J's 3 3 as THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE tiff THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT Choosing a Response to the Gorbachev Proposal U U John Poindexter asked that I provide you with my thoughts on how you should respond to Gorbachev's most recent arms control proposal The following represents my assessment of this proposal and my recommendations about the options described in the OWL 20 and 2 papers TS In my view far from adding to the momentum from the Geneva summit Gorbachev's proposal is a rather transparent attempt to divert the energy imparted to the Nuclear and Space Talks NST by your Joint Statement in Geneva In committing both sides to a focussed effort to make early progress in these negotiations in areas of common ground you charted a course with real promise for reaching agreement on sound arms control accords The striking feature of this commitment was its explicit reference to 9gp two agenda items 50% reductions appropriately applied in START and an interim INF agreement In short your Joint Statement undercut the Soviet insistence on linkage of such steps to the abortion of SDI TS I do not see the Gorbachev initiative as putting us on the defensive Quite to the contrary it is a defensive action on his part Incidentally I do not sense that there has been anything resembling world opinion rushing to support much less acclaim the Gorbachev proposals He has not seized the high ground by pushing these essentially warmed-over Soviet ideas TS In reasserting his insistence on killing SDI and encumbering the negotiating agenda with some new -- and in some ways patently unacceptable proposals Gorbachev clearly wants to divert us from the most promising tasks at hand and minimize the prospects for progress We should not make it easier for him to do so For this reason I would support a modified Option 1 approach TS Under such an approach we would respond to the Soviets' latest maneuver by reemphasizing the agenda you agreed with Gorbachev To this endIr we should seek Soviet responses to the proposals you tabled in November Thus far we have had 29 meaningful reaction upfrom the Soviet negotiators to the moves we made a month and a half gp ago I believe it would be inappropriate and undesirable for us Vito make yet another fundamental change in our positions under such i icircumstances especially as a response to a largely unhelp- ful and propagandistic posture struck by Mr Gorbachev This is Classified by SECEEF a Declass1fy on OADR X38230 lmy -if OWL 2 the strategy they always try they refuse to respond to our pro posals instead they put forward their own plans hoping to lead us to make responses to their agenda and thus abandon our initiatives TS While with Option we would not offer new modifications to the substance of our proposals this should not be confused with standing pat or negotiating inflexibility To the contrary we would make it clear that we are ready to engage the Soviets at Geneva and in the other relevant negotiating fora for the purpose of exploring the real significance of the few new and at first glance-attractive elements in their initiative If contrary to our present expectations these negotiations demonstrate Soviet willingness to give substance to Gorbachev's I'early progress common ground pledge at the Summit manifested among other things by dropping the obvious non starters in their latest pro posals m we could readily respond with new positions of our own as appropriate TS Option 2 allowing as it does for the firSt time the Soviets to keep in the Eastern USSR while denying us the right to retain any LRINF weapons in Western Europe would entail in my view not only an extremely significant departure from our longstanding and principled commitment to address on a world wide and equitable basis the 88 20 menace It would also be a dangerous and unwarranted concession Under the best of circumstances the effect of this proposal would be to leave the Soviets with at least 85 LRINF missiles with some 255 warheads nominally based in the Eastern Soviet Union but with the inherent mobility to threaten all European targets within a matter of hours or days Of course such a force would also continue to pose a large threat to our Asian allies a threat they are properly extremely concerned about TS We must expect moreover that as the negotiations proceed we will face strong pressure from the Soviets and even some of our European allies to fall-off our insistence on reductions in Eastern Consequently I think this new negotiating stance would be not only unjustified but quite tenuous as well In addition were we to table Option 2 it may give rise to the perception that the only major remaining obstacle to completing a European LRINF accord is the determination of our British and French allies to modernize their obsolescent national deterrents We must not give the Soviets such a powerful tool for sundering our alliance TS I feel we must also exercise great care in the way we respond to the Soviets' framework or mechanism for realizing the elimination of all nuclear weapons In particular the appear ance of U S -Soviet convergence on the terms and conditions under which we hope to reach our stated shared goal is calculated by the Soviets to increase the pressure on us to put this objective at the forefront of our negotiating agenda Thus while I endorse 1' n_1nr and - -- Ky-i 313 the view ascribed to Option 2 that we should reject the Soviet framework I think it will be most difficult simultaneously to reject their approach and to agree with the general goal of moving to the total elimination of nuclear weapons when possible consistent with overall security and stability as proposed by Option 2 without helping the Soviets to divert public attention and the negotiating focus away from our agenda and pursuit of common ground on START and INF Consequently I would recommend using our response in the nuclear arena solely to put the ball squarely back in Gorbachev's court to press him to work as he pledged to do for near term progress in the common ground of START and INF There will be plenty of time later for work on and discussions of other longer term and even more difficult tasks TS Even more damaging to U S interests in general and SDI in particular would be the Option 3 proposals Option 3 s proposed commitment not to seek amendment of the ABM Treaty during the first phase of offensive arms reduction would be extremely prejudicial to future SDI options Another proposal the idea of junking the ban on unverifiable mobile ICBMS we tabled in the START talks barely six weeks ago has the double liability of making us look weak and irresolute and legitimizing the Soviet effort to acquire the means to circumvent the sharp reductions agreements we seek on offensive nuclear arms I 5 jibe- 12 1 a c 34 Wit-