Produced by Defense Security Office Counterintelligence Directorate Contributors Mr Thomas Badoud Mr Timothy Deerr Ms Sara DeWitz and Mr John Parsons http www dss mil A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y Table of contents TABLES AND FIGURES 2 PREFACE 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 BACKGROUND 9 A Scope Methodology 9 B Explanation of Estimative Language Analytic Confidence 10 SPECIAL FOCUS AREA TARGETING UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 11 REGIONAL SECTION 17 A East Asia and the Pacific Region 17 B Near East Region 23 C Europe and Eurasia Region 29 D South and Central Asia Region 35 CONCLUSION 41 FORECAST 42 APPENDIX REFERENCES 45 REFERENCE MAP 46 In the interests of readability and ease of comprehension the editors have deferred the conventional stylistic use of repeated acronyms in favor of a full exposition of terms as they are first used within each specific section TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S 1 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S Tables and figures TABLES FIGURES EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC Table 1 Targeted Technologies 20 NEAR EAST Table 2 Targeted Technologies 26 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Figure 1 Regional Trends 5 Figure 2 Collector Affiliations 6 Figure 3 Methods of Operation 7 Figure 4 Targeted Technologies 8 EUROPE AND EURASIA Table 3 Targeted Technologies 32 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Figure 5 Foreign UAV Collection 14 SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA Table 4 Targeted Technologies 38 EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC Figure 6 Affiliations 18 Figure 7 Methods of Operation 19 NEAR EAST Figure 8 Affiliations 24 Figure 9 Methods of Operation 25 EUROPE AND EURASIA Figure 10 Affiliations 30 Figure 11 Methods of Operation 31 SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA Figure 12 Affiliations 36 Figure 13 Methods of Operation 37 2 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y SECURITY S SE VICE ER DEFE N preface TARGETING U S TECHNOLOGIES A TREND ANALYSIS OF REPORTING FROM DEFENSE INDUSTRY United States defense-related technologies and information are under attack each day every hour and from multiple sources The attack is pervasive relentless and unfortunately at times successful As a result the United States’ technical lead competitive edge and strategic military advantage are at risk and our national security interests could be compromised Defeating this attack requires knowledge of the threat and diligence on the part of all personnel charged with protecting classified information to deter or neutralize its effect The Defense Security Service DSS works with defense industry to protect critical technologies and information Defense contractors with access to classified material are required to identify and report suspicious contacts and potential collection attempts as mandated in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual NISPOM DSS publishes this annual report based on an analysis of suspicious contact reports SCRs that DSS considers indicative of efforts to target defense-related information Security officials cleared defense contractors intelligence professionals and Department of Defense policy and decision makers can use information in this publication to assess the technology collection threat and develop and implement appropriate measures to mitigate its effect DSS analysts examine information obtained from SCRs to identify the most frequently targeted technologies assess the most common collection methods explore possible motivations and affiliations of those attempting the collection and identify the locations where these collection threats originate If we are to be relevant and effective in defeating this threat it is incumbent upon cleared defense contractors to report all incidents indicative of targeting It is our hope that the information and analysis in this report will inform and encourage such reporting DSS encourages all Facility Security Officers to use the information in this report to supplement security awareness and education programs at their facilities In addition to increasing threat awareness within the industrial base robust training efforts contribute to additional SCRs and further contribute to the integrity of this analytical product Timely submission of SCRs to DSS field offices is critical to an effective industrial security program This document would not be possible without the strong support of Facility Security Officers within the United States cleared defense industry DSS thanks the employees and companies of the United States cleared defense industry for their continued support of the NISPOM and their contributions to this annual publication KATHLEEN M WATSON Director Defense Security Service P R E FA C E 3 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A KEY FINDINGS The Defense Security Service DSS presents the 2009 “Targeting U S Technologies” report in summation of defense industry reporting for fiscal year 2008 FY08 This report analyzes possible foreign targeting of information and technologies developed or maintained within the cleared defense contractor CDC community It offers a single perspective of the threat as viewed through the admittedly narrow but nonetheless • East Asia and Pacific-originated contacts continued to generate the greatest number of suspicious reports attributable to a specific region of origin For the fifth year in a row reporting with an East Asia and Pacific nexus far exceeded those from any other region suggesting a continuing concerted and growing effort to exploit contacts within United States industry for competitive economic and military advantage • Aggressive collection attempts by commercial actors continued to surge In FY08 commercial entities attempted to collect defense technology at a rate nearly double that of governmental or individual collector affiliations This trend likely represents a purposeful attempt to make the contacts seem more innocuous shifting focus from government collectors to commercial or non-traditional entities • Collectors continued bold and overt exploitation of the Internet to acquire information via direct requests 4 relevant window of defense industry’s unsolicited contact with foreign entities interested in defense programs and technologies The substance of this report is drawn from DSS analysis of suspicious contact reports SCRs received from industry These reports describe suspicious foreign activity targeting U S personnel technologies classified information and export controlled products The following constitutes key findings based on DSS analysis of FY08 data as compared to the previous year’s reporting Facilitated by ever increasing world wide connectivity the ease of inundating industry with overt email requests and webpage submissions made direct requests a premier vehicle for solicitation and or collection While not all direct requests for information or services represent organized collection attempts exploitation of this medium provides collectors an efficient low-cost high-gain opportunity to acquire classified or restricted information • Unmanned aerial vehicle UAV technology has emerged as a priority target of aggressive collectors from multiple regions In FY08 DSS noticed a significant increase in exploitation attempts against UAV systems and technologies at CDCs Targeting of UAVs is non-region specific broadly based and spans all phases of research development and deployment It is highly likely that this interest and probable targeting is the direct result of a growing and increasingly competitive world market for UAV systems TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y B REGIONAL COLLECTION TRENDS According to the U S State Department there are 194 independent countries in the world In FY08 entities in over half of these countries attempted at least once to illicitly acquire United States defense technologies or information DSS organized information about these attempts into the State Department’s six regional groupings See reference map for information about the countries within the State Department’s regional bureaus Concurrently DSS examined SCRs received from the defense industry in FY08 to determine which represented matters of confirmed or probable counterintelligence CI concern Where possible analysts affiliated relevant reports with specific regions of origin assessing the geographic association of the requestor For FY08 the regions most frequently affiliated with validated or probable reports of CI concern were in descending order of occurrence REGIONAL TRENDS FIGURE 1 East Asia and the Pacific Near East Europe and Eurasia South and Central Asia Western Hemisphere Africa EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A comparison to FY07 data reveals no major changes in this hierarchy with East Asia and the Pacific and Near East entities remaining the most prolific collectors of United States technology or information As in previous years East Asia and the Pacific collectors continued to dominate collection efforts in terms of sheer volume The desire to maintain and dominate a regional military capability while enhancing political and economic influence likely drives intense collection priorities from East Asia and Pacific entities This modernization campaign relies heavily on exploiting United States technical advancements Countering this threat to United States defense industry will require the highest degree of cooperation education awareness and vigilance This reporting period also witnessed a number of SCRs emanating from the Near East region While Near East entities were the second most prolific regional collectors the volume did not approach the deluge of reporting emanating from East Asia and the Pacific collectors To counter international trade restrictions and embargoes imposed on various actors in this region Near East collectors used widely cast and varied approaches to target United States technology frequently engaging non-traditional collectors such as students at American universities to illicitly gather information and attempt to acquire technology Given rising trends related to this region suspicious requests from Near East entities are not likely to abate in the near future Despite Europe and Eurasia’s geo-political significance and economic status as a rival in the technical marketplace attempts to acquire defense-related technologies emanating from this region failed to keep pace with collection attempts noted from either the East Asia and Pacific region or the Near East region When DSS first compiled comparative statistics in 2004 European and Eurasian collectors ranked second only 5 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S to East Asia and the Pacific entities Since then SCRs with European and Eurasian nexes have declined steadily relegating the region to the third position in the hierarchy of collectors an almost 40 percent decrease from reports in 2004 The reasons for this relative decline remain largely conjectural but DSS reporting indicates that European and Eurasian collectors may be simply less dependent on overt contacts with United States industry to keep pace with technical advancements Although many European and Eurasian research and development R D programs are robust and favorably positioned to satisfy the majority of their own technical requirements intelligence community reporting indicates that this indigenous R D capacity does not diminish an appetite for U S military and dual-use technologies More sinisterly it may suggest that Europe and Eurasia collectors do not need to use high-profile collection techniques because their covert collection methodologies are already efficient and effective as to render the more blatant overt requests largely supplemental to other collection competencies It is noteworthy that even though their overt collection efforts have declined European and Eurasian cyber actors remain some of the most active targeters of United States technology C COLLECTOR AFFILIATIONS DSS analyzes each SCR to determine the collector’s affiliation in an attempt to ascertain which foreign entity is targeting United States technology The examples below describe a sampling of collectors resident within a region of origin • Government Ministry of Defense foreign military attachés or branches of the military • Government Affiliated Research institutes laboratories 6 government-funded universities or contractors representing a government agency • Commercial Businesses in the commercial and defense sectors • Individual Persons seeking financial gain persons avoiding traditional export procedures or persons purportedly seeking academic or research information As in FY07 commercial entities represented the top collectors of United States technology outstripping government affiliated entities as the most frequently observed collector category While affected by the explosive growth of the worldwide marketplace and the ease with which commercial entities make inquiries through the Internet the growing preeminence of commercial collectors is likely attributable at least in part to a conscious effort on the part of foreign governments to mask interest using commercial surrogates to obtain information designed to enhance a specific regions’ technical or economic competitive posture The collector affiliations suspicious entities most frequently used are represented in the figure below COLLECTOR AFFILIATIONS FIGURE 2 FY 2008 Percent Individual 9 Government 9 Commercial 39 Unknown 11 GovernmentAssociated 14 Unidentified Entities Other 17 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y D METHODS OF OPERATION Once DSS identifies the requestor’s region of origin as well as the collector’s probable affiliation DSS assesses the methods of operation MOs that the suspicious entity employs to acquire information or technology Analysis of MOs assists CDC personnel in recognizing suspicious entity attempts to acquire sensitive defense-related information and aids in the application of appropriate countermeasures to mitigate or negate effectiveness Exploitation of direct requests continued to be the most common technique that foreign entities used in attempting to acquire information in FY08 Of note suspicious Internet activity was second only to direct request as a technique of choice emphasizing the growing significance of that MO to facilitate foreign collection of defense-related information and technology In FY08 the top four collection MOs were used in 80 percent of all foreign collection attempts The MOs suspicious entities most frequently utilized were in descending order of occurrence METHODS OF OPERATION FIGURE 3 Direct Request Email requests for information webcard purchase requests price quote requests phone calls or marketing surveys  Suspicious Internet Activity Confirmed intrusion attempted intrusion computer network attack potential pre-attack or spam w http ww Solicitation and Seeking Employment Offering technical and business services to CDCs resume submissions or sales offers Foreign Visits and Targeting Suspicious activity at a convention unannounced visit to a CDC solicitations to attend a convention offers of paid travel to a seminar targeting of travelers questions beyond scope or overt search and seizure EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  7 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S E TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES DSS analyzes foreign interest in United States defense technology in terms of the 20 categories detailed in the Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Identification of technologies that suspicious elements are targeting for acquisition is a critical analytic objective Understanding collection priorities allows the cleared defense industry to establish appropriately focused security countermeasures to help prevent or mitigate the loss of technology and classified information DSS analysis of FY08 SCRs indicated the following technologies listed in descending order of foreign entity interest represented probable collection priorities TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES FIGURE 4 Information Systems Aeronautics Lasers and Optics Sensors Marine Systems Positioning Navigation and Time This listing is generally consistent with previous years’ assessments In FY08 suspicious entities continued to target information systems technology most frequently as they had in FY07 The remaining technical categories retained their relative positions in the hierarchy but interest in aeronautic technology saw the largest increase owing primarily to growing interest in the acquisition of information and technologies identifiable with unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs F SPECIAL FOCUS AREA TARGETING UAVS This report contains a section focused on the increasing prominence of UAVs as an emerging collection target Technically diverse UAVs can range from small handlaunched planes to armed high-altitude long-endurance vehicles The UAV market also continues to expand as developers continually offer updated systems and concomitantly the global UAV demand increases This cyclical dynamic drives intense requirements for the information related to state-of-the-art developments in the field As a world leader in UAV R D the United States defense industry is at risk of intensive foreign-originated efforts to acquire UAV-related technologies or information Given this targeting focus on UAV platforms and systems it is highly likely that the imperative for economic or military advantage will continue to make defense industry UAV-related technologies primary collection priorities Electronics Non-DSTL Technology Armaments and Energetic Materials Materials and Processing 8 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y background Department of Defense DoD Instruction 5200 39 dated July 16 2008 requires DSS to publish a classified report as well as an unclassified companion report detailing suspicious contacts occurring within the cleared defense contractor CDC community indicative of a foreign threat to personnel information and technologies resident in the United States cleared defense industrial base In accordance with this instruction DSS disseminates these reports to the DoD counterintelligence CI community national entities and the CDC community to assist in general threat awareness to identify specific technologies at risk and to aid in the application of appropriate threat countermeasures DSS receives and analyzes suspicious contact reports SCRs from CDCs in accordance with reporting requirements as stated in Chapter 1 Section 3 of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual 5220 22-M dated February 28 2006 Based on an analysis of these SCRs DSS prepared this report determined a separate section is warranted to address this growing collection area This section provides a definition of UAV systems that foreign collectors target analysis based on reporting from defense industry and the UAV collector methodology This trends report covers information regarding the most prolific foreign collectors targeting the CDC community during fiscal year 2008 FY08 as compared to the previous fiscal year The report includes statistical and trends analysis on foreign collector affiliations the traditional methods foreign entities used to target the CDC community and the specific technology sectors that they targeted Each section also contains an analytical assessment forecasting potential future activities against the CDC community DSS provides statistical and trends analysis on the foreign entity threat posed to the CDC community over the past fiscal year as compared to the previous year The report is based on suspicious contact reporting DSS collected from the CDC community and also includes reference to all-source Intelligence Community IC reporting While DSS analyzes all SCRs received from industry only those DSS determined to represent a potential CI concern in FY08 form the basis of this report Through analytical processes and application of the DSS foreign intelligence threat assessment methodology DSS determined over 32 percent of these reports reflected a potential CI threat to the CDC community or represented a link to elements DSS determined as hostile to United States’ interests This trends report also provides specific information on unmanned aerial vehicle UAV technology acquisition in United States cleared defense industry DSS has BACKGROUND This report is published as part of the agency’s ongoing effort to enhance awareness of foreign entities targeting the United States’ cleared defense industry and to encourage reporting of such incidents as they occur It illuminates the entities’ modus operandi to acquire information concerning specific technologies identifies at-risk technologies and projects estimates of foreign collectors’ likely future activities This report is also intended as a ready reference tool for the use of security professionals in their efforts to detect deter mitigate or neutralize the effects of foreign targeting A SCOPE METHODOLOGY 9 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S DSS analyzes foreign interest in United States defense technology in terms of the 20 categories in the Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL The DSTL is a compendium of science and technology capabilities being developed worldwide that have the potential to significantly enhance or degrade United States military capabilities in the future The DSTL serves as a template for DSS to define categories and subcategories for each technology Identification of said technologies is a critical analytic objective As noted DSS categorizes and culls SCRs to determine if they have a CI nexus or pose a potential CI threat to the cleared defense community DSS analysts scrutinize the SCRs examining the critical United States technology the targeting entity the methods of operation the relationships to previous reporting from the CDC community and all-source IC information B EXPLANATION OF ESTIMATIVE LANGUAGE ANALYTIC CONFIDENCE DSS adopted the IC estimative language standard for use in this report The use of synonymous phraseology such as “we judge ” “we assess ” or “we estimate ” as well as terms such as “likely ” or “indicate ” represent an effort by DSS to convey an analytical assessment or judgment These assessments based on incomplete or at times fragmentary information are not a fact proof nor do they represent empirically-based certainty or knowledge Some analytical judgments are based directly on collected information others rest on previous judgments both of which serve as building blocks In either type of judgment DSS does not have “evidence” showing something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues Intelligence judgments pertaining to “likelihood” are intended to reflect the Agency’s sense of the probability of a development event or trend Assigning precise numerical ratings to 10 such judgments would imply more rigor than DSS intends The chart below provides a rough idea of the relationship of terms to each other Remote Unlikely Even Chance Probably Likely Almost Certainly DSS does not intend the term “unlikely” to imply an event will not happen It uses “probably” and “likely” to indicate there is a greater than even chance DSS uses words such as “we cannot dismiss ” “we cannot rule out ” and “we cannot discount” to reflect unlikely—or even remote—events whose consequences are such that it warrants mentioning Words such as “may” and “suggest” are used to reflect situations in which DSS is unable to assess the likelihood generally because relevant information is nonexistent sketchy or fragmented In addition to using words within a judgment to convey degrees of likelihood DSS also ascribes analytic confidence levels based on the scope and quality of information supporting DSS judgments • High Confidence Indicates judgments are based on high-quality information or the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment • Moderate Confidence Indicates the information can be interpreted in various ways DSS has alternative views or the information is credible and plausible but not corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence • Low Confidence Indicates the information is scant questionable or highly fragmented making solid analytic inferences difficult or that DSS has significant concerns or problems with the sources TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S Special Focus Area Targeting Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 1 OVERVIEW The worldwide use of unmanned aerial vehicles UAV for reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition RSTA has risen steadily over the past 25 years as countries place increasing emphasis on the acquisition of UAV capabilities to acquire parity or maintain strategic or tactical advantage As a world leader in UAV research and development R D the United States industrial sector is at risk of intensive foreign-originated efforts to acquire UAVrelated technologies or information resident at cleared defense contractor CDC facilities CDCs should be aware of the intensity of this burgeoning threat and be prepared to institute appropriate measures to counter its effect This special interest report is intended to contribute to that effort Currently approximately 50 countries are involved with more than 100 different UAV acquisition and or development programs An overview of UAV R D and production efforts reveals an unprecedented level of worldwide activity See Figure 5 • Near East entities continue to be the world leader in UAV exports and have made progress in the development of lethal UAVs • South and Central Asia collectors are leading importers of UAV technology and have started their own fledging development programs WHAT IS A UAV SYSTEM A UAV system usually consists of one or more aerial vehicles AVs a ground control station GCS a ground tracking unit and AV launch recovery and support equipment The AV flies within the atmosphere under its own power performs a mission and has the ability to return A simple propeller-driven fixed-wing AV minus data links and payload can cost as little as $5 000 Adding camera payloads and data links to transmit the camera pictures may increase the price anywhere from $350 000 to $1 000 000 Adding a GCS data processor a ground tracking unit ground maintenance support equipment and extra payload packages may increase the system cost to as much as $25 million 1 In the more advanced systems two-way data links provide payload management and vehicle command control as long as it stays within radio line-of-sight LOS of the ground tracking unit The data links also transmit payload-derived reconnaissance data to the GCS UAV navigation is derived from an internal navigation system coupled to a global positioning system receiver Many United States UAVs are equipped with a return-to-home function that automatically routes the AV back to its home station or a predetermined location if the AV loses LOS with the ground tracking unit The payloads or sensor packages available for use on UAVs include - Day-only television - Thermal imagers 12 - Low-light television - Synthetic-aperture radar - Infrared line scan - Moving-target-indicating radar TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y • East Asia and the Pacific entities desire to be major exporters of UAV platforms Also their indigenous programs are robust but often lack operational success further creating pressure to obtain foreign technology • European and Eurasian entities aggressively pursue joint ventures and technology transfers to aid indigenous R D efforts • African collectors have successfully marketed their systems to third-party buyers The UAV market continues to expand as a greater number of developers offer updated systems and the global demand increases This competitive dynamic drives intense requirements for the information related to UAV state-of-the-art developments These advanced UAV technologies may range from hand-launched micro-UAVs to small business or jet-sized high-altitude longrange endurance platforms 2 TREND ANALYSIS UAVs continue to be the most dynamic and competitive growth sector of the world aerospace industry Commercial market studies estimate that over the next 10 years UAV development and acquisition spending will almost double from worldwide expenditures of $4 4 billion annually to $8 7 billion The United States accounts for approximately 70 percent of the worldwide UAV research and development test and evaluation RDT E spending but only 60 percent of the procurement spending Europe and Eurasia represents the second largest source of RDT E and acquisition spending followed closely by the East Asia and Pacific region Analyst Comment It is likely the East Asia and Pacific region will overtake European and Eurasian UAV expenditures in the next decade Confidence Level Moderate UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE 2 1 UAV Regions of Origin Defense industry reporting indicates that UAV RDT E programs vary by region technological competencies and resources Whether the collection efforts are motivated to enhance country-specific production capabilities promote a country’s competitiveness for the growing UAV world market augment a specific country’s military competencies or develop potential countermeasures UAV technology remains an intense focus of foreign collection efforts Defense industry reporting reveals entities from the following regions attempted to acquire export-controlled UAV-related technology in FY08 See Figure 5 • South and Central Asian entities represented the most prolific collectors requesting complete UAV systems composite materials auto pilot systems and sensor payload technology • Near East collectors attempted joint ventures and offered maintenance and training services in exchange for United States’ classified systems Suspicious technology requests focused on control software and radio frequency microwave components • East Asian and Pacific entities utilized all available means of collection to target UAV technology including military joint agreements illicit collection attempts joint venture proposals and approved foreign military sales These regional entities requested production details as well as platform and individual components like auto tracking antennas • European and Eurasian collectors used a variety of state and non-state actors to acquire UAV command and control programs and airframe carbon composite manufacturing details 13 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S Defense industry reporting involving UAV technologies revealed a diverse effort not unique to any single world region Most collection efforts emanated from regions with more advanced industrial capabilities or active UAV development programs Typically these collection efforts focused on specific UAV technologies essential to a particular region’s RDT E program Analyst Comment Although regional entities occasionally sought complete systems it is likely the desire for fully functional UAV capabilities most commonly originated from regions attempting to address existing internal or border conflicts that taxed their limited command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance C4ISR capabilities Confidence Level High FOREIGN UAV COLLECTION A Perspective Based on Defense Industry Reporting foreign uav collection A Perspective FIGURE 5 Based on Defense Industry Reporting EUROPE EURASIA Enhancing its indigenous UAV program Utilizes multiple collector affiliations to gain UAV technology NEAR EAST World leader of UAV exports Utilizes joint venture solicitation and direct requests in exchange for U S UAV technology EAST ASIA THE PACIFIC Desires to be major exporter Aggressive UAV collection Utilizes multiple collector affiliations to seek UAV platform and individual component technology SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA Leading importer of UAV technology Most prolific collector of U S UAV technology AFRICA Successfully markets UAV’s to third-party buyers Direct requests for UAV subsystems sensors and radars 14 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y 2 2 Targeted Technology 3 ANALYTICAL FORECAST DSS suspicious contact reports showed that UAV technology collection attempts covered all aspects of UAV systems The collectors ranged from high-tech companies in industrially-advanced countries to emerging third-world countries Targeted technologies spanned the entire UAV spectrum and included • Software control programs • Data link control systems • Electro-optic sensors • Infrared sensors • Synthetic aperture radars • Signals intelligence • Electronic warfare systems • Chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear sensors • Launch and recovery systems • C4ISR systems • Propulsion designs • Inertial navigation systems • Advanced composite materials designs In the last few years there has been an evolution in battle space doctrine to use superior intelligence to defeat the enemy instead of relying exclusively on the application of overwhelming force This new doctrine elevates the importance of UAV capabilities and drives the imperative to acquire UAV technologies The proliferation of UAV RDT E programs and associated fielding of systems has resulted in an ever-increasing demand for UAV technology and expertise To maintain economic competitiveness UAV companies as well as suspicious collectors can be expected to use every available means to acquire breakthrough technologies Exploitation of joint ventures and or teaming collaborations to acquire information will become increasingly common as will attempts to solicit information from defense industry directly involved with UAV or associated dual-use technologies As a major developer of UAV technologies it is highly likely that defense industry’s UAV technologies will remain premier targets of both an overt and covert foreign collection focus Confidence Level High UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE 15 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S CASE 16 e pace a n d th p a rt s a re S T O u C d s tr y - s h e lf U AV in e g th in s ff d o s y s te m expan e rc ia lo b ta in comm ra p id ly f a to o y y rs b it b il c to d ri v e n come a v a il a th e r a ow be and o e m e n ts ro w in g nt have n ta te s dvanc s The g s a n l m a rt m e a o p te ti ic e s na sy h n o lo g nder D u il it y o f s if ie d s b e a a s la a o f te c c n e h he g th v io u s ly c p u rc 008 w ti o n iz in re p re r p u b li a rc h 2 y to re v o lu hat we a b le fo d in M mpan il W e o a v c rr s a u V ie c c A c nd il it c ie n ti fi ased U e n ts a such o s capab b n f s o o a n p e a w c se com ll G e rm is U AV ent E v id e n a th l m m e o s n tr o rc d u a l- u a d h con w e n fo e d w it p a y lo a m e rc e a n d la The y te a m of Com C irc le m il it a ry iv e rs it c n ti in u e rc n s A g ia in th e d fo r u N o rw e 2 a U AV m o d if ie n d fl y il y b e a ons s e a d e il u e ld b p ra ti ls o th u o o c e c t n u re is a a re b ent ts th e n n a is s n o m e c rt n in n a tu a re o ep and comp g to D la n c e COTS and c o rd in s u rv e il r husb o f U AV ts A c e p y h it m il d e b n tt a a a il n a a rt v re o a m wo exp in g m in ia tu 08 a il le g a l e g ro w a l- u s e u se of ust 20 d a n tr o ls g W it h th o u d re c A e c ll u y th e it a n t in ti o n in c o n tr o b a m d o to e rm c t rt n e fo o id e o f co In te r n ll y e x p y o u ts u b li c in n o lo g e d th e ti c e p il le g a h s s e D c u u J M te le f p e o re d th ou p ri n g 3 The c p o rt th d e li v e il v e r S g handnot ex n h in a d ri ld C n u u fr o m S a D o to w in a ts to C h s s m a te g th e y to p il o u la in d a c le im le V n e il g a l v UA n tl y c la A v ia ti o e n tr a s w e re f C iv il a u d u le w if e th a c ti o n o fr e ir y r h e it e T ft th rs a ta te s U n iv e m it te d it e d S h in e s e p le a d o r to th e U n e cou rm e r C ro fe s s th fo a ts n ars it y p to e e g ls iv a o n l tr u ra in fo rm con e s ig n re ti re d h fe d e d it a s w d g s e in c w o rk U AV w s e n te n in te rv ie ts to w tro ll e d ra l ju ry s tu d e n g con a fe d e te in a e n ts rt u e d o s d p tu a x ra s er c g a ll y e th e s e rt re ig n g a n o th fo r il le assed y e d fo e expo n p In y e t lo o th p d s s n ri m it a p e p ro h ib ra n tr a c t w in g ly e a rs in o o h o y l c ic n a r e h k n u s r o w n fo ti t fe s s o ig n n a o f D e fe tro l A c h e p ro a fo re ment rt C o n ti o n T a ta to D e p a rt s Expo d d l rm a te A ic ic n s tr n g th e g te c h o n a re v io la ti c lu d in 4 a l d a ta lo p ri a ls in cense ic li te n t a h n c m e d deve te m d te rn e la v re o ms an g te e s s y n S ir s U V cqu e o f d e fe it h o u t o th U A g to a a ti o n w m p ti n a t to b n e re n tt a th ig l d a ta s e fo re e n ti ti e a te th c h n ic a ic io u s a n d te m o n s tr p e h s d u rc s s a e re tu d ie n g re s o n ly a case s Not ta rg e ti These s a l d a ta re a ls o m ic a ra n y g h e c ro th l te R D p s but m e n ta n and y s te m fe ra ti o U AV s li S ro T p O C s U AV ig e n o u fo r in d Y STUD TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y E A S T A S I A A N D T H E PA C I F I C 17 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S east asia and the pacific 1 OVERVIEW For the fifth consecutive year the East Asia and the Pacific region retained its status as the home to the most prolific collectors of U S technology Defense industry fiscal year 2008 FY08 reporting revealed only minor variations from previous years in the types of technologies targeted and similarly the manner suspicious entities utilized to acquire them Collectors of all persuasions continued to express keen interest in information systems technologies specifically those with dual-use applications involving command control communication computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance C4ISR capabilities Furthermore there was little to no change in the collection method entities commonly employed The direct request method of operation MO was by far the most prevalent technique of choice with collectors often brazenly requesting restricted technology Interest in aeronautics continued to swell and was especially focused on technologies associated with unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs The use of commercial entities to collect controlled information and technologies far outpaced any other collector category further expanding its traditional dominance as the regional collection affiliation of choice The continued decrease of reports from government or government affiliated entities collecting information and concomitant increase of reports emanating from commercial collectors reinforces the assessment that East Asian and Pacific collectors likely avoid traditional statesponsored affiliates in an attempt to mask illicit intelligence activities AFFILIATIONS FIGURE 6 Percent Commercial Affiliate Unknown Affiliate Government Associated Affiliate Government Affiliate FY 2008 FY 2007 Individual Affiliate 0 10 20 30 40 50 2 COLLECTOR AFFILIATIONS As discussed in the overview the commercial category of collectors dominated FY08 reporting more than doubling any other collector affiliation a recurring theme noted over the last three years The continued rise of the commercial collector affiliation and the corresponding downward trajectory in the number of government or government affiliated suspicious contact FY 2008 SCRs reiterated a growing reports Percent Other Exploitation of that mask reliance on collection methods 4 Relationships state-sponsored interest Furthermore 3 Foreign Visit SCRsandindicated regional entities continued Targeting 7 to exploit non-traditional collectors like Solicitation graduate and post-graduate students and Seeking Employment for positions in United States applying defense 8industry as a guise to acquire Direct sensitive technologies Request Suspicious Fore and T 58 Internet Activity Analyst Comment While the growing 20 global marketplace and ease of Internet connectivity may be partially responsible for the increase in commercial Includes foreign employees and potential espionage indicators 18 FY 2007 Percen TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S Inte A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y collections analysis of the SCRs and the corresponding decrease in the numbers of government or government affiliated collection attempts suggests it is likely that foreign intelligence agencies are successfully exploiting the commercial sector as their typically less alarming collection surrogates ConfiPercent dence Level Moderate Commercial Affiliate The second most prolific regional affiliation Unknown in FY08 was the unknown affiliate responAffiliate sible for 20 percent of the East Asia and Government Pacific collection attempts The lack of Associated Affiliate information in some direct requests or email Government makes it extremely difficult to solicitations FY 2008 Affiliateif a government or commercial determine FY the 2007 affiliation likely exists In many cases Individual Affiliate only information the entity provided in a predominantly Internet-based 0 10 20 request 30 was 40 an 50 IP address that may or may not be related to the sender’s region of origin Analyst Comment The popularity of the “unknown” affiliation is likely derived from mass emailing ventures a cost-effective measure to maximize the collector’s return on requests for restricted or controlled technology Confidence Level Moderate 3 METHODS OF OPERATION The direct request MO retained its top position as the favored MO for FY08 with just over half of all such requests relying on email and web-card submissions to request information and purchase technology Also the use of foreign visits and targeting as a collection method fell from the third most common MO in FY07 to fourth most prevalent in FY08 Not to be overlooked suspicious Internet activity continued to maintain its ranking as the second most preferred method frequently involving confirmed intrusions of unclassified cleared defense contractor CDC computer systems When compared against all regions East Asia and the Pacific dominated as the most prolific in suspicious Internet activity Collectors relied heavily on network obfuscation techniques to mask their locations and respective identities METHODS OF OPERATION FIGURE 7 FY 2008 Percent Other 4 Foreign Visit and Targeting 7 Solicitation and Seeking Employment 8 FY 2007 Percent Exploitation of Relationships 2 Solicitation and Seeking Employment 8 Exploitation of Relationships 3 Suspicious Internet Activity 20 Potential Espionage Indicators Foreign Employees 0 Foreign Visit and Targeting 16 Direct Request 57 Direct Request 58 Suspicious Internet Activity 17 Includes foreign employees and potential espionage indicators E A S T A S I A A N D T H E PA C I F I C 19 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S Readily available information relating to various export-controlled technologies programs and personnel continued to assist in targeting those would-be victims Analyst Comment Requests for information and price quotes via email is the preferred MO to target United States technologies This collection technique underscores the “low-risk high-gain” efficiency associated with the direct request MO Sending multiple requests for the same information to different individuals on a CDC network maximizes the available opportunities for the collectors to gain the information they seek Additionally the abundance of personnel and technical information contained within CDC websites as well as the growing use of social networking sites gives a likely targeting advantage to East Asia and the Pacific cyber actors exploiting the Internet Confidence Level Moderate 4 TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES During FY08 collectors in the East Asia and Pacific region showed significant interest in information systems technologies often requesting data and hardware associated with battlefield management and TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES TABLE 1 Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Codes 20 FY 2008 Percent Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Codes FY 2007 Percent Information Systems 24 Information Systems Aeronautics 11 Aeronautics 28 11 Non-DSTL Technology 10 Sensors 10 Marine Systems 10 Laser and Optics 9 Positioning Navigation and Time 10 Armaments and Energetic Materials 9 Laser and Optics 7 Marine Systems 6 Sensors 7 Electronics 6 Electronics 6 Manufacturing and Fabrication 4 Armaments and Energetic Materials 4 Positioning Navigation and Time 4 Materials and Processing 3 Non-DSTL Technology 3 Space Systems 2 Space Systems 2 Ground Systems 2 Weapons Effects 2 Manufacturing and Fabrication 2 Ground Systems 2 Chemical 0 Biological 1 Energy Systems 0 Energy Systems 1 Nuclear 0 Chemical Weapons Effects 0 Signature Control 1 1 Directed and Kinetic Energy 0 Materials and Processing 1 Signature Control 0 Directed and Kinetic Energy 1 Biological 0 Biomedical 0 Biomedical 0 Nuclear 0 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y simulation systems The nature of specific inquires largely replicated FY07 reporting indicating C4ISR technologies were and still are in high demand The aeronautics category represented the second strongest concentration of interest most notably in inquiries related to UAV technologies Closely following aeronautics technology collectors requested marine systems and positioning navigation and time technologies information with a keen interest in autonomous underwater vehicles and global positioning system simulators Additionally the armaments and energetic materials technology category continued to decline in the hierarchy of requested technologies accounting for only four percent down from the fifth most targeted technology in FY07 Analyst Comment Analysis of FY08 industry reporting reinforces previous assessments that interest in information systems-related technologies is most likely attributable to collectors focusing on research and development shortcomings with the goal of modernizing aging military C4ISR assets Confidence Level High E A S T A S I A A N D T H E PA C I F I C 5 ANALYTICAL FORECAST Consistencies in FY07 and FY08 reporting indicate entities in the East Asia and Pacific region are highly likely to continue focusing on the acquisition of dual-use technologies to advance internal capabilities especially as it applies to C4ISR Also the ploy of using commercial or academic sector requests to circumvent import export restrictions will likely continue as an attractive option to mask state-sponsored collection activities Exploitation of joint agreements and legitimate purchases executed for legal applications will continue to enable illicit acquisition of dual-use technologies intended for restricted applications Additionally key regional collectors will likely continue to place their collection emphasis on the aeronautics industry most probably in an attempt to acquire access to advanced UAV technologies Confidence Level High 21 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S CASE 22 il t ema eques r t c e add a d ir tor to l sent Y iv id u a ontrac c d it e s in e UD h g s t u ST s k in g w o r k in s p ic io t a u e r s n o d the l t a 8 s o c ia e m a il e ontrac il 2 0 0 p u la r id u a l o nse c iv p fe o ld In A p r e a n in d h d on io u s s tec le a r e d a fr ie n s u s p ic ystem t r ia l s s to a c e s a h h u l t c d a n a l In ntact e la u n d iv id u s o io t a c a h g c orted N r t h e in the li s h in to pu it y r e p estab e n t s in s k in g d fa c il a m e r e a in A ft e r ir a u le g ec re q ctor a u a l t h it h t h e contra g Man p in g w in e t e a r k e Op r t in g o g y In gram y re p o it y P r o m u n it SS m D o t a in Secur c o b t ts ence t to o c id e n ttemp in t e ll ig s a t e t h e in m s c o r r t fi a l’s Cus a ll - s o u d iv id u e U S g to h in t S and in t e S p h 9 D t 8 m f t wo r atte as no In 1 9 y fo w g l a is lo s A r e v ie u h o a to t d iv id techn a r in g d that t h e in ic t e d s of s d r it t e n t s r e v e a le s in s u e h r e t mon d arr d 500 ll e d o r to 30 ted an es an a il d c o n t ro 7 the s e ig 0 t c is s 0 n m sente e in v e May 2 TOW d in n n a t io a lt ip le S e r v ic u n it d th v ic t e d to mu lt amm r e v e a le m a il s as con g e w t in expor it t echno s r t r e is s il e e c u lp y re p o t re q u r h m c ct t T e s a s t ir u u n n d d Ir a s of e r in a ll c o n v a r io nded Furth a s e r ie t io n o e n t a o y n m it e is r il r s p in fo ual d fa c DSS e s t in g in d iv id c le a r e se to s re q u same ll t h e he ca ie t e it d il w e c s r r d fa r e fe ig a nce a c le a r e in v e s t al and t in s t a d iv id u ed an In t h a n in er e s s p ic ie u o ff g o p ic io in g o I C E s t ig a t he sus ment im e e v h c r t in n fo w it h t e e ual s 8 Th ms En in d iv id er 200 Custo d b e d e h m n h t e a s t li s Sep a l a n d estab r a t io n u a l in unch d iv id u t was Im m ig in d iv id e ll it e la t h e in ontac t e c a h h t s it e r c n w n t fo and c O r a o d t t e t io n o n n t in u e e s t ig a ed co w e b s it o v h c e in s tli h n r t b e esta ig a t io a fo r a st on e rc o v F lo r id in v e s t re q u e e und e in h d al h t t n u T c d ie id e je y a fr e sub n o lo g al ask e in d iv t tech ted th ia T h d iv id u s n s t in s e a c r ll u e r A e h R a l t ro p n t ro ents gy to cket p ort Co h n o lo IC E a g a n d ro s Exp ch tec m 2009 r nal n u A io 5 t la e 1 a e r il st th In t e r n in m is s il a e on Ap g ll h a t e s and t io n s in g t o e g im e h v io la tempt n t ro l r e d w it o g C r a y h g o lo s was c Te c h n u la t io n is s il e s Reg m the M r A k in g in Tr a ff ic TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y NEAR EAST 23 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S Near East 1 OVERVIEW In fiscal year 2008 FY08 entities from the Near East region once again generated the second highest degree of collection attempts to acquire U S technology consistently maintaining this position for the last four years behind East Asia and the Pacific collectors Commercial collectors within the Near East region continued to dominate collection attempts accounting for almost half of all targeting Distantly following commercial entities collectors identifiable as government associated collectors accounted for more than a quarter of the targeting effort These collectors primarily continued to seek technologies involving information systems however regional entities also focused on the optics lasers and aeronautics categories of technology Near East collectors most commonly utilized direct requests as a means to obtain information followed by solicitation seeking employment and AFFILIATIONS FIGURE 8 Percent Commercial Affiliate Government Associated Affiliate Individual Affiliate Unknown Affiliate 2 COLLECTOR AFFILIATIONS Following a trend DSS noted in FY07 reporting entities categorized as “commercial” continued to increase their collection efforts and accounted for 44 percent of all collection reports with a Near East nexus The most significant regional change in FY08 reporting was the precipitous drop in collection efforts by entities strictly associated with government affiliates constituting only seven percent of all collection efforts in FY08 Analyst Comment The continuing rise of Near East commercial entity activity continued to indicate a growing collusion between commercial entities and government associated entities such as universities public agencies and research and development centers to acquire leadingedge technology from defense industry Consequently the corresponding drop in strictly government entities is likely attributable to the regional governments’ close control of all commercial and government associated entities’ activities reducing the need for direct government involvement in collection efforts Confidence Level Moderate FY 2008 FY 2007 Government Affiliate 0 24 suspicious Internet activity techniques The collectors in this region represented a vast spectrum of entities ranging from student and business entrepreneurs to full-fledged government operators 10 20 30 40 50 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y Percent 3 METHODS OF OPERATION Commercial Affiliate Near East entities continued to favor Government direct requests for information as the most Associated Affiliate common collection technique of choice Individual because of its low-risk high-gain properties Affiliate Direct requests accounted for 74 percent of regional collection reports in FY08 ColUnknown FY 2008 Affiliate lectors also continued to use solicitation and seeking employment in their efforts to FY 2007 Government Affiliate exploit cleared defense contractors CDCs for desired 0information FY08 also saw 10 20 30 40 50 a slight increase in the number of suspicious Internet activity incidents traceable to Near East entities Although suspicious Internet activity incidents only accounted for less than five percent of all collection reports this phenomenon mirrors rising cyber collection activities from other prolific regional collectors like East Asia and the Pacific and Europe and Eurasian collectors Analyst Comment It is highly likely Near East collectors will continue to use direct request as their preferred method of operation MO but they will also use all available avenues of approach like suspicious Internet activity in their efforts to circumvent embargoes and target United States technology This type of direct targeting increases the number of targets of opportunity and is likely to increase the success rate for acquiring sensitive classified and export-controlled United States technology Confidence Level High METHODS OF OPERATION FIGURE 9 FY 2008 Percent Suspicious Internet Activity 4 Foreign Visit and Targeting 4 Other 1 Exploitation of Relationships 0 FY 2007 Percent Suspicious Internet Activity 2 Exploitation of Relationships 4 Foreign Employees 1 Potential Espionage Indicators 0 Solicitation and Seeking Employment 12 Solicitation and Seeking Employment 16 Direct Request 74 Foreign Visit and Targeting 17 Direct Request 64 Includes foreign employees and potential espionage indicators NEAR EAST 25 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S 4 TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES Near East entities continued to steadily target information systems technologies as related to command control communication computers intelligences surveillance and reconnaissance C4ISR programs especially modeling and simulation systems In a shift from previous years’ reporting attempts for lasers and optics technology increased to second place displacing reports for aeronautics technology The specific technologies associated with lasers and optics were predominately optical software programs and unmanned aerial vehicle UAV targeting payloads Analyst Comment As defense industry continues to make advances in the laser and optical payloads for the aeronautics field it is highly likely that entities will continue to pursue aggressive collection attempts on this area in order to develop indigenous UAVs with weapons delivery and targeting capabilities Confidence Level High Since 2003 the number of UAVs fielded in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars increased over five-fold with a corresponding increase TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES TABLE 2 Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Codes Information Systems Laser and Optics Aeronautics Sensors 26 FY 2008 Percent 28 Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Codes FY 2007 Percent Information Systems 23 Aeronautics 13 15 Sensors 8 7 Armaments and Energetic Materials 8 Electronics 6 23 Electronics 5 Positioning Navigation and Time 4 Laser and Optics 6 Marine Systems 3 Positioning Navigation and Time 5 Energy Systems 2 Energy Systems 4 Armaments and Energetic Materials 2 Manufacturing and Fabrication 4 Directed and Kinetic Energy 2 Materials and Processing 4 Chemical 1 Non-DSTL Technology 4 Biological 1 Biological 4 Ground Systems 1 Marine Systems 2 Manufacturing and Fabrication 1 Nuclear 2 Signature Control 1 Chemical 2 Nuclear 1 Signature Control 2 Materials and Processing 1 Space Systems 1 Biomedical 0 Ground Systems 1 Space Systems 0 Biomedical 1 Weapons Effects 0 Directed and Kinetic Energy 0 Non-DSTL Technology 0 Weapons Effects 0 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y in suspicious entity interest As UAV technology evolves with ever-increasing efficiency and effectiveness the desire to obtain UAV emerging technologies bundled-weapons platforms and targeting platforms will also likely increase Not to be overlooked the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also generated an increased focus on the acquisition of cutting edge technologies related to C4ISR programs especially as they related to battlefield management capabilities 5 ANALYTICAL FORECAST Entities originating from the Near East region will likely continue to pursue United States technology and information in order to develop their own force multipliers as well as to improve existing technology It is highly likely they will continue to use the direct request MO in their attempts to acquire sensitive United States technology Furthermore channeling commercial affiliated requests through third party nations is also likely to grow in an effort to avoid sanctions and trade restrictions As this region becomes more volatile it is highly likely entities will continue to focus their collection on dual-use technologies such as information systems laser and optics and aeronautics technology especially in the areas of C4ISR systems and UAV payloads Confidence Level High NEAR EAST 27 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S CASE 28 r umbe sual n u n u an Y st for an re q u e s f r o m c la im in g t o a e STUD g ic in v e iv d e d c n n e a t io ed r a m e a o p e W h il e re p o r t e n a v ig ean n r A C D C c e d m a r it im t h e r n E u r o p o u t h e r n E u le s s r an o DC sa d v in n C d r a a e e f h g g t o a in te n s s a m u li r l fo ual ct m one in d iv id r it im e p r o je le s a p p r o v a o n h e r p h a M id d le a ID s sa b e a m t a f o r e ig n d t h e c a ll e r n t r y c o d e a e s a r e u u ic e o o v ic c e t g d r o n e in a t e d f il li hese t iv e n umb t a n f t o n e ly t e r m e n e s t s t o r e h ia r o p d p p e e x e r e m e r ’s ff ic r w h ic h quest a t iv e im S e c u r it y O t n e s t h e re c o u n t r y t o e it y re p r rn r F a c il s a le s cumEaste ie d h e if The t d o e g e r c ir e c h n it a d n ib n a h a o m r n p ed t le s n s a c t io t h e s a e r t c o n t r o ll s t h e f o t r the tra iv te pa lu s t r a t pt to d on the a t t e m T h is c a s e il u g h a d ir e c c t io n n a a k ly ic e o r r u k e h q li s t u s e y a h T w nd lo g io n what it e d e echno d-party nat v e n t e d t o a p r o h ib e d S t a t e s t ir h t a h n it ie s t h ro u g n o lo g u ir e U o a c q a ll d iv e r t e d t e ir s de sc s t s a le re q u e TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y EUROPE AND EURASIA 29 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S europe and eurasia 1 OVERVIEW As has been the case since DSS began disseminating reports on foreign collection activities within defense industry entities originating from the Europe and Eurasia region once again ranked among the top regional collectors of defense technology and information Since fiscal year 2004 FY04 collection attempts with a European Eurasian nexus have remained relatively constant However in the last four years collection activity recorded from this region continued to decline slightly now representing only a 14 percent share of overall reporting in FY08 The reasons for this decline remain largely conjectural but DSS analysis indicates European Eurasian collection methods may not rely as much on the blatant largely overt targeting utilized by East Asia and Pacific collectors Consistent with the overall trend of commercial companies and actors dominating collection attempts FY08 defense industry reporting indicated European Eurasian commercial entities were responsible for the majority of the targeting efforts originating from this region Furthermore commercial and government regional collectors continued to exploit direct requests for information as the predominant method of operation MO to procure United States defense technology More than a quarter of these direct requests were especially for aeronautic technology specifically unmanned aerial vehicle UAV components AFFILIATIONS FIGURE 10 Percent Commercial Affiliate Individual Affiliate Government Associated Affiliate Government Affiliate FY 2008 FY 2007 Unknown Affiliate 0 10 20 30 40 50 2 COLLECTOR AFFILIATIONS In FY07 defense industry reporting indicated government-associated collectors were responsible for the majority of the targeting efforts However in FY08 commercial targeting increased significantly from 21 percent to 39 percent Additionally over 70 percent of these commercial companies utilized email direct requests for FY 2008 information as a vehicle to contact defense Percent industry personnel Comment This Other Analyst Exploitation of 4 Relationships attempts surge in Foreign commercial collection Visit 0 and Targeting is consistent with overall trends observed 5 Suspicious in other regions It is highly likely this Internet Activity increase is attributable to entities delib7 erately attempting to shift their collection Solicitation and Seekingfrom governmental indicators signature Employment Direct asto seemingly innocuous commercial 11 Request sociations Confidence Level High 73 Includes foreign employees and potential espionage indicators 30 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S FY 2007 Percen S Intern A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y 3 METHODS OF OPERATION As in past years the most frequently utilized European Eurasian collection MO in FY08 remained direct request for information now representing 73 percent of overall collection attempts a dramatic increase from Percent previous years The combined categories of Commercial direct request and the second MO most Affiliateobserved solicitation and seeking frequently employment Individual together accounted for over Affiliate of all reported incidents involving 80 percent suspicious entities These two methods to Government obtainAffiliate United States technology dwarfed all Associated other collection methods and predominately Government targeted aeronautics and laser technology FY 2008 Affiliate FY 2007 Unknown Analyst Comment There is little indication Affiliate that European Eurasian actors are likely to 10 of their 20 30 40 overt50 change the0 manner principal collection efforts targeting industry It is highly likely collectors from this region will continue to augment covert collections with relatively low-risk high-gain requests for information price quotes or purchase requests via the Internet in a broadly-based effort to obtain access to sensitive information and technologies Confidence Level High Not to be overlooked in FY08 the third most prolific MO suspicious Internet activity continued to play a role in European Eurasian technology collection similar to targeting from the leading East Asia and Pacific cyber collectors European Eurasian cyber hosts frequently utilized intrusions and potential pre-attack targeting as cyber techniques These cyber MOs were consistent with previous years’ reporting concerning the use of socially engineered malicious emails and probe activity Note Socially engineered emails or “spear phishing” emails are specially crafted emails designed to trick the recipient into opening a malicious attachment possibly giving the intruder host or network access Probe activity is likely indicative of cyber reconnaissance conducted against a victim network 5 Analyst Comment Although the frequency of reported overt collection attempts declined from the Europe and METHODS OF OPERATION FIGURE 11 FY 2008 Percent Other 4 Foreign Visit and Targeting 5 Suspicious Internet Activity 7 Solicitation and Seeking Employment 11 FY 2007 Percent Exploitation of Relationships 0 Includes foreign employees and potential espionage indicators EUROPE AND EURASIA Exploitation of Relationships 2 Solicitation and SeekingEmployment 8 Direct Request 73 Suspicious Internet Activity 20 Foreign Employees 2 Potential Espionage Indicators 0 Direct Request 47 Foreign Visit and Targeting 20 31 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S Eurasia region in FY08 it is likely suspicious actors working in or through this region sought other means of collection to offset traditional techniques Cyber attacks on defense industry likely provide another avenue of approach to target critical information and technology Confidence Level High 4 TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES Collectors from the Europe and Eurasia region continued to target essentially the same technologies they have since FY04 with only minor variations in collection priority The most significant change in this reporting period was in the targeting of information systems technology In previous years information systems was the most targeted category with collectors primarily focused on encryption and modeling software however in FY08 aeronautics technology moved into first place as the most commonly targeted technology with a focus on UAV components European Eurasian entities sought all aspect of UAV technology ranging from complete systems payloads optics and sensors to global positioning systems GPS in an effort to enhance return-to-home functions TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES TABLE 3 Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Codes Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Codes FY 2007 Percent Aeronautics 30 Information Systems 35 Information Systems 12 Aeronautics 21 Laser and Optics 12 Armaments and Energetic Materials 8 Marine Systems 9 Biological 6 Space Systems 6 Electronics Sensors 32 FY 2008 Percent 7 7 Sensors 6 Materials and Processing 5 Electronics 4 Ground Systems 5 Marine Systems 3 Positioning Navigation and Time 3 Laser and Optics 3 Weapons Effects 3 Manufacturing and Fabrication 3 Manufacturing and Fabrication 1 Positioning Navigation and Time 2 Nuclear 1 Chemical 1 Energy Systems 1 Ground Systems 1 Space Systems 1 Biomedical 0 Non-DSTL Technology 1 Directed and Kinetic Energy 0 Armaments and Energetic Materials 0 Energy Systems 0 Biological 0 Materials and Processing 0 Biomedical 0 Nuclear 0 Chemical 0 Signature Control 0 Directed and Kinetic Energy 0 Weapons Effects 0 Signature Control 0 Non-DSTL Technology 0 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y Analyst comment It is likely entities originating from Europe and Eurasia increased aeronautics technology targeting with the intent to boost UAV production and focus on developing UAV technology This collection priority is not likely to abate in the near future given Europe and Eurasia’s desire to enhance and continue development of their indigenous UAV programs Confidence Level Moderate 5 ANALYTICAL FORECAST Despite a challenging economic environment European Eurasian entities will likely continue to pursue military modernization technologies and indigenous research and development competencies The continued pursuit of dual-use technologies focused on UAV technological advancement will likely drive overall collection attempts in the next year However combined targeting of information systems and positioning navigation and time technology will also likely continue as a subset of aeronautics technology collection The desire for technology components like GPS-aided inertial navigation system software vehicle control programs sensors and radars may greatly enhance Europe and Eurasia’s already burgeoning UAV program It is highly likely these collectors will continue to focus on not only these payload technologies but also on efforts to create smaller rucksack-portable platforms Confidence Level High EUROPE AND EURASIA 33 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S CASE 34 ed re p o r t re f ro m a pany m w o t f c so a se ic t defen u la t io n b t a in r e s t r s e im t s a t r o S o f o d t t e s t it e p re d U n b - c a rd re q u a re n t a t t e m A c le a p we p a a n g a in eal r e c e iv n p e r s o n in g y as a r ea is jo b n o lo h ed h c c d n e t E u ro p le a adv use evea r le a ir n u u o d q s that per ed ly r e howed t ic io u s u ld n o t li k e s p s h u c r s he sea wo men is o f t nager t h e r r e t r y g o v e r n t e d A n a ly s r o p e r t y m a f t w a r e F u r n u t o s c on ra p rty so a dem ir d - p a e s t a t e a p p li c a b le d h t a h a n o t o y ie s m il it a r o n h a d t ie s n d t h e p e r s t e c h n o lo g y a s r r o t h e p e c e s e r v ic e b a s e d m il it a s io n t en eu b m is d iv e r t s d r in t e ll ig g e o f s p a c a to b-c d tempt f a we k n o w le use o a further at e h t s s t r a t e n o lo g y a n d a t io n h a s e il lu T h is c u a l- u s e t e c p a r t y d e s t in d do b t a in g y t o a t h ir lo o n h c te Y STUD TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 35 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S SOUTH AND CENTRAL asia 1 OVERVIEW 2 COLLECTOR AFFILIATIONS Entities from or working through the South and Central Asia region generated the fourth largest number of collection attempts in fiscal year 2008 FY08 Commercial affiliated collectors retained their status as most active pursuers of sensitive or restricted technology while government and government affiliated collection methods were not as prolific These collectors relied heavily on direct requests for information or technology as the preferred method of operation MO accounting for a staggering 79 percent of all suspicious incidents These collection attempts effectively leveraged the Internet and email as relatively low-risk high-gain methods of choice As in FY07 commercial entities remained the most active collectors originating from South and Central Asia comprising more than 50 percent of all reported incidents Although commercial collection attempts dominated suspicious contact reporting individual collectors continued their steady targeting of defense industry tying with the slightly rising number of government collectors as the second most prolific collection category The primary technologies these entities sought included requests for aeronautics technology unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs information systems encryption software and sensors technology radars while previously dominant requests for laser and optics technologies took a back seat to UAV components and platforms Analyst Comment Defense industry reporting in FY08 confirms previous DSS assessments highlighting commercial entities as primary South and Central Asian collectors The ever-expanding global marketplace and increased dependence on the Internet likely aids the dominance of commercial affiliates offering a low-risk high-gain alternative to traditional collection methods AFFILIATIONS FIGURE 12 Percent Commercial Affiliate Government Affiliate Individual Affiliate Government Associated Affiliate FY 2008 FY 2007 Unknown Affiliate 0 36 10 20 30 40 50 60 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y suspicious incidents These percentages remained relatively consistent with corresponding reporting from previous years Because of the opportunities the Internet affords commercial collectors this tactic is not likely to abate in the near future Confidence Level High 3 METHODS OF OPERATION Percent South and Central Asian entities continued Commercial to useAffiliate direct requests for information as their primary means to target defense Government industry accounting for over 75 percent of Affiliate collection attempts in FY08 Furthermore Individual the use of solicitation and seeking employAffiliate ment as a technique to acquire information Government or access was second only to the foreign Associated Affiliate FY 2008 visits and targeting method or tradecraft for FY 2007 Unknown Analyst Comment In keeping with previous DSS assessments entities from South and Central Asia prefer to utilize direct requests for information and the commercial sector to acquire United States technologies It is highly likely this method is attributable to the cost effective nature of email and use of the Internet to maximize attempts and broaden business bases and clientele Confidence Level High Affiliate 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 METHODS OF OPERATION FIGURE 13 FY 2008 Percent Suspicious Internet Activity 3 Foreign Visit and Targeting 3 Solicitation and Seeking Employment 14 Exploitation of Relationships Other 0 Direct Request 79 FY 2007 Percent Foreign Employees 1 Suspicious Internet Activity 2 Foreign Visit and Targeting 4 Solicitation and Seeking Employment 15 Potential Espionage Indicators 1 Exploitation of Relationships 0 Direct Request 78 Includes foreign employees and potential espionage indicators SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 37 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S 4 TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES In FY08 South and Central Asian entities focused primarily on aeronautics technology with emphasis on UAV related technologies This targeted technology saw the largest increase in FY08 and coincides with the worldwide targeting of aeronautics and UAV systems Not to be overlooked information systems technology emphasizing communications and encryption technology also registered a small increase in collection attempts while requests for lasers and optics technology decreased Analyst comment The decrease in laser and optics is likely related to the significant increase in aeronautics technology collection attempts As the region’s most prolific collector of UAV technologies South and Central Asian entities have likely shifted focus to UAV platforms and payloads in an effort to develop indigenous UAV research and development programs and modernize military reconnaissance and surveillance equipment Confidence Level Moderate TARGETED TECHNOLOGIES TABLE 4 Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Codes 38 FY 2008 Percent Developing Science and Technologies List DSTL Codes FY 2007 Percent Aeronautics 38 Information Systems 21 Information Systems 24 Sensors 14 Sensors 16 Laser and Optics 14 Space Systems 5 Aeronautics 14 Marine Systems 5 Space Systems 10 Positioning Navigation and Time 3 Electronics 7 Armaments and Energetic Materials 3 Armaments and Energetic Materials 5 Electronics 3 Manufacturing and Fabrication 4 Laser and Optics 2 Signature Control 2 Biological 0 Nuclear 2 Biomedical 0 Positioning Navigation and Time 2 Chemical 0 Biological 2 Directed and Kinetic Energy 0 Biomedical 2 Energy Systems 0 Marine Systems 2 Ground Systems 0 Ground Systems 1 Manufacturing and Fabrication 0 Materials and Processing 1 Materials and Processing 0 Directed and Kinetic Energy 0 Nuclear 0 Chemical 0 Signature Control 0 Energy Systems 0 Weapons Effects 0 Weapons Effects 0 Non-DSTL Technology 0 Non-DSTL Technology 0 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y 5 ANALYTICAL FORECAST As foreign reliance on contractual procurement firms to acquire United States technology continues commercial entities are likely to maintain their position as the primary collector of dual-use technology in the South and Central Asia region Furthermore as countries within the South and Central Asia region desire to modernize their military equipment and deter perceived threats from various adversaries this aggressive posture will likely drive future collection and targeting attempts Interest in UAV technology and sophisticated airborne applications will likely continue in an effort to develop and improve current military forces in the event of any future regional hostilities Confidence Level Moderate SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 39 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S CASE 40 ne le p h o it e d t e n t it ie s c li o s un ne u lt ip le a l A s ia o m in a t e d Centr d iv e d m e d s c n m e a r r th in ry tfo t re n d in d u s t t s f r o m S o u d - w in g p la y e 8 k 0 Y a e s in g ix e d f n u n In F io h q la e g g - o ff is r e e m a il r m s A lt h o u h k t e a t in d l n a ts ic a e g vert ir e m e n V syst f o r U A e c t io n r e q u o n e m e r g in y o ll p r io r it U AV c as the tems w p r iv a t e n t r a c t o r 8 0 FY sys t in g a V n A e e co s U e r d e f e n s io n a l a n d a l re p V T O L d u e r id a iv nt in d t c le c o n v e h is w a s ce an iff e re n s f iv e tt in s t a n c t e d t w o d m a e e h t t n s o d ther In ate V sy nta A o ic c d U y in ct fur 0 n a 1 h f a c g p r In a in m t e t o s c e es es eral s re q u e m s R l’s f ir s t re q u l m a d e s e v d w a s a f a c il it ie L U AV s y s t a u an d iv id u O in d iv id c h n o lo g ie s f iv e V T u s p ic io u s in s u s p ic io u s e t se es the d u a l- u it a r y not th h o w e d f o r v a r io u s il s m h n c r ig f o re ests re s e a a u q o for t e r us t ie s uests p re v io e c a u s e o f c t re q e ir d b le d e n ie d m u lt ip h li g h t s ig h y ud a s e s t t e c h n o lo g y T h is c V A U e s d u a l- u Y STUD TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y CONCLUSION The targeting of U S technologies resident in defense industry remains intense and broadly-based However DSS analysis of fiscal year 2008 FY08 defense industry reporting showed no significant changes from FY07 in terms of the traditional regional actors making requests the methods of operation MOs they used their affiliations or the specific technologies being targeted The East Asia and Pacific region retained its status as the dominant region of origin for most collection efforts against United States technologies Near East collectors continued their pursuit of dual-use technologies maintaining their position as the second most prolific regional collector Europe and Eurasia regional collectors as well as those in the South and Central Asia region continued as significant players however requests from collectors with a Europe and Eurasia nexus remained somewhat of an anomaly steadily decreasing in volume relative to trends noted in previous years As predicted in the previous “Targeting U S Technologies” report these persistent regional collectors increased their targeting of aeronautics technology specifically UAVrelated components allowing that category to slowly gain momentum behind requests for the most frequently targeted discipline information systems technology The direct request MO continued to be the dominant method of choice for suspicious collectors and continued to provide the greatest return for minimal investment and risk While not all direct requests for information represent organized collection attempts exploitation of this medium facilitated the ease with which foreign entities utilized all available approaches to gain technology or information In FY08 regional CONCLUSION collectors further exploited the Internet not only making direct requests for information by email but also through electronic attacks targeting defense industry information networks Suspicious Internet activity with IP addresses originating in the East Asia and the Pacific region represented 79 percent of the regional cyber collection effort a significant increase over last year’s 52 percent These apparent cyber operations mainly targeted cleared defense contractor networks used for research and development documentation especially those related to information systems technology The trend to use non-government affiliated commercial surrogates as collectors to diffuse suspicions continued in FY08 Defense industry reporting indicated that state-actors from the East Asia and Pacific and Near East regions utilized both authentic commercial entities as well as illicit front companies in attempts to acquire controlled technologies Meanwhile South and Central Asian collectors remained more inclined to use less-traditional collectors such as students to gain access to restricted United States technology This multi-dimensional threat environment will continue to require innovative and proactive countermeasures on the part of security personnel and cleared contractors acting in a concerted team effort to protect United States technology and information 41 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S FORECAST The rapid globalization of world economies including defense-related industrial sectors will drive an unprecedented degree of interface between United States industry and foreign entities eager for information and technologies resident in defense industry Imperatives for emerging thirdworld countries to possess viable military and technical competencies will result in a spiraling demand for information and technology promising a competitive advantage Cleared defense contractors CDCs in the United States will almost certainly remain a primary focus of foreign collection efforts as foreign entities seek immediate competencies with minimal investment in their own indigenous programs Additionally The Unites States’ traditional geopolitical and military rivals as well as emerging strategic adversaries place sensitive information in the United States defense industry at continued risk Defense industry reporting indicates suspicious entities will continue to target the vast spectrum of defense contractor information and technology Information systems technology particularly command control communications computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance C4ISR systems with modeling and simulation programs will likely remain priority technology targets for all regions Aeronauticsrelated technologies particularly advanced unmanned aerial vehicle UAV systems are also expected to remain a major focus for all the foreign technology collectors Missile and missile defense technologies including sensor systems will continue to be collection priorities for Europe Eurasia and Near East entities In addition lasers and optics marine systems advanced naval systems and positioning navigation and time 42 technologies global positioning systems will continue to be a focus for East Asia and Pacific collectors In the last few years DSS analysis of industry reporting identified a rising trend of suspicious attempts for aeronautics-related technologies specifically UAV components and systems As a result of the global marketplace the expansive nature of the Internet and ease of acquiring commercialoff-the-shelf components the desire for cutting-edge UAV information and technology is not likely to abate in the near future As major developers of UAV technologies defense industry should be cognizant of attempts to gain information about UAV technologies as aeronautics technologies will likely continue as premier targets of foreign collection Government and commercial collection entities worldwide are highly likely to continue the use of cyber collection activities against United States government and its CDCs Cyber intrusion offers a relatively low-risk high-gain technique giving illicit collectors the opportunity to acquire sensitive and proprietary information stored on United States computer networks Cyber targeting may also be utilized as a collection planning tool to identify targets of opportunity not readily apparent to traditional collectors This cyber reconnaissance allows foreign elements to design targeting plans employing the full range of collection techniques on focused targets Because of the cutting-edge technical advancements they represent the United States’ dual-use technologies are expected to generate sustained interest irrespective of whether the collector has any actual interest in the specific commercial or military TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y applications Foreign commercial entities and joint enterprises will continue to complicate defense industry’s ability to distinguish between legitimate global business practices and illicit attempts to acquire United States technologies As always this multidimensional threat environment will continue to require a concerted team effort between cleared contractors and security professionals to develop innovative and pro-active countermeasures to secure the integrity of information and technology in the defense industrial base Confidence Level High FORECAST 43 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S This page intentionally left blank 44 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y APPENDIX REFERENCES MCIA MCIA-1361-001-00 OCT 2000 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Recognition Guide U FOUO p 5 U FOUO Ref 13 MAY 2009 1 Airframer com 2008 July UAV Flies Successfully in Arctic Circle http www airframer com journal_story html story 9244 2 United States Attorney’s Office 2009 The Court Report Press Release retrieved from the Department of Justice http usdoj gov usao dc community_prosecution court_reports feb09 id 1d_final_february_court_report pdf 3 Department of Justice Press Release 2008 September 3 Retired University of Tennessee Professor Convicted of Arms Export Violations http www usdoj gov opa pr 2008 september 08-nsd-774 html Case # 09-775 4 Internet Microsoft Spear Phishing Highly Targeted Scams 18 SEP 2006 5 APPENDIX REFERENCES 45 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S REFERENCE MAP EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC NEAR EAST EUROPE AND EURASIA SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA AFRICA WESTERN HEMISPHERE Retrieved from U S Department of State http www state gov countries on 19 Dec 08 46 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S A T R E N D A N A LY S I S O F R E P O R T I N G F R O M D E F E N S E I N D U S T R Y AFRICA EAST ASIA AND T H E PA C I F I C Angola Australia Benin Brunei Botswana Burma Burkina Faso EUROPE AND EURASIA NEAR EAST SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA WESTERN HEMISPHERE Albania Algeria Afghanistan Antigua and Barbuda Andorra Bahrain Bangladesh Argentina Armenia Egypt Bhutan Aruba Cambodia Austria Iran India Bahamas The Barbados Burundi China Azerbaijan Iraq Kazakhstan Cameroon Fiji Belarus Israel Kyrgyz Republic Belize Cape Verde Indonesia Belgium Jordan Maldives Bermuda Central African Republic Japan Bosnia and Herzegovina Kuwait Nepal Bolivia Chad Kiribati Bulgaria Lebanon Pakistan Brazil Comoros Korea North Croatia Libya Sri Lanka Canada Congo Democratic Republic of the Korea South Cyprus Morocco Tajikistan Cayman Islands Congo Republic of the Laos Czech Republic Oman Turkmenistan Chile Cote d'Ivoire Malaysia Denmark Palestinian Territories Uzbekistan Colombia Djibouti Marshall Islands Estonia Qatar Equatorial Guinea Micronesia Finland Saudi Arabia Costa Rica Cuba Eritrea Mongolia France Syria Dominica Dominican Republic Ethiopia Nauru Georgia Tunisia Gabon New Zealand Germany United Arab Emirates Ecuador Gambia The Palau Greece Yemen El Salvador Ghana Papua New Guinea Greenland Grenada Guinea Philippines Holy See Guatemala Guinea-Bissau Samoa Hungary Guyana Kenya Singapore Iceland Haiti Lesotho Solomon Islands Ireland Honduras Jamaica Liberia Taiwan Italy Madagascar Thailand Kosovo Mexico Malawi Timor-Leste Latvia Netherlands Antilles Nicaragua Mali Tonga Liechtenstein Mauritania Tuvalu Lithuania Panama Mauritius Vanuatu Luxembourg Paraguay Mozambique Vietnam Macedonia Peru Namibia Malta St Kitts and Nevis Niger Moldova St Lucia Nigeria Monaco St Vincent and the Grenadines Rwanda Montenegro Suriname Sao Tome and Principe Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago United States Senegal Norway Seychelles Poland Uruguay Sierra Leone Portugal Venezuela Somalia Romania South Africa Russia Sudan San Marino Swaziland Serbia Tanzania Slovakia Togo Slovenia Uganda Spain Zambia Sweden Zimbabwe Switzerland Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom Retrieved from U S Department of State http www state gov countries on 19 Dec 08 REFERENCE MAP 47 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S This page intentionally left blank 48 TA R G E T I N G U S T E C H N O L O G I E S