- ted States Department of State Washington D C 20520 January 29 1986 '33 Admiral Poindexter Assistant to the President f National Security a FROM E L Rowny S ARTxiggig _w1 1 a a -5177 9 ea rm tas ' SUBJECT Preferred Option for Responding to Gorbachev av- I support Option 2 This option gives the Soviets substantive responses to their substantive overtures and it gives them promises for the future where that's all they've given us It provides an appropriate response to Soviet ncwenent in INF without changing our existing positions in the other fora I would not categorize Option 2 as does as clearly rejecting the Soviet framework we should agree in principle that noving toWard eliminating all nuclear weapons will have to be done in some sort of phased approach Eb should insist however that all we can hope to do at this time is concentrate on the initial bilateral reductions as agreed in Geneva Ne should further insist that subsequent stages be tackled sequentially This would provide us time to take stock of the strategic situation and ensure that reductions had been properly huplemented and verified before crunencing further reductions The UK France and the PRC could observe the completion of the first stage reductions prior to themselves to negotiating reductions in their own nuclear forces Option 1 although better than the original Approach A still does not give the Soviets the opportunity to show whether they are serious or not Proponents of this option have argued that the Soviets have reestablished a link between LRINF reductions and SDI and that this does not merit a demonstration of US flexibility However the Soviets have stated that LRINF reductions are not linked to a ban on l space strike weapons we should see if they mean what they say Option 3 offers too much for too little There s no need for us to change our position in START We have a good position whereas they have introduced nothing new and maintain their precondition that no strategic reductions can take place until we give up SDI research There is no need to offer not to anend the ABM Treaty during the first stage We have no intention of violating the ABM Treaty Thus there is no point of renewing our marriage vows On the other hand we should not perpetuate the idea that we never intend to seek anendments to the Treaty even if SDI research is successful Furtherncme opening the Treaty in the hopes of arguing for wider interpretations of the ABM Treaty restrictions could establish a negotiating record that be used against us and our pursuit of testing that we believe is necessary and not in violation of the Treaty All options should bear down heavily on crnp iance and verification issues L