NAVAL W m COLLEGE Newport RI The Challenge of Netwar for the Operational Commander James A Poole LCDR USN A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy Signature 4S Paper Directed by Captain D Watson Chairman Joint Military Operations Department Security Classification This Page REPORT DOCUT ENTA TION PAGE 1 Report Security Classification UNCLASSIFIED - 2 Security Classification Authority 3 eclassification owngradingSchedule 4 istribution Availability of Report - DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED -- - 5 Name of Performing Organization JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT - - 7 Address NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT RI 02841-1207 6 Office Symbol C 8 Title n c l u d eSecurity classification The Challenge of Netwar for the Operational Commander Unclassified 9 Personal Authors LCDR James Andrew Poole USN 10 Type of Report 12 Page Count I FINAL 11 Date of Report 6 March 1996 29 13 Supplementary Notation A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy Netwar lnformation Warfare computer networks operational defense offense command control information 15-lbstract The threat of intrusions to U S domestic and military infrastructure and information systems is very real and may affect our national security now and in the future lnformation has become a new center of gravity that must be protected Netwar is one tool of lnformation Warfare that the operational commander can use in defensive and offensive operations to gain information dominance Netwar targets military or civilian non-weapons computer networks to gain a military advantage while it protects one's own systems from attack With an overview of Netwar concepts this paper explores the benefits of Netwar for the commander the defensive and offensive decisions that must be made and some prescriptions for the future that will enable the commander to fight and win conflicts effectively in the twenty-first century 14 Ten key' words that relate to your paper 16 Distribution Availability of Abstract DTIC Users X 17 Abstract Security Classification 18 Name of Responsible Individual 19 Telephone Same As Rpt Unclassified UNCLASSIFIED CHAIRMAN JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 20 0ffice Symbol 841--6$ - - Security Classification of This Page Unclassified C ABSTRACT The threat of intrusions to U S domestic and military infrastructure and information systems is very real and may affect our national security now and in the future lnformation has become a new center of gravity that must be protected Netwar is one tool of lnformation Warfare that the operational commander can use in defensive and offensive operations to gain information dominance Netwar targets military or civilian non-weapons computer networks to gain a military advantage while it protects one's own systems from attack With an overview of Netwar concepts this paper explores the benefits of Netwar for the commander the defensive and offensive decisions that must be made and some prescriptions for the future that will enable the commander to fight and win conflicts effectively in the twenty-first century The Challenge of Netwar for the Operational Commander Table of Contents PART PAGE Abstract 11 1 Introduction I II Information Concepts 2 Information Warfare Figures I and 2 Command and Control Warfare C2WJ Netwar Ill Netwar and the Commander 4 Revolution in Military Affairs Netwar in Context Intelligence Not Just lnformation IV Netwar in Defensive Posture 7 The Goals of Netwar Assessment of Vulnerabilities The Threat The Defense Prevention Detection Limitation Recovery V Offensive Use of Netwar 12 Observe Orient Decide Act F@ure3 VI Recommendations and Final Thoughts 17 Endnotes 19 Bibliography 22 The Challenge of Netwar for the Operational Commander 1 Introduction The world isn't run by weapons anymore or energy or money It's run by little ones and zeros little bits of data It's all just electrons There's a warout there A worldwar And it's not about who's got the most bullets It's about who controls the information The United States is in the midst of a tremendous transformation of world history that is creating a new social economic and political order The explosion of computer technology and the desire for global interconnectedness have created an lnformation Revolution linking nations companies and peoples This technological sophistication has provided a means by which to achieve superiority as an economic and military power Our increasing reliance on this technology for the efficient exchange of personal corporate and government information is not without risk Consequently information is now a strategic asset worthy of conquest and destruction '' The threat of intrusions to U S domestic and military infrastructure and information systems is very real and has the potential to affect the national security of the United States now and into the twenty-first century Information Warfare is coming For some it has already arrived This new lnformation Age of technology is impacting every facet of our daily lives and it is affecting how the military conducts war today and in the future Network communications systems have become increasingly vital for our civilian and military communities As a result lnformation Warfare IW will continue to develop into an important weapon for today's operational commander who depends on the processing of large volumes of information through the use of various networks and databases Network warfare or Netwar is one aspect of IW that the commander must be able to use effectively in the twenty-first century Today's commander must anticipate plan and integrate Netwar into his war-fighting arsenal The commander must understand Netwar as it relates to operational design successfully secure his own friendly information systems and work Netwar offensively against a variety of potential adversaries This paper explores the benefits Netwar holds for the commander and the defensive and offensive decisions that must be considered as he strives to successfully manipulate information systems to his advantage while thwarting those of his adversary Ultimately it may be the operational commander's understanding of the strengths and limitations of Netwar and his application of that knowledge that will determine his success 11 lnformation Concepts lnformation is the only asset that can be in two places at the same time --- Charles Robertello lnformation is to a large extent synonymous with knowledge It includes knowledge such as facts data or opinions including numerical graphic or narrative forms whether oral or maintained in any medium Today information is increasingly becoming the currency of true military and economic power lnformation must be protected as a result the military has recently begun to define lnformation Warfare One such definition describes lnformation Warfare IW as actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national strategy by affecting adversary information systems while leveraging and defending our own information and systems '' As shown in Figure I the concept of lnformation Warfare transcends all levels of warfare strategic operational and tactical and includes a wealth of concept At the strategic level IW may involve political military economic and social targets It involves both offensive capabilities as well as defensive vulnerabilities The goal of IW is to achieve information superiority or information dominance This dominance is viewed as a key to a decisive advantage over an adversary both in technological and economic competition and in conflict Figure 1 lnformation Warfare Spectrum N COMPETITION CONFLICT 11 Figure 2 lnformation Warfare Spectrum to Include Netwar COMPETITION CONFLICT 11 Adapted from the figure in Gerald Burnette's lnformation The Battlefield of the Future Surface Warfare July August 1995 p 8 Created by the author to illustrate a conception of Netwar within the lnformation Warfare Spectrum Much has been written about one subset of lnformation Warfare Command and Control Warfare C2W While its definition too is still evolvinglg C2W is described as the military strategy that implements IW on the battlefield and integrates physical destruction Generally speaking while IW is an all-inclusive term describing political economic and military aspects C2W deals primarily with lnformation Warfare's military aspects A new subset of lnformation Warfare has been recently termed Netwar Like C2W it too involves executing offensive and defensive operations Netwar involves conducting these operations on military or civilian non-weapons computer networks to gain a military advantage I3 Netwars could be largely non-military but they could have dimensions that overlap into military warfare Looking at Figure 2 one can see that Netwar See the dotted lines represents a new entry in the spectrum of conflict that spans economic political social as well as military forms of war l4 Netwars specifically target information and communications systems The weapons of Netwar are extensive They range from software devices such as viruses trap doors sniffers worms and data interception techniques to hardware devices that use High Power Microwaves HPM Electromagnetic Pulse EMP Van Eck radiation HERF Guns and active wiretapping Readily available today these hardlsoft kill overVcovert weapons can be used independently or in any combination to help achieve the commander's or adversaries' warfare goals Netwar whether described as a new subset of IW or a future extension of the evolving concept of C2W is an important concept that must be understood by the operational commander Ill Netwar and the Commander We have crossed the threshold We have to change fast to be able to fight and win in the information age It's time to be proactive and keep the Navy ahead of the information bow wave It is clear to me that information has become a major factor in warfare and will grow in importance in the next century I challenge you all to join me as we redefine how wars are fought and won ---Admiral J M Boordal Revolution i n Military Affairs synonymous with power In this lnformation Age knowledge has now become The technology that pervades nearly every aspect of our daily lives has created a Revolution in Military Affairs that is changing and influencing military thinking and planning Consequently this change in modern warfare is being compared to the revolutions that brought about the mechanization of land forces and the development of airpower In the past the United States relied heavily upon the use of conventional weapons in conflicts typically centered around land and capital Now the trends in modern warfare pursue a new form of capital information lnformation dominance in competition and in conflict may bring national power I6 Because information brings the promise of power it is fast becoming a new center of gravity one who controls that center of gravity in essence holds the power As we increasingly interact through networks that link civilian and military information systems together the more likely it is that conflicts will arise on those systems Our extensive reliance on these network systems increases our vulnerability to attack by our adversaries U S information systems are attacked daily 17 it is only a matter of time before conflicts or warfare will take place on these same vital network communication and data systems In warfare where the goal is to win in a conflict with one's adversary the commander must choose the weapons that give him an advantage over that adversary In the fight for information dominance the use of computers technology and networks of Netwar can give the commander that advantage The commander must anticipate the operational context of Netwar so that he can maximize its impact on potential courses of action Netwar i n Context For the commander the lnformation Revolution directly influences the operational context from which he must work in conflict situations Pursuing information dominance the commander may opt not to annihilate his adversary but rather to paralyze or blind him in battle or he may decide to do both Using computers and network systems as his tools he will target his adversary's command and control systems aiming to slow down his adversary and to introduce uncertainty into the enemy's Observe Orient Decide and Act OODA Loop lnformation systems will allow the commander to share common situational awareness with his forces on an extended battlefield in near real time enabling him to make adjustments quickly and efficiently as necessary He can plan synchronize and execute complex maneuvers The weapons of Netwar allow a flexibility in the degree of lethality that can be imposed on an adversary's center of gravity Executed with precision Netwar weapons can reduce collateral damage while at the same time increase the destructiveness of a strike Netwar could be used to put pressure on an adversary to change his behavior and avert further conflict It may also be used by the commander to help control the possible escalation of a conflict The lnformation Age is transforming military operations by providing commanders with information that is unprecedented in quantity and quality l8 The increased data can provide the commander with a superior understanding of the conflict situation in a short period of time so that he can make the appropriate decisions quickly Ultimately this information dominance will speed up the tempo of operations and outpace the enemy's decision-making cycle The commander's ability to gain information and interpret it more carefully and quickly than his adversary is the key to winning on the Netwar battlefield l9 Intelligence Not Just Information Modern warfare forces the commander to make decisions at a high tempo often under conditions of great uncertainty As the quantity of data and the role of the commander both increase it is very likely the precision and timeliness of the information will decrease 20 Mistakes such as the Iranian Airbus shoot-down by the U S S Vincennes CG 49 can happen What becomes increasingly vital to Netwar operations is not more data but qualip data that has been interpreted into quality intelligence Effective decision-making can only take place when there has been a reduction of uncertainty in a timely fashion That 'uncertainty can be reduced by commanders who properly direct intelligence efforts so that information about the enemy is as complete and reliable as possible 21 One cannot collect allintelligence as that would cause information overload and ultimately slow down the commander's OODA loop No data system today can meet the insatiable demand for information that can take place in a conflict The commander needs to understand intelligence systems capabilities and their limitation direct the gathering of intelligence data in an ongoing fashion in conflict and in peacetime and decide what is needed and who should get what There will have to be a certain amount of appetite suppression 23 IV Netwar in a Defensive Posture It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him not to presume that he will not attack but rather to make one's self invincible ---Sun Tsu 24 The Goals of Netwar With today's upwardly spiraling technology there is no such thing as a secure network system Almost every file that is stored magnetically transmitted over a wireline radio or fiber-optic link is subject to interception by an adversary 25 Nearly every component of the U S military and its supporting infrastructure is highly dependent on its information and information systems 26 The United States the most technologically advanced country in the world is without question the most vulnerable to Netwar One goal of Netwar is to provide the commander with the information necessary to seize and maintain information dominance over his adversary That data is collected through the use of friendly network and communications systems However the commander must be able to trust incoming information and be assured that it has not been contaminated or corrupted in any way Without the certainty that comes from trusted information the commander cannot make intelligent effective operational decisions during a conflict or in peacetime The most crucial aspect of Netwar is the ability of the U S to defend its network infrastructures from intrusion and compromise by potential adversaries With tens of thousands of computers all interconnected the damage that can be inflicted by a single computer or a computer-controlled network is incredible In 1994 the Joint Security Commission called the U S vulnerability to lnformation War the major security challenge of this decade and possibly the next century 27 The United States must be able to defend its defense network infrastructure otherwise military readiness will be compromised Defensive Netwar measures must be taken on a continual basis in peacetime and in conflict The Pentagon alone is probed electronically by outsiders close to 500 times a day 28 We must expect there will be continuous deliberate attempts to destroy or damage our information infrastructures in the future 29 The commander must seriously assess the vulnerabilities of the network infrastructures in his area of responsibility evaluate the possible actions of potential adversaries and make informed prioritized decisions to take the necessary defensive actions to secure his network systems Assessment of Vulnerabilities The commander must become familiar with the particular vulnerabilities of his systems He may choose to do so by contacting the appropriate lnformation Warfare authorities30 for updated assessment of current vulnerabilities Assessment must be made on an ongoing basis through purposeful attempts to infiltrate one's own systems Netwar is particularly difficult to assess and defend against because unlike attacks using conventional weapons it can be difficult to know when one has been attacked on a network Although the Department of Defense DoD does not openly discuss computer security breaches one Defense agency conducted its own mock attacks on more than 8 000 DoD computers over the last two years The Defense Information Systems Agency's DISA team was able to break into more than 88% of the computers Even more alarming less than 5% of the 7 860 systems penetrated realized they had been attacked and only 5% of those reported the incidents to authorities 31 It would be an extremely costly and lengthy process to provide widespread protection of civil and military infrastructures to make them more robust against degradation 32 We cannot defend against allvulnerabilities to a network system In light of that fact it is important that the commander take inventory of each known vulnerability to the systems in his area of responsibility and assess the value of the vulnerable information The information that is most critical to national security would be the most vital information to protect while information whose corruption or interruption would not compromise national security would fall lower on the list of priorities Through critical assessment of his vulnerabilities the commander takes the first step in prioritizing his information assurance needs Only then can he begin to meet the most crucial defensive Netwar needs of his theater The Threat The present vulnerabilities of the United States to Netwar are of greater concern right now than the known threats However in the coming years the number of nations and individuals with the capability to access and damage our systems should grow substantially 33 The operational commander must carefully and continually evaluate the potential for any adversary to attack our systems He must become very familiar with who these adversaries are or could be what their capabilities are and what their intentions are as well With the shrinking price of high-performance computers coupled with the proliferation of high-speed digital communications the threat of Netwar rises and more and more foreign governments and non-government groups and individuals become a threat to U S ecurity 3 In the highly unpredictable post Cold War age in which we live the commander cannot make assuri ptionsas to who his adversaries will be Tomorrow's enemy may or may not be a nation-state We may find ourselves attacked by adversaries such as clans terrorists ethnic factions religious groups or drug cartels The commander cannot assess an adversary strictly by measuring capability In a sense capability is a given Much of the technology that is needed is widely available at a low cost Even an adversary who does not have the capability to wreak havoc can have access to state-of-the-art knowledge and equipment by finding a Hacker for Hire for the right price The commander must shift his attention to the motivations or intentions of a potential adversary Very often careful consideration of those intentions will give a better defense barometric reading than a measure of capability alone If a potential U S target is vulnerable and is vital to our national interests and an adversary has the capability and intention to disrupt that particular target then the commander must work to protect that system The Defense The operational commander has four defensive approaches to thwart potential adversaries prevention detection limitation and reco very35 While prevention may be the most attractive option of all it may not be the most feasible for all systems The commander should consider a cost-benefit analysis to determine what action is the most appropriate for a given system 36 Prevention Successful prevention measures leave the intruder completely blocked from a system Computer facilities must be made secure from intrusion This can be done by ensuring the physical design of those structures and the computer hardware itself are protected so that electronic emissions cannot be intercepted by an adversary Encryption software and hardware should be used on the most crucial information Security personnel must receive ongoing training and be monitored to ensure that they follow through on all necessary security measures A majority of security breaches could be prevented if personnel enforced the security guidelines already in place 37 Detection of an intruder is a very difficult task DISA has estimated that only 5% of all attacks on military systems through the Internet are dete ted 8 Viruses and other passive intrusions may lay dormant for years without detection Because it is so difficult to know if one has been attacked one cannot rely on detection systems alone for defense The commander must maintain the integrity of his computer systems by running comparison checks with other systems and use passive detection devices such as sniffers to protect systems from being purposefully overloaded by an adversary Limitation Very often computer networks are protected by limiting access to information systems through various user ID and firewall procedures Because no system is 100% protected these limitation procedures may give a false sense of security to those who rely on them It is only a matter of time and persistence before an intruder will get through As Douglas Waller a T h e magazine journalist explains The toughest Pentagon computer to crack is the first one once inside nearly 90% of the other computers linked to the first computer will recognize the intruder as a legitimate Recovery The commander must guard against attack by planning and preparing for a possible strike against vital network systems These systems must be recovered as quickly as possible so that military effectiveness and readiness are not compromised Backup systems must be maintained so that systems can be restored to their previous working potential Defensive measures must be taken on a continual basis to ensure the certainty of our information systems We cannot become complacent As computer capacity continues to double every two years and will probably continue to do so for the next few decades 40 the speed and complexity of computer systems will increase at an astronomical rate It will become increasingly difficult to defend our information systems of today against the technology of tomorrow We must endeavor to always stay a few steps ahead of our adversaries V Offensive Use of Netwar In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and ears of the enemy making him blind and deaf and to create confusion in the minds of enemy ---Ma0 Tse-Tung 41 commanders driving them insane Ideally in peacetime or in conflict the commander would seek to keep his adversaries from being able to gain knowledge of U S forces or learn of U S intentions If engaged in a conflict situation the commander should strive to thwart the enemy leader's efforts to communicate among his own units 42 If successful the commander will be able to work comfortably in his OODA Loop while disrupting the decision-making cycle of his opponent This will force the enemy to lose the initiative and cause the enemy to resort to a reactive mode of operation 43 Before the commander can take such actions effectively he must have a clear understanding of the overall mission Ongoing peacetime planning must involve the development and maintenance of offensive Netwar capabilities and resources Through continuous peacetime activities the Netwar commander will be able to observe the situation orient available forces to meet the perceived threat decide a course of action to counter the threat and then in conflict act in a quick and decisive manner Observe The commander must have an understanding of his adversary's or potential adversaries' Netwar vulnerabilities long before the time of conflict and he should focus on those adversaries most likely to attack The commander will need to know who the advei-ary is what makes him tick where his vulnerabilities are and what it may take to weaken his will An effective commander will know the last step before he takes the first 44 Measures should reflect war termination goals for post war reconstruction It is easier to rebuild an adversary's disabled system vice a destroyed one The commander will devise a course of action that clearly states the Netwar objectives and not lose sight of those goals in the heat of conflict Although he will have the choice of a full range of weapons of attack he will choose those that have the potential to deliver the most effective blow in the most efficient manner possible The most effective blow may be quick and decisive or may just cause confusion for the enemy for a short time Properly executed Netwar can bring an adversary to his knees by hitting him swiftly in his most vulnerable network systems without necessarily physically destroying those systems Or Netwar can slowly degrade an adversary's information systems to the point that the enemy no longer trusts the information on those systems Properly directed intelligence efforts will assist the commander as he develops a situational awareness of the adversarial conflict Understanding of the enemy's culture and his perspective as well as his military infrastructure and information systems architecture will facilitate the commander in his efforts to select appropriate Netwar targets of vulnerability and nodes of attack Orient The orientation surrounding target selection is perhaps the most challenging dimension of offensive Netwar for the operational commander The decisions regarding the selection and prioritization of targets will involve political cultural and military decisions The identification of an adversary's centers of gravity and the assessment of the consequences of their neutralization must be as precise as possible so that the appropriate weapon s can be chosen for the j0b 5 Because Netwar involves information systems and infrastructures careful study of the adversary's systems during peacetime will yield the most effective results during a conflict Intelligence-gathering operations would involve the collection of information regarding the information infrastructure of the adversary the important links within those systems and how those systems depend upon each other 46 First one must determine which systems are the most important to the adversary as well as which systems could pose a threat to our forces1systems we may choose to employ The commander and his planners should determine which links in the system are susceptible to degradation accessible to friendly forces and feasible to attack If these links or nodes in a system meet these three criteria then they are considered vulnerable 47 Each vulnerable node must then be evaluated to determine how critical it is that is is an attack on the node by the commander necessary to meet the overall objectives or goals of the conflict If these vulnerable nodes meet these goals then the commander must determine the priority level of each of these targets Decide The kinds of targets that may be compromised are numerous The decision regarding what to target is dependent upon the nature of the conflict One may decide to target a physical computer network a computer support structure or a particular product of a network It may be that the targeting priority against an adversary would resemble the one employed in the air battle against Iraq Col John A Warden Ill of the Air Staff Plans Directorate developed a schematic that rank-ordered the components of the adversary as follows leadership material essentials infrastructure the people and the military 48 Netwar would concc trate on those infrastructures and information systems both military and civilian that would cut off the adversary leadership from its supporting infrastructure and deny or disrupt those systems The method of attack against a target can be overt or covert There are a number of modes of attack that can be employed and they fall along a continuum of destruction See Figure 3 In Netwar the commander can choose to ignore intercept disrupt corrupt manipulate control or physically destroy the network systems or The decision of which mode to utilize on which system products of those ystems g will not be made by the operational commander alone The National Command Authority would have to approve some types of non-traditional military operations economic and political targets networks before they could be pursued Act When it is time to act upon the adversary the preparedness of the operational commander will become most evident Netwar planning and operations are multidimensional involving the coordination of diverse forces to strike most effectively at the weakest and most decisive points Timing can be paramount strike too soon and the adversary may be able to recover Strike too late and the action is useless The final decision to act upon targets could be influenced by political moral and practical issues as well Netwar does not take place in a vacuum It can affect a conflict across a number of social and moral issues In this day and age of instant media coverage one cannot ignore the political ramifications of a decision to act upon a target that the American or international public may deem inappropriate or inhumane In the future Netwar may be used to prevent conflicts from escalating to the use of conventional forces Some believe it may even replace conventional warfare as the non-lethal weapon of the future FIGURE 3 Modes of Netwar Attack and Examples SOFT KILL PHYSICALLY DESTROY MANIPULATE CORRUPT DISRUPT INTERCEPT IGNORE EMP HMP WORM HERF Gun Light Energy Sound Wave Temperature l6 The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles The supreme excellence is to subdue the armies of your enemies without even having to fight --- Sun Tsu 50 them VI Recommendations and Final Thoughts The ultimate goal is simple Give the battlefield commander access to all the information needed to win the war And give it to him when he wants it where he wants it and how --- General Colin L Powell 5' he wants it As the realities of the Revolution in Military Affairs merge with the realities of the post Cold War world the U S military will need to make some organizational adjustments to keep pace in the years ahead While it is necessary to maintain separate IW communities within each of the armed services it is imperative that continuous joint planning be undertaken to ensure the efficient coordination of all Netwar activities The centralization of Netwar planning will guard against redundancy of information collection efforts and help to ensure the stealth of covert operations In peacetime and in conflict the coordination must be such that all communities are well aware of what each of the others is doing The operational commander must decentralize Netwar at the execution level to maximize the flexibility of the field operations In addition the close working relationship required between the operational and intelligence communities necessitated in Netwar may require those specialties to merge in the future In this era of force downsizing there is a planning dilemma as the operational commander must strike the appropriate balance between the need to invest in future technologies while maintaining an adequate force structure While some argue we should be upgrading in our current capabilities others argue that Netwar and Information Warfare will replace the need for conventional weapons Further reductions in forces may require the consolidation of specialties and the training of troops who are capable of flexible multitasking The distinctions between civil and military communications and information systems will continue to blur The traditional boundaries between what is the military domain and what is the non-military domain will increasingly fade As a consequence of downsizing and the commercial drive of the civilian market the military will grow dependent upon the private sector to support it through c vilian technological innovation The military is lagging as opposed to leading 52 The operational commander must recognize the shift in civilian and military technology that is taking place and make strides towards a productive civil-military relationship in the future The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one --- B H Liddell HarP3 out ENDNOTES Sneakers VHS 2 hrs 5 min 1993 MCA Universal Home Video Inc Character Cosmos is speaking to Marty Bishop at the end of the movie 1 Winn Schwartau Information Warfare Chaos on the Superhiahwav New York Thunder Mountain Press 1994 p 13 2 3 Schwartau p 11 Charles Robertello Information Security Expert quoted in Schwartau Information Warfare p 82 Plannina Considerations for Defensive Information Warfare Information Assurance Arlington VA Defense lnformation System Agency 1993 p 54 5 6 Peter Grier Information Warfare Air Force Maaazine March 1995 p 36 U S Dept of Defense Information Warfare Draft Washington April 1995 p 2 8 lnformation Warfare includes actions to deny exploit corrupt or destroy the adversary's information systems while protecting one's own In Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine for Joint O erations Joint Pub 3-0 Washington 1995 p GL-5 C2W is defined as command and control warfare The integrated use of operations security OPSEC military deception psychological operations PSYOP electronic warfare EW and physical destruction mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to influence degrade or destroy adversary command and control capabilities while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict Also called C2W C2W is both offensive and defensive a counter-C2 ---To prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to influencing degrading or destroying the adversary C2 system b C2 protection --- To maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to influence degrade or destroy the friendly C2 system 9 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Command and Control Warfare Memorandum of Policy No 30 Washington 1993 p 3 Wayne J Rowe Information Warfare a Primer for Navv Personnel Newport RI U S Naval War College Strategic Research Department 1995 p 3 11 The term Netwar was first used by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt from the International Policy Dept RAND Santa Monica CA Their paper Cybemar is Coming is published in Comparative Strateav ApriVJune 1993 'pp 141-165 l2 13 Stefan Eisen Jr Netwar It's Not Just for Hackers Anymore Unpublished Research Paper U S Naval War College Newport RI 1995 p 3 John Arquilla David Ronfeldt Cyberwar is Coming Comparative Strateaies ApriVJune 1993 p 144 14 Admiral J M Boorda Chief of Naval Operations as quoted in Rowe p iii l6 Information Dominance Edges Toward New Conflict Frontier Sianal August 1994 p 37 17 Winn Schwartau discusses the frequency and variety of attacks on U S information systems government corporate and personal throughout his book lnformation Warfare Chaos on the Superhiah U S Dept of the Air Force Cornerstones of lnformation Warfare Washington 1995 p 1 19 William B Scott 'Information Warfare' Demands New Approach Technoloav 13 March 1995 p 86 Aviation Week Space Edward A Smith Jr Putting it Through the Right Window U S Naval Institute Proceedings June 1995 p 40 20 AS Smith explains in his article p 40 Effective collection of data and its transformation into intelligence is based on a solid understanding of what is being sought and why To collect everything is inefficient and would overload systems Unless the intelligence collection is properly directed then any attempt to gather less than everything risks missing the essential target 21 m October 1994 p 146 22 Ira C Owens Army Intelligence Operations in Force XXI 23 Peter Grier The Data Weapon Government Executive June 1992 p 25 24 Sun Tsu as cited in Plannina Considerations page 3 Terry Metzgar Hostile Intercepts Aimed at lnformation Systems National Defense MayIJune 1993 p 25 25 26 Plannina Considerations p 8 z7 Douglas Waller Onward Cyber Soldiers Time 21 August 1995 p 40 28 Ibid p 44 Kerry A Blount A Two-Component Strategy for Winning the lnformation War p 1 I 29 m January 1995 Organizations such as the National Security Agency NSA Defense lnformation Systems Agency DISA the Fleet lnformation Warfare Center FIWC and the Naval lnformation Warfare Activity NIWA would be helpful in this regard 30 Bob Brewin DISA Stings Uncover Computer Security Flaws Federal Computer Week 6 February 1995 p 1 32 U S Dept of Defense lnformation Warfare Draft p 3 33 Ibid Bruce D Berkowitz Warfare in the lnformation Age Issues in Science Technoloav Fall 1995 p 62 34 President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency Computers Crimes Clues and Controls Washington 1986 p 3 35 The commander will need to consider the costs of such procedures measured in dollars time and restrictions in access With the regeneration of computer systems over time it may be more costeffective and worth the risk not to protect older systems before it is time to replace them 36 37 Plannina Considerations p 24 38 U S Dept of Defense Information Warfare Draft p 3 39 Waller p 44 40 Gregory H Canavan Changing Times Implode Defense Science Dynamics Sianal September 1993 p 50 41Mao Tse-Tung from On the Protracted War 1938 quoted in Norman B Hutcherson Command Control Warfare--Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter's Data Base Published Research Paper Maxwell Air Force Base AL Air University Press September 1994 p xiii 42 Jensen p 37 43 Hutcherson p 43 Carl von Clausewitz On War Michael Howard and Peter Paret eds and trans Princeton Princeton University Press 1976 p 263 44 45 Smith p 39 Facsimile from Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center Nodal Analysis Dam Neck VA 17 January 1996 p 3 46 47 Ibid p 4 John Arquilla 'Strategic Implications of Information Dominance Strateaic Review Summer 1994 p 27 48 49 Eisen p 6 Sun Tsu as quoted in James Charlton ed The Military Quotation Book New York St Martin's Press 1990 p 15 50 51GENColin L Powell Information-Age Warriors 52 Scott p 83 53 B H Liddell Hart as quoted in Charlton p 65 m July 1992 p 370 BIBLIOGRAPHY Alexander David lnformation Warfare and the Digitised 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Joint Force Quarterlv Summer 1994 pp 84-90 Evancoe Paul and Mark Bentley CVW--Computer Virus as a Weapon Military Technolo v May 1994 pp 38-40 EW Expands into lnformation Warfare 10 October 1994 pp 47-48 Aviation Week Space Technoloay Facsimile from Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center Nodal Analysis Dam Neck VA 17 January 1996 FitzGerald Mary C Russian Views on lnformation Warfare Armv May 1994 pp 54-60 Geisenheyner Stefan How Vulnerable are C31 Networks Jamming Versus Intercept and Decryption Armada International JuneJJuly 1990 pp 4648 Gordon Michael R Admiral with High-Tech Dreams Has Pentagon at War With Itself The New York Times 12 December 1994 pp A1 A1 7 Grier Peter lnformation Warfare Air Force Maaayine March 1995 pp 34-37 The Data Weapon Government Executive June 1992 pp 23-26 Hutcherson Norman B Command Control Warfare--Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter's Data Base Published Research Paper Maxwell Air Force Base AL Air University Press September 1994 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Research Paper U S Naval War College Newport RI 1994 Macedonia Michael R lnformation Technology in Desert Storm Military Review October 1992 pp 34-41 Matthews William Girding for Cyberwar Armv Times 18 July 1994 p 36 School is in for 'lnformation Warfare' Armv Times 23 May 1994 p 28 Susceptible to Sabotage 'Weapons of Preference' are Vulnerable Navv Times 5 February 1996 p 28 Metzgar Terry Hostile Intercepts Aimed at lnformation Systems Defense MayIJune 1993 pp 24-26 National Oder Joseph E Digitizing the Battlefield The Army's First Step to Force XXI Armv May 1994 pp 37-38 42 Owens Ira C Army Intelligence Operations in Force XXI Armv October 1994 pp 145-149 Oxburgh E R Future Military Technology and the West The RUSl Journal December 1992 pp 49-55 Plannina Considerations for Defensive lnformation Warfare lnformation Assurance Arlington VA Defense lnformation System Agency 1993 Powell Colin L Information-Age Warriors E k July 1992 p 370 Reitinger Kurt C Command and Control for Third 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1995 U S Dept of Defense Defensive lnformation Warfare Strateav Draft Washington 1995 U S Dept of Defense lnformation Warfare Draft Washington April 1995 pp 1-3 Waller Douglas Onward Cyber Soldiers Time 21 August 1995 pp 38-44