CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12 15 July 2010 Incorporating Change 1 30 November 2011 BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-12 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 15 JULY 2010 INCORPORATING CHANGE 1 30 NOVEMBER 2011 SUMMARY OF CHANGES This interim change reflects updates in national guidance command relationships and force presentation The more significant changes are found in Chapter Two Updates reflect USSTRATCOM delegation of OPCON to USCYBERCOM page 20 full operational status of the 624th Operations Center page 24 normalization of AF cyberspace liaison deployments to theater staffs page 26 and establishment of the terms “AFCYBER” identifying the 24th Air Force as the Service element to USSTRATCOM page 21 and “AF cyber tasking order” identifying the CTO as a standard tasking product analogous to an air tasking order page 30 Lastly this interim change reflects a more current listing of policy and doctrine in Appendix B and in the References section and it updates terms and definitions in the Glossary OPR LeMay Center DDS Certified by LeMay Center DD Col Todd C Westhauser Pages 60 Accessibility Publications are available on the e-publishing website at www e-publishing af mil for downloading Releasability There are no releasability restrictions on this publication Approved by Thomas K Andersen Major General USAF Commander Curtis E LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education FOREWORD Today we live in a globally-networked society that is increasingly dependent upon cyberspace access and security Our ability to gain and maintain superiority in cyberspace has become essential to our ability to deliver global reach power and vigilance As an integral member of the joint warfighting team the Air Force is committed to growing sustaining and presenting highly skilled and well-equipped forces to joint force commanders who can deliver decisive effects in from and through cyberspace while assuring our mission against an asymmetric cyber threat Freedom of action in the cyberspace domain enables our command control communication computers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities Our modern defenses industrial base and global commerce as well as that of our nation’s enemies depend on free use of land sea air space and cyberspace Leverage in cyberspace affords influence and control across all other domains This leverage increases our forces’ access speed reach stealth and precision Controlling the portions of cyberspace integral to our mission is a fundamental prerequisite to effective operations across the range of military operations While we appreciate the power that cyber-enabled capabilities add we also maintain a healthy respect for the asymmetric power that cyberspace affords our adversaries We must maintain a constant commitment to educate train and equip our Airman to prevail in the contested domain of cyberspace In the past decade we have participated in a revolution in military affairs afforded by cyberspace technologies Technological advances have provided the means to generate decisive and magnified effects in domains that traditionally could only be achieved via kinetic means We must continually adapt our operating concepts to leverage emerging cyberspace capabilities to ensure the Air Force maintains the decisive advantage over our adversaries Since Airmen use cyberspace capabilities it is important that Airmen understand cyberspace operations A cyberspace risk created by one Airman can pose a potential risk for the entire force Airmen must defend cyberspace capabilities against threats in order to protect mission-critical information and war fighting capabilities Airmen must make a fundamental commitment to growing our individual and collective knowledge skills and abilities throughout the cyberspace domain THOMAS K ANDERSEN Major General USAF Commander LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education ii TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY OF CHANGES iii  FOREWORD ii  TABLE OF CONTENTS iii  PREFACE v  CHAPTER ONE CYBERSPACE FUNDAMENTALS 1  DEFINITIONS 1  UNDERSTANDING CYBERSPACE 2  THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 3  Cyberspace Infrastructure Relationships 4  US NATIONAL CYBERSPACE POLICY 5  CHALLENGES OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 7  Mission Assurance 7  Compressed Decision Cycle of Cyberspace Operations 9  Anonymity and the Inherent Attribution Challenge 10  Threats to Cyberspace Operations 10  THE AIRMAN’S PERSPECTIVE 14  RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DOCTRINE 14  THE PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS AND CYBERSPACE 15  TENETS OF AIRPOWER IN RELATION TO CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 17  INTEGRATION OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS ACROSS DOMAINS 19  CHAPTER TWO COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION 20  POLICY RELATED TO COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION OF CYBERSPACE FORCES 20  COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 20  ORGANIZATION OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 21  United States Strategic Command USSTRATCOM 22  United States Cyber Command USCYBERCOM 22  Air Force Space Command 23  24th Air Force 24  Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency AFISRA 24  COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CYBERSPACE FORCES 24  Global Cyberspace Operations 25  Theater Cyberspace Integration 26  Air Force Presentation of Cyberspace Forces 26  CONSIDERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 28  Authorities and Legal Law Enforcement Considerations and Constraints 28  CHAPTER THREE DESIGN PLANNING EXECUTION AND ASSESSMENT 29  BASIC CONSIDERATIONS 29  Design of Cyberspace Operations 29  Planning 30  iii Security versus Capability 30  Logistics Support 30  Execution 30  Global Operations 30  Theater Operations 31  Integration and Synchronization of Theater and Global Operations 31  Assessment 31  Tactical Assessment TA 32  Operational-Level Assessment OA 32  Situation Reporting 33  Authorities 33  Legal Considerations 33  CONSIDERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 34  Engagement and Cooperation Operations 34  Homeland Operations 34  Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operation Considerations 36  Major Operations and Campaigns 36  CONCLUSION 37  APPENDIX A – Ten Things Every Airman Must Know 38  APPENDIX B – Policy and Doctrine Related to Cyberspace Operations 39  REFERENCES 45  Air Force Publications 45  Joint Publications 45  National and DOD Publications 45  Other Publications 46  Chief of Staff of the Air Force CSAF Professional Reading Program 46  GLOSSARY 47  Abbreviations and Acronyms 47  Definitions 49  iv PREFACE Much has changed in the overall operational environment in the past few years The character of contemporary conflict has driven a significant shift in the US approach to warfighting The large-scale complex force-on-force scenarios that drove much of Cold War planning and were executed in Operation DESERT STORM and the opening stage of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM are now viewed almost as the exception replaced by the careful precise and relatively measured pace of irregular warfare against nontraditional enemies Moreover it appears that US engagement in such conflicts will be ongoing for the next decade or longer The causes of conflict may vary from rational political calculation to uncontrolled actions Adversary capabilities may range from long-range precision-guided attacks to explosive vests worn by suicide bombers The threat of mass destruction from chemical biological radiological and nuclear weapons will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks 1 These changes have significant long-term implications for the planning and conduct of US operations  The need for current precise and detailed analysis requires a continuing expansion in the scale of information collection and processing networks are as important as a single bullet or bomb Sensors shooters and fusion centers are routinely interconnected worldwide to achieve a unified battle rhythm  Threats against the US homeland will increase The United States can expect future opponents to launch both terrorist and unconventional attacks on the territory of the United States 2 Civil military and industrial cyber networks have already seen an upswing in probes intrusions exploitations and attacks The proliferation of commercially available technology will allow adversaries to develop niche capabilities that will threaten in varying degrees the successful conduct of operations in areas where US forces were previously unchallenged Space and cyber networks are increasingly vulnerable to a wide array of new threats Adversary anti-access capabilities will continue to improve challenging US ability to project power and influence 3 Countering these capabilities is vital to assure freedom of action in through and from air space and cyberspace Air Force Doctrine Document AFDD 3-12 Cyberspace Operations is the Air Force’s foundational doctrine publication for Air Force operations in through and from 1 United States Joint Forces Command Publication “Joint Operational Environment 2008 – Changes and Implications for the Future Joint Force ” November 25 2008 JOE and HQ USAF A8X draft “Future Operating Environment” FOE 2008 2 HQ USAF A8X draft “Future Operating Environment” FOE 2008 p 7 3 FOE p 9 v the cyberspace domain AFDD 3-12 represents known sanctioned ideas and practices in the three chapters described below This document means to provide insight for Airmen to follow This document speaks to Air Force support of maintaining Cyberspace Superiority a common military function Chapter 1 Cyberspace Fundamentals Chapter 1 establishes the fundamental nature and context of Air Force cyberspace operations in this newly defined operational environment This chapter defines fundamental terms and concepts for cyberspace operations Discussions in this chapter include the strategic environment general strategic policy missions military challenges the Airman’s perspective relationship to other doctrine principles of war tenets of airpower and cross-domain integration Chapter 2 Command and Organization Chapter 2 describes the command control and organization of cyberspace forces It depicts operational-level policy command relationships and commander roles and responsibilities It discusses how global and theater cyberspace operations will be conducted through integrated command control and organization of military capabilities to achieve JFC objectives Chapter 3 Design Planning Execution and Assessment Chapter 3 describes how Air Force cyberspace operations are designed planned executed and assessed Also described are legal concerns logistics and operational considerations across the range of military operations Appendix A Ten Things Every Airman Must Know This is a list of ten things that every Airman ought to know with respect to cyberspace operations Appendix B Policy and Doctrine Related to Cyberspace Operations This matrix includes recent and relevant National Department of Defense-level joint and Air Force documents publications and doctrine which are related to cyberspace operations vi CHAPTER ONE CYBERSPACE FUNDAMENTALS      We have moved past the civilities in the cyberspace domain US forces and those of our adversaries now rely heavily on their computer networks for command and control for intelligence for planning for communications and for conducting operations But these architectures are vulnerable In fact for more than 15 years the US government and DOD networks have come under increasing pressure to attacks and probes from adversaries as diverse as nation-states to disgruntled individuals or bored teenage hackers And while we have detected illicit activities on our networks for more than 15 years and employed dual resources to offer a comprehensive multidisciplinary approach to protecting our networks we need to do more   —General Kevin Chilton USAF Commander US Strategic Command in “Cyberspace Leadership Towards New Culture Conduct and Capabilities ” Air Space Power Journal Fall 2009 DEFINITIONS Cyberspace Cyberspace is “a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures including the Internet telecommunications networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers ” 4 Cyberspace operations “The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace ” 5 4 5 Joint Publication JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms JP 3-0 1 Cyberspace superiority The operational advantage in through and from cyberspace to conduct operations at a given time and in a given domain without prohibitive interference 6 Cyberspace superiority may be localized in time and space or it may be broad and enduring The concept of cyberspace superiority hinges on the idea of preventing prohibitive interference to joint forces from opposing forces which would prevent joint forces from creating their desired effects “Supremacy” prevents effective interference which does not mean that no interference exists but that any attempted interference can be countered or should be so negligible as to have little or no effect on operations While “supremacy” is most desirable it may not be operationally feasible Cyberspace superiority even local or mission-specific cyberspace superiority may provide sufficient freedom of action to create desired effects Therefore commanders should determine the minimum level of control required to accomplish their mission and assign the appropriate level of effort UNDERSTANDING CYBERSPACE Cyberspace is a domain Cyberspace operations are not synonymous with information operations IO IO is a set of operations that can be performed in cyberspace and other domains Operations in cyberspace can directly support IO and non-cyber based IO can affect cyberspace operations Cyberspace is a man-made domain and is therefore unlike the natural domains of air land maritime and space It requires continued attention from humans to persist and encompass the features of specificity global scope and emphasis on the electromagnetic spectrum Cyberspace nodes physically reside in all domains Activities in cyberspace can enable freedom of action for activities in the other domains and activities in the other domains can create effects in and through cyberspace Even though networks in cyberspace are interdependent parts of these networks are isolated Isolation in cyberspace exists via protocols firewalls encryption and physical separation from other networks For instance classified networks such as the US Armed Forces Secure Internet Protocol Router network SIPRnet are not hardwired to the Internet at all times but connect to it via secure portals Additionally the construction of some hard-wired networks isolates them from most forms of radio frequency RF interference These factors enable these networks to be isolated within cyberspace yet still allow controlled connectivity to global networks Cyberspace segments are connected and supported by physical infrastructure electronic systems and portions of the electromagnetic spectrum EMS 7 As new 6 Approved Air Force Space Command AFSPC definition of cyberspace superiority derived from multiple AFSPC and LeMay Center cyberspace operations working groups 2009-2010 7 Definition of electromagnetic spectrum EMS “The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands ” JP 3-13 1 2 systems and infrastructures are developed they may use increasing portions of the EMS have higher data processing capacity and speed and leverage greater bandwidth Systems may also be designed to change frequencies the places where they operate within the EMS as they manipulate data Thus physical maneuver space exists in cyberspace 8 Logical maneuverability in cyberspace is often a function of the security protocols used by host systems Systems seeking connectivity with a secure host will have more difficulty gaining access than systems seeking connectivity with unsecured hosts Additionally defense against entry by undesired systems resides in the code or logic of the host system Once a connection between systems is established a potential intruder must exploit a fault in logic to enter the system Code writing can thus be a form of logical maneuver in cyberspace The potential intruder writes malicious code to gain maneuverability against targeted systems As a defender becomes aware of unwanted presence within the system the defender will alter the system’s code to deny entry The intruder wishing to remain “on target ” adapts the malicious code accordingly This process is the equivalent of forces maneuvering to gain positions of advantage in the traditional air land space and maritime domains Both logical and physical maneuver space is required — one is often useless without the other THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT The cyberspace domain is now a primary conduit for transactions vital to every facet of modern life Our society and military are increasingly dependent on cyberspace Cyberspace is a source of both strength and vulnerability for modern society While cyberspace operations enable a modern society they also create critical vulnerabilities for our adversaries to attack or exploit Manufacturing controls public utilities distribution banking communications and the distribution of information for national security have shifted to networked systems While this 30-year evolution has significantly benefited society it has also created serious vulnerabilities Increased wireless dependence and expanded interconnectivity has exposed previously isolated critical infrastructures vital to national security public health and economic well-being Adversaries may attempt to deny degrade manipulate disrupt or destroy critical infrastructures through cyberspace attack thus affecting warfighting systems and the nation as a whole Recent incursions into Department of Defense DOD and Air Force networks underscore today’s cyberspace challenge Adversaries in cyberspace are exploiting low-entry costs widely available resources and minimal required technological investment to inflict serious harm resulting in an increasingly complex and distributed environment The expanded availability of commercial off-the-shelf COTS technology provides adversaries with increasingly flexible and affordable technology to adapt to military purposes Low barriers to entry significantly decrease the traditional capability gap between the US and 8 For additional information on the “Physical Syntactic and Semantic layers of Cyberspace” see Chapter 10 of “Conquest in Cyberspace ” Libicki Martin C RAND Corporation Cambridge University Press 2007 3 our adversaries Adversaries are fielding sophisticated cyberspace systems and experimenting with advanced warfighting concepts Cyberspace Infrastructure Relationships 9 The Air Force depends upon the US’ critical infrastructure and key resources for many of its activities including force deployment training transportation and normal operations Physical protection of these is no longer sufficient as most critical infrastructure is under the control of networked and interdependent supervisory control and data acquisition SCADA or distributed control systems DCS Figure 1 1 Cyber Infrastructure Since private industry is the primary catalyst for technological advancements the military may become increasingly reliant on COTS technology This reliance may present three primary vulnerabilities 9 Adapted from DHS Securing the Nation's Critical Cyber Infrastructure 4  Foreign ownership control and influence of vendors Many of the COTS technologies hardware and software the Air Force purchases are developed manufactured or have components manufactured by foreign countries These manufacturers vendors service providers and developers can be influenced by adversaries to provide altered products that have built-in vulnerabilities such as modified chips  Supply chain The global supply chain has vulnerabilities that can potentially lead to the interception and alteration of products These vulnerabilities are present throughout the product life cycle from the inception of the design concept to product delivery and to product updates and support  COTS and government off-the-shelf GOTS balance The vast majority of the Air Force’s cyberspace operations components and capabilities are from COTS and to a much smaller degree GOTS technologies US NATIONAL CYBERSPACE POLICY We are in the midst of a dramatic change in the relationship between technology and the nature of warfare —David J Lonsdale The Nature of War in the Information Age Clausewitzian Future  There are many policy documents pertaining to cyberspace operations policy The documents most relevant to Air Force cyberspace operations are in Appendix B Policy and Doctrine Related to Cyberspace Operations The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative CNCI consists of a number of mutually reinforcing initiatives with the following major goals designed to help secure the United States in cyberspace  To establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate threats by creating or enhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities threats and events within the Federal Government—and ultimately with state local and tribal governments and private sector partners—and the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions  To defend against the full spectrum of threats by enhancing US counterintelligence capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain for key information technologies 5  To strengthen the future cybersecurity environment by expanding cyber education coordinating and redirecting research and development efforts across the Federal Government and working to define and develop strategies to deter hostile or malicious activity in cyberspace The following information is extracted from the CNCI 10 “ The President has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter Shortly after taking office the President therefore ordered a thorough review of federal efforts to defend the US information and communications infrastructure and the development of a comprehensive approach to securing America’s digital infrastructure In May 2009 the President accepted the recommendations of the resulting Cyberspace Policy Review including the selection of an Executive Branch Cybersecurity Coordinator who will have regular access to the President The Executive Branch was also directed to work closely with all key players in US cybersecurity including state and local governments and the private sector to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents strengthen public private partnerships to find technology solutions that ensure US security and prosperity invest in the cutting-edge research and development necessary for the innovation and discovery to meet the digital challenges of our time and begin a campaign to promote cybersecurity awareness and digital literacy from our boardrooms to our classrooms and begin to build the digital workforce of the 21st century Finally the President directed that these activities be conducted in a way that is consistent with ensuring the privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed in the Constitution and cherished by all Americans ” The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is the comprehensive strategy for the US to secure cyberspace It spells out three strategic priorities  Prevent cyber attacks against America’s critical infrastructure  Reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks  Minimize damage and recovery time from cyber attacks The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace seeks to empower US citizens to secure the portions of cyberspace that they own operate control or with which they interact This document outlines the framework for organizing and prioritizing US Government efforts in cyberspace This strategy guides federal government departments and agencies that secure cyberspace It identifies the steps every individual can take to improve our collective cyberspace security 10 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative CNCI The White House DECLASSIFIED 2010 6 The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations NMS-CO is the comprehensive strategy for US Armed Forces to ensure US superiority in cyberspace There are four strategic priorities of the NMS-CO  Gain and maintain initiative to operate within adversary decision cycles  Integrate cyberspace capabilities across the range of military operations ROMO  Build capacity for cyberspace operations  Manage risk for operations in cyberspace The NMS-CO describes the cyberspace domain articulates cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities and provides a strategic framework for action The NMS-CO is the US Armed Forces’ comprehensive strategic approach for using cyberspace operations to assure US military strategic superiority in the domain The integration of offensive and defensive cyberspace operations coupled with the skill and knowledge of our people is fundamental to this approach CHALLENGES OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS Cyberspace operations offer unique military challenges The paragraphs below address some of the known challenges mission assurance a compressed decision cycle anonymity and the attribution challenge and various threats inherent to cyberspace itself There is a requirement to balance defensive cyberspace actions within cyberspace with their impact on ongoing air space and cyberspace operations The lack of situational awareness among domains can cause serious disconnects in one significantly hindering operations in others 11 Mission Assurance Mission assurance consists of measures required to accomplish essential objectives of missions in a contested environment 12 Mission assurance entails prioritizing mission essential functions MEFs mapping mission dependence on cyberspace identifying vulnerabilities and mitigating risk of known vulnerabilities Mission assurance ensures the availability of a secured network to support military operations by assuring and defending the portion of the network directly supporting the operation Cyberspace mission assurance begins by mapping the operation to the supporting architecture Then deliberate actions are taken to assure the availability of that portion of the network These may include adding backups to 11 Office of Air Force Lessons Learned Enduring Airpower Lessons from OEF OIF Cyberspace Freedom of Action 20-25 April 2009 HQ USAF A9 12 United States Scientific Advisory Board Report on Defending and Operating in a Contested Cyber Domain SAB-TR-08-01 August 2008 p 11 7 single points of failure in the network or delaying certain maintenance actions to ensure the network will meet mission requirements Second the proactive actions are taken to ensure the network is secure and defended These actions may include focusing the attention of network defense assets on the slice of the network supporting the operations and conducting operations to ensure no threats are resident on the network A “contested cyber environment” involves circumstances in which one or more adversaries attempt to change the outcome of a mission by denying degrading disrupting or destroying our cyber capabilities or by altering the usage product or our confidence in those capabilities 13 Warfighters should realize risks and vulnerabilities are often created by the interdependencies inherent in the networking and integration of systems through cyberspace Integration of cyberspace operations involves actions taken to enable decision superiority through command and control C2 innovation integration and standardization of systems across air space and cyberspace domains Integration means are tested via operational experiments like the Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment Identifying vulnerabilities is difficult within a contested cyber environment Our systems are open to assault and are difficult to defend Some known examples of vulnerabilities in cyberspace operations are listed in the NMS-CO Assuring missions via cyberspace operations involves risk Since the nature of cyberspace is interconnectivity all cyberspace operations have inherent risk requiring constant attention and mitigation Cyberspace is a domain with its own set of risks In this domain a risk assumed by one is potentially assumed by all Mitigation of risk can result in a decreased risk level considered acceptable to continue conducting operations 14 Examples of this kind of approach toward handling risk can be seen in many aspects The implementation of firewalls training education and intrusion detection and prevention systems represent types of risk mitigation Just as in the air domain we do not defend the entire cyberspace domain we defend what is relevant to our operations In cyberspace this means protecting pathways and components since action against critical systems could seriously degrade our ability to fight and win Whether used offensively or defensively however conducting particular cyberspace operations may require access to only a very small “slice” of the domain This does not mean “localized” in the sense of a limited geographical area although that too may sometimes be required but perhaps just a string of internet protocol IP addresses which may span the globe but represent only a miniscule portion of data flow bandwidth Similarly it may involve the ability to hack through one particular firewall that may physically reside upon several servers but which is never engaged physically only through virtual means Finally many operations may span only seconds from inception to conclusion given the speed at which the Internet operates Successfully operating in cyberspace may require abandoning common assumptions concerning time and space 13 14 Ibid The White House National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations 2006 8 Freedom of action in cyberspace is a basic requirement for mission assurance However having the cyberspace capacity to achieve this freedom of action should not be taken for granted Just as operating in the air domain requires having the capacity to do so airborne platforms runways etc the Air Force should ensure it acquires sufficient capacity bandwidth components etc to operate within cyberspace Since access to cyberspace permeates daily activities it is easy to overlook this requirement and assume that sufficient capacity will simply exist Cyberspace operations seek to ensure freedom of action across all domains for US forces and allies and deny that same freedom to adversaries Specifically cyberspace operations overcome the limitations of distance time and physical barriers present in other domains Exploiting improved technologies makes it possible to enhance the Air Force’s global operations by delivering larger information payloads and increasingly sophisticated effects Cyberspace links operations in other domains thus facilitating interdependent defensive exploitative and offensive operations to achieve situational advantage Potential adversaries wish to undermine mission assurance actions via cyberspace operations The Air Force ensures it can establish and maintain cyberspace superiority and fight through cyberspace attacks at any time regardless if the US requires the use of military forces Our adversaries have also demonstrated that they can create civil instability through cyber attacks The Air Force maintains a capability to provide defense support to civil authorities in cyberspace when called upon by national leadership Potential adversaries have declared and demonstrated their intent Russia’s relatively crude ground offensive into Georgia in 2008 was preceded by a widespread and well-coordinated cyberspace attack The massive cyberspace attack and ensuing effects suffered by Estonia in 2007 illustrate how quickly malicious hackers affect even a technologically sophisticated government One last point to highlight concerning mission assurance is homeland infrastructure protection from threats or natural disaster The Air Force should prepare to respond rapidly to mitigate effects of such threats or events and reconstitute lost critical infrastructure capabilities while also providing support to civil authorities as directed by competent authority The Air Force should establish policies and guidance to ensure the execution of mission essential functions for critical infrastructure protection in the event that an emergency threatens or incapacitates operations Compressed Decision Cycle of Cyberspace Operations The fact that operations can take place nearly instantaneously requires the formulation of appropriate responses to potential cyberspace attacks within legal and policy constraints The compressed decision cycle may require predetermined rules for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR actions 9 Anonymity and the Inherent Attribution Challenge Perhaps the most challenging aspect of attribution of actions in cyberspace is connecting a cyberspace actor or action to an actual real-world agent be it individual or state actor with sufficient confidence and verifiability to inform decision- and policymakers Often this involves significant analysis and collaboration with other noncyberspace agencies or organizations While cyberspace attribution e g indentifying a particular IP address may be enough for some actions such as establishing access lists e g “white” or “black” lists of allowed or blocked IP addresses attribution equating to positive identification of the IP address holder may be required for others such as offensive actions targeting identified IP addresses The nature of cyberspace government policies and international laws and treaties make it very difficult to determine the origin of a cyberspace attack The ability to hide the source of an attack makes it difficult to connect an attack with an attacker within the cyberspace domain The design of the Internet lends itself to anonymity Anonymity is maintained both by the massive volume of information flowing through the networks and by features that allow users to cloak their identity and activities Nations can do little to combat the anonymity their adversaries exploit in cyberspace however the same features used by terrorists hackers and criminals strengthen state surveillance and law enforcement capability in modified form Actions of anonymous or unidentified actors are akin to an arms race Illicit actors continually amaze those in global law enforcement with the speed at which they stay one step ahead in the technology race Nevertheless nations have the advantage of law and the ability to modify the technological environment by regulation Anonymity is a feature of the Internet because of the way information moves through it and the way it is governed The underlying architecture was intended to be robust distributed and survivable The anonymous nature of the Internet is literally written into the structure of the Internet itself and cannot be dislodged without physically destroying many networks The Internet was also designed where the intelligence was placed at the ends of the network not in the network itself Routing tools software applications and information requests come from the ends in contrast to a traditional telephone network in which the switches routing protocols etc are in the network itself The difference makes it much harder to trace individual bits of information once they are in the network The Internet’s governance structure reflects its design 15 This makes attribution a challenge Threats to Cyberspace Operations In other domains the primary threats to national security come from either nation states or transnational actors such as terrorist organizations Massive capital resources and personnel are required to build field maintain and operate fighter aircraft satellites and ships but it took only a small and determined organization with simple tools to fly into the World Trade Center buildings on September 11 2001 15 Ibid 10 Adversaries seek asymmetric advantages and cyberspace provides significant opportunities for obtaining them There are a variety of threats to cyberspace operations The following paragraphs provide a brief description of each category of threat These threats and others should be considered when conducting cyberspace operations 16 Nation State Threat This threat is potentially the most dangerous because of access to resources personnel and time that may not be available to other actors Other nations may employ cyberspace to attack and conduct espionage against the US Nation state threats involve traditional adversaries and sometimes in the case of espionage even traditional allies Nation states may conduct operations directly or may outsource third parties to achieve their goals Transnational Actor Threat Transnational actors are formal and informal organizations that are not bound by national borders These actors use cyberspace to raise funds communicate with target audiences and each other recruit plan operations destabilize confidence in governments and conduct direct terrorist action Criminal Organization Threat Criminal organizations may be national or transnational in nature depending on how they are organized Criminal organizations steal information for their own use or in turn sell it to raise capital Individual or Small Group Threat Individuals or small groups of people can illegally disrupt or gain access to a network or computer system—these people are better known as “hackers ” The intentions of hackers vary Some are peaceful and hack into systems to discover vulnerabilities sometimes sharing the information with the owners and some have malicious intent Other hackers have political motivations and use cyberspace to spread their message to target audiences Another type of hacker desires fame or status and obtains it by breaking into secure systems or creating malware that creates havoc on commercial or government systems Malware is the short name for “malicious software ” Hackers can also be exploited by the other cyberspace threats such as criminal organizations in order to execute concealed operations against specific targets while preserving their identity or create plausible deniability 16 See the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations 2006 for expanded descriptions 11 In May 05 an unknown subject obtained unauthorized user level access to the Assignments Management System AMS Using this access the subject was able to view information contained within the AMS but was unable to alter information or gain access to any other Air Force computer systems Computer records indicate that the subject gained access to AMS via a senior Air Force official's account The compromised AMS account was set with privileges which allow the user to review any active duty Air Force members' single unit retrieval format SURF data from anywhere in the world with an Internet connection SURF records contain sensitive data such as assignment history security clearance personal identification information rank position and duty status The subject gained access to the web based account using the forgot password function to answer the challenge questions required to change the account password The challenge questions asked for biographical information on the senior official which was readily available on the Internet Upon review it was determined that the senior USAF official's account had been used to view the SURF records of 37 069 Air Force members Log analysis indicates the intrusion initially originated from forty-one different source IP addresses throughout the duration that the compromised account was used by the subject Throughout this duration the subject’s activity originated from approximately twelve additional US based Internet Protocol IP addresses which were later determined to be open proxies that the subject used to mask their true place of origin There were no foreign based IP addresses used after the incident was reported Court order subpoenas were served on all US-based source IP addresses from which the compromised AMS account was accessed fifty in total Information obtained via court order subpoenas identified the last known point of the origin However local law enforcement indicated that the information required to further identify the subject was no longer available ―Air Force Office of Special Investigations Brief June 2005 Traditional Threat Traditional threats typically arise from states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military conflict Within cyberspace these threats may be less understood due to the continuing evolution of technologies and methods Traditional threats are generally focused against the cyberspace capabilities that enable our air land maritime special operations and space forces and are focused to deny the US military freedom of action and use of cyberspace 12 Irregular Threat Irregular threats can use cyberspace as an unconventional asymmetric means to counter traditional advantages These threats could also manifest through an adversary’s selective targeting of US cyberspace capabilities and infrastructure For example terrorists could use cyberspace to conduct operations against our financial and industrial sectors while simultaneously launching other physical attacks Terrorists also use cyberspace to communicate anonymously asynchronously and without being tied to set physical locations They attempt to shield themselves from US law enforcement intelligence and military operations through use of commercial security products and services readily available in cyberspace Irregular threats from criminal elements and advocates of radical political agendas seek to use cyberspace for their own ends to challenge government corporate or societal interests Catastrophic Threat Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition possession and use of weapons of mass destruction WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects While WMD attacks are physical kinetic events they may have profound effects within the cyber domain by degrading or destroying key cyber-based systems vital to infrastructure like SCADA systems Well-planned attacks on key nodes of the cyberspace infrastructure have the potential to produce network collapse and cascading effects that can severely affect critical infrastructures locally nationally or possibly even globally For example an electromagnetic pulse could cause widespread damage to segments of the cyberspace domain in which operations must occur Disruptive Threat Disruptive threats are breakthrough technologies that may negate or reduce current US advantages in warfighting domains Global research investment development and industrial processes provide an environment conducive to the creation of technological advances The DOD should be prepared for the increased possibility of adversary breakthroughs due to continuing diffusion of cyberspace technologies Natural Threat Natural threats that can damage and disrupt cyberspace include events such as floods hurricanes solar flares lightning and tornados These types of events often produce highly destructive effects requiring the DOD to maintain or restore key cyberspace systems These events also provide adversaries the opportunity to capitalize on infrastructure degradation and diversion of attention and resources Accidental Threat Accidental threats are unpredictable and can take many forms From a backhoe cutting a fiber optic cable of a key cyberspace node to inadvertent introduction of viruses accidental threats unintentionally disrupt the operation of cyberspace Although post-accident investigations show that the large majority of accidents can be prevented and measures put in place to reduce accidents accidents should be anticipated Insider Threat The “insider” is an individual currently or at one time authorized to access an organization’s information system data or network Such authorization implies a degree of trust in the individual The insider threat refers to harmful acts that 13 trusted insiders might carry out for example something that causes harm to the organization or an unauthorized act that benefits the individual THE AIRMAN’S PERSPECTIVE Airmen normally think of the application of force from a functional rather than geographical perspective Airmen do not divide up the battlefield into operating areas as do surface forces air mindedness entails thinking beyond two dimensions into the dimensions of the vertical and the dimension of time 17 Airmen leverage speed range flexibility precision time and lethality to create effects from and within the air space and cyberspace domains Cyberspace operations are intrinsic to the conduct of modern military operations “Airmen conduct a greater percentage of operations not just over the horizon but globally expanding operations first through space and now also in cyberspace Just as air operations grew from its initial use as an adjunct to surface operations space and cyberspace have likewise grown from their original manifestations as supporting capabilities into warfighting arenas in their own right ” 18 Thus cyberspace operations should be tightly integrated with capabilities of the air and space domains into a cohesive whole commanded by an Airman who takes a broader view of war unconstrained by geographic boundaries RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DOCTRINE Cyberspace operations are compatible with existing Air Force air space and IO doctrine The relevant AFDDs to this document are explained in Appendix B Policy and Doctrine Related to Cyberspace Operations Cyberspace operations are integral to all combatant commands Services and agency boundaries As of the date of publication of this AFDD a new joint publication JP JP 3-12 Cyberspace Operations is being developed to provide overarching joint doctrine for planning or operations in cyberspace Air Force doctrine seeks compatibility and to influence joint doctrine AFDD 3-12 links cyberspace doctrine to joint operations including JP 3-13 Information Operations AFDD 3-12 also expands upon concepts found in NATO publications such as Allied Joint Publication AJP 3-10 Information Operations see Appendix B 17 18 AFDD 1 Air Force Basic Doctrine Organization and Command Ibid 14 Figure 1 2 Cyberspace Superiority 19 Cyberspace superiority supports and is supported by all of the other Air Force core functions It supports our joint and Service doctrine and joint operations concepts by providing cyberspace force application cyberspace defense and cyberspace support and associated capabilities that are tailored specifically to cyberspace superiority and are focused to bolster coalition and joint operations Cyberspace superiority is considered a common military function The Air Force approach to cyberspace operations should address and remain vigilant of alternative operating principles and procedures Some cyberspace users have ways and intents of using cyberspace that are similar to our own Other users possible adversaries often operate in ways not constrained by our laws or moral values Therefore the US should continue to watch closely for malicious use of cyberspace which can hamper Air Force cyberspace operations THE PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS AND CYBERSPACE Below is a matrix portraying how the principles of joint operations can be expressed and demonstrated through cyberspace operations 20 19 20 Derived from the Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master Plan Per AFDD 1 Air Force Basic Doctrine 17 November 2003 15 Relation of the Principles of Joint Operations to Cyberspace Operations 21 PRINCIPLE Objective Offensive Mass Economy of Force Maneuver Unity of Command Security Surprise 21 EXAMPLE CYBERSPACE OPERATION Direct every Military JFC-directed cyberspace military operation objectives must attacks shutting down toward a clearly support electrical power to key defined decisive overarching power grids of enemy achievable goal political goals leadership Disrupt degrade Most effective Distributed denial of service deny deter decisive way to attacks on Estonia 2007 seize retain and achieve overwhelming Estonian exploit initiative objectives networks Concentrate Must integrate Suspected Russian actors effects at the and synchronize preemptive attacks on most with other forces Georgian networks to advantageous disrupt coordination of places and times Georgian forces during 2008 invasion Allocate minimum Less manpower Use of cyberspace attack on essential power to needed to key enemy nodes to free secondary efforts create massive “kinetic” assets for other effects across operations the cyberspace domain Place the enemy Keeps enemy Use of numerous IPs to in a position of off balance avoid attribution during a disadvantage cyber attack Ensure unity of Attempts to Control of Air Force global effort under one secure unity of information grid through the responsible effort 24 AF commander Maintain access Reduce friendly Protect and enable without vulnerability to operability of C2 networks interruption hostile acts through layered defense influence and self-healing and robust surprise reconfigurations Strike at time Can shift Cyberspace attacks that are place or manner advantage well unannounced on vulnerable for which the out of proportion or compromised systems enemy is to effort unprepared expended PURPOSE REMARKS Convertino Sebastian Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace July 2007 Air University p 49 16 PRINCIPLE Simplicity Restraint PURPOSE REMARKS Give clear and concise direction to ensure understanding Limit collateral damage prevent unnecessary force Minimizes “friction” of war to the maximum extent possible Prevent damaging political and social consequences War is seldom if ever concluded by “the single sharp blow” Build trust and cooperation necessary to achieve end state Ensure commitment Perseverance necessary to attain strategic end state Ensure actions are legal moral and legitimate in eyes of target Legitimacy population and coalition partners EXAMPLE CYBERSPACE OPERATION Equip the force at all levels with user-friendly access to data and network structures Provide stand-alone nonkinetic options to commanders creating effects without destroying targets Provide enduring assured operation of systems create robust cyberspace capability in partner nations Use of nonkinetic cyber means to create desired effects against the enemy that under the circumstances are advantageous over kinetic attack TENETS OF AIRPOWER IN RELATION TO CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS While the principles of joint operations provide general guidance on the application of military forces the tenets of airpower provide unique considerations for air and space forces They reflect the specific lessons of air space and cyberspace operations over history 17 TENET Centralized Control Decentralized Execution Flexibility and Versatility Synergistic Effects Persistence Concentration PURPOSE Control by a commander with an Airman’s broad perspective execution by those who best understand the tactical intricacies of a dynamic operation Exploit mass and maneuver simultaneously employ at all levels of war Integrate use of forces to create effects that exceed contributions of individual force elements Conduct continuous ops visit and revisit targets nearly at will Concentrate overwhelming power at the right time and place EXAMPLE CYBERSPACE OPERATION Enables most Geographic combatant effective C2 of commander cyberspace capabilities and operations concepts of forces operations which translate into actions taken via regional combined air operations centers CAOCs and local Network Operations Centers REMARKS Flexible and versatile cyberspace operations act as a total force multiplier Ability to freely observe operational environment allowing unprecedented speed and agility A function of airpower’s speed and range Airmen must guard against dilution of airpower 18 Flexibility simultaneous mass and maneuver is inherent in the nature of cyberspace itself Versatility also inherent one small piece of code can create tactical operational or strategic effects depending on the target Support integration through robust persistent and survivable connectivity of C2 and ISR supporting real time joint force operations Distributed denial of service attacks persist until deliberately and specifically countered Simultaneous cyber attacks on or defense of multiple networks Establish clear priorities for use of airpower Priority Balance Balance opportunity necessity effectiveness and efficiency against risk to friendly forces Demands for airpower may exceed available resources Cyberspace operations support other missions across the ROMO giving commanders more capability and options to balance resources Prioritized ISR feeds reachback and “local” Air Force networks can be used by Air Force members and other service joint interagency nongovernmental organizations and coalition military members as necessary to meet national security needs INTEGRATION OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS ACROSS DOMAINS The core of cross-domain integration is the ability to leverage capabilities from different domains to create unique—and often “decisive”—effects As the use of cyberspace continues to evolve Airmen will determine new ways to solve problems to meet national objectives The figure below portrays the relationship among the operational domains This is important to consider because in modern warfare all domains are interconnected via cyberspace operations 22 Figure 1 3 Warfighting Operational Domain Relationships 22 Convertino Sebastian Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace July 2007 Air University p 11 19 CHAPTER TWO COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION      We must treat our computers and networks similarly to our aircraft satellites and missiles To this end operations and maintenance will follow standards governed by a tight system of regulations and technical orders Compliance with time critical software updates will gain new emphasis and commanders will be held accountable — General Norton A Schwartz Chief of Staff POLICY RELATED TO COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION OF CYBERSPACE FORCES According to the Deputy Secretary of Defense DepSecDef all combatant commands military departments and other defense components need the ability to operate unhindered in cyberspace the domain does not fall within the purview of any one particular department or component The Unified Command Plan assigns US Strategic Command USSTRATCOM the mission of synchronizing planning for cyberspace operations in coordination with other combatant commanders CCDRs the Services and as directed other US government agencies and executing selected cyberspace operations To support USSTRATCOM’s cyberspace mission requirements the commander of USSTRATCOM CDRUSSTRATCOM further delegated OPCON or TACON of designated cyber forces to the commander of US Cyber Command CDRUSCYBERCOM 23 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS Command relationships are defined in JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States This guidance aims to establish and maintain unity of command effort and purpose in achieving joint force and national security objectives Command relationships for specific operations are established in the governing operations order or execution order and may vary from operation to operation These SecDef-issued orders define supported and supporting relationships among the joint force commanders JFCs 23 Derived from USCC CONOPS dated 21 Sep 2010 20 Combatant Command Support Relationships 24 The geographic combatant commands GCCs US Central Command US European Command US Africa Command US Southern Command US Pacific Command USPACOM and US Northern Command USNORTHCOM are each assigned a geographic area of responsibility AOR within which their missions are accomplished with assigned and attached forces Forces under the direction of the President or the SecDef may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks as mutually agreed by the CCDRs concerned or as specifically directed by the President or the SecDef Functional combatant commands USSTRATCOM US Transportation Command and US Special Operations Command support the GCCs conduct operations in support of the President or the SecDef normally in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the operation will be conducted and may be designated by the SecDef as the supported CCDR for some operations When specialized units are assigned to functional CCDRs and one or more GCC wants those units for their operations formal command relationships need to be established prior to initiation of operations This applies to some cyberspace units In these situations GCCs are provided tailored support and forces by the CDRUSCYBERCOM depending on the type of contingency the type of force requested and what other operations are being conducted worldwide There are several different command relationships available to ensure the GCC gets the capabilities and authorities needed to meet national objectives ORGANIZATION OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS The Air Force organizes trains and equips its cyber forces to support the CCDRs and the joint warfighters and to accomplish Service functions Joint cyberspace forces are an integral part of military operations and command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective employment CDRUSSTRATCOM advocates plans and executes military cyberspace operations and has the responsibility to prioritize deconflict integrate and synchronize military cyberspace operations for current and planned joint operations The Air Force presents some cyberspace forces to CDRUSSTRATCOM for day-to-day operations via its Service element AFCYBER 24th Air Force USNORTHCOM and USPACOM may conduct the civil support and homeland defense HD missions with cyberspace operations during critical infrastructure protection 25 Like all Air Force forces Air Force cyberspace forces may be assigned or attached to other CCDRs coalition or joint force commanders as directed 24 25 Adapted from JP 1 Executive Summary See JP 3-27 Homeland Defense 12 July 2007 p 32 21 United States Strategic Command USSTRATCOM USSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing the planning of cyberspace operations 26 The foundational command relationship for Air Force cyberspace forces under USSTRATCOM 27 which  Directs global information grid GIG operations and defense  Plans against designated cyberspace threats  Coordinates with other combatant commands and appropriate US government agencies prior to the creation of cyberspace effects that cross AORs  Provides military representation to US national agencies US commercial entities and international agencies for matters related to cyberspace as directed  Advocates for cyberspace capabilities  Integrates theater security cooperation activities deployments and capabilities that support cyberspace operations in coordination with the GCCs and makes priority recommendations to the SecDef  Conducts operational preparation of the environment OPE and intelligence preparation of the operational environment IPOE and as directed synchronizes execution with GCCs  Executes cyberspace operations as directed  Plans coordinates and executes kinetic and non-kinetic global strike as required Each of these missions assigned by the Unified Command Plan UCP has key functions roles and responsibilities the Air Force accomplishes in order to support JFCs United States Cyber Command USCYBERCOM 28 Mission USCYBERCOM plans coordinates integrates synchronizes and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and prepare to and when directed conduct full-spectrum 26 The phrase “synchronizing planning” pertains specifically to planning efforts only and does not by itself convey authority to execute operations or direct execution of operations 27 Derived from the 2008 Unified Command Plan 28 Fact Sheets “USCYBERCOM” http www stratcom mil factsheets Cyber_Command 22 military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains ensure US allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries Focus USCYBERCOM fuses the Department’s full spectrum of cyberspace operations and plans coordinates integrates synchronizes and conducts activities to lead day-to-day defense and protection of DOD information networks coordinate DOD operations providing support to military missions direct the operations and defense of specified DOD information networks and prepare to and when directed conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations The command is charged with pulling together existing cyberspace resources and synchronizing warfighting effects to defend the information security environment USCYBERCOM centralizes command of cyberspace operations strengthens DOD cyberspace capabilities and integrates and bolsters the DOD’s cyber expertise USCYBERCOM’s efforts support the Armed Services’ ability to confidently conduct high-tempo effective operations as well as protect command and control systems and the cyberspace infrastructure supporting weapons system platforms from disruptions intrusions and attacks Forces USCYBERCOM is a USSTRATCOM Service elements include USAF USA USN USMC sub-unified command subordinate to 24th Air Force AFCYBER Army Forces Cyber Command ARCYBER Fleet Cyber Command FLTCYBERCOM Marine Forces Cyber Command MARFORCYBER Air Force Space Command AFSPC organizes trains and equips Air Force cyberspace forces to conduct sustained operations in through and from cyberspace and fully integrates with air and space operations It serves as the lead major command MAJCOM for Air Force cyberspace procedures and concepts of operations As the Air Force Service component commander to CDRUSSTRATCOM for Air Force cyberspace forces the commander AFSPC AFSPC CC exercises administrative control ADCON over active component and specified elements of ADCON over activated reserve component Air Force cyber forces assigned or attached to USSTRATCOM This includes those Air Force forces assigned or attached as part of USCYBERCOM under 24th Air Force 24 AF Operational control OPCON over assigned and attached Air Force cyberspace forces will be as directed by CDRUSSTRATCOM normally through CDRUSCYBERCOM to the commander 24 AF 24 AF CC AFSPC supports all joint warfighters in the cyberspace domain by providing forces through 24 AF that establish maintain operate and defend Air Force cyberspace components exploit adversary vulnerabilities attack adversary systems and provide command and control for assigned and attached cyberspace forces 29 29 AFSPC Cyberspace PAD Change 4 23 See AFDD 1 Air Force Basic Doctrine Organization and Command for additional doctrinal guidance on ADCON and specified ADCON responsibilities 24th Air Force This numbered Air Force serves as the component numbered Air Force C-NAF to USCYBERCOM In this role the C-NAF commander serves as the senior Air Force warfighter for employment of assigned and attached forces under USCYBERCOM As commander of Air Force forces COMAFFOR the 24 AF CC is normally delegated OPCON of assigned and attached Air Force forces and exercises control via the 624th Operations Center 624 OC The 24 AF CC is further responsible for executing Air Force Service tasks as directed by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force SECAF CSAF in the role as the commander Air Force Network Operations AFNETOPS CC These tasks include overseeing the morale welfare safety and security of assigned and attached forces They also include tasks inherent in the responsibility to provide establish and maintain a secure and defensible network in accordance with Air Force Guidance Memorandum 13-01 Per this document the AFNETOPS CC is “the single commander responsible for the overall operation defense maintenance and control of the AF-GIG ” Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency AFISRA AFISRA is a field operating agency subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance AF A2 AFISRA organizes trains equips presents and integrates all-source intelligence e g signals intelligence SIGINT geospatial intelligence GEOINT measurement and signature intelligence human intelligence etc and full-spectrum capabilities to the intelligence community and to JFCs through the COMAFFOR It provides customers at all echelons with multisource intelligence products applications and services and provides intelligence expertise in the areas of SIGINT IO including information protection acquisition foreign weapons systems and technology and treaty monitoring In relation to cyberspace AFISRA serves as the Air Force Service cryptologic component to the National Security Agency Central Security Service NSA CSS which authorizes SIGINT operations under Title 50 United States Code U S C While NSA-derived analytic work roles are essential to cyber operations employing full-spectrum cyber effects requires a multi-INT analysis approach To enable 24 AF AFCYBER operations AFISRA provides all-source cyber-focused ISR including digital network analysis to 24 AF through the 659th ISR Group This support is generally characterized within five cyber-focused ISR areas current intelligence and reporting indications and warning threat attribution and characterization IPOE and computer network exploitation COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CYBERSPACE FORCES 24 JP-1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States defines generic models for command relationships under which forces may be assigned or attached In all cases the nature of the mission forces and overall objective should remain paramount in determining proper command relationships The JFC has the authority to organize assigned attached forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations CONOPS The JFC establishes subordinate commands assigns responsibilities establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships and establishes coordinating instructions for subordinate commanders When organizing joint forces simplicity and clarity are critical See JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States and AFDD 1 for additional doctrinal guidance on command relationships C2 Options When contemplating C2 options for joint cyberspace operations within the operational area the JFC can choose to exercise C2 through the joint force staff through a Service component commander or through a functional component commander by designating one of the Service component commanders Many factors will weigh on the JFC’s selection most notably the type and availability of forces capabilities to accomplish the assigned mission Additional factors may include host and friendly nation support level and commitment of coalition forces enemy capabilities and actions and environmental limitations Theater-Level Considerations When the GCC establishes a subordinate joint command to conduct operations forces are normally attached as needed with delegation of OPCON to the subordinate JFC However the GCC also will weigh the operational circumstances and decide if available cyberspace forces capabilities can be most effectively employed by the subordinate JFC s by retaining them at the GCC level or a combination thereof This decision requires careful consideration after a thorough dialogue among the joint and Service component force commanders Global Cyberspace Operations Air Force cyberspace capabilities are used around the globe daily The UCP establishes USSTRATCOM as the functional unified command with overall responsibility synchronizing planning for military cyberspace operations CDRUSSTRATCOM exercises combatant command command authority COCOM of cyberspace forces assigned by the SecDef in the Forces For Unified Commands memorandum CDRUSSTRATCOM has delegated OPCON to CDRUSCYBERCOM to employ these forces to support worldwide operations Some cyberspace capabilities require deconfliction with organizations outside assigned AORs due to collaboration with US government and partner nation organizations Thus theater and global cyberspace operations require a C2 system capable of collaborative design planning execution and assessment across all affected AORs and with USSTRATCOM 25 Cyberspace operations can be controlled as a global system operating as a single entity for example the Air Force portion of non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network or by GCC’s as part of theater operations Global and theater cyberspace operations require different command relationships and levels of coordination to create desired effects Theater Cyberspace Integration Cyberspace effects are created through the integration of cyberspace capabilities with air and space capabilities The boundaries within which cyberspace C2 is exercised and the priorities and restrictions on its use should be identified in coordination with the JFC non-DOD governmental agencies and national leadership The potential for cyberspace effects to cause strategically important consequences may often necessitate coordination with the highest levels of US and partner nation governments Theater commanders integrate cyberspace effects throughout joint and coalition military operations Certain cyberspace forces move forward to conduct operations in specific theaters Some organic cyberspace forces may also be assigned to particular theaters Even in the case of global functional C2 cyberspace experts normally are assigned to theater staffs to facilitate cyberspace integration USSTRATCOM should provide representation to theater JFCs For the Air Force cyberspace expertise resides in each AOC When requested to serve on theater staffs the 24 AF presents expertise via an AF cyber liaison element to assist coordinating deconflicting synchronizing and integrating global and theater cyberspace operations Air Force Presentation of Cyberspace Forces Regional Organization and Control In response to a military situation a CCDR will normally organize a joint task force JTF If the entire theater is engaged the CCDR may be the JFC If the contingency is less than theater-wide the CCDR may establish a subordinate JTF commanded by a subordinate JFC In either case the CCDR will first look to assigned in-theater forces If augmentation is required the JFC will request additional forces through the SecDef Upon SecDef approval additional forces will transfer into the theater and will be attached to the gaining CCDR and the degree of control gained over those forces i e OPCON or TACON will be specified in the deployment orders The gaining CCDR then normally delegates OPCON of these forces downward to the JTF commander who should normally delegate OPCON to the Service component commanders within the gaining JTF All Air Force forces assigned or attached to a joint task force or established as a single-Service task force should be organized and presented as an Air Expeditionary Task Force AETF  Within a joint force the JFC may organize forces in a mix of Service and functional components All joint forces contain Service components because administrative and logistical support for joint forces are provided through Service components 26 Therefore by definition every joint force containing assigned or attached Air Force forces will have a COMAFFOR  The COMAFFOR normally exercises OPCON over Air Force forces within the AETF Functional Organization and Control Not all air space and cyberspace forces employed in an operation will be attached forward to a geographic combatant commander Some Air Force forces are capable of serving more than one GCC at a time Such forces such as inter-theater air mobility space and special operations forces are organized under functional combatant commanders to facilitate optimal use of cross-AOR forces When such forces are deployed in a GCC’s AOR they will often remain under the OPCON of their respective functional combatant commander and operate in support of the regional GCC The SecDef establishes support relationships between the CCDRs for the planning and execution of joint operations 30 Normally a support relationship is formally established between a GCC and USSTRATCOM In some circumstances after coordination with the owning commander and upon SecDef approval control of functional forces may be transferred to a geographic commander with specification of OPCON or TACON OPCON over assigned and attached Air Force cyberspace forces will be as directed by CDRUSSTRATCOM normally through CDRUSCYBERCOM to the 24 AF CC As the COMAFFOR the 24 AF CC normally exercises OPCON of assigned and attached Air Force forces through the 624th Operations Center 624 OC For more detailed information concerning presentation of forces see AFDD 1 Air Force Basic Doctrine Organization Command The JFC may elect to establish functional component commands to integrate specific capabilities across the joint force The JFC normally appoints a joint force air component commander JFACC who is responsible for air effects within the theater When the theater COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC the COMAFFOR is prepared to command joint cyberspace forces as well as joint air forces since the JFC may also delegate authority for cyberspace effects to the JFACC The JFC specifies the elements of TACON to be exercised over forces made available Some cyberspace forces may be attached to a COMAFFOR JFACC even though they may remain at home station 30 JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 27 CONSIDERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS Authorities and Legal Law Enforcement Considerations and Constraints Command control and organization of Air Force cyberspace forces are designed with inherent flexibility and versatility These characteristics ensure Air Force cyberspace mission accomplishment across the range of military operations Legal considerations and international legal obligations apply to the employment of cyberspace capabilities International law domestic law and policy decisions the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement establish the legal framework within which operational activities are evaluated In certain situations law enforcement authorities may be the driving forces for certain actions in military cyberspace operations In these situations law enforcement organizations e g the Air Force Office of Special Investigation and Federal Bureau of Investigation do three things 1 make cases against criminals who represent a threat via cyberspace 2 apprehend cyberspace criminals and 3 preserve evidence of a cyberspace crime The authority of cyberspace law enforcement agencies is driven by jurisdiction Mutually beneficial national interests govern coalition cyberspace force involvement Coalition forces are integrated as needed and are tailored to each situation or operation based on the national interests of both the US and partner nations The level of coalition integration is directly influenced by the partnerships or agreements made with the partner nation involved Across the range of military operations cyberspace forces may at one moment be operating under authorities flowing from provisions of Title 10 U S C Armed Forces and another under Title 50 U S C War and National Defense In addition Air National Guard cyberspace forces may be training under Title 32 U S C National Guard Guardsmen in Title 32 status may train for Title 10 missions but may not execute them The rules for operating under these different titles of US law are very different and the authority to transition from one to another may be held at a very high level even that of the President although the individual conducting the operation and his her immediate supervisors may be tactical-level “operators ” It is important that individuals be clearly aware of the authority for each operation they are a part of and the legal parameters that implies The employment of forces within this varied legal landscape emphasizes the need for clearly delineated command relationships This is particularly true when reserve component forces reserve or ANG are being utilized The authority that may be exercised varies with duty status and command relationships Particular care should be given to clearly delineating command relationships that apply during various states of reserve component employment and training 28 CHAPTER THREE DESIGN PLANNING EXECUTION AND ASSESSMENT      Although attacks in the cybersphere do not involve use of physical weapons their destructive impacts physical and otherwise may be no less lethal to societies ―Jeffrey R Cooper Another View of Information Warfare  BASIC CONSIDERATIONS Cyberspace operations may be conducted in a variety of situations and circumstances across the range of military operations The decision of which cyberspace capabilities to employ is based not only on overall joint campaign or operation objectives but on the risks of possible adversary responses and other potential second and third order effects on the campaign or operation Design of Cyberspace Operations In cyberspace the time between execution and effect can be milliseconds Nonetheless the observe-orient-decide-act OODA loop remains a valid construct for examining the decision cycle in cyberspace Ongoing operations can be considered those operations that span past the phases of warfare Even for ongoing operations planning at the strategic level is imperative because cyberspace operations can create effects simultaneously at the strategic operational and tactical levels across multiple domains Planners should provide inputs to and receive feedback from appropriate intelligence and targeting organizations across the full range of government organizations and partner nations Cyberspace’s unique attributes and potential for speed require the ability to react to rapidly changing situations Inclusion of cyberspace superiority strategy in formal planning normally offers many planning and execution options to meet a theater JFC’s objectives Cyberspace operations can enable creation of many effects that formerly required physical attack to accomplish Descriptions of these processes can be found in JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning 29 Planning Airmen should be prepared to articulate to commanders the advantages that cyberspace operations can provide as well as the dangers of unintended and undesirable effects and the need for close coordination between the many agencies with a role in cyberspace operations Cyberspace operations normally are planned as part of major operations and campaigns homeland operations crisis response and limited contingency operations In these cases planning is normally fully integrated into the joint operations planning process at the JFC level and in the joint operations planning process JOPP at the component level Security versus Capability Planners should consider the impact of increasing security in cyberspace on operations Changing information operations conditions or deploying additional tools to analyze networks can cause slower network operation speeds In a bandwidth-limited environment or in an environment with many dispersed forces planners should account for impacts of how measures designed to improve cyberspace defenses could actually hinder or desynchronize operations Logistics Support Readiness and sustainability of cyberspace capabilities are directly related to the quality of logistics planning Cyberspace logistics programs should be developed in balance with modernization efforts and the operating capability each category of resources provides Emphasis should be on total effectiveness to maximize cyberspace operations capabilities Execution During the execution stage across the range of military operations cyberspace operators within the AOC will integrate cyberspace effects into the COMAFFOR JFACC’s time-phased scheme of maneuver and fires based on commander’s guidance desired effects friendly capabilities and likely adversary courses of action USSTRATCOM cyberspace support may be obtained through the supported supporting relationship and should be fully integrated into the COMAFFOR JFACC’s planning and execution Global Operations The tasking cycle for cyberspace operations is the process the 624 OC uses to translate CDRUSCYBERCOM and theater JFC’s objectives priorities and intent into a coherent executable plan for Air Force cyberspace forces The 624 OC’s process is a derivative of the Joint Operations Planning Process–Air JOPP-A The Air Force cyber tasking order CTO a key product of the tasking cycle is used to task and execute assigned and attached cyberspace forces The cyber tasking order is analogous to an air tasking order The cyber tasking cycle which is based on the air tasking cycle is an iterative process for planning coordinating apportioning allocating executing and assessing the effectiveness of cyberspace operations The cycle can be lengthened or 30 shortened to synchronize with the theater battle rhythm to support crisis It includes continuous collection correlation and prioritization of many inputs to meet CDRUSCYBERCOM and theater JFC’s intent and objectives The CTO is derived from CDRUSCYBERCOM orders and when supported JFC’s orders It tasks assigned and attached cyberspace forces provides guidance for synchronization of global and theater joint air space and cyberspace operations and provides special instructions for the period it covers Every cyberspace operation during that period should be on the CTO for situational awareness and deconfliction purposes Theater Operations The air and space tasking cycles are the processes the theater AOC uses to translate JFC objectives priorities and intent into a coherent executable plan for assigned and attached Air Force forces The air operations directive and the air tasking order ATO are key products of the air and space tasking cycle The joint air and space operations plan reflects the COMAFFOR JFACC’s integrated air space and cyberspace operations plan to support the JFC’s campaign It should include the tasking of all assigned or attached cyberspace forces and all requests for theater support from global cyberspace forces Air Force cyberspace forces that are assigned or attached with specification of OPCON or TACON to a theater COMAFFOR JFACC are integrated into operations via the air tasking cycle and tasked via the ATO Integration and Synchronization of Theater and Global Operations When the 624 OC is supporting a theater operation the CTO is synchronized with the theater ATO throughout the tasking cycle with theater operators working closely with those at the 624 OC If supporting a single primary theater the tasking cycle is synchronized with that theater’s tasking cycle to optimize cyberspace support to the theater The 624 OC using guidance from the COMAFFOR JFACC helps develop cyberspace courses of action in support of theater operations During the planning phase the 624 OC uses COMAFFOR JFACC guidance rules of engagement ROE the joint integrated prioritized target list the target nomination list and the approved master air attack plan MAAP to finalize the CTO After the ATO is finalized the theater AOC forwards it to all required users to include the 624 OC During execution cyberspace tasking can occur dynamically to meet supported commander’s requests Assessment Assessment encompasses efforts at all levels of conflict use logical and defensible constructs to evaluate effects gauge progress toward accomplishment of actions and objectives and make strategy recommendations to shape future action Assessments of operations conducted in and through cyberspace follow the same general procedures as the assessment of all other operations and are informed by a range of inputs including ISR munitions effectiveness and operational reporting 31 There are two primary types of assessments accomplished at the operational level tactical and operational-level Tactical assessment TA is generally performed by the AOC’s ISR division and focuses on the effectiveness of tactical operations Operational-level assessment OA of strategy is usually executed within the strategy division provides insights and recommendations on the relevant commander’s i e COMAFFOR JFACC or 24 AF CC strategy Tactical Assessment TA TA is the overall determination of the effectiveness of tactical operations It consists of the evaluation of tactical actions against assigned tactical tasks using empirical objective and usually quantifiable measures for collection and analysis TA analysts collect aggregate analyze and archive relevant data This level of assessment determines commander need to take further tactical action TA answers such questions as “Was the intended action accomplished ” “Was the intended direct effect created ” “Has the target‘s status changed ” and “Is re-engagement re-attack or ‘re-influence’ necessary ” To make assessment most effective measures and indicators should be determined during the planning process TA of an operation is based on post-mission analysis Task accomplishment and resulting potential direct effects are measured through a variety of intelligence and analytical methods including SIGINT and GEOINT among other means Indirect effects such as potential changes in behavior that are very difficult to assess in a time-sensitive manner are best assessed at the operational level and above Operational-Level Assessment OA OA assessment is an analytically supported judgment of a commander’s strategy ends ways and means This type of assessment is the first level at which complex indirect effects are normally evaluated progress toward operational and strategic objectives is measured and recommendations for strategy adjustments and future action extending beyond re-attack are made Assessment at the operational level focuses on both effects and performance via measures of effectiveness MOE and measures of performance MOP respectively MOEs are “used to assess changes in system behavior capability or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state achievement of an objective or creation of an effect ” 31 MOPs are “used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment ” 32 In short MOEs help measure progress toward the end state while MOPs are used to measure the strategy’s ways and means These measures should flow from the development of criteria that define the conditions required to receive specific assessment grades This grading of the strategy’s ends 31 32 JP 3-0 Ibid 32 ways and means is often presented using a stoplight chart – with specific criteria designated for red yellow and green – in order to yield consistent meaningful and understandable feedback to the commander In order to accomplish this assessment process within the interrelated and complex nature of many cyberspace operations operational-level cyberspace planners and analysts should develop an intimate understanding of the linkage between cyberspace and the supported mission or operation This requires direct feedback from those closest to observing the intended effects such as the Airmen executing cyberenabled Air Force missions or the warfighters in theater in order to assess the level of cyberspace performance and effectiveness For example the assessment of cyberspace operational effects in support of influence operations requires an in-depth understanding of the warfighter’s desired impact on behavior and the ability to measure any resulting behavioral changes Situation Reporting In addition to the assessment provided by the strategy team regarding conduct of combat operations the COMAFFOR JFACC and 24 AF CC should receive daily reports on the status of friendly forces Commanders should prioritize assets by their criticality to operations and have situational awareness of their linkages in the domain In addition they should anticipate cascading effects of degraded operations similar to attacks on assets in other domains Additionally the 24 AF CC should ensure situation reporting is operationally-focused and addresses enemy actions and attacks friendly actions taken to mitigate threats and subsequent impact on friendly forces AUTHORITIES AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS Authorities Cyberspace forces will normally conduct operations under the authority of Title 10 or Title 50 The authorities invoked will differ depending on the type of operation being conducted The rules for operating under these varying titles are different Authorities to act against adversaries are included in the execute order or operation order for a specific operation If aggressive defensive responses or counter-offensive operations are authorized authorities should be clearly defined and understood Cyberspace forces belonging to the Air National Guard are governed in peacetime by Title 32 Legal Considerations Cyberspace operations may be conducted at any level of war and within legal parameters across the entire range of military operations in support of global and theater objectives Legal considerations and international legal obligations apply to the employment of cyberspace capabilities International law domestic law and policy decisions the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement establish the legal framework within which 33 operational activities are evaluated Usually the staff judge advocate on a commander’s staff advises the given commander on the lawful means of conducting cyberspace operations as detailed in JP 1-04 Legal Support to Military Operations Sound legal advice throughout the planning and execution of cyberspace operations is essential to mission success This is especially important while courses of action are being developed and before they are executed Early identification of legal issues will maximize planning efforts by developing lawful courses of action early in the planning process The legal support staff should have access billets and clearances to the information processes and programs used in cyberspace operations and understanding of the underlying cyber technologies CONSIDERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS Engagement and Cooperation Operations Multinational operations are becoming the norm for military operations making intelligence and information sharing with allies and coalition partners increasingly important Connectivity is essential particularly when the US allies and coalition host nation forces function in mutual support during combat operations Interoperability issues should also be considered in light of the Air Force’s need for information assurance As a part of a larger networked team the Air Force should plan and execute in complete concert with other Services nations and agencies Homeland Operations Cyberspace capabilities play a major role in homeland operations e g disaster relief when they are needed to rebuild portions of the cyberspace domain or to restore access to the domain Timely and coordinated US government responses are important when establishing and reconstituting cyberspace capabilities Attack and exploitation operations in an HD scenario may involve complex legal and policy issues however these issues do not prevent the application of attack and exploitation operations for HD but temper it Unless approved by appropriate authorities DOD assets cannot be used to perform attack or exploit operations on US entities Also information sharing protocols laws and policies regulate and at times may prevent data and information sharing between agencies organizations and nations thereby potentially reducing knowledge development Protection of classified and sensitive information may also preclude effective sharing with other agencies and coalition partners 34 Establishing the Cyberspace Infrastructure in Afghanistan In 2007 in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM the 3rd Combat Communication Group 3 CCG deployed to Kabul Afghanistan and established an Enterprise Network for Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior MoI which provides capabilities such as e-mail telephone service through voice over Internet protocol and video teleconferencing capability between the National Police Coordination Center six joint regional coordination centers 12 Kabul headquarters buildings 38 provincial command centers as well as about 200 other locations such as medical and fire stations Also 3 CCG provided the infrastructure to allow network technicians to protect MoI’s computers against viruses and provided a platform from which they can defend against cyber-attack   Properly implemented cyberspace operations support defense of the homeland When a domestic incident occurs the escalation processes inherent in civil support procedures are implemented A non-DOD civilian agency is in charge of civil support incidents and military assistance is provided through a relationship similar to direct support as articulated in civil support agreements and the Standing civil support EXORD In all cases the Air Force is prepared to support homeland operations through intelligence and information sharing within the appropriate legal framework Reconstituting the Cyberspace Infrastructure during Disaster Relief In 2005 the US’s Gulf of Mexico region was devastated by a hurricane which destroyed critical infrastructure in Mississippi Louisiana and Texas This disaster displaced tens of thousands of people seeking to escape the impact of the storm Based on their expertise for extending the cyberspace domain Air Force combat communications groups deployed throughout the Gulf region to reconstitute the cyberspace domain and allow military and US government organizations to communicate and be connected for situational awareness and C2 35 Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operation Considerations These missions may be operations into friendly nations however some states are unstable and may include elements that are actively hostile toward the US In other situations political or international considerations may require air operations to be conducted within known threat areas Cyberspace forces may or may not have to deploy to support these operations Major Operations and Campaigns In addition to other ongoing missions cyberspace operations can be planned as part of major operations and campaigns In these cases planning should be fully integrated into the joint operation planning process at the JFC level and the joint operations planning process for Air at the component level Descriptions of these processes can be found in JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning and AFDD 3-0 Operations and Planning This kind of operational planning does not significantly differ from planning for operations in other domains in terms of processes thus this section concentrates upon the continuous cyclic and iterative nature of ongoing cyberspace operations Inclusion of a strategy for cyberspace superiority in formal planning offers commanders many “non-traditional” options Cyberspace operations enable creation of effects that formerly required physical attack to accomplish Cyberspace operations also open avenues for exploitation of adversary capabilities and for changing the information that the adversary receives This type of effect may not be possible through access in the other physical domains During the execution stage of major operations and campaigns cyberspace planners and operators should work in conjunction with the COMAFFOR’s time-phased scheme of maneuver for a given tasking period Planners should synthesize commander’s guidance desired effects supported components’ schemes of maneuver friendly capabilities and likely adversary courses of action Operators will employ friendly resources against approved targets 36 CONCLUSION Cyberspace operations are evolving inside the DOD and the Air Force Air Force Space Command and 24 AF form the foundation of Air Force cyberspace operations Their resulting capabilities support all geographic and functional combatant commanders This doctrine document establishes fundamentals for Air Force cyberspace operations Uses of the cyberspace domain continue to evolve as new concepts and capabilities are developed The Air Force recognizes its critical dependence on cyberspace Hence a culture shift is underway that reflects the reality that cyberspace is a contested domain and the importance of maintaining cyberspace superiority The Air Force will develop unique cyber capabilities that originate in its distinct missions and take full advantage of the integration of air space and cyber capabilities Each Service brings its own cyber strengths and capabilities to the joint team and the nation Since air space and cyberspace are inextricably linked the potential exists to integrate capabilities across these domains to exponentially increase each other’s power This integration promises to give joint force commanders unrivaled global access persistence awareness and connectivity capabilities and to rapidly restore critical infrastructure via a cross-domain network-of-networks approach The Air Force seeks to develop cyberspace capabilities that complement those of other services and will explore the combination of cyberspace with other non-kinetic capabilities to achieve synergies The Air Force’s growing reliance on cyberspace requires a well-educated and trained professional cadre composed of cyberspace operators and leaders who are ready to provide the required capability and capacity for mission accomplishment Professional cyberspace operators with technical and tactical expertise are mission essential individuals Experience shows us that cyberspace operators should possess high levels of technical competence robust analytical skills and a critical understanding of cyberspace warfare application Finally this professional corps should take advantage of experience and skill sets from multiple existing Air Force specialties and be represented across the total force structure Each Airman should be an educated and responsible user of cyberspace capabilities We should take care of each other as good wingmen in cyberspace AT THE VERY HEART OF WARFARE LIES DOCTRINE… 37 APPENDIX A – TEN THINGS EVERY AIRMAN MUST KNOW 1 The United States is vulnerable to cyberspace attacks by relentless adversaries attempting to infiltrate our networks at work and at home – millions of times a day 24 7 2 Our adversaries plant malicious code worms botnets and hooks in common websites software and hardware such as thumbdrives printers etc 3 Once implanted this code begins to distort destroy and manipulate information or “phone” it home Certain code allows our adversaries to obtain higher levels of credentials to access highly sensitive information 4 The adversary attacks your computers at work and at home knowing you communicate with the Air Force network by email or by transferring information from one system to another 5 As cyber wingmen you have a critical role in defending your networks your information your security your teammates and your country 6 You significantly decrease our adversaries’ access to our networks critical Air Force information and even your personal identity by taking simple action 7 Do not open attachments or click on links unless the email is digitally signed or you can directly verify the source—even if it appears to be from someone you know 8 Do not connect any hardware or download any software applications music or information onto our networks without approval 9 Encrypt sensitive but unclassified and or critical information Ask your computer security administrator for more information 10 Install the free Department of Defense anti-virus software on your home computer Your computer security administrator can provide you with your free copy — Gen Norton A Schwartz Chief of Staff US Air Force “Defending Our Networks and Our Country” 38 APPENDIX B – POLICY AND DOCTRINE RELATED TO CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS MATRIX OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS DOCUMENTS National Security Strategy US National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace February 2003 National Defense Strategy NDS National Military Strategy National-Level Documents The National Security Strategy of the United States of America is a document prepared periodically by the executive branch of the government of the United States for congress that outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to deal with them The legal foundation for the document is spelled out in the GoldwaterNichols Act The document is purposely general in content contrast with the National Military Strategy and its implementation relies on elaborating guidance provided in supporting documents including the National Military Strategy NMS Covers the necessity for vigilance in cyberspace many defensive aspects of cyberspace operations and the general principles that should guide national response to a cyberspace “crisis ” 33 Department of Defense Documents The NDS is issued periodically and the last one was published in June 2008 It outlines how the Department supports the President’s National Security Strategy and informs the National Military Strategy and other subordinate strategy documents The strategy builds on lessons learned and insights from previous operations and strategic reviews such as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review The NMS is issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a deliverable to the Secretary of Defense briefly outlining the strategic aims of the armed Services The NMS's chief source of guidance is the National Security Strategy document The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense prepares the National Military Strategy in accordance with 10 U S C Section 153 Title 10 requires that not later than February 15 of each evennumbered year the Chairman submit to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed Services a comprehensive examination of the national military 33 National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace The White House February 2003 39 MATRIX OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS DOCUMENTS National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations NMSCO December 2006 Unified Command Plan UCP 6 April 2011 Joint Operations Planning and Execution System JOPES CJCS Net-Centric Operational Environment NCOE Joint Integrating Concept JIC v1 31 Oct 2005 DOD Directive 3600 01 Information Operations 23 May strategy This report must delineate a national military strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President the most recent annual report of the Secretary of Defense submitted to the President and Congress and the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review conducted by the Secretary of Defense The NMS-CO describes the cyberspace domain articulates cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities and provides a strategic framework for action The NMS-CO is the US Armed Forces’ comprehensive strategic approach for using cyberspace operations to assure US military strategic superiority in the domain The integration of offensive and defensive cyberspace operations coupled with the skill and knowledge of our people is fundamental to this approach The UCP assigns USSTRATCOM the mission of synchronizing planning for cyberspace operations in coordination with other CCDRs the Services and as directed other US government agencies and executing selected cyberspace operations The JOPES is the Department of Defense’s DOD’s principal means for translating national security policy decisions into military plans and operations JOPES Functional Managers grant permissions restrict access to operation plans on the database and perform periodic reviews of user IDs and the content of the JOPES database to ensure outdated plans and accounts are removed when no longer required This document provides a conceptual look at how the NCOE will enhance the overall performance of warfighters at every level Its focus is supporting a JTF including the JTF commander JTF mission partners and warfighters at the “first tactical mile ” The goal is for the entire joint force and mission partners to have the technical connectivity and interoperability necessary to rapidly and dynamically share knowledge amongst decisionmakers communities of interest and others while protecting information from those who should not have it—all to facilitate the coherent application of joint action The NCOE will translate information superiority into combat power by effectively linking both horizontally and vertically knowledgeable entities throughout the battlespace thus making possible dramatically new ways of operating and by extension decisive advantages in warfighting The timeframe is 8 to 20 years in the future with an illustrative focus on the year 2015 Covers some of the computer network aspects of cyberspace operations classifying them as part of IO 3600 01 discusses “computer network operations ” comprised of “computer network 40 MATRIX OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS DOCUMENTS 2011 Secret title and attack ” computer network defense ” and computer network information extracted exploitation ” but does not discuss networks or cyberspace are unclassified operations in a more holistic sense Some further guidance may be found in the NMS-CO but the details are not releasable at this time SecDef Specifies that USSTRATCOM’s JTF-GNO falls under the Memorandum operational control of USSTRATCOM’s USCYBERCOM which directly impacts the organization of the global functional Command and combatant command responsible for much joint cyberspace Control for Military Cyberspace Missions activity 12 November 2008 DODD 3020 40 This Directive cancels DOD Directive 5160 54 Critical Asset Assurance Program January 20 1998 hereby canceled Defense Critical updates policy and assigns responsibilities for the DCIP Infrastructure Program DCIP 14 incorporating guidance from the President in Homeland Security January 2010 Presidential Directive #7 December 17 2003 to function as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Defense Industrial Base with the following responsibilities collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies State and local governments and the private sector including with key persons and entities in their infrastructure sector conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector and encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources DODD 3020 26 Department of Defense Continuity Programs January 9 2009 •DODD 8500 01E Information Assurance 24 This Directive cancels Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum “Critical Infrastructure Protection Responsibilities and Realignments ” August 11 1999 hereby canceled and supersedes The Department of Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan November 18 1998 hereby superseded and the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum “Realignment of Critical Infrastructure Protection Oversight to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense ” September 3 2003 hereby superseded DOD policy that all defense continuity-related activities programs and requirements of the DOD Components including those related to continuity of operations continuity of government and enduring constitutional Government shall ensure the continuation of current approved DOD and DOD component mission essential functions all circumstances across the spectrum of threats Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to achieve Department of Defense DOD information assurance IA through a defense-in-depth approach that integrates the 41 MATRIX OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS DOCUMENTS October 2002 •DODD O-8530 01 Computer Network Defense 1 January 2001 DODI O-3600 02 Information Operations Security Classification Guidance 28 Nov 1995 DODI 8410 02 Network Operations for the GIG 19 Dec 08 DODI O-8530 02 Support to Computer Network Defense 9 Mar 2001 JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 14 May 2007 Change 1 20 March 2009 JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence 22 June 2007 JP 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations 07 October 2004 JP 2-01 3 Joint Intelligence capabilities of personnel operations and technology and supports the evolution to network centric warfare Establishes policy definition and responsibilities for CND within DOD information systems and computer networks Provides DOD-level security classification guidance relevant to some cyberspace operations Incorporates and cancels DOD chief information officer Guidance and Policy Memoranda No 10-8460 and No 4-8460 Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for implementing and executing NetOps the DOD-wide operational organizational and technical capabilities for operating and defending the GIG Institutionalizes NetOps as an integral part of the GIG Implements policy assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures under DODD 8530 01 This publication is the capstone joint doctrine publication It provides doctrine for unified action by the Armed Forces of the United States As such it specifies the authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders can use provides guidance for the exercise of that military authority provides fundamental principles and guidance for command and control prescribes guidance for organizing joint forces and describes policy for selected joint activities It also provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multiagency and multinational operations This publication is the keystone document of the joint intelligence series It provides fundamental principles and guidance for intelligence support to joint operations and unified action This publication establishes doctrinal guidance on the provision of joint and national intelligence products services and support to military operations This publication describes the process in which the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment are 42 MATRIX OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS DOCUMENTS Preparation of the Operational Environment 16 June 2009 JP 3-0 Joint Operations 11 August 2011 analyzed to identify possible adversary courses of action and to support joint operation planning execution and assessment This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series It provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations JP 3-08 Interagency Volume I discusses the interagency intergovernmental organization IGO and nongovernmental organization NGO Intergovernmental environment and provides fundamental principles and guidance Organization and to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense Nongovernmental and other US Government agencies IGOs NGOs and regional Organization organizations Volume II describes key US Government Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I departments and agencies IGOs and NGOs — their core and II 17 March 2006 competencies basic organizational structures and relationship or potential relationship with the Armed Forces of the United States JP 3-13 Information This publication provides doctrine for information operations Operations 13 planning preparation execution and assessment in support of February 2006 joint operations JP 3-13 1 Electronic This publication provides joint doctrine for electronic warfare Warfare 25 January planning preparation execution and assessment in support of 2007 joint operations across the range of military operations JP 3-13 3 Operations This publication provides doctrine for planning preparation Security 29 June execution and assessment of operations security in joint 2006 operations JP 3-13 4 Military This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and Deception 13 July execution of military deception at the combatant command 2006 and or subordinate joint force level JP 3-14 Space This publication provides joint doctrine for planning executing Operations 6 January and assessing joint space operations 2009 JP 3-13 2 This publication addresses military psychological operations planning and execution in support of joint multinational and Psychological Operations 0707 interagency efforts across the range of military operations January 2010 JP 5-0 Joint This publication is the keystone doctrine for joint operation planning throughout the range of military operations Operation Planning 11 August 2011 JP 6-0 Joint This publication is the keystone document for the communications system series of publications This publication Communications System 10 June presents approved doctrine for communications system support 43 MATRIX OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS DOCUMENTS 2010 to joint and multinational operations and outlines the responsibilities of Services agencies and combatant commands with respect to ensuring effective communications system support to commanders Air Force-Level Documents HQ USAF Program Organization of the Air Force’s Service contribution to Action Directive 07-08 cyberspace operations Change 4 Phase I of Implementation of Secretary of Air Force Direction to Organize Air Force Cyberspace Forces 20 February 2009 AFDD 1 Air Force This document is the premier statement of US Air Force basic doctrine It has been prepared under the direction of the CSAF Basic Doctrine It establishes general doctrinal guidance for the application of Organization and Command 14 air and space forces in operations across the full range of October 2011 military operations AFDD 3-0 This document has been prepared under the direction of the CSAF It establishes doctrinal guidance for organizing planning Operations and Planning 3 April 2007 and employing air space and cyberspace forces at the operational level of conflict across the full range of military operations It is the capstone of US Air Force operational-level doctrine publications Together these publications collectively form the basis from which commanders plan and execute their assigned air and space missions and their actions as a component of a joint Service or multinational force AFDD 3-13 This AFDD establishes doctrinal guidance for information operations More detailed doctrinal discussions of information Information Operations 11 operations concepts are explained in AFDD 3-13 1 Electronic January 2005 Warfare Operations and AFDD 3-61 Public Affairs Operations The nomenclature of these publications is subject to change Other AFDDs also discuss information operations as they apply to those specific airpower functions AFDD 3-61 Public This document articulates fundamental Air Force principles for Affairs 23 December conducting public affairs operations and provides commanders 2010 with operational-level guidance for employing and integrating those capabilities across the range of air space and information operations 44 REFERENCES Air Force Publications NOTE all AFDDs are available at HTTP WWW E-PUBLISHING AF MIL AFDD 1 Air Force Basic Doctrine Organization and Command AFDD 3-0 Operations and Planning AFDD 3-01 Air Warfare AFDD 3-24 Irregular Warfare AFDD 4-0 Combat Support AFDD 3-13 Information Operations AFDD 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare AFDD 3-61 Public Affairs Operations AFDD 6-0 Command and Control Systems Joint Publications CJCSM 6510 01 Defense-in-Depth Information Assurance IA and Computer Network Defense CND CJCSI 5120 02B Joint Doctrine Development Systems CM-0527-08 Definition of Cyberspace Operations SM 183-06 Joint Concept of Operations for Global Information Grid NetOps JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence JP 3-0 Joint Operations JP 3-08 Interagency Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I II JP 3-13 Information Operations JP 3-13 1 Electronic Warfare JP 3-13 2 Psychological Operations JP 3-13 3 Operations Security JP 3-13 4 Military Deception JP 3-14 Space Operations JP 3-30 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations JP 3-60 Joint Targeting JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning JP 6-0 Joint Communications System National and DOD Publications Unified Command Plan UCP 6 April 2011 National Security Presidential Directive NSPD -54 Cyberspace Security 8 January 2008 National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations NMS-CO 11 December 2006 45 DepSecDef Memo The Definition of Cyberspace 12 May 2008 DODD 3020 40 Defense Critical Infrastructure Program DCIP 14 January 2010 DODD 3020 26 Department of Defense Continuity Programs January 9 2009 DODD 3100 10 Space Policy 9 July 1999 DODD O-5100 30 Department of Defense Command and Control 5 Jan 2006 DODD 8100 01 Global Information Grid Overarching Policy 21 Nov 03 DODD O-8530 1 Computer Network Defense CND 8 January 2001 DODI S-3100 15 Space Control 19 January 2001 DODI 4650 01 Policy and Procedures for Management and Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum 9 January 2009 DODI 8410 02 NetOps for the Global Information Grid GIG 19 December 2008 DODI O-8530 2 Support to Computer Network Defense CND 9 March 2001 Other Publications US Army Field Manual 3-13 Information Operations 28 November 2003 US Army Field Manual 3-05 30 Psychological Operations April 2005 Field Manual 3-05 301 Psychological Operations Process Tactics Techniques and Procedures August 2007 US Army Field Manual 3-05 302 Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics Techniques and Procedures April 2005 Navy Warfare Publication 3-13 Navy Information Operations June 2003 Navy Warfare Publication 3-63 Vol I Computer Network Operations January 2008 Navy Warfare Publication 3-63 Vol II Computer Network Operations September 2008 Navy Tactics Techniques and Procedures 3-13 1 Theater and Campaign Information Operations Planning January 2008 Navy Tactics Techniques and Procedures 3-13 2 Navy Information Operations Warfare Commander's Manual May 2006 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40 4 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations 9 July 2003 Allied Joint Publication 3-10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations 2006 Playbook for Cyberspace Intrusions 28 May 2008 Chief of Staff of the Air Force CSAF Professional Reading Program The CSAF’s professional reading list with book reviews is available on the Air Force web site at http www af mil information csafreading index asp The list is subject to revision Readers are encouraged to check the Air Force web site http www af mil for the most current information 46 GLOSSARY Abbreviations and Acronyms AFSPC AJP AOC AOR ATO air expeditionary task force Air Force Doctrine Document Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency Air Force Space Command allied joint publication air and space operations center area of responsibility air tasking order C2 CAOC CCDR COG COMAFFOR COMINT CSAF CTO command and control combined air operations center combatant commander center of gravity commander Air Force forces communications intelligence Chief of Staff US Air Force cyber tasking order DOD Department of Defense ELINT EMS electronic intelligence electromagnetic spectrum FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 GCC GIG global combatant commander global information grid HD HUMINT IMINT homeland defense human intelligence imagery intelligence IO IP IPOE ISR information operations Internet protocols intelligence preparation of the operational environment intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance JEFX JFACC joint expeditionary force experiment joint force air component commander AETF AFDD AFISRA 47 JFC JFCC JFCC-NW JP JTF JTF-GNO joint force commander joint functional component command Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare joint publication joint task force Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations MAAP MAJCOM MOE MOP NDS NMS NMS-CO master air attack plan major command measures of effectiveness measures of performance national defense strategy national military strategy National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations OA OODA OPCON operational assessment observe-orient-decide-act operational control ROE ROMO RF rules of engagement range of military operations radio frequency SCADA SECAF SIGINT SURF supervisory control and data acquisition Secretary US Air Force signals intelligence single unit and retrieval format TA TACON tactical assessment tactical control TTP tactics techniques and procedures UAS UCP US U S C USSTRATCOM unmanned aircraft systems unified command plan United States United States Code United States Strategic Command WMD weapons of mass destruction 48 Definitions administrative control Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces control of resources and equipment personnel management unit logistics individual and unit training readiness mobilization demobilization discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations Also called ADCON JP 1 combatant command command authority Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 “Armed Forces” United States Code section 164 exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense Combatant command command authority cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces assigning tasks designating objectives and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations joint training and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command Combatant command authority should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and or functional component commanders Combatant command command authority provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions Operational control is inherent in combatant command authority Also called COCOM JP 1 computer network exploitation Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks Also called CNE JP 3-13 cyber tasking order Tasking document used by the AF cyber component commander to task assigned AF cyber forces to perform specific actions at specific time frames in support of AF and Joint requirements Also called CTO AFDD 3-12 cyberspace Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures including the Internet telecommunications networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers JP1-02 Cyberspace is a domain that requires man-made technology to enter and exploit The only difference is that it is easier to see and sense the other domains As with air and space effects of cyberspace operations can occur simultaneously in many 49 places They can be precise broad enduring and transitory AFDD 3-12 Definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity cyberspace defense The passive active and dynamic employment of capabilities to respond to imminent or on-going actions against AF or AFprotected networks AF's portion of the Global Information Grid GIG or expeditionary communications assigned to the AF AFDD 3-12 cyberspace force application Combat operations in through and from cyberspace to achieve military objectives and influence the course and outcome of conflict by taking decisive actions against approved targets AFDD 3-12 cyberspace operations The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace JP 3-0 cyberspace superiority The operational advantage in through and from cyberspace to conduct operations at a given time and in a given domain without prohibitive interference AFDD 3-12 cyberspace support Foundational continuous or responsive operations in order to ensure information integrity and availability in through or from AF controlled infrastructure and its interconnected analog and digital portion of the battle space AFDD 3-12 defensive counter cyberspace A full range of active defensive measures taken to detect identify acquire information track and defend AF operations against actions or operations to penetrate dissuade degrade disrupt or corrupt friendly cyberspace freedom of action and capabilities AFDD 3-12 design A method of critical and creative thinking for understanding visualizing and describing complex ill-structured problems and the approaches to resolve them AFDD 3-12 electromagnetic spectrum The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands Also called EMS JP 3-13 1 electronic warfare Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy Electronic warfare consists of three divisions electronic attack electronic protection and electronic warfare support Also called EW JP 3-13 1 global information grid The globally interconnected end-to-end set of information capabilities associated processes and personnel for collecting processing storing disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters policy makers and support personnel The global information grid 50 includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services software including applications data security services other associated services and National Security Systems Also called GIG JP 6-0 global information infrastructure The worldwide interconnection of communications networks computers databases and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of information available to users The global information infrastructure encompasses a wide range of equipment including cameras scanners keyboards facsimile machines computers switches compact disks video and audio tape cable wire satellites fiber optic transmission lines networks of all types televisions monitors printers and much more The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted information constitute a critical component of the global information infrastructure Also called GII JP 3-13 global network operations center United States Strategic Command operational element responsible for providing global satellite communications system status maintaining global situational awareness to include each combatant commander’s planned and current operations as well as contingency plans supporting radio frequency interference resolution management supporting satellite anomaly resolution and management facilitating satellite communications interface to the defense information infrastructure and managing the regional satellite communications support centers Also called GNC JP 6-0 information assurance Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability integrity authentication confidentiality and non-repudiation This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection detection and reaction capabilities DODD 8500 01E October 24 2002 recertified April 23 2007 information environment The aggregate of individuals organizations and systems that collect process disseminate or act on information JP 3-13 information operations The integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence disrupt corrupt or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own Also called IO SecDef Memo 12401-10 joint force air component commander The commander within a unified command subordinate unified command or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned attached and or made available for tasking air forces planning and coordinating air operations or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned Also called JFACC See also joint force commander JP 3-0 51 joint force commander A general term applied to a combatant commander subordinate unified commander or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command command authority or operational control over a joint force Also called JFC JP 1 malware Software such as viruses or Trojans designed to cause damage or disruption to a computer system AFDD 3-12 mission assurance cyberspace Measures required to accomplish essential objectives of missions in a contested environment Mission assurance entails prioritizing mission essential functions mapping mission dependence on cyberspace identifying vulnerabilities and mitigating risk of known vulnerabilities AFDD 3-12 network defense The employment of network-based capabilities to defend friendly information resident in or transiting through networks against adversary efforts to destroy disrupt corrupt or usurp it Also called NetD AFDD 3-13 network operations Activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid Also called NetOps JP 6-0 offensive counter cyberspace The operational planning and employment of capabilities to disrupt deny degrade divert neutralize or destroy an adversary’s use of cyberspace capability or other data and information infrastructures to conduct activities or freedom of action AFDD 3-12 operational control Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command Operational control is inherent in combatant command command authority and may be delegated within the command Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces assigning tasks designating objectives and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and or functional component commanders Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions it does not in and of itself include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration discipline internal organization or unit training Also called OPCON JP 1 52 A process of identifying critical information and operations security subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to a identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems b determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries and c select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation Also called OPSEC JP 3-13 3 passive defense Measures taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the initiative JP 1-02 Continuous measures taken to secure and protect AF and DOD cyberspace assets through hardening and other measures against cyberspace attack and exploitation identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities and employing capabilities to detect adversary activity and provide continual defense AFDD 3-12 Definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity tactical control Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability or forces made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned Tactical control is inherent in operational control Tactical control may be delegated to and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task Also called TACON JP 1 53