secuissned a scum wn mesoue 5 BDigues i jgy secamn tol 6 Piotrineetes oute mm ont 96 C mapsey in $ 6—8 oy obgwermt or sta A400 emm emia Memorandum of Conversation #7 s ftl a v dd p Ont nose MBL dE nis _ ¥ DATE Nlovenber 16 1971 Intsioi life sumer sare if 4h parmicimmtm We Michael Butler Counselor Embassy of Great Britain Robert A Maxtin R DCA State Department cores 8 Eur 2 acon 2 5 it Mtg ctame 3a 3 s ec OSD Sh—Dr Tucker §— ¢ OSD r58—to1 Randal m 2 NSC Seczetariat—iirs Davis € Autabassy LOON use saum vr Tx 1 Me Butler asked to get a run—doun on the US position for SAULT VI T fold him that the baste US position is unchanged and that Anbassador Parsons vould be so indicating in a restricted MMC in Brussels tomorrow Me Butler sald he was not surprised at this p since this to the‘seneral fnpression ha had going from tatking to various people during the recess Me Butler then gave me the Talking Points on SALT that had been R elcared by UK Forelgn Secretary Siz Alec Douglas tose for use in his Sesting witi—uresident Wisonlfeptentos 20 — ise setelment ‘u Me Butler safd he had been instructed to provide the points to Me Spters and I satd that 1 would ensure that e Spiers saw then 2a I noted thit the Talking Points made clear the Ut interest in a Soviet AMY level as lou as possible Me Butler assured me that thibipoint Seuaired of centnil anperience to the 9% W In that regard Mr Butler said he wanted to correct a possible mistmpression created by sone coments ande by Me Wacklen of the we a mg the D —IX bilateral SALT discussion in late July yuiruamcl m mse Z4 Tovime ofn mi vien — v pps zor secret ensmunscicen — seolissied — $ sco uo 2ezo05 — 3 we wns oni Pith Is 5 oo securt mors 2 Me Macklen had indicated that the critical level of Soviet ABs with respect to UK penetration capability vas 300 However Me Butler eaphastzed this would only be true with a UK force of greater penetration capability than now exists the proposed improved WK nuclear force In the current situation the UX would have difi— culty if the Soviets had more than 200 ABK launchers Therefore the US 2—oz—1 AM proposal was fine with respect to this speci¢ic UK Interest and concern because the Soviets surely vould choose to defend Moscow and be‘linited thereby to 100 launchers Tf the USSR 41d not accept this proposal the Ut vould infinitely prefer a change to 1—for—1 and not one which‘alloned the USSR 2 sites and thereby 200 launchers I told M Butler as T indicated at the outset that the US position is unchanged including the specifics of our 2—0r—1 ABM proposal tor seorm mors ommesiznn e i res — F # sessa $ causer — Incoommen sesene zor secuse £ 9 wee wm on tthe stcaeziny or state‘s vistt To mus vitro states sternite 1971 weetuic wite rassipait NTN sitt Points to be made see annexed Background Brief ue ae grateful for being kept informed of developments bilaterally as well as through NATO 2 ue welcome the progress made at the recent HelsinkL sesston The agreements on measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuctear war and to improve hot—line communications between the US and the ‘USSR aze a useful practical and public sign of this progress 3 The negotiation of an agreement to 1im t ABMs is apparently at an advanced stage and we assume now that the Helsinict session is over that the Ancricans will be‘considering their £inal bargaining postion The Russians appear to have shown sose flexibility on AM levels This may therefore be a suftable opportunity to pat our position on record with the President __ ve realise that ABM evels are only one element of these cooplex _ negotfations and that there are many other factors which the ® Anertcans must take into account But as Beitish officials have explained on a number of occasions we have a special national _ Interest in the Tevel of Soviet Allis which emerges from SALT _ S being as low as possible This s of vital concern to us for the‘ maintenance of our on nuclear capability He trust that our interest will be taken nto account when the President Ls decid— — ing what proposals should be put to the Russians £ Tor stoutt