see b f 1-2 THEVHHTEHOUSE SYSTEM 11 90126 11 99 - ii - in was W MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM JOHN M SUBJECT Allied Views on a Response to Gorbachev As you recall Ambassadors Hitse and Rowny along with Ron Lehman and Bob Linhard were sent last week to consult with our NATO and Asian allies respectively on the approach you propose to take in responding to the overall arms Control plan put forward by General Secretary Gorbachev last month I provided you with a preliminary staff summary of the reborts coming in from the consultation teams last weekend in California At Tabs A and from your two emissaries are letters formally reporting on their trips They represent a more seasoned assessment of the allied reactien from their gerspeetives Additionally we have begun to replies to your most scent letter on this subject sent to allied leaders You may the personal replies of Prime M'nihter Tha toher Tab C 4 i Jrime Minister Nakasene iah D and Prime Minis er subbers very different particular inte reasons has reacted to our propes 1 Md approach taking into consideration these results and will be providing you with a recommended course of action by week's end We are revisiting the INF Attachments Tab A Letter from Ambassador Paul Nitze dated 2 14 86 Tab Letter from Ambassador Edward Rowny dated 2 14 86 Tab Letter from Prime Minister Thatcher dated 2 11 86 Tab Letter from Prime Minister Nakasone dated 2 10 86 Tab Letter from Prime Minister Lnbhers dated 2 17 86 Prepared ty Bob Linhard Bill Wright seesaw assairrgaa ere- REL United States Department of State Washington D C 20520 February 14 1986 Dear Mr President Pursuant to your instructions Ron Lehman and I consulted with the seniOr government leadership in London Paris Bonn Rome The Hague and Brussels He also held consultations with the North Atlantic Council at the end of our bilateral discussions in capitals This is our report on those consultations Our European allies are most appreciative of your emphasis on the consultative process and showed general support for your anticipated response to General Secretary Gorbachev's January program They understand the necessity of your trying to work with Mr Gorbachev to find common ground in arms control on which we can base an agreement which would be in the interest' of both East and West They are however fully aware that Mr Gorbachev's proposal was packaged and delivered to maximize its political and propaganda impact They are supportive of the positive tone of your proposed response to Mr Gorbachev but largely because they believe such a tone is necessary to counter the public effect of the Gorbachev proposal In sum they are in general with you in your response to the Soviets There was no significant disagreement with our appraisal that the Gorbachev proposal is astute designed for its political impact designed to drive wedges in the Alliance and requires a careful response Almost all favored a response that would be positive in tone but cautious as to Specifics They approved the idea of focusing on bilateral first steps and the idea of emphasizing the preconditions to a nuclear-free world Home suggested changing our START or our basic Defense Space position There are problems however A number of issues surfaced which should be considered as suggestions for modifications to your anticipated response to Mr Gorbachev or to our public handling of that re5ponse I DECL V'rim assmmo IN PART I ere was somedeestioning of a respon f'rs steps a zero zero outcome on INF in res-m simi ome opponents of zero zero INF 1n EurOpe argue- at wit drawing U S INF forces could decouple the U S from Europe a situation which they claim the 1979 dual track decision was aimed to redress The Germans are supportive of both the goal of total elimination and zero zero INF in Europe Because of their unique geographic position they are also sensitive to the shorter-range missile issue Hence they are appreciative that your proposed reSponse would address this issue whereas Mr Gorbachev d'd 9 There was general support for SDI as a research program which potentially could Strengthen the deterrent there was disagreement however with linking it to the objective of a nuclear-free world Some thought we should develOp a dialogue to clarify ABM Treaty restraints in a way that would make evident that SDI research is not limited Some also suggested an extention of time with regard to withdrawal There was a virtual consensus that you should press Mr Gorbachev strongly for a total ban on chemical weapons and on an acceptable outcome on a package of from the Stockholm Conference The Allies are also anxious for movement in MBFR They are mindful however that an agreement from the Vienna forum cannot in itself redress the conventional force imbalance in Europe rdi fl Hith the exception there has universal concern over U S opposition to a CTB Most of this criticism seemed to stem from domestic political pressure in the Allied countries Some suggested we express more strongly approval of a CTB as a goal to be attained some time in the future Almost all urged that we continue to abide by the limitations of existing strategic arms treaties otherwise it would have devastating effect on European support for and confidence in U S arms control policy Finally the Allies were unanimous in the view that your response to Mr Gorbachev should pick up on and challenge him to demonstrate his willingness meaningfully to implement his overture on verification ReSpectfully I aw Paul H Nitze Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters The President The White House Foam 53 some 3 -Dear Mr iihuman rights and bilateral issues Waited States Department of State Wishingmn D C 20520 February 14 1986 President The leaders of Japan PRC Korea and Australia all expressed their gratitude that you sent me to expand upon your proposed response to Gorbachev's January 15 plan They were unanimous in their praise of your initial reaction While they consider Gorbachev's 'plan I to be largely propaganda they said you were correct in adopting a positive attitude and welcoming the common ground while expressing disagreement with many of the details of his I plan All believe you are on the right track in broadening the issues beyond arms control to include regional issues They all bore down hard on the importance of effective verification and expressed skepticism that the Soviets would go beyond their rhetoric and permit on site inspection In Japan I was unfortunately preceded by a New Yo 5_limes story which had been reprinted in the Japanese press It characterized the proposed INF reductions as 100% in Europe but only 50% in Asia I pointed out that a 100% reduction of INF missiles on a global basis was our preferred position and still on the table Moreover while we agreed with the Soviets that there should be a 50% reduction in strategic systems in an appropriate manner in the first phase we also agreed that during the same phase our plan would in fact amount to about an 80% reduction of INF warheads on a global basis Further we would retain the right to match their remaining LRINF missiles until they reduced to zero Hour proposal wi important idea that we call for an 80% global reduction in Soviet DECLASSIFIED IN NLS era r W NARA sate The President The White House Washington DC BY 20500 nattzo na LRINF missiles permitting the Soviets to keep their remaining 205 about 85 in Novosibirsk Barnaul and Kansk represents one possible solution These Soviet missiles would be labeled neither European nor Asian e Ja-angse also at -- 19' -a hy the fety and reliability of our ndblear stockpile depended on continued testing which would make a moratorium unacceptable Mike Mansfield was supportive throughout The'Chinese reaction was simila one point st 7 3 5a f 22m - amd h gempha51zed our steadfast commitment to global elimination of LRINF missiles I explained that although the Soviets still refused to include Asian LRINF systems in their initial proposal they had agreed for the first time to eliminate ERINF missiles in Europe The US in response proposes to accept the Soviet position in Europe but calls for reductions in Soviet Asian LRINF missiles as well This US proposal would result in 80% reductions on a global basis during the first phase The Chinese were friendly throughout the meeting and during Win Lord's luncheon Win has quickly gained the respect of the Chinese but much more mutedKorea Dixie Walker a college classmate and old friend was particularly helpful I had more than an hour with President Chun whose approach was supportive of our proposal He expressed confidence that we will do whatever is best on g far US Korean relations but for our allies the re ioncharacterized the US Korean relationship as being very strong Other Koreans I spoke with expressed a desire to improve economic relations The Australian reaction produced no surprises A session with Prime Minister Hawks and Defense Minister Hayden originally scheduled for twenty minutes went well over an hour We covered the gamut from INF to SDI to nuclear testing The Prime Minister 3 75 - - 15 43 r Mt- f our commitmen 0 zero NF y ustra lans showed great interest in the nuclear testing issue Here again I stressed the continued need for nuclear testing to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile On SDI the Australians i Anu r In summary the reaction from our Asian friends and allies was as expected especially on INF The negative reaction concerning the INF portion of our proposal can be dealt with by how we characterize that proposal I recommend that we modify our proposal First we should restate our commitment to a global zeronzero LRINF missile solution SecondIr we should propose an interim step on the road to this goal with the USSR reducing its LRINF warheads by 80% and the US matching the Soviet global warhead level The remaining systems could be deployed by the US and the USSR without geographical constraints of any kind I am convinced this approach will be significantly more palatable to our allies in Asia and would be met with a positive reaction in Europe as well Yours respectfully gg ZW Rowny