Declassified in Part - Sgnitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Praia MIG Daily Brief 12 Fe mary 1969 19 0 Z5OX1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 3'2 7 gals 11 I Lataki Nicosia _ Hamah CYPRUS I A Israeli-controlled reas following I June196j hostilitie s LEBANQN Damascus Mediterranean Sea GOLAN HEIGHTS Haifa ISRAEL 32 TelYAa qlg Amman _32 L PJeru alem - 392ml GAZA war 1 Ale andn port Said r 7 1 lsmailia Suezv I I Cuanall i 7 3 Cairo I - - a Suez PENINSULA 1 1 EliatJA 28 _28_ Sharmash haykh 1 5 E Hurghadao Qina i _24_ MILES 3'2 ASWAN 1 934781-69 i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 - Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 13 February 1969 I LATE NOTES FOR THE DAILY BRIEF 0F 5 12 FEBRUARY 1969 I 7 I MAJOR PROBLEMS 3 MIDDLE EAST Yasir Arafat the leader of Fatah and newly elected head of the Palestine Liberation Organization will visit Beirut soon and the Lebanese hope they can persuade him to cooperate with their efforts to limit terrorist opera- tions based in Lebanon They regard Arafat as a poten tially moderate leader who does not want serious trouble along the Lebanon-Israel border They are unwilling to push him too hard on the issue _however for fear of undermining his position among his fellow Palestinians 5OX1 EUROPE SOVIET AFFAIRS i 5OX1 i I FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassviified in Part - Sanitiied Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 9 y 1m 5OX1 5OX1 VIETNAM 5OX1 11 OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS 50X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 m7inn jam VML Jib Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 50X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY MAJOR PROBLEMS MIDDLE EAST Lebanon is trying hard to control terrorists oper- I a 5OX1 ating Within its borders 50x1 These attempts are nOt likely to have much success The emotional hold the terrorists have in the Arab world is so strong that most governments fear the domestic political consequences of any action against them The Lebanese in fact are probably well aware of this but they may hope that a well publicized effort to control the terrorists will help stay Israel's retaliatory hand Fatah the biggest and most active of the Palestinian terrorist groups has-begun to widen its horizons Last month Fatah picked up 31 seats on the national council of the Palestine Liberation Organization which since its es- tablishment in 1964 has been viewed by Arab states as the most legitimate vehicle for Palestinian nationalism Using IllR 771E Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 IKIR this platform Fatah then managed to place three of its men- on the ll man executive coMittee Fatah's principal SpOk'es man Yasir Arafat was elected chairman EUROPE There is nothing of significance to report - 50x1 SOVIET AFFAIRS - 50X1 VIETNAM Vietnamese Communist propaganda in the past two days provides a preview of the line Hanoi and the Front are likely Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY to take in tomorrow's session in Paris The Communists have focused squarely on the issue of US troop withdrawal as the first order of business in the talks While not abandoning the priority they put on political issues the Communists I are now saying that unconditional withdrawal of US forces is the ery isSue in a settlement implying that they hope to get into broader questions via this one They also ine sist as they have been doing for several weeks that this question must be resolved by the negotiators in Paris They_ seem genuinely concerned that a gradual US withdrawal worked out between Saigon and Washington and based essentially on a strong allied military position might significantly re duce preSsure on the US to make political concessions to the Communists The Communist View of the withdrawal issue was put most authoritatively in a ghan'gan commentary on 12 February de- manding an immediate and Tunconditional TWithdraWal Of US forces This presumably means that for a while at least the Communists will not discuss mutual withdrawals The Front s Liberation Radio taking its usual harder than-Hanoi approach makes this point explicitly_by saying that only the US has external forces in Vietnam and that there is no question of mutual withdrawal Despite the propaganda format of the current withdraWal theme there is good reason to believe that-whenever private substantive discusSions begin the Communists would like to make this issue the first item on the agenda 5OX1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 1'02 194 195 198 I 'B aglaa Nan ning _Ning-ming 22BURMA I 7 I4 I Binh' VPlaigirgt'a ng 3 Samneua Nam Dinh LAOS 20 Int Hoa' i Luang Prabang NORTH l VIETNAM GULF HAINAN a-Ivmh 2 xx x I HaTInh an 1 rawi v VIENTFANE 18 -18 Udon Thani' PJDemarca on Line I ug fri 'Savaqnakhet If I Ba Nang 15 7'1 THAILAND erg-3 16 'Saravane SOUTH - 14- BANGKOK BaItambang A I -A I II 'BanlMe xx ThuoJysza t I 'r Loc Ninh l 0 PENH WV Tay Ninh conps CULI- - SIAM r '5 My Tho 3 v 4 I I kVung Tau 10_ A Can Tho_ _10 Cupilal Special Zone I IV CORPS SOUTH Ca I A CHINA SEA MILES I I I 102 104 106 I08 93465 1-69 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Hanoi's propaganda position that unconditional withdrawal is a nonnegotiable demand is simple bombast designed for openers in any future private talks The Communists are well aware however that the US withdrawal they seek will Only come about as a result of negotiations and that eventually they will have to recipro cate by pulling out forces of their own They doubtless would prefer that their reciprocity on this issue take place on an undeclared basis much as it did on the bombing halt They may even try eventually to use unacknowledged uni lateral withdrawals of selected NVA units as incentive for US concessions Reports from all four Corps areas Of South Vietnam indicate extensive Communist preparations for attacks prior to during and just after the Tet holidays No major enemy offensive activity was reported during the past 24 hours however While a great deal of attention quite properly has_been focused on indications of impending Communist military ac tion during the Tet period it should also be noted that the Communists apparently hope to inspire popular antigov ernment demonstrations in urban areas as part of their offen sive Preparations for FOR I THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 50x1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY demonstrations have become fairly widespread in the last two months especially in villages close to district and provin- cial Capitals 5OX1 The impact of any demonstrations will depend in large measure on the degree of success achieved in coordinated enemy military actions The demonstrators would have diffi culty drawing sustained support and would be dangerously ex posed unless the government were dist raCte d by significant enemy operations FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 l lR 11 - OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS PERU Prime Minister Montagne tried to play down the Seriousness of the international Petroleum Company dis- pute in his talk With the US charge this morning but 7 he wes notably nnforthcoming when the charge pressed i 'him on Specifics 'He did nothing to dispel the im pression that the government intends to push ahead on ail three of the issues in dispute-4the vaiue of the combany's expropriated property the $15 millionl bill for petrOleum acquired by the compeny since last October and the $690 claim for the company'S' unjust profits since the oil field-was opened up in the 1920s us this seems to be further confirmation theti honever cinch Montagne may want President Velasco's job there is no 5i nificant difference between them where the IPC is concerned I LATIN AMERICA FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Thailand Areas of Tgibal Insurgency- 98 162 jv NORTH 4 VIETNAM I 71- I sour N4 VIETNAM Or Xi 56 ca 5OX1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THAILAND TheagOVernment position in the north continues' to deteriorate Thai troops in the northern tri-bor der area have been unable to drive Communist-led guer- rillas from fortified villages and have now virtually given up patrolling The insurgents in additidn to inflicting heavy casualties on government troops are also making further efforts to destroy the government'siseverely disrupted tribal development program Recently they have fothhe first time among tribal groups and are making sporadic raids on heretofore secure main roads Farther north in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces where armed insurgent activity by Meo hill tribesmen is entering its third year there is increasing evi dence_that the Communists are_attempting to extend their influence into adjacent lowland areas The re cent capture of a group of ethnic Thai insurgents sug- gests the Communists are making some headway in re- cruiting lowland villagers Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 5OX1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Qopy Approved for Release 2015 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 't EUKIHEIKEMUENIUNLY In the face of these developments the army has decided to concentrate its activities in the lowlands Citing the heavy expense of maintaining trobpS'in the field as well'as a desire to re-establish a reServe force the 3rd Army has withdrawn a third of its troops committed to the security operation and has deactivated its forward Operations headquarters The immediate ef- fect will be to enable the insurgents to establish a secure base area in the north FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 5OX1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in_ Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE OPTIONS Soviet strategic policy in recent years has been aimed at narrowing and eventually overcoming the United States lead in capabilities for intercontinental attack The' sprimary objective of the Soviets has been to achieve a more meaningful deterrent They set the goals for achieving this at a time when the US enjoyed a superiority in strategic de- livery systems Which put the Soviet Union at a political and disadvantage To this end the Soviets have built strategic forces which give them a large assured-destruc- tion capability as well as important capabilities for limit ing damage to themselves Although the Soviets have only beL gun to narrow the gap in submarine-launched ballistic mis- siles_and remain inferior in heavy bembers they will draw even with the US later this year in the number of operational ICBM launchers Current programs will bring further improve-- ments_in their strategic position over the next year or so lhe Soviets nonetheless are well aware that the United States is moving toward a number of significant improvements in strategic capabilities The improved deterrent posture which the Soviets are now achieving could be seriously under cut by the US deployment of Poseidon Minuteman Sentinel and_other new strategic systems Faced with these US develop- ments we believe that Soviet military planners haVe a limited set of options available to them for the near term thions for Strategic Defense 1 Strategic defense continues to be a focus of major Soviet efforts bUt offers the least possibilities for success in the Ile Declassified in Pari - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY foreseeable future A2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 50x1 50X1 5OX1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY A3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 FOR PRESIDENT ONLY A4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 5OX1 5OX1 5OX1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 50x1 50X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 Top ecret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016 07 12 CIA-RDP79T00936A006800070001-5