Digitized from Box 8 of the Richard B Cheney Files at the Gerald R Ford Presidential Library THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON June 4 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER DONALD RUMSFELD PI-ITLIP BUCHEN JACK MARSH FROM RODERICK I-ITLLS I -1 Attached is a copy of the working copy of Part 1 of the ·Rockefeller Commission Report It is in the for m submitted to the printers Hopefully we will receive the rest of the report in comparable form in the next hour or two Since the attached is in a sense the summary it perhaps will suffice for our meeting at 3 PM today • • m n» g•p --eaan 'F Table of Contents· jJ e C 9 c Part I -S11mmary of the Investigation Pag 3 Chapter 1 The Fundamental Issues-------------------------------2 rfhe Need for Int 'lligence ______________________________ _ '7 3 Summary of Findings Conclusions and Recommendations •••• 6 Part II The Role and Authority of the CIA • - 4 Intelligence nnd Related A tivitie by the United States before 1 l47 --- ________ • ______ -- _-- _ ------ --------5 The Sources of CIA ActthoritY---------------------------6 Legal Analysis _______ • __ ---- ______ ----------_--------Part III Supen•ision and Control· of the CIA b 7 External Controls-------------------------------------- 1 V·• --L r # Part IV Sig dficcmt Areas of lnvesliga tion - 'T 1 CIA Mail Intercepts -------------------------- L ___ J 7 Intelligence Activities Relating to Domestic Dl nce_____ I 2- 8 Internal Control of the CIA----------------------------- 9 '- 10 u Special Operations Group- OperationlCh lOs ------------ 2 ' 2 Protl'ction of the Agency against Threats of Violence _______ Other Investigations by the Office of Security __ _ ___________ ·14 InYolvement of the CIA in Improper Activitic s for the White ' • louse ________ • ___ ---------· ____ ----------------- f o#e sf J9 -t· · · i_5 Domestic Activities of the Directorate of Operations ____ --- riJ f 1-' -- Ji Science and TechnologY--------------------------------P 17 CIA Relationships with Other Federal State and Local Agencies-------------------------------------------18 Information on American Citizens----------------------- 19 All gntions Concerning the Assnssinn ion of President enncdY-----------------------------------·-------AppendL I Exec tive Order Establishing a Commission on CIA · Activities Within the United States -----------------II Statement by the President --------------------------I I Nationnl Security Act of 1 47_ _________________________ IV B ogruphical Information and Acknowledgements________ V Highlights of Civil Disturbances and Other Di ordcrs in United States-January 196G through January 1973 ____ VI Revised Statute 50 U S C Sec 403 d -------------- - 3 UI '- - Q c rJ 0 1 '1 r 2 3 1 1_3 0 2 lf J- b 0 2 b 2 z 2 J 2 LJ -6 g f '7 rl ' r J' f I '• ' Preface President Gerald R Ford created the Commission on CIA Activities rfthin the United States on January 4 1975 He directed the Commission to detennine whether any domestic CIA activities exceeded the Agency's statutory authority and to make appropriate recommendations The findings conclusions and recommendationa of the Commission are summarized in Chapter 3 and detailed with full background in subsequent chapters 2Ch rges A SJ iemanpe on CIA D mestic Activities 11 n-nsM--ytM'B cll u·ges that the CIA has conducted illegal activities 0 within the United Stl __ 3thave aroused concern r -Because of f lleilUmber and seriousness of alleged violn tions 1V 0 tt J 'I of law and n h -Because many o f the Agency's activities are necessarily or i14 fe secret and therefore are not well understood by the American - Cte ' of J e tS a rn i people At the same time many persons have voiced alann that pnhlic controversy and exposure would seriously impair the CIA's ability to ium i vLi - 1 1 i J t - 1 ' - '1P•· m c lv unrlermine the national security Therefore the President took steps designed to a••••' ·tli ttt- fl v i12 the charges would be fully and impartially investigated and that necessary conective actions would be taken t ' 1 Large-scale spying on American citizens in the United States € ----- b-Y CIA whose responsibility is foreign intelligence 2 Keeping dossiers on large munbers of American c itizens 3 Aiming these activities at Americans who have expressed their disagreement with various government policies These initial charges were sR l J Iltyt le t supplemented by· others including allegations that the CI t -Had intercepted and opened personal mail in the United States for 20 years l-lgd 'n1g- jfl l11 14 Qi'P tiret fl8 l'll l r Qal ijgs -l Q V -rftD - e v -tv t 0· -' ret 'J -1 o o t- ' -Had infiltrated domestic dissident groups and 1nterrc 1cd in domestic politics - I ad improperly assisted other government agencies In addition assertions have been made ostensibl · linking the CIA to the assassination of President John F Kennedy ·J · IT'h a --·- P -t Q1rl nt' - ·-·- OrifP r Tho President requested a report on many of the charges from the Director of Central Intelligence and received it in late December 197•1 On January 4 1975 he issued Executive Order No 11828 establishing 1 a-Commission on CIA Activities thin the United States He assigned this Commission three tasks ·' i on deems 1 Ascertain and evaluate any facts relating to activities conductl' l Within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency wi Jich h·e ·tlse to questions of compliance with the proYisions of 50 U S C 403 • · 2 Determine whether existing 8afe 'l lard nrc ntleqtuite to pre ent any rr-'· _activities which violate the pro 'isions of 50 U S C 103 _ - -fA-'-_ c President F ordappointed 98• i nbers of the Commission Q _ m c • a su e 1ttet1ti Hole PNtiosu t l Nelson A Rockefeller the Vice President of the United States nnd former Go ·ernor of New York who has held various posts in the Federal Government since HHO as · Chairman The other members all from P i - - vate life broug 1t widely varied experience to the Commissionr-J t u a 1 The Order ts reprlnte lln full tn Appendlx • This statute established the CIA to l l-li It ts reprinted ln full tn Appendix III 1 T j- C ' · I _ oo1' L i ' ' ' -· • J i t 3 J i r • u u recommendations to v r _ _ atral Intellig· tCL t 1c President and to as tl1e Conunission deems nr John T Connor Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Allied Chemical Corpomtion and former Secretary of Commerce under President Johnson C Douglas Dillon a Managing Director of Dillon Read Co Inc an investment banking firm a former Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and former A mbassador to France and Cndersecretary of State under President Eisenhower Erwin N Griswold lawyer former Solicitor General under Presidents Jolmson and Nixon and former Dean of the Harvard Law School _ _ L'lne Kirkland Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO 7 Ollald Reagan political commentator former President of the Screen Actors' Guild and former Governor of California and Edgar F Shannon Jr Commonwealth Professor of English and former President of the UniYersity of Virginia The President named David ' · Belin a lawyer from Des lioincs Iowa as the Commission's Executi ·e Director A staJT of elenm lawyers primarily from the printtc practice of law and with substantial inwstigative experienc itl9u ificcb ppd r emtn' 1ah rl S l t il't'J the @e n l9P Sl fl9inhneat ----- a Q Conduct of the Investigation mak The Comm1ion has been determined from its inception to a thorough and vigorous investigation Because of the sensitivity of the CIA's intelligence and counterintelligence activities and their critical relationship to national security the Commission rccognizc -J2 that it must close its sessions to the public But as a consequencc lt has felt all the more an obligation to conduct a diligent innstigation assuring the American people that all serious questions of legality and propriety within the area of responsibility assignecl to the Commi sion have been carefully im·estigated and analyzed The CIA and other agencies ·ere directed by the Pr ent to cooperate with the CommissionJ ml they h · lil oo 'l Iuch of th evidence the Commission ex mined has come from CIA files and personnel But the Commission has sought to verify Yidence - ' independently using available outside so rces rather than relying solely on summaries or analyses of materi s supplied by the CIA or other diYisions of the federal goYernm t The Commission began weekly he ·ing within 8 days after its appointment and even before a full staff was available ------- whe re ver possible ' Alleged Plans to Assassinate Certain Foreign Leaders Allegations that the CIA had been involved in plans to assassinate certain leaders of foreign countries came to the Commission's attention was under way shortly after its Although it was unclear whether or not allegations fell within the scope of the Commission's the Commission directed-that a i ry inquiry be · ' 1 r_ ch _j The President concurred in this The Commis ion's staff began the required inq ' ' ' ' - ·-· but time did not permit ful investigation before this I was due The PresidentTtherefore requested that in the possession· of the Commission which·bear on these al he bt be turned over to him This _ba JlaaisPPJ done t I JuSummary of the InvestigaiiPart I Chapter 1 The Fundamental Issues In announcing the formation of this Commission the President noted that an effective intelligence and counterintelligence capability is essential to provide the safeguards that protect our national in terest and help avert armed conflicts While it is vital that security requirements be met the President continued it is equ lly important that intelligence activities be conducted without impairing our democratic institutions and flmdamental freedoms The Commission's assessment of the CIA's activities within the United States reflects the members' deep concern for both individual rights and national security A Individual Rights The right of the people to be secure in their persons housE's papers and effects J against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vlolah d •• r ----- In accordance with the objectives enunciated in thesa a_ncl other Constitutional amendments the Supreme Court has outlined the following basic Constitutional doctr nes 1 J Jry intrusive im·estig tion of an Americr 11 citizen by the 3 The individual liberties of American citizens depend on r t observance of the law Under our form of Constitutional government authority can be ·exercised only if it has been properly delegated to a particular depart• mentor agency by the Constitution or Congress Most delegations come from Congress some are implied from the 1l llocation of responsibility to the President Wherever the basic authority resides however it is fundamental in our scheme of Constitutional government that agencies-including the CIA-shall exercise nly those powers properly assigned to them by Congress or the President 'Vhcnever the acti ·ities of a goYernment agency exceed its authority individual liberty may be impaired 1 Omnibus Crime Control and Snfe stJ eets Act of 1968 18 U S C Sees 251Q-20 and Pr l'l ncy let of 1974 5l i S C Sec 55 a 5 C National Security l · I Individual liberties likewise depend on mnintnini o public orclcr at home and in protecting the country ·against infiltr 1011 from abroad and armed att 'tek Ensuring domestic tranquility nd pro iding for e common defense are not only Constitutional · but necessary re-JC - conditions for a free democrntie system The process rc erly and lawful change is the essence of democracy Violent change or forcing -a change of govemment by the stealthy -action of enemies foreign or domestic are contrary to our Constitutional system t eJ The Go ·emment has both the right oncl the obligation within Con· ____ st-it ltionai1imitS to i its a ·ailable power to protect the people and their established form of government Nevertheless the mere uwocation of the national security does not grant unlimited power to the Government The degree of the danger -ancl the type of action contemplated to meet that danger require careful eva luation to ensure t' - - th l l ' - e c rrtfcd c • uba tiQn to nc H e that the danger is sufficient to justify the udion and that ftmdamental rights are '· l I • ' • I ' ' 1 t i'· t·cspected D Resolving the Issues Individual freedoms and privacy are fundamental in our society Co tut 0 l g'w M'mf'tTt must be maintained An effective and efficient intelligence system is necessary and to be effective many of its activities must be conducted in secrecy Satisfying these objective presents considerable opportunity for conflict The vigorous pursuit of intelligence bv certain methods can lead to invasions of individual rights te preservatiOn ofllc rkhcli'i ties within t le l mtec tates ren JJire ljw it Jt il u or restrictions on o·athe · lliO'ence · 'he preserv-ation of thE United States rc _uires an effective intelligence capability A­ The drawing of reasonable lines- here legitimate intelligence needs end and erosion of Constitutional government begins-is difficult In seeking to draw such lines we have been guided in the first instance by the commands of the Constitution as they have been interpreted by the Supreme Court the laws as written by Congress the values we believe are reflected in the democr·atic proces ncl the faith we have in a free society 'Ve have nlso sought to lie fully cognizant of the needs of nationa l security the requirements of a strong national defense against external aggression and internal subversion and the duty of the government to protect its citizens In the final nnalysis public safety and individual libe1·ty sustain r each other - t J I·'· I ' I t ' ' Chapter z· The Need for IntelligenceDuring the period of the Cnnunission's inquiry there have been· public allegations that a democracy docs not need an intelligence apparatus The Commission does not share this view Intelligence is information gathered for policymakers in government wl icl illmuinates tl e range of choices available to them and enables tl cm to exer1 cise judgment Good intelligence will not necessarily lead io wise policy cl oicl'S But without sound intelligence national policy dccisim s and 1 _ ctions cannot effectively respond to actual conditions and reflect the af0 est national interest or adequately protect our national secudty b j ill ' ' Intelligence gntlwring im·olves collecting in format ion about other · subversive acth·itics economic conditions · political developments scientific and technolocical ooe aJ Rc i -Jties and cmul tiooo TJ c mw information must be CYa uatcd to · iecermine iUJ reliability and relevance and must then be o nalyzed The final products-ealled finished distributed to tho President and tl c political milit y and oU1cr governmental leaders according to their needs 'countl'les · z intcllige ce -nre radic lly Intelligence gathering has changed rapidly and since the advent of the CIA in 1947 • Tl e increased complexity of international political economic and milita y anangemcnts tbe increased destructiveness of tl e weapons of modern warfare and the advent of elcc- · Ironic methods of surveillance hn ·e altered and enlarged the needs for sophisticated intelligence Intelligence agencies loa -e had to rely more and more tl1ese needs on scientific and technological de ·elopmcnts to l elp meet Despite tl e increasing complexity and sign flcance of intdligence in national policymaking it is also important to undcrstnnd its limits Not all information is reliable even when the most highly um ' ' ' • o•o • lined 'Tho «A •• r of mtoll to tho Fodou ' ' ' ' Othon too odo X o t ' I Sre Jty A Oooy tho ' ' f t o Hgoo A o r tho ' '' '· gence and Research bu tho ' '' ' ' S oto or n moot· ' ' · 7 8 b1telligence methods are 1secl to collect it Nor can any intelligence system assure tl1at its cu rent estimates of another country's intentions or future capacities will not be outrun by unforeseen events Tl1ere are limits to accura e forecasting and the use of deception by •H '' '' ' the possibility that intelligence predictions may prove to wrong Nevertheless informccl decision-making is impossible without an intelligence system adequately protected from _____ enetration ThereW' · · - connterintelli · · tiu tt irectecl toward protecting our own intelligence system and Y asce1taining the activities of foreign intelligence services iiJ fS' t LCt o -scspionage sabotage nncl subversiol and minimizing or counteracting ·- i l l the effectivcness of these activities _ -Eo w 7 Foreign Invasions of United States Privacy prot cting rig _ £ loll This Commission is devoted to analyzing activities of the CIA in 1 the interest ·of the priYncy and security ican citizens But we cannot ignore of the privacy _ ecunty r1ghts of nericans'rf the other side of the coin and R f' rit attention here in the interest of perspective - bu €lqll the li fenco have toid ii•• Cv or oo c ''' ' ''' United States r mains the 'ie Of' # itf phncipal intelligenco target ofthe communist bloc - J - The communists invest large sums of money personnel mel sophist D technology in collecting information-within the Unitecl ' Is Statcs- n our militc ry capabilities our wen pons systems our defense _ structure and our social divisions The communists seek to penetrate our intelligence services to compromise our law enforcement agencies ancl to recruit as their agents United Stn tes citizens holding sensitive gO ·ernmcnt and industry jobs In addition it is a common practice in communist bloc countries to inspect and open mail coming from w rlrie'i # mil c responsibilitiCs10i 'Com el-Eiw t -- ke -1 licatecl ' J1 - r going to the Unitecl States In an open society such as oms the intelligence opportunities our advet-saries are inuuensurablrgr atcr t Ui'n TIICS U·e Ot us m '7 « S closed societies Our society must remnin nn open one with our trndi· tiona freedoms unimpnired But when the intelligence activities of j other countries ar-e flourishing in the free environment we allord them b it is all the more essential that the foreign intelligence activities of 'f ho CIA Hi ·• am our other t e mte 1gcnce e' 'Cn the supp01t r' Othlf1'r ef iaoiHO 11 1 OnttttH ct ethlti CSS nut o•l ' to protectO IC nnttOnaJ 1 _security · o shield the pri acy 8 t s 5 Americnn citi' _zens from foreign intrusion _ Q tlil _ r wef l inklJ e e J- e FB dm ' ' '' H ' a enCles · o' ' ''· · o -·- - ' I '' ' 6LJ6 O JO Tho Commission has receiwl e i ates munist bloc intel- ligence forces currently number well over · worlchnde The number of communist government officials in the United States has tripled since 1960 and is still increasing Nearly 2 000 of them are now in this country-and 25 percent of them have been identified as members of intelligence or security agencies Conservative estimates for the number of unidentified intelligence officers among the remaining officials raise the figure to over 40 percent 1 a b r 'o ---- £ v inc gree of exchange between tl sc 't oc1Cties wit 1 t 1eir widely diffcringcoitt' wQnt -ina1Vidual freedom But we h veto b eqlt JJ _se listit g ·din n d4'l l1 s that ca tJ UUlW tf l J t '-e-ett'1 f l to t re g·· l hn • In addition to ding ra toM itll mbers of their citizens to this country communist bloc countries also place considerable emphasis on the training provision of false identification and dispatching of illegal agents-that is operatives for whom an alias identity has b£ en systematically developed which enables them to live ------ h l the United States as American citizens or resident aliens without t t e l -fru e ' ' ·' f Ot y C'C g£ LhlliD Ln JniclJ i 9 Qnoo SUtH'C '- or n·11 the c d munist count ·ics lso have developed electroni c olle tio11 of v intelligc'lre to an extraordinary degree of sophistication _ Rccent de- fectors repoF _that these c un ries regul rly monito ·yuf record most of the telephottc commnmcatlons m maJor populatiOn centers of the United States itundreds of thousands of conYe ations are thus being intercepted wifh particular telephone npri1bers sorted out by the use of computers R o microwave trans n'issions which carry most of the communications the Unitec States can be t1nd are being monitored and transcribed 'bJ l a conti r tting basis night and day American users of telephones who'1t ye'inything to hide are therefore potentially subject to blackmail th t- can seriously affect their actions or eYen lead in some cases to_y fu'ruitn s espionage agents These foreign inYasiOJlS of the privacy ancl security riO'hts of A meri ' cans therefore dt maycf' our most serious concern Theya do not in any sense justify unl_ ywful activities of the CI c h impinge on the privacy and rjglits of American citizens But they tlQ argue strongly for strengtl ening the counterintelligence activities o£ fi1 fBI within tho Unitecf States and for maintaining if not increasing t he CL 's - --c-ai piiylorc J teetmg roteignJu t l tJ e --- · ' ' I i '· -- ·fuile making large-•scale use of hum a a intelligence '-- sources the communist countries also have developeU electronic collection of intelligence to an extraordinary degree of technology and sophistication for use in the United States and 1111i1I else 'lhere throug 1out t 1e Horlu Recent defectors report that these countries regular monitor and record teleP hone corru '1nmications i ll a£ througi1out the V Uni teJ States ' including Has 1ington and Ne T York City Hunc ireds of thousands of conversations are beiug intercepted daily including those of congressmen and oti1er government officials busines and labor leaders and private citizease American users of tclephoHes who have anything to are potentially subject to blac mail tnat can seriously affect their actio ts or even lead in some cases to recruitmen as espioaage agents Even the millions of Americans 'lho nave nothing illegal to hide have a right to be uneasy if not seriously distur ed 'TileD they learn that ·business activities and thoughts t 1ey t 1eir personal and J iscuss freely over the telep 1one ar3 being recorJ eJ and analyzed by agents of foreign pmmrs Such invasions of p rsonal privacy are illegal and vmuld not be tolerated if done by agents of our own governraent 'l' lcse foreign invasions of tlle privacy rights and security of Americans must i e of all citizens th most serious concern to T21 ey do not lessen ccasure of ·any L'1lm· ful activities of t i1e CIA But they Jo emphasize tl1e need for vigilant counterintelligc 41ce activities 0y u 1i t2-l t e FDI 'li tl1in t 1e States aud for the collectioa evaluation a 1d nation of timely a d accurate fox2ign intelligence by disse ai- t c CIA lm it 1233 4K 0 if demgned in 1 2 5 Hi uthority it recur 1 u rL-a xaarem f 1's L inn ke m is hi as f2 'Okg 4 33 5' 2349 U n smith-he secrecy in whi Wsu 916 193 domes c g 10 3 up a If 8 Douajs f a As directed by the Pro ting the Commission has investigated the role and authority of the - the adequzicy of the internal controls and sion of the Agency This chapter summarizes the lusiens of the Commission and sets forth its recent external supcrvi ndings and cone icndations 6K the Agency necessarily operates combined r7 with the allegations of wrongdoing 1g of the Agency's contributed to widespread public misunderstandii actual practices that the great majority of the CI- s domestic activities I wit-lrthe Comp 7 32's 61 4 f5 I H t74i Tovertheless over the 25 years oi' its history the CT has engaged in some activities that should be criticized and not permitted to hap- pen again both in light of the limits imposed on the Agency by law and as a matter of public policy Some of theSe activities were initia Mesidents either directly or indirectly thin the doubtful area between respon- ted aeordered by Some of a mi sibilities dclega ed to the CIA by Congress and the National Security - fically prohibited to the and activities speci Council on the one hand Agency on the other Some of proper invasions upon the The Agency s own recent actions 197 3 and 1974 have gone far to investigation has focused 4129 ' activiti s 0 60C W1 594mg gyzaff 'i 'f I We eat page ewes were f i I #95 new mvohw' constituted im- were plainly unlawful an ights of Americans undertaken for the most part in A3011 which this er no i - - 4 - Mn to l' - ' The to clarify a-re recommendations of the Commission are 0 ·Zr duu ot design concerning the Agency's authority to strengthen the Agency's structure and to guard against recurrences of these improprieties 1 I I I• Jlf ' j' t t ·1 ' I ' ' I m- _ft k 'S I • B f The CIA's Role and Authot·ity 4-6 Findings 'iY The Central Intelligence Agency was establi hecl by the National Secur ty Act of HH7 as the nation's first comprehensin peacetime foreign intelligence service The object in was to proYi le the Prcsitlent with coordinated intelligence which thl' country lnt ked prim· to the 1'1 nttack on Pearl Harbor rnf 1 tw the t ttf' Jle Din ctor of Central In telligence directly to the President 'rlw CL receives its policy I direction and guidance from tl1e Xational ScrmitY Council col J2_Q § G d_ ofthe President the Vice President mel the Secretnries of State an l 1 f Defense · -·· re a_ leO The statute directs the CIA to correlate evaluate d flisscin'it atc int lligence obtained from United States it tcllfgencc agencies and to perforrn snch other functions o intelligence as the National Security Council directs Recognizing that the CIA ·ould be dealing with sensitive secret materials Congress made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for prote'cting urces and methods U'f 1 unauthorized disclosure At the same time Congress sought to assure the American public that it was not establishing a secret police which would threaten the civil liberties of Americans i bpt'-' 11y b -l d thP 0-T A from exercising ''police subpena or law en forcenient powers or intemal secnrity functions The CIA was not to replace the Federal Bureau of 1i vcstigation i conducting domestic activities to W@ ·en t crim or J J mternal subversiOn · '-1nVe 5 ll 1a JC Although Congress contemplated that the focus of the CIA would J be on foreign intelligence it understood that some of its activities would be conducted within the United States The CIA necessarily maintains its headquarters here procures logistical support recruits and trains employees tests equipment and conducts other domestic tWtivities in support of its foreign intelligence mission It makes neceSsary investigations in the United States to maintain the security of its facil ties and personnel · · Ad clit onully it' has been understood from the beginning that the CIA is permittecl to collect foreign intelligence-that is inJ formation concerning foreign capabilities intentions Ulld activitier from American citizens within this country ---· · - b'1 ov r l 1 Determining the legal propriety of domestic acthitics of tl e CIA m ar s requires the application of the Jaw to the particulnr facts itn-olved '- I' his task involves consideration of more than the National Security 0 Ac lircctiyes of the Xational Security Council · constitutional m statutory provisions also circumscribe the domestic activities of the CIA Among the are the First t men hnent 1 re1 orts II I ligcnce•from ird il ente J 1 L Oi-JPIICCtrJ I I - C u11$i h 'f -t-'fJ l' 4 I lj pr-o Ills JV S 4 · · ' roo-1 cr #e 6 t t fu ' prov itn s ore W h 1 f8 os _ J c _ _ _ - - ------------ --· -- - ·--- · z _ if- t - s a Lxar hee· wrtdu5-lood fP v1 f lfu _ lA ' Ji'll SSJ IS a enceable prots fl'eedom of speed o assembly and the F'purth Amendment prohibiting tinreasonable searches and seizures speeiAeo 15tPtntee ttloo limit such ctivities as electronic·ea es­ dropping and interception of the mails The precise scope of many of these statutory and constitutional provisions is not easily stated The National Security Act in particular c 6 ' M as clrafted in broad terms in 9rder to prodcle flexibility for the CIA ' _ to Udapt to changing intelligence needs Such critical phrases as i ternal security functions'' ai·e left undefined The meaning of t1 19• rector's responsibility t protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosu ro has also been a subject di Jpute The word foreig1 -herefi ppearsJin the statutory grant of nuthori ty though J htlO fthn -reg ' de il its Jn osien Q il limited to matters related to foreign intelligence · a arent statutory 7 ambiguit although not posing problems in practice - - _ _ron - members of the public who rend the statute without having the benefit - oCf the egislative history and i HeH e Na _ oual - _ - _ - ounCI _ lnStrttt f al'l fo L 1 A -Pt-- _ Conclusions It' _ e Th - ' 1 ' '' 'i hh tllP c '0pe nf' thi 'l inqni ry does not indicate that - -fundamental rewriting of the National Secmity Act is either necessary ' • a ' f l or appropnate · · a J '' The evidence does demonstrate the need for some statutor clar1fica- 1 fy-C 'tlv tion of the role and function o£ the Agency _ Ambi 11 lities have been partially responsible for some though not all of the Agency's deviations ·ithin the United States from its assigned mission In some cases reasonable persons will differ as to the lawfulness of the activity in others the absence of clear guidelines as to its authority deprived the Agency of a means of i esistiug pressures to engage in activities which now appear to us improper Greater public awareness of the limits of the CI A s domestic authority would do much to reassure tlm American people The requisite clarification can best be accomplished a through specific amendment clarifying the National Secmity Act provision which delineates the permissible scope of CIA activities as set forth in Recommendation 1 and b through issuance of an Executive Order further limiting domestic activities of the CIA as set forth in Recommendation 2 Recommendation 1 Section 403 of the National Secmity Act of 19-17 s11oulcl be amended in the form set forth in Appendix to this Report These amendments in summary would 1 ZL 1' excel f CVJ SfJ ec i Ce b fttR Prestdenf• CLpc bits heel E e euh've J_ d Or- er a ' Make explicit that tl1ef's octi must be related to foreifn intelligence e_t f lb ylarify aml mahe pnl1ltc the responsibility of the o f CQ1 1·iW TvJ-cl_ligrn to protect intt pi cnce sourct s an l- lc - - - from ut lanthortzed dtsclosurc The u Xi re -ponJef'ltv h _ against uuautho1ized disclosures within tho 7 ' CIA k_ t tds u£ o hcr ug tddi M lm'Tiw lts 'Ortld t spensttilQr i n pt'Otet bng ttgttHUt mr ttt ttton tttt d S limtn'C wtftri'n t l1ei¥ e 't ' a eueies ttnd e rarhflents tnttlef th_ oord m ti n r'-nf d II'J I I • _ _ _ _ _ - - tt V1 l El J i 'tloe · t rrt1 ttl Ilnte-Higctrc t ' -m tt ''thc-A1 irt ett W 'Onld be q c t J U ' Tespr5li§lb1e •f n· e hmcal 1stan e -to l i other ngen and department heads m dtl'l·ymg -- t -·· --F --- fm protectiug an4 I a I ·- - -- C ry c on fi rl11 1y tl1e CI J- ·s ' · ex1stmg to co11 C l t pub111c nutl10r1ty foreign intplligcnco from v illing sources within the United States and - prohibit the CIA from collection efforts within the Unite Stat directed at securing i a nr from unl nowing Ammeau - ' Je f''Me e tlzeus Jlecommendation should j i e from persons ZJ The President should by Executive Order rohi it the--GIA from - the collection of information mestic activities of United' a o - _r States citizens whether by overt or covert means the correlation and dissemination of una lyses or reports about such nctiv----ities and the storage of such information with exceptions for the following categories of persons or activities a Persons presently or formerly affiliatecl r being considered for _affiliation -vith the CIA directly or indirectly or others wl10 require clearance by the CIA to receive cln · · ·errrrmtloir ---- L__o A b Persons or activities that pose a threat to CIA facilities or personnel provided that proper coordmation with the FBI is ac- _ ---· complished -- --·- l _ e ' c Persons w l-w th@ioie lB rt aEQH tg ll liipoct atiQ ed t t'Csp10ne t age or other illegal acth·ities relating to foreign intelligence ·ovjded that proper coordination with the FBI is accomplished _ _ · Collection of information from normal library sources such as newsnot to be a£- · ' '' papers books magazines and other such documents £ected by this order Mi ccll PMJ - ufnr recei ed- i1i Cicleiifa1 to api5i oprrate-ci tdnrifie3ii1nyl ctraiistititt c to an agency 'with ap- lnm nriate j dicH J l 'i lil g _J'l ' -- for c ment agencies - __ Information currently being maintained Yhic h is inconsistent with the order to be issuc·d should be l'@tAiund until dl nt irl 't StigatiC IITS tl• GlA 'tt l'-ftfHt 'o evaluation Yr A J - 130 I ­ · incidental Agency k I 0 is ·American ·r - -'- 71 E-ttwu-d'r Yl - t- ·- _ --7----- Je-stro'lec o T PM ecmt «SW•• of # e uJr-t'lf ttrM sst o i •'rl es a · -r S r tdl S __ ff c-ft 't -kr fe J m n 1c o' t w· i '· l' l t • l '· · New 1 footnote 1 to be inserted on new page 13 old 130 The Executive Order authorized by this statute should who are not United States citizens results in tJ e incidental acquisition of information from unknowing citizens the Agency should be permitted to s make appropriate use« lf t or dispo I of such information Such collection activities must be dire at foreign intelligence sources and the involvement of American citizens must be incidental • -· all materittl ·o _ The propo 'cl Exccuth·e Order should be issued after consultation with the Kationnl Security Council the ttorncy Gcm•ral and the Director of Central Intc lligencc Any modification of the order would be permitted only through published amendments cc J - Supervision and Contml of the C - I A t - - - · 1 External Controls Chapter 7 ---· VI p fvte 01tlr re5S j I - '---------·· 'cr f Th CIA is subject to supervi n and ontro y various executh·c ·b J ' ' IJJ JL-1 enciCs anclofoop Gongres3ffirat1 t-Jt ht 'Olililt rU-cc · _ -- -rfO C dJ fYCrr The princ pal ccutive Bran_ch fwnal Security- r svt - l' '€'1 '1CoW1c1l wlnch g1ves the CIA 1ts pohcy chrectwn and control the t_ ' pa Office of Management and Budget which reviews the CIA's budget · · Findings in much the same fashion as it reviews budgets of other government 1 • ' agencies and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boarq Wf Mt 4'JlQ last i1Utnl4ld is composed of distinguished citizens ser ·ing p ut --- · • · • · · · · n· 1 P gciict uu v vt·y iuuctwn ror tne 1-'reslcleut on lU enJgeJH • i m rr1 0 7 None of these agencies has the specific responsibility of overseeing CfC Hta·''n r utt · · ··· ti11 J tt -A _ -It The Department of Justice exercise s an oversight role through its power to initiate prosecutions for criminal misconduc For a lj Jell U 'J'_e period of onr 20 years however au agreement that e c e ' 5 a the Agency was to investigate allegations of crimes by CI i employees llt-h•e $ or agents which involved Government money or _ are invoh·e operational Security If following the l'QQQRlUl e-ml ti o H the proper Agency determined that there was no reasonable basis to be en a O·t 'h vee crime had been _committed or that operational security aspect pre- flte t r f­ c lud d prosecutiOn the case was not rderred to the Departmet1t of meAf 'of· Justice 1 r o - hce The Commission has found nothing to indicate that the jCIA J e abused the function given it by the agreement The agreement how- eYer i l -eh ecl the Agency directly in forbidden law enforcement a1·ti '- -it ies ancl re by the Department of Jus ice of its statutory responsibilities J fJ · _ • J d e er j · lso C - Ln existe providing property-o ght p jl _ or I 'tC A I ' ' A-rt __• L' t uH2 J•c e §u baort1111 l e J l 1 t '-- ' ·f '- _ l '-'f 00- f P--vt S r7 J 1P- '7f r I 01 I e m H 1l t CJ'S I firmed 5ervice5 J J n7 n-u rees fwo 1-lou 11 o n-t e e Iii ' folcl --rr -- r-· _ __m---- - - ------- - ---····· Congress has established special procedures for review of the CIA and its secret budget ·within four small subcommittees Histol'ically these subcommittees lwxe been composed of members of Congress with many other demands on their time The CIA has not as n general rule recci ved detailed scrutiny by the Congress ---------------------·--- -----------_ -- ___ Conclusions wr f - - @__fj od _ A new body is needed to provide oversight of the Agency vithin the Executive Branch Because of the need to preserve security the CIA is not subject to the usual constraints of audit judicial review publicity or open Congressional budget review and oversight Consequently its operations require adclitiond externd control The mthority assigned the job of mpervising the CIA mnst be given snffidcnt nnd u · in the Congressional oversight system would be - r- The problem of proYiding adequate oYcrsig-ht and control e 'yhile maintaining essential security is not easily resoln•d Scn ral knowledgeable witnesses pointed to the Joint Committee on Atomic Eitcrgy fl5 HH hiJlli lilJJ id t i n 1cl ior c l · - o tt1l C r£ig1' tJf 1 Agency That Committee has had an excellent record of providing effective oversight while avoiding breaches of security in a highly sensitive area y 1 si l2_i_f '2 § -'ill tU ill Fi iVJi« _pf ttlS s tis tJ e£ i _ R - -nd-1- - - -- ------------------------------- 'lt - I' h e President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boarsl uld b ' 'J 'econstitutecP-in n Executive Branch ove · · · or the CIA and appropriately s of the board should be distinguished citizensjJ o y hac c s and serve pa1t te W' 'ffi1 a permanent staff to assist • • ' sihi lit i'e'§r n u ' • mul to nkcn In the opPn In my ion wh -ther the bullr et of the CIA pnrtlculnrly In view of the pro lslons ' ------- One of tl1e underlying causes of the problems confronting - ' 1e CIA arises out of the perv_ adinCJ ac n- osphere of secrecy -- in which its activities 1ave been co 1Juc ited in t he past -$ spect One of this has been the secrecy o f the budget urW p 1 ilt5Z- prd ' f' P ' it nation v tere Oy the Agency determined vhet 1er o lm etnployees vould be prosecutiel • must not be pcrmi tte- 1 to recur b The Board shoulcl ha ·c access to all information in the CIA It should be authorized to audit and inn stigatc CL expt'nditurcs and acti ·ities on its 0 nl initiatiw _It hFnthl nn Hy st111l tl' A QnQy s-_ ___ - uflge -itttd mt l e t H'O'lmllt•mlM lOllS to tlw fre - ttlPnt- -'JH8e ·lm t c The Inspector Gl'llt'l'al of the CIA should he authorized t report ' directly to the Board after ha ·ing notified the Director of Central f»_ __ n • - -a --- 2 ' Recommendation k The President should recommend to Congress the establishment of a oint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role currently played by the Armed Services Committ ee 3 'f'i Wl o Wlw Qi--1fl t tt l ti ' mlfflffi_nl 1l iieerezstf iatTfiliea 'Thaucan'ilc-omioiled lliFo a constitution of the Preshlent s Ad 'IRory Board A ther sng cstlon bus been ni Ynnced which seems to me to be worthy of cii reful conslcler ou · · - W wn t Xntlonal Security Act was pn serl in 1947 it wns contemplated and understoot1 that the cslc function of the Central Intelll ePce Agency would be 'coordinating the lntelli nce ncth· s or the enml Gow·rnment rlepartm i1ts and ngencles In th ' lnt rest o£ national seeurity he Central Intt•ll ence Ar ency was ln•n no direct authority to 'collect lntelll euce anil--the growth of its activities in that field nnrl in th ' field of ncth·e op •ratlons has been 11 de ' pment 81nce the enactment of tlw lon1d S curlty Act It is ho1Ye1·er r 'co nlzc·d that the lrector of Central Intelligence hal tv o fmwtions Ont• I his rcsi onslbillty to coordinate 'th lntell gence acth·ltie of th e--·se eral Gonrnment depo rtmeuts nnd agencies nnd the other- hi responsibility ns Director or the Central Intelligence Agency There nrc In net a numbe-r of go1·ernmcnt Intelligence ngenciE s some ot which Dlay lnYoh·e the same sort of policy questions as nre rulsed and discussed In the Comruls· slon's J eport - · ·· The Director of Central Intelllgenc '-- ts in fnct extraorrl nnrn ' • '1' •-'SiJ mhllnlnie in my lew It would no be' tlesiruble to dlvhlt thP e respon lbllltics between two di Ierent officers Such a dl lsloji ju addition to mnklng the tu k more mnuage able might have the nclded nd1·nntnge of Jlrovlt jng a menns tor the ort of Informed but Independent supen·lslon and control whl h bns often bet n lacking In the past Such a de 'elopment would of cou se requlr '-carelul consideration und formulation by Congrt ss Congress coulu set up a' Director of Ccn't n IntE lllgPnc ' with un appropriate stnlf and eout l ns gn to him the luty of coordlnatlug all government lntelll -l'nce activities and also the responsibility of Sl l•er lslng them partlcularh with respect to the npJlroprlateD 'Ss and legality of their OlM'ratlons nnrl their conforma e With constitutional requirements and broadly iewed • Iflerican Interests There would then be iinother officer who might be cnlle the Director ot Nntlonat Intelligence or slmply ithe Intelligence Dlr ctor The name of tli Ilre l'nt C L would be changed to National Jntelllgence Agency since ·c ntral Intelllgeu - Agency' bns not been nn accurate description of the Agency a$ It has developed The Director ot Xatlonnl Intelligence would report· to the outside Director ot Central Intelligence nud ' ould be subject to his super lslon IUld control In Important policy questions The DlrPctor Central Intelll· gence should n person of notional standing and highest probity lie sbQuld hn 'e an adequate starr- and would operate on n full time nnd contll uously rest On ilble bll ls In tbls wny a sympathetic and understanding authority outside the National Intelligence Agency would be ·' established which could exercise the control which 1s needed In a -·· brond perspe t e '- I Ia1·e not hnd time to work out the details of this suggestion which did not orlgll wl_th me It hns seemed to me thougll to be wortll nsiderntlon and so I ln •··•t · · · ·a1 J d Is u a fQ l iowiu sht f Ztd - __ _ _ __ The u sl nmeut gi -eii t iml sslon reh'ltl's only to thf ' domestic acth·ltles of the C I A But the problems which lm1·e nrlsen In the domestic fil'l l cannot be tully understood and e ·alunted unless they are lewetl ngulnst the role which the CIA l1as undertnken to piny outside the linlt•'d Stntu Because of the secret nature of Its operations legal and J ttecomll lendation 6 Ti e Department of Justice an l t c _- §iii r _ m ri· Cil ' should establish written guiJeliaes for t •Ei handling of reports of criminal vii_olations by employees of tl e 'f'gencY or relating f These guidelines shoulu r quire that the to its affairs criminal investigation and the decision - wheti er to prosecute be made by t e Department of Justice •after coasideration l of AgencY views regarding the impact of prOsecutim on the national securitY• The AgencY should be permitted to conduct such investigation as it requires to determine hether its operations '' · c b en jeopardized T e Agency should scrup- ulously avoid exercise of the - prosecutorial functio• · ReconunenQ atio11 4 _ Congress should give careful -t consideration to the question whether the bud0et of the CIA should not at least to some extent 1 be made public 1 · fif I'' · ••••apaxililtiP particularly inti view of the tLtltllli81tM'triMaa provisions of Article I Secti 9 Clause 7 of the Constitution 4 Recormnenda tion 5 a The functions of the President's Foreign Intelli- gencc Advisory Board should be expanded to include oversigh t of b1e CIA This expanded oversight board should be composed of distinguis11e J citizens vit l and experience varying-i •nGi liinct ackgrounO S It should be headed by a full-time chairman anJ should have a full-time staff appropriate to its role Its functions related to the CIA should include Assessing compliance by the C IA vi th its 1 statutory authority 2 Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence a - iwan z collection 3 Assesaing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates 4 Assessing the quality bf the organization of the CIA 5 Assessing the quality of the _ manager11ent· o Baking rcconi'n· ndatiOi l S with respect to the above slL Jjects to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence and where appropriate t e 4 No Money shall be drawn from t 1e Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made oy Law and a regular Statement a 1 d Accouat of the Receipts 4t and £ xpenditures of all pliolic Moaey shall be publis ed from time to time - 2 Internal Controls 98 L 1wpleJ' 8 0 Findings Tl e f Lel tfr r leU e ct inh•l i l 'c Director's duties in administering tlw community hnndling relations with other components oy-tfu· go ·ct·nment nml passing on broad questions of policy lea e l illl litt lc time for da ·-today supervision of the Agency Pnst tu f s han noted th need fol' the Director to delegate greater respm lbility for the administration of the Agency to the Deputy Dircctm In recent years the position of Deputy Director has been occapied by a high-ranking military officer 'Yith responsibilities for maintaining liaison with the Department of Defense fo5tering the Agcncis 1 elationship with the military services and providing top CIA management with necessary expecience aad ski H in understanding particular intelligence rectuircments of the military G 'nernlly speaking the Deputy Dilwtors of Central Intelligence have not been heavily engagecl in administration of lh l A Y Qpt iiln t ain of command the primary internal mechanism fm···-· keeping the Agency within hounds is the lnspector ienerai • the si t of this office was recently sharply reduced ancl its previous practice of making regular revic S of various Agency departments was ter tLi minated At the present time the acti ·ities of the office m·e almost entirely concerned with coordinating Agency responses to the various '- or inwstigating bodies and with various types of employee grievances ' JO' The Office of General Connse1 has on occasion played an impor -- '-taut role in preventing or terminating Agency activities in violation flaw but many of the questionable or unlawful -cussed were not brought to the attentWn- t-t1lis office 1 J i a t _u certain parochialism ltecl from the fact that attorneys in the office have little or no legal e - -perience outside the Agency It is important tl1at the Agency receive the best possible legal advice on the often difficult and unusual situations which con- the v it-Ie-s it _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ w -- -·- --- _front ___ -- moral llmltatlons mny not nl'wn rs be kept In mind In this sltuntlon 1t should not be snrprlslng tllnt per•onnel when working In the Unlte l Stutes should not nlwnys feel thnt they nre ubject to ordinary restrnlnts Congress should In lilY op uion decide by lnw whet H r nnd to wbnt extent tbe CIA should be an nction on nnizntlon cnrryinf out OlJerntlons ns dlstingui be l from tbe gnther0 tng nod e nluntion of lntell gence If ncticu operations w re llmitNl th re would be 11 lcssened need for secr cy nud the nclwr c effect which the nctivlt1e or the CIA sometimes hnve _l• on the crtodlbllity of the Gnlted State would be modified • _ One of the gt·ent stn•ngth of thl country Ill n M•'ll and wl le- ung cnpnclt r for goodu-111 '6 · T Jose who r •pre cnt U both nt home nu l nbrond hould recognize the potentiality of tltnt goodwill nnd take extteme care not to undermine It k t their elrorts be In fact counter• __ tl' l0 ' i producth·e to t s - _c - -c - 'tc ' --- ---- • __ l- '· 1 r ft ' ' f J •• I t l - 0 · ff' c£ I I· 11 - Each of the four directorates within the CIA-Operations Intelligence Administrat ion and Science a 1d ···u- Tecnnology--is headed by a deputy tiirector who reports to ho ·ily the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence ro7 These four deputios together with certain other top Agency • · f _ - _ __ _ --·- a t ' ' '1'- 7' r' ' '7' - _ -··- J '- tr t' ' »rrn-·----· - ment Commi·ttee which makes many of ti1e administrative and • IOSt lUS management decisions affecting mor than 011e directorate ·01'- laf 1i i · is · mt ihe -·l Je ··on- ' · 'nr- thf•y I ·' ti • ·· f'IA l h lt t it•r- I I '1 ·· Conclusions I n the fin ul analysis the proper function in f tlH Agency nmst depend in urge part on the churactet· of Director of Central Intelligence · 'l'hc best assurance against misuse of the Agency lies in the appointment to that position of persons with tll judgllll'Ht cmu··1ge if' d independence to r 'sist improper prcssnn-I'Und from the 'Yhite IIousl' within the Agency or elsewhere '- • xpericncc m mtCillgenceSCi vi ·es lsllofliecesslU ily·a-piTi Ccrl1site for the Osition management and administrative skills arc nt ll•ast as important as the technical expertise which can always be found in unnblcde mt · -·---Compnrtmentation within the Agency although certainly appro·priate for security reasons has sometimes been carried to extremes __ v hich pre ·cnt proper supervision and control Fhcre tte · importu11ing Yh'6ther rocl1inli 8fl1 -- ' The Agency must rely on the discipline and integrity of the me11 nd women it employs n uny of the _activities we lun·e found to be or tmlawful were m fact questwned by lower-level employcl'® wlH'l wet•e al lh te mttke Llwit -¥iews-k-l 6IJ m m gt ment Bringing such situations to the attention of upper levels of management is · a system of internal controls P- 0 e f t'f 0 Recommendati n 1 · -w a Persons appomtcd to the pos1hon of Director of Central intelligence should be individuals of stature independence and integrity t et t-tt' n·ne t t IQ li¥ 1 outside the service of the CIA · b Although the Director sencs aL the pleasure of the no Director should serve in that position for more than Recommendation a The Office o f Director of Central Intelligence shou be reconstituted to rovidc for two such deputies One de mty would J act as the 1 • administrati ·e officer · ' · ' freeing the J A 'j Director from day-to-day munugem 1t duties The other dl•puty J I should be a military ofllcer ser ·ing tlw fnnctior of fostering relations with the military and prO ·iding the Ag ncy with tcchnica l expertise on m ilitary intelligence requirements b The advice and consent of the Senate shot d he required for the I J 1 ol appointment of eac 'Y__ ect r_ f C7•·al lntclli ncc ff t c7 -i - M l- ili -lt s vo•' '5idtAc r rrf - 511°f •rvt'Yrl d 1 -lo tt1divlal cti J JJ io 1 _ 'li It of 'f e P t t r _ ·f • A e •rJ c c us 0 t B ct -t e ff 5 1 tM o I• 1 • t Recommendation w - m n The Inspector General should he upgraded to a status eqnh·alC'nt to that of the deputy directors in charge of the fom· directorates within the CIA b The Office of Inspector Genernl should bC' staffed by outstanding experienced oflicers from both inside and ontside the CIA with ability to understand the nu·ious branches of the gC'ncy c The Inspector Gi 'nera l's duties with respect to domestic CIA ctivities should include periodic reriews of all offices within the United States He should examine each oflice for compliance with CIA authori ty and regul tions a well as or the efi'ecti ·eness of their pro- grams m nnplcmC'ntmg pohcy obJechres - • d The InspC'ctor GenC'rn1 should hn-estigate all reports Jr om em ployees concerning possible Yiolntions of the CIA 'il 'te l e The Inspector General should be gh-eu complete access to all information in the CIA relenmt to his rP-views · f An eft'ectivc Inspector General's office will require a larger stafi' more frequent reviews and highly qualified personnel g Inspector General reports should be nH 'fl'rtt-ti tl r l- e-i YiHft'n'tm T11n the National Security Council and the Uf Pl'AlH _ c ecuti 'e 0 -ersight body The Inspector General should hare the authoi'ity when -· he deems it anl rOI riate after notifyii Q· the Director of Ccnb·a I TntPl- --rt· · 1 1 fiigence to consult with the executive orersight body on any CIA ' AJe 11 activity see Recommendatimj_ _ • ·· slt t le J Recommendation p 1 o tr· n- • • @ a The Director oulcl reriew the composition and operation of the Office of General Counsel and the degree to which this office is consulted to determine whether the Agency is rereidng adequate legal nS sistance and representation in view of current requirements b Consideration should be given to measures which would strengthen the office's professional capabilities and resources including among other things 1 occasionally departing from the existing pi·actice of hiring lawyers from within the Agency to bring in season d lawyers' from pri ·atc practice as Yell as to hire In school graduates ithout prior CIA experience 2 occasionally assigning Agency lawyers to serve a tour of duty elsewhere in the goremment to expand their experience 3 encouraging lawyers to participate in outside professional acti ities Jeare e P'qi$7C '-f Recommendation ··· @ e 'f tf e r CIA shonli c enconrngecl to proride for inrreascd lateral fi'J J fur movement of personnel among the dirrctorates and to bring persons l€ i•-h l f ·ith outside experience into the Agency at all l1 nls -sett t r 'I • I i Recommendation r tvr -r c rjc r a The Agency should issue detniled guidelines for 'its 'mp1oyecs f t trthcr specifying those nctidties within the rnited States which are permi tted and those whid1 are prohiLited by statute Execnth·e ·Orders and XSC and DCI directi ·cs b These guidelines should also set forth the standards Yhich govern CIA activities and tho genernl types of actidties which are permitted '- tt and prohibited They should among other things specify L - janclcstino collection of intelligence directed against • United States citizens is prohibited except as specifically permitted by law or published cxecuti -e order -'J1Wtrt unlawfu1 methods or activities are prohibited -' E mt·nrior approval of the DCI shall be required for any activities hich may raise questions of compliance ·with the law or with Agency regulatio lS c The guidelines should also provide that employees ·with information on possibly improper activities are to bring it promptly to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence or the Inspector - ------ -··· J-r General 12'-1 • Q ··J Significn nt Areas o f Investigation · ·• Introduction l t J u m 1 Q y ' ------ Domestic activities of the CIA raising substantial 1estions of compli-ance with the law lm ·c been closely examined to determine the context in which they wHe performed the pressur s of the times thc relationship of the activity to the Agency's foreign intelligence assignment and to other CIA activities the procedures used to authorize and conduct the activity and the C i ent and effect of the activity In describing and assessing each such activity it has been necessary to consider both that activity's relationship to the legitimate national security needs of the nation and the threat such activiti 's might pose to individual rights of Americans and to a society founded on the need for government as ve ll as private citizens to obey the law -- 1 The CIA's JJJail Intercepts _Chapter 9 Findings At the time the CIA came into being one of the highest llationa l intelligence priorities was to gain an understanding of the SoYiet Union and its worldwide acti ·ities afl'ecting our national sccmity In this context the CIA began in 1 52 a program of surveying mail between the United States and the Soviet Union as it passed through · ' tt L V- a Now York postal facility In 1953 it begun opening some of this mail The 1 rogram ·was expanded over the following two decades and ultimately im·olved the opening of many letters and the analysis of envelopes or covers '' of a great many more letters The New York mail intercept was designed to attempt to identify persons within the United States who were c ooperutingwith the Soviet Union uncl its intelligence forces to harm the United States It was also intended to detl'l·mine technicn 1 communications procedures nncl mail censorship technic1uc used by the So icts The Director of the Centml Intelligence Agrncy approved mencement of the Xcw York mail intercept in 1 2 During the suing years so far as the record shows Postmasters General Snnune field Day and Blount were informed of the program in nuying de- - - - grees as was Attorney General Iitchell Since 1938 the F CI was aware of this program and receh·ed i' i 000 items from it -· _ A 1962 CIA memorandum indicates the Agcnc was· l Yare that the mail openings ·would be viewed as violating_ fCE1Cb11 criminalla ws prohibiting obstruct·ion or delay of the mn_U ---· In the last year before the tcrn'iination of this program out of 4 350 000 items of mail SCl t-'t ncl from the Soviet rnion the Xew York intercept 2 300 000 of these items photographed 33 000 P'f'ln 'l nnrl 0 1flnecl R 700 · --------1 A - The mail in rce1 t was terminated in 1973 whe11 'Chicf Postal ln- spector re used to allow its continuation wiftwut high-______ t Y' level approval The CIA also ran much smaller mail intercepts for brief pe fo J in San Francisco between 1969 and19'i1 and in the territory of Ha vaii _ luring 1954 and 1955 For a short period in 1957 mail in transit ft ·· _c_ J tw c m0 rc S Eld was intercepted in New O rleans 7' ·1f rrt f t pe h' 1 · r t e r- 5n'r-u hc '· J Concluswns 1 ••• a f$o _ - rfi 't1 $ u-v- 13 _ --- - v e 1 -' V1lilc in operation the CIA's domestic mail opening programs were unlawful United States statutes specifieally forbid opening the tnaH · · · - 1-i- the Fo1'irth Amendment guarantees against u1 reasonable search and the scope of the New York project poses possible difficulties with the First Amendment rights of speech and press · Xb tnmrM-eenn· lSp i '' eJ at in tio of oun lopc'i oyJ gf the - t al ere nol JJtd15'1i iul · Tho nnture and degree of assistance given by the· CIA tQ_jhe FBI - y - - i n the 1 ew York mail project indicate that 1 the CL 's ev'tJJftt _ lfp ecame t P the FBI in intemal security __- - l i_o s 11 3 6 imtn·opgt• under'_ the 1 -- l u ·i _AcJ A s rl _· 1 tt-- t qs_' f t r l -t J' ' o ·• A · b- t • I '·o z I po 4crra tJG 1£1 y ' Hail cover operations exa in and copying of envelopes· only are legal v1 1ea carried out in compliance i t f-' wit postal egulations on a limited and select basis invol ving matters of national security intercept did not meet 7 Ti1e e York mail If these criteria wil- tLxC-eff 31'-f fY2$5 L ' 2---_-tag-Recommendation a ' t l- 0 n p tv It r s 'h la rl f I i1 lm ol e q_ · Thc_ r i_dent should instruct the Diredor of Cen tclljgence 1 ' -t JwaCtTlc CIA engage ti1 domestic mail openings ino ime t- 1 1 Y'Oi 'fJE tte ee also Recommendation J in this Tieport l b 11w 'resident should instruct'the Director of l ntral Inte1ligencc that mail co ·er examinations are to be in compliance with postal regulations they are to be undertaken only in furtherance o£ leuitimate fetti ' Y intcllib t liee acti ·ities and then only on a limited and selected basis clearly im·olving matters of national security lntelli clir Jitit3 Relating to Bomeslic Dissid $nce see- ·I 17 ' · I' ·· • ' ·_ r • _J I • ' t tJ_ __ _ A Chapter 10 Findings 1979's wetem trl etrby idcsprmd viol _nce-1 -isil disorder Dcmonstrr tions marches and protest asscl'i1Ulies were fr quctrt iQJ __l unbc_r of cities UniYersit_ r ld--colte _c mpuses · c b came places of 1Sl n1 tw E _ nd un st Gotern ncnt facihtiC w re N# picketed and somctunes mYadett·LJ1ucflt_e of bombmg and bombmg m o ' f cidents occurred frequently In 'Vashingtofi '·nncl onler m jor cities J 7 spcci_nl se ur_ity measures had to be instituted to conti o1ihe a c ss to _ _l_lb_l c bmldmgs _ Asarcsul the Department of Justice starting in HH37 at the direction of Attorney Geneml Clark coordinated a series of secret umts ancl mteragcncy groups m an ettort to collate anel e ·alnate mte1lig-ence rPlnting to these events These efforts continued until 1973 The interagency committees were designed £or analytic and not 1_ ' operational purposr_ s They were created as a result of ' Yhite Hou ' O - l J lit n·essure which began in 1967 because the FBI performed only limf r 1 ted c ·alnation and analy is of the information it collected on these v i 1 · 'efitS le GIJ l fn'tieitH' tl for th 1 fnu·poce e£ B'l lt lg relevant n ' d-s foreign· intelligence nncl ffit·n hh g-m mce-oii e •aluat icni techniques - il- C '_ tY he CIA was reluctant to hl· ome unduly ii Yoh· cl n these g-reups Tb v' which hacl1 roblems of _domestiC unrest ns thetr prmctpal focus It rQ- 'ut · s rJf I pea edly refns d to a sstgn full time personne to nny of thct n - ·_ '· · · y ' he most a ctlYC of s was the Int lhgence Ev h wtwn Staff 0 M 4 - · wluch met £r 111 January 19' 1 to lay 19' 3 A CIA hal son officer 4 _ · • r attended ov·eJ 100 weekly meetings of the Staff some o£ which con' cemed drafts of reports ·hich had no foreign aspects - dence that he acted in any capacity other than as an a CD f'fllitfgts intelligence and to some degree as an editor -· 1 1 a e-Htf ftt1 eaPly b t1 · ' ' •The liaison officer wns Chl f of the CIA's Speclnl Otleratlo9il Group whlch rnn Opertt• jr J ' · - J Q K - J ·- -- tlon CHAOS discussed lu Chn1•tcr 11 of this Report _-L •' 7 1 J' ·r Jt -1 '-' ' OY1e li-15 ai Cf' t L _Lbt________________ - · --··-- 1 On one » oecasion1 loow j liaison officer appears to l•••• caused a CIA agent to gather dome tic information which was reported to the Intelligence E ·alnation Staff Tho Commission found no evidence of other acti ·ities by the CIA that Yere conducted on behalf of the Department of Justice groups except for the supplying of appropriate foreign intelligence and advice on evaluation techniques Con elusions The statutory prohibition on internal security functions does not preclude the CIA from providing foreign intelligence or advice on evaluation techniques to interdcpartmcntnl iatelligence evaluation organizations hn ·ing some domestic aspects The statute was intended to promote coorcliiuttion not compartmentation of intelligence between governmental departments The attendance of the CIA liaison officer at over 100 meetings of the Iiltelligence Evaluation Staff some of them concerned wholly with domestic matters nevertheless created at least the appearance of im propri •ty -The Director of Central Intelligence was well advised to approach such participation reluctantly ' The lia-ison oflicer acted improperly in the one instance in which he directed an agent to gather domestic information within the United States which h 1s reported to the Intelligence Evaluation Staff Inch of the problem stemmed from the absence in Government of nny organization capable of adequately analyzing intelligence collected by the FBI on matters outside the purview of CIA Recommendation 1 a A capability should be den•lopecl within the FBI or elsewhere -fii-ffic1Jeparfnlci1t of Justic e ·aluate analyze and coordinate intelligence and connterintelligenc collectecl by the FBI concerning espionage terrorism BM tJ • Cl i81lo %id other related matters of hiternal security b The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelligence committees to foreign intelligence matters c The FBI should be encoura ed to continue to look to the CIA for such foreign intelligence and cot 1ter-intelligence as is relevant to FBI' needs '· - 3 Special Operations Group- Operation CIIAOS 8t11JCC1wp· ter 11 I Findings t i _ The late lOGOs and early 1 70s ere lllarked by widespread violence Mtt llCI ---JLnci £i_ il disorder Demonstrations marches and protest assemblies l ere frequent in a munbcrof citiC5 7Jllli ·ersity ami college campuses became places of disruption and ufuest Government facilities were tpicketed and sometimes invaded Threats of bombing and bombing ··incidents occurred frequently In 'Vashington and other major cities special security measures had to be instituted to control the access to ' _ ' public buildings J te Dep rr tmcnt o g-itrl tY'htM h 1-- 1foii-of A t orney General Clark coordinated a scrie QfseCtct units ancl nteragencJgrOl in an effort to collat d e uate intelligence re1' ting to these event hese effort _ continued until 1973 The interagency committe s w c lS0lesignecl for analytic and not op- rational purposes Tl_lC- 'fc i·e createct·a-s· ult of Yhite House prcs HlG7 bec ause the only limited ure valuatlOI ancl analys1s of the mformatwn 1t collcctcd·on tl ese eve1 1ts TI -CIA participated for the purpose of supplying relevaiit-fors-ign · ···telligence·and-funlishing-·ndv-iooResponding to Presidential requests made in the face disorder the lJ1rector oi '' 1 1 establishecl a Special Operations Group within the CIA to collect coordinate evaluate and report on the extent of foreign influence ·on domes- v -l ich bc 'Ur n _FB_I-p 'fQ ned on-evahmtim rtc-chniqne T -· ··-·y' - - · Ccnlm Ir t i c n nst of@oli 1cStiC c rc•Jliflll -te L --- - I- 1 1 activities which later came to be known as Operation tic dissidence CHAOS led -i# CIA to collect information on dissident Americans from CIA field stations overseas and from the FBI Although the stated purpose of the Operation w·as to determine whether there were any foreign contacts '' ith American dissident groups it resulted in the accumulation of considerable material on domestic dissidents and their activities During six years the Operation compiled some 13 000 different files including files on 7 200 American citizens The documents in these files and related materials included the names of more than 300 000 persons ancl organizations ·hich were entered into a computerized index · i i ·- I D_c ¥ 7 42- --- 'This informaiion was kept clos 'ly gnarrlccl within the CL itlil n i41 hr 'lllrAnP othn· tkm t te pt•t' 3onnt4- of th ' peeihl ens c I'OHJl rt ilizin this information P 'l'SO lll 'l of the Group p1 epat ed 3 mo mcniomnda for ·internal use 3 000 m 'mornnda for clissemination to the FBI and i memoranda for distrilmtion to 'Yhite House and other top le ·el officia Is 'in the Go ·ernment _ _ s a Pt •snlt of repedetl Prc sident i tl requests fot 1t r re tt t efl trr t o__ qt _he staff assign£ d to the Operation was steadily enlarged ultimately - t reaching a maximum of p2 in 1 71 Because of excessin CC ttl ttoi ' · t 1e Operation ' 'ls snb -t ant lJ ill lut1 t from mem ing£ 1 r re-sft- rr e _ -- - -- renew 'nthm the g 'ncy ritclm mg renew b y the Conntenntelh- fo r f-ec ' so t genre Staff-of -duch the OperatiOn was tecluucally a part prest e11 A J Commencint in late 1 69 Operation CHAOS used a number o flues-A f r _ _ _ s ' • agents to collect intdJig 'nce abroad on any foreign connections with J'd · j · u lJ m t-tfQkJ American dissident groups In order to have sufficient cover for L n r 'i ' theSe agents the fYJ recruited persons from domestic dissident groups or rec_r nrted others and instmcted them to associate with such'----- group 'drrihfs country • fost o f the Operation's recruits were not directed to collect jufor mation domestically on American dissidents On a number of occaOpef -11' sions however such information was reported by the recruits while - - - they were dewloping dissident cred 'ntials in the United States and th£ h fo ·mntion wns retainP l in the files of the Qperatioa On three occasions an agent of the Operation was specifically -t@ to collectJ 1 1 domestic intelligence Jl ec fe c No evidence was found that any Operation CHAOS agent used or was directed by the Agency to use electronic surveillance wiretaps or break-ins in the United States against any dissident individual or group · AetiYity o f the Opern tion decreased substantially by mid-1 72 The ·Operation was formally terminated in March 1974 _ car 1 tJT Conclusions ' ·' I ' Some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the CIA's statutory authority even though the declared mission· of gathering inte1ligcnce abroad as to foreign influence on domestic dissident activities '' as proper _ occaswns an age t-of-t·he Opet l'tti-mr ts u info J t ion within the Unit 'd Stat 's on_3 t ftly--dom tiC matt 'rs In additi n sOii'iliintelli gcu iss miil lfions by the Operation a1icl a p rtion of a najor stncly prepn7'ecfny-the--Agcuc J' alt with pui·ely 1ftt T-hcsu acti vjties ln J e iml roner -----' --- • ' '-' ll • J ' ' ' ' i l Io st significantly the Operation brcamc a rrpository for larg quantities of information on the domestic acth·ities of American cit ·zcns This information was dcrircd principally from FBI rrports ot· from o ·crt som·ccs and not from clandestine collection by the C'L It was probably necessary for the CIA to accumulate an information base oi1 domestic dissident activities in order to assess fairly whether the nctivities had fore1gn cmmec 1ons Hut the accumulation of domestic data in the Operation exceeded tat was reasonably required to _ make such an assessment and was thus improper The isolation of Operation Cl-L OS within the CIA and its inde- pendence from superTision by the regular chain of command within the clandestine service made it possible for the activities of the operation to stray over the 'hounds of the Agency s authority without the knowledge of senior officials The absence of any regulm· review of these activities prevented timely correction of such missteps as did occur J Recommendation · a Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perfo11n what are essentially internal security tasl s b The CIA should resist any etl'orts whatever their origin to involve it again in such improper activities c The Agency should guard against allowing any component like the Special Operations Group to h 'come so self-contained nwl iso t fm - ''LJ ca ler i1ip that regular snpcrdsion and l' ' i 'w aJ'l' lost d The files of the CHAOS project which han no foreign intelligence value should be destroyed by the AgPnc y at the conclusion of the current Congressional inYestigations or as permitted by_ _ _ law 4 Protection of the Agency Against Threats _Chapter 12 _ r -r-t uri' C'1 r Findings The CIA was not immune from the threats of violence and disrup tion during the period of domestic unrest between HlG7 and 1972 The Office of Security was charged throughout this period with the respon sibility Of uring the continued functioning of the CIA The Ofiice therefore from Hl67 to 1970 had its field officers collect information from published materials law enforcement authorities other agencies and college officials before · cmiters some campuses Monitoring and commtmications support was prodde recruiters when trouble was expected sen 1- were The use of agents of the Operation on three occasions to gather information within the UnitcJ tatcs on strictly _ ' Jomestic matters was beyond the CIA's authority In addition Z·· ti 1e intelligence I diss mina·tioi l s and b w e portions of a major study prepared by the Agency vhich uealt ·lith purely L1omcstic matters were improper ·' · · j I - ' t l · · _t - ' ' I i i - • f • • •••• '1' l ps «-n# tl t 't' rh ·t t - i te 4 petrt- ba- 1 rl j # I • ' The Office was also responsible with th ' appro ·al of the Director · of Central Intellig-ence for a rworrram from Fl'hruan· HJfii to De ' cember 1968 Yhich at first monitored hut later infiltrntl' l di - ident organizations in the ' Ynshinnton D C nrl'a to determine if the groups planned any actiVIties agni11s Gonrmnent installations · At no time were more than 1 pe1·sons performing thes ' tasks The project was tetminated when the Washington etropolitnn Police Department dewloped its own intelligence capability In December 1967 the Office began a continuing study of dissident activity in the United States This Office used information from publishecl and other Yoluntary knowleclgeahlo sources This small Oflke produced weekly Situation Information Rep01•ts analyzing dissident activities and providing calendars of future eycnts Calendars wel'C given to the Secret Service but the CIA made no other dissemjnutions outside the Agency About 500 to 800 files wero maintained on dissenting organizations and individuals Thousands of names in the files were indexed lleport publication was ended in 1atc_lV7 2 and ----- the entire project was ended in 1973 · - £ • T c eeaea f tC ·' r S · Conclusions s-le - _k l C4 fltor z· I Tlle program uncter wlncll the Othce ot becunty rencterect nssistance to Agency recruiters on coll 'go campus 'S was justified as an exercise of the Agency's responsibility to protect its own personnel aml operations Such support acti -ities were not undertaken for the pur- pose of protecting the facilities or operations of other goYermnental agencies or to maintain public order or enforce laws _ · The -gency should not infiltrate a llis ident gro llp for security purposes unless there is a clear ft ll un Ml i Iger to gency instnlla· t ions operations or personnel and inwstignth·e con fage of the threat by the FBI and local law enforcement authorities is inadequate The Agency's infiltration of dissident groups in the ' V shington area went far beyond steps necessary to grotect the Agcncy 's own facilities personnel m d operations and therefore lHMu • ml In aclclition 1 the Agency undertook to protect other Gowrnment departments and agencies-a police function prohibited to it by statute Intelligence activity directed toward learning from what somces a clomestic dissident group receives its financial support within the United States and how much income it has is no part of the authorized security operations on the Agency Keither is it the function of the Agency to compile records on who attends peaceful meetings of such dissident groups or whate ch speaker has to sa r unless it relntcs clistupth·e or violent acth ity '' hich may be directed against the Agency to· --- • · • t f tu a cct tm v lq_-h n · o P ' -n elo-n e hc o dl·vif es we r b-euI h1d e ' l'fJ ln-Po-r h o - I il • 'Q SI Y'£t t 't•fct Olf H11 ri e t J 1 • · I I e q tnl' ' 1 set t--tl' n etr s I The · ·- xceeo C' Jk -nt eI J j s ai t' -tOrt n1 c 0 A 17 f t r C 'ff ·lrlei ere e exceeded tt'Mot y at crY1 -- --· 1 1 I • c Agcncy s gti n n--eoi1frfl uting funds phot JTaphing people _ -----· ' -- i nc h·iti 's mal cars anti following people hon were unreasonable · l 'cft ufpt'h- ' Uil ilcr the cii·cumstances and therefore mhz fttl f 1 -ith certain exceptions the progmm under which the • or- ec Lr ·t1 · fil · l orgumzec · 1 ancl ana 1yze d m · f orma- L 'Cura · -- ' out_ 1 --- ·ation gat lHm c - 1 'J _ t Ion ·1bout disstdent groupS1was within the CIA's ehttrtH 11' vmc of tlR mffl't'tlHiZhm g xt-het·ecl __ t Tl1 - ccnmulation of reference files on dissident organizations and t tll ·· r-- -' ' J ''· WctS ueu·f •aders l appropriate both to evn Iuatc - t 11e r1s s posecl to the Agency and to den'lop an understanding of dissident gt'Olll and their ditl'cren_c 'S for SN nrity cle ranc_e purposes he tlp cL_ p ol vn L nmnb'rr·ot n m O T'hc fill ' ta thm twegl'ltm i1Joeeeded -tha··· g·enej 'd·4e mat see-uft t y-nE ed n-nd tts h qn r __ At· ' P - _ le-gi tlte-nt cds-for Recommendation 1 lc m ----- tto l 1 f The CIA should p l·o lJ ibit n ef ib comr onett tn 'f-it'trq C ' r dissidC'nt groups or other organizations of Americans in the absence of • a written determination by the Director of Central Intelligence that • such action is necessary to JUect a clear and present danger to Agency facilities operations or personnel and that adequate coverage by law enforcement agencies is mwvnilahlP Recommendation l All files on individuals accumulated by the Office of Security ill the program relating to dissidents should be identified and except where necessary for a legitimate foreign intelligence activity be destroyecl_j1 pou c mplilUan af the ettPreat investigations or as soon there er as pernutted by law _ · - 5 0-tlter Investigatio1 by tlze Office of Security Chapter 13 8· Ot 'f lrt _ Offici'o - ecurity Findi'lg s - y·· · - occa The has also been called uu on a number of ' 4 renf sions to innstigai pccific allegnti01 s _tl tel igencc sources and ­ l ttnctiC SJ- 1 ncthor s we1 c th_reute · The COJ m §- J m·s mqmry c01 centn te-d on l J ___-Jthoso nn·eshgat10ns wluc Jscdyt'festJgatn·e means mtrudmg on A __ --· the privacy of the subjects s s surveillance · The great bulk of tl 0 'im·estio' ions were directed at persons ' affiliated with the Agency-such us e1 loyees former employees l i§ fJ foreign persons J C by the Agency as intc · o-ence sources and defectors _ f _A I A few itwestigations invoh'ing intrusions on pers tnl pri 'acy were directed 'at subject with no relationship to the Agency £ these r ·- ' ' · I -------5 Other Investigations by the Office of Security Chapter 13 A Security Clearance Investigations of Prospective Employees and Operatives Findings and Conclusions The Office of Security routinely conducts standard security investigations of persons seeking affiliation with the Agency In doing so the Office is performing the necessary function of screening persons to whom it will make available classified information Such investigations are necessary and no improprieties were found in connection with them B Investigations of Possible Breaches of Security 1 Persons Investigated Findings The Office of Security has been called upon on a number of occasions to investigate specific allegations that intelligence sources and methods were threatened by unauthorized disclosures The Com- mission's inquiry concentrated on those investigations which used investigative means intruding on the privacy of the subjects including physical and electronic surveillance unauthorized entry mail covers and intercept and reviews of individual federal tax returns The large majority of these investigations were directed at persons affiliated with the Agency--such as employees former employees ' and foreign nationals used by the Agency as intelligence sources and defectors A few investigations involving intrusions on personal privacy were directed at subjects with no relationship to the Agency The Com- n1ission has found no evidence that any such investigations were directed - against a ny senator congressman judge or other public officialo _ Five were directed against newstnen in an effort to determine their 1 41 d t t sources of leaked classified information and nineJagainst other United States citizens The CIA's investigations of newsmen to determine their sources f hrg assified infonnation stemmed from pressures from the White House and were partly a result of the FBI's unwillingness to undertake such investigations efused to proceed without - an advance opinion that the Justice Department would prosecute if a case were developed Conclusions Investigations of allegations against Agency employees and operatives are a reasonable exercise of the Director's statutory duty to protect inte lligen e urces and methods from unauthorized disl 'ft _Jrt J J cp_1 a-Yt S_j closure aret'awfully conducted Such investigations also r b_t assist the Directo xercisejhis unreviewable authority to terminate the employment of any Agency employee They are proper unless their principal purpose becomes law-enforcement or the maintenance 9----' of internal security The Director's responsibility to protect - intelligence urces Cnd methods is not so broad as to permit Investigations of persons having no relationship whatever with the Agency authori y The CIA has no to investigate newsmen simply because they have published leaked classified information Investigations by the CIA should be limited to persons presently or formerly affiliated with the Agency directly or indirectly Recommendation '6 ' a The Director of Central Intelligence should issue clear £'Uidelines settin forth the situations in which the CIA is iustified in conducting its own investigation of individuals presently or formerly affiliated with it b The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct investigations of such persons only when the Director of Central Intelligence first determines that the investigation is necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods the disclosure of which might endanger the national security c Such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI whenever substa ntial evidence suggesting espionage or violation of a Federal criminal statute is discovered Recommendation a ' In cases involving serious or continuing security violations as determined by the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board the Committee should be authorized to recommend in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence with a copy to the Nationcil Security Council that the case be referred to the FBI for further investigation under procedures to be developed by the Attorney General b These procedures should include a requirement that the FBI ccept such investigations without regard to whether a favorable prosecutive opinion is issued by the Justice Department The CIA Recommendation The CIA and other components and agencies of the intelligence community should cOnduct periodic reviews of all classified material _ -l J t $4- s originating withi epartment or agenc' with a view to declassifyin as much of that material as possible The purpose of sudl a review would be to assure the public that it has access to all information that should properly be disclosed Recommendation C f The Commission endorses legislation drafted with appropriate safeguards of the constitutional rights of all affected individuals 5 which would make it a criminal offense for employees or former tLJt employees of CIA wilfully to divulge to any unauthorized person classified information pertaining to foreign intelligence or the collection thereof obtained during the course of their employment J·O ' 2 InV esti·ga·ti ve Techniques Findings Even an investigation within the CIA's authority must be conducted by lawful means Some of the past investigations by the Office of Security within the United States were con- ducted by means which were invalid at the time Others might have been lawful when conducted but vould be impermissible today Some investigations involved physical surveillance of the individuals concerned possibly in conjunct5_on with ot her methods of investigation The last instance of physical surveillance by the Agency within the United States occurred in 1973 The investigation disclosed the domestic use of 32 wiretaps the last in 1965 32 instances of bugging the last in 1968 and 12 break-ins the last in 1971 of these activities was conducted None under 1 warrant and only one with the written approval of the Attorney General Information from the income tax records of 16 persons was obtained from the Internal F venue Service by the CIA in order to help determine whether the taxpayer was a security risk with possible connections to foreign groups The CIA did not employ the existing statutory and regulatory procedures for obtaining such records from the IRS In instances mail covers the photographing of the front and back of an envelope were employed and in instances letters lere intercepted and opened The state of the CIA records on these activities is such that it is often difficult to determine why the investigation occurred in the first place who authorized-the special coverage and what the results were Although there ms testin1ony that these activities were frequently known to the Director of Central Intelligence and sometimes to the Attorney General the files often are insufficient to confirm such information Conclusions The use of physical surveillance is not unlawful unless it reaches the point of harassment The unauthorized entries described were illegal when conducted and would be illegal if conducted today Likewise the review of individual's federal tax returns and the interception and opening of mail violated specific statutes and regulation$ prohibiting such conduct constitutional and statutory constraints applicable to the use of electronic eavesdropping bugs and wiretaps has been evolving over the years the Commission deems it impractical to apply those changing standards on a case-by-case basis The Commission does believe that while some of the electronic eavesdropping were proper when conducted many were not To be lawful today such activities· would require at least the written approval of the Attorney General on the basis of a finding that the national security is involved and that the case has significant foreign connections t · t RECOMtVlENDATION 5 1 '0· · I The CIA should not undertake physical surveillance defined as systematic observation of Agency employees contractors or related personnel within the United States without first obtaining written approval of the Director of Central Intelligence RECOM MENDATION v 'l-t c t In the United States and its possessions the CIA should not intercept wire or oral communications or otherwise engage in activities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law enforcement agency Responsibility for such activities belongs with the FBI RE J'1E DfTION tV The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal procedures governing access to federal income tax information As defined in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 18 u s -c se tft 2510-20 • _ S ----·--------- C Handlin9 ·o·f Defectors Findings The Office of Security is charged with providing security for persons who have defected to the United States Generally a defector can be processed and placed into society in a fe '1 months but one defector was involuntarily confined at a CIA nstallation for three years He was held in solitary confinement under spartan living conditions The CIA maintained the long confinement because of doubts about the bona fides of the defector This confinement was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the FBI Attorney General United States Intelligence Board and selected members of Congress were aware to some extent of 1 the coniinernent In one otheL· Cd Se a ue Lec L UJ wct pl y i a i i y abused the Director of Central Intelligence discharged the offender Conclusions Such treatment of individuals by an agency of the United States is unlawful The Director of Central Intelligence and the Inspector General must be alert to prevent repetitions CIA investigative records should show that each investigation was duly authorized and by whom and should clea ly set forth the factual basis for undertaking the investigation and the results of the investigation J1 · inY s pgations were directed against newsmen and nine against thcr 'Gnitei_J States citizens The CI Vs im·estigations of nc YSmen to determine their s7u·ccs of highly cl assified information stemnwd from pressures at tl1c highest lcYels of 'go ·ernment and were partly a result of the Fl' I's extreme reluctance' o rngage in such innstigations The Oflic'e of Security conducts doctrine security h ·estigations of persons seekh1g an application Yith the Agency St 1 investigations seem nccessar and improprietirs were found in cm ection with them 'The Bnrrau re used to proceed without an adra ce opinion that the Justice Dcpartm ·nt Yould prosecute if a case'' ·e developed The Commissio has found no e ·iclence that ny such investigations were directed again t any public ofi1rial Even an inn stiga ion Yith a proper sn ect must be conducted by lawful means Some hf the past inYesti o·· ions by the Office of Security within th Unitec States ·were co lnctetl by means which were inntlicl at the time ot rs might ha· been lawful when conductca but would be impcrmissi lc today il the absence of authority beyond that originally obtained Some of these inn stiga ·ons i ·oh·ec1 physical smTcillance of the individuals concerned poss1 ljj n conjunction with other methods of investigation If the subjcctxms properly under in 'Cstigation t1lC iacliimt pll 6 1 l Si - i··· i - 1 S C r 1 0ycd rli l fl f n1nlm tho inVPStigatiOll unlawful The insto fce physical smTeillance by the Agency within the United States currcd ·n 1973 The i1wcstigation als disclosed H' domestic use of 12 brenk-ins the last in 1971 32 wireta the last in 9G5 and 32 instances of bugging the last bug in 1968 roue of these ctiYities was conducted under a warrant and only ne with the wr ten npprond of the Attorney General Information fr n the income tax reco ds of 16 persons Yas obtained from the Intern Revenue Service by th CIA in order to determine 'Yhether the a xtyer was a security isk ith possible connections to foreign grouP The CIA did not employ he existing statutory and regulatory p oceclures for obtaining such re rds from the IRS The stat of the CIA records on tlwse nc ·ities is snc h that it is often cliffi 1lt to determine why the inwstigat n occurred in the first place wl authorized the special cm·erage and -hat the results were Althou f1 there was testimony that these activ'ties were frequently know1 to the Director of Central Intelligence n d sometimes to the Attor 1ey General the files often are insufficimit to confirm such info mation ' 1e use of physical sm ·eillance is not unlawful nless it reaches tl point of harassment The unauthorized entries J escribed were egal where conducted and y ould be illegtll if conducte ct· oaay J v ' • · ' ' 'f - I 0' · t ' Sou of the usc of electronic ' n-esclropping bugs nn wiretaps was prol'rr when conclncted Lnt many wen• not ToLe ' ndnl today sur h acti ties require at least the written npprontl o the ttomey Genernl on he basis of a finding- that the Xntionnl Sec rity is involwcl and that the nsc has signiftcnnt fon•ign connections · The Dircctb s responsibility to protect intclli encc sources and methods is not 89 broad as to 1wrmit innstigntio1 of persons having no relationship lwtenr with the Agency Inn s igations by the CIA should be limited to pe rsons presently or fo11ng ·ly aflilinted with th Agency directly Ol ·indirectly The CIA has no a 1thority to investigate ewsmen simply because they have published leaked classified iniorm Hon The CIA has prope y performed the nqccssnry function of screening persons to whom it will make avai1ay1e classified information 1 ·· '· • ' ofll a eg tt10ns agamst ·'A gency empwyees anc1 operaI nvest Jgabons tives if la wfully conductfcl are a re l'sonable exercis3 of the Director's statutory duty to protect intelli_¢ence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure Slich investigations enable him to exerciso wisely his unreviewable al 10rit to terminate the employment of any Agency employee They re proper unless their principal purpose becomes law-enforcement or tfie xfi aintenance of internal securitv V Recommendation 16 J i a Clear guidelines should b issued setting forth the types of investigations involving im ividndls presently or formerly associated with· CIA in which the CIA iJ justificcl in conducting its own • • • mve stlgatwn 1 t b The guidelines sho ulcl permit t c CIA to conduct investigations of sneh persons only hen the Direct_or of Central Intelligence first determines that the l vestigation is n 9essary to protect intelligence sources and mcthofs the disclosure of ·hich might endanger the national security j c Such investigations must be coorclin tecl with the FBI whenever substantial evi_ nce suggesting espionage'Y pr violation of a Fcde ral criminal stab e is discovered Recommen · ation 17 Prospe 1ve employees and foreign nationals cting for tl1e Agency should l · more clearly placed on notice that tH y will be subject to investi• ation by lawful means for suspected bret hes of security · f • t • · •· I q i In cases im·olYing serious or continuing secut1t y violati011s as defermincd by the Security Committee of the Unite cl States Intcllij ' - 31 · y genc oard the Committ 'c should hE' authorized to recommcn in writing to the Director of Centml Int 'lli Pnce with a copy o the National seeurity Counril that the case be refe rred to the ni for further it estigation under pt·ocedures to be de ·elo by the Attorney Ge eral b These pr eclures should include a reqnirNnent required to ace t such investigation without re rd to whether a favorable prosecu ive opinion is issued by the ustice Department and the CIA shoulc wt engage in such investi tions unless otherwise authorized The Commission endo ses legislaf on drafted with appropriate safeguards of the constitn · onal ghts of all affected individuals which would make it a crinu 1 ffense for employees ot· fo rmer employees of CIA wilfully to di2 ge to any ummthorized person classified information pertaining o · reign intelligence obtained during the course of their cmploy1 nt The CIA should ot undertake ph ical surveillance defined as systematic observ 1011 of Agency cmpl ·ees contractors or related personnel with the United States ' vitho t first obtaining written n proval o Director of Central inteiligcn ·Reconum ndation 21 · In t1 lt'Unitecl States and its possessions the 0 should not intet_cept 1rc or oral communications 5 or otherwise en age in activities th would require a warrant if conducted by a 1a ' enforcement · ency Responsibility for such activities belong with t tc ---FBI e t-t '- rtJ_ of t 'ttn01Xf - me v ef'S - k't J ik lov se _fa f- C j 6 Involvement of the CIA in improper Activities for the White _ ll use Chapter $ T '' Finduzgs ·During 1 7ltthe CIA provided alias documents and disgnis m terial a tape recorder camera film and film processing to Hownrc It also prepared a psychological profile of Dr Danie Ellsbcrg ' ·ccp wstm1l y t te Vi rin TI-onse-sttt me-M-' 4t-wa t-€'-P-n illconnection Yith various improper activities indncl- Y ing ¥ t ·t- -l n'tt h 'lnt l tre entry into the office of Dr Lewis Y F iclding psychiatrist-pf-r rr --Bnrricl-BllsbcrJ · · r tY · · • · · t o er 5 o -d- • s ilt'fmtd tn - t n lm H oo rd B t e Strmncr -rs -u -s -c - - -----rr-----7 ·u -- lv-- 1 --- ·L S4r e ot -'-iVHs e_q l nJP o t Kt5 tcfterusea e-Y l VlO ·u t G iJO tJi£ i't fZ- o f - · C l j r · J Some members of the CL s medical staff who pnrticipntecl in the preparation of the Elbberg profile knew that one of its pmposcs was to support a public attack on Ellsh 'rg Except for this fact the investigation has disclosed no eddPnce that the CIA knew or had rcason to knmv that the assistance it gaw 'vonld be used for improper e_ purposes · President Nixon and his staff also insisted in this period that the O A turn over to the President highly classified files relating to the banon 1 'lndings the Bay of Pig the Cuban Iissile Crisis and the Viehuun rar The request ·as made e tt ot h y -thc ground -that these files were needed by the President· in the performance of his duties but the record shows the purpose undisclosed to the CIA •f personal political ends SE'f '7 't ' - The comn issi n has als im·estig ted the response of th CI i esltlen s- to the mvestigatiOns followmg the atergate arrests Begmmng m June 1972 the CIA receiwd various requests for bformation and nssistancc in connection with these im·estigations In a number of instances its responses were either incomplete or deln yed and some materials that may or may not ha ·e contained relevant information ---- were destroyed The Commission feels that this conduct reflects poor i ·ndgment on the part of the CIA but it has found no evidence that y et i a he CIA participatec post- Yatergate cover-up by the White bft'ar #'1 House ---------- •1 - 1h l'r' e -·--·--· v J Y Conclusions - Providing the assistance requested by the V 1lite Honse including the alias and disguise materials the camera and the psychological profile on Ellsberg was not related to the performance by the Agency of its authorized intelligence functions and was therefore improper No evidence has been disclosed however except as noted in con - ' nection with the Ellsberg profile that the CIA knew or had reason 0 to know that its assistance vould be used in connection with improper 'Li' 'f 1 t • 7 a yitics Nor h_g _any evidence been disclosed indicating that the CI t ·y articipa ted in the planning1of either the Fielcling or Vat crgate r '15fCi1lZ I ls ICIA a ppa rcntly ''a s una varc of the break-ms lmhl they were reportecl in the mecl --- _ ' 'l'he r0corcrdoe5 _s1iow l10wever th ti the Agency failed to _ _l ll _y __ - - -r - --f l vith normal control procedures in providing assistance to'1Ioward _ • fit It also shows that the Agency s failure to in 1going investigations following Yatcrgate wr s inconsistent with its · -yf e 1 Jw 1 au ·s J-I eoopeAte - -f e - ·· Il'inally the Commission concludes that the requests for assistance by the Yhite IlollSC reflect a pattern for actual and attempted misuse of the CIA by the Nixon administration ·· ' _ · ' ' I reayt-ta' 1 I fi -rt-t cts d j e atreOltt J 1 J I o ' of rea c « 'ly _ ba ' ff--j N Aapt B s loMe hL tn-1- 3 v ·1 t ' '-' £ ----- rtlea-t o_ -e - p o r e6 · --- Recommendation ei J f ' i o s-rctl- '- _ -· p a A single ancl exclusiYe high-len l chn 1 lcl should he establishecl ' for transmission of all 'Vhite Hou e eqnests to the geney This channel should run between an officer of the Xational Security C'ouncil staff designated by the President and the oflke of the Director or his deputy b A1l Agency officers ancl employees should be instructed th t m y c__ direction or reqnest the-tnoptid r of -w-hieh is nhj t t t · t' Yed with thFinsp cnc l- the Director of Central Intelligence 7 Domestic Activities of the Di -ectorate of OpeJ ations L Cl apter 15 Findings and Conclw ions -------2 A Overt Collection of Foreign Intelligence Within the United States ' i- upporl of its responsibility fm· the collection of foreign i t j '--' li ence nncl conduct of coyert operations onrseus the CIA s DirccJ j to rate of Operations engages m u varicl y u u i i- - -i lii- tl t 1f t f th 'i t d of-op t s CO iCCtS 0 -eig i lilt l Y 1igence within the United States from residents business firmsfond other organizations willing to assist the Agency This activity is concluc tecl openly by officers v ·ho identify themselves as CIA employees Such sources of information are not compensated In connection with these collection activities the CI t maintains approximately 50 000 activo files 'vhich include details of the CIA's relationships with these voluntary sources and the results of a Federal agency name check _ The division's collection efforts have been almost exclusively con£01 eign er onomic political milit u rpmcl operational topics h -Commencii1g in 1969 howeYer some activities of the division re ultecl in the collection of limited information with respect to Amer -­ U r can dissidents and dissident groups Although the focus was on 1' 1'f contacts of these groups hackgrouncl information on clome stic 0 - --cfi ___ diss I_l - s also collected Bt•t ·een H 69 ancl1974 when this -- - ·as formally 400 reports ''ere made to Operation CHAOS In 1912 and 1973 the dh·ision obtained and transmitted to other parts of the CIA information about telephone calls between the 'Vestcrn ·Hetnisphero including the United States and two -other co1mtries The infonnation was limited to names telephone numbers -- ' fi lecl o lo l ioreign J f i - ' ' I • · · ' · ' I I · nnd locations of callers and recipients It did not include the content of the conversations This division also occasionn lly receiws reports conc 'rning criminal activity within the United States Pursuant to written regulations the source or a report of the information recci ·ed is referred to the ·-appropriate 1a w enforcement agency The CIA's efforts to collect foreign intelligence from residents of the United States willing to assist the CIA nrc a valid and ncc 'ssary clement of its responsibility Not only do these persons prO ·idc a large reservoir of foreign intelligence they are by far the most cessible source of such information The divisions' efforts with few exceptions have been confined to9--1 legitimate fm·'ligu OCQn omic politieal l'Trilitai mel ope-J rt nCs · The collection of information with resper t to American dissident groups exceeded at· m e rdg lcgitimute foreign intel- - lige nce collection ancl was beyond the proper scope of CIA activity This impropriety was recognized in some of the division's own memoranda · The Commission was unable to discover any specific purpose for the collection of telephone toll call information or any use of that ------ ' tion by the Agency In the absence of a validr mrpose s uch --- --------·-·· collectiOI _i r pe _ _______ IiCchv1sion's files on American citizens and firms representing f actual or potential sources of information constitute a necessary part · r 0- 1 1 i 1 ¥ Sd d 7 J ··---- ·--- ------·-- B Provision and Control of Cover for CIA Personnel CIA personnel engaged in clandestine foreign intelligence activities cannot travel live or perform their duties openly as Agenc y employees Accordingly virtually all CIA personnel serving abroad and many in the united States assume a cover as employees of another government agency or of a commercial enterprise CIA involvement in certain activities such as research and development projects are also sometimes conducted under cm·er ' CIA's cover arrangements are essential to the CIA s pcrformanc_c of its foreign intelligence mission The investigation has disclosed no instances in 'vhich domestic aspects of the CIA's cover arrangements involncl any violations of law By definition however cover necessitates an element of deceptio 1 J I J' ' which must be practiced -ai the - ' meriem ub-lie as well ri's --- --0 J -- - j V'-' i --' --- t d-eo · · --···---------·- Jl '' l fl l • v t _r- -5-· '·'·'' -· I ' ' • - J ' ' · '' · ' 1 ·I ' I · ·'I fill'€ 1rusis · Wievtls 1 a _J - r i - -- l l · i _ Jlt'f tZ I'A L t IS U1 l--t -1 St J1Si· nui-hes1 e 5craw5' ojsurat-u e a -rc utrr --altf q h e n el -h d Pe p•neA Af r l l J to Pfl c ·- r _t -c ' f-c t_plfh e S' 162 3 S -- L z l_ l u T fD C1 J f V 1 orcign countries This 'l'eatcs a risk of C'onflict with Yari9fi's regula- tory statutes and other lrgalrequircnwnts The Agency rc 6gnizcs this risk It has installed controls und ·r -hich cover arnufgcments are closely supervised to attempt to ensure compliance wjth applicable laws 1- 'I 0 ' ' C Operating Proprietary Companies I The CIA uses proprietary companies to prO ·idl cover and perform administrnti -c tasks 'ithout attril mtion to thel gency Most of the c· large opernti1ig proi i·i0taries-primarily airli les-haYe bel'u liquiclated nn l the remainder engage in activiti c ofl'ering little or no comprtltion to pnn1te enterpi'JSe ·I The only rt mnining large proprietar · acfirity is a c omplex of fl nuncinl companies with assets of upproxpnately $20 million that --- 1H'fl• iElt· '1 snp P on·t-t The remaining f small operating proprietaries generally hn yjug less than ten em f x cep pl y 'es each make nonattributable purehascs of equipment and sup· d scc LS s 1 plws 1 ' ort11Gp - ' he Ofl t of etttti t t so lle t'r trro '- 1 -f 't'2 t luc ln 'C h lt • liW ·Mlml 'f' S- ttrct'­ c V' j - gton B C • tH tt S c ChftJ tt t R epHf t oo c 1 tlw ommission has found no c ·idence that nny proprietaries have ec v l• ' 1her 1 usr l r opPrations against American citizens or investi tion of l t f 1the1t· act ntH's 11 oft hl'm n p l'fll' to hP o n h t•f't to r·lnc l' C ll WlTl ' n fl 'rl __ j r J ·I · o· ol I· ·· reign Nationals In connection with the CU's fm ign intelligence l'esponsibilitics it seeks to derelop contacts with foreign nationals 'vithin the lTnited Stah•s American citizens voluntarily assist in de ·eloping these contacts As far ns the Commission can find these acti ·ities han- not in ·oln d coel'ciYe methods These ncti ·ities nppenr to be directed entil'ely to the produdion foreign intelligenf'e and to be ' ithin the authority of the CIA 'Ve found no evidence that any of these nctidties han• bc·cn directed against American citizens of E Assistance in Narcotics Control Tho Directorate of Opemtions proddrs fon·ign intrlli rencc snp·port to the GoYernmenfs eilorts to control the flow of narcotics and other dangerous drugs into this country The CL coordinates clnndes- '' J I i • r· I fine intel1igC'nce collection O CI'Seas and proYicl 's other GoYet·nment agencies ·ith foreign intelligence on drug tmflic From the hegimiing of suc·h c·li'orts in IDG the CL Dire tor and other officials lta 'C instructed 0mployees to mak0 no attempt to gather information on Americans allC'gedly trafiicking in drugs If suc-h information is obtained incidentally it is transmitted to law enforcement agencies Concerns that the CIA's narcotics-related intcllig 'nce activitiE-s may involn the Agency in law enforcement Ol' other actions directed against American citizens thus appear nn warranted q Beginning in the fall of 1973 the Directorate intercepted-tW y communications befween the United States and Latin America in an effort to identify narcotics traffickers Three months after the progmm began the General Counsel of the CIA was consulted He issnt d an opinion that the program was illegal and it was immediately _ -- terminated This interception although a source of Yalnable information for e e t' nf01 ceme 1t officials was a vi lation of a statute of the Un ted States l Contmua tlon of the operatwn for oyer 3 months w1thout tl-e Re CP · knowledge of the Office of the General Counsel demonstrates the I need for imprond uifCriii ii consnltatiOli J V Ad --- 8 Domestic Activities of the Directorate of Science and Tech· nology Chapte1· 16 Findings and Conclusions The CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology pt rforms a va riety of research and development and operational support functions for the Agency's foreign intelligence mission Many of these activities are performed in the United States and inYolw cooperation with priYate cOlll anies A few of these activities were improper or questionable As part of a program to test the influence of drugs on humans research inclndecl the administration of LSD to persons who WC're una ·arc that they were being tested This cloa¥1 IW5 im 1'tof '· One person died in 1%3 apparently as J'fesult In 19G3 follo ·ing the In· spector General's discovery of Jhese events new stringent criteria were issued prohibiting drug tl''sting by the CIA on unknmving persons All drug testing prograuis were ended in 1DG7 In the process of testin g-'communications intercept equipment for use overseas the CIA has overheard communications between Anwricans The names of t e ·sp akers were not identified the content of I --t · J V foO n- 1 v---v Je C t I f - 'lt j _ u •t j C c'c f r v '' · f ' • Ie e _ rt tJ -P-' S# Y o tt A _ ' 1 fJ 54 w-ere not c 1'tsscnunnte · d · '-·'11 rccorc1'mgs w-ere d e1e coml' llUUCahons F tl strovcd ' hen t ' tin was conclnded h t stin should not he dircctt'tl ngninst unsuspecting persons in fO Q -1 e 't pt 9 Athn tY ms t __ the Uniteq States _ in tho -l' cast's '' het'tt o£ l tr tn ' i fttl ' Some of tht' tl'sts performed hy the CIA in the past would fall rth 1 ew' 'P Otht ould easily lun·e been performed using only Agency personnel and with the full kno lE'dge of those whose communications were being intercepted This ' ee the present Ageney practice Other activities of this Directorate include the manufacture H £1 ' x· of alias credentials for use by CIA employees n nd agents '' ' ' '' • etll' ' oU '• P '·t• of tlw Oo··•' ' _ ·po fl e-t-1-Bf Y _ necessary - -to __ - u ' tet'tti i efv fnci litnte CIA opemtions ·strictl st --r crandestine co 'ftrot nilid · 1ty m b fJ l bo maintained over the use of such documents Recent guidelines estab' ' lished by the Dcput y Director for Operations to control the use of alins documentation appear adequate to prevent abuse in the future dill'anmt p c photographs taken b r CI l - overhead surn illance equipment are provided to civilian agencies of the _ _ J -_ _ Such photographs are used to assess natural disasters _ r con duct route sun·eys and forecast inventories and detect crop ' ffl of antf e 1 rmitting civilian use of overhead photography systems Beet118 _ proper The economy of operating but one overhead photography program dic use of these photographs for appropriate civilian Cl'fdeno f Gon rmnent f''' Y b i p c purpos £E j'fl -gL' evel'' th tt eiv - g reY coniDUitcc JJ x blished to -ov I'Oee-t-lte- ses ot-O V Ctht ad int e Higsu cc phot ogmphy_ iu ru dcr tn d an - t•- lolneseie-tlSC t'f a··CI elope d s ystcm ct trr6 o cej · '1 -k c ' ' n ation J n ' S j ' l ilitidt lin S by-the - rohiliit t o v t· e lt c l'ton ' ·• roh tct-camP Ta l'fl l l- -y-- 1 • unsuspedmg TT e __ _ • ' l tne - _-'Jh ' ' W Lu gJ f of to coop wsts' · I -- 1 r · · - - Recoznmendation SZ i ' 0 -- I 7 ' vL $ Testmg of commumca mtercept systems should not lu tecl ' r i J zC llS nr the testii1g of drugs r- · tllosc-g i l lillAA i• ' i ol il prote t-p _ ntat - b P·· · t't e A•''' 'f yt p 'OU Hllgat d c l l P'- 2A Qlfl • 0 - - · ' r · • • • • unsuspecting pe ·sons living within the Unitod Stato 10n JeC'h eft'Hy·pos ible p-si tmrtio vhere·tt Sti-fl g ·fflH tn 'ltSpee is-the_ _ -that is --b 1o n1§ technically easible mea_l s of testing a sfstcm any 11 iJt to oi _• - v pb m lic ltion fnt_ scePf l ' aent if tliO_ r •kcr terccpfud- I J Xl -- -- --·- I If V-' _____ i - '·· ·• - 1 U- Recornmendatio11 ---------------1 ·A civilian agency corarni ttce si 1ouL l 1 L reesta0lished I j to I oversee tJ 1e civilian uses of overhead intelligence photo- graphy in order to avoid any concerns over t 1c improper domestic use of a CIA-c eVelopcd system 1 of' '-S3 t io cen ntsrim-n W i11ccl 1ii cLr t r'tlilt'gS··orrrn fi -e f-ill intci 'ersti-Ha£s - must OO le o QS soon as the trstillg 1 · i- pc • t _ -- i 9 CIA Relationships With Other Federal State ancl Local Agencies - Chapter 17 -·CIA operations touch the interest o£ many other agencies The CIA like other agencies of the government frequently has occasion to give or receive assistance from other agencies This investigation has concentrated on those relationships which raise substantial questions un der the CIA's legislative mandate Lh1 Findings and Conclusions A Federal Bureau of Investigation 0 e C s 5 1 - · The FBI counterintelligence operations often have positive i ntelli- t f0 _ss _ gence ramifications Likewise legitimate domestic CIA activities·ht'tTe·---· -th ' P ff t l- fere sstng the path o f FBI investigations Daily liai- son is therefore necessary between the two agencies 1 Iuch routine information is passed back and forth Occasionally · l joint operations are conducted The relationship between the agencies has however not been uniformly satisfactory over the years Formal ' t' ' J i nn ' ' ls cut off from February 1970 to November 1972 but rela-· - J 1 J tiouships have improved in recent years j • 1 · The relationship between the CIA and the FBI l o clarifiecl·and outlined in detail in order to ensure that the needs of'--- ti onafSe CUl lty a·i et- tr' Oil tlre legititn lt C rp 1 un 5 - '·' slimtl · J l J _2 z ¢ omain- tl -- Q '-- tf •iJ 15 1 J jA _E i a f v B NarcOtiCS a nforcement AgenCieS J ' Beginning in late 1970 the CIA assisted the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drnt rs BNDD to orrnption within that orgn nization The CIA used one of pr pr ctary companies to re _ -- t l-ti'tlfor BNDD and gave t ll 0 on L£ 02 -e s Q • two am one-half years tbfo CIA recruited 19 agents for BNDD The project was termina M in 1973 The Director -was correct h1'his written directive terminating the project The CL 's participq t lon in law enforcement activities n the -course of these activities w-hs forbidden by its · The Director and the Inspector General should be alert to prevent in ·olvement of the Agency in similar eu erprises in the future Gl fts I U'lltover fflS I Jale tho '' ' I I y1 d'' C The Department of State For more than 20 years the CIA tlu·ough a proprietary conducted a training school for foreign police and security ofiicers in the United States under the auspices of the Agency for International Development of the Department of State The proprietary also sold small amounts of licensed firearms and police equipment to the foreign officers and their departments The CIA's activities in providing educational programs f J 1 1 eign police •were not improper under the Agency's 1thougl CS 'i l-flt fe _ the school was conducted within the United States through a CIA • IJI proprietary it had no other significant domestic impact £he €INs im·Qhff ffi e s 1le ci •n·ms And poU uif»•• nL 1 r e tujureign po1icc·uffi eer r- mtl- iee detm-t tmo tl W h mJJ gh t proprict 'l Q - 11 6R·pePtl i n wasp questionable activity for a government intelligence cjjL firea agcnc l' a e ft nt e Y It should not -· O ftt ll ' be repl li'ted J Funding Requests From Other Federal Agencies In the spring of 1970 at the request of the 'White Honse the CIA contributl•d 833 655 68 for navment of stationerv and other cosh fot· replies se lt'10pcrsons who w-rote the President -after the invasion of Cambodia This use of CIA funds for a ·purpose unrelated to intdligence is improper Steps should be taken to ensure against any repetition of such an incident E State and Local Police The CIA handles a variety of routine security matters through liai ·son with local police departments In addition it offered training courses from 1966 to 19i3 to l- -nitecl States police officers on a variety of law enforcement techniques and has frequently supplied equipment to statC' and local police In general the oordination and cooperation between state and local law enforcement agencies and the CIA has been exemplary1 based upon a desire to facilitate their respecti 'e legitimate aims and goals l Iost of the assistance rendered to state and local law enforcement n'gencies by the CIA has been no more than an effort to share ·ith law enforcement authorities the benefits of new methods techniques and equipment developed or used by the Agency ' On a few occasions howeVer the Agency has improperly become involved in actual police operations Thus despite a general rule I 'i • 't • w JL - fBI uJ t tr fortMt 7lTr tfYI lew J-edt'''IICal de ve 16f' 'g vd- IJ fV O 'f be t A-Se AJ fo Joc a_ t w ----' M brcew f __1 ' I l-1 7 E' ____ -f · -- against providing manpower to local police forcc$Ale CIA has lent mt n along with radio-equipped vehiclt s to the ''Jishington Metropolitan Police Department to help monitor anti tl1r demonstrations It helped the same Department surveil a police· former It also provided un interpreter to the Fairfax County Vir · 1ia Police Department to icl in a criminal investigation In compliance with the spirit of a Act of Congress the CIA tcnninat cd all but routine assistance to state and local law enforce- ment agencies in 1973 In 'tecl o £ these recent st cttltOIJ tssistnnce is now being provided g h the FBI to dm s atc and a ocaf There is no impropriety in the CIA's furnishing s te L_ ch11 n ea ntt l i ' emn foo re e- sen ral years the CIA has given gratuities to local police offi 1__ e_ who had been helpful to the Agency practice should - T_____Terin Jultt d tiH cO l it' 'tt ' • - 'f 1 police For • -1HH •1 so rcf'PivPrl llSSiSb ifQlfl oe Qo £91'CQB 'J' t t Fn-fr _ Wg iu i a e-ffi e r l gfinly participated in 1 CI H-w gftt ttt-includi ng•YS ll-li-1-t ae-Gl-A ty ebtrcint'd-poliee-badges tkmt trim lseo---tt 'C TC 'f6t'ltS '-he ttssistttnce received byth GIA irom -Stat -audloca Ua w enfor ­ ment nuthorities clld not J ii Ol lL J - b - '- r i - jA D 'f rl' o_ Reco m na fun 3 ------ The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI 1 should prepare and submit for approYal by the National Security · Council a detailed agreement setting forth the jurisdiction of each agency nnd pmviding for eflecti -e liaison with respect to all matters J of mutual concern This agreement should be consistent with the pr0 1 ' J sions of Jaw and with other applicable recommendations of thi rt • · • ¥ D 10 lrtformation on AlJU'rican • Citi Chaptel' 18 _ rr1jlc_'e s f Ugency e · Findings information is a ajor Biographical resource of an intelligence The CIA maintains a number of files and indices that include biographical information on Americans As a part of its normal process of indexing names nncl information of foreign intelligence interest th o tt@t tti8i tS Dircctorat as indexed some 7 000 000 names of all nationalities An estimatcdll 000 of these arc believed to be American citizens n · l f ·' · i '• I ·nt Jilt ··d j · ' - ' • ·I t t t ' has also received assiJtance from local Aside from routine matters officers · police forces such forces -l' I -- i e ha occasionallY assisted-the office of conduct of i estigations fro Securi Tna'CIA has occasionallY o0tained police badges and ot 1er iuel- tification for use as · cover for its agents J xcepi fvr c o t lI f l ·· ' I I 0-o c io u 1en ome local police assisted CIA in an unauthorized entry tha·assistaaca received by t•1B CIA fro1n state ana local 1a11 proper enfo -tement ·authorities l «aS The use of police identificadion as a _means of providing cover ihile - not strictly •lieaking · a viola- tion of the Agency's statutory authority as long as i1o police function is performed is a practice subject to 1nisunderstanding and s ould be avoiJed •• tj s Jtlll 'Vhcre a person was believed to be of possibly continuing intelligence interest files to collect information as received were opened An estimated 57 000 out of a total of 750 000 such files concern American citizens • or the most part the names of Americans appear as actual or potential sources of information or assistance to the CIA In addition to · these files files on some 7 200 American citizens relating primarily _t _ - ' tJ c actiriti were as ah·cad stated compiled within t te uMOJIS Directorate1as part of OperatiOn CHAOS l hm'i te- le stn ·oy tb QS8 fthlii QitSl' S9mpJ0t nf tbe CJ U H U t io ypsti tioa ---·---- ·c z----'1 The 'l dminiatmtive Directorate aintains a number of files fr _ u11 -----persons who have been associated with the CIA These files are main- - · · taincd for security personnel training medical and payroll purposes Very few are maintained on persons una ware that they ha ve a relationship with the CIA However the Office of Security maintained files on American citizens associated vith dissident groups who were never affiliated with the Agency because they were considered v threat to the physical security of Agency facilities and employees These · • files were also maintained in part for use in future security clearance determinations Dissemination of security files is restricted to person or Arn f wi n0o e_t a t a t 1 · 1 J i V V L 6 ' ' ' ' VV t 9J'_' 1istory · 0 - b c V J v-el f yt iea·l-o-f-tl i 'l' ¥et'l-t lM iHg t mrs' tm 'Congt e'33 _ l J f e $ tf5 ft ' tJ J ' ttJ'I'J r'- ' 11£'1 Conclusions Office 11 AllegatigJJ iJ Concerning the Assassination of P1·esident Ken· if ·nedy e_Chapter 19 - ---- Numerous allegations haye·beeil made that the CIA participated in · the 'assassinri tion of President Jolm F Keimedy The Commission staff investignted these allegations On the basis of the staff's investigation the Commission there cno credible evidence of any CIA involvement TJ 15 '1'he ·lr J ­ ·i s ------ · c ' t '' - j' · n I · ' ' ' ·n J·· 4- - ·o- •n I J m •Ill sir ------ - -- • a ·l l- Although maintenance of most of the indices files records of ' i tandards 1 if 'iJ - is tory t' ''' _ ---' _ Agency bas been nQoessary and proper the applied by the Agency • not needed ror legJ tJ matc J ntellJ gence or security cat gori · JUrposes f files relatt u to Operation CdAOS ' at some points Juring its have permitted the accumulai ion a ul inC exin0 of -· i-s re € t · IAtiJS Pv tacer als • ··l'r t' 0• t • • Included J n tlus are man ot tne -- an-- tne activities of the vffice of Security C0l1Cer l ing J i ljr- dissiciell t groups Constant vigilance ty the Aycncy is essential to prevent the collectio l of informatio 1 on Uniteu States citizens which is not needed for proJer '1'm intelligenc activities Executive Order reconrrnenl eJ byf ne Cor u1 1issio 1 i ccora- mendation 2 v-lill e11 sure purging of onessc•l tial 0 or improper materials £rom Agency files ANNOTATED PARTIAL VERSION FOLLOWS June 1975 Report to the Presider by the 3 OMMISSION ON ACT-PHI IE5 YE 1N THE UNITED STATES HE Ms a form Photocopy from Gerald R Ford Libra Kim