DECLASSIFIED' I Authority o ld ql By ii NA ate IJ L 1 lit NATIONAL SECURITY C01 JNQ i '1 30328 i' TOP SECRET SENSITIVE I MEMORANDUM FOR MR KISSIN9tR I FROM lIelnmt n'ieldt p · SUBJECT NSSM 12 3 -UK Nuclea r Relations - We have received ttre--c6mpieted study in response to NSSM 123 Tab F and written conllnents from the agencies Tab C Our Analytical Summary is at Tab E You need 110 V to decide 'whether YOll ' Tant to hold an SRG or to forV ard a decision memorandum directly to the President Through Defense channels the UK has requested our assistance in upgrading their Polaris systeln so that it will be capable of penetrating Soviet ABM defenses and hitting Moscow Kno vn as Super Antelope this program would involve improved hardening and spacing of their RV's and adding pen aids of a different design from our own Following a UK Ministerial decision last fall the British have already begun an approxirn ately two-year Project Definition study after which they may decide to proceed to deploy They could also return to other options such as developing a MIRV for their Polaris A-3 or asking us for Poseidon The British would like us to provide analysis and design critiques on their approach to RV and pen aid design including possible use of US contractors continued access to US underground nuclear tests to expose their -hardware samples and - - possibly the use of Vhite Sands Proving Ground for lfight test of components Although no formal reply has yet gone to the British Dave Packard wrote you on '1arch 25 1971 Tab D that Defense intends to respond affirmatively to the UK request for assistance through Project Definition while reserving our freedoln of action beyond that point Initial consultations rith the British have already begun and the next round is scheduled for the JY-eek of July 26 Ve need to decide whether to overturn Packard's decision or x hether we V lnt to modify it TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -2- If we go ahead it will be important to set up a ll1echanism to supervise this progran1 on a continuing basis As described in our Analytical Summary Tab E Super Antelope has implications for our entire European nuclear policy If we are not careful it could get us into a Skybolt-type situation two years hence The options presented at the end of the study are essentially two 1 Decline cooperation on Super Antelope or at least tell the British we are postponing a decision on assistance 2 Continue US assistance through Project Definition per Packard's March 1971 letter to you This would mean helping the UK with R V hardening developm ent of pen aids and allocation of space at our Nevada underground tests Two SUb-options involving operational considerations are also suggested under option #2 Za Assistance through Project Definition but with the understanding that some requests pertaining to highly visible assistance e g flight tests on US ranges or the presence of UK personnel at US underground tests be considered on a case by case basis lb An add-on to Za this would also envisage lending assistance on requests relating to Post Project Definition before the end of the Project Definition phase e g use of US contractors to begin fabrication of long lead-time items although such requests would also be reviewed on a case by-case basis We have solicited formal agency views on the options Tab C State Defense JCS and AEC all favor option 2b - - Especially concerned that they be included in a coordination mechanism to supervise our cooperation on Super Antelope State also stresses the need to revie v all UK requests which may have political implications e g with respect to UK entry into the EC and SALT Reportedly State would not raise serious objections if Za were selected over 2b as our final policy -- Noting that it represents essentially the position under which it has already been operating the AEC long a proponent of UK nuclear co operation not unexpectedly favors this forthcoming stance TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ___________ Iii ••••• ·a 1 DECLASSJFJED -tf-I ___ _ Authority • 0 I d- rl E d BY NARAD te IJ L TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -3- - -- - - Defense vhile noting that portions of the study do not fully reflect in their view the extent of past and present cooperative programs with the UK indicates that option 2b most nearly conforms with the position taken in Packard's letter to you of March 25 and to our present activity in support of the UK Still maintaining that we should hold open our options regarding support beyond Project Definition nevertheless Packard is apparently willing to consider some follow-on support before the end of the Project Definition phase - - Also proponents of 2b the JCS are willing to go on record now in favor of assisting development and deployment of Super Antelope No agency recommends against assistance but CIA and ACDA take more cautious stands -- ACDA favors option Za stressing that we should not get ourselves committed to follow through to the conclusion of Super Antelope until the value of the project is established or before the British decide themselves to go ahead or before possible complications in SALT are clearer ACDA appears satisfied that assistance in Project Definition is not likely to jeopardize our SALT interests but that assistance in deployment could easily do so -- CIA while taking no position on the particular options voices reservations about the potentially negative effects cooperation on Super Antelope could have on US-French relations and UK entry into the European Community The points are well taken On balance there are some reservations about moving forward at this time with an extension of the US-UK nuclear relationship given our interests in British entry stepped-up Vest European defense cooperation in the future and SALT However it is also true that we are already partly into Super Antelope on account of discussions which Defense has already had with the British A decision to cut off now could have adverse effects on the entire TOP SECRET SENSITIVE _________ E __ 'I 0 Authority LQRtl IT J By J9 NARA e Uf TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -4- - US-UK political relationship including the President's relationship with Heath The trick would seenl to be to proceed with Project Definition but in such a way as to preserve n axilnurn flexibility in regard to later decisions on what to do beyond Pr ject Definition The answer is probably to be frank with the British and to tie our future stand to a further review later on By then London hopefully will be a part of Europe and we will know the contents of any SALT agreement and also know more about how French policy is developing with re spect to European cooperation Since no agency supports termination of cooperation and the differences between optims 2a and 2b are not that great given the built-in review mechanism you may decide that an SRG meeting is unnecessary Alter natively you may want to have a meeting viewing it essentially as an educational foruln as well as an opportunity to probe more deeply the dif ferences between options 2a and 2b If so it would be slightly preferable to have a meeting in Washington so that staff level experts could attend the principals are not likely to have grasped all the nuance s of this subject If you wish to have a meeting in San Clemente we can DEX talking points to you early next week In case you decide against a meeting we have prepared a memorandum for the President Tab A and an NSDM Tab B recornrn ending that ve 1 pro ceed with cooperation on Super Antelope through Project Definition 2 main tain our flexibility regarding actual as sistance later in production and deployment and 3 establish the Under Secretaries Committee as a review mechanism to scrutinize certain sensitive highly visible aspects of our cooperation on a case-by-case basis This is essentially option 2a but does not foreclose further decisions by the President in the direction of 2b as and if specific requests arise relating to post Project Definition support However you should realize that this position does differ somewhat from the one taken by most of the agencie s RECOMMENDA TIONS 1 That you handle the Super Antelope matter directly by memorandum to the President Approve ___ _ Disapprove ---- Prefer a meeting ----- 2 That you approve the NSDM and sign the memoloandum for varding it to the Pre sident Tab A TOP SECRET SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED ' Authorityt O r q g By NARA Date IJ' LJI THE WHITE HOUSE 30328 WASHINGTON TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM Henry A Kis singer I SUBJECT US-UK Nuclear Relations The British have approached us for assistance in a two-year project definition study of ways to improve their Polaris missile system and make it more effective against Soviet ABM defenses Known as Super Antelope the project involves hardening and redesigning existing British Polaris A-3 warheads and introducing penetration aids The UK wants us to provide analysis and design critiques continued access to US underground nuclear tests to expose hardware samples and possibly the use of vVhite Sands Proving Ground for flight tests Further assistance relating to the production phase of this pro gram such as use of US contractors could be requested before the end of the two-year period While the project study ha s been approved at Ministerial level the British government has not yet decided to deploy this system They could return to other options we know they are considering such as developing a MIRV for their Polaris A-3 or asking us for Poseidon Their ultimate decision will depend to a considerable extent on the outcome of SALT Since our involvement in Super Antelope could cause us some problems in SALT and could reduce your flexibility should you wish to encourage greater UK defense nuclear cooperation in a West European framework in the future we have done an interagency study of the British request - - State Defense JCS and the AEC favor assistance through the project definition phase and even beyond recommending that we should consider on a case-by-case any British requests for support on post Project Definition projects such as fabrication by US contractors of long lead-time items even before conclusion of the two-year study It is also suggested that we review on a case - by-case basis certain aspects of our assistance which might be highly visible and could cause us problems in SALT or have other political implications TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -2- ACDA on the other hand while favoring assistance is more cautious recomn1 ending no commitments to assistance in the production phase until the British have themselves decided to proceed and until the results of SALT are clearer -- CIA points out that assistance poses some risks of affecting ad versely our relations with France should it become known and UK entry into the European Community which could be viewed particularly in France as incompatible with new US-UK defense ties Since Defense has already held initial consultations with the British o §uper Antelope any negative decision at this time would surprise them and could have negative repercussions on the whole range of US-UK relations including you r relationship with Prime Minister Heath Moreover since the UK nuclear force contributes to Western deterrent strength it is in our interest to assist the British in evaluating ways of modernizing their force On the other hand we would not want to deepen our cooperation with the British to the point where it would virtually foreclose possible AnglO-French or 'Vest European gefense cooperation after likely British entry into the Corrununity I recoznmend that we proceed with assistance through Project Definition on Super Antelope At the same time I see no compelling reason for you to commit the US to longer term cooperation on this particular project until we know whether it will succeed and whether the UK will in fact decide to deploy it Accordingly I have prepared a NSDM which would confirm our decision to assist the British subject to a limitation that permits you to review the questior 1 of assistance beyond Project Definition when and if the British choose to raise it The NSDM also establishes the NSC Under Secretaries Committee as the mechanism to keep this project under review RECOMMENDATION That you approve the NSDM at Tab A confirming your de cis ion to proceed with assistance to the UK on Super Antelope through the Project Definition phase Approve ------ Disapprove ---- See m e ------ TOP SECRET SENSI-TIVE 5 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington D C 20520 TOP SECRET SENSITlVE NODIS July 9 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR MR HENRY A KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject Department of State·-P-osition on Response _ to NSSM 123 -- US-UK Nuclear Relations The Department of State is satisfied with the study on US-UK Nuclear Relations response to' NSSM 123 as drafted The Department favors sub-option 2b page 39 The Department recommends that the supplementary action outlined under Operational Considerations pages 40-42 be carried out The Department of State fully endorses the program of cooperation with HMG on Super Antelope it realizes how ever that there may be some aspects of the program as the study points out which would be ill-timed and have adverse political impact during the forthcoming period It is for this reason th t the Department while not wishing to interfere with the operational aspe'ts of the project supports establishment of a coordination process that will bring to its attention in timely fashion those British requests or elements of the program which may have political implications G -- Theodore L Eliot Jr Executive Secretary TOP SECRET SENSITlVE NODIS THE DEPUTY SECI tTARY OF DEfENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301 1 0 Jut fJT1 MEr-10RANDUN l OR THE ASSISTANT TO TIlE PRESIDf1' T FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AF' 'AIRS SUBJECT NSSM 123 - US UK Nuclear Relations DOD has revtev7ed the NSSM 123 study on US-ill nuclear relations forv7arded_ by your staff on July 2 1972 While there are-portions of the-study that do not fully reflect the extent of-past and present cooperative programs '-le believe on the ' '1hole it is an- adequate-assessment of the problems and issues pertaining to our current action in supporting UK development of an improved POLlillIS System 1-1y staff has prepared some specific comments on the study which I have attached for your i nformation - As you Till reca ll I outlined in some detail in my memorandum of March 25 the projected extent of the Super Antelope program and stated my intent to assi st the U1 'within certain limits in the project defjniti on stage of Super Antelope holding open our options for support after that I believe t e current study bears out the course of action I took at that time Of the options the study presents Option 2B most nearly conforms to m r position and to our present activity in SUPl Ol t of th0 1 1 There are several other factors vlhich sceni to me to present strong reasons for continuing our support to the UK As I sta ted on March 25 in vie' '1 of the nature of our past and present relationship ' vi th the UK it is appro priate and proper to give them this type of limited assistance The alternati ve -- a US decision to terminate assistance -- lould raise funda mental questions for the British about the future of the US-UK relationship and could creaLe problems concerning US base rights in tht ul anu its territories particularly as regards the Holy Loch SSffif base Additionally US support to the UK in the project definition phase of the Super Antelope program can be without prejudice to our or the UK's ultimate position on whether to support further development of such a system In view of the above I recommend the approval of Option 2B The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recon end adoption of Option 2B but·in so doing note their support for development and deployment of an improved UK 3226 Soc' D t CClU t Nr X __ t----- ---- ' -- DECLASSIFIED Authority O I qSX By NARA nate Of 'TOf srCt ET ------ i t 'J i' - 2 POLARIS System I have attached their memorandum to t he Secretary of Defense on this subject including the i r detailed textual comments Enclosure a s DECLASSIFIED 1 AUthOrityt O qSXfJ By iJ NA Date Recommended ChanGes to NSsr'1-123 Study 1 Page 21 line 15 field not bet' veen basil and evaluation Comment This important typographical omission changes the whole meaning of the serltence 2 Page 25 ' delete pa ragraJ h one Corronent The paragrr-lph overstates the impact of failure for the UK The failure of the Super Antelope-'program-during the pro e ct defi ' nition phase ylould certainly be a disappointment to the British - but would not present them vTi th any nel t or mor e serious strat gic and political problems than they already have 3 Page 28 delete first full sentence lines 2-4 Comment The UK and EC have reached agreement on the terms of British entry hence this statement is no longer relevant Only a rejection of the EC terms by the British Parliament could preclude now UK entry into the Common Marl et 4 Page-32 paragraph 4 delete third sentence Comment Article VII of the 1958 Agreement provides that neither party shall communicate classified information or transfer or permit a ccess to or use of materials or equipment made available by the other party to any nation or international organization In view' of this the third sentence is inappropriate 5 Page 34 option 1 third point delete the parenthetical clause Comment The assumption that the UK can presently penetrate the existing Galosh system is not vTarranted by US intelligence estimates 6 Page 34 option 1 delete fourth point 7 Comment The assumption that the UK v10uld divert resources to im proving conventional force postures if the US terminated assistance on project definition for Super Antelope is not valid Page 35 option 1 third point under cons delete and in particular mif ht deny the US nCl' infor 1ation on hardeninf of' BV I sit Conunent The potential value of such information to the US is not sufficient to Tarrant the statement 8 Page 35 option 1 delete fifth point under conR _ mrnen It is not clear hu a US refus'al to assist the UK in project defini tion could encourage the UK to ask us for help · i th Po eidon o 11InV ' l n t-_' R l t 'r ' l' k' • J P l • • I I I I I DECLASSIFIED Authority O I q IT BY NARADate IJ L ----_-1 2 9 Page 35 add t h0 follo' l n G con tl ar- siRtnnCp is a1Jr o t er f nti a1 if the UK is to reach a succef rul 'onclu j on to its I OLI RIS imn 'ovG men t 1ro J U l r 10 Page A-6 delet8 par lgrnph lL Comment US statements ·to the UK of January 1970 qu oted on page A-6 ' 'ere Inu cle in the context of receiving a series of UK papers discussing present and potential Soviet J BM threats to their POIJillIS system The s1 L 'YiJ' 1ary statement that given its limited size the UK force could not achieve hiGh effectiveness·· against defenQ ed ta1 eets even 1i th improved Antelope II -laS made in the context of potential --Soviet ABl·r expansions especially potet ttinl te 1Tlinal intercept systems ABainst the presently estimated 64 MoscO 'l launchers such an improved system should allow penetration to be made As seen in Appendix C the UK system poses a reasonably credible exoatmospheric penetration scheme against p rt sent and potential Soviet ABM systems using radar tecbniques If the present Galosh system is not capable of loiter intercept allowing atmospheric dis crimination this system should materially enhance the probabiljty of penetration of the lftoSCO q defenses provided they are not augmented by ·terminal interceptors 11 Page C-8_ ragraph 3 delete the 'vords '-'ill almost certainly from the first line and su bstitute might l ossibl r and add to the end of the sentence and lould require a se£l l cbillg re-exalnination on their part of the ultimate valifli ty of' the project 11 12 Connnent The ability and 'willingness of the UK to continue Super Antelope without US aid is far more problematical than the paragra ph would suggest Paee c-18 lines 3- delete 1 ••• v1hich is part of the existing strategic balance CC Jln'nent vle do not count British forces in our calculations of the strategic balance bet een the US and USSR ' -- n E JOINT CHI r-S 0 S1 AfF WASHINGTO r c L030 MEHORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JCSH-322-71 8 July 1971 o Su ject US-UK Nuclear Relations NSSM 123 U 1 U Reference is made to a memorandum by the Staff Secretary National Security Council dated 2 July 1971 subject as above which for 7ardcd and requested agency vie 'ls on the study on US-UK nuclear relations 2 U The study has been reviewed and the changes reflected in the Annex hereto are submitted for incorporation into the t' study r 3 TS The Joint Chiefs of Staff support the British effort to develop and deploy an improved POLARIS System and recommend an affirmative decision on Option 2b ' Attachment For the Joint Chiefs of Staff - L- r FRANK B CL l Major General USA Deputy Director Joint Staff 3196 - L Soo Dor Cont lh' x-_______________ _ '- 'I'a ' - - ' ''' '' ·t GROUP· 3 C n r dt d t 12 Yl ar D£CLASSJFIED AUllior • 0 w By J' j NARA Date I J oJ ----- MWEX RECOHHENDI O ClIM-JGES IN· 'J IIE RCSPOUSE TO NSS 123 U 1 U rage 5 line 13 Add further bafore diminished REASON Accuracy 2 U P gc S lines 16 and 17 Delete sentence This risk ••• flight tests II RE SON The risk is not defined 3 U p Cjc 19 Delata last paragr ph Docs not necessarily repr esent_the pol y of the British Government 4 U Delete Same as paragraph 3 above 5 e Pages 24 and 25 Delete paragraphs under the heading RThe Effectiveness of Super Antelope -- The Risks pi Failure The risks of failure of the UK program are ·'propeJ ly the responsibility of the UK 6 U Paqc 34 Delete statements 1 2 3 and 5 of the Pro factors for Option 1 REASON These statements are much too problematical to be established as valid IIprosll for this option 1- 2 3 4 - 7· 8 • ·9 E II 12 13 14 15 U lB 19 7 TS Page 35 Delete the last three statements of the 21 Con factors and substitut e the following a --US assistance to t11e UK is almost essential if the UK is to reach a successful conclUsion to its POLARIS improve ment program b --1 failure to pro ide information or assistance would be regarded as an abrupt shirt in US policy R Statements are problem tical TOP J- 'H1 'J' - f r' TTJVP' JC lH- j2 - I 1 GROUP 3 DmlHGW DJm AT l Yl- l R Ill'fERVALS tJOT AUTOH1 TICALT Y D CLASSIFlr D Annex 22 23 24 25 26 II 28 ·'l'OP mCRET - SENSITIVE 8 U rnqe 37 linQ 7 Delete advdnccd nnd substitute specific Accuracy •• 9 TS Paqc 37 Add new statements under Con s as follo -1s I a -- Highly probable failures of 2 3 reentry vehicle R V scale models in inilial underground tests at levels between 6 250-400 cal cm2 may imply us capability- to de5ign hardened R vs The United States has not demonstrated the ability to design build and test successfully an R V Q to a denign hardness goal without subsequent underground testing to eliminate design weakness 1 b -- Present US underground test schedule probably is not optimum for orderly development of UK-hardenea R v n 14 The driving force for the underground R V test 15 program has been to assess the sUL ivability of us stra- 16 tegic systems which appear to be completed' and thus UK 1 participation must receive similar priority if the devel- opment program is to be successful 10 CU Page A-l lin s 17 and lB Delete without paying any part of the great R D costs required to develop the system and substitute and have paid only a small part 5 percent 01 the development cost Accuracy TOP f F Cl ET - f m SITIVl 2 Anl 20 21 ·22 - 5 _____ -- UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D C 2 0545 JUL 8 197f Honorable Henry A Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Dep r Henry At the request of the Ad Hoc Group preparing th response to NSSM 123 the AEC staff has assisted in the study recently transmi tted' to the National Security Council and upon which written agency views have been requested The AEC for a number of years has been actively cooperating with the united Kingdom in the design and development of nuclear weapons and in the past several years this has centered on the hardening of their Polaris warhead Because of the above it was thought you may wish to have the Commission's comments on the NSSM 123 study Of the several options set forth in the study the Commission favors Sub-Option 2b which provides for con tinuing assistance to the U K on their Polaris Improvement Program through the Project Definition phase and further considering U K requests related to the Post Project Definition Program on a case-by-case basis The policy set forth i Sub-Option 2b is essentially the same as that under which the Commission has been cooperating with the United Kingdom A recent statement of this policy is summarized in my letter to Senator John o Pastore Chairman of the Joint Committee for Atomic Energy Enclosure 1 to NSSM 123 The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State concurred in the· views expressed in this letter • ' ••••• ' ••••• • ro 'U 4'·' ' ' i ' ' - jl t ' • ' ' - • 1 • ' ' r 1 Chairman This a eri 1 contains inf rm2tion affecting tho national cll rcn ic f t le United SI I'Js within the me lOin of lilt '1 1'1- la'l S Tille lao U S C Sees 793 tim j j th 1 r 5rflis cn cr rtvf'l ltion of which ill anv nt ' 1 1 r to an un ulhoril d nHSOr - is prohibited hi' law OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR tt This document consists of 2 PRs No of copies Series TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 3030t l UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY WASHINGTON ACDA-5 5C July 8 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR MR HENRY Ao KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE - SUBJECT Comment on the Study on U So-U K Nuclear Relations NSSM-123 The subject study presents a sound comprehensive review of a problem with many ramifications Among the points made we would single out two as deserving special emphasi 1 Assista ce to the British on the early stages of Super Antelope could easily evolve into an implied commit ment for support in the full program Both sides recognize that our underground test facilities and the Atlantic test range are almost essential for completion of Super Antelope and a decision to proceed with Project Definition would seem futile if there were no possibility to proceed furthe1 if Proj ect Defii ition succeeds as planned The British deserve to be apprised in good time if our hesita tion to make an explicit commitment on Super Antelope as a whole is for substantive rather than merely procedural reasons 2 While U S -U Ko collaboration on the Project Definition phase of the British Polaris program is not • likely to jeopardize our interests at SALT both the nego tiation process at SALT and the viability of any agree ment reached could be affected by more strategically significant fonus of collaboration which might develop GROUP 1 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Excluded from automatio downg r ad1ng and declassification --------------_ _- --_ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - 2 - later such as U S manufacture of operational reentry vehicles for Super Antelope or assistance on a MIRV program for the British The problem will be a continuing one and could be a factor in the projected follow-on SALT negotia tions which are intended to secure comprehensive offense limitations With these considerations in mind we would support Sub-Option 2a page 38 of the study which calls fo __ con _ tinued U S collaboration through Project Definition subject to case-by-case review of some requests such as _ _ those pertaining to relatively visible assistance Option 1 which would involve breaking commitments and interrupting a project already well advanced appears infeasible at this stage Additional assistance as envisioned by Option 2b would be tantamount to a commitment strongly implied if not explicit to follow through to the conclusion of Super Antelope if the British so ·desire I don't think we should put o rselves in this position before the value of the project is established or the British government makes a formal request or before the shadow cast by possible difficulties at SALT is removed We endorse the proposals of the study under Operational Considerations regarding discussions with the British and for coordination among the concerned U S agencies on these sensitive questions itf r __ 1- ' - C l I Phi ip J Farla Act ng Director TOP SECRET SENSITIVE a •• 10 ' '_ r d It • CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON D C 2 0505 MEMORANDUM FOR Jeanne W Davis Staff Secretary National Security Council SUBJECT NSSM 123 ttus-U -Nuclear Relations --- REFERENCE NSC Memorandum of 2--July 1971 1 The Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed and found no serious fault with the study on US-UK Nuclear Relations prepared by an Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group in response to NSSM 123 We have expressed reservations previous ly and continue to question however certain judgments found on pages 11 and 14 of Annex C and reflected on pages 27-28 of the main paper These reservations have to do with benefits to Franco-US and to European Community-US relations which allegedly would result from t e proposed US assistance to the British 2 We believe that US relations with the French could be adversely affected in the future if the French inferred from US assistance to the UK that such aid would 'subsequently be extended to France As for the possibility of strength£uing Britaih's political position in the Community we consider it equally possible that new measures which retain the special US-UK relationship in the military field may lead to a fresh round of suspicions with regard to British intentions Moreover since presumably the French are in mind when the draft at the top of page 14 of Annex C allows that maintenance of close US-UK ties may not be unanimously favored in the Community we question the compatibility impli9d between the alleged potential boost to US-French relations and the possible enhancem nt of US influence over the enlarged Community • - - --· a i - ' _ ' - I ' a -' eo • • • • TS # 201978 Copy 1 · 1 1 'I li I·Jc h rJ o C 10JOl I-Iollorablc IIcnry A I is -iinger Assistant to the I l esidcnt for National Sccuri ty Affairs Executive Office OI 1 lc Prcsjdcnt 'Va_ hington D C • 20500 Dear I-Ienr j I • I - - • r' I I ·tJ ' I' t f · As you arc a varc and as vaG cliscusscd hriefly at the SRG 11 Cct- 'Io9J 3 ing on 3 J 1 arch the British rlj C asking our a'ssi blnc c in a pl'ogralu to irnprovo the capability of their Polarir- A-3 nd ssilcs a ga inst a defended target The attached fact sheet sets lo t h a surnrnary of our assistance 1 0 date and details o Ctheir curl'cnt request 6 In brief they c nl X'enHy al'e buying irorn us the boq t·· phase hardening rnoclific ltiens ve d vcloped uncler our 1 n tel p6· procrran1 - -- to irnproyc the nuclear hard ness of 1J10 A-3 111issile l clo Vthc rc-- entry systen1 They vcn e offered but arc not'procuxing the R V hardening 111odifications and penetration aids a lso developed by us under Antelope Instead tileir preference has been to devis e re- entry sys1 cn _l1 J qdifica tions sh nilar to those of Antelope but with a hir hcr lcvel o£ nuclea l' A1C l'dening for H Vs and pen aids and vith also a larger l1'lllnbcr of pen aids They have l cen vorking on the basic techniques involved in their o vn laholoatories and VC have rendered Cl 8sistal1ce by providing tcclmical inlorn1ation relativ c to Antelope and also by providing space on our underground nuclear tests for exposure of san1ples 01 nuclear-hardened lnaterial developed and furnif hcd by then1 Until l'cc m t l y 1'11eir effor t have heen l' la ti vely rnode s t 11cl· prhnarHy explora1 cJry in naturc ith no decision on vhcthcr to proceed vith s steln c1cvel pn- nt or dcployn1cnt No v however tllCr has be 'l'l a 11 jni5 crinllc 'e l dceisjon taken in late 1 70 to irnplcn1cnt pl'ojeet c 1cfinHion on an inlprovcd dcsi n Because of its d n jlarity to t he U SOt l ntclopc progJ an1 but with antieipa ted hl1provcc1 p rfOl'fnanc c ch U° 'lct C l'i t tics they r I l' to the progr n tf SllrH r Alltc · lopc l ' ith a oc 1e· n lrnc of AH T1FICER • • ' 1 - • ·6 f C ' - c ' r l I ' I _ ' • ' I ·0_ _ _____ _ __ · • _ _ _ • •• __ • _ __ __ •• _ ••• - • ' ' J •• •••• • A ·' f I ' f - J f ' - r 4-'r V _wl Ji 2 The British arc qnitc anxio'lls to scctlJ e U S ssi t nc in t he p 'o g an1 C r quickly as p H ihle TJH extent of total cU d i ancc dCf il ed is no1 presently lefinl ' 51 CI S BrH ish thinking has not yet fully crystallized Initially they are asking lor 1 he follo ving a U S C0111111cnt and guidance 011 1'heil' Pl'opo cd designs of n V j and pen aids • b C01l1J11itnlc nt to allocation of space on future U S U1 dCl'gl'O 1 ul test s --- rotlghly-t hrough-l975 · There is little doubt that if the progJ atn vcre carried to c0111ple tiOll and if VC c0111pliecl l1 lJ ly with British ne eds as 1J1CY bccc lTIe kno vn the total U S involvc111cnt vcH lc1 go 1110ch dccp l' than the above As the attached fact sheet not s it conl l include such itcl11 s as provision of range tCBt facilities fliGht test h lr hval'e dcsign analysc J and perhaps overall' syste111 dcvelopn1cnt or integration 'rIley have n1cntionec1 tl pos sibilit of hiring L ck heed the U S i nicloD systCl1l contractor t f'l lllCt iol1 in a • A silnilar role in this c _se altl1 ough thcy alf o have §aic1 theY' vish • • - - - I - • to do as Innch vol'k in the U l as pos sible I shonl l note that this r epresents a S0111c vhat different fOl'rn or level of assistance thdn T e have pl'ovlded to date I-Icretofor c VC basically ha vc J pvidcd thcrn t he opportunity to purchase items Vc '·had developed - for our o 'n usc In this c sc T C vould bc prov ld- ing·f acHities n'lClnpO VCJ ' technical guidance etc for thc devclopn1cnt of a n1ajor lTIodifical ion speci fically for the U K Polaris vithout projected U S application Evcn though they vould expect to vork out a suitable basis for payn1cnt the dis tinction in kinc l still should be noted The question arises 01 couJ 'se as 1 o vhat position ve should auopt - - to help or not and to vhai degree Corlf icleJ ing our past nd pl'csent relationship vith th J U K 1 I helieve it propel to lend thern Clssi tancc and I plan to do so I do not f eel it should be open-endcd hC ' Icvcr nor represent a iirrn long-tern1 C0111111itnl C n t lJ fact in Jf ar as underground testing is con cerned our own planning is uncertain be 'ond a year or hvo in the future But the Driti h thc1l1 clves arc c0111rnittcd only 't l -0 t ••• i· J ' - ' 1 • ' ' I -' • ' DECLASSIFIED -- AuthoriIY • 0 9 IT d By NARA Date JJ 3 to project dcfinH ion _ npp roxilnar cly byo yC ll' endeavor not to a C lnpJ ete pl'ogr nn hH'lucHng cnginc lring h y 'lopn1 cn1 and fol10 v··on production • l b lievc this provides a reasonabl 1 1 'S position -- i c to cOlnn1ii to assisianGc in the pl'oject c1c Cinition pIl t HC but with the lllHlcrst 1iH ling thaI this C0111nl i l Jncllt is 111ade vithout prejndicc to Ollr £1 ecdon1 of ac i ion bcy 'Ild thLtt point and that further assif tanc w ul l have to he the subjc ct of a future dccision o I ecalize 1 of course that - once VC start down this path future re£usCll hcCOrne 3 lnore di Hicnlto N·cvcl'theless I believe that ve should hold OP l1 Ol l op ioi s and that 1 11e point should be cleal'ly undcl's1 ood Since thc J3l'itifh have adopted essentially the sarne position thc111selvcs I sec no real difficul ties vi1 h thif3 approach I feel you should be fully a Val'C- 01 this lYlatter and the course I intend to follow In providing the assistance requested I intend to ill1pO sc tJ1C folIo-wing qualificat i9ns in addition to the general onc notod a hove • c ' 1 a r ro h1fol'1flatlon - viII be furniBhec1 vhich · veals· - f i specific vnlne l' t lJilitic l- j or vulnerability Ie vels of U S vcapons b No signi ca nt interference to U S pl'ogran1 s is o c r sionC d nlC l'C byo c Suit blc proy i siol1s for reh-nhtn se rnent arc effected I shoul d note that the l ritif h ha ve cst blishcc1 a vcr r rigid security policy concerning this prorrr u11 lirnitlng acces s vlthin thc U 1 to a relatively srnall nun-ther ell people They ask that the U 0 S estab lish sirnilar procedures In the 3 J 1 al'ch SH G 111c ting on NSS1 100 you requested aU S technical aSS jr Tlent f tll chance£ of succcriS foJ ' thc U J ilesjgn9 part cularly in t he next Se 'ieD of l1 l T gr lncl tests in vhich they plan to h LVC scale rnodC l J of their re· entry vehic le d igns You irnpJicd that we tVC no ' dGc or c pc l ic nc c vhich inc1icatc they arc on a 'l1'ong path arc ' 'asting theLl' ii rne and 1110nC r and l hat VC J uld tell ill' '111 so t··· ' ' '' ' - ' ' ' - - 5 --- ------ 4' rc convened p c j l 111 'cUng of kllo vledgeahlc U S cxperb3 to c n'ine this quer t iollo In slnnrrlar r f their eOlH lusions uch is noi the c u ' Ther is no 1 1 S cxp l· iencc directly upplic tblc to the U J C dC jign any U S evaluation rnust be based prin1arily - upon thcorcLical considerations In the opinion of the convened group ho vCVCJ there if no caSOll to bclic 'e the U 1 • design to be unsouIHl o Their designer appear vcll gronnded in the th eo retical aspects and to h vc chosen their configuration vith care and l varcncss of thc pl'ohlcl11 s involve-d Our--J CCOn1n1 Cl1datiolJ is tha-t they proceed as lannecl and o lJ expectation is that thc U S vllllearn som cthjng in the' proce ss ---- I shall keep you periodically in forn1 C d of the progress in the InattCl and pal·Ucula rly v ill advise you if c it any tilnc the situaHon tah cs a turn in significant v2rial1ce froj11 that described abovco c have had inforlTIal discussions on t11c U I request rj th Si a c I UIU sending c l copy of this l ttcr to J nhn Ir vin I -' Attaeluncnt Sin CC11'Cl r --0 _ - 0 I rl '- ''''''1 '- i 1 t j f ·' I L' 0- If '··V j··1' L' i' i ' ' l r t n -- ' y v l c ' - 'r l l j· t t l · 4 I · • • •• • Il - l I f _ f I 1 l n i C llOU - D The UK h ts fonr PO l 'i sn n1 rin' j each p t1ppt d jth 6 J oJad s A3 nlis jil ·s rrhc l nj asHe l1d nt'her p· u·ts of the vec 1 pon s 51 '111 vc 'c procul'ed frorn the US Ql O 11h one except ion are identical viih our own The exception is the r tc 1C't v rhcad within the re-entry vchicle This Va 'hcL rl is i UK h i n f' ln- ifjiled hy theln The subrnarincs thcrnsclvcs also Y' re built by the UK - The Ih itL l h vc been concerned for sorne titne over thc pr pc-r steps to l p their n1is ilcE3 n' ocL n ized r-rnproved p r ctrc tlion c8 pahility and hardcl' ing of the It V8 to nuclear 'cffcctz have been their chief concCJ ·ns Several years ago the US developed a series of n10c1ifications fen the A3 l11issilc under OUT Antelope progl'a111 I'he lnoc1ifications included boost p11 t3c h'lrc1 1 ing'l -- a series of chal1ges to ha rdcn the n1i sile othc - tln'l n the re-entry sy tel'n to nuclear effects -- and a series of modi ficCi Eons for the re -entry sy D'Ccm vhich inclu ded lluclea r htl rcl ning cn' the RVs and provisior of pcnc tration aids In this lattcr n1odificc '_t 0 1t one of the thrce H Vs t 'C' 3 l'eplaccd hy a PelH trati on Aid Carrier PJ C ' vhich cont incd Si 11pJe ni ancc and pro1 llsion systen1-1 ' • l'his p l C 'fas relea sed sinlult2 1120 1s1 Y j h thA RVs and t1 n flew in such rnal l r - 4t- 't • us to • dispen' c pen b· tion aid s in a lO'i1g thl'c t cloac1 in the rniclst 01 yHlich ve-i'e t he two rern aining n Vs The US c1eploycd1 thc boost-phase hal'c ening lTIouificatiol1 but not the re -entr r systern r- odilicCltio11 s ---- The UK vas offered beth rnodifications phase hardening but not the re-entry n'1ods They h vc procured t11e boost Their feeling '1as that they necc cc1 a grcater dcgree of ItV hardening as vell as rnorc h rder tlnd 1110rc sophistic lted pen tration aids They have studied the problc1l1 for the last scvcr 1 1 years and h2wve nOON cqrnc to a decision on the type of in1provcrncnt they wish to pursue They vant to obtain US help in thc Inattcr The basic British l ilosophy apparently is to hc tve the ap bilily to pose a serioll J tbr ·at to Ido co lith sa'l t 'lO boats on p l trol at any given UIY C conti1inin 32 rni fjiles the present 3 sy teln v ou1 l h · v' d fi·· cuHr clchic' 'lrig thifj objcctiv in the ce Gf tllC - oscu A B L Th y would thercfore li1 e to H j Hfj' tb nlissile in a '-'lily to hnpro' C the itl1 liQTl f ·_ _····- - ·· _ ·- - - -_ -_ __ _ _ _- - _ -- ---- -------------- ---'---'1 i' OT ' Th d c r t' nt JlJ in s n tivc · inf0rll·I ti l'l 0n the B ' ti h i I ' p ' r h lop j· 'o 'I' · n whi h th U l· h l Cl · cl b c h 'ld I c r 1 ' 'J 'J I ' ' f 1· · 1 r ' 1 ' ILl ' ' I' I • r II' '' • f I' - J II '-' J •• J- J' I •• J I J ' t J t J ''' ' JI t • · I I • H l· Jf h Hd bl I rtt l y lil lito ' l in ilC r t 1C th ret vith t I' I ••• • • - r ' i u' i n ' l I ' J The j l' C n' 1 en ' 11 1 n i ll l 1 no i E r ' t 11 t r l nll' y - y ' t t' n in t 1'n 1 1 1 1 C' r r tt t 'rni d hro 1 ' fL l' GUl' l n ArdeJ lpc h l n hnt 1if · rin ill ll t l i L B c ln of the L irnj 1 tl'ity Hi 1 1 o for thc h ' h d oJ' i n provl d IH ' oJ'ln ancc they h 'l' c -l l UH r In'ogralll Supl r AntcJope 11 In uJjef t H y voulcl like to do the oJ T ·win6 a ncpl f cc nl' of tllC three bcdie with a PcnL'tration l id Carrie' ' PAC vhich lispel1scs P ll aicl The pen aich would lH cornpL tc ly difft rent in dcsi 1 frOI' l tl o£ e d tn 102l d b r the US and the object-iv- is to I 1 ' ' - ' - • ''' r'' t ' II ' ' ' ' • '1 -' I 1'd ' ' i- hfi _ ' l d la il - le t 1 11 · 1 11 j I 1 1'1 1 J llS - l _ l 'Vc Cl Lcc n In en of rifnc The PA C also ' 'Quld be a 1 C '1 dG_si gn b Inc rcasc the dcploy d sp cing hehvce l1 the tv 'o renln ining n V s 2 and het reCl1 thcrn to nnclear cfrcct · 1 0 a sufficient degrce 50 tb t a s5nglc ABl 1 interceptor vlould ha vc c' 10 ' pl'obabilit T of killing bot h R V s Thei r preference is to h l rd n the It V3 to a level of '1-00 calories q cnl • which is higher than US systerns but they ' 111 cornpl'olTlise down to a levol of 250 call sq ern if nCCC8S 1 J y l chieving this h2 rdn s vill rcquii'c a ccnnpletc J y nc v R r shell -- e •• the old UI ' 'arhead vill b placed i 1Sic1c a con 1pJ ctcly 1e ' dc ibn RV • Ho vc l'J depel ng upon hc c1csi n of the RV' shell the va1'hc2 d ncl it rnol' 1 ti n n1 t 7 c lso n cc rJ 'cdcsi n The I J ' • • • incrcC ' f ccl sp -tch g - vill rc irc other changes in tlie· 04·ent -ry systQn1 1110nnting nd dcployll cnt design • The British arelpuTsu1ng C1 prirlJ aTY RV design based upon a solid berylli u rn shell wit1 a bonded ove rcoat layer of S 5% pOl'ons lJC ryllh'ln and a loaded ett f8on undcl'co2 t This dcsig- 1 is not s n1 ilai· to any US design There is evidently a vcll-devclopqc1 base in beryllium technology in the Ul The T are also pursui11g a bac1 ul de sign using th rcc -din1 cns1 o 1al qua rtz phenolic 3DQP for the RV S cll Thi bacl up V c S suggested t t H n by the Defense Atomic Support A 2 el1cy 3 DQP is C i1 experirnental US rn t ri l vhich has been trlcd 11 Jur nRES prograrn Cl nd ha5 dC TIonstr- 1 lr d good strcnr th Cind re-entry hcatf hield p l' orrnance There arc no pl' -1 n j to usc it on any US It Vs hO CVf 4 • It las a drawhac 11 that under C · po5u1·e to a colcJ X-ray cnvironrnent it p t s cs ll n1uch Grc ltcr shor JJ tq tlie ' rhcr d· carried withi n the ItV Bbell t an doe the b Tyllinn1 he l ' '- 'ith bl rylJ h - ' the prescnt UK ¥ arhcc d could bt n ed a is ' ith 3 2 2 it wUI require con sidcrabl rcde dgn 1'orn a hvcl rniti ti Jn jt 'tl dpoint The nTjt i h tl1 C a vc rc of thl H' c cts however Thc 'c is no P 'C icnt c ' p l'i l1ce in th U '1ith 3 DC1P •• J_ • • - ' - •• lSi ' • ' ' j - i l 4 ' - ' 'If 0 • • ' • 3 Tlh t ir l I · · llvc1lo p ' l l t 2 ' c tl ' nHhh·l If ci tch ch ign hi a UTS' '1 l ' I -I· - • 11' 'J l' l' ' In ll rr n lu 1 C 3 t y c • l i 1 c h· ' t l ' lor pnng C 1 a 1 1 t· tional n1pJ s of 11 · in t tl k i n in ll10P h 1' t t t Di u llond Scull schc d111 d 101' atc 7 2 The OV T ll effl' ct of t 11C lho·v in a nl l jor 111oc1ific2 lion to the re-c'ntry systcnl -- eH el'cilf h'orn oth the current 1 3 systern and frolTl thltt ' ork c1 Otlt uncler the US nt lop ' pl'og rti 1n VH T THE DRITI · It t ' - L' T FRO TI·n US --_ ------_ ---- _-- - - _-----_ ------- - _-_ _--- - There llas b en no concrete statcrnent fTOn l e1C UK regarc1in the extent of as istance clesil'ccl 1'CI11 the U They achnit fl -allkly to riot htl ving defined their progl'arn ii1 St' i 'icl nt detail to Pl'Ojcct this Thcy ucs1 rc to do as lnnch Cl1 k S p jsDjbl thC 1Y13Clvcs but VC11_S0J there voulcl still ren'lain a rnajol cOljtribut on ni c ·ssal'y by us An inc1icatio l of '- hat this could enta il wiJl be given beloy r vouJd Eke a sisC cl l1ce • III p I US C0111 'nnl1 t g l'cl 'l' rc - 1a 111'O' l1' r · -- j ' '-1 a r · ·1 '11 El··il · 'J 'l'p' · · · ·'C· A •• ' C' - 1 - J I A 10 ' '_ •• l c _ j'J ' t I - 1 _ - to RV design h ·ern both hal Qcning and Cleroc1yn rnic sta ·Jdpoint5 The S2 1 1C f01 pen c d t s as ell 2 S gaid lncc on pen c dd cal'l'icr They vi sh to c void t l dcla y and cost of goh g dc ' n any blind alleys vhich our prcvi o ls experience could help then' -void 41' ' - b Support on US 'll dcrgronnc1 nuc eur te·sts for exposure of n itish design sarnplefi This o ld be for 0 period e · tc'L lt1ir g into ap 11·o - irn d cly 1975 alld ' -ould er tuil f ip2 ce including enot gh for full size RVs 1 on Ct schedule nc1 at the proper exposure levels to rnatc properly vith their dcveJ oplncnt l l'ograr 1 o Regen'ding the above it shonJc1 be noted thatl first the PI P V di iti l is sl 1 ici y di ff l'ent fronl tn t of any US c1 sign that US experience 1 S not directly pplic Glc· J ny con r 'H nt vould he hascQ pl·im r ily up n thcorctic l considC l· ' t 071r pel'h • couplet to SO - 1C d b1' e f 'ilh n cxt1'2 pU laUon of our own c q eriencc S coiHlly 10 nc-t have o r o ' n u nd l'g '0 n test prO rc ln pl n ·lcd fa cnr Ju6h - hc c1 to penl1i firrn CGln 11itrn nt thereon to uPPOyt he f3 ri t-ish in t1 e Hrne f-' nnc they c rcqu ·d ing The c points nohvith - t nc ing we cO 11d dou tedlr be of con ic l·nble hl p to thenl ' - ' 1 ' • ' ' '0 • • • I ' t • I _ It' I - - ' 1 v • In t ici i ·' l L p ' 1 H n - it i pl· b· th ' th t l y wIn V • 'J llt to ' ' sy t fli hL lC t ni l COl ' Ll g if ·p o - i nE t y t l · ' l i i il ' rl l '' ' ' · · 1·' 1 ' I - ···· t · ·· l· · · - ·I ' ·ll 'i' -'t 'I J Cf 1· Il 'g' · 'L ll ··' · t 1 1· 1 _ • • · 1 _ _ _ -- •• ' 1 ' ' 'c ' ' _ ' I ' rl 1r 'I ' ' • C' ' ·1 · ·· c· 1 1' ' IC' · ···11 ' l 'lL t ' 'l c··· · 'l • I J ' ••• Il l ' 1 •• 3 ' _ •• LI l ' ll'l Jl 1' act 'ltil - I · o' 11d 1 ' · ·J L · l by the US The D -iti 'l ' l io rn · n ion the 1 • 1 • - 1 1 t' • 1 1 proo l ' _ll y or n ec 1 a S CF' __ i ' I C' l serle's 11 a U t on to t lC a VC flight tcsl pro j·t - ii i BC ''l t il1g like lhe Athen2 b t vehicle They il1 dici i i ·cfl r l' c ro ' l 'c of ' hHc S I iHh Proylng Ground for this siner to I O J - C't • 1 t I ' ' 1' · 1 ·•·· • c- 1 - • L I ' t j' n' ' L · l· llTI • '11' ' l 1' t 011 _ 'd' t11C' _ ·l' _ o · n I U -'l'N 4 - l - I 'f CIO'I 1 _ 1- _ - vonld be too c ' p n · iv 0 ' t1H t Design he l o ' 'Dllld b TI qub e 1-of us at lcc st in il tcr cc L' TCaS to il1SETe th2 t ttH 'e 1CE gncc1 re-entry systen is cornp tihlc vith the rest of the rnissile to l-c d sig 1 the s bnl l l' inc-cal'l'iGc 1 firL control s stcln to proyide the rcqu1 'cc1 p rc-settin info rrlz tio l o the P C to do irajccto -y Ctnalyses and pro0 tbly' help in othel' arcc s as-well It is proh ble th2 t they vould p • ·cfcr the OVCl' lll b1tcgl·C' ion tc sk be pcrfornl cl by the US They h2 - '- nl cnt io n cl in£ol'rn ll J fo cX2 rn le the possib5 lity of contracting' vith Lockheed the systern contractor on he US A n clope prog rcun f to' uncle rlClkt such a - responsi uility I In surn the U role could involve t- '0 a Significant contribution in unc1ergrou'1d testing SU1 ort b Signi fic2 n c0 tributioa in design de sign c l'itique an2 1ysi s systcl'n integra tiol1 f bj icCltion and re 1c ' ted support ClC ti viti e s --' c Sigj1ilic nt contri ution in use of tcst ra ge5 and facilities SPECI1 L f OT E Thc' present BriU l co nrnitr '1C nt is only to CO 1rJuct a p1·O P· 1 1 c cfi - tion phc · hic i s e · pected t o 12 5 t a proxir l tcl r two yC 1·5 Thc'I h · vr not l-n- 'c '-_'- J t1 l'n · 'E·r ' - - - JJ 2 c'cclr o' • j to 'rtr' • _Ao 11 ·'Yfircc'·in · c 1c· · · c' ·' l ··'· a ' 4 _ # £' · 01' pr lCl l ' ti o11 T'lH' US co 'd '-·''' 'j ·t c·'1 11 ·0'1 • • 1cf 1 '- • '- 1 ' J _ 1 J j _ 1 • 1't i _ Ol1 t r - 1 rc·1'l- tivcly ITtOC' C 5t Ci Ol t d c n filCr t' 1C qn ' tion of furth0l' SUP Jl't ch time az the B dt 11 t 1l s lv 's td lr 5 th prohic -n • • I ' - - TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 5 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D C 20508 July 2 1971 ------- MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT Under Secretary of State John N Irwin II Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H Moor er Director Central Intelligence Richard Helms US-UK Nuclear Relations NSSM 123 Attached is the study on US-UK Nuclear Relations prepared by the Ad Hoc Group in response to NSSM 123 In order to prepare for early decisions on this issue may we please have written agency views on the paper particu larly the options by close of business Thursday July 8 Davis Staff Secretary Attachment cc Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Chairman Atomic Energy Commission TOP SECRET SENSITIVE e t TOP SECRET SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED Authority t o rd-q 5'6 J By iJ NARA nte IJI q NSSM 123 - - US- UK NUCLEAR RELATIONS Analytical Summary 1 The Problem We need to take an early decision on how to respond to a British request for assistance in upgrading their Polaris system Conveyed to the US last fall in a letter to Dr John S Foster from Sir 'Nilliam Cook of the UK MOD this request followed a Ministerial level decision in London to proceed with a Project Defi_nition stud y of ways to improve the hardness and penetration capability of the warhead of the UK Polaris The ostensible objective a UK capability·to penetrate Soviet ABM -'- defenses and strike Moscow or other major cities in the Western USSR Known as Super Antelope this program has already begun and will run until the end of 1972 or early 1973 At that time the British will decide whether they wish to produce and deploy this system and possibly seek further US assistance in doing so Alternatively they could return to other options which we know they must be considering such as developing a MIRV for the Polaris A-3 or asking us for Poseidon which the Royal Navy is believed to want but which Whitehall has so far rejected On March 25 1971 Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard wrote you a letter summarizing the UK Super Antelope request and informing you of DOD's intention to respond affirmatively for the Project Definition phase but without prejudice to our freedom of action beyond that point This NSSM is intended to review that decision and to ensure that all interested agencies have an opportunity to present their views As described in the study present British plans are to modify the reentry system of their Polaris A-3 by - - replacing one of the thr ee R V's with a penetration aid carrier which dispenses pen aids in larger numbers and of different design than those developed by the US and -- widening the deployed spacing between the two remaining -RV's whose hardening would be increased to the point where a single ABM inter ceptor would have a low probability of killing both RV' s A considerable amount of RV redesigning will be necessary to accommodate these changes and possibly some redesigning of the missile and weapon system TOP SECRET SENSITIVE --- - -- DECLASSIFIED AUthOrityt o l qS1 By S9 NARA Date J JI LI - -- ----- TOP SECRET 'SENSITIVE - 2 - As elaborated in a series of Pentagon meetings in late April the British would like the following from the US - - the benefit of ORr analysis and design critiques on their approach to RV and pen aid design including possible use of US contractors -- continued access to US underground nuclear tests to expose UK hardware samples including at least one undergroWld proof test of their new R V de sign r -- possible use of White Sands Proving Grouna for flight test oL components Although they are only asking our assistance through a two year Project Definition phase it is clear that the British would seek further US support of some kind in producing and deploying this system should they decide to do so This would represent a much deeper US involvm ent in UK weapons modernization and an extension of the present US-UK special nuclear _ relationshi p It could narrow our range of choice in our futur e European nuclear policy US involvement in the Post Project Definition phase might include additional under ground effects test support continuation of design analysis and design critique support with extension to redesign of affected portions other than the reentry systeD'1 possible use of US ontractor s for R V fabrication and -- use of facilities of the Eastern Test Range in the Atlantic possibly including US test missiles The British could request assil tance in matters relating to post-Project Definition prior to completion of the Project Definition phase II Conunitments to the UK Under Existing Agreements Although not presenting a rigorous legal analysis the study reviews various agreements relating to US-UK nuclear cooperation -- The 1958 Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes essentially a framework agreement provides ' TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ----- -- -- DECLASSIFIED AUthOrityt O I ql 1 BY NARADate J L --------- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - 3 - for cooperation in a nUluber of areas including improvement of atomic weapon design and attainn'lellt of delivery capability with particular atomic weapons it leaves for subsequent determination the specific nature of the parts and information to be transferred This agreement does not commit us to cooperation with the UK on Super Antelope but it is broad enough to include such assistance if we decide to proceed -- The 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement commits us to make avail- able to the UK in addition to Polaris rnissiles - such-related equipment and supporting services as the UK ma-y from time to time require plus any modifications we might make to the Pofaris weapons system Coop eration relating to warheads and penetration aids is howe ver J specifically excluded -- A September 1969 joint US-UK memorandum stated that the US would work with the UK in evaluation of the hardness and vulnerability of the UK Polaris make available to the UK inforrnation on the A ntelope modification to Polaris essentially RV hardening and addition of pene tration aids which we had developed ourselves but rejected when we opted for Poseidon We offered to provide support if the UK decided to go ahead with that modification exchanging information on pen aids and allowing the British to expose a limited number of samples in US under ground effects tests The AEC arranged to make available space in three US underground effects tests in 1970 Subsequently however the UK decided· against Antelope While none of the foregoing agreements expressly cornmits us to assist the British with Super Antelope which -- unlike Antelope -- is a system the UK is seeking to develop and which we ourselves have not developed the impression has been given the British in a number of on going technical exchanges that these same channels will be available for cooperation wi th respect to Super Antelope In addition Defense which has informed the British in general terms per Packard's March 25 1971 letter to Kissinger that we will assist them in the project definition phase of Super Antelope has already established special channels under the 1958 agreement for the supply of inforrnation relevant to that program Thus a decision at this time not to a ssist the British with Super Antelope could be regarded in London as a shift in US policy However the British are aware that Defense's approval of US cooperation on Super Antelope has been submitted to the White House for review TOP SECRET SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED 'Jr _ Authority t o 'd-Q 11 _ _______ iiiiiiiiiiiiii- · By NARA Date J a TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 4 - The basis of the 1969 memorandum of under standing with the British was a series of recommendations emerging from a Senior Interagency Group study of US- UK uc1ear relations in the fall of 1968 the most recent overall policy review It recommended in som ewhat contradictory fashion that we - - maintain existing arrangements with the UK but limit exchange of weapons information and materials to what the Br tish nee to arry forward their programs in nuclear weapons research and to Inaintain the effectivenes s of their existing nuclear forces - - not in the absence of advance Presidential approval encourage or commit our sel ves to support any significant modification to existing British programs or any m ajor new British program ff -- release in response to British requests nuclear weapons in form ation which the British need to maintain the effectiveness of their existing nuclear forces and to evaluate fully the alternatives available to them for improvelnellt of these forces If Note This partially contradicts the guideline immediately above Based on the SIG reconunendations the President submitted to Con gress an amendment to the 1958 Agreement which Congress approved extending through December 1974 provisions for the transfer of certain atotnic weapon parts and special nuclear tnaterials to the UK Comment US nuclear cooperation vith the UK has been continuous since 1958 While none of the above mentioned specific agreements commit the US to helping the British with Super Antelope we have been vorking with the UK for the last several years in helping them to explore ways to improve their existing Polaris system And we did offer them our Antelope modification in 1969 although they turned it down As set down in the 1968 SIG study US policy is presently based on con tradictory guidelines as noted above So far Defense in its contacts with the British on their Super Antelope request has created the presumption that we would assist the UK through project definition although no forIllal reply has yet gone to the November 1970 letter from Sir William Cook to Dr Foster Nevertheless US-UK nuclear relations are Presidential business The Super Antelope program can be considered a significant modification of the UK Polaris system and has only now been submitted for White Housel NSC review Obviously it could be overturn d by a Presidential decision though this could have negative political consequences for US- UK relations as discussed below TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -5- III Implications of an Affirmative Re sponse Strategic After exalnining available intelligence information the British govern ment has apparently concluded that Super Antelope will substantially im prove their Polaris system's capability to penetrate Moscow defenses into the 1980' s They have not shared their analyses with us Indeed one of the recommendations at the end of the study calls for an early joint intelligence review if we do decide to as sist the British to -ensure that we-a re both oper til1g from the same data base taKing into account the latest information regarding the Soviet ABM program As faY-as we can tell the Briti-fsh assume - - that Soviet ABM defense s will continue to emphasize very high altitude exo-atmospheric intercepts with no high -acceleration Sprint-type interceptor available -- that the loiter capability of Galosh is inadequate to achieve atomo spheric sorting and be effective against Super Antelope when the two R V's are separated as planned an d - - that no upgrading of existing SAMs for terminal defense is expected The study makes the judgm ent that Super Antelope is probably strategic ally sound and has a reasonable chance of success However it is also o noted that Soviet ABM modernization could change this situation and force the British to conclude later that SlIper Antelope will not be adequate to meet their strategic objectives Comment Although the paper does not bring this out the effectiveness of Super Antelope is probably contingent on the achievement of a SALT agree- j ment which limits ABM's to the levels now being discussed i e a m oderate Moscow defense not exceeding 100 interceptors If SALT fails and the Soviets move to a heavier or more sophisticated system Super Antelope probably would not be sufficient The British would probably need MIRV or ·Poseidon under these circumstances assuming they still insist on hitting Moscow • • The paper also glosses over the point that the present UK Polaris system still has a reasonable chance of penetrating a Moscow ABM of 100 interceptors assuming at least two British subs on station with 96 RV's plus some leakage and failure s in the Soviet ABM In this frame of refe rence one option would be to try to persuade the British to save their time and scarce resources and TOP SECRET SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED 4 - AUthOri'Yt O Id-ql 1 By NARA Date J L ----------- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -6- forego what might prove to be a marginal improvement It should also be noted that with their present system the British have the capability to hit other major Soviet cities not defended by ABM' s such as Leningrad which is still a respectable deterrent But the British choose to conclude otherwise The study notes that the UK nuclear force makes a relatively small contribution to US strategic objectives All UK strategic forces when assigned to NATO are targeted solely against n1 ilitary targets contributing currently about seven percent of the total coverage The proportionate UK contribution will shrink even further as ·Poseidon enters the USIorce- -More over· targets programmed to be struck by the UK are also programmed to be struck by the US in order to achieve the-i equiredaamage expectancy and to hedge against the unavailability of the UK force Under the Nassau Agree m ent Britain retains the right to withdraw its force when II supreme national interests are at stake Under such circuITlstances it is presumed that the UK maintains independent strike plans directed against Soviet urban targets In short the design objective which the UK has set for Super Antelope penetrating the Moscow ABM is more relevant to the national purposes of the UK Polaris force than to the role of that force in NATO strike plans Moreover an independent UK launch capability diminishes our control over the initiation and conduct of nuclear war and thus poses a potential inconsistency with US objectives On the other hand the UK force doe s contribute to deterring a Soviet attack against Western Europe although the amount of that contribution is controversial Two views are summarized in the paper - - Given that geography and politics tie Britain more closely to Europe than the US and that recent changes in the US-USSR strategic balance have somewhat diminished the credibility of a US nuclear response to a Soviet attack on Europe there are circumstances in which the Soviets might see a UK nuclear strike as more likely or credible than a US attack in the context of an incursion in Europe SALT and US domestic pressures to reduce our troop levels in Europe reinforce this tendency Thus the UK and also the French nuclear force could assume increasing importance in addipg to Soviet uncertainties regarding a nuclear war in Europe This it can be argued is in our interest -- In another view an independent UK launch - - which would invite the obliteration of the UK by Soviet missiles -- is basically so implausible as to have little decisive effect on Soviet calculations Short of a direct Soviet attack on the UK it is difficult to postulate plausible circumstances in which the Soviet Union might perceive the UK as more likely to launch a nuclear attack than the US TOP SECRET SENSITIVE --• _------- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -7- After this review the study concludes somewhat abruptly that although US nuclear credibility may have been somewhat reduced the US nuclear comm itment still plays the prim ary role in deterring a Soviet attack against NATO N either French or UK nuclear forces are capable -- now or in the fore seeable future - - of supplanting the US nuclear guarantee but these smaller nuclear forces do make a contribution to deterrence in Europe Comment Unfortunately this study breaks no-new ground ol1 t P_e s'J bject of US interest in allied nuclear forces - There is a some vhat spurious quality to the argument that Super Antelope aimed-ars it is at improving the Ul city busting capability which does not directly support NATO nuclear plans will further diminish our control over the initiation of nuclear war in Europe Whether or not we assist them the British will continue efforts to improve their nuclear force and will doubtless continue to kave separate national strike plans targeting their force against Soviet cities Reminiscent of old US doctrine from the 1960 I s maintaining central command and control over all alliance nuclear forces is no longer possible anyway and perhaps not even desirable Super Antelope will not change this situation The study also skirts the point that the more credible and effective the UK force is in Soviet eyes the greater its contribution will be to deterrence Political Clearly as committed to maintaining an independent deterrent as was its predecessor the present British government will probably 'pursue project definition with or without US assistance although without access to under ground nuclear tests and missile flight ranges this would be expensive and more difficult A US decision to assist through Project Definition although we are not obligated to do so would be consistent with the US-UK spe cial nuclear relationship as it has developed since 1958 and especially since Nassau Indeed the British co ld argue on political grounds that it is a natural extension of our relationship especially since we offered them Antelope A positive response would be consistent with the overall political relationship which the President wants· to maintain with the Heath government Rejection of the British request on the other hand could be expec ted to color other areas of our political and military relations although perhaps not as seriously as suggested in the paper Comment The study notes in Appendix C that a US refusal to provide the help requested might in British eyes represent a change in US policy as significant as the cancellation of Skybolt in 196 We doubt that this is TOP SECRET SENSITIVE o 0 __ • O_ - _ 0 DECLASSIFIED AUthOrityt O I ql 1 BY NARADate IJ L TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -8- necessarily the case especially if our refusal were accompanied by a high level approach to the British government stre ssing our interest in en couraging greater West European defense and nuclear cooperation and our concerns about SALT di cussed below Where the Skybolt analogy seems more relevant is in the case of US assistance through Project Definition but then followed by a refusal of further support if London decided to proceed with deployment The problem we face here is the difficulty of proceeding through Proj ect Definition and yet maintaining our flexibility How do we convey to the British that we mean seriously too review the wh9le_ sitgation at that point and can promise nothing further at this stage The study correctly notes that the current UK request impinges on a range of multilateral defense relationships including our relations with France and other European countries Our entire European nuclear policy is affected especially whether or not we want to change the Atlantic Alliance I s nuclear statu Yi the years ahead A major deficiency is the absence of any new thought regarding what our European nuclear policy should be in the 19701 s and how our response to the current UK request might be related to it The paper confines itself to the following contentions -- With respect to Brit sh entry into the European Community POIllpidou apparently accepts the special US-UK defense relationship at least for the present and does not consider this incompatible wi th British membership Thus US assistance to the UK is not likely to jeopardize British entry pros pects On balance this is a fair assessment However if US assistance became public knowledge it could jeopardize ratification of British accession especially in France Pompidou might lB ve to admit to ardent Gaullists that this was net ao Europe' 1 policy he could argue that it was contrary to his understanding with Heath Sensitive on this point CIA questions the judgment in the paper - - The fact that we are now beginning some as sistance to the French in nuclear-related areas would tone down any possible official French charges of discrimination should new assistance to the British become klXMn in Paris - - The moment is not at hand to ncourage UK -French nuclear co operation since these countries have agreed to postpone the issue until European construction and the evolution of the French force is flfrther advanced Thus US assistance to the UK conditional on London's exploring nuclear cooperation with the French would be inappropriate at this stage It would also complicate SALT US assistance to Super Antelope if properly limited need not reduce our future flexibiOlity toward supporting or opposing such cooperation or movement toward a Euro an nuclear force Basically TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -9- sound the problem with this judgment is again how to avoid committing ourselves at this time to deeper involvement in m odernization of the UK force Comment One problelTI not addressed in the study is that by assisting the UK with Super Antelope we are promoting further nuclear disparities in Europe by allowing the British to get further ahead of the French thus making the possibilities of any Anglo-French cooperation later m ore difficult In this context saying no to theBritish might l ad them to Pos ne ction on modernizing their deterrent uutil SALT was clearer at which time the French force would be more equal to the Bxitish and_joint actions f r_ modernization on a cooperative basis could be more easily_discussed Of course if we held our assistance to Project Definition and then decided against further cooperation in two years time we might still succeed in holding the UK at pre sent levels But this would be more difficult SALT If US assistance to the UK on Super Antelope became known in Moscow the Soviets could charge that we vere IIcircum venting a SALT agreement by aiding a third country in the development of strategic arms The Soviets could be especially sensitive since the objective of Super Antelope is to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses This might make more difficult the task of negotiating a limitation on ABM's - - However since the next round of SALT will be focused on an ABM agreement coupled with some measures restraining cfff' lsive armsJ th question of non-transfer of offensive weapons will take on less immediate importance If there is a formal provision not to transfer ABMs we would need to take into account the precedent of such a provision later applied to offensive systems -- The study concludes that Project Definition assistance on Super Antelope if carried out prudently would not be likely to jaopardi ze ou r objectives in SALT But the subject should be kept under continuing review And it would be wise to limit ourselves to less visible assistance J declining overt forms of cooperation such as US manufacture of RVs or allowing the British to use US flight test ranges Any early US involvement in post Project Definition projects of Super Antelope or in a UK MIRV program should be avoided from the SALT standpo nt TOP SECRF T SENSITIVE ' TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -10- IV Options 1 Terminate As sistance on Project Definition of Super Antelope Could be couched in terms of postponement· of a decision on assistance Pro Avoiding a possibly troublesome issue in SALT this might also encourage closer UK association with Europe by reducing special US-UK defense ties It might also save the British effort and scarce resources if we could persuade them that their pre sent deterrent is adequate to hit Moscow that Super Antelope would 'at best be a marginal impr ment and that they should wait for the outcome of SALT before_making moder i ation decisions More UK resources lTIight be available to imprQve NATO con ventional forces Con By interrupting a project already launched and faulting on a firm UK space allocation at a forthcoming underground effects test as well as cancelling scheduled meetings on cooperation this course of action might adversely affect overall US-UK relations not to mention the President's relations with Prime Minister Heath In the military sphere it might mean jeopardizing some projects carried out with the UK in which we have a major interest e g Holy Loch as veIl as giving up any chance of profiting from future technical exchanges e g on hardening of RV's where we might stand to learn UK attention might be diverted toward requests for other kinds of assistance such as MIRV or Poseidon which would be more difficult for us to handle 2 Continue US Assistance through Project Definition per March 25 1971 Packard letter to Kissinger We would help with RV hardening development of pen aids and allocation of space in underground tests but preserve freedom of action beyond project definition Pro Living up to the impres sion already created by Defense officials such assistance would enable the UK to evaluate its options on how best to modernize its deterrent thus creasing overall Western strength and preserving UK confidence in the US This cooperation from which we might learn something ourselves about RV h 'ardening would not divulge advanced US missile technology Con Reducing US flexibility by making it difficult not to aid the British beyond Proje ct Definition in deploying Super Antelope such a policy might lead us into a new Skybolt-type l ' situation if indeed we anticipate eventual curtailment of the US-UK special nuclear relationship and prolTIotion of West European defense nuclear cooperation over the longer run If it became publicly known it could cause some complications for UK entry into TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - - ' DECLASSIFIED Authority O I d q 5Z By S1 NARA Date 1 J L TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -11- the EC It might annul the benefits froITl our recently initiated ITlodest military cooperation with France Difficulties could be caused in SALT SUb-Options on the Extent of our As si stance CoITlment Two sub-options are suggested under Option #2 la would potentially liITlit our Project Definition assistance sOITlewhat ITlore than suggested in the Packal·d letter 2b would go a step beyond However both have built in mechanisITls to review relevant items on a case-by-case basis To a degree this is hair-split ing But-these ·operational considera tions could be ilnportant especially since 2b wo uld involve early commit m ents to post Project Definition 2a Assistance through Project Definition but with an understanding that some requests pertaining to highly visible assistance e g flight testing on US ranges and in State's vie v presence of U'l officials at US under ground tests should be considered on a case-by-case basis -- Limiting more visible assistance would lessen the chances of complications in SALT I while specifically indicating to the UK in advance that we plan to be cautious We would be reducing chances for iInplicit comrn itment o assistance beyond Project Definition in contrast to option 2b On the other hand UK planning for post Project Definition could be hindered lb The same as la but with the additional provision that we would envision at the outset lending assistance on requests relating to Post Project Definition e g use of US contractors to begin fabrication of long lead time items before the end of the Project Definition phase although such requests would also be reviewed on a case-by-case basis - - A more forthcoming position which could benefit UK planning this option would still give us flexibility in considering UK requests However it could make it more difficult to reject future UK requests and it could increase the chance s of complications in SALT Comment State Defense and AEC 'wishing to be forthcoming to· the British as long as we preserve some flexibility and have a review mechanism favor this option The paper is not clear as to whether we would tell the British the substance of this option or simply view it as our own inteLTlal USG guide line - - probably preferable Procedural Recon1 ffiendations If option 2 is selected or variants thereof the study proposes the following operational guideline TOP SECRET SENSITIVE I I e '3 DECLASSIFIED II --_ · _ A m t O l ·- BY ij NARA Date crr TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -12- 1 Defense in notifying the U1 of Presidential confirmation of US assistance in Project Definition would also indicate any restrictions on our assistance per 2a or 2b our wish to consult at an appropriate time should HMG formally decide to proceed beyond Project Definition - - that an early joint intelligence review wou d be de ir ble_ con cerning the Soviet ABM program to ensure that both the UK and the US are operating frorn the same intelligence data base 2 Moreover Defense would assume responsibility for future coordination within the USG on Super Antelope including all interested agencies preparing policy questions at appropriate times which requir e executive decisions The Secretary of Defense would forward periodic status reports to the President including any significant developments requiring Pre sidential decision Comment Other coordination mechanisms are possible Consideration might be given to bringing this into the NSC system although it is true that Defense has the prhnary action on handling our assistance on Super Antelope 3 State would inform the UK through diplomatic channels that -- we can give no assurance regarding the success of this project since we have little experience in sorne of the areas e g higher levels of R V hardening that the British will want to explore -- because of sensitive developments under way in SALT and with respect to British entry into the European Cornm unity this project should be closely held and any a spects risking public disclosure should be carefully reviewed by each government before concurring We will also need to review the pos sibility of a conflict betw een a SALT agreement and future US as sistance to the UK a s SALT V unfolds ' Concluding Staff Cornment 1 There has been a tendency as this study reveals for our UK nuclear policy to be formulated in a highly decentralized fashion for exarnple at the working levels of Defense and the AEC State in particular has felt left out of the action One of the fruits of this NSSM will hopefully be a watch and review mechanisrn in which all interested agencies can participate and which should be charged with bringing larger policy questions rnore TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE -13- promptly to White House attention This is especially important if we decide to proceed to as sist the British through Project Definition but want to reserve our future options since this could get us into a Skybolt-type situation in early 1973 - 2 This study offers no new insights into what our longer range European nuclear policy should be in the 1970 1 s and where our UK nuclear policy fits in After the UK is in the European Community and when SALT results are clearer we will need to review this whole picture with a particular eye on w ether West Euro an defense cooperation might or should i crease and what role we could play This could involve reducing US-UK nuclear ties or assisting the UK only on an equal basis with the French in o ffi e kind of Anglo-French or European framework 3 NSSM 123 included a request for an asses sment of a possible future UK request for MIRV technology or Poseidon Except for noting the fact that the British Navy continues to be interested in Poseidon but has so far been held back by the top levels of Whitehall the study doe s not sugge st what our response should be if a UK MIRV or Poseidon request should corne later It simply flags the issue for future review 4 Another point omitted in the study is the need to consult at some point with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy if we decide to go ahead on Super Antelope As evidenced by a letter from Holifield to Chairman Seaborg last fall the Com mittee is sensitive to even our present level of nuclear cooperation with the British The Seaborg reply dated May 10 1 1971 which was coordinated among the agencies and is appended to the study carefully skirted the Super Antelope question With appropriate con S111tations any Committee opposition should be manageable but this could of course be a problem TOP SECRET SEl TSITIVE