5 900 9 i pi THEVWHTEHOUSE mimim ea WASHINGTON February 4 1986 NAIIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 210 Allied Consultations on the US Response to General Secretary Gorbachev's January 14 1986 Arms Control Proposal U Earlier last month General Secretary Gorbachev proposed a plan for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of this century I have completed my review of our options in responding to the General Secretary's proposal and I have reached certain decisions Before proceeding further I would like to ensure that we have consulted fully with our allies In accomplishing these consultations the primary focus should be on our approach to handling the general concept of a process leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and on a proposed U S initiative in the Intermediate range Nuclear Force INF area The Concept With respect to the concept advanced by the General Secretary as his plan for the elimination of all nuclear weapons the U S should respond in the following manner 99 l The United States is pleased that the Soviet Union agrees with our ultimate goal of moving to the total elimination of nuclear weapons when possible consistent with our overall requirements for security and stability 2 As a means of accomplishing this the U S has proposed and continues to advocate a process by which the U S and the U S S R would take the first steps toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons bilaterally specifically by implementing the principle of a 50% reduction in the nuclear forces of both sides appropriately applied and by negotiating an interim INF agreement When U S and Soviet forces are reduced and additional reductions are under discussion we can envision subsequent steps which could involve the United Kingdom France and the People's Republic of China so that all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced and stable manner imv mxamasm w mam-I If 9 z 22955 3 The U S believes that our immediate focus should remain on the prompt accomplishment of the first steps of this process especially the implementation of the principle of 50% reductions appropriately applied and an interim INF agreement Achieving 50% reductions and a separate INF agreement will NSI Declassify on OADR was mm 2 require serious negotiation Significant differences on the elements that would constitute an equitable agreement exist between the two sides Both sides must focus their negotiating efforts on resolving these differences This is in keeping with the commitment made at our most recent summit to accelerate efforts to find common ground It is also clearly the foundation upon which both we and the Soviets agree all else must build 4 The U S is pleased that the Soviet Union recognizes our long held position that verification of negotiated agreements is critical and we intend to pursue General Secretary Gorbachev's offer to come to terms on any necessary verification measures an 5 We cannot agree with many of the specific details proposed in the subsequent phases of the Soviet plan at this time Any commitment to the specifics of the Soviet subsequent phases would require extensive detailed discussion This would divert time and talent from the immediate work at hand likely add difficulties for that critical bilateral work immediately involve other sovereign nations in the process and once done result in at best very tentative commitments which would still depend upon the results of the first steps now in process in Geneva For this reason we see no benefit in negotiating with the Soviets on a framework going beyond the points contained above P In explaining the commitments associated with the approach outlined above the United States would make it clear that in its view the total elimination of nuclear weapons requires conditions that include correcting conventional and other force imbalances and problems full compliance with existing and future treaty obligations peaceful resolution of regional conflicts in ways that allow free choice without outside interference and a demonstrated commitment by the Soviet leadership to peaceful competition The U S would also make clear its view that the elimination of nuclear weapons would not obviate the need for defenses against such weapons particularly to protect against cheating or breakout by any country Nuclear and Space Talks NST I am not inclined to change our November 1985 positions in those areas in which the Soviet Union has failed to indicate any motion on their part nor even addressed fully our most recent proposals Therefore I do not envision new U S initiatives in either the START or Defense and Space areas at this time I am considering authorizing the U S delegation to propose a new U S initiative in the INF area along the following lines gment-W CHRON HLE i 3 l The United States continues firmly to believe that the best solution remains the global elimination of the entire class of U S and Soviet land-based LRINF missiles We are prepared to negotiate an effective verifiable agreement to that end without any additional constraints However since the Soviet Union continues to refuse to join us in moving immediately to such a global zero zero solution the U S would propose the elimination of U S and Soviet LRINF in Europe west of Novosibirsk and therefore Barnaul coupled to initial significant reductions in in central and eastern Asia of at least subsequently to zero 2 These reductions and limits would involve US and Soviet systems only There would be no agreed constraints on the forces of the United Kingdom or France S 3 Associated with this the United States would also propose a global LRINF missile warhead ceiling under which the U S would retain the right to global equality to match any Soviet 85-20 warheads remaining outside Europe with U S systems in the Continental United States or elsewhere outside of Europe Soviet LRINF systems which are reduced wouldtbe destroyed U S systems based in Europe could be withdrawn to the U S unless or until they were in excess of the equal global ceiling in which case they would be destroyed while protecting a right to convert the Pershing II missiles to Pershing IB missiles LE 4 This would also be associated with an equal Shorter Range INF SRINF ceiling at current Soviet level or to freeze SRINF at both sides December 31 1982 levels 54 5 Finally the United States would introduce the basis for mutual exploration of a verification regime as an integral part of this proposal Consultation I would like consultations based upon the positions outlined above completed on a priority basis with our European and Asian allies FF - a at l Ul ujwn