United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees September 2016 DEFENSE CIVIL SUPPORT DOD Needs to Identify National Guard’s Cyber Capabilities and Address Challenges in Its Exercises GAO-16-574 September 2016 DEFENSE CIVIL SUPPORT DOD Needs to Identify National Guard’s Cyber Capabilities and Address Challenges in Its Exercises Highlights of GAO-16-574 a report to congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The DOD 2015 Cyber Strategy reported that a cyber attack could present a significant risk to U S national security House Report 114102 included a provision that GAO assess DOD’s plans for providing support to civil authorities for a domestic cyber incident National Guard units have developed capabilities that could be used if requested and approved to support civil authorities in a cyber incident however the Department of Defense DOD does not have visibility of all National Guard units’ capabilities for this support GAO found three types of cyber capabilities that exist in National Guard units This report assesses whether 1 the National Guard has developed and DOD has visibility over capabilities that could support civil authorities in a cyber incident and 2 DOD has conducted and participated in exercises to support civil authorities in cyber incidents and any challenges it faced To conduct this review GAO examined DOD and National Guard reports policies and guidance and interviewed officials about the National Guard’s capabilities in defense support to civil authorities GAO also reviewed after-action reports and interviewed DOD officials about exercise planning What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD maintain a database that identifies National Guard cyber capabilities conduct a tier 1 exercise to prepare its forces in the event of a disaster with cyber effects and address challenges from prior exercises DOD partially concurred with the recommendations stating that current mechanisms and exercises are sufficient to address the issues highlighted in the report GAO believes that the mechanisms and exercises in their current formats are not sufficient and continues to believe the recommendations are valid as described in the report View GAO-16-574 For more information contact Joseph W Kirschbaum at 202 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao gov Communications directorates These organizations operate and maintain the National Guard’s information network • Computer network defense teams These teams protect National Guard information systems could serve as first responders for states’ cyber emergencies and provide surge capacity to national capabilities • Cyber units These teams are to conduct cyberspace operations However DOD does not have visibility of all National Guard units’ cyber capabilities because the department has not maintained a database that identifies the National Guard units’ cyber-related emergency response capabilities as required by law Without such a database to fully and quickly identify National Guard cyber capabilities DOD may not have timely access to these capabilities when requested by civil authorities during a cyber incident • DOD has conducted or participated in exercises to support civil authorities in a cyber incident or to test the responses to simulated attacks on cyber infrastructure owned by civil authorities but has experienced several challenges that it has not addressed These challenges include limited participant access because of a classified exercise environment limited inclusion of other federal agencies and critical infrastructure owners and inadequate incorporation of joint physical-cyber scenarios In addition to these challenges DOD has not identified and conducted a “tier 1” exercise—an exercise involving national-level organizations and combatant commanders and staff in highly complex environments A DOD cyber strategy planning document states and DOD officials agreed that such an exercise is needed to help prepare forces in the event of a disaster with physical and cyber effects Until DOD identifies and conducts a tier 1 exercise DOD will miss an opportunity to fully test response plans evaluate response capabilities assess the clarity of established roles and responsibilities and address the challenges DOD has experienced in prior exercises The table below shows selected DOD-conducted exercises Selected DOD Exercises Designed to Support Civil Authorities During or After a Cyber Incident Exercise title Exercise host Fiscal year 2015 Cyber Guard 15 U S Cyber Command Cyber Shield 2015 Army National Guard 2015 Vista Host II North American Aerospace Defense Command and U S Northern Command 2015 Cyber civil-support objective Test DOD participation in a response to a cyberattack of significant consequence against U S critical infrastructure Train and evaluate U S Army National Guard computer network defense teams in a civilsupport scenario Examine planning assumptions potential resource requirements and roles and responsibilities associated with cyber-related defense support to civil authorities operations Source GAO analysis of DOD documentation GAO-16-574 United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Background The National Guard Has Developed Cyber Capabilities That Could Support Civil Authorities but DOD Does Not Have Full Visibility of National Guard Units’ Capabilities DOD Has Conducted and Participated in Exercises to Support Civil Authorities in a Cyber Incident but Has Not Addressed Challenges with the Exercises Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 15 21 22 22 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 27 Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 31 Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34 Related GAO Products 5 10 35 Table Table 1 Department of Defense DOD Exercises Designed to Support Civil Authorities During or After a Cyber Incident Page i 16 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Abbreviations DHS DOD DSCA ODASD Department of Homeland Security Department of Defense Defense Support of Civil Authorities Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense This is a work of the U S government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO However because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately Page ii GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Letter 441 G St N W Washington DC 20548 September 6 2016 Congressional Committees The Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident Coordination states that significant cyber incidents are occurring with increasing frequency impacting public and private infrastructure in the United States 1 DOD recognizes that a disruptive manipulative or destructive cyber attack could present a significant risk to U S economic and national security if lives are lost property destroyed policy objectives harmed or economic interests affected 2 and that the department must be prepared to support civil authorities in all domains—including cyberspace 3 DOD could support such an effort with capabilities from across the military—such as the National Security Agency military services U S Cyber Command and the National Guard—through the department’s Defense Support of Civil Authorities DSCA mission DOD has stated that the National Guard offers a unique capability for supporting the department’s DSCA mission and represents a critical surge capacity for cyber responders 4 According to the 2008 National Response Framework exercises i e training events can play an instrumental role in preparing organizations to respond to an incident by providing opportunities to test response plans evaluate response capabilities assess the clarity of established roles and responsibilities and improve proficiency in a simulated risk-free environment 5 Well1 Presidential Policy Directive—United States Cyber Incident Coordination PPD-41 July 26 2016 2 See DOD The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy April 2015 Hereinafter referred to as the DOD Cyber Strategy 3 See DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities February 2013 4 The DOD Cyber Strategy and DOD Cyber Mission Analysis Mission Analysis for Cyber Operations of Department of Defense Aug 21 2014 5 DHS National Response Framework Washington D C January 2008 The 2008 nd National Response Framework was revised and superseded by publication of the 2 rd edition in 2013 and the 3 edition in 2016 The National Response Framework is a component of the National Preparedness System mandated by Presidential Policy Directive 8 PPD 8 National Preparedness The 2016 framework reiterates the principles and concepts of the 2008 and 2013 versions Page 1 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support designed exercises can improve interagency coordination and communications highlight capabilities gaps and identify opportunities for improvement We have previously reported on progress DOD has made to address issues related to DSCA In June 2015 we testified on the progress DOD had made in implementing our prior recommendations to support civil authorities including strengthening the department’s strategy plans and guidance interagency coordination and capabilities 6 We found that DOD had taken action to address some of our prior recommendations but had not fully addressed others For example DOD had improved interagency coordination for support of civil authorities by defining interagency roles and responsibilities and had identified capabilities it could provide for DSCA However DOD had not issued implementation guidance on the use of dual-status commanders as we had recommended 7 According to DOD as of May 2016 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security had drafted a DOD instruction that provides policy and guidance on dual-status commanders and the instruction was in the approval process In April 2016 we reported on the extent to which DOD had developed guidance that clearly defines the department’s DSCA roles and responsibilities in response to domestic cyber incidents 8 We reported that DOD guidance does not clarify the roles and responsibilities of key DOD entities—such as DOD components the supported command and the dual-status commander—that may be 6 GAO Civil Support DOD Is Taking Action to Strengthen Support of Civil Authorities GAO-15-686T Washington D C June 10 2015 7 Dual-status commanders are commissioned officers Army or Air Force or a federally recognized Army National Guard or Air National Guard officer who serve as an intermediate link between the separate chains of command for state and federal forces and have authority over both National Guard forces under state control and active-duty forces under federal control during a civil-support incident or special event 8 GAO Civil Support DOD Needs to Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities for Defense Support of Civil Authorities during Cyber Incidents GAO-16-332 Washington D C Apr 4 2016 Page 2 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support called upon to support a cyber incident 9 We recommended that DOD issue or update guidance that clarifies roles and responsibilities for relevant entities and officials to support civil authorities as needed in a cyber incident DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will issue or update guidance as appropriate that will clarify these roles and responsibilities House Report 114-102 included a provision that GAO assess DOD’s plans for providing support to civil authorities related to a domestic cyber incident 10 This report assesses whether 1 the National Guard has developed cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities in response to a cyber incident and DOD has visibility over those capabilities and 2 DOD has conducted and participated in exercises to support civil authorities in cyber incidents and any challenges it faced in doing so To assess the extent to which the National Guard has developed cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities in response to a cyber incident and DOD has visibility over those capabilities we reviewed DOD policies and guidance to identify the National Guard’s role in providing DSCA National Guard cyber capabilities and the mechanisms used to identify National Guard capabilities Specifically we reviewed Joint Publication 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities DOD Directive 3025 18 Defense Support of Civil Authorities DSCA DOD Instruction 3025 22 The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities and DOD Directive 7730 65 Department of Defense 9 DOD defines “DOD components” to include the Office of the Secretary of Defense the military departments the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff the combatant commands the DOD Office of Inspector General the defense agencies the DOD field activities and all other entities within DOD A supported combatant commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of an operation including capability requests identifying tasks for DOD components and developing a plan to achieve the common goal Supporting combatant commanders provide the requested assistance as available to assist the supported combatant commander to accomplish missions 10 See H R Rep No 114-102 at 289-290 2015 Page 3 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Readiness Reporting System DRRS 11 We compared the DOD guidance documents listed above and the information we received in our interviews to the requirement for identifying National Guard emergency response capabilities listed in the United States Code 12 Additionally we discussed National Guard unit cyber capabilities and capability identification mechanisms with officials from DOD involved in DSCA including from the National Guard Bureau the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard After pre-testing our interview questions with officials from the Maryland National Guard and meeting with the Colorado National Guard we interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of state National Guard cyber units from Georgia Nevada and Washington regarding their cyber civil-support roles and responsibilities cyber capabilities and capability identification mechanisms We judgmentally selected these states based on factors such as the type and number of cybersecurity teams in the state and the participation of teams in cyber civil-support exercises Our findings regarding the capabilities identified during our interviews with these National Guard units are not generalizable to all state National Guard cyber units and do not reflect an exhaustive list of National Guard cyber capabilities While some of the National Guard capabilities could be used to support their respective state missions our focus was on National Guard capabilities that could be used in DOD’s DSCA mission To assess the extent to which DOD has conducted and participated in exercises to support civil authorities in cyber incidents and any challenges it faced in doing so we reviewed the DOD Cyber Strategy the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities and DOD’s joint doctrine for DSCA We also reviewed these documents to determine the types of exercises in which DOD should be conducting or participating We then identified a non-generalizable sample of relevant exercises from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 by reviewing DOD 11 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities July 31 2013 Hereinafter cited as Joint Publication 3-28 DOD Directive 3025 18 Defense Support of Civil Authorities DSCA Dec 29 2010 incorporating change 1 Sept 21 2012 Hereinafter cited as DOD Directive 3025 18 DOD Instruction 3025 22 The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities July 26 2013 and DOD Directive 7730 65 Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System DRRS May 11 2015 Hereinafter cited as DOD Directive 7730 65 12 See 10 U S C § 113 note Page 4 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support exercise planning documentation and by interviewing knowledgeable officials from DOD and the Department of Homeland Security DHS We chose this timeframe because it allowed us to identify a range of exercises for review and to identify any trends over time We selected exercises where DOD trained for its role in supporting civil authorities during a domestic cyber incident To examine DOD planning for conducting future exercises related to civil support for cyber incidents we compared DOD planning documentation to DOD guidance for exercises such as the DOD Cyber Strategy and Joint Publication 3-28 We also interviewed officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense ODASD for Cyber Policy National Guard Bureau U S Northern Command and U S Cyber Command We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to September 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives See appendix I for a detailed description of the scope and methodology for this report Background Defense Support of Civil Authorities Under the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act Stafford Act when state capabilities and resources are overwhelmed and the President of the United States declares an emergency or disaster the governor of an affected state can request assistance from the federal government for major disasters or emergencies 13 Additionally under the Economy Act a federal agency 13 See Pub L No 100-707 1988 codified as amended at 42 U S C § 5121 et seq The Stafford Act aims to provide a means of assistance by the federal government to state and local governments in responding to a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency A governor’s request for the President to declare a major disaster or emergency is required to be based on a finding that the situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the affected local governments and that federal assistance is necessary 42 U S C § 5191 Page 5 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support may request the support of another federal agency including DOD without a presidential declaration of a major disaster or an emergency 14 The federal government’s response to major disasters and emergencies in the United States is guided by the National Response Framework a national-level guide on how local state and federal governments respond to major disasters and emergencies 15 The DHS interim National Cyber Incident Response Plan outlines domestic cyber-incident response coordination and execution among federal state and territorial and local governments and the private sector 16 Overall coordination of federal incident-management activities is generally the responsibility of DHS DOD supports the lead federal agency in the federal response to a major disaster or emergency When the appropriate DOD official approves a lead federal agency’s request to provide support to civil authorities for domestic disasters or emergencies DOD may provide capabilities and resources including those drawn from the National Guard Through DSCA DOD provides these capabilities and resources which the department defines as support provided by U S federal military forces DOD civilians DOD contract personnel DOD component assets and National Guard forces when the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the governors of the affected states elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32 status in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies law enforcement support and other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events National Guard The National Guard which is comprised of Army and Air National Guard units is located in the 50 states three U S territories and the District of Columbia 17 The National Guard has both federal and state-level missions making it unique among U S military organizations Its federal 14 See 31 U S C § 1535 a which permits one federal agency to request goods and services from another federal agency provided that among other things the service is available and cannot be obtained more cheaply or conveniently by contract 31 U S C § 1535 a 1 - 4 15 rd DHS National Response Framework 3 Edition June 2016 16 DHS National Cyber Incident Response Plan Interim Version Washington D C September 2010 DHS officials told us that while the plan is identified as an “Interim Version ” the officials have been told to treat this plan as if it were finalized 17 The three territories are Guam Puerto Rico and the U S Virgin Islands Page 6 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support mission which is executed under the control of the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense includes maintaining welltrained and well-equipped units that are ready to be mobilized and when mobilized to execute military missions in support of the full spectrum of DOD missions including but not limited to warfighting contingency operations defense security cooperation activities and DSCA during national emergencies major disasters insurrections and civil disturbances Its state-level mission which is executed under the control of state and territorial governors or by the President for the District of Columbia—is to protect life and property and preserve peace order and public safety This mission involves providing emergency relief support during local or statewide emergencies such as riots earthquakes floods or terrorist attacks National Guard unit personnel may operate in a Title 10 status a Title 32 status or a state active-duty status Personnel in a Title 10 status are federally funded and under the command and control of the President Personnel in a Title 32 status are federally funded but under the command and control of the governor National Guard personnel could support DOD’s DSCA mission while in a Title 10 or Title 32 status The Secretary of Defense in coordination with respective state governors determines the most appropriate duty status for National Guard personnel when providing federal support during disasters and emergencies including cyber support Separately National Guard personnel could also support the state’s civil authorities in a state active-duty status Personnel in a state active-duty status are under the command and control of the governor and are state funded Under state active duty status the National Guard can be used for state purposes in accordance with the state constitution and statutes and the respective state is responsible for National Guard expenses The National Guard Bureau is a joint organization of DOD that by law is the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the National Guard between a the Department of the Army and the Air Force and b the states 18 In addition according to DOD Directive 5105 77 National Guard Bureau NGB the bureau is the focal point at the strategic level for non-federalized National Guard matters that are not the responsibility 18 See 10 U S C § 10501 Page 7 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support in law or DOD policy of the Secretary of the Army the Secretary of the Air Force or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 19 The directive also states that the bureau supports force employment matters pertaining to homeland defense and DSCA missions by advising the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the activities of the National Guard as they relate to those missions Specifically according to the directive the bureau prescribes training requirements plans programs and administers the budget and implements guidance on the structure of the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States In its 2014 cyber mission analysis report DOD reported that the National Guard is well-positioned to offer its expertise and support to states in traditional missions like natural disasters as well as less traditional missions in cyberspace 20 Further the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in his 2017 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement reported that the National Guard is uniquely postured to provide cyber capabilities and that its cyber capacity will play an integral role in coordinating with state and federal cyber professionals 21 In May 2016 DOD issued a Deputy Secretary of Defense policy memorandum that provides guidance on a coordinating training advising and assisting cybersecurity support and services that DOD—including National Guard units—could provide to civil authorities incidental to military training and b a state’s use of DOD networks hardware and software for state cybersecurity activities 22 Exercises Exercises are training events that according to the 2008 National Response Framework can play an instrumental role in preparing organizations to respond to an incident by providing opportunities to test response plans evaluate response capabilities assess the clarity of established roles and responsibilities and improve proficiency in a 19 DOD Directive 5105 77 National Guard Bureau NGB Oct 30 2015 20 DOD Cyber Mission Analysis Mission Analysis for Cyber Operations of Department of Defense Aug 21 2014 21 National Guard Bureau 2017 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement 22 Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 16-002 Cyber Support and Services Provided Incidental to Military Training and National Guard Use of DOD Information Networks Software and Hardware for State Cyberspace Activities May 24 2016 Page 8 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support simulated risk-free environment 23 Short of performance in actual operations exercises provide the best means to assess the effectiveness of organizations in achieving mission preparedness Exercises provide an ideal opportunity to collect develop implement and disseminate lessons learned and to verify corrective action taken to resolve previously identified issues 24 Sharing positive experiences reinforces positive behaviors doctrine tactics techniques and procedures while disseminating negative experiences highlights potential challenges in unique situations or environments or identifies issues that need to be resolved 25 According to the 2008 National Response Framework welldesigned exercises improve interagency coordination and communications highlight capability gaps and identify opportunities for improvement There are various types of exercises ranging from tabletop exercises that involve key personnel discussing simulated scenarios in informal settings to full-scale response exercises that include many agencies jurisdictions and disciplines In addition to different types of exercises there are different complexities or focus areas for exercises such as tiers of exercises identified by numbers 1 through 4 For example DOD units are to conduct tier 4 training to focus on unit policy and joint and service doctrine linked to unit mission-essential tasks However for more complex training situations DOD is to conduct tier 1 exercises that are designed to prepare national-level organizations and combatant commanders and staffs at the strategic and operational level to integrate interagency non-governmental and multinational partners in highly complex environments Also the goal of tier 1 exercises is to integrate a diverse audience in a joint training environment and identify 23 DHS National Response Framework Washington D C January 2008 24 North American Aerospace Defense Command and U S Northern Command Commander’s Training Guidance CTG to the FY17-18 N-NC Joint Training Plans JTPs Dec 10 2015 25 North American Aerospace Defense Command and U S Northern Command Instruction 16-166 Lessons Learned Program and Corrective Action Program Sept 19 2013 Page 9 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support core competencies procedural disconnects and common ground to achieve U S unity of effort 26 The National Guard Has Developed Cyber Capabilities That Could Support Civil Authorities but DOD Does Not Have Full Visibility of National Guard Units’ Capabilities The National Guard Has Cyber Capabilities That Could Support Civil Authorities The National Guard in the 50 states three territories and the District of Columbia have capabilities that could be used—if requested and approved—to perform DOD or state missions to support civil authorities in a cyber incident National Guard cyber capabilities according to DOD officials vary among states territories and the District of Columbia based on their differences in funding and prioritization National Guard officials told us that National Guard units are in a unique position to recruit and retain individuals who have significant cyber expertise based on their fulltime positions outside of the military and can coordinate with state authorities and critical infrastructure owners within their respective states Based on our review of DOD reports National Guard guidance documents and our interviews with National Guard officials we found three types of cyber capabilities that exist within the National Guard 26 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500 01H Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States Apr 25 2014 Tier 2 training is joint training designed to assist the Joint Task Force Commander in preparing for the conduct of complex military operations at the operational level of conflict Tier 3 training is training for service component and other service headquarters that is designed to ensure the ability of systems units or forces to function within a joint interagency non-governmental and multinational environment Page 10 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support • Communications directorates The National Guard has a communications directorate 27 within each state territory and the District of Columbia that operates and maintains that state’s part of the National Guard information network called GuardNet 28 In this capacity the directorate conducts information assurance information operations and internal defensive activities The size of each National Guard unit’s communications directorate varies between state territory and federal district For example Nevada National Guard officials told us that there were 26 full-time Army National Guard personnel staffed to their communications directorate in fiscal year 2016 Also Maryland National Guard officials told us that there were 30 full-time personnel staffed to their Army National Guard communications directorate in fiscal year 2016 According to National Guard officials personnel who work within a communications directorate if requested and approved could support a DSCA mission in a cyber incident For example Washington National Guard officials told us that their communications directorate’s cyber personnel can conduct vulnerability assessments support cyber recovery efforts provide cyber incident response support and provide cyber and communication capabilities during cyber-related emergencies Further National Guard officials told us that the Georgia Washington and Maryland National Guard units have developed partnerships with state agencies and local governments to provide cybersecurity support • Computer network defense teams The National Guard has computer network defense teams 29 in each state three territories and the District of Columbia with a mission to protect National Guard information systems against cyber threats within the respective state territory or federal district 30 According to the 2015 Concept of Operations Army National 27 These directorates are also known as the Command Control Communications and Computers directorate J6 directorate or G6 directorate 28 GuardNet is a network of interconnected federal and state military networks across the United States its territories and the District of Columbia that bridges military and civilian sectors 29 According to the Army National Guard computer network defense team concept of operations computer network defense teams report to their respective states’ communications directorate unless otherwise directed The communications directorate also provides guidance and technical oversight of the computer network defense teams Army National Guard Concept of Operations Army National Guard Computer Network Defense Team CND-T May 30 2015 30 According to National Guard Bureau officials the name of computer network defense teams will change to defense cyber operation elements in 2017 Page 11 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Guard Computer Network Defense Team CND-T the teams could serve as first responders for states for cyber emergencies and may provide surge capacity to national capabilities For example Colorado National Guard officials told us that their computer network defense team—if requested—could provide cyber capabilities to support civil authorities In preparation for such a request the team developed a planning document that identified specific cyber capabilities—such as cyber analysis threat assessment and incident response—that the team could provide to civil authorities for a cyber-related emergency or incident Georgia National Guard officials also told us that their computer network defense team’s primary mission is to provide direct cybersecurity support to the network enterprise center and the team also conducts cybersecurity assessments incident response network analysis and forensic support 31 As of October 2015 50 states three territories and the District of Columbia had computer network defense teams that ranged from 1 to 23 personnel • National Guard cyber units The Army and Air Force are in the process of setting up National Guard units with cyber capabilities to support U S Cyber Command’s missions For example the Army and the Air Force are planning to establish National Guard cyber protection teams to conduct defensive cyberspace operations 32 National Guard officials stated that while the Army National Guard and Air National Guard are approaching the organization of the teams differently both sets of teams will have capabilities that could support civil authorities in a domestic cyber incident Specifically within the Army National Guard the Army has 1 full-time cyber protection team in place and is developing 10 parttime cyber protection teams that would conduct defensive cyberspace operations and could support DSCA missions if called upon Also within the Air National Guard the Air Force plans to develop 2 full-time cyber protection teams that will be filled by 12 Air National Guard units on a rotational basis that would support U S Cyber Command to defend DOD networks and would be available as surge capacity in a cyber incident According to the 2017 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement the National Guard will activate the cyber teams by the end of fiscal year 31 According to Georgia National Guard officials the network enterprise center is responsible for maintaining availability and delivering services on the Georgia National Guard’s portion of GuardNet 32 DOD cyber protection teams perform cybersecurity functions such as assessments of network vulnerabilities penetration testing and remediation of vulnerabilities Page 12 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support 2019 33 According to National Guard officials the cyber protection teams are authorized to have 39 personnel each and Georgia National Guard officials told us that in fiscal year 2016 their cyber protection team had 34 assigned personnel In addition to the cyber protection teams the Air National Guard has 3 additional cyber units whose mission—as members of U S Cyber Command’s national mission teams—is to stop cyber attacks and malicious cyber activity of significant consequence against the United States The Air National Guard also has 7 cyber intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance units whose mission is to produce tailored all-source intelligence products that enable cyberspace operations 34 In addition according to DOD’s cyber mission analysis report 35 the Virginia National Guard Data Processing Unit when activated conducts cyberspace operations in support of U S Cyber Command and other organizations 36 DOD Does Not Have Full Visibility of All National Guard Cyber Capabilities DOD has not identified and does not have full visibility into National Guard cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities during a cyber incident As noted in DOD’s 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities DOD is often expected to play a prominent supporting role in responding to a disaster and to rapidly and effectively harness resources to respond to civil-support requests in the homeland According to the strategy an effective response will require among other things better linking of established federal and state capabilities DOD does not have visibility into all National Guard units’ cyber capabilities because the department has not maintained a database that identifies National Guard cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities during a cyber incident Section 1406 of the John Warner 33 2017 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement 34 Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors assets and processing exploitation and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations Jan 5 2012 35 DOD Cyber Mission Analysis 36 According to Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Nov 8 2010 as amended through Feb 15 2016 cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace Page 13 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 requires that DOD identify National Guard emergency response capabilities Specifically the section requires that the Secretary of Defense maintain a database of emergency response capabilities that includes the following 1 the types of emergency response capabilities that each state’s National Guard as reported by the states may be able to provide in response to a domestic natural or manmade disaster both to their home states and under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements and 2 the types of emergency response capabilities that DOD may be able to provide in support of the National Response Plan’s emergency support functions and identification of the units that provide these capabilities 37 Initially during our review National Guard Bureau officials identified two systems that the bureau traditionally uses to identify some National Guard capabilities—the Defense Readiness Reporting System 38 and the Joint Information Exchange Environment 39 However National Guard officials acknowledged that neither of these systems fully or quickly identified National Guard cyber capabilities that could be used to support civil authorities in a cyber incident For example according to National Guard Bureau officials the Defense Readiness Reporting System was designed to identify the capabilities associated with National Guard units’ federal missions however since some National Guard capabilities such as computer network defense teams were established to support state and 37 Pub L No 109-364 §1406 1 2006 and codified at 10 U S C § 113 note The National Response Framework identifies 14 emergency support functions that serve as the federal government’s primary coordinating structure for building sustaining and delivering response capabilities DHS is responsible for overseeing the preparedness activities of the communications emergency support functions among others which include cybersecurity 38 According to DOD Directive 7730 65 the Defense Readiness Reporting System is a capabilities-based and near-real-time readiness reporting system and provides the means to manage and report the readiness of DOD and its components DOD has used its readiness assessment system to assess the ability of units and joint forces to fight and meet the demands of the national security strategy and captures organizational capabilities to perform a wider variety of missions and mission-essential tasks 39 The Joint Information Exchange Environment is the National Guard’s system of record for facilitating information sharing and collaboration for the National Guard National Guard Bureau officials told us they use the Joint Information Exchange Environment to track National Guard missions share critical event and mission information within the National Guard coordinate requests for assistance and identify specific National Guard capabilities to support a request for assistance Page 14 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support local governments and do not have a federal mission the Defense Readiness Reporting System will not report or identify these capabilities Additionally National Guard Bureau officials told us that they have used the Joint Information Exchange Environment system to query National Guard units for specific capabilities however the officials acknowledged that the query approach takes time that might not be available during a cyber incident National Guard Bureau officials also told us that these systems were not designed to identify National Guard unit cyber capabilities and that neither of the systems were established or designed for the purposes described in section 1406 DOD officials including National Guard Bureau officials and two state National Guard units we interviewed acknowledged that DOD has not maintained a database that would allow the department to fully and quickly identify existing cyber capabilities of all National Guard cyber units Without such a database DOD may not have timely access to these capabilities when requested by civil authorities during a cyber incident DOD Has Conducted and Participated in Exercises to Support Civil Authorities in a Cyber Incident but Has Not Addressed Challenges with the Exercises DOD Has Conducted and Participated in Exercises to Prepare to Support Civil Authorities During or After a Cyber Incident From fiscal years 2013 through 2015 DOD conducted or participated in 9 exercises that were designed to explore the application of policies for supporting civil authorities or to test the response to simulated attacks on cyber infrastructure owned by civil authorities Of these 9 exercises DOD conducted 7 exercises and participated in 2 non-DOD hosted exercises Table 1 shows the 7 exercises that DOD components conducted during the time period of our review—fiscal years 2013 through 2015 Page 15 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Table 1 Department of Defense DOD Exercises Designed to Support Civil Authorities During or After a Cyber Incident Exercise title Cyber Guard 13-1 Exercise host U S Cyber Command Fiscal year Cyber civil-support objective 2013 Conduct defensive cyber operations and provide analysis assistance to private sector companies and municipalities during simulated cyber incidents Cyber Guard 14-1 U S Cyber Command 2014 Evaluate response of National Guard in a state active duty status DOD Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation to a cyber incident against U S critical infrastructure Cyber Guard 15 U S Cyber Command 2015 Test DOD participation in a response to a cyberattack of significant consequence against U S critical infrastructure 2015 Train and evaluate U S Army National Guard computer network defense teams on the detection analysis identification reporting and mitigation of cyber threats in a scenario supporting an electric utility Cyber Shield 2015 Army National Guard Vista Host II North American Aerospace Defense Command and U S Northern Command 2015 Examine planning assumptions potential resource requirements and roles and responsibilities associated with cyber-related defense support to civil authorities operations Vista Code I North American Aerospace Defense Command and U S Northern Command 2015 Examine roles and responsibilities for cyber-related defense support to civil authorities Cyber Yankee 2015 New England-area U S Army National Guard units 2015 U S Army National Guard computer network defense teams and other National Guard cyber units train in cyber defense and share threat information with civil authorities in a regional cyber incident Source GAO analysis of DOD documentation GAO-16-574 The exercises explored how the department would provide assistance to civil authorities during or after a cyber incident For example • U S Cyber Command’s Cyber Guard—The command conducted exercises in fiscal years 2013 2014 and 2015 to explore the ability of DOD other federal agencies and the private sector to respond in cyberspace to a destructive or disruptive attack of significant consequence on U S critical infrastructure In the 2015 Cyber Guard exercise DOD participants supported DHS network defense as part of a simulated DSCA response National Guard teams also conducted activities to coordinate train advise and assist civil authorities in a state active duty status The exercises also included legal and policy tabletop review sessions to explore legal and policy issues related to a national response to significant domestic cyberspace incidents • Army National Guard’s Cyber Shield—The Army National Guard conducted Cyber Shield exercises in fiscal years 2013 2014 and 2015 to train computer network defense teams on the detection analysis Page 16 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support identification reporting and mitigation of cyber threats The Army National Guard focused the fiscal year 2013 and 2014 exercises on defense of the GuardNet and in the fiscal year 2015 exercise changed the focus to support for civil authorities Specifically the Cyber Shield 2015 exercise included a scenario where industrial-control systems for electric grid infrastructure and hydroelectric dams were under cyber threat According to Army National Guard officials this change to focus on civil support was in response to requests from states for an exercise that would involve National Guard support for information technology infrastructure in the states • Vista Host II—In this May 2015 tabletop exercise North American Aerospace Defense Command and U S Northern Command focused on examining planning assumptions potential resource requirements and the roles and responsibilities for cyber-related defense support of civil authorities Specifically the exercise scenario involved civil support to an electric power generator in responding to a disaster caused by a cyber attack on the generator’s industrial-control systems that controlled hydroelectric and nuclear power generation systems According to U S Northern Command officials the exercise showed that there was a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities for supporting civil authorities during a cyber incident In addition to conducting the 7 exercises from fiscal year 2013 through 2015 DOD components participated in 2 exercises conducted by nonDOD organizations • DHS’s Cyber Storm IV—The department’s Cyber Storm IV exercises which consisted of a series of 15 exercises focused on cybersecurity preparedness and response capabilities ran from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2014 The exercise series was designed to among other things improve the processes procedures interactions and information-sharing mechanisms that exist or should exist under the interim National Cyber Incident Response Plan According to DHS officials involved in planning the exercise series DOD officials assisted in designing the exercise scenarios and DOD officials also participated in multiple exercises that included a tabletop exercise component designed to examine policy issues U S Cyber Command officials also noted that Cyber Storm IV helped participants better understand federal cyber capabilities Page 17 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support • DOD Has Experienced Challenges in Its CivilSupport Exercises and Has Not Conducted a Tier 1 Exercise That Could Address Challenges North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s GridEx II—The not-forprofit international organization conducted the GridEx II exercise in fiscal year 2014 on responding to cyber attacks on electric grid components 40 The exercise included both executive decision making in a tabletop exercise and a response to simulated cyber attacks on electric grid networks According to a North American Electric Reliability Corporation official DOD components such as U S Northern Command U S Cyber Command and two state National Guard units participated in GridEx II We identified three types of challenges with DOD’s exercises that could limit the extent to which DOD is prepared to support civil authorities in a cyber incident DOD has not addressed the challenges The DOD Cyber Strategy states that DOD will exercise its DSCA capabilities in support of DHS and other agencies and with state and local authorities to help defend the federal government and the private sector if directed in an emergency Similarly the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities states that DOD will deepen and facilitate rigorous federal regional and state-level planning training and exercises through coordination and liaison arrangements that support civil authorities at all levels Although DOD has developed the two guidance documents we found challenges that could limit the effectiveness of DOD’s exercises Specifically • Limited access because of classified exercise environments According to documents we reviewed and officials we interviewed DOD’s tendency to exercise in a classified environment limited the ability of other federal agencies and critical infrastructure owners to participate in DSCA exercises In one example Washington National Guard officials told us that utility personnel who had flown across the country to participate in a civil support exercise that the National Guard unit had invited them to participate in were not admitted into the classified exercise environment According to DHS’s Cyber Guard 15 after-action report DOD’s requirement for the exercise environment to be closed and classified prohibited a more active participation by industry partners and 40 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation is a not-for-profit international electric reliability organization whose mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system in North America including the continental United States Canada and the northern portion of Baja California Mexico In the United States the corporation is subject to oversight by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Page 18 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support DHS components including the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center According to the DHS Cyber Guard 15 exercise after-action report the exercise has experienced this challenge since 2013 Similarly according to U S Cyber Command’s after-action report for its February 2016 Cyber Guard 16 tabletop exercise the exercise experienced issues because officials of state and local governments and the private sector did not have security clearances which hindered information sharing • Limited inclusion of other federal agencies and critical infrastructure owners Some of the exercises DOD conducted included key federal agencies such as DHS and critical infrastructure owners such as power providers However the exercises DOD conducted did not include other key federal agencies e g State and Treasury departments or other critical infrastructure owners e g bank owners According to an official from ODASD for Cyber Policy DOD recognizes that such organizations potentially would be involved in a cyber incident Similarly according to the DOD Cyber Strategy the private sector owns and operates over 90 percent of all of the networks and infrastructure of cyberspace and is thus the first line of defense In Vista Host II DOD officials reportedly learned that the critical infrastructure owner would contact its security vendors first because of their familiarity with the critical infrastructure’s industrial-control systems however none of the DOD exercises we reviewed included such vendors • Inadequate incorporation of joint physical-cyber scenarios The 7 DOD-conducted exercises we reviewed did not fully explore a scenario in which multiple DOD components and commanders would be responding to a cyber incident that causes an emergency or disaster with physical effects or occurs during such an emergency The Joint Action Plan for State-Federal Unity of Effort on Cybersecurity which was approved by DOD recognizes the possibility of a cyber incident with physical effects as well as a physical incident with cyber implications 41 DOD recognizes that a cyber incident could cause physical effects including cascading failures of multiple interdependent critical life-sustaining infrastructure 41 Council of Governors Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense Joint Action Plan for State-Federal Unity of Effort on Cybersecurity Washington D C July 2014 Page 19 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support sectors Similarly Washington National Guard officials told us that bad actors may take advantage of a disaster or emergency to conduct cyber attacks on information and communications systems in that geographic area In its planning DOD has recognized that this is an area that needs to be addressed Specifically a planning document that the ODASD for Cyber Policy the National Guard Bureau U S Northern Command and U S Cyber Command developed to implement the DOD Cyber Strategy states that the department should conduct an exercise that will incorporate cybersecurity as part of broader exercise scenarios 42 DOD officials acknowledged that DOD exercises to date such as the Cyber Guard exercises have not been ideal for a nationwide exercise that addresses multiple complexities of cyber incidents and physical consequences In addition to these challenges we also observed that DOD has not addressed its goals by conducting a tier 1 exercise involving various partners in highly complex environments Specifically while DOD conducted 7 exercises that evaluated in some part civil support for a cyber incident these exercises varied from tabletop exercises to other exercises that do not meet Joint Staff’s’ tier 1 exercise criteria 43 DOD’s Cyber Strategy exercise planning document states that DOD needs to conduct a tier 1 exercise to achieve the DOD Cyber Strategy goal of exercising its DSCA capabilities in support of DHS and other agencies including state and local authorities to help defend the federal government and the private sector if directed in an emergency Similarly U S Northern Command and ODASD for Cyber Policy officials told us that the department needs to conduct a tier 1 exercise to explore a disaster with physical and cyber effects DOD’s Cyber Strategy planning document states and officials agree that the department needs to conduct such an exercise to prepare its forces to support civil authorities during or after a cyber incident However DOD has not conducted a tier 1 exercise that would prepare DOD forces and enable the department to achieve one of the goals in the DOD Cyber Strategy because the department has not identified an exercise to do so According to U S Northern Command 42 ODASD for Cyber Policy U S Northern Command U S Cyber Command and the National Guard Bureau 6-6 DTN Exercise Defense Support of Civil Authorities 2015 43 DOD is to conduct tier 1 exercises that are designed to prepare national-level organizations and combatant commanders and staffs at the strategic and operational level to integrate interagency non-governmental and multinational partners in highly complex environments Page 20 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support officials the command wanted to incorporate a cyber civil-support scenario in its 2016 Ardent Sentry exercise which is a tier 1 exercise 44 However the command cancelled its plans after U S Cyber Command— a DOD component that would potentially provide critical capabilities in supporting civil authorities—stated that the command had to focus its exercise resources on the Cyber Guard exercise to certify DOD’s cyber protection teams Until DOD identifies and conducts a tier 1 exercise DOD will miss an opportunity to fully test response plans evaluate response capabilities assess the clarity of established roles and responsibilities and improve proficiency in supporting DHS other federal agencies and state and local authorities if directed in an emergency In addition identifying and conducting a tier 1 exercise would provide DOD an opportunity to address the challenges the department has experienced in previous exercises For example the tier 1 exercise could be conducted in part on an open network include additional federal agencies and other critical infrastructure owners that would be involved in a response and incorporate scenarios where both cyber threats and physical effects were involved Conclusions DOD has a key role to prepare to defend the homeland and support civil authorities in all domains—including cyberspace—and plays a crucial role in supporting a national effort to confront cyber threats to critical infrastructure The National Guard has cyber capabilities that could be used—if requested and approved—to support civil authorities in a cyber incident During an emergency it is necessary for decision makers to have visibility into the full capabilities that National Guard units possess to support civil authorities Unless DOD develops or specifies a database to provide full and quick identification of all National Guard units’ cyber capabilities DOD may not have timely visibility and access for needed capabilities when requested by civil authorities during a cyber incident Similarly DOD has conducted and participated in exercises to prepare the department to support civil authorities in a cyber incident Unless DOD conducts a tier 1 exercise that involves various partners in highly complex environments DOD risks having unprepared forces to call upon to support civil authorities during or after a disaster with physical and 44 Ardent Sentry is a DSCA exercise based on the interaction of federal state local and tribal governments private and non-profit organizations and their response to natural and man-made disasters Page 21 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support cyber effects and will miss a key opportunity to address the challenges we have identified with its previous exercises Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure that decision makers have immediate visibility into all capabilities of the National Guard that could support civil authorities in a cyber incident we recommend that the Secretary of Defense maintain a database that can fully and quickly identify the cyber capabilities that the National Guard in the 50 states three territories and the District of Columbia have and could be used—if requested and approved—to support civil authorities in a cyber incident To better prepare DOD to support civil authorities in a cyber incident we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy the Chief of the National Guard Bureau the Commander of U S Northern Command and the Commander of U S Cyber Command to conduct a tier 1 exercise that will improve DOD’s planning efforts to support civil authorities in a cyber incident Such an exercise should also address challenges from prior exercises such as limited participant access to exercise environment inclusion of other federal agencies and private-sector cybersecurity vendors and incorporation of emergency or disaster scenarios concurrent to cyber incidents Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to DOD and DHS for their review and comment In its written comments DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations DOD’s comments are summarized below and are reprinted in entirety in appendix II DOD also provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report as appropriate DHS provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense maintain a database that can fully and quickly identify the cyber capabilities that the National Guard in the 50 states three territories and the District of Columbia have and could be used—if requested and approved—to support civil authorities in a cyber incident In its response DOD stated that it already tracks capability and readiness across the entire force Specifically DOD stated that National Guard units assigned to and performing Title 10 U S Code missions report readiness through the Defense Readiness Reporting System and that units assigned to perform Title 32 U S Code missions report to their state’s adjutant general However as we reported—and DOD’s comments reflect—the Defense Readiness Reporting System does not identify National Guard Page 22 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support capabilities that could provide cyber support in a cyber incident While this system could track some National Guard capabilities such as cyber protection teams assigned to U S Cyber Command this system alone will not provide DOD leaders complete information about capabilities they could employ to assist civil authorities For example while National Guard computer network defense teams could serve as first responders for states for cyber emergencies and may provide surge capacity to national capabilities the readiness system will not include these teams In its comments DOD also made reference to an annual report that state adjutants general are to provide to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau regarding the readiness of their respective state National Guards During our engagement we reviewed the National Guard Bureau’s submission to the July-September 2015 Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress which the bureau uses to meet its requirement to provide DOD leaders a status on the readiness of the National Guard to conduct DSCA activities We found that the report identifies the readiness of state National Guard units to conduct certain DSCA missions—such as hurricane response However the National Guard has not incorporated other DSCA missions—including cyber civil support—in the Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress Consequently as prepared now this report does not help DOD leaders identify assets that could be used in a cyber crisis scenario However if the National Guard Bureau modifies the report to include the readiness level of National Guard units to provide civil support in a cyber incident DOD leaders will potentially have more visibility into cyber capabilities that exist within the National Guard across each state Because the Defense Readiness Reporting System and the National Guard report do not currently enable DOD leaders to identify National Guard cyber capabilities that could facilitate a quick response in a cyber incident we continue to believe that DOD should maintain a database—as required by law—that can fully and quickly identify the cyber capabilities that the National Guard possesses In response to DOD’s comments we clarified the recommendation that was initially in the report Specifically we modified the recommendation from stating that the database should include cyber capabilities that “all National Guard units possess” to cyber capabilities that “the National Guard in the 50 states three territories and the District of Columbia have and could be used ” This modification is consistent with the requirement identified in Section 1406 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 which states that the database should include emergency response capabilities that each state’s National Guard may be able to provide in response to a natural or Page 23 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support manmade domestic disaster We discussed this modification with DOD officials and they agreed that the modified recommendation provided them the necessary flexibility to address the report’s finding and recommendation DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy the Chief of the National Guard Bureau the Commander of U S Northern Command and the Commander of U S Cyber Command to conduct a tier 1 exercise that will improve DOD’s planning efforts to support civil authorities in a cyber incident DOD concurred in the need to exercise a whole range of challenges associated with responding to a cyber incident but stated that it believes that the Cyber Guard exercise meets the intent of the recommendation DOD stated that Cyber Guard is designed to address a whole-of-government whole-of-nation response to a significant cyber attack and included participants from across DOD the National Guard DHS the Federal Bureau of Investigation the intelligence community and the private sector Based on our review of after-action reports and discussions with DOD officials we believe that the Cyber Guard exercise provides DOD components with an opportunity to evaluate aspects of the department’s DSCA mission—such as Cyber Guard 15’s test of DOD participation in a response to a cyber attack of significant consequence against U S critical infrastructure However these after-action reports and DOD officials at various levels also identified a number of issues that keep Cyber Guard in its current form from being a tier 1 exercise that would enable the department to achieve its DOD Cyber Strategy goal of exercising its DSCA capabilities in support of DHS and other agencies including state and local authorities Specifically officials from the ODASD for Cyber Policy U S Northern Command U S Cyber Command and National Guard units told us that Cyber Guard in its current form does not meet the intentions of a tier 1 exercise For example according to DOD officials one of the primary purposes of Cyber Guard is to use the exercise as a forum to certify cyber protection teams as being operationally ready Consequently according to DOD officials this does not provide DOD flexibility to address training requirements that are not part of the certification requirements DOD has also conducted the exercise in a classified forum which consistently limits public and private sector participation DOD stated that it strives for greater inclusion of public and private entities in its exercises to increase realism and enhance its understanding of domestic response requirements however the exercises are typically classified because they can reveal capabilities readiness or plans for military forces that must be protected Page 24 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support DOD’s approach does not recognize that while some DOD components may support civil authorities using classified means other DOD components—including the National Guard—may be coordinating training advising or assisting civil authorities on unclassified networks Other cyber civil support exercises such as the Army National Guard’s Cyber Shield exercise and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s GridEx exercise demonstrate that training in unclassified forums is both possible and beneficial If DOD modifies Cyber Guard to address the challenges we have highlighted—such as limited participant access to exercise environment inclusion of other federal agencies and private-sector cybersecurity vendors and incorporation of emergency or disaster scenarios concurrent to cyber incidents—it could improve DOD’s planning efforts to support civil authorities in a cyber incident Otherwise we still believe that DOD should conduct a tier 1 exercise such as a modified Ardent Sentry that includes a DOD response to civil authorities for a cyber incident We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security In addition the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http www gao gov If you or your staff have any questions about this report please contact me at 202 512-9971 or KirschbaumJ@gao gov Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III Joseph W Kirschbaum Director Defense Capabilities and Management Page 25 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support List of Committees The Honorable John McCain Chairman The Honorable Jack Reed Ranking Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate The Honorable Mac Thornberry Chairman The Honorable Adam Smith Ranking Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Page 26 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Appendix I Scope and Methodology Appendix I Scope and Methodology To examine the extent to which the National Guard has developed cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities in response to a cyber incident and the Department of Defense DOD has visibility over those capabilities we reviewed DOD policies and guidance to identify the National Guard’s role in providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities National Guard cyber capabilities and the mechanisms used to identify National Guard capabilities Specifically we reviewed Joint Publication 328 Defense Support of Civil Authorities 1 DOD Directive 3025 18 Defense Support of Civil Authorities DSCA 2 DOD Instruction 3025 22 The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities 3 and DOD Directive 7730 65 Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System DRRS 4 To identify National Guard cyber capabilities we reviewed DOD’s 5 and the National Guard’s 6 cyber mission analysis reports 7 Additionally we discussed National Guard unit cyber capabilities and capability identification mechanisms with officials from DOD involved in DSCA from the National Guard Bureau the Army National Guard the Air National Guard and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense ODASD for Cyber Policy We also spoke with Timothy Lowenberg a recognized expert on the National Guard’s role in cyber incidents who is a retired U S Air Force Major General he also has served as an advisor to the Council of Governors and the National Governors Association We compared the DOD guidance documents 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities July 31 2013 2 DOD Directive 3025 18 Defense Support of Civil Authorities DSCA Dec 29 2010 incorporating change 1 Sept 21 2012 3 DOD Instruction 3025 22 The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities July 26 2013 4 DOD Directive 7730 65 Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System DRRS May 11 2015 5 DOD Cyber Mission Analysis Mission Analysis for Cyber Operations of Department of Defense Washington D C Aug 21 2014 6 Chief National Guard Bureau National Guard Bureau Cyber Mission Analysis Assessment Sept 29 2014 7 A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated DOD to report on the department’s efforts to conduct cyberspace operations and for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to issue an assessment of the DOD report Pub L No 113-66 § 933 2013 Page 27 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Appendix I Scope and Methodology listed above and the information we received in our interviews to the requirement for identifying National Guard emergency response capabilities listed in the United States Code 8 Based on these discussions and relevant DOD documentation we categorized National Guard units with cyber capabilities After pre-testing our interview questions with officials from the Maryland National Guard and meeting with the Colorado National Guard we conducted structured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of officials from state National Guard cyber units from Georgia Nevada and Washington to discuss their cyber civilsupport roles and responsibilities cyber capabilities and capability tracking mechanisms We judgmentally selected these states based on the type and number of cybersecurity teams in the state participation of teams in cyber civil-support exercises and the relative level of information sector employment in the state based on 2014 Bureau of Labor Statistics sector-level data 9 We found the Bureau of Labor Statistics informationsector activity data sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this selection Our findings regarding the capabilities identified during our three sets of interviews with these National Guard units are not generalizable to all state National Guard cyber units and do not reflect an exhaustive list of National Guard cyber capabilities While some of the National Guard capabilities could be used to support their respective state missions our focus was on National Guard capabilities that could be used in DOD’s DSCA mission To assess the extent to which DOD has conducted and participated in exercises to support civil authorities in cyber incidents and any challenges it faced in doing so we reviewed the DOD Cyber Strategy Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities and Joint Publication 3-28 for DSCA We also reviewed these documents to determine the types of exercises in which DOD should be conducting or 8 See 10 U S C § 113 note 9 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the total size of the information sector in each state and the District of Columbia According to the North American Industry Classification System the information sector comprises establishments engaged in producing and distributing information and cultural products providing the means to transmit or distribute these products as well as data or communications and processing data Page 28 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Appendix I Scope and Methodology participating 10 We identified a non-generalizable sample of relevant exercises by reviewing exercise planning documentation and through interviews with knowledgeable officials Specifically we reviewed an exercise planning document that DOD developed in response to the DOD Cyber Strategy 11 and interviewed DOD and DHS officials to identify exercises that DOD components conducted or participated in from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 We chose this timeframe because it allowed us to identify a range of exercises for review and to identify any trends over time We selected exercises—to include tabletop or simulated network defense exercises—that addressed computer network defense and involved support to civil authorities We excluded exercises that focused solely on defense of DOD networks We confirmed these exercises met our selection criteria through reviewing exercise after-action reports To examine DOD planning for conducting future exercises related to civil support for cyber incidents we reviewed the DOD Cyber Strategy exercise planning document We also reviewed DOD guidance for such exercises such as the DOD Cyber Strategy Joint Publication 3-28 DOD Directive 3025 18 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500 01H Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States 12 We compared DOD plans for exercises for supporting civil authorities in cyber incidents to these documents We observed the Cyber Guard 2016 Legal Policy Tabletop Exercise held in February 2016 in Laurel Maryland To learn about DOD challenges in conducting exercises and planning for exercises of civil support in cyber incidents over the next few years we interviewed officials from ODASD for Cyber Policy National Guard Bureau U S Northern Command and U S Cyber Command We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to September 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards 10 DOD The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy April 2015 DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities February 2013 and Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities July 31 2013 11 ODASD for Cyber Policy U S Northern Command U S Cyber Command and the National Guard Bureau 6-6 Defend the Nation Exercise Defense Support of Civil Authorities 2015 12 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500 01H Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States April 25 2014 Page 29 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Appendix I Scope and Methodology Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives Page 30 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense Page 31 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support 003 33% 33 5 9 3133 0 032 3 3 Edge 2 11 Earn u 35 $2235 nw n z 5 55 2 3 SEE Kai 2 Elwin E HE - ESE 5 w 3 Eur - 2 F 5 HES 3 1 F 23 15its min 13 35 Saran35 an 0 90- ma 032 3 Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 1 To better prepare II-ell tn snppurl eivil authorities in a eyher ineidenl Gilli that the ieermarv n r'Del'ense eliteei Ihe Deputy Eeereiar fur h-er I nliejI- ilie direelur ml the Hillinnal finaer lhIr-eall the vullniial'lder 5'2 Hurlheni L ennmanel and the enmnianlier el' L jeher In ennduet 1 tier 1 esereise imlmave planning circuits In sup le eivil authm-ilies in a her ineidenl Rue-h an exercise should aim address Pram prier exercises such as limited participant access In- e'wreise em imnalent inelusimi ar'nlher r'nnlerul age-mics and an van seem-r ef-h-erseeurhjv velldurse and irreurpuratian ut emergeney er dissenter- seenarius mnenrrent 1e evil-er illeidenls Dull The Deparlnienl ul' IJel'ense partiallv cuneer in shall repent l -f-T-l reemnmendalinn tam EM enneurs in 1he need 11 exereise the range nl'ehallenges assaveia1ed nilh Imp-ending In a e her ineiilern Dal helievezs that ha uinnal I'll eatereiace meets the intent ul'ihe reminmenthinn Eli-Hill is dealer-ed 1e address a nltnIe-n-F-gm'emmem resi'mnse ten 3 sie itieani e3 herattaele 'l'he esereise inelndes ruinieipanls i'rum ill-'l'ui'vti lJulJ lhe tin-ard- tl1e ul' llinnelauld Seenritv the Federal Bureau e-I' invemigatimi Fill the inlelligenee and the private seetur EITHER till'tlilJ 115 - hie as eendneled in June 20112 was amp-inmqu hv and the Hi and had National inard partieipanls from males rern'esenlatlves I reurn erilienl nre seetar's ilie Federal Aviatiun Idirrinixiralim tuners and uthem Del evnitinues re ne 1he exereise Formal i'er l'Iaseel an lessens learned during prev iath exereises and has marked In inereave 1Jie eennple eitg ni'seenarim hmaden panieipatinn hath nilhin and autslde the -'ederal tievermnent- utd linel ways to Integrate private seeter e en1e-t1t- intn a elassi erl envimnment Juli alsn- enrieurs in the need I'er an esereise that lesls h-nth the her and phasieal respenaes and is melting tu- e hereleme l'lls inle- Del eaereises as luv-never believes the greatest value n'ettld be in a truly n'lmle-nllnatinn esereise that shettld he urgiulired ilJILl led and agencies 1 will ille rearIn-I'Isi'llilitfi I'nr elHIr'Ilinatingn domestic emergency respense Finally Jul understands the need For and slrites far greater ineheaien ul puhlie urtl Irivale entities in its e'eereises ta increase realism and enhanee Delis respunzm requirements Heal exereises are twieally rlassilied heeause they ean reveal readiness- er plans liar militan' l'nrees 1ha1 mus-1 he pnneeted l'ndmtanding hen am under lint 17ml sari eniplnv ilk ill a Lliniteslin reap-mew scenarin is liar Dal readiness and must he haJaneed nilh the need in inelude inrtside enlilies chillies 5e seen in year's Tilil'ili ii-JR il-TI Hill-e ls lilita licifultr in it slammed l'urtnn Page 33 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Joseph W Kirschbaum 202 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao gov Staff Acknowledgments In addition to the contact above key contributors to this report included Tommy Baril Assistant Director Tracy Barnes David Beardwood Kevin Copping Patricia Farrell Donahue Jamilah Moon and Richard Powelson Page 34 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support Related GAO Products Related GAO Products Civil Support DOD Needs to Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities for Defense Support of Civil Authorities during Cyber Incidents GAO-16-332 Washington D C April 4 2016 Civil Support DOD is Taking Action to Strengthen Support of Civil Authorities GAO-15-686T Washington D C June 10 2015 Cybersecurity Actions Needed to Address Challenges Facing Federal Systems GAO-15-573T Washington D C April 22 2015 Information Security Agencies Need to Improve Cyber Incident Response Practices GAO-14-354 Washington D C April 30 2014 Information Security Federal Agencies Need to Enhance Responses to Data Breaches GAO-14-487T Washington D C April 2 2014 Civil Support Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Planning for a Complex Catastrophe GAO-13-763 Washington D C September 30 2013 Homeland Defense DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense and Civil Support Guidance GAO-13-128 Washington D C October 24 2012 Defense Cyber Efforts Management Improvements Needed to Enhance Programs Protecting the Defense Industrial Base from Cyber Threats GAO-12-762SU Washington D C August 3 2012 Information Security Cyber Threats Facilitate Ability to Commit Economic Espionage GAO-12-876T Washington D C June 28 2012 Cybersecurity Threats Impacting the Nation GAO-12-666T Washington D C April 24 2012 100479 Page 35 GAO-16-574 Defense Civil Support GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office the audit evaluation and investigative arm of Congress exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people GAO examines the use of public funds evaluates federal programs and policies and provides analyses recommendations and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight policy and funding decisions GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability integrity and reliability Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony The fastest and 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