SYSTEM II 12 90068 THE WHITE HOUSE addwn WASHINGTON INFORMATION February 1 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM JOHN M POINDEXTER SUBJECT Background Material for the February 3 NSPG Meeting on Responding to Gorbachev S General Secretary Gorbachev wrote you on January 14 about a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons through a three phase schedule by the year 2000 He also went public with this plan shortly thereafter The Soviet plan has a large measure of propaganda but its broad nature and defined timelines have optical appeal which must be handled carefully in formulating our response You received a background package last weekend on this subject and the attached material has been further refined for your reading this weekend A meeting of appropriate Cabinet officials is scheduled for Monday at 11 15 to permit you to hear their recommended approach before deciding their written views are compiled at Tab E In sum OSD favors not altering our current positions while discrediting the Soviet plan and the JCS have recently joined in this View The State Department would be far more forthcoming in adapting to parts of the Soviet plan and putting forth new US positions in Geneva this round in each of the three negotiating fora ACDA your NST negotiators and my own recommendations fall between these two approaches in which we reframe the issue in our own terms and move with a substantive change to our INF position only Attachment Tab A Issue Paper for NSPG Tab Options Matrix of the OWL 20 Paper Tab Summary of the Soviet Proposal Tab w- Military Implications Tab Views of NSPG Principals Prepared by Bill Wright Bob Linhard 0-150 gilghl $ 15 02 - 9 February 1 1936 Responding to Gorbachev's January Proposals S ISSUE The issue to be addressed at Monday's NSPG is how should the US respond to the January 14 1986 initiative by General Secretary Gorbachev ALTERNATIVES Three alternative options have been developed gption 1 Express reservations about the Soviet plan Explore new elements of the Soviet proposal in the appropriate negotiating fora but not put forward any changes to our current positions in the START INF or Defense and Space Talks DST areas in response to this Soviet initiative gption 2 Protect our option to advance at the appropriate tine a US proposal which refranes the core of the Soviet plan accepting some basic elenents a commitment to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons but with no specific tineline and agreeuanzthat the initial step should be reductions but rejecting discussion of the Soviet proposal of subsequent phases or the details associated with such out year phases thion 3 Go beyond Option 2 and propose substantive changes to all three US positions START INF and DST during the current round Each of the options would attempt to maintain the focus on keeping priority on executing the mandate given at the last summit to pursue areas of ccnnon ground 50% reduction in nuclear arms appropriately applied and an interbn INF agreenent Paper copies of the larger option summary charts which have been prepared to support NSPG discussion are provided at Tab B DISCUSSION At the heart of the Soviet proposal sunnerized at Tab C is General Secretary Gorbachev's proposed plan for achieving the total elinunation of nuclear weapons by the end of the century Certain elenents of the Soviet plan reflect positions offered by the US to the Soviets over the past 5 years including the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons handling the nuclear forces of others only after we have unwed bilaterally to 50% reductions as we define them and the need to go beyond National Technical Means EHM as required for effective verification 0n the other hand the Soviet plan narrowly focuses on only the total elindnation of all nuclear weapons by 1999 making that a goal in itself It Q3 does not address the corresponding deterrence and stability rationale for weapons or the associated mechanisms including equitable reductions compliance and SDI that will be needed either to eliminate the underlying 7 security requirements fer nuclear weapons or replace the contribution now 3 fa made by the nuclear weapons It offers no schedule for the resolution of 9 existing regional conflicts and differences and in the process sets up a situation in which if the elimination of nuclear weapons by that date were taken as a serious possibility it undercuts US and allied nuclear modernization Key national security considerations associated with the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are sunnarized at Tab D 8i Declassify on OADR The potential relationship of this general conceptual issue to the upcoming summit should be considered Those who support gptions 2 ACDA Ambassador Rowny and your three negotiators and ng'on 3 State want to protect the option of using the US response to reframe the Soviet proposal along US terms so as to give us the possibility of some limited general agreement about the elimination of nuclear weapons which could be reached at the next summit Those who support gpg on 1 the Secretary of Defense and the JCS believe that if we pursue this approach it will cause the smmit to because in effect a deadline for reaching some agreement with the Soviets and therefore it will be much more difficult to deal with the Soviet proposal protect our interests and pursue our agenda In addition to deciding we should respond to the general Soviet framemrk for the elimination of nuclear weapons by 1999 we also need to consider the issue of whether the US should now move in INF Defense and Space or in any other major arms control area as a result of the Soviet initiative The Gorbachev proposal does not involve any changes in the previous Soviet START position The Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs ACDA Ambassador Rowny and our START negotiator Ambassador Tower believe that the US should not adjust the US position tabled only last November The Secretary of State and Ambassador Nitze believe that we should change our START position by altering our proposed ban on mobile ICHVIs so as to permit single warhead mobile if the proper verification measures can be worked out State feels that this would not only allow us to make scme modest movement in Geneva but would help with Congress especially with those who support our own program thion 3 supported by State would direct such a move in the START area The Gorbachev package canbines an important Shift in INF that is both potentially encouraging and potentially troublescme with some familiar and unacceptable elements The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs feel that the Soviets have not made a move in INF that deserves a response at this time The Secretary of State ACDA Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny and our INF negotiator Ambassador Glitman believe the US should respond by proposing the elimination of US and Soviet LRINF in Europe coupled with significant reductions of 85 205 in Asia at least 50% and subsequent elimination of all in Asia gption 2 would direct such a move thion 3 supported by State would also direct such a move but go further and make it part of a package corresponding moves which also involve both the START and Defense and Space areas Defense and Space The parts of the new Soviet proposal that address matters in Defense and Space neither advance the negotiations nor offer anything positive to which we could respond The Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs ACDA Ambassador Rowny and our Defense and Space negotiator Ambassador Kampleman believe that the US should not adjust its position The Secretary of State and Ambassador Nitze believe that we should change our position by proposing that neither side seek amendment of the ABM Treaty during the period in which reductions to 50% of offensive nuclear forces take place and agree to do nothing further to erode confidence in it gption 3 supported by State would direct such a move in the Defense and Space area AGENCY VIEWS Tab includes a series of Hencmanda which contain agency views thion 1 is supported by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Qggigg_g is supported by ACDA Ambassador Rowny and your HST negotiators Ambassadors Kanpdenan Tower and Glitman thion 3 is supported by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Nitze The views of the Director of Central Intelligence have not been provided as of this time NSC STAFF What is needed now is a preliminary decision on the options so that we can begin innediate consultation with Allies hear their views and then reach a final US position NSC staff would recommend that gption 2 be selected - gption is too negative It fails to address the potential challenge that we may face should the Gorbachev initiative gain unnemtum over time It also fails to attempt to exploit the opportunity that the Gorbachev initiative may represent to make some useful progress Finally it forecloses the possibility of using this opportunity to refrane the Soviet proposal into scnething that could be usefully used at the next summit - gption 3 goes too far The Soviet initiative does not on its own Inerit warrant an additional US Home in either the START or the Defense and Space area does the public response to the Gorbachev initiative demand that we make an across the board come we just made a major move last November and before making the changes in START or Defense and Space contained in Option 3 we would prefer to do a more complete analysis of these and other perhaps better potential options gption 2 would put us in a position to make a US proposal which reframes the Soviet plan in US terms and let us try to pocket any serious Soviet nrNenent in the INF area Executing Option 2 If gption 2 were selected fnon February 5th through the 12th we would consult with our allies Until this is no US decision would be announced or implemented with the Soviets thion 2 would be presented as US preliminary thinking so that allies would feel that their views have been fully taken into account With allied views heard and assuming no unforeseen allied reactions we would incorporate the thrust of thion 2 in correspondence responding to Gorbachev we would not make a specific proposal for an agreement on the points associated with gption 2 at this time but lay the foundation for such a step as the summit nears Finally by February 15th we would issue instructions to the US delegation in Geneva directing the US move in the INF area only I 85% Wm US is committed ultimately to eliminating nuclear weapons observations are not intended to undercut this goal __'dangers we face if this goal is pursued in isolation as proposed by the Soviet plan factions which obviate the requirements for those weapons including resolu -L Ztion of regional differences SENSITIVE Annex -- National Security Inplications of Eliminating Nuclear Weapons by 1999 Our current national strategy depends to a great extent on the contribution of offensive nuclear weapons both strategic and non-strategic While we are committed to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons we have always noted that translating this into reality will take a long time since we will either have to change the international situation to the point that the contribution of nuclear weapons is no longer needed ideological and regional tensions resolved or alternative means of maintaining security are in place Any ccnmitment we make to a detailed plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons must be viewed as an extremely serious step which we must be sure we can execute and safely live with because once made it may generate pressures budgetary arms control political which could force the US unilaterally toward such a course We are equally to NATO strategy 14 3 which also depends feavily on the contribution of both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons mm 14 3 is in many respects a scmewhat fragile political strategy but absolutely essential to maintaining alliance cohesion In tie context of re SDI debate for example the FRG offered the principle which we endorsed that unless and until an alternative to current strategy is found and agreed upon it is essential that full support be provided to 14 3 Any commitment to a schedule such as that proposed by the Soviets would immediately call into question the future of 14 3 Once again this would be a most serious step and one that would require extensive Allied consultation If the current regional imbalances in conventional forces are not resolved there would be little to deter hostile powers from pursuing their interests to the potential detriment of US interests Significant political economic and military commitment would be required to equal the deterrent potential of relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons Furthermore elimination of nuclear weapons by the current nuclear powers could place than at risk from those that have not possession but may in fact possess or gain access to such weapons The direct impact of the Soviet plan would be to derail Western modernization Sane of the provisions by simply being given the status of real possibilities could achieve the same result For example if ue elimination of British and French systems is roughly 8 years away why should the UK invest its limited resources on the Trident missile Similarly if tactical systems are also going to be gone in the same time frame why should NATO pay the fiscal and political costs of modernizing these systems Why should the US or the US and its allies waste precious funds and take the political heat of continuing with And why pay for systems like MX and the These But to point out the Total elimination of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by the correction of military asymmetries and a fundamental change in orientation and ambitions of the Soviet leadership