Authoriemm eazo - umneu anu'ES GOVERNMENT - -44-- Memorandum sooner To Robert 0 Strong April 9 1952 FROM NE-J illiam 1 Hamiltonudg h L so Reply to U K Paper on Safeguards Hr Talbot has approVed the Department's fully cleared reply to the UJK study Tab of controls over nuclear energy programs in the Near East handed to Mr Grant by Denis Greenhill on February 1h Hr Talbot has also agreed to your giv our reply to Denis Speares An appointment has been arranged for p n Monday April 9 Hr Crawford will be present RECOMMENDATION That you give an original and one copy attached with envelope of our reply to Mr Spesres summarizing its main elements as follows 1 We agree on the desirability of bringing Near East nuclear develop- ment under IAEA control and are willing to work toward that and 2 we agree an the necessity for interim ad hoc inspection to satisfy ourselves and the worldpat-larga as to Israel s I t tions 3 we question whether because of the French tie-in any amount of pressure is likely to induce Israel to accept the IAEA system now h In any event no question the utility of Israel's acceptance now since IAEA controls do not become operative until a reactor goes critical and it is obviously the period before Dianna goes critical that is most worrisome as regards Arab reaction 5 He doubt Canada would be regarded as a true neutral in view of its very close association with Britain and the 11 5 in the 6 He have had quiet discussions with Sweden with a view to that country's accepting the role of first neutral visitor to Dianna T we are willing to consider a further secret visit by v 3 scientists if arrangements for an open neutral visit are not completed in the near future Attachments A U-KI Original and One Copy of the U S statement attached with envelope for handing to Mr Speares was SECRET uni 1451531111151 - us Mummy Madame SEGRET NUCLEAR REACTOR The Foreign Office have asked us to discuss with the State Department questions relating to the nuclear reactor which Iarael is building at Dimona In spite of Israel's assurances and the inspection so far carried out the fact that Israel has resisted suggestions that she should apply International Atomic Energy Agency safe- guards together with the information that she proposes to set up a plutonium separation plant gives cause for concern not only in itself but also on account of the effect of the continuing uncertainty upon the Arabs 2 It also seems likely that we shall soon be faced with an equally alarming development in the United Arab Republic is the State Department will know the U A R Government have wanted for some time to acquire a mediumw sized research reactor and this desire has naturally been strengthened by Israel's progress They have apparently obtained an undertaking in principle that the west German Government will not prevent their obtaining such a reactor in West Germany but the West Germans have told the American authorities and ourselves that this would be subject to 1 'eppropriate safeguards However since the U A H have always opposed the principle of safeguards in the I A E A they may feel unable to accept a West German reactor on such conditions and may turn to the Soviet Uhion In any case- to acquire a reactor at least as large as the Dimona installation DEC LASSIFIED AllthorityAenvisamx 2 - BECKER installation and subject to no greater restrictions than those which Israel accepts If we are not to witness the start of a nuclear weapons race in the middle East we believe we must therefore do everya thing possible to secure the application of adequate international safeguards and inspection to Dimona and thereafter to any similar reactor acquired by the U A R 3 k Two principal aims thus emerge to obtain sufficient information concerning the nuclear site at Dimona to satisfy ourselves that it is and continues to be devoted to purely peaceful purposes to find some means of convincing the Arab States if we ourselves are at so convinced Israel is not embarking on a military nuclear programs angthat an Arab country such as the would place itself at no disadvantage by accepting international safeguards To take the second aim first we think Arab fears might best be set at rest in the long tern by applying the International Atomic Energy Agency's system of safeguards and inspection to the Dimona reactor This DECLASSLFIED I Authority Mohegan SECRET This seems to be the only satisfactory solution in the long term and should we consider remain our principal objective But if we are to attain it we must first overcome Israel objections which are to the practical application of the safeguards to Israel rather than to the actual principle of safe guards - for which Israel unlike the U A H has voted in the I i h a We must also consider the possibility that France whose assistance in this field is vital to Israel's work may object to the application of safeguards on the grounds that it would in- volve the inspection of irradiated fuel elements returned to France thus preventing the diversion of the plutonium content of those elements to the French nuclear programme 5 It may in fact be possible to overcome all these objections Although the I A E A Safeguards Division is still being formed it is already almost certain that the Soviet bloc will be effectively excluded from membership the possibility of Soviet membership has hitherto worried the Israelis Additional protection is provided by the I A E A Statute which lays down that for each project the inspectors will be selected in consultation with the Government of the State to be inspected The system has already been accepted in an agreement with Finland while a similar agreement with Yugoslavia is pending These facts and precedents might serve to convince the Israel Government that safeguards are neither so alarming nor as dangerous as 7 Authority they appear to believe Finally the application of the system depends on the willingness of the party concerned to accept safeguards and would almost certainly allow sufficient latitude to apply safeguards in Israel without the necessity of extending them to the fuel elements returned to France The Israelis may of course continue to resist safeguards since their basic objective is probably to keep their hands free for the future In that case they could hide behind India's refusal to accept adequate international restrictions on their nuclear installations 6 Unfortunately the I A E A system of safeguards could not be Operated soon enough to meet our present purposes since the system although it includes the examination of reactor designs does not provide for routine inspections until the reactor is in operation In_the case of Dimona this would not be until lgbj Sh Other measures are therefore needed to meet our short term requirements 7 It should not be too difficult to arrange for Q_ pg inspections of Dimons by Ineutrals Mr Ben Gurion has already accepted this in principle The only dif- ficulty would be to reconcile support for neutral inspections with our policy towards the and towards safeguards since g_hgg inspections would clearly trespass upon_the ground which the Agency was set up to cover But in the circumstances it would seem that this disadvantage is outweighed by the fact that 1 neutral inspections SECRET - ung ll nu umm i m aams t4 5 SECRET inspections could go into immediate operation 8 Assuming we aim at l'neuctral inspections we are left with the task of working into them some arrangement to meet our own requirement to satisfy ourselves that Dimona is devoted to purely peaceful purposes We need therefore to find a country which is technically proficient in nuclear matters accepted as a neutral in the Arab Israel dispute by both Israelis and Arabs and sufficiently close to us to agree to give us in confidence all the information we need The main if not the only country to meet all these requirements seems to be Canada Our own need for information would therefore be met if the Israelis accept neutral inspections and if the Canadians agree to be one of the inspecting powers 9 We should therefore try - to persuade the Israel Government as a sine as non that the only satisfactory solution in the long term is for them to accept the application to Dimona of the I A E A safeguards which they have always within the Agency supported in principle to seek the agreement of the Canadian Government to their undertaking the tasks described above subject SECRET DECLASSHHED It Nam - 5 - SECRET subject to the success of to prompt the Israel Government to invite possibly through channels an immediate inspection by Canadians and representatives of other neutral countries whose findings would be accept able to both Israel and the Arabs and to agree to further inspections pending the application of the I A E A system A suggested list of countries from whom inspectors might be drawn is attached 10 Although they have not yet made much of the point it is certain that the Israel Government would be unwilling to accept international safeguards unless they can be sure that any reactor delivered to the U A R would be similarly controlled One possible way of satisfying them might be to tell them that if they will assure us of their willingness to accept the I A E A system provided that similar restrictions are applied to any reactor in the U A R we shall then try to get a similar concession from the In approaching the U A B we should have to try to offer some inducement to cooperate This might amount to telling the U A R Government that we are most con cerned at the idea of unsafeguarded reactors in the Middle East that we have therefore extracted from the Israelis the concession mentioned above and that we should be prepared to offer the U A R assistance perhaps UELLASSIFIED 7 - SECRET perhaps in concert with Heat Germany - in building a reactor similar to that at Dimona on condition that they accept the principle and the application of the I A E A system Only when such a series of negotiations had been satisfactorily concluded would we expect Israel and the U A R to make their concessions public 11 In considering a course of procedure on the lines of paras 9 and 10 above we are of course most anxious to act in agreement with the United States Government Canada apart from heing very well suited to participate in a neutral inspection may well also he the best country to put forward the proposals in paras 9 and 10 above to the Israelis and Arabs Subject to the views of the State Department therefore we might suggest this to the Canadian Government In all probability however any Canadian approach would need to be backed up by the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government We realize that it might well be necessary to bring some pressure to bear on the Israeli Government to induce them to accept our proposals and we would hope the United States Government would be ready to play a part in this For our own part we are ready to consider what might be done in this context in the field of arms supply to Israel 12 We have also given some thought to the possibility of aligning the French Government with us in any approach to Israel since French support is so essential SECRET DECLASSIFIED 3 Autho emo aano - 3 - essential to Israel s nuclear programme However although we have been assursiby M ours de Murville that the French have already taken some precautions and that he is concerned by the extent of the French nuclear commitment to isrsel we doubt whether we could expect active French cooperation 13 In conclusion we should be glad to learn the views of the State Department on the course of action outlined in paras 9 and 1U above and on the idea that the Canadians might be asked to take the initiative in pursuing it para 11 above We be lieve that if the Canadian Government are Willing to cooperate and if both the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government put their influence behind these proposals they offer the best chance of prevent- ing matters getting beyond our control before it is too late If the State Department agree to the general outline of the proposals as would propose next to discuss the matter with the Canadians BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON February 7 1962 SECRET umLLAssquD Authode SECRET List of coun$riee which might be suitable as inspectors of the Israel reactor Canada Yugoslavia Japan Greece Brazil Switzerland Austria Norway Sweden SECRET