pm 1 3 a raga 2133 f li f etim we ji g'i 1'33 wayd wij j i 3111 a i333 a iihi igg ims d 5 Hi i ' Eaten gage if 333 $5233333313m ea' im THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS U December 2006 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff Washington D C 20318 Classi ed By VADM N Brown Reason 1 Declassify On 19 September 2030 INTENTIONALLY BLANK DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20318 NOVEMBER 2006 NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 3% Secretary s Foreward Chairman s Message Vii Executive Summary ix Chapter One Purpose 1 Chapter Two Strategic Context 3 Chapter Three Threats and Vulnerabilities 7 Chapter Four Strategic Considerations 9 Chapter Five Military Strategic Framework 13 Chapter Six - Implementation and Assessment 19 Enclosure A Legal Authorities Table A-1 Enclosure Strategic Guidance Enclosure - Examples of Threats and Threat Actors Enclosure Examples of Vulnerabilities D-l Enclosure Application to Joint Capabilities Areas Enclosure Strategic Priorities and Outcomes F l Enclosure Distribution List G-l Glossary GL- 1 INTENTIO NALLY BLANK iv FOREWORD U The Department of Defense DOD relies on cyberspace to achieve national military objectives in the areas of military intelligence and business operations This reliance provides adversaries a ready avenue of approach to exploit cyberspace to gain strategic operational and tactical advantages over the United States The cyberspace domain is complex and evolves at astonishing rates increasing the challenge of ensuring strategic advantage in this domain The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations is an important rst step toward ensuring our own freedom of action in this contested domain While denying the same to our adversaries U Our strategy must remain exible as our understanding of cyberspace grows and our capacity to conduct cyberspace operations increases Therefore the implementation of the strategy Will be based on an iterative approach in partnership with other US Government dep artments and agencies partner nations and industry Supported by fresh thinking attuned to the speed and dynamics at which cyberspace operations occur the strategy Will remain continuously relevant I direct components to palticipate in this important process INTENTIONALLY BLANK MEMORANDUM FOR Distribution List Subject National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations 1 Operations in cyberspace are a critical aspect of our military operations around the globe The enclosed is the product of signi cant re ection and debate Within our military and government It describes the cyberspace domain articulates threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace and provides a strategic framework for action The NMS-CO is the US Armed Forces comprehensive strategic approach for using cyberspace operations to assure US military strategic superiority in the domain The integration of offensive and defensive cyberspace operations coupled with the skill and knowledge of our people is fundamental to this approach 2 Implementation of this strategy w l help ensure that our Armed Forces have the capacity to conduct cyberspace operations in support of US national interests in the years ahead 3 Without enclosure this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED PETER PACE General United States Marine Corps Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Enclosure INTENTIO NALLY BLANK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY U Purpose The National Militaly Strategy for Cyberspace Operations is the comprehensive strategy of the US Armed Forces to ensure US military superiority in cyberspace The NMS-CO establishes a common understanding of cyberspace and sets forth a military strategic framework that orients and focuses DOD action in the areas of military intelligence and business operations in and through cyberspace Combatant commands Military Departments agencies eld activities and other DOD organizational entities hereafter referred to collectively as DOD components should use the NMS-CO as a defmitive reference to plan execute and resource cyberspace operations U The Cyberspace Domain Recognizing that the understanding of cyberspace has evolved for the purpose of this strategy cyberspace is de ned as U domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical U Military Strategic Framework The military strategic framework focuses operations toward a strategic goal in terms of ends ways and means U Military Strategic Goal The military strategic goal is to ensure US military strategic superiority in cyberspace mm U Ways The ends are achieved by DOD through the integrated execution of ve fundamental ways and six enabling ways The fundamental ways are Infomation Operations Network Operations Kinetic Actions Law Enforcement and Counterintelligence and Themes and Messages Six enabling ways out across all mission areas and facilitate execution of cyberspace operations Science and Technology Partnering Intelligence Data and Support to Operations Situational Awareness Law and Policy and People seesa- ix U Means DOD relies on the uni ed employment of organizations personnel capabilities and resources to ful l the strategic goal U Implementation The Joint Staff will develop an implementation plan and lead an annual assessment process Development of speci c capabilities for cyberspace operations occurs Within the context of the current Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System This strategy identi eseight joint capability areas for special attention Joint Battlespaee Awareness Joint Force Generation Joint Command and Control Joint Infonnation Operations Joint Net-Centric Operations Joint Global Deterrence Joint Homeland Defense and Joint Interagency Integration Intergovemmental Organization Coordination and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination In addition Chapter Six of this strategy directs four strategic priorities that provide focus for a Wide range of outcomes U Gain and maintain initiative to operate within adyersary decision cycles U Integrate cyberspace capabilities across the range of military operations U Build capacity for cyberspace operations U Manage risk for operations in cyberspace CHAPTER ONE PURPOSE U U The Impact of Cyberspace The United States operates in a global environment characterized by interdependence uncertainty complexity and continual change In this environment the prosperity and security of our Nation rely on cyberspace to achieve strategic advantage and strengthen the instruments of national power Cyberspace reaches across geopolitical boundaries and is integrated into the operation of critical infrastructures and the conduct of commerce governance and national security The United States must have cyberspace superiority to ensure our freedom of action and deny the same to our adversaries through the integration of network defense exploitation and attack Therefore the Department of Defense DOD must be prepared to provide military options to the President and Secretary of Defense U Pgmose The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations NMS-CO is the comprehensive military strategy for the US Armed Forces to ensure US superiority in cyberspace It serves to begin integrating cyberspace operations with national defense role in the areas of military intelligence and business operations Five elements comprise this strategy U Strategic Context provides the working de nition and cyberspace characteristics - U Threats and Vulnerabilities creates a common understanding of the context threats vulnerabilities and opportunities for cyberspace operations U Strategic Considerations provide additional clarity to identi z priorities U Military Strategic Framework presents ends ways and means U Implementation and Assessment identi es areas where change is needed and establishes a mechanism to measure progress toward achieving the strategic goal U Authorities Authority for actions undertaken by the US Armed Forces is derived from the US Constitution and Federal law These authorities establish roles and responsibilities that provide focus for organizations to develop capabilities and expertise including those for cyberspace Key authorities that apply to DOD include Title 10 Armed Forces Title 50 War and National Defense and Title 32 National Guard see Enclosure A U National Guidance DOD Strategic Planning Guidance March 2006 directs the development of the National Military Strategic Plan for Securing Cyberspace Early in the process of writing this document the Chairman recognized an urgent need for an overarching strategy that encompassed all aspects of cyberspace Accordingly he directed expansion to include all cyberspace operations in the strategy U DOD Roles in Cyberspace The NIVIS-CO builds on the national and DOD guidance listed in Enclosure B US law and national policy assign DOD three main roles defense of the Nation national incident response and critical infrastructure protection These miSsions may be performed simultaneously Although partner seesa- 1 SEER-ET- departments and agencies have responsibilities to secure portions of cyberspace only DOD conducts military operations to defend cyberspace the critical infrastructure the homeland or other vital US interests If defense of a vital interest is implicated national defense mission takes primacy even if that would conflict with or subsume the other support missions U Defense of the Nation DOD will execute the full range of military operations ROMO in and through cyberspace to defeat dissuade and deter threats against US interests Also under the authorities of the Secretary of Defense DOD will use network exploitation to gather intelligence and shape the cyberspace environment as necessary to provide integrated offensive and defensive options DOD will leverage the authorities and capabilities of those agencies under the Director of National Intelligence as appropriate DOD may conduct cyberspace operations across national boundaries and will in some cases require global actions to be coordinated across geopolitical and theater boundaries DOD will partner with the Intelligence Community IC Department of Justice Department of Homeland Security DHS and other Federal departments and agencies to further DOD cyberspace operations As directed DOD will deploy necessary resources to support efforts of other Federal agencies U National Incident Response In addition to responsibility to defend the Nation DOD will provide military support to civil authorities as directed DOD will coordinate with DHS and other Federal departments and agencies as described in the National Response Plan 2004 U Critical Protection Concurrent with its national defense and incident response missions DOD will support DHS and other Federal departments and agencies to ensure all sectors of cyberspace critical infrastructure are available to support the ROMO Critical infrastructure protection relies on analysis warning information sharing vulnerability identi cation and reduction mitigation and aiding of national recovery efforts DOD in accordance With the draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan January 2006 has been designated as the Sector Speci c Agency for the Defense Industrial Base DIB sector The Defense Information Systems Agency as the lead agent for the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program Global Information Grid GIG sector is responsible for matters pertaining to the identi cation prioritization and remediation of critical GIG infrastructure DOD is responsible for coordination of efforts to protect the DIB sector and the GIG sector of the DIB CHAPTER TWO STRATEGIC CONTEXT U U The Cyberspace Domain Throughout the history of warfare opponents have sought technology to gain an advantage Those responsible for the Nation s defense must appreciate the military s dependence upon cyberspace for cyberspace-speci c operations and use it to ensure success in the other domains The reality of increasing net centric operations requires DOD to employ our cyberspace resources consistently to achieve and maintain US military strategic advantage U De nition of Cyberspace Joint Publication JP 3 0 Joint Operations discusses the operational environment as consisting 'of the air land maritime and space domains and the information environment However treating cyberspace as a domain establishes a foundation to understand and de ne its place in military operations JP 1-02 currently de nes cyberspace as The notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks Recognizing that the understanding of cyberspace has evolved for the purposes of this strategy a working de nition of cyberspace is U domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store modify and exchange data via networked systems and associated physicalr U Key Features of the Domain U Mam-Made Domain Sustaining and evolving cyberspace is an ongoing effort requiring continuous operations signi cant resources and a more comprehensive response to extraordinary incidents For example the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 resulted in the destruction of the ground based communications in astructure causing the interruption of communications and severely impacting cyberspace in the a 'ected regions U Technical Innovation Cyberspace evolves in response to ongoing technical innovation and is the only domain whose underlying structure can be dynamically recon gured In addition operating requirements for the equipment used in the domain are founded on similar standards thereby facilitating effects applicability across the range of cyberspace operations Keeping pace with technological change requires sustained and constant vigilance and high degrees of domain expertise U Volatility Cyberspace constantly changes making some targets transitory and o ensive and defensive operations challenging A previously vulnerable target may be replaced or provided with new defenses with no warning rendering cyberspace operations less effective Also an unapproved or uncoordinated change in a US or allied network con guration could introduce unintended vulnerabilities to friendly systems U Information Movement The lack of geopolitical boundaries and natural boundaries of the electromagnetic spectrum allows cyberspace operations to occur rapidly nearly anywhere U speed The speed at which information moves in cyberspace approaches the speed of light In war operational speed is a source of combat power When this speed is exploited increased ef ciency and productivity can result Cyberspace affords commanders opportunities to make decisions rapidly conduct operations and deliver effects at speeds that were previously incomprehensible In addition increasing the speed of the policy and decisionmaking process potentially will yield greater effectiveness of cyberspace capabilities However speed also can degrade cyberspace operations In some cases a rapid tempo of operations can trigger unintended detection and evasive actions that would not otherwise have occurred U Cyberspace and the Information Environment The information environment is the aggregate of individuals organizations and systems that collect process disseminate or act on information The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions physical informational and cognitive Cyberspace is best understood as relating to the physical and information dimensions of the information environment The physical dimension of the information environment includes information systems and networks computers and communications systems and supporting in astructures Similarly the information dimension of the information environment includes information that is processed stored disseminated displayed and protected all of which are important functions that take place Within cyberspace Cyberspace also provides a link into the cognitive dimension U Envisioning Cyberspace Missions Framing traditional missions in terms of how they might apply to cyberspace facilitates a deeper understanding of this domain and its impact on war ghting This includes setting conditions in cyberspace to ensure the availability of the domain the ability to engage adversaries decisively to establish cyberspace control superiority and the ability to conduct cyberspace operations to achieve desired effects in military intelligence and business operations or in support of operations in the air land maritime and space domains 2 U 13 Information Operations February 2006 4 5 INTENTIO NALLY BLANK CHAPTER THREE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES U U Vulnerabilities Actions taken to implement this strategy must identify and address asydeemed appropriate by risk management processes the full range of vulnerabilities discussed in Enclosure D In contrast to the physical domains in cyberspace a risk accepted by one is a risk assumed by all INTENTIONALLY BLANK CHAPTER FOUR STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS U U Cyberspace is a domain with its own set of risks and imperatives The following considerations provide additional clarity for identi cation of implementation priorities U Risk Considerations Through the process of risk management leaders must consider risks to US interests from adversaries using cyberspace to their advantage and from our owne brts to employ the global nature of cyberspace to achieve objectives in military intelligence and business operations The outcome of these efforts helps set the conditions to gain and maintain freedom of action to conduct cyberspace operations For operational plans development the combination of threats vulnerabilities and impacts must be evaluated in order to identify important trends and decide where e ort should be applied to eliminate or reduce threat capabilities eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities and assess coordinate and decon ict all cyberspace operations U US Military dependence on cyberspace will continue to increase DOD force transformation hinges largely on a move toward net-centric operations Signi cant investments in force structure infrastructure and programs have oriented DOD components toward the use of cyberspace as an integral part of war ghting Threat actors can take advantage of this dependence and adversely affect cyberspace operations Risk to operational effectiveness increases if inadequate resources prevent the elding of required capabilities needed to conduct cyberspace operations U Designated lead agencies will unevenly fulfill their responsibilities to secure cyberspace The responsibility for securing cyberspace at a national level resides with DHS However DOD must ensure secure operation of its own portion of cyberspace and depend on other Federal departments and agencies to secure their portions of cyberspace U Lack ofadequately and consistently trained and equipped personnel increases cyberspace vulnerability DOD must establish common training standards across DOD and collaborate with DHS to share those standards and help ensure all USG personnel who operate in cyberspace possess appropriate training U Absent significant ejj brt the United States will not continue to possess an advantage in cyberspace Although the United States currently enjoys technological advantages in cyberspace these advantages are erodirrg 3 The United States will not continue to enjoy an advantage in how this technology is developed and employed The United States increasingly depends on technology designed and manufactured by 3 U Gartner Report March 2006 9 entities that reside outside the United States who may become adversaries Unlike the other war ghting domains the United States risks parity with adversaries U Strategic Imperatives Strategic imperatives are those considerations that must be taken into account to operate successfully in the domain U O ensive defensive operations Offensive capabilities in cyberspace offer the United States and our adversaries an opportunity to gain and maintain the initiative DOD cyberspace operations are strongest when offensive and defensive capabilities are mutually supporting This requires a long-range focus and dedicated resources to achieve this goal U Integration Operations to achieve desired effects in and through cyberspace require integration of organizations capabilities functions technologies and missions The requirements to comply with law and policy cooperate with partners and decon ict operations further drive the need to integrate Coordinating planning efforts early will reduce seams and gaps in organizational boundaries limit shortfalls in resources needed to support mission accomplishment and increase the overall success of cyberspace operations Also integration of procedures to ensure lawful targeting must be a cornerstone of planning for cyberspace operations Finally integration across time space and purpose in cyberspace facilitates the rapid coordination and unified action needed to generate strategic advantage U Sharing information DOD must be able to use cyberspace to share information in support of operations The speed at which multiple partners and mission areas must integrate and interoperate in cyberspace means that information sharing must occur rapidly securely and systematically Policies and technical architectures must contribute to effective and secure information sharing with USG partners allies and commercial providers in support of military operations as well as DOD business operations U Ability to operate through degradation Elements of this imperative include domain resilience redundancy restorative capacity consequence management continuity of operations COOP procedures training and exercising In addition leaders must have con dence in the credibility of theinformation they receive through cyberspace if they are to act upon that information Of particular importance in this regard are consequence management and COOP Consequence management includes SEGRE-T- 10 SEER-ET- actions taken to manage and mitigate problems resulting from environmental disasters and catastrophic events COOP is the capability of DOD to continue mission-essential functions without unacceptable interruption to maintain military e ectiveness readiness and survivability It also includes the ability to assess and decide which is a greater risk or consequence the continued support of an exploited or affected system or the need for that system to support on going or planned military operations U Command Relationships The responsiveness simplicity agility and exibility of command relationships in uence successful application of military power in cyberspace Coordination of courses of action among combatant commanders is an on-going collaborative process that begins with plan development and extends through operational execution in the context of continuous cyberspace operations The United States can achieve superiority in cyberspace only if supported and supporting relationships are clearly de ned and executed These relationships must support unity of effort in achieving combatant commander missions as well as maintaining freedom of action in cyberspace Senior leaders must establish a structure that integrates all mission areas and dismantles stove -piped organizations that hinder collaboration and lengthen decisionmaking cycles U Command and Control Cyberspace provides the foundation for CQ of military operations in other domains 02 in cyberspace operations is achieving uni ed action vertically and horizontally among all levels of war and throughout I organizations Due to the nature of cyberspace C2 requires extremely short decision- making cycles Effective C2 integrates decon icts and cyberspace operations at the speeds required for achieving awareness and generating effects U Configuration Management DOD organizations must have positive control of systems supporting cyberspace Global force sourcing and interoperability requirements mandate the establishment and enforcement of standardized approaches to providing connectivity to cyberspace Con guration management enables consistent application of tools processes and procedures across cyberspace and is critical for a mature and defensible cyberspace U Enforcement DOD organizations with insuf cient leadership emphasis on developing and enforcing cyberspace policies and regulations are targets for adversaries and place our networks at risk Leaders at all levels are accountable for ensuring readiness and security to the same degree as in any other domain Leaders must hold individuals and organizations accountable for violations of laws and policies In addition the rapid evolution of cyberspace technology highlights the need to continually adapt policy based on new threats vulnerabilities and opportunities while evolving mitigation approaches U Understand Cyberspace Leaders must understand cyberspace as it relates to ability to operate in military intelligence and business operations DOD personnel operating in cyberspace must have a thorough understanding of the rapidly evolving procedural and technical mechanisms required to conduct cyberspace operations This knowledge must be coupled with an understanding of the applications used to conduct military intelligence and business processes to optimize effectiveness and mitigate risks U Current and Future Military Campaigns and Operations The National' Security Strategy states that the US military s highest priority is to defend the United States This strategy must complement all other critical defense undertakings Cyberspace operations must take into account these national efforts and their requirements for DOD resources GEE-REF 12 CHAPTER FIVE MILITARY STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK U U The military strategic framework orients and focuses DOD action in the areas of military intelligence and business operations in and through cyberspace The military strategic goal is to ensure US military strategic superiority in cyberspace The strategic framework focuses on offensive and defensive operations to achieve this goal This approach is expressed in terms of ends ways and means U Ends Five speci c ends provide further re nement of the strategic goal and are consistent with the existing national cyberspace guidance and the 2005 Contingency Planning Guidance CPG termination objectives These ends represent the steady state DOD must establish as the comprehensive military contribution to cyberspace operations U Adversaries are deterred from establishing or employing offensive capabilities against US interests in cyberspace DOD Will deter malicious adversary use of cyberspace While promoting eedom of action and trust and con dence in US cyberspace operations Through deterrence DOD seeks to in uence the adversary s decisionmaking processes by imposing political economic or military costs denying the bene ts of their actions and induCing adversary restraint based on demonstrated US capabilities DOD will act in collaboration with the intelligence community law enforcement counterintelligence and other USG partners and allies 13 U DOD is posturea' to support homeland security critical protection and civil support DOD could be called upon to lend expertise or assistance in the event of catastrophic incidents affecting US use of cyberspace DOD must be prepared with appropriate contingency plans and resources to provide coordinated support as directed U Ways DOD achieves the strategic goal and complements other USG activities using a variety of ways that require development of particular capabilities U Fundamental Ways Five fundamental ways represent pro ciencies military forces must develop and execute to accomplish the ends Although many ways may contribute to achieving the ends Network Operations Information Operations Kinetic Actions Law Enforcement and Counterintelligence and Themes and Messages are fundamental to cyberspace operations There may be other ways not explicitly listed here that contribute to achieving the ends DOD components should initiate collaboration at the earliest possible stage of the planning process to share relevant knowledge about tools accesses techniques and information Early collaboration will facilitate decon iction 4 integration and of military and intelligence operations U Network Operations Network operations provide integrated network visibility and end to end management of networks global applications and services across the GIG Network visibility enables commanders to manage their networks as they would other combat systems 5 Network operations provide for assured system and network availability information protection and information delivery to support military intelligence and business inctions DOD must employ an information- centric layered defense in depth approach to operate and defend the GIG using technical and non technical practices These practices will further support continuous monitoring detection reporting prevention and response to ensure authorized and legitimate access to information while preventing unauthorized or illegitimate access and disclosure of information Network operations must also be inte grated with other information operations activities 5 U JP 6 0 Joint System 20 March 2006 p U Kinetic Actions DOD will conduct kinetic missions to preserve freedom of action and strategic advantage in cyberspace Kinetic actions can be either offensive or defensive and used in conjunction with other mission areas to achieve optimal military effects U Law Enforcement and Counte ntelh gence Rapid coordination among DOD criminal investigative and counterintelligence organizations with international federal state and local law enforcement and other counterintelligence agencies is a force multiplier Effective law enforcement investigations and the threat of prosecution can deter potential aggressors However arrest and prosecution will remain selective and infrequent due to di iculty in ascertaining the identity and status of attackers coupled with complex jurisdictional issues Counterintelligence goals include identifying adversary intent targets and capabilities exploiting adversary cyber operations and providing threat warning U Themes and Messages DOD can use cyberspace rapidly and more effectively to reach target audiences in support of USG interests and policies Increasingly the Internet and wireless networks provide DOD the means to reach foreign audiences as part of support to a comprehensive interagency e ort These activities should be coordinated and integrated with USG objectives through appropriate DOD mechanisms U Enabling Ways Enablers enhance the e ectiveness and integration of military capabilities and their sub sequent effects 15 7% 1 3 sisally samparabl i it'o U Science and Technology DOD must continually invest in 865T and leverage emerging innovative and disruptive cyberspace technologies particularly those arising in the commercial arena Continual advances in operations resulting from pursuit of 885T initiatives are a prerequisite for superiority in cyberspace DOD must capitalize on to ensure 'no US peer competitor emerges to challenge US interests in cyberspace U Partnering In addition to standard military relationships leaders must recognize that interagency and coalition relationships are critical to successful cyberspace operations ability to conduct cyberspace operations freely is fundamentally linked to infrastructures not all of which are under our control Therefore DOD must assist in decreasing vulnerabilities to those infrastructures whenever possible through success rl partnerships Clearly de ned partnerships help distinguish between foreign and domestic threats and help resolve procedural and legal issues These relationships include defense contractors federally funded research and development centers academia commercial infrastructure providers and other global and regional allies and partners who share similar dependence on cyberspace To the extent possible DOD will work with these partners to mitigate vulnerabilities and increase the resilience of the critical infrastructures U Industry The continuing evolution of global outsourcing and offshore development of IT increases DOD reliance on industry partnerships For example the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers6 are public and private alliances that facilitate information sharing between the public and private sectors This permits collaborative actions to create an environment that fosters greater security in cyberspace and enables freedom of action for other mission areas DOD must be prepared to support and collaborate with these public private alliances and other government initiatives designed to secure and defend the US against cyberspace threats DOD has limited in uence on the strategic direction of global markets but can leverage relationships to increase strategic advantage and decrease risk DOD in partnership with industry must ensure adequate measures are in place for the software assurance and security of cyberspace U Interagency The interagency process must provide for integrated planning and operations The process must also clearly de ne lines of 5 Recommended in the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets SEER-ET- 16 responsibility among DOD DHS DOS IC and other governmental agencies Interagency and coalition relationships must be built and maintained so that they may dynamically respond and evolve as the situation dictates Integrating early planning efforts will reduce seams and close gaps in interagency efforts limit shortfalls in resources needed to support mission accomplishment and increase the overall success in conducting operations For example the National Cyber Response Coordination Group is a forum of USG agencies including representatives from the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council The coordinates intra-governrnental and public private preparedness operations to respond to and recover om national cyber incidents U International Coalition The United States must build and maintain coalitions that are adaptable and capable of evolving throughout an operation Integrating coalition partners early into the planning process reduces operational seams across the coalition and increases the overall success of operations U Situational Awareness Cyberspace situational awareness enables commanders and planners to assess the current situation collaborate on courses of action take action and anticipate opportunities and challenges in the domain Automated tools must be employed to provide near-real time noti cation of anomalous activity and properly inject appropriate data into operational views to characterize the cyberspace activity This situational awareness combined with proper risk assessments including intelligence loss or gain determinations will allow commanders to make the best decisions on courses of action U Law Policy Policy in uences organizational relationships and partnerships that must be established in order to operate successfully in the domain DOD must conduct cyberspace operations within applicable US and international law and relevant'USG and DOD policies The legal amework applicable to cyberspace operations depends on the nature of the activities to be conducted such as offensive or defensive military operations defense support to civil authorities security service provider actions law enforcement and connterintelligence activities intelligence operations and defense of the homeland Before conducting cyberspace operations commanders planners and operators must understand the relevant legal framework in order to comply with laws and policies the application of which may be challenging given the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace and the often geographic orientation of domestic and international law It is essential that commanders planners and operators consult with legal counsel during the planning and execution of cyberspace operations DOD must ensure policy is in place to protect both information and infrastructure to facilitate sharing information securely and appropriately with partners U People DOD must invest the resources necessary to eld an adequately and consistently trained and properly equipped force Training must encompass the entire workforce as well as provide specialty training for those directly involved in cyberspace operations Training must be continuous and commanders must ensure that training is dynamic and updated to re ect new technology and address new 17 threats Although the roles and responsibilities of training the force remain a functional responsibility of the Military Departments combatant commands and agencies also must integrate mandatory cyberspace training Adequate and consistent training will ensure that all personnel become an effective rst line of defense and a human sensor In particular developing and integrating IO and network operations joint learning areas into joint professional military education improves the overall IO education baseline and ensures consistency among the DOD workforce Military Departments should take advantage of 10 training in cyberspace operations disciplines as appropriate to promote common standards and facilitate integrated and collaborative operations Incorporating IO and network operations into all training and exercise programs is critical to ensure that war ghters gain a better understanding of IO and network operations capabilities and vulnerabilities within a training environment U Means The uni ed employment of the combatant commands Military Departments agencies eld activities and other organizational entities of the DOD and resources along with strategies plans policies and programs constitute the military means for cyberspace operations Combatant commands are responsible for operational planning and execution the Military Departments organize train and equip forces to present to the joint force commander and the various agencies and eld activities support both In addition DOD will continue to leverage Reserve and National Guard contributions for cyberspace operations In addition judicious elding of advanced technologies improves awareness agility protection and response to threats against cyberspace and to our interests in cyberspace CHAPTER SIX IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENT U U Way Ahead The Joint Staff has the responsibility to advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta on the progress of supporting plans and actions to meet the intent of the priorities and outcomes in Enclosure F To this end United States Strategic Command with Joint Staff as co lead will develop an implementation plan and lead an annual assessment process Within 60 days of approval terms of reference for the implementation plan should be submitted to the Chairman for approval by the Secretary of Defense The implementation plan will include representation across the DOD components Following approval of the terms of reference the implementation plan will develop speci c tasks with lead agencies assigned U Assessment Assessment is an important part of implementation DOD components will provide assessments of progress that will be consolidated into a report to assess the effectiveness of the strategy and forwarded through the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense The reporting process will be with the primary DOD decision processes The assessment will examine metrics through measures of effectiveness that apply to the ways identi ed in the military strategic framework for cyberspace operations Mitigating strategies based on the report ndings will be executed using plans of action and milestones integrated throughout operations requirements planning budgeting and acquisition processes To the extent possible metrics and reporting will be shared with interagency and coalition partners and coordinated with other key strategic efforts U Capabilities To achieve these ends forces will combine capabilities to create the necessary effects Development of capabilities should augment these mission areas and contribute to strategic enablers through the current Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Although all Joint Capability Areas apply to cyberspace operations the areas identi ed in Enclosure merit speci c emphasis U Strategic Priorities DOD components are tasked with nanslating this strategy into action The priorities focus DOD efforts to achieve the strategic goal and ve speci c ends using the ways outlined in the amework The strategic priorities are U Gain and maintain the initiative to operate within adversary decision cycles War ghters should use cyberspace to accelerate their own decision making cycle while degrading that of the adversary This involves maintaining a robust defense of cyberspace while exploiting adversary cyberspace vulnerabilities in order to understand the enemy s decision cycle and defensive weaknesses U Integrate capabilities across the full range of military operations using cyberspace DOD components must integrate cyberspace into deliberate and crisis plans Combatant commands must work closely with Service components and DOD agencies to create fully integrated capabilities to conduct military operations As capabilities are deployed to various theaters they must SEER-ET- 19 complement or decon ict with existing operations and provide seamless interoperability with interagency joint coalition and industry partners U Build capacity for cyberspace operations The Military Departments and certain agencies or commands should develop capabilities necessary to conduct cyberspace operations including consistently trained personnel infrastructure and organizational structures These organizations should work closely with combatant commands to integrate new capacity into existing operations through aggressive testing exercises and continual improvements to operations Highly capable and agile forces using illy integrated technology are critical to delivering offensive and defensive capabilities cyberspace operations U Manage risk to cyberspace operations There are three types of risk innate risk of operating in cyberspace resulting from threats and vulnerabilities consequential risk of actions taken in cyberspace and risk associated with resource choices Leaders at all levels must balance each type of risk for e ective operations U Outcomes DOD components must develop and coordinate plans and roadmapsto ensure appropriate resource allocation for which the serves as a de nitive reference The strategic priorities above serve to translate the military strategic framework described in Chapter Five into focused efforts to ensure US military strategic superiority in cyberspace The priorities serve as broad guidelines that DOD components can use to focus activities to attain capabilities organized around the doctrine organization training materiel leadership personnel and facilities D construct DOD components should use the strategy to develop actions leading to the outcomes listed in Enclosure F 20 ENCLOSURE A 5 LEGAL AUTHORITIES TABLE U US Code Title Key Focus Principal Organization Role in Cyberspace Department of Homeland Title 6 Domestic Security Homeland Security Security Security of US Cyberspace T1tle Armed Forces National Defense DOD Secure US Interests by Conductmg 10 Military Operations in Cyberspace Crime Prevention Apprehension Law Enforcement Department of Justice and Prosecution of Cyberspace Criminals Title Crimes and Criminal 18 Procedure Support Defense of US Interests in Cyberspace Through Critical Title - National Guard First Line Defense of Army National Guard Air Infrastructure Protection Domestic 32 the United States National Guard Consequence Management and Other Homeland Defense Related Activities Chief Information Establish and Enforce Standards for Of cer Roles and All Federal DEP ants Acquisition and Security of Title Public Buildings Property Responsibilities and Agem es Information Technologies 40 and Works Intelligence Community Agencies Aligned Under the Of ce of the Director of National Intelligence Foreign Intelligence War and National Defense and Counter Intelligence Activities Intelligence Gathering Through Q berspace on Foreign Intentions Operations and Capabilities Title 50 Ez m Sizo zmez ENCLOSURE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE U U Management of Domestic Incidents 2003 U Critical In astructure Identi cation Prioritization and Protection 2003 U Executive Order 13388 Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Infomation to Protect Americans 2005 U Uni ed Command Plan 2006 U National Security Strategy 2006 U National Strategy forHomelancl Security 2002 U National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 2003 U National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 2003 U National Defense Strategy 2005 U Security Cooperation Guidance 2005 U Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 U Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 2005 U National Response Plan 2004 U National Military Strategy 2004 U DOD Information Assurance Strategic Plan 2004 INTENT IO NALLY BLANK ENCLOSURE EXAMPLES OF THREATS AND THREAT ACTORS U U Cyberspace threats generally fall within six categories traditional irregular catastrophic disruptive natural and accidental U Traditional Traditional threats typically arise from states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military con ict Within cyberspace these threats may be less understood due to the continuing evolution of technologies and methods Traditional threats are generally focused against the cyberspace capabilities that enable our air land maritime and space forces and are focused to deny the US military freedom of action and use of cyberspace U Irregular Irregular threats can use cyberspace as an unconventional asymmetric means to counter traditional advantages These threats could also manifest through an adversary s selective targeting of US cyberspace capabilities and infrastructure For example terrorists could use cyberspace to conduct operations against our nancial and industrial sectors while simultaneously launching other physical attacks Terrorists also use cyberspace to communicate anonymously and without being tied to set physical locations They attempt to shield themselves from US law enforcement intelligence and military operations through use of commercial security products and serviCes readily available in cyberspace Irregular threats from criminal elements and advocates of radical political agendas seek to use cyberspace for their own ends to challenge government corporate or societal interests U Catastrophic Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition possession and use of weapons of mass destruction WMD or methods producing WMD like effects Such catastrophic effects are possible in cyberspace because of the existing linkage of cyberspace to critical infrastructure SCADA systems Well-planned attacks on key nodes of the Cyberspace infrastructure have the potential to produce network collapse and cascading effects that can severely affect critical infrastructures locally nationally or possibly globally For example electromagnetic pulse events could cause widespread degradation and outright destruction of the electronic components that comprise cyberspace leading to the debilitating destruction of segments of the cyberspace domain in which operations must occur U Dismpiive Disruptive threats are breakthrough technologies that may negate or reduce current US advantages in war ghting domains Global research investment development and industrial processes provide an environment conducive to the creation of technological advances DOD must be prepared for the increased possibility of adversary breakthroughs due to the continuing diffusion of cyberspace technologies U Natural Natural threats that can damage and disrupt cyberspace include acts of nature such as oods hurricanes solar ares lightning and tornados These types of events often produce highly destructive effects requiring DOD to support the continuity of operations in cyberspace conduct consequence management and restore cyberspace capacity These events also provide adversaries the opportunity to capitalize on infrastructure degradation and diversion of attention and resources U Accidental Accidental threats are unpredictable and can take many forms From a backhoe cutting a ber optic cable of a key cyberspace node to inadvertent introduction of viruses accidental threats unintentionally disrupt the operation of cyberspace Although post accident investigations show that the large majority of accidents can be prevented and measures put in place to reduce accidents accidents must be anticipated U Cyberspace threat actors generally fall within six categories 7 U National Intelligence Estimate Cyber Threats to the Information Infrastructure February 2004 2004 8 U Ibid INTENTIO NALLY BLANK ENCLOSURE EXAMPLES OF VULNERABILITIES U I seams iif i$1113tf Ei qlisimread ssphis sa i U Architecture The current cyberspace architecture is permissive to the conduct of malicious activity Insecure communications protocols and software combined with the huge number of connection points in cyberspace make securing cyberspace an extremely di icult task In addition the nature of cyberspace enables military operations intended to be local in scope to become global rapidly in effect U Operating with Partners Connecting to partner components of cyberspace such as Federal departments and allies introduces additional vulnerabilities especially if cyberspace security is not a partner priority or if security has been unevenly applied U Technical Vulnerabilities Technical vulnerabilities are an inherent aspect of cyberspace operations Vulnerabilities found in operating systems software applications and controlled interfaces can allow threat actors to gain unauthorized access to information systems and data and enable them to disrupt system functionality at their discretion Threat actors pro cient in software programming signaling command and control 02 protocol architecture or may be able to inject malicious data into software rmware hardware and mechanisms to render the data useless or crack for data collection na a J- U Commercial Technologies and Outsourcing Exploitation could occur anywhere within the technology life-cycle process Throughout a product s life cycle adVersaries can discover potential vulnerabilities in commercial otf the shelf software and hardware installed on DOD systems and networks U Physical Protection Insu cient protective measures or poor physical protection procedures for cyberspace components such as cables facilities sites structures and equipment could have signi cant negative consequences for operations U Open Source Infomation Potential threat actors may use publicly available information and employ data mining methods to focus intelligence collection efforts and plan attacks against DOD networks Proper OPSEC process implementation would assist in denying adversaries access to controlled unclassi ed information which in its aggregate may be classi ed U Training Personnel including senior leaders commanders cyberspace operators and ordinary users all require thorough training for e ective cyberspace operations Poor training lessens awareness of adversary techniques such as social engineering to gain access to networks systems and information In addition since at some level all personnel operate in cyberspace of paramount concern is adequate training to maintain and improve defense-in-depth measures Poorly trained personnel may carelessly or incorrectly install maintain or secure systems mishandle passwords or improperly check for malicious software Users whether due to carelessness lack of training or lack of adherence to policies and procedures may unwittingly cause system denials disruptions or degradations as well as data loss or compromise Poorly trained operators can also introduce vulnerabilities to operations U Policy Vulnerabilities Policies related to cyberspace are designed to codify desired behavior and actions conducive to reducing cyberspace vulnerabilities Policies also ensure that offensive cyberspace operations are carried out only with appropriate authorities risk management and quali ed personnel Policies help guide and ensure decon iction of cyberspace operations Poorly enforced or poorly written policies and procedures place our operating environment our operations and broader US interests at risk Lack of awareness of existing policy is another signi cant vulnerability ENCLOSURE APPLICATION TO JOINT CAPABILITIES AREAS U U Joint Battlespace Awareness Shared awareness and understanding of the battlespace are critical to situational awareness while intelligence plays a key role in supporting this awareness and understanding of the battlespace Joint Battlespace Awareness applies across all the ways i U Joint Force Generation Creating and developing the force necessary to conduct cyberspace operations applies to people describing the need to ensure personnel receive adequate consistent training and the tools necessary to accomplish mission objectives The development of future capabilities is also important to 8657 This capability area ensures the necessary forces to implement IO and network operations are prepared to conduct operations U Joint C2 Effective C2 ensures coordinated deliberate action across IO network operations and kinetic actions In addition intelligence and situational awareness rely on C2 to enable effective collaboration U Joint Information Operations Capabilities identi ed and developed in this area will build and sustain IO This capability area will also contribute to intelligence U Joint Net-Centric Operations Components of joint net centric operations such as information transport enterprise services and information assurance will sustain IO and network operations This capability area will also contribute to situational awareness U Joint Global Deterrence Development of appropriate force projection facilitates IO and kinetic actions mission areas Partnering relies on capabilities developed for coalition military cooperation and integration 1 U Joint Homeland Defense Further development of network defense and critical infrastructure protection capabilities will contribute to IO and network operations As key relationships are examined law-enforcement 65 counterintelligence and themes and messages will be affected Consequence management applies to law and policy U Joint Interagency Integration Intergovernmental Organization Coordination nongovernmental Organization Coordination Successful integration is crucial to partnering and law and policy and applies across all of the ways E4 INTENTIONALLY BLANK SEGREF E2 U The strategic priorities and outcomes are aligned with the appropriate component of the construct Military Departments and agencies should consider these as they allocate resources Combatant commands should incorporate these outcomes into actions as they develop capabilities and plans in their particular areas of responsibility U Gain and Maintain the Initiative to Operate Within Adversary Decision Cycle ENCLOSURE STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND OUTCOMES U U Develop joint doctrine for all aspects of cyberspace operations Include revised de nition and development of terms to describe emerging cyberspace operations mission areas in accordance with the Joint Doctrine Development and Joint Operations Concept Development processes Doctrine U Employ an enterprise wide system of sensors whose data is automatically distributed to those who need it on detection of malicious activity Materiel U Maintain continuous active layered defenses using existing information assurance guidance to protect the con dentiality integrity availability authentication and non-repudiation of information as it is processed created and manipulated at rest and in-motion Leadership U Rapidly intelligence to support cyberspace operations Doctrine U Improve the collection and use of intelligence to produce indications and warnings in order to anticipate not just detect attacks Leadership U Re ne C2 processes for cyberspace operations so that they are well understood agile and integrated with the full range of military operations Doctrine U Establish readiness reporting for cyberspace operations Doctrine U Integrate Capabilities Across the Full Range of Military Operations Using Cyberspace U Change and implement the appropriate rules of engagement ROE to facilitate cyberspace operations Doctrine U Conduct collaborative planning for integrated cyberspace operations A with other military and intelligence operations Leadership I LJ U Transform organizations to enable joint cyberspace operations and integrate Military Department focused efforts to shape cyberspace Organization U Augment and integrate intelligence support into all aspects of cyberspace operations Personnel U Describe the complete set of capabilities required to improve secure information sharing in a phased incremental approach Materiel U Transform operations to implement increased self-defense and self- healing capabilities using emerging automated tools to respond more quickly to cyberspace events Organization U Ensure allied and coalition contributions are integrated into US e orts to secure cyberspace Organization U Develop processes for cyberspace targeting collateral damage estimation standing and special ROE and measures of effectiveness assessments that are integrated within the joint force targeting process and result in tailored operations that support joint commander objectives guidance and intent Organization U Develop modeling and simulation tools and methods to support cyberspace capability development adaptive planning and integrated operations Materiel U Build Capacity for Cyberspace Operations U Improve abilities to conduct and share analysis of military effects in cyberspace cyber intelligence preparation of the environment CIPE and post-event forensic analysis Leadership U Increase investments and acquisition in tools for cyberspace operations Build on cyberspace exploitation dual-use capabilities as appropriate Materiel U Conduct appropriate reviews and source code testing to identify malicious code or unauthorized functionality Organization U Establish a mechanism and a managed process to ensure system con guration facilitates joint operations Leadership U Architect the GIG to support diEferent levels of information assurance and INFOCON across regional and functional boundaries Facility U Conduct enterprise-Wide acquisition of tools and infrastructure equipment using a clearing house concept to reduce duplication enhance collaboration and reduce acquisition and training costs Materiel U Establish coalition cyberspace operations processes and exercises to include cyberspace capacity building programs and policies for information sharing Training U Integrate cyberspace operations into existing exercises Training U Tailor education and training to meet speci c needs of leaders professionals and users in cyberspace Training U Ensure coherence among various compartmented programs Leadership U Expand information operations range to incorporate integrated cyberspace operations training and exercise Facility U Make information visible accessible and understandable Doctrine U Manage Riskfor Cyberspace Operations U Hold leaders at all levels responsible and accountable for cyberspace operations in the same manner as accountability is addressed in the other domains Leadership U Identi and manage operational dependencies in the cyberspace domain Leadership U Develop standardized risk management processes across the range of defensive cyberspace operations and link to resource allocation decisions Leadership U Understand mitigate and manage the effects of foreign ownership control or in uence FOCI on operations using cyberspace Leadership U Develop integrated vulnerability assessment processes to facilitate protection detection and response to cyberspace attacks and intrusions Doctrine U Assess operational risk of using hardware and software developed outside ae United States or by untrusted workers within the United States Materiel U Review all communications with non authenticated sources and where practical reduce them Doctrine U Improve OPSEC education and training to support cyberspace operations Training INTENTIO NALLY BLANK ENCLOSURE DISTRIBUTION LIST Copies O ce of the Secretary of Defense 3 O ce of the Deputy Secretary of Defense 2 Secretaries of the Military Departments 2 Under Secretaries of Defense 2 Assistant Secretaries of Defense 5 General Counsel of the Department of Defense 2 Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense 5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 3 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta 3 Chief of Staff US Army 5 Chief of Naval Operations 5 Chief of Sta ' US Air Force 5 Commandant of the Marine Corps 5 Commandant US Coast Guard 3 Commander US Joint Forces Command 3 Commander US Central Command 5 Commander US European Command 5 Commander UN Command Combined Forces Command 3 Commander US Paci c Command 5 Commander US Southern Command 5 Commander US Special Operations Command 3 Commander US Strategic Command 5 Commander US Transportation Command 5 Commander US Northern Command 5 Commander US Element NORAD 1 Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Director Joint Staff 1 Director for Manpower and Personnel Joint Sta ' 1 Director for Intelligence Joint Sta 5 Director for Operations Joint Sta 5 Director for Logistics Joint Staff 5 Director for Strategic Plans and Policy Joint Staff 5 Director for Command Control Communications and Computer Systems Joint Staff 5 Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Joint Staff 3 Director for Force Structure Resources and Assessment Joint Staff 3 US Military Representative NATO Military Committee 1 Director Defense Information Systems Agency 1 Director Defense Intelligence Agency 1 Director Defense Logistics Agency 1 Director Defense Security Cooperation Agency 1 Director Defense Threat Reduction Agency 1 Director National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 1 Director National Security Agency Chief Central Security Service 1 Director National Guard Bureau 1 Director Combating Terrorism Center United States Military Academy 1 G'l Director Combating Terrorism Center Naval Postgraduate School 1 Director Missile Defense Agency 1 US National Military Representative to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 1 Director Joint Command and Control Warfare Center 1 Chief National Military Command Center Site R 1 Chief National Airborne Operations Center 4 Secretary Joint Staff 7 Information Management Division Joint Staff 7 GLOSSARY computer network attack CNA Operations to disrupt deny degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks or the computers and networks themselves 3600 02 computer network attack operational preparation of the environment are operations conducted to gain and or con rm access to and gather key information on the target network concerning the capabilities and con guration of targeted networks or systems and to facilitate target acquisition and target analysis in preparation for CNA and or other offensive missions 3121 013 computer network defense CND Actions taken to protect monitor analyze detect and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks CND employs IA capabilities to respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks in response to a CND alert or threat information Note CND also employs intelligence counterintelligence law enforcement and other military capabilities to defend DOD information and computer networks 3600 02 computer network ekploitation ONE Enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks 3600 02 computer network operations Comprised of computer network attack computer network defense and related computer network exploitation enabling operations 1-02 continuity of operations plan COOP The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions tasks or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy It includes the functions and duties of the commander as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the commander 1 02 counterintelligence CI Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage other intelligence activities sabotage or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof foreign organizations or foreign persons or international terrorist activities 1 02 global information grid GIG The globally interconnected end to end set of information capabilities associated processes and personnel for collecting processing storing disseminating and managing information on demand to war ghters policy makers and support personnel The GIG includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and services software including applications data security services and other associated services necessary to achieve information superiority It also includes National Security Systems as de ned in 40 USC 1 1 103 a formerly section 5 142 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 Section 11103 a of title 40 information assurance Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability integrity authentication con dentiality and non-repudiation This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection detection and reaction capabilities 1-02 information environment The aggregate of individuals organizations and systems that co ect process disseminate or act on information 1-02 information operations The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare computer network operations operations military deception and operations security in concert with speci ed supporting and related capabilities to in uence disrupt corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own 3600 02 intelligence 1 The product resulting from the collection processing integration analysis evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas 2 Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation investigation analysis or understanding 1-02 network operations Activities conducted to operate and defend the Global Information Grid 1 02 strategic communications Focused US Government USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests policies and objectives through the use of coordinated programs plans themes messages and products with the actions of all elements of national power 1-02 threat Any circumstance or event with the potential to a ect an information system adversely through unauthorized access destruction disclosure modi cation of data and or denial of service SS Instruction No 4009 vulnerability 1 The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or cembat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to ght diminished 2 The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a de nite degradation incapability to perform the designated mission as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of e 'ects in an unnatural manrnade hostile environment 3 In information operations a weakness in information system security design procedures implementation or internal controls that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information or an information system 1 02 NOTE Unless a glossary entry is followed by the caption 1-02 to indicate incorporation in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms J 1-02 the entry is applicable only in the context of this document and not to be used outside that context INTENTIONALLY BLANK