_ seusanen as neg ®rkC mion om pop ceraimment or stare mosense me ions P 1 top secret 71 October 6 R971 To RM — M Joseph T Kendrick From 1 8 f0 Seymour Velas L4 Subjects US—UK Nuclear Relations 1 You asked for comments on the above subject menorandim In general I think t 4s excellent quite comprehensive and in my view generally correct in both tts approaches and conclusions _I do however have a few thoughts which you and Me Deforte might 4 wish to consider incorporating t 2 UK—FRo Straterte Doctrine Although it is perhaps a matter of degreo the paper seens to me to draw too sharp a dichotomy ‘as between UK and French ‘ strateste views Tt 1s of course correct as the paper points out that the British force is coordinated — with the STOP This is not quite the same however as saying that the French are counter value orfented and the British counter force When one digs into British views on nuclear stratesy one finds that in a great 7% many respects they paraliel those of the French Beyond i that however there is some evidence that the ultimate British strategic reMance is on counter—value retalta— # tion They are willing to integrate their orn force Mou within the total SIOP because the total STOP has such a large Assured Destruction component If it did not T doubt that the British would accept the degree of con ordination that 1s fmplted While not conclusive evidence to support this thests I recently earned while in Europe that the British are uneasy about the prospect of a SALT agreement containing a Tager Soviet AMX systen then was zor secret ‘ap mmmmmommmouuummmummmmmmemmemnn CONN pemmemmmmmmmmmemmnmmmms t a g oC wins om Tor secret # originally contemplated They want to be sure to be able to penetrate to Noscow or at least to have the Soviets belfeve that they have such a capability This concern 1s further bome out by their current efforts to upgrade Polasis efforts which night not be required 1£ they were solely content to hit a limited number of soft counter—force targets the only kind which theix submarine launched missiles can destroy with high con fidence If one enters into a discussion with the British on the stratestc question in the last analysis J one is reminded that the Beitish commitment of their submarine force s subject to withdrawal 1f required in the supreme national dnterest I would not myself bet against the existence of a British natfonal targeting option of counter—value strikes in the event the US did not activate STOP and the British felt their supreme national interest in Jeopardy 3 SAZ I wanted to make three points here The first I have alzeady mentioned namely the British concern about a large AM tending to jeopardize theis nuclear penetration capability Second T suspect that at least this Bitish Covernment which in many respects ts quite tough 1s now and will increasingly becone uneasy about what 1s occurring in the US—USSR strategie balance If a SALT agreement not only codifies nuclear parity shatever thet in but appears to Teave soon for the Soviets achfeving a significant numerical super dority which sone fear could be the case they will note is your paper sussests be caught up in a detente atmos 2 phere In short except perhaps for a relatively short perfod during which there could be some detente relaxation the British and French view of the US—U5SR stratestc balance will relate almost solely to what we and the Russians are doing not what we say If the balance seems to be widening in favor of the Soviets whether SAT or not uncertainty about the US commitment and consern for considering options other than relance on ror secust p vevemsiee a cs ®rkC vins om zor sect 3 the US stratestc commitment 1s likely to srov hind there is a degree of ambivalence in European attitudes toward SALT On the one hand our allies concede that our consultation has for the most part been good while on the other they retain a residual suspicion of ‘the US and USSR holding secret talks Especially 1f the SALT proposal involves no transfer agreements 1 think this suspteton will be much enlarged Perhaps more to the substantive point your paper ought to emphasize « that depending on hoy such no ssanster provisos ase interpreted this could lintt or even preclude our assisting the British and French Ths could create very serious problems in their relations with us and could accelerate their mutual cooperation 4 Decoupling There is concern in some quarters in Europe that the effect of a SAUT agreement between the US and USSR will be to sterilize both homelands against the prospect of strategic weapons use by either side This could result in an effective decoupling ‘of the strategic deterrent The argument is made that this @ _ could in turn leave Europe as the cockpit for future wars including those involving the two super powers shoutd this view spread E have heard t attributed to % the Germans it could act as still another inducement tovard the development of a European force centered on existing UK—French forces 5 Cultueal Factors The reference to the cultural ties between the U5 and the UK and the role they play in US and UK policy and cooperation is mentioned once and that in passing _I think this is not an unimportant defictency in the paper In my view we have greatly underestimated in the past how strong these cultural and historical ties are A paragraph or tro on this subs ject may be warzanted 6 Erench—UK Cooperation A small point on page 26 it ts speculated that a UK move into the Community could 45 result in some French—UK cooperation at a very early zor secret 1 veogsnce ey t KC mion om — Tor sect a date It 1s my impression that there is alzeaty some cooperation The real question is vhether 1 will ber come significant 7 ostpolitik Detente Ete This parallels ay earlier coments on British attitudes t 4s ay judge ment that at least the present British and French Covern— ments take a rather hard headed view toward Ostpolitik and detente and contrazy to the statement on page 33 and 34 whether or not these activities doninate the Europen atmosphere the British and French could well have the politteal energy for nuclear cooperation Tt is other practical considerations mentioned else where in your paper which are more otgnificant Matting factors to such cooperation 8 Options I confess that I am not entizely clear as to the distinction between options 1 and 2 1 would have thought that most observers would beleve that our current approach is a relatively £lexible one Perhaps it is a matter of enphasts n ary event 1 sustest that you consider whether the real alternatives are not between a combination of options 1 and 2 and options 3 Top secret