1 an 77% We SYSTEM II 90138 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL aljihiwiv 3' in sscese SENS ITIVE WASHINGTON no 20506 SEHVE WITH OWL ATTACHMENT 5i ACTION February 22 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M POINDEXTER w FROM BOB LIN RON LEHMAN SUBJECT Additional INF Options Per instructions we have brainstormed additional options had asked for an option which is between Option A and Oppion and which meets certain criteria The criteria applied were 1 Options should represent a firm plan to get to zero zero globally as soon as possible with clear intermediate points 2 or 3 2 Rationale for intermediate points needs to be publicly presentable 3 Needs to be perceived as fair in the public in that we should not demand Soviet reductions with no explainable comparable US LRINF reductions 4 There should be no direct ccnnutnent to a European zero zero 5 Should be a GrannrRudman like approach to the problem At Tab A you will find a description of our reccnnended solution to the above tasking Qppion G we feel that this effectively takes the existing gpgions A and and modifies them to meet the criteria above At Tab is a short paper which provides to you the range of options that we developed last night This paper includes a numerical description of our current Options and F our new recommended Option G and one additional option Option H The additional new Option is the most direct option in that working inane baseline for the US of planned NATO deployments and for the Soviet Union their current deployments each side would reduce within 6 or so years to zero with steps involving l 3rd reductions in LRINF launchers at 2 year intervals The problem that we have with it is that it is not tied directly to our current 1 Nevember 1985 INF position is most susceptable to causing us a real problem if we cannot sustain the use of the planned NATO deployment 572 warheads missiles on 224 launchers as the baseline and would leave us at the greatest net disadvantage in residual forces if the agreement collapses before achieving zero zero In all options we feel strongly that the ccnnem elements cited at the tOp Of the paper at Tab are critical we certainly want to support a short overall reduction period but we AH must protect against having this used against the Dutch and other follow-on - basing should the Soviets string us out by neither accepting or rejecting -- we have to maintain the US right to equal global warhead limits even during an unequal balance in Europe Asia Whether we exercise that right and maintain warheads in the CONUS would be our choice HANDLE OWL ATTACHMENT IN OWL CHANNELS WITH OWL ATTACHMENT Declassify on OADR Can t SENSITIVE 2 we must insist on the NATO's planned deployments S72 warheads on 224 launchers as the US baseline or we will undercut our current LRINF position and in effect concede a freeze We can rapidly move from this to a reduction that roughly equates to our current position NSC Staff View we would strongly reconnend the following additional considerations While public diplomacy aspects are important we can't allow the pursuit of these aspects to impair our ability to achieve our negotiating goals It is very important that the US be innovative but at the same tine we must not be perceived as jumping from position to position It is for this reason that we feel that a firm link to our 1 November 1985 position be maintained This protects us from the perception of It also protects us should the Soviets reject this flat we need to be concerned that we don't surprize the allies At the same tine we need to have an out for those allies especially the FRG that are now out front on a European zero zero The additional language added in our reccnnended Option does this 'Thning is critical Party Congres opens on next Tuesday The last INF negotiating group meeting is next Thursday If we are going to move this round then we need to move quickly Recommendation That you approve the approach suggested in Tab A as a baseline for our continued preparations We will then turn this into a draft NSDD Approve Disapprove as Av Concurrence Eahley g m g Attachments Tab A Recommended Options Tab Alternative Options Paper VJ 5c as h h thion G If the Soviet Union will agree to a date certain for the elimination of LRINF missiles globally the United States proposes the following concrete plan to achieve this aim Step I by 1987 The United States would be prepared to fully implement its 1 Nbvember 1985 proposal within one year Both the United States and the Soviet Union would initially limit LRINF missile deployments in Europe to 140 launchers each with the Soviet Union making concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia accomplishing this by the end of 1987 Step II by 1990 Subsequently the US would prOpose mowing beyond this position and within the next 3 years sooner if the Soviets prefer both sides would further reduce the numbers of these LRINF missile launchers by an additional 50% The these is a critical word in that we are referring to reductions of US LRINF launchers retained in Europe or Asia only -- Step by 1992 Finally both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons no later than 1992 and sooner if the Soviets perfer Associated with this the United States would also propose global LRINF missile warhead ceilings under which the U S retains the right to global equality U S systems based in Europe could be withdrawn to the U S unless or until they were in excess of the equal global warhead ceiling associated with the launcher reductions in which case they could be destroyed while protecting a right to convert Pershing II missiles to Pershing I missiles Also under this plan we would demand that unless otherwise agreed Soviet reductions in both Europe and Asia would be concurrent and proportional However in the context of such a far reaching agreement an agreed date for global elimination of LRINF missiles and the achievement of deep reductions in LRINF missiles globally without regard to the forces of other nations the United States would also be prepared to consider proposals which would result in the elimdnation of LRINF missiles in both Europe and in the Far East together somewhat ahead of the schedule for their elimination globally These reductions and limits would involve U S and Soviet systems only There would be no agreed constraints on the forces of the United France These reductions would also be associated with an equal Shorter-range INF SRINF ceiling at current Soviet levels or to freeze SRINF at both sides December 31 1982 levels Finally the United States will be proposing specific verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits we seek These details will be presented in the context of a verification regime which 33'includes the use of national technical means of verification and cooperative 5 measures between the two governments such as on site ncroirming inspection and deata exchanges r FYI Because the Soviet Union has far more such missiles an does the United States the United States recognizes that this would maintain a Soviet advantage in 13111 missiles well into the reductions period Therefore the United States would insist that it have the right to choose its mix of Pershing II and GDCM during the reductions period and Wild insist that the level of weapons on launchers possessed by the Soviet Union during the reductions constitute also a global ceiling This would permit retention 0 scme US LRINF outside Europe upto the declining global ceiling