have laid the basis for a claim to the Labor electorate that it had tried sincerely to honor its campaign pledges in a manner consistent with UK national security DECLASSIF1ED Authority Dt-01'1'- SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEH I £14· u CONFIDENT I AL with _ _ S E- a C R1 1 1ETi i f J NwO J JFl lO liB11 E T lJGU NLDJJ LS i S EMM_ •tt1ch• •11ta Report Nu111bcr tNR REPORT AND RELEASE FORM Qli'TT_ Du _' J This for111 and 1 disuibution Ust must be completed 111d submitted In duplicate Date Co111pleted hr ht to CS ILB Rm 6528 with each INR issuance No classified report1 aie re leased outside the Department uotil specific approval is ivtn Number of Pa1e1 Title of Report Major Factors Under liiQB British and G ma o f liliticca Bega cdfog ilucl eu - Weapons Requester Nome A1c11cy U11i1 If SIGI• Requeater'1 Dae Date Producer INRIREUIRA AF bm E1tea1I011 1893 - 4541 Office Diui1io11 Projcc1 SMp crvl1or Projcel f114ly••• Distribution by Producer Cle••ncH Messrs ckma Wol fson Dt11e No of Coplu u lt Ll11 Johnson pepo 8 PrHiulrt1 Off•u 01lt• Recommended for release to other US Government qenciea • poclfy OD DlltribatiOll Form O Recommended fot releue to UK Canada Auatralia and New Zeaload O Recommended for release to all NATO couatries Au1trali1 111d New Zeaload D Recommended for release to USIB controctors specify O Recommended for release to other countries specify Jg Not recommend ed for any distribution other tbn th81 indicated by the producioc office O Not recommended for release outside the Department a Not recommended for release outside the US Government Does thi1 Report contain Yes No 0 1 Statements which micht diaclose US policy or 1creemeat1 io the procen al ronnulltloa or not yet rev•lecl KJ O Statements •bout other countries wbicb should not be revealed to £omp recipietatl 1 0 Clessified milit•y informatiOD Clessified ioformation cle• 111ce for wllicb must be obtained om oaotb• apncy • fomp pvenllllllt or otlier aOD ep tllfttal iatel· licence so11tce prior to releue D Ci lnformetion which is the property of prlvllle compoain or individual1 thot lllOGld not b9 releued From the intelliceoce st1111dpoint i1 there 111y other reason why thia report lboald DOt be releaaed D Y• fXI No REMARKS It is intended that IS many report• will be releued ii poa1ible COGlilt•t with HCWity •d broad policy COHid 0111 Ac or ncly if a report in ceneral seems 1ppropri81e for releue ezceptlac c•tlin portioa1 whicb 1111 nq11ire H dlioaa or cleor•cn om otliar agencies the responsible officer should recommend releeae U uy al the precedi111 q911tloa1 - 1111wwed offir111tlvely plHM Hpllin bcl w as may be appropriate citinc sourcea i nd pace nu111ber1 oad indicltla PllNI 1nueated for deletion 1tc OBSER r fl RTM T OF STATE RECEIVED M4R 1 1965 1cc11se110 R · DECLAS IF Lf' l ROOM 7818 NS E Authority l t I '·r J fc Richard 'W Boehm - 21 26 65 l Typer Nome Slpotw• D91• COHFIDEHTIAL with S mRET NO P'OREIGN DISSEM