ES January 25 1986 Copy of 20 PI CHL 20 Responding to Gorbachev's January Proposals S NOTE This is the final record copy Of the OWL 20 paper Changes from tie version reviewed by the SACG on January 23 are indicated by sidebars Based upon that discussion the thrust of this paper was captured in a much shorter options paper CWL 21 In the process the Options discussed in this basic paper have evolved to some degree as indicated below OWL 20 Options SACG OptiOns OWL 21 Options Franemrk Option Framework Option A T Option 1 Framrk Option Option 2 Framework Option 8% Franework Option 3 Framework Option Option 3 Framework Option deleted se This paper has been generated by the Arms Control Support Group for consideration by the Senior Arms Control Group in their deliberations on a correct U S response to the January 14 Soviet initiative involving inter alia a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 I Summary of the Nuclear ASpects of the Soviet Proposal U General Secretary Gorbachev proposed a three stage approach leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2000 U First Stage Lasting 5-8 years U Reduction by 50 percent in systems capable of reaching the territory of the other side resulting in no more than 6000 nuclear charges the current Soviet START position U A ban on developtent testing and deployment of space strike arms U Inplementation of a decision on the complete liquidation of US and Soviet Mk3 neditmr-range missiles in European zone No transfer of US strategic and medium range missiles to other countries and no build up of corresponding ff j British and French nuclear arms C Egg Cessation of all US and Soviet nuclear explosions and a call on other states 33 to join this moratorium U he Second Stag Begins by 1990 years U 13 UK France and PRC start to join reductions Soviets suggest they could 5 3 35 freeze their nuclear forces and cmnit not to deploy their nuclear arms on WE the territories of other countries C 1 Option is described at Annex- A'of this paper U 2 The final points associated with Option 2 are provided at Annex of this paper U 3 The changes to the current US position recommended under Option 13 and subsequently Option 3 are described at Axmex of thi Declassify on OADR Wamsmm WL 2 Copy of 20 Continuation of US and Soviet first stage reductions and carry out further measures to liquidate medium range nuclear weapons and freeze tactical systems C Once US Soviets reach 50% reductions in strategic systems elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons up to 1000 range by all nuclear powers C Multilateral extension of the US Soviet ban on space strike arms now including all leading industrial states U Cessation of nuclear testing by all nuclear powers U Ban on the creation of non nuclear arne based on new physical principles which approximate nuclear capabilities in terms of casualty producing capacity C Third Stage Begins by 1995 U Elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons by 1999 U Additional Provisions C Special procedures for destruction of nuclear weapons and for the dismantlement conversion or destruction of their delivery vehicles U Agreenent on the quantity of weapons to be destroyed at each stage place of destruction etc C A three month unilateral extension on their nuclear testing moratorium U verification procedures to include other measures beyond N M including on-site inspection U II Intelligence Assessment U Gorbachev's statement was intended to regain the initiative in arms control that had been captured by the US NST initiative of November 1985 and to undercut the US effort to broaden the agenda for the EastrWest security dialogue beyond arms control negotiations His crummehensive repackaging of earlier Soviet positions together with a few new elements borrows previous highulevel US discussions of possible phased approaches to offensive force reductions and is presumably intended in part to counter the US concept of a transition from an offense dominant world to one relying more heavily on defenses Gorbachev has skillfully mixed hints of flexibility on key issues with prepositions known to be unacceptable to the US counting of FBS in strategic weapon aggregates and deliberate ambiguities of explicit reference to a ban on research on space strike weapons although the Soviet NST delegation subsequently stated that the research ban still holds in an effort to complicate US decision making and to create a variety of political pressures on the President He has also by packaging these elements in a political concept created a variety of potential linkages that could be exploited by the Soviets in an attempt to dictate the pace of progress at several ongoing negotiations 3 EB if L 3 Copy of 20 Gorbachev has thus continued a general strategy toughness and conciliation that was in evidence prior to the Geneva summit His objectives then and now evidently have been to sow confusion and dissension within the US between the US and its major allies and among governments opposition parties and electorates in key countries to prod the US into revealing any areas of negotiating flexibility and to convey an image of willingness to negotiate in contrast-to the Soviet propaganda image of the US Administration as being opposed to progress The timing of Gorbachev's initiative took advantage of both external and tinnestic events This particular initiative probably was fermulated in the weeks after the sunndt meeting to build on the image of intelligence and flexibility that Gorbachev tried to create there The nearly coincident resumption of NST CD and MBFR negotiations provided a convenient opportunity for a comprehensive arms control package and for trying to place the US at a tactical disadvantage as new rounds of talks began Elucidating his peace program now ensures prominence on the agendas of the republic level congresses to be held over the next three weeks in preparation for the upcoming Party Congress This will give him the opportunity to elicit support for this element of his political progranland to identify and deal with those who might oppose his strategy on Eastewest relations While the initiative contains a mixture of considerable prepaganda and some hints at flexibility Gorbachev's ultimate objectives and expectations are as yet unclear He certainly would like to have progress on arms control but on his own terms Some reliable sources allege that he believes it is possible to achieve agreements that are in the Soviet interest with this President while others clainithat Gorbachev has resolved to wait fer a new administration The latest initiative could represent the beginnings of a major effort to put us on the defensive and probe for flexibility in US positions possibly leading to a more explicit joint agreement on several key arms control issues at the next sunmdt Should an agreement in the Soviet interest not appear to be in the offing the Soviets would hope to reap a major propaganda and political advantage by placing the onus for failure on the President If these are indeed the Soviet intentions they are likely to supplement this latest initiative with a series of tactical moves leading up to the summit These will be carefully orchestrated to combine hints of possible changes in position with signals of toughness With the US they may hint at or introduce additional proposals designed to portray flexibility on key issues such as heavy missiles expanded limits on strategic defenses or Asian 55 20 deployments They will continue their probes to other governments through letters to heads of state regularized briefings on Soviet proposals and where possible direct bilateral discussions Principal targets include the UK France China Japan the FRG the Netherlands Norway as well as major non aligned powers like India These approaches will be specifically tailored to appear responsive to the special concerns of the target countries or to exploit domestic political stresses Examples include the UK TRIDENT program Japanese concerns about Asian nuclear forces German and Scandinavian fears of being held hostage to short range nuclear systems and Third interest in linking disarmament and development 4 Copy of 20 In multilateral negotiations the Soviets-are likely to adopt a cooperative and businesslike demeanor and to canproni'se on procedural issues to bolster their image as serious proponents of arms control Specifically at the CD they are likely to emphasize their nuclear testing moratorium proposal and stated willingness to accept some_additional verification measures for both nuclear and chemical weapon limitations At the same time the Soviets will continue_an energetic if not harsh propaganda campaign against US policies and especially the SDI that will include personal attacks on US officials possibly excepting the President as well as dip rnetic pressures against key supporters of US policies and countries that have agreed to or are considering participation in SDI research The goal will be to create an interrelated set of tempting hints and political pressures in hopes of inducing a US on major issues especially the next sunmdt Some believe that the Gorbachev initiative cannot be dismissed as a totally cynical exercise It is the latest in a series of recent Soviet arms control proposals including the Soviet proposal last September for 50% reductions in offensive weapons The Soviet negotiators in Geneva are not treating the proposal as purely a propaganda ploy Thus far in Round VI they are focusing on the first stage of reductions as proposed by Gorbachev and they have ugt_atfenpted to link a separate INF agreement to US steps on strategic defense There are indications that Gorbachev personally supervised the development of the new initiative without working level involvement It has energed just prior to what will be the most important Soviet party Congress in years The new proposal could be a part of a larger strategy to redirect resources towards domestic priOrities Whether or not Gorbachev expects to get to zero weapons he may see the concept of phasing particularly deferring resolution of current obstacles such as third country forces to later stages as a way to overcome objections of the Soviet military and others to an agreement now Thus in addition to its propaganda value Gorbachev might see his plan as an inatrument to help reach at least a significant first stage agreement that wogld permit hinlto concentrate his resources on his dcmestic agenda Can we Accept the Soviet Framework C Issue At the heart of the Soviet proposal is the plan for achieving the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century An inuediate question is how should the US respond to this plan since this decision will channel options with respect to many aspects of our substantive and public response The main issue is what should be the primary thrust of the US response we have three general approaches available S Approach A Make no inmediate counter moves on either the general concept or specific issues Express our reservations about the Soviet franework and those portions of the Gorbachev package we have previously identified as designed for propaganda purposes not constructive negotiating Explore the Soviet proposal within the relevant negotiating fora 4 This insert was provided by the Department of State It was not reviewed by the Intelligence Community who provided the remainder of the section U 5 Copy of 20 roach B Advance a US counter on the general concept including certain objectives we have already supported but not containing outyear details Call for mutual focus on the first step about which we both agree by pressing them to negotiate on reductions and to demonstrate the sincerity of their proposal 1 gpproach C Advance plan of our own in about the same level of detail as the Soviets 5to show that the US has an equally comprehensive alternative National Security Considerations In evaluating the concept that the Soviet Union has proposed we must keep in mind certain key national security considerations U Our current national strategy depends to a great extent on the contribution of offensive nuclear weapons both strategic and non-strategic While we are to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons we have always noted that translating this into reality will take a long time since we will either have to change the international situation to the point that the contribution of nuclear weapons is no longer needed ideological and regional tensions resolved or alternative means of maintaining security are in place SDI conventional forces imbalance corrected Any ccun tnent we make to a detailed plan fer the elimination of nuclear weapons must be viewed as an extremely serious step which we must be sure we can execute and safely live with because once made it may generate pressures budgetary arms control political which could force the US unilaterally toward such a course ' we are equally connuiied to NATO which also depends heavily on the contribution of both strategic and non strategic nuclear weapons 14 3 is in many respects a scnewhat fragile political strategy but absolutely essential to maintaining alliance cohesion In the context of the SDI debate for example the EEG offered the principle which we endorsed that unless and until an alternative to Current strategy is found and agreed upon it is essential that full support be provided to 14 3 Any commitment to a plan schedule such as that proposed by the Soviets would immediately call into question the future of 14 3 Once again this would be a most serious step and one that would require extensive Allied consultation Military Implications of Eliminating Nuclear weapons Elimination of nuclear weapons would reduce the direct and innediate military threat to the continental United States but critically increases the importance of conventional forces we fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression we equally recognize the destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means and the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger posed by the threat of aggression through such means In this centext the prospect of direct conventional aggression against vital US allies and interests could be dramatically increased by the elindnation of nuclear weapons Thus the likelihood of major conflict requiring direct participation by US forces could be significantly greater in the absence of nuclear deterrence S 5 Since not supported by any agency the SACG directed this option be eliminated 5 mm 3m 1m mm SWVE 6 Copy of 20 If the current regional imbalances in conventional forces are not resolved there would be little to deter hostile powers from pursuing their interests to the potential detriment of US interests For example European acceptance of political and military realities might result in the Finlandization of Europe Tb prevent such circumstances a massive buildup of US and Allied conventional forces would be required Significant political economic and military would be required to eqUal the deterrent potential of relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons Furthermore elimination of nuclear weapons by the current nuclear powers could place them at risk from those that have not acknowledged possession but may in fact possess or gain access to such weapons There could also be an increased emphasis on chemical biological weapons as well as a substantial incentive to develop other means of mass destruction The achievement of an effective elindnation of all nuclear weapons holds three consequences for the United States First we would be forced to reassess the continued viability of our current global strategy and objectives Second the United States would also be forced to undertake a massive worldwide buildup and deployment of conventional forces in order to maintain at least the same deterrent capability as today Third the United States would be required to address the likely emergence of other weapons of mass destruction Finally verification would become even more critical since any suspicion of an adversary's cheating and retaining nuclear capabilities would severly and adversely affect our situation The Soviet proposal to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons during their second phase is self serving Such a relatively near term potential elimination of these weapons would greatly reduce ability to continue current much needed Western programs to modernize this force i e there would be little incentive to modernize with the prospect of an agreement to elindnate these weapons soon The Soviets have underway a full modernization of their tactical nuclear capabilities The resultant effect would be to continue existing asynnetries in capability based on a future promise to eliminate these weapons The President has the US ultimately to eliminating nuclear weapons The above Observations are not intended to undercut this goal Rather they are to point out the dangers we face if this goal is pursued in isolation as proposed by the Soviet plan Total elimination of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by actions which obviate the requirements for those weapons including resolution of regional differences the correction of military asymmetries and a fundamental change in orientation and ambitions of the Soviet leadership Potential Connon Ground Certain elements of this plan reflect positions offered by the U S to the Soviets over the past 5 years For example the US is on record as calling ultimately for the total elimination of nuclear weapons Further in response to questions about how the US would prepose handling the issue of British and French forces we_suggested to the Soviets that we should take the first important steps bilaterally in nnwing to 50% reductions as we define them and then involve not only_the British and French but the PRC as well we have also repeatedly stressed the need to go beyond NTM as required for effective verification SBTWE Eff 0 W73 El Copy of 20 l u Specific Problems On the other hand the way that the Soviet proposal is framed poses certain immediate problems that must be considered S The Soviet plan does narrow the focus only on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by 1999 making that a goal in itself It does not address the corresponding reasons for the weapons and the associated mechanisms that will be needed either to eliminate the underlying security requirements or replace the contribution now made by the nuclear weapons As a result it offers no schedule for the resolution of existing regional conflicts and differences It calls for scheduling the total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons for example but does not call for a corresponding schedule for the significant reduction of armored forces in central Europe This one-sided focus puts maximum pressure on the West and avoids putting corresponding pressure on the East In short as the Soviets have often tried to do this attempts to set an unfair public focus and agenda Without a balanced and more comprehensive focus which includes both a plan schedule for the elimination of nuclear weapons and a plan schedule for either eliminating or handling in some other way the security requirements for these weapons it is questionable whether the US and NATO could go much beyond agreeing to the general concept The Soviet plan also calls for us to accept many unacceptable elements of the Soviet approach to reductions during the first phase front loading the deal in order to get certain benefits in subsequent phases Even then many of the benefits the total elimination of tactical weapons promised in subsequent Soviet phases play more to public opinion than as real sweeteners to the pot for the US and its allies S The direct impact of some of the Soviet provisions would be to derail Western modernization Moreover some of these provisions by simply being given the status of real possibilities could achieve the sane result For example if the elimination of British and French systems is roughly 8 years away why should the UK invest its limited resources on the Trident D-S missile Similarly if tactical systems are also going to be gone in the same time frame why should pay the fiscal and political costs of modernizing these systems like the W82 155nm artillery fired atomic projectile And closer to home if all nuclear weapons are to be gone soon why should the U S or the U S and its allies waste precious funds and take the political heat of continuing with And why pay for systems like MX and the TRIDENT Other Considerations We should also consider a number of other factors which involve the political situation in which our decision must be made U We face a serious problem in reconciling planned national security and defense spending in the DOE and State budgets with the realities of deficit reduction and Granm Rudmam-Hollings We must consider how our response to the Soviet plan will affect the debate in this area We must also consider the potential relationship to the upcoming sunmit Some believe that we could use this Soviet proposal to reach some limited general agreement about the elimination of nuclear weapons and if this agreement were framed in a manner so that it could be finally decided at the summit and protect our positions and interest in focusing on offensive WW 8 Copy of 20 reductions that this could be useful to the United States Others believe that if we pursue this approach it will cause the sunnut to constitute a deadline for reaching some agreement withthe Soviets and therefore it will be much more difficult to deal with the Soviet proposal protect our interests and pursue our agenda U Framework Approach A U Since Gorbachev's most recent proposal contains only repackaged previously unacceptable positions ill defined phrases a willingness to reach agreement on necessary verification arrangements and new conditions calculated to be unacceptable to the US and its allies the most prudent response at the present time is for the US to use the next round in the various negotiating fora to probe the Soviet preposal If as some expect it becones readily apparent that there is no real flexibility or forward movenent in any of the key areas Soviet intransigence at the negotiating table will help us dismiss the Gorbachev package as a propaganda ploy If on the other hand and contrary to present expectations the Soviets prove able and willing to drop those elements of their proposals which are non starters and work with us on equitable verifiable accords we will be in a better position to assess how our own positions might usefully be modified after the next round of negotiations Consequently under this approach our strategy would be to establish in public and at the negotiating table those aspects of the Gorbachev package which appear intended for propaganda value and are unhelpful to reaching equitable verifiable acCords We would not repackage or otherwise alter our own position revised only a month andwa half ago Of course should there be evidence of genuine Soviet flexibility in the various negotiating fora and the prospect of real movement towards equitable verifiable accords we would be able indeed in a stronger position to modify our own proposals taking account of such considerations following the next round of talks Framework Approach U Since the Soviet plan is partially a playing-back to us of previous US proposals and because of the problems associated with rejecting these elements what we need to do is to find the common ground contained in the idea isolate and accept that canton ground dismiss or effectively counter those elements that are not in our interest and which are beyond the negotiating horizon anyway and refocus on the business at hand Itrdo this we should take the fellowing approach 1 Agree with the general concept goal of unwing to the total elimination of nuclear weapons when possible consistent with overall security and stability 2 Note that the U S has long advocated a process by which the US and the USSR would take the first step by implementing the principle of a 50% reduction in the nuclear forces of both sides appropriately applied and an SEVE seem momma 9 Copy of 20 interim INF agreement When US and Soviet forces are in the process of beigg' reduced and additional reductions are under discussion we envision the next step would be to seek to involve the UK France and the PRC so that all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced manner This approach was specifically proposed to the USSR by the US during the preparations for and during the recent summit -- 3 Therefore we would welcome the Seviet Union's joining us in this ineertant pursuing this general goal Need to work this in advance with UK France and the 4 There could be a benefit in satting a geal ef completing this process as quickly as possible We see benefit in achieving this goal as soon as possible under conditions that include moving to non-nuclear defenses and correcting of conventional force imbalances Soviet compliance with existing and future agreements peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and in general a mdaxgental change in the orientation and ambitions of the Soviet leadership 5 We also see benefit in the prompt accomplishment of the first step of this process the implementation of the principle of 50% reductions appropriately applied and an interim INF agreement This is achievable with political cormitment and serious constructive negotiating on both sides It is also clearly the foundation upon which both we and the Soviets agree all else must build 6 Tm first-stem to appropriately apply the principle of 50% reduction and to achieve a separate INF agreement will require serious negotiation There are significant differences on the elements of an equitable first stage outcome The resolution of these differences and the finding of common ground is the area in' which both sides must now focus their negotiating efforts if the goal for this step is to be achieved It is an area in which real negotiations can take place at this time We should both agree that this should be our focus This is in keeping with the commitment to accelerate efforts to find common ground made at the most recent summit 7 We see bexiefit in pursuing Gorbachev's offer to come to terms on any necessary verification measures 8 The Soviet proposal on what specifically would be accomplished in its subsequent phases contains much with which we can not agree at this time Commitment to subsequent phases as the Soviets propose would require extensive detailed discussion to identify the real common ground here in the process diverting time and talent from the immediate work at hand on this first step upon which we both agree likely adding additional potential 6 ACDA suggested this alternative formulation of point 4 but later withdrew it in favor of the addition of a new point 9 next page The conditions listed reflect the same conditions that the President laid out in the joint appearance with Gorbachev in Geneva U memos om Copy of 20 difficulties for that critical bilateral work innediately involving additional sovereign nations in the process and once done resulting in at best very tentative commitments which still depend upon the results of this first step For this reason we see no benefit in seeking agreenent with the Soviets on a framework going beyond the points contained in above At the same tine we would continue to criticize the unacceptable parts of the overall Soviet plan In explaining the crnnutnents associated with points above the US would neke it clear that in its View the total elinunation of nuclear weapons requires conditions that include moving to nonunuclear defenses and correcting conventional force imbalances Soviet compliance with their treaty obligations peaceful resolution of regional conflicts in ways that allow free choice without outside interference and a fun ntal change in the orientation and ambitions of the Soviet leadership In employing the approach suggested above the US objectives are to U Discredit the Soviet plan while co_0pting elements of the Soviet proposal by indicating the degree to which it is at its core and in its most significant dimension a Soviet acceptance of some US principles TherefOre the core concept as we define it is not a move to which the US must respond but simply a Soviet agreement that the core concept is the cannon ground upon which we can both humediately agree Discredit the details of the Soviet subsequent phases to the extent of indicating that we have no interest nor see any value in arguing over whether there should be 3 or more phases This should be done to avoid both having these details be used against the modernization of US and NATO nuclear forces and to avoid being placed in the position of having the public appeal of these points if generated by the Soviets used as leverage to coerce concessions during the negotiations associated with the first step Achieve Soviet agreement on the US argument for addressing only US and Soviet forces at this time Stress the task mandated by the sunmdt joint statement seeking the cocoon ground in current US and Soviet START and INF positions Seeking conuom ground should remain our these as it counters Soviet attempts at linkage and attempts to use SDI to lever other Soviet positions and allows us to use the 50% principle and the interim INF agreement to the maximum advantage Make the point repeatedly that argument over the details of outyear activity beyond the general concept and the acceptance of a goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons by the end of the century if it can be done while maintaining security and stability is an irrelevant largely useless and clearly diverting activity that will only delay and complicate progress in reaching successful conpletion of the first step phase upon which we both can agree See footnote 6 on alternative point 4 on previous page SE 11 Copy of 20 Implementing this Approach This approach is designed to avoid surrendering the field to the Soviets to exploit apparent change in the Soviet position on British and French forces to maintain the focus on the Geneva negotiations and the summit mandate to seek ccnnon ground and to craft crunch ground on the general concept of a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons which could form the basis for something that could be agreed and announced at the appropriate time It is intended to protect options for both an agreement at the soundt along these lines and for a pre sunnut dialogue based on this approach The United States should seek to focus most attention and negotiating effort on a first step bilateral agreement substantially reducing strategic and intermediate-range forces This is the area of potential ctnnen ground referred to in the joint statement worked out at the Geneva sunndt and the only obligations undertaken in an initial agreement will be to provisions to be implemented in the first stage Our position could also include a statement that once an initial agreement substantially reducing strategic and internediate range offensive forces is being implemented we envision inviting the other nuclear powers to subsequent negotiations on further steps to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons This position would tie our proposed reductions to our overall goal of the elin nation of nuclear weapons would reinforce the bilateral nature of the first step in whiCh constraints on third country forces are inappropriate and would avoid ceding the public diplomacy high ground to the Soviets by demonstrating that our proposal is also part of a larger plan whose ultimate goal is the elimination of nuclear weapons At this tine there is no support for Approach C U IV Substantive Areas of the Proposal U A U In Geneva the Soviet delegation has said that the Gorbachev proposal does not involve any changes in their previous START position The new position does however present their START position as a component in the first stage of a three-stage framework The Soviet position now is that if we agree to their current START and SDI positions as they are they are prepared to negotiate a second phase on strategic weapons with the British French and Chinese to be followed by a third stage in which all nuclear weapons are elindnated That concept is not entirely new for the Soviets What is new is the compressed and explicit tinetable S The new Soviet proposal stresses a prohibition on the transfer of strategic missiles to other countries and in the INF context Britain and France must not build up their corresponding weapons The non transfer language appears stronger than that agreed to in SALT II and may be aimed at the British TRIDENT progrann S The US and USSR would continue the reductions they had agreed to in the first stage into the second stage Thus it appears that US and USSR strategic weapons would not be reduced below the 6000 level agreed to in the first stage until the third stage That is in terms of ICBMs and heavy see seem T 2 3 3333 r1 C22 4W 12 Copy of 20 bothers the second stage really aims at the British French and Chinese S The October 1985 Soviet START proposal already encumbered by a non- negotiable definition of strategic anus designed to make their deep reductions proposal unacceptable to the United States has not been modified Unless this is clarified in public the concept of the elimination of all nuclear weapons a US initiative in these talks will be perceived as novenent in START and the Soviets will press to suggest that the ball is in our court without any change in their START position S Recommendations Since there was no change in the substance of the Soviet position in START no specific elements have been introduced which can be pocketed as part of the substantive negotiations The lack of Soviet movement in their START position however also might give us sane leverage in that their failure to alter their position after the U 5 November proposal and after the call for acceleration and an emphasis on 50% reductions with a focus on column ground can be highlighted and public pressure placed upon them 5 While continuing to welcome the Soviet statement along our original lines now is the time for the US to begin backgrounding on the negative aspects of the Soviet proposal highlighting the fact that the Soviets despite our significant move in START on November 1 including a 1500 A104 limit and the guidelines of the Joint statement have made absolutely no change in the substance of their position We should explain that the Soviet proposal would have us agree to the substance of their proposal now in exchange for high sounding premises for the future they want us to trade hardware for rhetoric S We should agree on the desirability of creating the conditions which muld make possible the elimination of nuclear weapons by 1999 but point out that the failure of the Soviet Union to provide any novenent in their position undermines our confidence that this is a serious proposal 5 We should challenge the Soviet Union to show their good faith and demonstrate that we can get on schedule for a 1999 date by dropping their onesided preconditions and getting down to serious negotiations on limiting and heavy bcmbers as they had promised earlier in the negotiations S Sate believe that we should revisit the issue of mobile ICBMs in light of Congressional opposition to our p oposed ban They recommend it be modified to a ban on mobile 3 ENE U The Gorbachev package ccmbines an important shift in INF that is both potentially encouraging and potentially troublescrne with some familiar and unacceptable elements Their interim proposal allowing 100-120 U S GICMs to remain in Europe is apparently still on the table according to the Soviet NST Delegation To the extent that the newest Soviet version of 8 This is further developed in Option B Option 3 described in Annex of this paper U eop saeer smemIVE WL 13 Copy of 20 Li 33 a zero INF solution zero in Europe is linked to Defense and Space issues it is a step back Sunndt joint statement 5 In comparison with past Soviet zero INF proposals the new version U Is silent on the first stage treatnent of Soviet systems in Asia In the past the Soviets have offered a freeze on systems there Shevardnadze reportedly said in TOkyo last week that the Soviet missiles in Asia would be reduced if the number of nuclear delivery vehicles in the Far East countering Soviet missiles were reduced It is not yet clear how this fits into the Gorbachev program 5 - Gives the appearance of dropping past Soviet insistence that UK and French strategic systems be aggregated with US LRINF systems in defining an equal balance in the European zone However it adds a new condition that there be no build up of UK and French nuclear forces The proposal accepts US Soviet equality at zero at least in Europe but with collateral requirements of US non transfer to its Allies and no increase in UK or French systems 5 Has language on the verification of limits on nuclear systems applying inter alia to INF which appears to go further than past statements OSI and other verification measures are specifically mentioned without any stated requirement to show that NTM is insufficient However it is not clear at what stage these measures would ccne into effect or exactly how they would be implemented S The Soviet proposal not to increase UK and French forces is a change from past Soviet INF positions and gives us the opportunity to assert Soviet acceptance of the principle of US Soviet equality However it is still unacceptable for E _to limit Allied forces and certainly objectionable to the UK and French as well It is essentially identical to the penultinete Soviet SALT I position on this issue in 1972 which we rejected The Soviet move is designed to drive wedges between ourselves and our Allies and we must continue to prevent this 5 Finally the Soviets appear to continue to include US FBS as strategic systems so that US but not Soviet non missile aircraft INF systems would be double counted in both strategic and INF balances This is however a problem to be dealt with primarily in START S ALTERNATIVES U INF Approach 1 U The USSR has Heme than offset the value of its concession on INF by adding new and wholly unacceptable conditions By tying their INF proposal to termination of SDI cessation of UK and French strategic modernization programs and prohibition of cooperation on the Trident D S between the U S and United Kingdom the Soviets have calculatedly made the price for zero-zero in Europe should we conclude such an outcome is in our interest unacceptably high More worrisome they have done so in a way intended to neximize pressure on the United States to pursue such an agreement Wm s 14 Copy of 20 LN were we to modify our proposal pocket the apparent Soviet concession on crnpensation for UK and French systems currently deployed we would be playing into the Soviets' hands In short order the perception would take root in Europe and elsewhere that the impediment to concluding an agreement would be singularly or collectively the U S ccnudtment to SDI to its Asian allies and or to the necessary enhancement of British and French strategic forces Unfortunately each of these issues offers the Soviets abundant opportunities for sowing discord between the United States and its friends Consequently in keeping with the overall approach to the Soviet proposal outlined above Alternative A our best course of action in INF is to stand our ground with respect to our recently-tabled initiative we should explore the Soviet proposal in this round but defer any consideration of further modification of our own positions until we have an opportunity to take the full measure of the Soviets' maneuvering INF Approach 2 U Since the Soviets appear to have moved more in INF than elsewhere sr e believe a prompt US response should be considered Such a response should be designed to 1 Attempt to exploit apparent Soviet movement Soviet acceptance of principle of US Soviet LRINF equality and acceptance of a role for OSI and other measures beyond verifying the agreement and deferring UK French participation until later S 2 Press the Soviets to reach and implement an INF agreement consistent with US principles and objectives without linkage to other areas and SDI S 3 Press the Soviets on issues where they are silent particularly the need for reduction of Soviet systems in Asia as part of an INF agreement despite what Shevardnadze said in Tokyo S 4 Prevent the Soviets from appearing to deep reductions than is the US Our zero zero proposal has been on the table since 1981 and we may want to stress this S Those who hold this view believe a specific US INF counterproposal should be considered to accomplish these ends It would differ substantially fromtour current position only by adopting zero-zero in Europe rather than give the Soviets that high ground and be changing from proportionate reductions in Asia to significant reductions 50 percent in Asia It is recognized that if the Soviets relink INF to defense and space and if a US move leads closer to agreement allied pressure on SDI might increase However those supporting this alternative believe that the alternative which they feel would give the Soviets the high ground in Europe is unacceptable and that we can continue to insist on delinkage Its key elements as part of a first step package could be as follows S Elimination of US and Soviet LBINF in Europe west of Novosibirsk and therefore Barnaul S WW 14 1 Copy of 20 53 Significant reduction in in central and eastern Asia at least 50 percent cuts though the US would restate its zero-zero preference for their total elimination S -- A global LRINF mdssile warhead ceiling The US would have a legal right to global equality to match any Soviet warheads remaining outside Europe with US systems in CONUS or elsewhere outside of Europe S Soviet LRINF systems which are reduced would be destroyed US systems based in EurOpe could be withdrawn to the U S unless or until they were in excess of the equal glObal ceiling in which case they would be destroyed while protecting a right to convert the P115 to PIES S Equal SRINF ceiling at current Soviet level or freeze SRINF at both sides December 31 1982 levels S The reductions and lhnits would involve US and Soviet systems only there would be no agreed constraints on UK and French systems S -- Introduce key elenents of verification regime as an integral part of this proposal S Reaffirm November summit joint statement to move ahead on INF agreement without linkage to Defense and Space issues S In the second step of an overall program we could envision the completion of LRINF reductions to zero zero S C pg U Most of the elements of the Soviet proposal that deal with Defense and Space merely repeat earlier positions that they have taken They continue to propose a ban on development testing and deployment of space strike arne In the DST in Geneva the Soviets explain that the ban on develOpment includes a ban on directed or purposeful research This proposal remains unacceptable to the United States because it would prohibit the SDI program The Soviets continue to link reductions in strategic systems to their proposed space ban this also is unacceptable Finally they appear to have repeated the statement Gorbachev made in his press conference after his meeting with the President in Geneva that relevant laboratories could be inspected as part of a means to verify the proposed space ban There are two portions of the Soviet proposal that are new and have implications for DST During the second stage of their preposed reghne early to mid-19905 their space ban would have to beccne multilateral with necessary participation in it by the leading industrial powers This portion appears to make the longhternlobjective of freeing the world of nuclear weapons within the next 15 years contingent on complete participation of the industrialized world and may be designed to ensure that the proposal would not succeed because of some other country's rejection Their proposal also includes the new element to ban creation of non nuclear arms based on new physical principles This could be an additional attempt to focus on development of unconventional technologies such as lasers in SDI In any case this portion could focus particularly on US technical is very ambiguous and is thus unacceptable 15 Copy of 20 ALTERNATIVES U DST approach 1 U The parts of the new Soviet proposal that address matters in Defense and Space neither advance the negotiations nor offer anything positive to which we could respond The Defense and Space Negotiating Group should continue to follow the agenda defined in the DST instructions for Round and should indicate to the Soviets that if anything their new proposal is a demonstration of lack of seriousness on their part to pursue a businesslike dialogue we should also turn acne of the Soviet logic back on them noting that the obverse of their position is that acne defenses will be required as long as nuclear weapons exist At the same thus we should also note that defenses will still be necessary in a nuclear free world to protect against cheating DST approach 29 U In addition to the items in Alternative 1 the U S delegation should begin discussions with the Soviets on the specific meaning of the ABM Treaty D verification U In Gorbachev's public statement verification or related issues are addressed in ways that the appearance of flexibility with a lack of specificity about particular measures to the circumstances under whiCh they would apply Relevant portions of the statement are quoted below apparent or potential new positions are underlined S In the area of nuclear weapons limitations 1 Special procedures for the destruction of nuclear weapons will be elaborated 2 Special procedures for the dismantling conversion or destruction of delivery vehicles also will be elaborated and 3 verification of the armaments liable to destruction and lhnitation would be implemented both via national technical means and via onwsite inspections The USSR is prepared to come to terms on any other additional verification measures On nuclear testing There are no grounds for possible references to verification as an obstacle to establishing a moratorium on nuclear explosions We state quite categorically that verification is not a problem for us If the United States embarks on ending all nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis the proper verification of the observance of the Htmatorium 'will be fully ensured by national technical means and also with the help of international procedures with mutual on site inspections where necessary Regarding space strike weapons And let there be the strictest verification in this case which includes allowing inepections at the relevant laboratories U In the area of chemical weapons and all this limits set forth would 9 This alternative has been expanded even futher in Option B Option 3 which is described in full in Annex of this paper U SETEVE 16 C0py of 20 take place under strict control including international on-site verifications And with regard to MBFR As for the observance of a on freezing the numerical strength of troops in addition to national technical means it would be possible to establish permanent monitoring points to monitor the entry and some Soviet sources say the exit of any troop contingents into the reduction zon ikxne of these provisions such as destruction of delivery vehicles probably could be monitored with high confidence using'N ns others such as destruction of nuclear weapons are vague and our monitoring ability would depend importantly on how supplementary measures were implemented The references to verification in this most recent package whether a reiteration of previous offers or a possible new develogmann could represent sore form of Soviet attempt to address the long standing U S concerns with arms control verification If so they could provide an opportunity to press the Soviets to make good on their Geneva agree on effective verification measures during negotiation of new agreements and to cease violations of past agreements that have impeded verification But Gorbachev's statements may well represent no more than an effort to undercut US positions on verification by linking potential Soviet concessions on verification to changes in US requirements on weapon limits They could also exploit a verification dialogue for information about US NTMs that could be used against us In the area of verification all agreed that we should test Soviet sincerity by taking Gorbachev at his word and proposing specific items as needed In the multilateral arms control area we have a number of such items on the table that we could point to and seek Soviet action based on Gorbachev's remarks The problem is that in the NST area we are still working to finalize verification proposals The issue is what to do until this work is Some Approach 1 would have us probe without specific proposals on the belief that this will quickly reveal Soviet insincerity Others Approach 2 would argue that doing this will likely reduce any possibility of the Soviets acting favorably on our specific proposals once our internal work is complete They would argue we should not probe in general terms but work to get specific verification proposals ready and table them as soon as possible U NST verification Approach 1 U The US should pursue discussions with the Soviets within the specific context of their offers to find out whether there are real measures they would be willing to undertake in verification Under the presumption that the mildly positive U S reactions in public so far to the verification elements will build over tine we should press for substantive answers in the specific areas that have been suggested by the Soviets In so doing we should ask 10 solution which combines these two alternatives has been proposed and incorporated in OWL 21 It would permit probing but only in ways that do not predjudice either US options or Soviet likely responses U 17 Copy of 20 thenlto explain how their proposals would apply to concrete provisions that are approaches of both sides such as counting ballistic missileRVs or monitoring mobile 11234 deployments We should ask them to be explicit about the circumstances and details of supplementary measures including such issues as degree and frequency of on site access use of technical devices and the mandatory or voluntary nature of inspections and other monitoring activities including geographic limitations and data exchanges We should stress the security interest that both sides have in reducing uncertainty in a deep reductions regime and not enter into discussions of the characteristics or capabilities of' li NST verification Approach 2 U In response to Gorbachev's offer to reach agreement on necessary NST verification measures the US should propose specific measures which as we deem necessary designed to best verify elements of our proposal and press the Soviets to accept these or up with equally effective verification procedures This will require decisions on specific proposals S E Risk Reduction Centers U The Joint Statenent November SUnndt contained agreement by the sides study the question at the expert level of centers to reduce nuclear risk taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations During the negotiation of this statement in Geneva the US side specifically rejected a Soviet formulation which made NST the venue and explained clearly what we intended by the language In the President's letter to Gorbachev of December 24 1985 he proposed we have our experts on this subject meet here or in Moscow if you prefer during the first week in February to begin this process S A followbon demarche reiterating the President's offer was delivered on 13 January in Moscow to a midelevel official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who recalled Gorbachev's position on the matter in Geneva but had no innediate response to provide The Soviets made no mention of a possible Geneva venue at that point and the U S interlocators did not employ their contingency points against burdening the NST negotiations with the additional responsibility of exploring the concept of risk reduction centers S In the Gorbachev letter to the President dated 14 January he responded with As to the question you raised of centers to reduce nuclear risk it could beccnela subject for discussion at the upcoming round of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons There was no mention of risk reduction centers in the Gorbachev Statement appearing in the 16 January IZVESTIYA edition It is possible that the letter response was sent without knowledge of the demarche and the tentative nature of the letter suggests that the Soviets had not reached a final decision on the venue but were aware that time was running out on a reply IExxnnendation With regard to the venue the NST Delegation should deflect any Soviet nnwe to introduce the subject into the Geneva negotiations and reiterate our proposal for an early February meeting of experts in capitals E'l 18 Copy of 20 F Chemical Weapons U In parallel to a nuclear weapons free world Gorbachev's statement calls it an entirely realistic task to totally elindnate those barbarous weapons of mass destruction ciendcal weapons during this century When he asserts that the CD talks have been dragged out impermissibly he ignores the US draft treaty and the fact that the Soviets have refused to engage in a serious detailed discussion of key verification procedures needed to implement such a carprehensive ban C Gorbachev calls for a fresh look at things and notes that the Soviet union stands up for the speediest total elimination of these weapons and of the industrial base for their manufacture itself He says he is ready to agree to prompt declaration of the locations of enterprises for the production of chemical weapons and the cessation of production to begin the elaboration of procedures for the destruction of the relevant production base and also to embark soon after the convention comes into force on the elimination of c mmdcal weapons stockpiles and all of this would take place under strict control including international on-site verifications S There are two new elements in these formulations First the reference to the destruction of the industrial base declaration ofsproduction facilities vice weapons stockpiles only but this is caveated by a subsequent reference to destruction of only the relevant production bases but this could range anywhere 30 days proposed in the US draft treaty to the years proposed by the and second a reference to strict control including international on site verifications for the destruction of the weapons and the relevant production base No movement is indicated on the long standing issues pressed by the US on mandatory challenge inspections for suspect activity at non-declared sites or on the precise nature of the verification_nechanism S O There may be opportunity in this statement to build on the Soviet novement however small toward greater verification stringency with respect to chemical weapons ban negotiations in Geneva and the bilateral dialogue on CW non proliferation C The limited apparent movement in the statenent is further circumscribed by the fact that Gorbachev clearly links the radical solution of the problem above to certain interim steps such as not transferring chemical weapons to anyone and not deploying them on other states' territory a policy claimed to be always adhered strictly to by the Soviet Union and with the sene restraint demanded of the US Gorbachev thus both denies Soviet use of CW in Afghanistan and CW transfers to its Vietnamese allies and in effect invokes the standard Soviet posture against US deployment of CW in NATO Europe thus adding fuel to the heavily promoted Soviet proposal for a European-CW Free Zone S Reccnnendation It appears to press the Soviets on the inclusion of the production base or industrial base while also seeking definitions of relevan and what they Kean by promp and for specific details on on site verifications we should also press the Soviets on the point that they wish a complete read universal ban on chemical weapons and thus should not divert attention and effort to regional bans 19 Copy of 20 G U Gorbachev's language in emphasizing the Stockholm mandate to ensure the creation of barriers in the path of the use of force and covert preparations for war focuses on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures CSBM not as the Soviets normally do on a Non-Use of Force NUF declaration S 'His call for lowering the level of exercises requiring notification 25 000 ground troops under the Helsinki Accords does not serve WEstern interests is ambiguous and could be sent as a constraint While Gorbachev's general statement on naval and air exercise notification Why not seek to solve them piece by piece appears encouraging at first his next sentence deflates expectations by exercises of ground and air forces even though he at least postpones naval forces from an initial agreement Since the USSR is already isolated in its call for notifications of both air and naval exercises at Stockholnn this may be a ploy to rescue air exercises from what appears to the Soviets to be a lost cause S Recennendation we therefore should publicly welcome Gorbachev's statenent but reject reject both these elements from CSEMs not just the naval deferral that Gorbachev offered langaage using Gorbachev's omission of any call for language to H Nuclear Testing U The proposal calls for an immediate moratorium on all US and Soviet nuclear explosions to be followed by a discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests by all nuclear powers in the second stage National Technical Means with the help of international procedures including on-site inspections where necessary would provide proper verification of compliance S The proposal also announces extension of the unilateral Soviet noratorium by three months until 31 March 1986 and Soviet readiness to resume the trilateral negotiations or to start multilateral negotiations in the CD for a CTB The Soviets also announced their support for the Delhi statement C The test banemoratorium proposal contains nothing new and the position on verification also is not new In the negotiations that began in 1958 as well as in the trilateral talks of 1977 1980 the Soviet Union claimed to support on site inspection of suspect events by international teams However they always insisted on the right to veto any request for inspection Therefore the Soviet Union to date has supported voluntary verification only In practice they have refused to agree to any meaningful measures that will actually allow verification The Soviet call for a halt in nuclear testing is unacceptable because the risks it would pose to national security would be serious For the foreseeable future we will depend 0n nuclear weapons to deter aggression Given this dependence nuclear testing will be required to ensure that our deterrent is credible and effective and that our nuclear weapons are safe and reliable This position was recently reviewed by the ACSG and SACG and WW 20 Copy of 20 nothing in the recent Gorbachev proposal would cause a change in the assessments reached we should position ourselves to respond to the Soviet proposal by educating our Allies on the reasons for our policy on nuclear test bans and on our need to test We also should continue our efforts to engage the Soviets in technical discussions on the problems associated with verifying cmpliance with nuclear testing limitations as recently proposed by the President In particular we should seek to advance our Objectives with respect to improving verification of the Paxrnmendations With respect to nuclear testing we should make no new proposals at this time but continue to press the Soviets for a positive response to the President's UN proposal of September 1984 invitation of July 1985 and recent proposal for a meeting of technical experts At the same thus we should handle all approaches to the Soviet Union on nuclear testing matters in Washington The US NST Delegation should be instructed to avoid the nuclear testing issue in Geneva If the Soviets bring it up the delegation should that the matter is more appropriately handled in capitals Finally we must educate the public the Congress and our allies on the security implications of a CTB and why we most test given our dependence on nuclear weapons S I U The new western proposal presented at the end of the last round incorporated several key elements of the Soviet position and represented a substantial western concession The initial Soviet reaction was negative and may reflect nothing meme than the fact that the Soviets had little time to respond and had not received considered instructions Gorbachev's meme positive words about show that the Soviets now appreciate the large extent to which we have moved toward their position Gorbachev's acknowledgement fer the requirement for reasonable monitoring should not be over valued by the US To the extent that the Soviets have in the past rejected even the principle of non NTM verification it is a step forward that they now say the principle is valid Gorbachev has now agreed to permanent stationing of observers at entry points rather than on a temporary basis as in addition to the temporary exist points the Soviets had earlier proposed However the Soviets have yet to show any willingness to correct address the really significant verification requirements fer an MBFR agreement more importantly continuing such as onsite inspection The only kind of on-site measures they have been willing to discuss are of a trivial nature in that they would allow the Soviets to violate the treaty easily without detection wholly insufficient to detect or deter possible Soviet violations S Recrnmendation While we cannot agree that national technical means supplemented only hmm toring entry exit points to monitor the entry of any troop contingents all the provisions of an agreement are sufficient we should demonstrate the need for additional verification measures which we propose to apply to both sides to and explore whether Gorbachev's language means the USSR is prepared to be constructive in the negotiations SXO f 'z 21 Copy of 20 V Substantive Response ll U ALTERNATIVES U Framework Approach A INF Approach 1 U This combination would have the US take the stance that it has reservations about the franemork and about those elements which have been surfaced previously and rejected Where there are new elements which appear constructive at first glance the U S will utilize the responsible negotiating fora to explore the extent to which those positions reflect significant new flexibility on the Soviets' part If this combination is chosen the task would be to take action to explain the US assessnent of the Soviet position as quickly and effectively as possible The US objective would be to reestablish focus on achieving the goal of seeking'ccumon ground at the NST talks as mandated in the joint statenent issued after the sunmit Since there would be no change in the US position involved in this US response the innediate requirement for substantive allied consultation would be minimized However we should consult within the SCG on our assessnent of the Soviet INF position With respect to the larger aspects of the Soviet plan we should notify our allies regarding how we intend to respond to what we would characterize as essentially a Soviet propaganda maneuver and encourage them to join us in this stance TSXO Framework Approach INF Approach 2 U This combination would have the US attempt to advance its own concept of a franework redefined to meet US needs and linuted to avoid the down sides of making the details of the Soviet second and third phases appear to be real and feasible possibilities It would also attempt to gain agreement on a zero zero LRINF outcome in Europe matched by significant reductions in Asia leading to zero there as well and 50 percent reductions appropriately applied in START If this combination were chosen we would also have to consider alternative strategies on how to approach the framework concept with the Soviets now leading up to the summit at the sonnet and when it would be best totunmein the INF area Once decided we would then have to carefully consult with our allies on all aspects before approaching the Soviets Our public diplomacy approach would allow a general agreement on a framework as outlined in Approach while making clear that the out-year details of the Soviet plan would not be considered Other Issues There are also specific issues on defense and space 14 and on verification 16 which also require resolution C n Chart Figure 1 summarizes the substantive issues pending decisions U 11 The two alternatives described above have been overcome by the SACG discussion of this paper described on page 1 and by the subsequent OWL 21 paper U 12 Given that OWL 21 provides a current summary chart Figure 1 of OWL 20 has not been updated to reflect changes or SACG discussion U Frau i 22 COpy of 20 Rd VI Public Response U Until the substantive response issue is decided the US public response must be framed to keep options open Therefore until this is resolved our public response should avoid criticizing the general aspects of the Soviet plan that Framework Approach would attempt to build upon It should also avoid rejecting the Soviet phase one INF position TSXO On the other hand our public response can innediately build upon the current publicly released material in areas ccnmon to both approaches outlined above This includes directly attacking those aspects of the Soviet preposals which are carry overs from previously rejected Soviet positions the Soviet concept of strategic systems and associated counting rules It can also highlight the difficulties that would be involved in attempting to gain agreement to some of the outnyear details of the Soviet plan emphasizing how even if resolved the results would still be contingent on success in the innediate NST negotiations upon which both the US and USSR agree are the necessary first and next step Finally on a ncme positive note our public thenes should stress the need to focus our best talents and efforts on achieving success in finding the common ground in NST as mandated in the sunnut joint statement VII Reconnended Course of Action U Based upon the above the ACSG would reconnend the following course of action U l The SACG should review this paper direct modifications as needed and ncwe this issue to the NSC for discussion on a priority basis so that the President is in a position to decide any remaining substantive issues with the benefit of NSC discussion as soon as possible C 2 Against the contingency that Framework Approach is chosen the ACSG should develop a short paper outlining the alternatives associated with the implementation of this option addressing the who when and where questions This should be by COB Saturday January 25 C 3 The Public Diplomacy IG should draft and circulate as quickly as possible improved public diplomacy materials for general use based upon the guidance outlined in section VI above C 4 The Department of State should develop and circulate for review by COB Friday January 24 alternative allied consultation plans which would address the requirenents for consultation notification associated with each of the substantive responses listed in section V C 5 The ACDA should develop and circulate for review by COB Friday January 24 draft cables providing additional instructions as needed to each of the NST negotiating groups Where appropriate these cables should include bracketed language reflecting the substantive alternatives still undecided The Backstopping group should assure that the framework issue will not be an inmediate subject of negotiation by the NST delegation in Geneva C Wamsmm WL 2 Copy of 20 6 The Department of Defense should develop and circulate for review of COB Saturday January 25 a set of talking points for use in briefing selected members of Congress on the US assessment of the Soviet proposal Where appropriate these talking points should include alternative bracketed language reflecting the substantiVe alternatives as yet undecided These points should cover the entire range of negotiations addressed in the OWL 20 paper and not simply focus on the general Framework issue and NET C 7 The Departnent of State should_develop and circulate for review by COB Saturday January 25 a sindlar set of talking point for use in briefing and consulting with allies C In the tasks identified above the OWL 20 paper itself will remain in OWL channels and OWL cleared personnel in agencies will share with non cleared personnel only the information needed drawn paper to permit the efficient accomplishment of these tasks C Results of SACG Discussion The SACG discussed OWL 20 on January 23 As a result the ACSG was directed to redo the paper for historical purposes and to include two new options provided by the OJCS and provided by State Attached at Annexes A and are the inputs provided to describe these two new Options in detail C Subsequent ACSG Work Rather than attempt to rework completely OWL 20 the ACSG decided to shift to a very short sunmary paper OWL 21 that attempted to narrow the range of options and present these options is a crisp manner drawing on OWL 20 for more detailed description The annexes of this paper are intended to provide the sore detailed descriptions of the options containted in OWL 21 C The specific detail of the enhancements to our current NST position which are called for in Option 3 of OWL 21 are listed in Annex of this paper as associated with Option C The detailed points which are the treatment of the concept issue crnnon to both Options 2 and 3 of OWL 21 are listed in their final ferm in Annex of this paper C ATTACHMENTS Figure 1 Annex A OJCS Input on Option Annex State Input on Option Annex Final Points for Concept Issue Carmen to Options 2 and 3 of OWL 21 WERE WU 5-4-51 - Q3 6 t2 is 9 3 Probe the Soviet position 0C3 00020N86 0C5 January 21 1986 FIGURE 1 WEIR ISSUE Alternative 1 Express reservations about the Soviet plan Explore new elements of the Soviet proposal in the appropriate negotiating fora Make no carmitment to a future approach along the lines of the concept proposed in Alternative 2 Alternative 2 Connit to advance at the appropriate time a US concept much reframes the core of the Soviet plan accepting some basic elements but rejecting any discussion of sub sequent phases or the details associ ated with such out year phases The timing of when this limited counter would be made is yet to be decided This is a limited concept with the specific details and limitiations provided on pages 8 and 9 Both approaches would inmediately criticize elements of the Soviet proposal that have been previously been offered and rejected by the US and the unrealistic details proposed in Soviet phases 2 and 3 attempt to maintain the focus on keeping priority on executing the mandate given at the last summit to pursue areas of council ground 50% reduction in nuclear arms appropriately applied and an INF agreanent Both would also START No issue The US would continue to press forward seeking ocnrnon ground based on our November 1 1985 proposal INF Alternative 1 Make no counter nove Press forward seeking common ground based on our November 1 position and probe the new elanents of the Soviet position Alternative 2 Propose zero-zero LRINF US and Soviet missiles in range of Europe and reductions of 35 205 in Asia initially to 50% subsequently also to zero Do it this round Defense 8 Space Make no counter move In any case do not attempt to negotiate an understanding on the interpretation of the AEM Treaty with the Soviets Alternative 1 Alternative 2 In addition to our current position the US delegation begin discussions with the Soviets on the specific meaning of the A34 Treaty's restrictions Verification Alternative 1 Immediately probe the Soviets on the nature of Gorbachev's connitment to work out NST verifica tion problems Alternative 2 Do not probe the Soviets on NST verification until the US has specific verification measures that it wishes to propose FIGURE 1 Won Declassify on OADR Substantive Issues Surmery U FIGURE 1