REPORT Tl THE PRES Fehmary 2335 Cyber Security A Crisis of Prioritization President s tnfurr atinn Technulugg Hduisnry Committee Ordering Copies of PITAC Reports This report is published by the National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development To request additional copies or copies of other PITAC reports please contact National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development 4201 Wilson Blvd Suite II-405 Arlington Virginia 22230 703 292-4873 Fax 703 292-9097 Email nco@nitrd gov PITAC documents are also available on the NCO Web site http www nitrd gov Copyright This is a work of the U S government and is in the public domain It may be freely distributed and copied but it is requested that the National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development NCO IT R D be acknowledged R E P O R T T O T H E P R E S I D E N T Cyber Security A Crisis of Prioritization President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee FEBRUARY 2005 February 28 2005 The Honorable George W Bush President of the United States The White House Washington D C 20500 Dear Mr President We submit to you the enclosed report entitled Cyber Security A Crisis of Prioritization For nearly a year the President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee PITAC has studied the security of the information technology IT infrastructure of the United States which is essential to national and homeland security as well as everyday life The IT infrastructure is highly vulnerable to premeditated attacks with potentially catastrophic effects Thus it is a prime target for cyber terrorism as well as criminal acts The IT infrastructure encompasses not only the best-known uses of the public Internet – e-commerce communication and Web services – but also the less visible systems and connections of the Nation’s critical infrastructures such as power grids air traffic control systems financial systems and military and intelligence systems The growing dependence of these critical infrastructures on the IT infrastructure means that the former cannot be secure if the latter is not Although current technical approaches address some of our immediate needs they do not provide adequate computer and network security Fundamentally different architectures and technologies are needed so that the IT infrastructure as a whole can become secure iii PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Page 2 February 28 2005 Historically the Federal government has played a vital irreplaceable role in providing support for fundamental long-term IT R D generating technologies that gave rise to the multibillion-dollar IT industry The PITAC’s review of current Federally supported R D in cyber security finds an imbalance however in the current cyber security R D portfolio most support is for short-term defense-oriented research there is relatively little support for fundamental research to address the larger security vulnerabilities of the civilian IT infrastructure which supports defense systems as well Therefore PITAC urges changes in the Federal government’s cyber security R D portfolio to • Increase Federal support for fundamental research in civilian cyber security by $90 million annually at NSF and by substantial amounts at agencies such as DARPA and DHS to support work in 10 high-priority areas identified by PITAC • Intensify Federal efforts to promote recruitment and retention of cyber security researchers and students at research universities with an aim of doubling this profession’s numbers by the end of the decade • Provide increased support for the rapid transfer of Federally developed cutting-edge cyber security technologies to the private sector • Strengthen the coordination of the Interagency Working Group on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and integrate it under the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development NITRD Program These actions will lead the way toward improving the Nation’s cyber security thereby promoting the security and prosperity of our citizens We would be pleased to discuss this report with you and members of your Administration Sincerely Marc R Benioff PITAC Co-Chair Edward D Lazowska PITAC Co-Chair iv CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee CO-CHAIRS Marc R Benioff Chairman and CEO Salesforce com Inc Edward D Lazowska Ph D Bill Melinda Gates Chair Department of Computer Science Engineering University of Washington MEMBERS Ruzena Bajcsy Ph D Director Center for Information Technology Research in the Interest of Society CITRIS and Professor University of California Berkeley William J Hannigan President AT T Jonathan C Javitt M D M P H Senior Fellow Potomac Institute for Policy Studies J Carter Beese Jr President Riggs Capital Partners Judith L Klavans Ph D Director of Research Center for the Advanced Study of Language and Research Professor College of Library and Information Science University of Maryland Pedro Celis Ph D Software Architect Microsoft Corporation Patricia Thomas Evans President and CEO Global Systems Consulting Corporation F Thomson Leighton Ph D Chief Scientist Akamai Technologies and Professor of Applied Mathematics Massachusetts Institute of Technology Manuel A Fernandez Managing Director SI Ventures Gartner Luis E Fiallo President Fiallo and Associates LLC Harold Mortazavian Ph D President and CEO Advanced Scientific Research Inc José-Marie Griffiths Ph D Professor and Dean School of Information and Library Science University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Randall D Mott Senior Vice President and CIO Dell Computer Corporation Peter M Neupert Consultant v PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Eli M Noam Ph D Professor and Director of the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information Columbia University Eugene H Spafford Ph D Professor and Director Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security CERIAS Purdue University David A Patterson Ph D Professor and E H and M E Pardee Chair of Computer Science University of California Berkeley David H Staelin Sc D Professor of Electrical Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology Alice G Quintanilla President and CEO Information Assets Management Inc Peter S Tippett M D Ph D CTO and Vice-Chairman TruSecure Corporation Daniel A Reed Ph D Chancellor’s Eminent Professor Vice Chancellor for Information Technology and CIO and Director Institute for Renaissance Computing University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Geoffrey Yang Managing Director Redpoint Ventures CYBER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIR F Thomson Leighton MEMBERS J Carter Beese Jr Patricia Thomas Evans Luis E Fiallo Harold Mortazavian David A Patterson Alice G Quintanilla Eugene H Spafford Peter S Tippett Geoffrey Yang vi CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION About PITAC and This Report The President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee PITAC is appointed by the President to provide independent expert advice on maintaining America’s preeminence in advanced information technology IT PITAC members are IT leaders in industry and academia with expertise relevant to critical elements of the national IT infrastructure such as high-performance computing large-scale networking and high-assurance software and systems design The Committee’s studies help guide the Administration’s efforts to accelerate the development and adoption of information technologies vital for American prosperity in the 21st century Chartered by Congress under the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 Public Law 102-194 and the Next Generation Internet Act of 1998 Public Law 105-305 and formally renewed through Presidential Executive Orders PITAC is a Federally chartered advisory committee operating under the Federal Advisory Committee Act FACA Public Law 92-463 and other Federal laws governing such activities The PITAC chose cyber security as one of three topics for evaluation The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy then provided a formal charge asking PITAC members to concentrate their efforts on the focus balance and effectiveness of current Federal cyber security research and development R D activities see Appendix A To conduct this examination PITAC established the Subcommittee on Cyber Security whose work culminated in this report Cyber Security A Crisis of Prioritization PITAC found that the Nation’s IT infrastructure – integral to national and homeland security and everyday life – is highly vulnerable to attack While existing technologies can address some vulnerabilities fundamentally new architectures and technologies are needed to address the larger structural insecurities of an infrastructure developed in a more trusting time when mass cyber attacks were not foreseen PITAC offers four findings and recommendations on how the Federal government can foster the development of new architectures and technologies to secure the Nation’s IT infrastructure for the 21st century vii PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Outlined in the Executive Summary and discussed in detail in Chapter 4 the report’s findings and recommendations were developed by PITAC over almost a year of study The Subcommittee was briefed by cyber security experts in the Federal government academia and industry reviewed the current literature and obtained public input at PITAC meetings and a town hall meeting and through written submissions see Appendix B for the Cyber Security Subcommittee Fact-Finding Process The Subcommittee’s draft findings and recommendations were reviewed by the PITAC on November 19 2004 and the final report was approved at its January 12 2005 meeting viii CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION Table of Contents PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE v ABOUT PITAC AND THIS REPORT vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ix 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 Background 1 Summary of Findings and Recommendations 2 2 CYBER SECURITY A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE 5 Trusting Systems in a Dangerous World 5 The Information Technology Infrastructure Is ‘Critical’ 5 Ubiquitous Interconnectivity Widespread Vulnerability 7 Software Is a Major Vulnerability 9 Attacks and Vulnerabilities Are Growing Rapidly 9 Endless Patching Is Not the Answer 11 Fundamentally New Security Models Methods Needed 12 Central Role for Federal R D 13 Figure 1 Role of Federal R D in Creating IT Industry 16 A Note on Non-Technology Aspects of Cyber Security 18 3 FEDERAL CYBER SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CURRENT PRIORITIES FUTURE IMPACTS 19 Cyber Security R D in the Military and Intelligence Sectors 19 Federal Investments in Civilian Cyber Security R D 21 The Relationship Between Military Intelligence and Civilian Cyber Space 22 An Assessment of Current Federal Efforts 23 4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 A Crisis of Prioritization 25 Finding and Recommendation 1 Federal Funding for Fundamental Research in Civilian Cyber Security 25 ix PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Finding and Recommendation 2 Cyber Security Research Community 30 Finding and Recommendation 3 Technology Transfer Efforts 32 Finding and Recommendation 4 Coordination and Oversight of Federal Cyber Security R D 34 Cyber Security Research Priorities 37 1 Authentication Technologies 37 2 Secure Fundamental Protocols 38 3 Secure Software Engineering and Software Assurance 39 4 Holistic System Security 40 5 Monitoring and Detection 41 6 Mitigation and Recovery Methodologies 42 7 Cyber Forensics Catching Criminals and Deterring Criminal Activities 43 8 Modeling and Testbeds for New Technologies 44 9 Metrics Benchmarks and Best Practices 45 10 Non-Technology Issues That Can Compromise Cyber Security 46 APPENDIX A CHARGE TO PITAC 47 APPENDIX B CYBER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE FACT-FINDING PROCESS 49 APPENDIX C SELECTED MAJOR REPORTS ON CYBER SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 52 APPENDIX D ACRONYMS 55 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 58 x CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION 1 Executive Summary The information technology IT infrastructure of the United States which is now vital for communication commerce and control of our physical infrastructure is highly vulnerable to terrorist and criminal attacks The private sector has an important role in securing the Nation’s IT infrastructure by deploying sound security products and adopting good security practices But the Federal government also has a key role to play by supporting the discovery and development of cyber security technologies that underpin these products and practices The PITAC finds that the Federal government needs to fundamentally improve its approach to cyber security to fulfill its responsibilities in this regard Background The Nation’s IT infrastructure has undergone a dramatic transformation over the last decade Explosive growth in the use of networks to connect various IT systems has made it relatively easy to obtain information to communicate and to control these systems across great distances Because of the tremendous productivity gains and new capabilities enabled by these networked systems they have been incorporated into a vast number of civilian applications including education commerce science and engineering and entertainment They have also been incorporated into virtually every sector of the Nation’s critical infrastructure – including communications utilities finance transportation law enforcement and defense Indeed these sectors are now critically reliant on the underlying IT infrastructure At the same time this revolution in connectivity has also increased the potential of those who would do harm giving them the capability to do so from afar while armed with only a computer and the knowledge needed to identify and exploit vulnerabilities Today it is possible for a malicious agent to penetrate millions of computers around the world in a matter of minutes exploiting those machines to attack the Nation’s critical infrastructure penetrate sensitive systems or steal valuable data The growth in the number of attacks matches the tremendous growth in connectivity and dealing with these attacks now costs the Nation billions of dollars annually Moreover we are rapidly losing ground to those who do harm as is indicated by the steadily mounting numbers of compromised networks and resulting financial losses Beyond economic repercussions the risks to our Nation’s security are clear In addition to the potential for attacks on critical targets within our borders 1 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE our national defense systems are at risk as well because the military increasingly relies on ubiquitous communication and the networks that support it The Global Information Grid GIG which is projected to cost as much as $100 billion and is intended to improve military communications by linking weapons intelligence and military personnel to each other represents one such critical network Since military networks interconnect with those in the civilian sector or use similar hardware or software they are susceptible to any vulnerability in these other networks or technologies Thus cyber security in the civilian and military sectors is intrinsically linked Although the large costs associated with cyber insecurity have only recently become manifest the Nation’s cyber security problems have been building for many years and will plague us for many years to come They derive from a decades-long failure to develop the security protocols and practices needed to protect the Nation’s IT infrastructure and to adequately train and grow the numbers of experts needed to employ those mechanisms effectively The shortterm patches and fixes that are deployed today can be useful in response to isolated vulnerabilities but they do not adequately address the core problems Rather fundamental long-term research is required to develop entirely new approaches to cyber security It is imperative that we take action before the situation worsens and the cost of inaction becomes even greater Summary of Findings and Recommendations The PITAC’s recommendations on cyber security and the findings upon which those recommendations are based are summarized below Issue 1 Federal Funding Levels for Fundamental Research in Civilian Cyber Security Long-term fundamental research in cyber security requires a significant investment by the Federal government because market forces direct private sector investment away from research and toward the application of existing technologies to develop marketable products However Federal funding for cyber security research has shifted from long-term fundamental research toward shorter-term research and development and from civilian research toward military and intelligence applications Research in these domains is often classified and the results are thus unavailable for use in securing civilian IT infrastructure and commercial off-the-shelf COTS products in widespread use by both government and the civilian sector These changes have been particularly dramatic at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA and the National Security Agency NSA other agencies such as the National Science Foundation NSF and the Department of Homeland Security DHS have not stepped in to fill the gaps that have been 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY created As a result investment in fundamental research in civilian cyber security is decreasing at the time when it is most desperately needed The PITAC finds that the Federal R D budget provides inadequate funding for fundamental research in civilian cyber security and recommends that the NSF budget in this area be increased by $90 million annually Funding for fundamental research in civilian cyber security should also be substantially increased at other agencies most notably DHS and DARPA Funding should be allocated so that at least the ten specific areas listed in the “Cyber Security Research Priorities” section beginning on page 37 of Chapter 4 are appropriately addressed Further increases in funding may be necessary depending on the Nation’s future cyber security posture Issue 2 The Cyber Security Fundamental Research Community Improving the Nation’s cyber security posture requires highly trained people to develop deploy and incorporate new cyber security products and practices The number of such highly trained people in the U S is too small given the magnitude of the challenge At U S academic institutions today the PITAC estimates there are fewer than 250 active cyber security or cyber assurance specialists many of whom lack either formal training or extensive professional experience in the field In part this situation exists because cyber security has historically been the focus of a small segment of the computer science and engineering research community The situation has been exacerbated by the insufficient and unstable funding levels for long-term civilian cyber security research which universities depend upon to attract and retain faculty The PITAC finds that the Nation’s cyber security research community is too small to adequately support the cyber security research and education programs necessary to protect the United States The PITAC recommends that the Federal government intensify its efforts to promote recruitment and retention of cyber security researchers and students at research universities with a goal of at least doubling the size of the civilian cyber security fundamental research community by the end of the decade In particular the Federal government should increase and stabilize funding for fundamental research in civilian cyber security and should support programs that enable researchers to move into cyber security research from other fields Issue 3 Translating Research into Effective Cyber Security for the Nation Technology transfer enables the results of Federally supported R D to be incorporated into products that are available for general use There has been a long and successful history of Federally funded IT R D being transferred into 3 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE products and best practices that are widely adopted in the private sector in many cases spawning entirely new billion-dollar industries Technology transfer has been particularly challenging in the area of cyber security however because the value of a good cyber security product to the consumer lies in the reduced incidence of successful attacks – a factor difficult to quantify in the short term as a return on investment The PITAC finds that current cyber security technology transfer efforts are not adequate to successfully transition Federal research investments into civilian sector best practices and products As a result the PITAC recommends that the Federal government strengthen its cyber security technology transfer partnership with the private sector Specifically the Federal government should place greater emphasis on the development of metrics models datasets and testbeds so that new products and best practices can be evaluated jointly sponsor with the private sector an annual interagency conference at which new cyber security R D results are showcased fund technology transfer efforts in cooperation with industry by researchers who have developed promising ideas or technologies and encourage Federally supported graduate students and postdoctoral researchers to gain experience in industry as researchers interns or consultants Issue 4 Coordination and Oversight for Federal Cyber Security R D One of the key problems with the Federal government’s current approach to cyber security is that the government-wide coordination of cyber security R D is ineffective Research agendas and programs are not systematically coordinated across agencies and as a result misconceptions among agencies regarding each others’ programs and responsibilities have been allowed to develop causing important priorities to be overlooked In the absence of coordination individual agencies focus on their individual missions and can lose sight of overarching national needs Initiatives to strengthen and enlarge the cyber security research community and efforts to implement the results of R D would be more effective and efficient with significantly stronger coordination across the Federal government The PITAC finds that the overall Federal cyber security R D effort is currently unfocused and inefficient because of inadequate coordination and oversight To remedy this situation PITAC recommends that the Interagency Working Group on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection CIIP become the focal point for coordinating Federal cyber security R D efforts This working group should be strengthened and integrated under the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development NITRD Program 4 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION 2 Cyber Security A Problem of National Importance Trusting Systems in a Dangerous World The Nation’s information technology IT infrastructure still evolving from U S technological innovations such as the personal computer and the Internet today is a vast fabric of computers – from supercomputers to handheld devices – and interconnected networks enabling high-speed communications information access advanced computation transactions and automated processes relied upon in every sector of society Because much of this infrastructure connects one way or another to the Internet it embodies the Internet’s original structural attributes of openness inventiveness and the assumption of good will These signature attributes have made the U S IT infrastructure an irresistible target for vandals and criminals worldwide The PITAC believes that terrorists will inevitably follow suit taking advantage of vulnerabilities including some that the Nation has not yet clearly recognized or addressed The computers that manage critical U S facilities infrastructures and essential services can be targeted to set off systemwide failures and these computers frequently are accessible from virtually anywhere in the world via the Internet The Information Technology Infrastructure Is ‘Critical’ Most Americans see and use the components of the IT infrastructure – mainly desktop computers connected to the Internet – that enable e-mail instant messaging exchange and downloading of sound and images online shopping The IT infrastructure of the information searches interactive games and United States is highly even telephony Americans also work with the vulnerable to terrorist and information technologies that drive day-to-day operations in industry and government and criminal attacks are relied upon by organizations large and small for a range of functions including design manufacturing inventory sales payroll information storage and retrieval education and training and research and development In fact economists credit successful applications of information technologies throughout the economy for the spectacular gains in U S productivity over the last decade Less visible and certainly less well understood is the fact that these technologies – computers mass storage devices high-speed networks and 5 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE network components such as routers and switches systems and applications software embedded and wireless devices and the Internet itself – are now also essential to virtually all of the Nation’s critical infrastructures Computing systems control the management of power plants dams the North American power grid air traffic control systems food and energy distribution and the financial system to name only some The reliance of these sensitive physical installations and processes on the IT infrastructure makes that infrastructure itself critical and in the national interest to safeguard The electric power generation industry for example relies on a range of IT systems and capabilities As in other industries power companies implement business management systems for administrative and information services But the power industry uses much more information technology It relies on supervisory control and data acquisition SCADA systems to collect information about system operation help regulate and control power generation optimize power production respond to changing Computers networks and power demands and system network components are now parameters control distribution and coordinate among the various essential to virtually all of the Nation’s critical infrastructures generation and storage facilities within a power company system Increasingly SCADA systems are also used to integrate electric companies into regional or national power grids to optimize power production minimize production and distribution costs and provide backup services This requires a private network that often includes links to the Internet A cyber attack that disables key Internet nodes could disrupt the power network’s communications And if an entity within the private network is compromised an attacker could gain direct control of the SCADA systems and their data and operation Today the Internet also is used to manage essential services provided by business and government such as electronic financial transactions law enforcement dispatch and support emergency response and community alerts and military communications Banks for example rely on extensive distributed Internet and information services both for customer interaction and in interbank operations To assure reliability and security of its most sensitive systems the banking industry like the power industry uses private networks and is vulnerable to cyber attacks that cripple Internet nodes and or result in unauthorized access to data and services Such shared Internet links 6 CYBER SECURITY A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE for example enabled the “Slammer” worm to disable a major bank’s ATM system and an airline’s computer system even though they were not directly connected to the Internet During a national emergency it is imperative that the Nation’s communications infrastructure be available for emergency response coordination Today that vital infrastructure is vulnerable to a variety of denial of service attacks including the release of simple viruses and worms that can disrupt Internet communications as well as more sophisticated attacks in which modems from compromised servers are used to flood key parts of the telephone network such as 911 services The latter example demonstrates how a vulnerability in one system e g the Internet can be exploited to attack a totally separate system e g the telephone network These examples illustrate how computing and computer communications have become integral to virtually every domain of activity in the U S today Those systems are interconnected and interdependent in highly complex ways which are often surprisingly fragile Ubiquitous Interconnectivity Widespread Vulnerability The Internet – now a global network of networks linking more than 300 million computers worldwide – was designed in a spirit of trust Neither the protocols for network communication nor the software governing computing systems nodes connected to the network were architected to operate in an environment in which they are under attack Indeed the protocols used by the Internet Ubiquitous interconnectivity today are derived from the protocols that is the primary conduit for were developed in the 1960s for the Federal government’s experimental ARPANET Only exploiting vulnerabilities on a few researchers used ARPANET and they a widespread basis were trusted to do no harm The civilian networks such as NSFNET that developed from ARPANET into the Internet likewise did not incorporate security technologies at the system software or network protocol levels Ubiquitous interconnectedness – first exhibited by the Internet and further extended in local area networks wide area networks and wireless and hybrid networks – has generated whole new industries rejuvenated productivity in older ones and opened new avenues for discourse and education and an unprecedented era of collaborative science and engineering discovery 7 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE worldwide That is indeed good news The bad news is that ubiquitous interconnectivity provides the primary conduit for exploiting vulnerabilities on a widespread basis Despite efforts in recent years Acts of a hostile party to add security components to computing systems networks and software the acts of a hostile party can propagate far – whether a terrorist an adversary nation and wide organized crime or a mischievous hacker – can propagate far and wide with damaging effects on a national or international scale For example • In the past several years worms such as Code Red 1 which defaces World Wide Web sites and or launches distributed denial of service DDoS attacks 2 and Slammer which severely degraded the Bank of America’s ATM network in January 2003 have caused damage estimated in the billions of dollars • The Department of Defense responded to the Code Red worm by disconnecting its unclassified network NIPRnet from the Internet to protect it from infection This protective measure disabled the Army Corps of Engineers’ control of the locks on the Mississippi River since the NIPRnet was used to transmit commands to the locks through the Internet • By using a laptop computer and radio transmitter a former contractor for an overseas wastewater system was able to assume command of hundreds of control systems that manage sewage and drinking water Over a period of two months hundreds of thousands of gallons of putrid sludge were intentionally released from the wastewater system • Many businesses are now being attacked by cyber extortionists who demand payment in return for not attacking the businesses’ Web presence Seventeen percent of the 100 companies surveyed in a 2004 poll by Carnegie Mellon University-Information Week reported being the target of some form of cyber extortion –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 2 Most network worms spread by scanning the Internet identifying vulnerable systems and infecting those systems by installing themselves Also see “Impact of Malicious Code” – September 2004 at http www computereconomics com A denial of service attack floods a target with artificial requests for service thus rendering it unable to service legitimate ones A distributed denial of service DDoS attack distributes the source of the artificial requests among many computers thus greatly complicating the task of blocking a connection to eliminate a specific source of the artificial requests The computers involved in a DDoS attack are generally the unwitting agents of the real attacker 8 CYBER SECURITY A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE • Identity theft is a rapidly increasing problem for Internet users One of the simplest methods of stealing a user’s identity is known as “phishing ” a technique that uses fake e-mail messages and fraudulent Web sites to fool recipients into divulging personal financial data Consumers Union estimates that 1 percent of U S households fell victim to such attacks at a cost of $400 million in the first half of 2004 Software Is a Major Vulnerability Network connectivity provides “door-to-door” transportation for attackers but vulnerabilities in the software residing in computers substantially compound the cyber security problem As the PITAC noted in a 1999 report 3 the software development methods that have been the norm fail to provide the high-quality reliable and secure software that the IT infrastructure requires Software development is not yet a science or a rigorous discipline and the development process by and large is not controlled to minimize the vulnerabilities that attackers exploit Today as with cancer vulnerable software can be invaded and modified to cause damage to previously healthy software and infected software can replicate itself and be carried across networks to cause damage in other systems Like cancer these damaging processes may be invisible to the lay person even though experts recognize that their threat is growing And as in cancer both preventive actions and research are critical the former to minimize damage today and the latter to establish a foundation of knowledge and capabilities that will assist the cyber security professionals of tomorrow reduce risk and minimize damage for the long term Vulnerabilities in software that are introduced by mistake or poor practices are a serious problem today In the future the Nation may face an even more challenging problem as adversaries – both foreign and domestic – become increasingly sophisticated in their ability to insert malicious code into critical software Attacks and Vulnerabilities Are Growing Rapidly Today the threat clearly is growing Most indicators and studies of the frequency impact scope and cost of cyber security incidents – among both organizations and individuals – point to continuously increasing levels and varieties of attacks The data show that the total number of attacks – including –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 3 Information Technology Research Investing in Our Future President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee February 1999 9 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE viruses worms cyber fraud and insider attacks in corporations – is rising by over 20 percent annually with many types of attacks doubling in number For example according to Deloitte’s “2004 Global Security Survey ” 83 percent of financial service organizations Technology indicators and trends experienced compromised systems in 2003 more than double the within large organizations percentage in 2001 Moreover the clearly reflect rapid growth in the reported level of security incidents almost certainly understates the rate of cyber attacks actual level There are few incentives – but strong disincentives – for large organizations to report incidents in a public forum Targets of cyber attacks typically are concerned that widespread disclosure of their victimization could shake public confidence in their operations not to mention attract other attackers Technology-oriented indicators clearly reflect the rapid growth in the rate of cyber attacks For example ICSA Labs reports that the monthly percentage of personal computers infected by a virus has grown from 1 percent in 1996 to over 10 percent in 2003 From January to June of 2004 the rate at which new hosts were compromised and incorporated into “bot armies” rose from well under 2 000 a day to more than 30 000 a day according to the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 4 When compromised hosts are incorporated into bot armies they can be used as platforms for launching denial of service attacks against a given target or to distribute “spam” e-mail without the knowledge or consent of the owners or operators Trends within large organizations are also disturbing For example the percentage of organizations that experienced virus disasters defined as those with more than 25 simultaneous infections or with major impact from infection has grown nearly every year over the last decade with 92 percent of organizations reporting such incidents during 2003 Symantec reports that 40 percent of the networks controlled by the Fortune 100 companies were exploited to originate hostile worm traffic despite the fact that these companies have taken a variety of protective measures The cost downtime and days to recover from significant virus events have also trended upward for each of the past nine years according to ICSA Labs data Meanwhile the number of identified system and network vulnerabilities has also risen The Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 4 http enterprisesecurity symantec com content cfm articleid 1539 10 CYBER SECURITY A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE Center CERT CC at Carnegie Mellon University reports that 3 780 new electronic vulnerabilities were published in 2004 more than a 20-fold increase from 1995 Once published most of the details of vulnerabilities are available for miscreants to begin attacking or developing attack tools and techniques thus forcing users and organizations to scramble to assure that their defenses are adequate The Symantec security threat report notes that in the first half of 2004 for example the average time between the public disclosure of a vulnerability and the release of an associated exploit was 5 8 days substantially reduced from the months estimated in prior years In fact many IT system designs continue to incorporate characteristics that make these systems vulnerable to attack In some instances system designs may be pushing the state of the art so their vulnerabilities may not be understood until they are deployed In other instances vulnerabilities may be designed into systems because the developers lack technical knowledge or fail to execute best practices In this brief report PITAC can point to only a few examples to provide the reader with a sense of the vulnerabilities of IT systems But it is clear that that without action IT vulnerabilities will become more severe as computers cell phones and embedded systems proliferate globally and as expanding “always-on” high-speed or broadband connections enable attacks to propagate more rapidly and with more force than the occasionally connected low-bandwidth modems that were the norm until recently Endless Patching Is Not the Answer A broad consensus among computer scientists is emerging that the approach of patching and retrofitting networks computing systems and software to “add” security and reliability may be necessary in the short run but is inadequate for addressing the Nation’s cyber security needs As computer security expert and PITAC member Eugene Spafford testified before the House Science Committee Security cannot be easily or adequately added on after the fact and this greatly complicates our overall mission The software and hardware being deployed today have been designed by individuals with little or no security training using unsafe methods and then poorly tested This is being added to the fault-ridden infrastructure already in place and operated by personnel with insufficient awareness of the risks Therefore 11 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE none of us should be surprised if we continue to see a rise in break-ins defacements and viruses in the years to come 5 Granted our IT infrastructure may be less secure right now than it could be if all known security best practices were applied everywhere But Professor Spafford’s comment suggests that even if all best practices were fully in place in the absence of any fundamental new approaches we would still endlessly be patching and “plugging holes in the dike ” Fundamentally New Security Models Methods Needed We urgently need to expand our focus on short-term patching to also include longer-term development of new methods for designing and engineering secure systems Addressing cyber security for the longer term requires a vigorous ongoing program of fundamental research to explore the science and develop the technologies necessary to design security into computing and networking systems and software from the ground up Fundamental research is characterized by its potential for broad rather than specific application and includes farsighted high-payoff research that provides the basis for technological progress 6 The vast majority of cyber security research conducted to date has been based on the concept of perimeter defense In this model what is “inside” an information system or network is protected from an “outside” attacker who tries to penetrate it to The weakness of the gain access to or control its data and system perimeter defense resources However once the perimeter is strategy has become breached whether by virtue of a technical painfully clear weakness such as a software vulnerability or an operational weakness such as an employee being bribed or tricked to reveal a password the attacker has entirely free rein and can compromise every system connected in a network with not much more effort than is required to compromise only one This weakness of the perimeter defense strategy has become painfully clear But it is not the only problem with the model The distinction between “outside” and “inside” breaks down amid the proliferation of wireless and –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 5 http www house gov science hearings full oct10 spafford htm 6 Adapted from National Research Council Assessment of Department of Defense Basic Research National Academies Press 2005 12 CYBER SECURITY A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE embedded technologies connected to networks and the increasing complexity of networked “systems of systems ” One element of a more realistic model for cyber security may be a principle of mutual suspicion Every component of a system or network is always suspicious of every other component and access to data and other resources must be constantly reauthorized More generally cyber security would be an integral part of the design process for any large complex system or network Security add-ons will always be necessary to fix some security problems but ultimately there is no substitute for systemwide end-to-end security that is minimally intrusive Central Role for Federal R D “The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” states that the private sector has the most important role to play in cyber security The PITAC agrees with this conclusion as it pertains to relatively short-term Federally sponsored efforts to improve the security of today’s systems and networks But the Federal government has a fundamental research vital irreplaceable role to play as well As at earlier is a unique national stages of the digital revolution Federal investment investment in the in fundamental research is required to fill the production of new pipeline with new concepts technologies infrastructure prototypes and trained personnel knowledge that can needed for the private sector to accomplish its cyber be used across all security mission The Government can also promote sectors of society for technology transfer mechanisms that accelerate adoption of these new technologies by industry in the common good part by supporting the development of performance metrics models datasets and testbeds so that new products and best practices can be evaluated Federally sponsored fundamental research is a unique national investment in the production of new knowledge that can be broadly used across all sectors of society for the common good Such research takes place primarily in universities and national laboratories As for-profit entities companies typically focus on short-term results or proprietary research that can provide 13 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE near-term competitive advantage It is the mission of research universities to take the long-term view of a problem Unclassified research performed in universities and national laboratories has the added benefit of creating trained talent in the field as university graduates obtain employment in industry universities and government University graduates who pursue advanced degrees in IT become the new generation of research leaders other graduates frequently become involved in start-up companies which have historically played critical roles in the IT industry Research at universities also accelerates changes in the education of new college graduates as researchers rapidly move new ideas into undergraduate courses and textbooks Fundamental research focuses on problems of extraordinary difficulty and complexity that often require a number of years to solve As Figure 1 on pages 16 and 17 demonstrates the Federal government has long played a central role in supporting fundamental research in information technology The results of this research lie at the heart of many of today’s billion-dollar information technology industries – industries that are transforming our lives driving our economy and enhancing our security Fundamental research is a “public good” – hence the role of the Federal government in supporting it The result of a highly effective interplay of Federally supported fundamental research industry-supported applied research and industry product development The United States today is the world leader in information technology An expanded portfolio of Federal cyber security R D efforts is required because today we simply do not know how to model design and build systems incorporating integral security attributes such as mutual suspicion – An expanded portfolio of or any other fundamental security Federal cyber security R D innovations In addition we face substantial new challenges from the efforts is required because today we simply do not know constant stream of emerging technologies For example we do not how to model design and fully understand the security ramifications of networks of embedded build systems incorporating devices In that context a principle of integral security attributes mutual suspicion would have to consider controlled access to the subnetworks the information stores the devices that are interconnected and the computing and communication resources of a given network In our 14 CYBER SECURITY A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE current methods of software development security is simply one more incremental requirement further burdening an already cumbersome slow and expensive process The add-on approach will not address our fundamental need for far-sighted advances in systems and software technologies that provide innovative new approaches to the problem of security In the findings and recommendations in Chapter 4 of this report we urge a rethinking of the Federal investment balance between military intelligence and civilian cyber security R D In part this is because the military and intelligence communities rely on the commercial Internet and commercial providers of computing systems and software for the bulk of their own operations 7 It is only through fundamental research in civilian cyber security that we can hope to address the strategic and pervasive vulnerabilities of our national IT infrastructure We also underscore the importance of technology transfer because new concepts do not appear in products automatically For this to happen IT vendors must build into their products and services new security functionalities But vendors respond to what users demand and it is only recently that most users – In the findings and corporations government agencies and individual recommendations of users – have begun to care about cyber security In the absence of significant demand for cyber this report we urge a security IT vendors have mostly chosen to add new rethinking of the features for which customers are willing to pay Federal investment Ironically the addition of new features and added balance between complexity often leads to the introduction of more security vulnerabilities This market-driven bias military intelligence away from cyber security is the “valley of death” and civilian cyber for cyber security noted by many analysts R D security R D may provide the knowledge and the proof of operational feasibility but in the absence of customer demand for the security that may be provided vendors have little incentive to include new security technologies in their products –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 7 Two examples from Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate this reality 1 more than 80 percent of the bandwidth used by the U S military was supplied by commercial providers and 2 a large fraction of the IT systems deployed were shipped directly from commercial vendors “U S Weaponization of Space Implications for International Security ” Theresa Hitchens September 29 2003 http www cdi org friendlyversion printversion cfm documentID 1745 15 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Historic Role of Federally Supported Fundamental R D 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Timesharing CTSS Multics BSD Unix SDS 940 360 67 VMS Client server computing Berkeley CMU CERN PARC DEC IBM Novell EMC Sun Oracle Graphics Sketchpad Utah GM IBM Xerox Microsoft E S SGI ATI Adobe Entertainment Spacewar MIT Trek Rochester Atari Nintendo SGI Pixar Internet ARPANET Aloha Internet Pup DECnet TCP IP LANs Rings Hubnet Ethernet Datakit Autonet LANs switched Ethernet Workstations Lisp machine Stanford Xerox Alto Xerox Star Apollo Sun Graphical user interfaces Engelbart Rochester Alto Smalltalk Star Mac Microsoft VLSI design Berkeley Caltech MOSIS many RISC processors Berkeley Stanford IBM 801 SUN SGI IBM HP to World Wide Web 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 University Industry R D The topics are ordered roughly by increasing date of $1 B industry 1995 2000 Products $1 B market Figure 1 The role played by Federally sponsored fundamental research in information technology in creating billion-dollar segments of the IT industry Reprinted with permission from Innovation in Information Technology c 2003 by the National Academy of Sciences courtesy of the National Academies Press Washington D C 16 CYBER SECURITY A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE in Creating Billion-Dollar Segments of the IT Industry 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 from Internet Relational databases Berkeley Wisconsin IBM Oracle IBM Sybase Parallel databases Tokyo Wisconsin UCLA IBM ICL ICL Teradata Tandem Data mining Wisconsin Stanford IBM Arbor IRI Arbor Plato Parallel computing Illiac 4 CMU Caltech HPC IBM Intel CM-5 Teradata Cray T3D RAID disk servers Berkeley Striping Datamesh Petal many Portable communication Berkeley Purdue CDMA Linkabit Hughes Qualcomm World Wide Web CERN Illinois Mosaic Alta Vista Netscape Yahoo Google Speech recognition CMU SRI MIT Bell IBM Dragon Dragon IBM Broadbandl in last mile Stanford UCLA Bellcore Telcordia Amati Alcatel Broadcom 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 University Industry R D The topics are ordered roughly by increasing date of $1 B industry 17 1995 2000 Products $1 B market PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE A Note on Non-Technology Aspects of Cyber Security PITAC recognizes that the development of technologies to counteract vulnerabilities or – better yet – designs that avoid vulnerabilities in the first place constitute only one component although arguably the most important component of effective cyber security We briefly point here to several facets of cyber security that require societal attention but are not addressed in this report Domestic and international law enforcement A hostile party using an Internet-connected computer thousands of miles away can attack an Internetconnected computer in the United States as easily as if he or she were next door It is often difficult to identify the perpetrator of such an attack and even when a perpetrator is identified criminal prosecution across national boundaries is problematic Education We need to educate citizens that if they are going to use the Internet they need to continually maintain and update the security on their systems so that they cannot be compromised for example to become agents in a DDoS attack or for “spam” distribution We also need to educate corporations and organizations in best practices for effective security management For example some large organizations now have a policy that all systems in their purview must meet strict security guidelines Automated updates are sent to all computers and servers on the internal network and no new system is allowed online until it conforms to the security policy Information security Information security refers to measures taken to protect or preserve information on a network as well as the network itself Thus it also involves physical security personnel security criminal law and investigation economics and other issues These factors need to be included in the curriculum for cyber security practitioners and supporting law and technologies need to be made available Sociological issues There are several areas relating to cyber security in which there may be conflicting interests and needs and such tensions will need to be addressed as part on any comprehensive approach to cyber security For example as part of the effort to prevent attacks or to track down cyber criminals it may be necessary to know the origin of data packets on the Internet but such knowledge may be perceived by some to conflict with an individual’s right to privacy or anonymity To cite another example what some nations or individuals may perceive as a necessary filtering of data may be perceived by others as unwanted censorship Such issues involve ethics law and societal concerns as much as they do technology and these nontechnology issues make the cyber security problem even more challenging 18 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION 3 Federal Cyber Security Research and Development Current Priorities Future Impacts To assess how well the Federal government is fulfilling its important role in providing support for cyber security R D the PITAC examined the current Federal cyber security R D portfolio As expected Federal support for cyber security R D is provided by the military the intelligence community and the civilian research sector The Committee’s analysis of agency investments found that the Federal government’s historical focus on fundamental unclassified R D has changed in ways that place our long-term physical and economic security at risk Cyber Security R D in the Military and Intelligence Sectors Recognition of the potential benefits of communication between geographically distributed computing systems led the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA 8 to develop the ARPANET the forerunner of today’s Internet Today the military’s vision of ubiquitous connectivity has been dramatically realized The Armed Forces now critically depend on the networked IT systems that have amplified battlefield effectiveness and permanently transformed military strategy However the architecture of these networks and systems was defined in a different environment – an environment of trust Today ill-intended individuals organizations and governments can become armed with the knowledge and tools needed to compromise IT networks As a result the security of these networks of systems has become of paramount importance to the military The R D budgets of the defense agencies reflect this urgency The most sizable investment within the Department of Defense’s cyber security programs is found at DARPA though the research agencies of the Armed Forces have smaller but valuable cyber security programs as well The Department of Defense’s Office of the Director Defense Research and Engineering provides coordination and oversight in addition to supporting some cyber security research activities directly DARPA historically used a large portion of its budget to fund unclassified long-term fundamental research – in general activities with a time horizon –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 8 At the time it was called the Advanced Research Projects Agency 19 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE that exceeds five years This provided DARPA with access to talented researchers in the Nation’s finest research institutions and helped cultivate a community of scholars and professionals who developed the field The Committee’s analysis of By FY 2004 however very little if agency investments found any of DARPA’s substantial cyber that the Federal government’s security R D investment9 was directed towards fundamental research historical focus on Instead DARPA now depends on fundamental unclassified NSF-supported researchers for the R D has changed in ways fundamental advances needed to that place our long-term develop new cyber security technologies to benefit the military physical and economic Additionally the emergence of cyber security at risk warfare as a tool of the warfighter has led DARPA to classify more of its programs The combined result is an overall shift in DARPA’s portfolio towards classified and short-term research and development and away from its traditional support of unclassified longer-term R D Major support for cyber security research and development programs within the intelligence agencies is provided by the National Security Agency NSA and the Advanced Research and Development Activity ARDA NSA cyber security research – what the agency terms information assurance – is supported by its Information Assurance Research Group R2 NSA allocates approximately $50 million to this work with roughly 20 percent directed to fundamental research Academic research accounts for only about six percent $3 million a level much reduced from prior years While the majority of this research is unclassified it is largely short-term Created by the intelligence community ARDA supports the development of technologies to improve this community’s information systems and networks ARDA’s cyber security research amounts to about $17 million one third of which supports academic research and is mostly unclassified However ARDA typically classifies the results of this research once it is mature enough to incorporate into tools for the intelligence community The Department of Energy also invests in cyber security R D with virtually all of its work directed towards short-term and or military and –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 9 The data supplied to the PITAC by the Federal government indicate that the FY 2004 DARPA investment in cyber security is between $40 million and $150 million 20 FEDERAL CYBER SECURITY R D intelligence applications This work is conducted principally at its national laboratories Federal Investments in Civilian Cyber Security R D Agencies supporting R D that is not focused on military or intelligence applications – “civilian” research in this report – play a key role in the evolution of the Nation’s IT infrastructure including cyber security These agencies include the National Science Foundation NSF the Department of Homeland Security DHS the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST and the Department of Justice DOJ NSF has the only substantial Federal civilian cyber security research program an activity it has supported for many years The majority of the work is undertaken at academic institutions and all of it is unclassified Much of the research is considered fundamental but the PITAC has noted a subtle change toward shorter-term activities In FY 2004 the agency’s funding for cyber security programmatic activities totaled $76 million of which support for research projects was approximately $58 million The cornerstone of NSF’s cyber security research activities is its Cyber Trust program established in FY 2004 the program supports both individual cyber security researchers and research centers at academic institutions DHS plays a dual role including both operational responsibilities – such as securing the Nation’s borders property economy and critical infrastructure – and R D activities R D efforts are aimed at countering threats to the homeland by making evolutionary improvements to current capabilities and by developing revolutionary new capabilities The varied and complex mission of the agency’s NSF has the only Science and Technology Directorate where its substantial Federal Cyber Security R D program resides includes program in civilian responsibility for developing technologies to combat weapons of mass destruction such as cyber security research radiological nuclear chemical and biological threats Most of DHS’s approximately $1-billion science and technology budget is directed towards research development and demonstration projects in technologies to counter these threats The Cyber Security R D program was funded at only $18 million in FY 2004 DHS’s cyber security R D activities are largely unclassified and short-term only about $1 5 million is 21 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE dedicated to long-term research and some work is funded in partnership with NSF NIST’s mission involves the development of measurements and standards – activities that play a key role in facilitating technology transfer – and its role in cyber security is focused on this type of work NIST’s FY 2004 budget for cyber security was $9 7 million In the recently approved FY 2005 budget cyber security funding for NIST’s Computer Security Division was increased by $10 million NIST also receives some funding from Federal agencies such as DHS and has partnered with others such as NSA The Institute has historically collaborated closely with industry and has been increasing its involvement with academia NIST’s cyber security research program is primarily short-term in focus The DOJ’s National Institute of Justice NIJ has a $7-million budget aimed at fighting electronic crime The Relationship Between Military Intelligence and Civilian Cyber Space Historically the military and intelligence communities have derived enormous benefit from research funds invested in the civilian sector primarily via strong support of long-term academic research by DARPA and NSA However the shift within both agencies towards support for short-term classified research and the concomitant reduction in support for the civilian research community is leading to the erosion of that community’s strength The military and intelligence Because many of the ideas solutions communities have derived and talent in cyber security have traditionally come from the civilian enormous benefit from research community both the civilian research funds invested in and military sectors stand to lose from the civilian sector this new trend – an issue that the military and intelligence agencies themselves recognize However those agencies do not appear inclined to shift away from their current more short-term mission-focused approach and while the gap in support for the civilian cyber security R D community could in theory be filled by other agencies to date it has not The Department of Defense’s Global Information Grid GIG one of the most ambitious IT projects ever undertaken by the Federal government illustrates the negative impacts of reduced R D in civilian cyber security To 22 FEDERAL CYBER SECURITY R D improve U S military communications the Pentagon plans to deploy the GIG a multilayered network to link weapons intelligence and military personnel for “network-enhanced” warfare While the cost of developing and deploying the GIG is not a matter of public record a recent GAO report estimates that it will cost at least $21 billion through 2010 with significant additional expenditures beyond that date 10 The Defense Department intends the most sensitive portions of the GIG to be self-contained reducing the military’s potential exposure to the insecurities associated with the public IT infrastructure However some less sensitive portions of the GIG are expected to connect to the Internet at least part of the time Vulnerabilities are introduced whenever highly sensitive defense networks and The Committee’s civilian networks intersect giving both examination revealed communities a significant stake in cooperating to pronounced shifts in improve the security of the civilian IT infrastructure Also economic realities dictate that favor of classifying today’s military networks and tomorrow’s GIG use military intelligence civilian commercial hardware and software cyber security R D and exposing those networks to the security vulnerabilities of such products Thus the success in favor of short-term of the GIG as a secure IT infrastructure of the research future – and the near-term success of today’s military networks – depends in part on improvements in the security of the civilian IT infrastructure Yet because the civilian R D community has access only to the results of unclassified research reduced support for this community will have a harmful impact on its ability to generate the fundamental discoveries upon which future generations of security products and practices will be based An Assessment of Current Federal Efforts The Committee’s examination of the Federal cyber security R D portfolio has revealed two disturbing trends 1 a pronounced shift in favor of classifying military and intelligence R D rendering it unavailable to the civilian sector and 2 an equally pronounced shift in both the military intelligence and civilian sectors favoring short-term research over long-term fundamental research These trends should concern policymakers because they threaten to constrict the pipeline of fundamental cyber security research that as outlined in the previous chapter is vital to securing the Nation’s IT infrastructure –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 10 http www gao gov new items d04858 pdf 23 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE If research in the civilian sector is allowed to stagnate – the likely scenario if current trends are allowed to continue – the security of the IT infrastructure upon which our Nation depends will These trends should concern erode further Because any interconnected system is open to attack policymakers because they via its weakest link even the Nation’s threaten to constrict the military systems which are expected to continue to be linked to civilian systems pipeline of fundamental will continue to be vulnerable Yet of the research that is vital to agencies providing major support for securing the Nation’s IT cyber security R D only NSF NIST and to some extent DHS operate infrastructure primarily in the civilian sector Of these only NSF provides significant support for fundamental research in civilian cyber security Just as alarming is the increased emphasis in all agencies on funding shortterm R D to address immediate mission requirements The Committee’s analysis shows that funding for long-term fundamental research – a necessary precursor to developing leading edge solutions to more complex problems – has significantly fallen behind In total the Federal investment in fundamental research in civilian cyber security is a small fraction11 of the overall Federal investment in cyber security R D The PITAC believes that the Federal budget for fundamental research in civilian cyber security must be dramatically increased or the Nation’s security and technological edge will be seriously jeopardized The next chapter provides PITAC’s recommendations for addressing this and related issues –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 11 After substantial and lengthy efforts to determine specific budget numbers the PITAC estimates that this fraction is between 10 percent and 25 percent 24 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION 4 Findings and Recommendations A Crisis of Prioritization The information technology IT infrastructure of the United States which is now vital for communication commerce and control of our physical infrastructure is highly vulnerable to terrorist and criminal attacks The private The PITAC finds that the sector has an important role in securing Federal government needs to the Nation’s IT infrastructure by deploying sound security products and fundamentally improve its adopting good security practices But the approach to cyber security Federal government also has a key role to play by supporting the discovery and development of cyber security technologies that underpin these products and practices The PITAC finds that the Federal government needs to fundamentally improve its approach to cyber security to fulfill its responsibilities in this regard Finding 1 The Federal R D budget provides inadequate funding for fundamental research in civilian cyber security Recommendation 1 The NSF budget for fundamental research in civilian cyber security should be increased by $90 million annually Funding for fundamental research in civilian cyber security should also be substantially increased at other agencies most notably DHS and DARPA Funding should be allocated so that at least the ten specific areas listed in the “Cyber Security Research Priorities” section of this chapter are appropriately addressed Further increases in funding may be necessary depending on the Nation’s future cyber security posture Discussion The Snare of Short-term Fixes Most private-sector cyber security funding today addresses immediate needs such as augmenting existing defenses and installing patches in poorly designed or defective systems Such needs have a legitimate and important claim on budget resources However addressing these needs is akin to plugging holes in a dike 25 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Federal cyber security R D also has a short-term focus As discussed in Chapter 3 many agencies expect to benefit within several years from their recent cyber security R D investments Insufficient long-term cyber security fundamental research today means that we will not be prepared for tomorrow’s vulnerabilities and that we are not designing intrinsically more secure systems for the future The October 2001 Congressional testimony of Wm A Wulf President of the National Academy of Engineering and a computer systems researcher is as true today as it was then We have virtually no research base on which to build truly secure systems When funds are scarce researchers become very conservative and bold challenges to the conventional wisdom are not likely to pass peer review As a result incrementalism has become the norm 12 Today’s urgent problems require that we continue to address immediate needs and conduct short-term research However significant progress in cyber security cannot be achieved as long as the focus is only reactive Longer-range fundamental research in cyber security needs to be substantially strengthened to make future cyber security efforts proactive instead The Importance of Civilian Cyber Security Research “Civilian” cyber security R D refers to unclassified R D associated with computing systems networks and software used by civilian Federal agencies universities corporations and the population at large One beneficiary of the results of research in civilian cyber security is the vast IT marketplace which includes the commercial Internet and networks connected to it as well as most private computing systems Less well known is the key role civilian research plays in homeland and national security fundamental research in civilian cyber security lays the foundation upon which their systems are built This includes for example the systems networks and software that control key infrastructure for utilities that support the transportation and financial sectors and that underlie military networks Thus unclassified research in civilian cyber security plays an important and fundamental role across the Nation’s entire cyber security portfolio Civilian research is distinct from research targeted to military and intelligence applications which is often classified Classified research is usually undertaken when its public disclosure could damage national security such as by disclosing U S intelligence about adversary capabilities or revealing our –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 12 http www house gov science hearings full oct10 wulf htm 26 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS military’s information warfare capabilities Thus there are good reasons to pursue classified research but there are also disadvantages if it is done at the expense of unclassified research For example the results of classified research often cannot be used commercially because to do so would subject their inner workings Classified cyber security to public scrutiny Therefore classified research largely cannot be cyber security research largely cannot be applied to the civilian cyber applied to the general-purpose cyber security marketplace and it cannot have a security marketplace direct impact on the commercial Internet and its underlying technologies or on the IT infrastructure broadly which together underpin much of the Nation’s critical infrastructure By contrast unclassified research in civilian cyber security often benefits classified systems because rarely is a fundamental security problem faced only in the classified world Moreover funding for classified cyber security research is not as effective as funding for unclassified research in increasing the number of professionals who are knowledgeable in cyber security a critical problem identified in Finding 2 page 30 of this report Finally public policy review and oversight of classified research are difficult at best which means that research dollars may not be as effectively spent as with unclassified research Research Directions As suggested by Dr Wulf’s testimony today there are many fundamental questions about cyber security that cannot be answered satisfactorily • How can we build complex software-intensive systems that are secure and reliable when first deployed • How can we build large distributed systems that can continue to operate reliably during hostile or natural disturbances • How can we verify that software obtained from a third party correctly implements stated functionality and only that functionality • How can we guarantee the privacy of an individual’s identity information or lawful transactions when stored in distributed systems or transmitted over networks • How can we build systems that authenticate the identities of large numbers of users in many organizations and locations 27 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE • How can we easily determine the origin of a message transmitted over the Internet • How can we automatically determine whether a message transmitted over the Internet is malicious or benign The Committee analyzed more than 30 reports on cyber security R D see Appendix C to identify 10 priority areas for funding see “Cyber Security Research Priorities ” beginning on page 37 These areas are of paramount importance Without significant advances in research in these areas the Nation will not be able to secure its IT infrastructure Some may view this list as overly broad in terms of setting funding priorities while others will find omissions they consider critical The Committee believes the list strikes a balance between these viewpoints Cyber security is a complex and multifaceted problem There is no silver bullet Federal Cyber Security R D Funding Programs The National Science Foundation NSF with its key role in supporting fundamental research across the entire scientific and engineering enterprise is the primary funding agency for fundamental research in civilian cyber security The Committee believes that the cyber security research investments of NSF’s Computer and Information Science and Cyber security is a complex Engineering CISE Directorate and its Cyber Trust program in particular which and multifaceted problem account for most of the Federal funding There is no silver bullet for fundamental research in civilian cyber security are seriously under-funded relative to the need for cyber security research for the Nation In FY 2004 the Cyber Trust program received 390 research proposals and made 32 awards totaling $31 million This success rate of 8 percent of the proposals and 6 percent of requested funds is a factor of three lower than the NSF-wide numbers In scientific peer review at least 25 percent of the proposals were judged worthy of support Further the majority of the proposals supported were funded at levels significantly below those requested The Cyber Trust program’s experience suggests that a quadrupling of its budget could be employed on high-quality research that would lay the foundation for critical improvements in the Nation’s cyber security In dollar 28 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS terms this increase would add approximately $90 million in new funding to the NSF budget for fundamental research in civilian cyber security The PITAC estimates between 10 percent and 25 percent of FY 2004 Federal support for cyber security R D was devoted to fundamental research in civilian cyber security Given the central role that civilian cyber Funding for civilian research security plays across the Nation’s should be increased so that it is a entire critical infrastructure the much larger fraction of the overall Committee believes that the funding for civilian research should cyber security research budget be increased so that it is a much larger fraction of the overall cyber security research budget While NSF should continue to be the major funding agency for civilian cyber security research the Committee suggests that NSF should not be the entire focus of increased investment in fundamental research in civilian cyber security Different agencies provide different motivations for fundamental research thus increasing the opportunities to apply the research to their missions and more generally The Committee believes that both DARPA and DHS should increase their support of fundamental research in civilian cyber security Increased support would benefit each agency as DARPA has experienced in the past as well as the Nation as a whole PITAC recommends that the increase in the NSF CISE budget for civilian cyber security fundamental research not be funded at the expense of other parts of the CISE Directorate The proposal success rate for CISE is 16 percent 14 percent for research grants which is already only two-thirds of the NSF-wide average Significant shifts of funding within CISE towards cyber security would exacerbate the strain on these other programs without addressing the existing disparity between CISE and other directorates Moreover much work in “other” CISE areas is beneficial to cyber security and thus reductions in those other areas would be counterproductive 13 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 13 Some examples Theoretical computer science underpins much encryption research both in identifying weaknesses and in advancing the state of the art Algorithms research helps ensure that protocols designed for security can be efficiently implemented Programming language research can help address security at a higher level of abstraction and can add functionalities such as security assurances to software Software engineering can help eliminate software bugs that are often exploited as security holes And new computer architectures might enforce protection faster and at finer granularity 29 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Finally Federal program managers must not be penalized for some level of “failures ” Fundamental research is conducted with long time horizons and moderate to high risk for payoff If the incentive structures within Federal grant-making agencies encourage failure avoidance then research that favors incremental work – grants that are likely to yield definite projected results – will become the norm However many expert evaluations of cyber security research challenges make the case that incremental work is unlikely to lead to solutions for some of the most difficult problems 14 Finding 2 The Nation’s cyber security research community is too small to adequately support the cyber security research and education programs necessary to protect the United States Recommendation 2 The Federal government should intensify its efforts to promote recruitment and retention of cyber security researchers and students at research universities with a goal of at least doubling the size of the civilian cyber security fundamental research community by the end of the decade In particular the Federal government should increase and stabilize the funding for fundamental research in civilian cyber security and should support programs that enable researchers to move into cyber security research from other fields Discussion Cyber security has been the focus of a small segment of the computer science and engineering research community In the testimony cited above Dr Wulf noted that the Nation has “only a tiny cadre of academic long-term basic researchers who are thinking deeply about problems in cyber security ” The Committee concurs with this assessment and estimates that U S academic institutions employ fewer than 250 active cyber security or cyber assurance specialists many of whom lack either formal training or extensive professional experience in the field –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 14 For example see the Computing Research Association’s Information Security Grand Challenges at http www cra org grand challenges 30 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Consequences of the existing community’s The Federal small size include limitations on the amount of government should research that can be undertaken over all and on the intensify its efforts to number of research topics that can be investigated effectively because productive work in a topic promote recruitment commonly requires a critical mass of researchers and retention of cyber The supporting infrastructure for research – such security researchers as technical conferences and journals – is also less and students at developed for such small research communities Finally the community’s small size prevents it from research universities preparing larger numbers of bachelor’s and master’s candidates to work in the profession This disconnect exists even as demand for cyber security practitioners in the United States grows Recommendations 1 and 2 go hand-in-hand To strengthen and enlarge the cyber security fundamental research community the Federal government should • Increase Federal funding for cyber security fundamental research Substantially increasing funding levels as in Recommendation 1 is essential to building a larger cyber security fundamental research community • Provide stable Federal funding for cyber security fundamental research Stable funding levels – an issue separate from the absolute levels of funding – are critical for achieving growth in a field because those who are interested in entering the field know that they can have a viable future in that field • Support programs that enable researchers to move into cyber security research from other fields Researchers attempting to change fields need funding to pursue new lines of work but face hurdles because they have no track record in the new field Sabbaticals and similar programs would enable prospective cyber security researchers to gain knowledge and experience thereby enabling them to contribute to the field more quickly • Emphasize unclassified cyber security research The vast majority of the Nation’s academic researchers do not hold the security clearances needed to undertake 31 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE classified work Further many research universities regard classified research as incompatible with their role as producers of knowledge benefiting society as a whole 15 The trend towards increased classification of cyber security research has had a negative impact on developing the community of cyber security fundamental researchers in universities and should be reversed Nurturing a larger more robust cyber security fundamental research community will help ensure that revolutionary new ideas – as opposed to incremental advances – are generated The Committee believes that doubling the size of the cyber security fundamental research community by the end of the decade is possible and would help advance the Nation’s cyber security efforts Finding 3 Current cyber security technology transfer efforts are not adequate to successfully transition Federal research investments into civilian sector best practices and products Recommendation 3 The Federal government should strengthen its cyber security technology transfer partnership with the private sector Specifically the Federal government should place greater emphasis on the development of metrics models datasets and testbeds so that new products and best practices can be evaluated jointly sponsor with the private sector an annual interagency conference at which new cyber security R D results are showcased fund technology transfer efforts in cooperation with industry by researchers who have developed promising ideas or technologies and encourage Federally supported graduate students and postdoctoral researchers to gain experience in industry as researchers interns or consultants Discussion Technology transfer enables the results of Federally supported R D to be incorporated into products that are available for general use There has been a long and successful history of Federally funded IT R D being transferred into products and best practices that are widely adopted in the private sector Figure 1 see pages 16-17 highlights 19 examples of Federally sponsored fundamental research in IT that led to the creation of new billion-dollar –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 15 Similar problems arise when the Federal government places restrictions on the work that foreign graduate students can perform or the courses they can take because graduate students are an essential element of university research programs 32 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS industries This demonstrates the synergy that is possible when academia industry and government work together The diffusion of Federally supported IT R D into products and practices benefits both consumers and developers • Consumers have benefited from faster hardware faster networks better software that is easier to use and more frequent time- and labor-saving upgrades • IT research often results in new ideas and prototypes16 that can rapidly be developed into new or improved commercial products The developers of such innovations are free to carry their innovative ideas into the marketplace benefiting all consumers Unlike other IT products cyber security’s benefits are measured by the absence of problems in IT systems Because the market for these benefits has historically been small interest is limited among both start-ups and large companies The Committee believes that given the value and difficulty of technology transfer the Federal government should support programs to transform existing and future cyber security research results into commercial products or operational best practices Specifically the Federal government should Unlike other IT products cyber security’s benefits are measured by the absence of system problems • Strengthen the development of metrics models datasets and testbeds so that new products and best practices can be evaluated • Jointly sponsor with the private sector an annual interagency conference at which new cyber security R D results especially those conducted or sponsored by the Federal government are showcased 17 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 16 See Academic Careers for Experimental Computer Scientists and Engineers Computer Science 17 and Telecommunications Board National Research Council 1994 Prior to 2001 the annual National Information Systems Security Conference jointly sponsored by NIST and NSA performed these functions It was the one event that most security professionals attended The conference featured invited speakers presentation of the National Information Systems Security Award generally considered the top award in the field and the Vendor and Program awards and a large vendor exhibition to showcase current technologies 33 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE • Require grant proposals to describe the potential practical utility of their research results and have the coordinating body identified in Recommendation 4 collect and publish these descriptions While fundamental research is usually undertaken without any direct transition path envisioned cyber security research is often undertaken in the context of recognized problems and documenting logical connections with real world problems is worthwhile • Establish a fund to support technology transfer efforts by researchers who have developed promising ideas or technologies This fund could also help researchers cooperate with industry to bring products or enhancements rapidly to market • Establish and maintain a national database of results from Federally funded cyber security research allowing vendors to identify ideas that can be incorporated into commercial products • Encourage Federally supported graduate students and postdoctoral researchers to gain experience in industry as researchers interns or consultants • Encourage agency investment in technology transfer of cyber security R D results through the Small Business Innovation Research SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer SBTT programs of the Federal government The Federal government and the private sector by working together can effectively and efficiently transfer Federally funded cyber security research results into commercial products and build an innovative cyber security workforce and by doing so can help our society realize the potential benefits of this research Finding 4 The overall Federal cyber security R D effort is currently unfocused and inefficient because of inadequate coordination and oversight Recommendation 4 The Interagency Working Group on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection should become the focal point for coordinating Federal cyber security R D efforts This working group should be strengthened and integrated under the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development NITRD Program 34 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Discussion Within the Federal government there are several coordinating bodies whose domains include various aspects of cyber security R D They include the • Interagency Working Group on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection IWG CIIP which is part of the National Science and Technology Council NSTC • Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development which coordinates the NITRD Program and which is also part of the NSTC and the Subcommittee’s Coordinating Groups especially the ° High Confidence Software and Systems Coordinating Group18 ° Large Scale Networking Coordinating Group19 • Infosec Research Council IRC These coordinating bodies hold regular often monthly meetings provide opportunities for agency representatives to share information sponsor multiagency workshops facilitate joint or coordinated funding of programs and studies and serve as a means for academic experts and industry representatives to provide input Yet a key component – effective government-wide coordination of the agencies’ cyber security research programs and agendas – has largely been missing The Committee notes that the IWG CIIP has recently begun a crossagency effort to prioritize cyber security research areas with the intent of developing a Federal agenda for cyber security R D that cuts across agencies and is focused on the highest priority needs This preliminary work is encouraging and will be critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal investment in cyber security R D because in the absence of such coordination agencies understandably focus on their individual missions rather than on the priorities of the Federal government as a whole In addition as the level of funding for cyber security R D increases greater coordination is needed to ensure that the new funding is invested wisely Therefore the role of the IWG CIIP in coordinating cyber security R D across the Federal government should be further strengthened and integrated –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 18 http www nitrd gov iwg hcss html 19 http www nitrd gov iwg lsn html 35 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE into the NITRD Program Objectives to be achieved by strengthened coordination include • Coordination of research agendas across Federal agencies enabling the most important topics to receive priority avoiding duplication of effort and encouraging jointly supported work where appropriate • Improved communication between the Federal government and the private sector Effective decision making about Federal cyber security R D investments requires improved Government understanding of the activities and trends of private sector R D and operational realities in the private sector • Convening forums at which participants from government university and industrial settings exchange information about high-level strategies and issues for example long-term architectural design issues to better meet the growing cyber security challenge Without such forums competitive and antitrust constraints on key vendors make such dialogue difficult • Systematic collection of data on cyber security R D efforts throughout the Federal government Obtaining cyber security budget data proved a challenge for the PITAC To track progress in cyber security R D and give it greater visibility in budget discussions accurate up-to-date data must be readily available • Tracking the intellectual progress of cyber security R D programs and their impact on cyber security acquisition and use within the Federal government The IWG CIIP should issue periodic reports on the overall effectiveness of Federal cyber security R D investments The cyber security R D programs that the IWG CIIP coordinates should be brought into the NITRD Program and the IWG CIIP should report not only to its current parent the NSTC’s Subcommittee on Infrastructure but also to the NITRD Subcommittee Advances in cyber security need to be built into IT systems from the ground up which requires cyber security R D to be an integral part of overall IT R D This would be enabled by bringing IWG CIIP under the NITRD umbrella The IRC should continue to operate and coordinate with other Federal cyber security R D bodies 36 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Cyber Security Research Priorities The Committee analyzed more than 30 reports on cyber security R D listed in Appendix C to identify 10 priority areas for increased emphasis These areas are of paramount importance Without significant advances in research in these areas the Nation will not be able to secure its IT infrastructure The ordering of the areas below does not represent a priority ranking 1 Authentication Technologies Authentication schemes for networked entities such as hardware software data and users are needed for a variety of purposes including identification authorization and integrity checking These schemes must be provably secure easy to verify supportable for use with billions of components and rapidly executable Methods in traditional cryptography have focused on security but may not be efficient enough for widespread use in environments where for example millions of data packets per second must be authenticated by a single network router Much useful work has been done on cryptographic protocols But the requirement that the protocols be usable in an environment such as the Internet demands the development of new protocols Research subtopics include on infrastructure and protocols for large-scale public • Research key distribution and management and on other possible approaches • Certificate and revocation management • Integration with biometrics and physical tokens authentication from identification to address • Decoupling privacy issues 37 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Cyber Security Research Priorities 2 Secure Fundamental Protocols Few of the protocols governing the Internet’s operation have adequate security For example to misdirect traffic to an alternate site an attacker can easily fool or spoof protocols such as the Border Gateway Protocol BGP which controls the paths taken by packets as they move through the Internet and services such as the Domain Name System DNS which controls the destinations of packets Such attackers can intercept monitor alter or otherwise manipulate Internet traffic often without detection Secure versions of the basic protocols that address threats such as denial of service corruption and spoofing must be developed if the Internet is to become a reliable medium for communication Moreover we need to secure basic protocols against incapacitating attacks that exploit weaknesses in the protocols themselves Research subtopics include over Internet Protocol VoIP and wireless Web and • Voice Virtual Private Network VPN security each of whose protocols are more complex than basic Internet protocols and none of which is adequately secured protocols even when they are shared with and • Securing executed by untrusted parties • Tradeoffs between security and performance 38 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Cyber Security Research Priorities 3 Secure Software Engineering and Software Assurance Commercial software engineering today lacks the scientific underpinnings and rigorous controls needed to produce high-quality secure products at acceptable cost Commonly used software engineering practices permit dangerous errors such as improper handling of buffer overflows which enable hundreds of attack programs to compromise millions of computers every year In the future the Nation may face even more challenging problems as adversaries – both foreign and domestic – become increasingly sophisticated in their ability to insert malicious code into critical software From avoiding basic programming errors to developing massive systems that remain secure even if portions of the system software are compromised significant new research on secure software engineering is needed Research subtopics include languages and systems that include fundamental • Programming security features or reusable code that remains secure when deployed • Portable in different environments to capture requirement definitions and design • Technologies specifications that address security issues and validation technologies to ensure that • Verification documented requirements and specifications have been implemented for comparison and metrics to assure that required • Models standards have been met and to enable evaluation of alternatives to efficiently and economically verify that • Technologies computer code does not contain exploitable features that are not documented or desired 39 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Cyber Security Research Priorities 4 Holistic System Security Effective security in a complex many-layered global infrastructure such as the Internet and its nodes requires more than the security of its component parts Establishing sound methods for authentication secure protocols for basic Web operations and improved software engineering will undoubtedly become part of an evolving solution to this problem But most importantly researchers must recognize from the outset that an end-to-end architectural approach to the security of the whole necessarily transcends the security of the individual parts For example customers assume that their online banking transactions based on secure socket layer SSL are indeed secure But by spoofing the associated underlying protocols or end-user software a malicious party can make a user’s transaction appear secured by SSL while allowing the theft of confidential data It is also possible to compromise the security of the end computing systems obtaining the data even though it was secure in transit Software usability itself is a legitimate and important research topic in cyber security Incorrectly used software or hostile or confusing user interfaces can lead to user frustration and unauthorized workarounds that can compromise even the most robust security schemes Research is also needed on how to make large and complex systems where components can interact in unexpected ways secure as a whole Ultimately fundamental research should address the development of entirely new holistic security architectures including hardware operating systems networks and applications Research subtopics include secure systems from trusted and untrusted components and • Building integrating new systems with legacy components • Proactively reducing vulnerabilities • Securing a system that is co-operated and or co-owned by an adversary • Comprehensively addressing the growing problem of insider threats • Modeling and analyzing emergent failures in complex systems factors engineering such as interfaces that promote security and • Human user awareness of its importance • Supporting privacy in conjunction with improved security 40 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Cyber Security Research Priorities 5 Monitoring and Detection Regardless of progress made in the preceding research areas unanticipated events will still occur When they do tools to monitor and understand what is happening are needed to enable the proper deployment of appropriate defensive measures The ability of current tools that monitor irregular network activity to rapidly identify the underlying cause is primitive The current advantage that adversaries enjoy will increase as they become more knowledgeable and as the Internet becomes larger and more complex Research subtopics include protection that can react when attacks are detected possibly • Dynamic by increasing monitoring activities • Global scale monitoring and intrusion detection of systems to ensure that they meet declared security • Monitoring policies tools based on improved models that characterize normal • Better behavior • Real-time data collection storage mining and analysis during a crisis presentation interfaces that allow operators to better understand • Usable incidents in progress 41 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Cyber Security Research Priorities 6 Mitigation and Recovery Methodologies Secure systems must be designed to rapidly respond to unforeseen events and attacks and recover from any resultant damage – a particularly challenging task in a system as large and complex as the Internet and its nodes This issue has been addressed in other systems of extraordinary complexity such as the space shuttle where a substantial investment has been made to build in maximal reliability and redundancy No comparable effort has been invested in developing methods to make the Internet and critical computer systems reliable in the face of attacks Research subtopics include automated discovery of outages and attacks from • Rapid monitoring data systems architectures that enable rapid recovery from • New outages and attacks systems to increase the role of automated • Simplifying operation to reduce errors and insider attacks by human operators especially when updating software and configurations • Fault tolerance and graceful degradation 42 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Cyber Security Research Priorities 7 Cyber Forensics Catching Criminals and Deterring Criminal Activities The rapid arrest and conviction of criminals is a primary goal of law enforcement and also serves as a deterrent When potential criminals believe there is a strong chance that they will be caught and convicted they are more reluctant to commit crimes Current capabilities to investigate cyber crime identify perpetrators gather and present evidence and convict criminals are woefully inadequate Compounding the problem we do not really know how to deter cyber crime Very few of the thousands of cyber criminals active today are being caught There is a pressing need to develop new tools and techniques to investigate cyber crimes and prosecute criminals Robust cyber forensic methods are also needed that will prove capable of withstanding the burden of proof in court whether employed to prosecute criminals or exonerate the innocent Research subtopics include the origin of cyber attacks including traceback of • Identifying network traffic • Identifying attackers based on their behavior • Collecting evidence in uncooperative network environments stolen information used in the growing traffic in • Tracing fraud identity theft and intellectual property theft including tools and protocols for recovering trace evidence from volatile and incompletely-erased computing media disks cell phones PDAs and embedded systems and protocols to search massive data stores for specific • Tools information and indicators possibly while the data stores are in use research to develop forensic-friendly system • Fundamental architectures that are more amenable to investigation when incidents occur 43 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Cyber Security Research Priorities 8 Modeling and Testbeds for New Technologies One of the barriers to the rapid development of new cyber security products is the paucity of realistic models and testbeds available for exercising the latest technologies in a real-world environment Some Internet modeling research has been conducted but it has been rudimentary and has had little impact in practice The problem is challenging because of the Internet’s scale and complexity Additionally existing data on the Internet’s workings are limited and typically confidential Some Federal programs have been established recently but a significantly larger and more sophisticated effort is needed if useful models and testbeds are ever to become a reality Research subtopics include • System simulation environments • Validating simulations involving millions of nodes • Gathering and synthesizing very large amounts of data • Designing a testbed that preserves the confidentiality of data 44 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Cyber Security Research Priorities 9 Metrics Benchmarks and Best Practices Some scientific fields have established universally acknowledged metrics and benchmarks to help evaluate new technologies or products However there has been relatively little research focused on developing metrics benchmarks and best practices for cyber security Where benchmarks or certification criteria exist they are typically antiquated expensive and even counter-productive to improving security Without universally accepted cyber security metrics separating promising developments from dead-end approaches will prove difficult This in turn will significantly increase costs and delay time to market when transferring such technologies into the product cycle Research subtopics include • Developing security metrics and benchmarks impact assessment and risk analysis including • Economic objective measures of risk risk reduction and cost of defense • Automated tools to assess compliance and or risk • Tools to assess vulnerability including source code scanning and documenting best practices including • Discovering auditing procedures and configuration and patch management 45 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Cyber Security Research Priorities 10 Non-Technology Issues That Can Compromise Cyber Security A number of non-technological factors – psychological societal institutional legal and economic – can compromise cyber security in ways that network and software engineering alone cannot address Technology deployments that fail to address these factors can aggravate problems they are intended to solve Cyber security research that reaches beyond technology and into these other realms is needed Research on human and organizational aspects of IT infrastructures can be used to explore solutions that factor in human behavior Research subtopics include to change the widely held perception that greater • Strategies networked security is not worth the cost to individuals and corporations – a perception that actively discourages needed software development in this area to enhance the perceived value of privacy protection and • Ways trust in the IT infrastructure with implications for risk management and risk analysis examination of how people interact with the IT • An infrastructure with a focus on ethics culture behavior and other factors that can lead to non-technology security lapses of sociological and behavioral phenomena that may lead • Studies people to commit acts of cyber crime of international laws and standards and the impact • Consideration of both on cyber security technologies policies and implementation implications of network-enabled commerce including • The jurisdictional disputes in the related areas of taxation and payment resolution including ways to address these issues in cyber security and networking software and business security issues that arise in the creation or • National transfer of cyber security technologies outside of the United States 46 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION Appendix A Charge to PITAC EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY WASHINGTON D C 20502 March 2 2004 Edward D Lazowska Ph D Bill and Melinda Gates Chair in Computer Science University of Washington Department of Computer Science and Engineering Box 252350 Seattle WA 98195 Dear Dr Lazowska I would like to take this opportunity both to thank you for your service as co-chair of the President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee PITAC and to outline my expectations regarding PITAC’s work on cyber security I look forward to PITAC’s engagement in this important issue As per Executive Order 13035 as amended PITAC exists “to provide the National Science and Technology Council NSTC through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications information technology and the Next Generation Internet ” With this role in mind I would like PITAC to address the following questions with regard to the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development NITRD Program as well as other relevant Federally funded research and development programs 1 How well is the Federal government targeting the right cyber security research areas and how well has it balanced its priorities among cyber security research areas In particular how well balanced is Federally funded cyber security research between shorter-term lower-risk research and longer-term higher-risk research 47 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 2 How effective have the Federal government’s cyber security research programs been in terms of the successful outcomes of the research and the value of the research results 3 How useful have the research results proven as measured by implementation to improve the security of our computing and networking environments What modifications to research areas development efforts or technology transfer would improve utility and encourage broader implementation of cyber security technologies 4 How well are current Federal research efforts and supporting institutions able to anticipate or respond to paradigm shifts or fundamental shifts in technology that can create unexpected cyber security challenges Based on the findings of the PITAC with regard to these questions I request that PITAC present any recommendations you deem appropriate that would assist us in strengthening the NITRD Program or other cyber security research programs of the Federal government In addressing this charge I ask that you consider what the roles of the Federal government in cyber security research should be given that other entities are also involved in this field I also ask that you specifically consider the balance between Federal research aimed at improving security within the current computing and network environment and Federal research aimed at fundamental advances in computing and network architectures that would improve the intrinsic security of the environment I request that PITAC deliver its response to this charge by December 31 2004 Sincerely John H Marburger III Director Letter also sent to Marc R Benioff 48 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION Appendix B Cyber Security Subcommittee Fact-Finding Process In addition to drawing upon its own expertise and experience the Cyber Security Subcommittee conducted an intensive review of relevant scholarly literature and trade publications The Subcommittee also held a series of meetings during which government leaders and private-sector experts were invited to provide input These meetings included the following • • • • • April 13 2004 PITAC meeting June 17 2004 PITAC meeting July 29 2004 Cyber Security Research and Development Town Hall meeting at The Government Security Expo and Conference GOVSEC and Cyber Security Subcommittee meeting November 19 2004 PITAC meeting January 12 2005 PITAC meeting April 13 2004 PITAC Meeting On April 13 2004 formal presentations by the following invited experts were given • • • • • Amit Yoran Director National Cyber Security Division Department of Homeland Security Carl Landwehr Ph D Program Director National Science Foundation David D Clark Ph D Senior Research Scientist Massachusetts Institute of Technology Anthony Tether Ph D Director Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Simon Szykman Ph D Director Cyber Security R D Department of Homeland Security PITAC members then discussed the issues addressed in the presentations The public was then invited to make comments and ask questions To view or hear these presentations or to read meeting minutes please visit http www itrd gov pitac meetings 2004 20040413 agenda html 49 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE June 17 2004 PITAC Meeting On June 17 2004 a PITAC meeting was held in Arlington Virginia at which F Thomson Leighton Subcommittee Chair provided an update on the Cyber Security Subcommittee’s activities and solicited comment from PITAC members and the public July 29 2004 Town Hall Meeting On June 29 2004 the PITAC Cyber Security Subcommittee held a Town Hall meeting at the Government Security Expo and Conference GOVSEC in Washington D C The purpose of the Town Hall meeting was to solicit perspectives from the public on the current state of cyber security and the future measures needed to help ensure U S leadership in this area Subcommittee Chair Leighton provided an introduction to PITAC and its Subcommittee on Cyber Security This presentation can be found at http www itrd gov pitac meetings 2004 20040729 agenda html The Subcommittee presented a list of questions to focus on particular areas of interest These questions can be found at http www itrd gov pitac meetings 2004 20040729 questions pdf The initial framing discussions were presented by the following individuals • • Harris Miller President Information Technology Association of America Joel Birnbaum Chairman National Research Council Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Committee on Improving Cybersecurity Research in the United States July 29 2004 Cyber Security Subcommittee Meeting On July 29 2004 members of the PITAC Cyber Security Subcommittee met in Arlington Virginia Formal presentations were given by the following experts • • • • • Brian Witten Director for Strategic Technologies The Sytex Group John Pescatore Vice President of Intelligence and Distinguished Analyst Gartner Research André van Tilborg Ph D Director Information Systems Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering Douglas Maughan Ph D Program Manager Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency Robert Meushaw Technical Director National Security Agency 50 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION • • • • Richard Brackney Thrust Manager Advanced Research and Development Activity Edward Roback Chief Computer Security Division National Institute of Standards and Technology Martin Novak Program Manager National Institute of Justice John Morgan Ph D Assistant Director National Institute of Justice November 19 2004 PITAC Meeting On November 19 2004 Subcommittee Chair Leighton presented the draft findings and recommendations at a PITAC meeting in Washington D C PITAC members provided guidance and specific inputs to the Subcommittee for use in drafting the report Members of the public also provided comments The Leighton presentation can be found at http www itrd gov pitac meetings 2004 20041119 agenda html January 12 2005 PITAC Meeting On January 12 2005 Subcommittee Chair Leighton presented the draft report at a PITAC meeting in Arlington Virginia After receiving public comments the PITAC discussed the draft report and approved it for publication The Leighton presentation can be found on the PITAC Web site http www itrd gov pitac meetings 2005 20050112 agenda html Agency Information A number of agencies provided written information about their cyber security R D investments in response to a formal request from PITAC Senior officials from several agencies participated in teleconferences with PITAC and Subcommittee leadership to provide further insight into agency policies and practices The Committee also conducted a detailed review of some 1 500 Federally funded projects related to cyber security R D in an effort to inform the development of its findings and recommendations Additional Comments In addition the PITAC studied written input and comments contributed by concerned individuals and organizations The PITAC took this input under consideration in the process of drafting and revising this report 51 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Appendix C Selected Major Reports on Cyber Security Research and Development Internet Architecture Board IAB Concerns and Recommendations Regarding Internet Research and Evolution Request for Comments RFC 3869 ftp ftp rfc-editor org in-notes rfc3869 txt August 2004 NIAP Certification Proposals by CSIA for Strengthening Security Certification https www csialliance org news press pr080504 pdf July 2004 Law Enforcement Tools and Technologies for Investigating Cyber Attacks A National Research and Development Agenda Institute for Security Technology Studies Dartmouth College http www ists dartmouth edu TAG randd htm June 2004 Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection Technology Assessment GAO-04-321 http www gao gov cgi-bin getrpt GAO-04-321 and http www gao gov highlights d04321high pdf May 2004 Accelerating Trustworthy Internetworking Workshop – Conference Report Atlanta Georgia http gtisc gatech edu ati2004 ATI_Report_FINAL_4-25-04 pdf April 2004 Best Practices for Government to Enhance the Security of National Critical Infrastructures National Infrastructure Advisory Council http www dhs gov interweb assetlibrary NIAC_BestPracticesSecurityInfrastructures_0404 pdf April 2004 Information Security Governance A Call to Action Corporate Governance Task Force http www cyberpartnership org InfoSecGov4_04 pdf April 2004 Department of Defense Software Assurance Initiative Appendix G Software Assurance Research and Development 2004 Grand Research Challenges in Information Security and Assurance Computing Research Association http www cra org Activities grand challenges security grayslides pdf November 2003 Security at Line Speed Report of a Workshop Chicago Illinois http apps internet2 edu sals files 20031108-wr-sals-v1 1 pdf November 2003 52 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION Biometric Research Agenda Report of the NSF Workshop Morgantown West Virginia http www wvu edu bknc BiometricResearchAgenda pdf April May 2003 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Research and Development Exchange Workshop Atlanta Georgia http www ncs gov nstac rd nstac_03_bos html March 2003 Workshop on Scalable Cyber-Security Challenges in Large-Scale Networks Deployment Obstacles Large Scale Networking Coordinating Group NITRD Landsdowne Virginia http www cs yale edu homes jf LSNreport pdf March 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace The White House http www whitehouse gov pcipb February 2003 Cyber Security Research and Development Agenda I3P Dartmouth College http www thei3p org documents 2003_Cyber_Security_RD_Agenda pdf January 2003 Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and the Law An Overview of Key Issues Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council http www cstb org pub_ciip html 2003 Information Technology for Counterterrorism Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council http www7 nationalacademies org cstb pub_counterterrorism html 2003 The Internet Under Crisis Conditions Learning from September 11 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council http www7 nationalacademies org cstb pub_internet911 html 2003 Who Goes There Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council http www7 nationalacademies org cstb pub_authentication html 2003 IDs-Not That Easy Questions About Nationwide Identity Systems Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council http www7 nationalacademies org cstb pub_nationwideidentity html 2002 Robust Cyber Defense Study commissioned for DARPA ITO Slides available at http www cs cornell edu fbs darpa RobustCyberDefense ppt Fall 2001 Electronic Crime Needs Assessment for State and Local Law Enforcement National Institute of Justice Research Report http www ncjrs org pdffiles1 nij 186276 pdf March 2001 53 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE High Confidence Software and Systems Research Needs High Confidence Software and Systems Coordinating Group Interagency Working Group on Information Technology Research and Development http www nitrd gov pubs hcss-research pdf January 2001 Embedded Everywhere A Research Agenda for Networked Systems of Embedded Computers Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council http www7 nationalacademies org cstb pub_embedded html 2001 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Research and Development Exchange Workshop Tulsa Oklahoma http www ncs gov nstac reports 2001 R D_Exchange2000Proceedings htm September 2000 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Protecting Systems Task Force Report on Enhancing the Nation’s Security Efforts http www ncs gov nstac reports 2001 R D_Exchange2000Proceedings htm May 2000 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force Report http www ncs gov nstac reports 2001 R D_Exchange2000Proceedings htm May 2000 Hard Problems List Infosec Research Council September 1999 and draft revision as of September 2004 Information Technology Research for Crisis Management Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council http www7 nationalacademies org cstb pub_crisismanagement html 1999 Trust in Cyberspace Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Research Council http www7 nationalacademies org cstb pub trust html 1999 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Research and Development Exchange Workshop West Lafayette Indiana http www ncs gov nstac reports 1998 R DExchange pdf October 1998 Critical Foundations Protecting America’s Infrastructures President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection http www timeusa com CIAO resource pccip PCCIP_Report pdf October 1997 54 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION Appendix D Acronyms ARDA Advanced Research and Development Activity ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency Network ATM Automated teller machine BGP Border Gateway Protocol BSD Berkeley Software Distribution CDMA Code Division Multiple Access CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research CERT CC Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center CIIP Critical Information Infrastructure Protection CISE NSF’s Computer and Information Science and Engineering Directorate CM Connection Machine CMU Carnegie Mellon University COTS Commercial off-the-shelf CTSS Compatible Time Sharing System DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DDoS Distributed denial of service DEC Digital Equipment Corporation DECnet Digital Equipment Corporation network DHS Department of Homeland Security DNS Domain Name System DOE Department of Energy DOJ Department of Justice DoS Denial of service E S Evans and Sutherland FY Fiscal year GAO Government Accountability Office GIG Global Information Grid 55 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE GM General Motors HP Hewlett-Packard HPC High Performance Computing IBM International Business Machines NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NITRD Networking and Information Technology Research and Development NSA National Security Agency ICL ICL High Performance Systems U K NSF National Science Foundation IRC Infosec Research Council NSFNET National Science Foundation Network IRI Information Resources Incorporated U K IT Information technology NSTC National Science and Technology Council PARC Palo Alto Research Center IT R D Information Technology Research and Development PDA Personal digital assistant IWG Interagency Working Group PITAC President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee LAN Local area network MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology MOSIS Metal oxide semiconductor implementation service NIJ National Institute of Justice NIPRNet Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network R D Research and development RAID Redundant array of independent disks RISC Reduced instruction set computer SBIR Small Business Innovation Research SBTT Small Business Technology Transfer 56 CYBER SECURITY A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition SDS Scientific Data Systems SGI Silicon Graphics Incorporated SRI Stanford Research Institute SSL Secure Socket Layer TCP IP Transmission Control Protocol Internet Protocol UCLA University of California at Los Angeles VLSI Very-large-scale integration VMS Virtual Memory System VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol VPN Virtual Private Network 57 PRESIDENT’S INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Acknowledgements The PITAC co-chairs would like to acknowledge the members of the Committee’s Subcommittee on Cyber Security for their contributions In particular Subcommittee Chair F Thomson Leighton deserves special recognition for his strong leadership and tireless efforts in bringing this report to completion The PITAC thanks the staff of the National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development for their contributions in supporting and documenting meetings drafting sections of this report critiquing editing and proofreading the numerous drafts and contributing to the substantive dialogue that led to this final report Staff members Alan S Inouye Martha Matzke and Terry L Ponick provided primary support in the development of this report under the guidance and oversight of David B Nelson and Sally E Howe Staff members Nekeia Bell Elizabeth Kirk Grant Miller Virginia Moore Karen Skeete and Diane Theiss provided technical and administrative support for the Subcommittee’s work NCO interns Nils Janson and Stephanie Showell contributed to the Subcommittee’s research effort as part of their NSF-supported undergraduate internships in the Federal Cyber Corps The Corps is part of the Federal Cyber Service Scholarship for Service program which seeks to increase the number of qualified students entering the fields of information assurance and computer security The PITAC appreciates the technical information and thoughtful advice provided by Sharon L Hays and Charles H Romine of the Office of Science and Technology Policy Their inputs stimulated Subcommittee discussions and led to improvements in the text Finally the PITAC acknowledges Wade H Baker James Caras Paul Robertson and John Voeller for their specialized technical support of the Subcommittee’s work 58 Ordering Copies of PITAC Reports This report is published by the National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development To request additional copies or copies of other PITAC reports please contact National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development 4201 Wilson Blvd Suite II-405 Arlington Virginia 22230 703 292-4873 Fax 703 292-9097 Email nco@nitrd gov PITAC documents are also available on the NCO Web site http www nitrd gov Copyright This is a work of the U S government and is in the public domain It may be freely distributed and copied but it is requested that the National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development NCO IT R D be acknowledged Hatiunal Inuniinatiun fur lnfunnatiun Technulugy Hesearch and euelupment SUIIE rlin-gturl Lll'rgmi'd 2223 1'92 413E Email address nm inilr'IigIJuLII a rlm s