Mariam OWL 0 3 ours an February 19 1986 Copy of 10 OWL 23 Sumerizing the INF Options The following options were developed based upon Allied ccnsultation and are scribed in some additional detail in OWL 22 They would replace a portion of the INF decision in NSDD 210 All would begin as outlined in NSDD 210 with the following statement The US continues firmly to believe that the best solution remains the global elimination of the entire class of US and Soviet land-based IBINF missiles We are prepared to negotiate an effective verifiable agreanent to that end without additional constraints Hcmever since the Soviet Union continues to refuse to join us in moving immediately to such a global zero-zero solution the US proposes ggionh the USSR will reduce its LRINF warheads by 80 percent and the U S will match the Soviet global warhead level The remaining systems may be deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union wittnut geographic constraints of any kind 'on B As an interim INF agreement both sides mild reduce their LRINF misslees and latmchers in Europe and the Far East to zero The Soviet Union could retain no more than 243 270 warheads on 81 90 55-20 launchers and missiles These remaining Soviet missiles would be deployed only at the existing bases at Novosibirisk and Barnaul in the central USSR The US would retain an equal number of LRINF warheads on missiles and launchers deployed outside Europe and the Far East This would result in an equal global ceiling of from 243-270 warheads on LRINF missiles Both sides would reaffirm the objective of the eventual elimination of all US and Soviet missiles The US would continue to seek the firmest possible commitment to the earliest possible date for the eventual elimination of all US and Soviet IRINF missiles ion C As an interim INF agreement both sides would reduce their IRDIF missiles and launchers in Europe and the Far East to zero The Soviet Union could retain no more than 243 270 warheads on 81-90 55-20 launchers and missiles These remaining Soviet IRINF missiles would be deployed only at the existing bases at Novosibiriskand Barnaul in the central USSR The US would retain an equal nomber of LRINF warheads on missiles and launchers deployed outside Europe and the Far East Under this agreement the USSR and the US would initially reduce their LRINF missile deployments in Europe to 140 g launchers with concurrent proportiormte reductions in Asia and the US would s gre freeze its LRINF missile deployments at the December 31 1985 level of 140 g is launchers to be followed by further reductions to the interim outcoie stated above The US would also continue to seek an early date for the elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF missiles and both sides would reaffirm' the objective of the eventual elimination of all US and Soviet IRINF missiles ion D Continue to pursue the option described in NSDD 210 zero zero in Europe and 50% reduction in Asia as briefed to the allies i gEion E Given the Allied reaction rather than making an additional move in INF mw the US should reaffirm our November 1985 position which seeks as an interim agreement reductions in IRINF in Europe to 140 launchers and concurrent proportional reductions in Asia Declassify on OADR as ML 22 INF OPTIQQS AFIER The following options were developed based upon Allied consultation and are described in some additional detail in OWL 22 They would replace a portion of the INF decision in NSDD 210 All would begin as outlined in NSDD 210 with the following statement The US continues firmly to believe that the best solution retains the global elimination of the entire class of US and Soviet land based LRINF missiles We are prepared to negotiate an effective verifiable agreement to that end without additional constraints However since the Soviet Union continues to refuse to join us in moving immediately to such a global zero zero solution the US proposes 'on A As an interim step on the road to this goal 1mder this option the USSR will reduce its IRINF warheads by 80 percent and the U S will match the Soviet global warhead level The remaining systems may be deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union without geographic constraints of any kind Pros Simple to explain and understand Consistent with NSDD 210 Avoids implicit compensation for UK and French systems Is conpletely global in nature and iereby avoids treating one region differently from another Would give the US the right to retain sane LRINF deployments in Europe Meets 1977 NATO High Level Group study reqiiratents for NATO deterrence 200 to 600 warheads on IRINF missiles in Europe and retains coupling with NATO lower global LRINF missile warhead level 255 IBINF warheads than the current US position 687 IBINF warheads tabled in November 1985 Warhead unit of account is the best measure of capability and provides the greatest degree of force mix flexibility Basing can be achieved in all 5 basing countries Meets Japanese and Chinese concerns in that it avoids treating one region differently from another i Cons This is essentially a step back to our 1983 INF position equal global limits at a level between 0 and 572 and it would be generally seen as less attractive to the Soviet Union than our November 1 1983 It proposal and would be taken as a negative response to Gorbachev's proposal and thus inconsistent with the spirit of the summit IE It is inconsistent with the US offer not to offset the entire Soviet a global deployment with US deployments in Europe and to discuss the mix of US Pershing II and GEMS in Europe if- With no regional sub-ceiling Soviets are free to concentrate all their SS-20s in either Europe or Asia and to move 58-205 back and forth between East and West making both US matching missiles in Europe and verification even more difficult Declassify on OADR ion B As an interim INF agreatent both sides would reduce their LRINF missiles and launchers in Europe and the Far East to zero The Soviet Union could retain no mre than 243 270 warheads on 81 90 85-20 launchers and missiles These remaining Soviet LRINF missiles would be deployed only at the existing bases at Novosibirisk and Barnaul in the central USSR The US would retain an equal nmber of IRINF warheads on missiles and launchers deployed outside Europe and the Far East This would result in an equal global ceiling of 243-270 warheads on LRINF missiles Both sides would reaffirm the objective of the eventual elimination of all US and Soviet missiles The US would ccmtinue to seek the firmest possible corrmi ment to the earliest possible date for the eventual elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF missiles Pros Stresses global approach Consistent with NSDD 210 Same basic INF position as in NSDD 210 plus additional constraints on the location of residual INF missiles Responsive to Japanese concern and suggestions May help verification in constraining deployrrents to a limited area - A substantive Hove in INF picking up zerowzero in Europe from the Soviet proposal lower global missile warhead level 255 IMF warheads than the current US position 687 LRINF warheads tabled in November 1985 tion E Warhead unit of account is the best measure of capability and provides the greatest degree of force mix flexibility Cons -- Hasthe sane fundamental flawastheNSDD 210 INFoptionthatwasnot well received by allies that it radically departs from long established US and mu principles of genuine equality and globality -- Leaves the Soviets with wverage of most of Europe Japan and China In view of the nobility of the 55 205 they could readily be deployed into range of all of MTG Europe The US have no IBINF coverage of the USSR -- Notwithstanding the Central figleaf it will be characterized prominently in the press as zero for Europe and 81-90 for Asia thereby continuing problem for the Japanese -- Undercuts the Governments of MTG basing countries who have made hard-won decisions Implanentation of deployment decisions will be highly problematic with the mere tabling of a US zero in Europe option Chances of US redeploynent of IRINF to Eur0pe if the Soviet Union fails to reduce its Asian 55 203 to zero would be impossible as a practical political matter Does not meet the m0 High Level Group study requirements for HMO deterrence in that it does not provide between 200 and 600 US IMF warheads deployed in Europe as called for in the NATO 1977 study Destabilizirxg perceived as decoupling by a number of European Allies Novosibirisk and Barnaul 80% of the 55 20 warheads it had at the tins of two track decision in 1979 would make a mockery of that dwision by risking the very decolpling of US defense itself from US defense of Europe that it sought to prevent Confining US out of range of the USSR removes the only significant leverage for elimination of the remaining 55 205 and opens possibilities for Soviet linkages and pressures on other US forces There being no likelihood of the Soviets going to zero the US and mo would be faced with a nominally numerically limited SS-20 force which could not be verified with adequate confidence given the nobility and transportability of these weapons and the Soviet propensity for cheating Creates perception of US acquiescence to indirect form of carpensation or offset for the USSR for third country nuclear forces or US forward based system Restricting US IMF deployments out of range of the USSR and effectively totheUSmaybetresane as eliminating them ashidgetandother pressures undercut our ability to maintain this force in the US Tabling this proposal would give rise to perception that the only major remaining obstacle to completion of an IRINF accord is the determination of our British and French allies to modernize their obsolesCent national nuclear deterrent forces Qgion C As an interim INF agreement both sides would reduce their LRINF missiles and launchers in Europe and the Far East to zero The Soviet Union could retain no more than 243-270 warheads on 81-90 85-20 launchers and missiles These remaining Soviet IRINF missiles would be deployed only at the existing bases at Novosibirisk and Barnaul in the central USSR The US would retain an equal umber of LRINF warheads on missiles and launchers deployed outside Europe and the Far East Under this agreement the USSR and the US would initially reduce their IRENE missile deployments in Europe to 140 launchers with concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia and the US wild freeze its IRINF missile deployments at the December 31 1985 level of 140 launchers to be followed by further reductions to the interim outccne stated above The US would also continue to seek an early date for the elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF missiles and both sides would reaffirm the objective of the eventual elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF missiles Pros The initial reductions required under this approach are consistent with both NSDD 210 and our current URINF position -- The initial reductions to 140 launchers meets the NATO High level Group study criteria for NATO deterrence and supports basing in all 5 basing countries This could result in initial equal warhead levels in Europe -- The initial reductions to 140 launchers could support basing in all 5 current basing countries in Europe The further interim reductions continue the reduction of operational with the resulting threat is shared equally by Asia and Europe Meets Japanese Dutch and sure UK concerns gez snemVE cm Cons The approach is fairly carplicated making it difficult to explain and present The presentation could become confused with the Soviet three phase plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons Use of launcher unit of account in the initial reductions 140 in Europe restricts force mix flexibility If warhead equality is maintained in Europe the launcher unit of drives the Pershing II force level down by roughly 60% which is far more than the overall US percentage reduction from 572 to 420 450 The interim reductions leaving Soviet systems at Novosibirisk and Barnaul has the same fundamental flawastheNSDD 210 INFoprtionthatwasmt well received by allies that it radically departs long- established US and mun principles of genuine equality and globality The interim reductions also leaves the Soviets with IRINF coverage of most of Europe Japan and China view of the nobility of the 85 205 they could readily be deployed into range of all of NATO Europe The US would have no LRINF coverage of the USSR Notwithstanding the Central figleaf it will be characterized prcminently in the press as zero for Europe and til-90 85-205 for Asia thereby continuing problems for the Japanese Undercuts the Governments of NATO basing countries who have made hard won decisions Implementation of deployment decisions will be highly problematic with the nere tabling of a US zero in Europe option Chances of US redeployment of IRINF to Europe if the Soviet Union fails to reduce its Asian 85-205 to zero would be impossible as a practical political matter Does not meet the HMO High Level Group study requirements for deterrence in that it does not provide between 200 and 600 US warheads deployed in Europe as called for in the MO 1977 study Deetabilizing perceived as decexpling by a number of European Allies UK France etc ZeroUSlRINFinEuropewhile allevingtl eSovietstoretainat Novosibirisk and Barnaul 80% of the 55-20 warheads it had at the titre of two track decision in 1979 wild make a mockery of that decision by risking the very decoupling of US defense itself from US defense of Europe that it sought to prevent Confining US IRINF out of range of the USSR renoves the only significant leverage for elimination of the remaining 58-205 and opens possibilities for Soviet linkages and pressures on other US forces There being no likelihood of the Soviets going to zero the US and HMO would be faced with a ncminally numerically limited 55 20 force which could not be verified with adequate confidence given the nobility and transportability of these weapons and the Soviet propensity for cheating Creates perception of US acquiescence to indirect form of cmpensation or offset for the USSR for third country forces or US forward-based systems Restricting US IRINF deployments out of range of the USSR and effectively asbudgetandother pressures undercut our ability to maintain this force in the US Tabling this proposal would give rise to perception that the only major retaining obstacle to completion of an IBINF accord is the determination of our British and French allies to modernize their obsolescent national nuclear deterrent forces 'on D Continue to pursue the option described in N811 210 zero-zero in Europe and 50% reduction in Asia as briefed to tie allies Pros -- Eliminates all IRJNF missiles in Europe and this seems to fall in line with the US zero-zero gldaal approach - Reduces by 1 2 the Soviet threat in Asia Maintains US right to an equal US global warhead level Cons Does not nest High Level Group deterrence criteria Risks decoupling in Europe Restricting US LRINF to the us removes major leverage for the eventual elimination of the ranaining 85-20 force Soviets could perceive this proposal as achiowledging their right 1 to scme level of to offset third countries and or US forward based Will be perceived by Asians that they are less important to the US than our NATO allies Will confirm suspicions of sons allies that our consultations were merely perfunctory and of final US positions Could cause serious alliance management problems in the future gption E Given the Allied reaction rather than making an additional move in INF now the US should reaffirm our November 1985 position which seeks as an interim agreement reductions in in Eurcnpe to 140 launchers and Pros Couples US and NATO and meets MTG deterrence criteria - Basing can be achieved in 5 basing countries Could result in equal warheads in Europe while meeting Japanese concerns Calls on Soviets to address fully our relatively new Novelrber proposal Trey have so far attarpted to brush it off without adequate attention Cons Use of launcher unit of account restricts force mix flexibility Would result in a US response to Gorbachev which includes no change at all in our Nuclear and Space Talks position This chuld have adverse political Congressional and public relations consequences Lack of substantive response by the US to the Gorbachev proposal will present the Soviets with a public relations bonanza the US will be protrayed as incapable of responding constructively to a Soviet initiative that is perceived as having scne utility