PYETEE 90289 HOUSE Vu f-x I C SE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT The President's Meeting with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin of the Soviet Union 8 PARTICIPANTS Secretary George P Shultz Donald T Regan John M Poindexter Rosanne L Ridgway Donald R Fortier Jack F Matlock SOVIET Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin Deputy Minister Aleksandr Soviet DCM Oleg Sokolov DATE TIME TUESDAY APRIL 8 1986 AND PLACE 09 45 11 00 Oval Office The President opened the meeting by congratulating Dobrynin on his election as Secretary of the Central Committee and pointing out that he was eager to move forward along the lines agreed at the Geneva Summit He noted that we had made some progress especially in bilateral areas and said that he was particularly encouraged by the Soviet Government's receptiveness to discussing an expansion of peoplento peOple programs Charlie Wick he observed had informed him of his good reception during his trip C However the President added he was disappointed by the overall lack of progress in our relations and was aware that much remains to be done He then invited Dobrynin's comments S Dobrynin began by thanking the President for the cooperation he had received during his tenure in Washington and mentioned that his new duties would involve supervision of the Central Committee's International Department which would include in the future U S Soviet relations C He also brought personal greetings from Gorbachev and mentioned that he had delivered a letter from Gorbachev to Secretary Shultz yesterday He hOped that there would be a reply soon and 4 I ZN '3 cz f spur all 1 suggested that it would be nice if he could carry one back to the General Secretary He had had a good talk with Secretary Shultz and Admiral Poindester yesterday and wondered if the President had any reaction to Gorbachev's letter S The President said that he would speak frankly As he had noted progress in our relations had not been what he had hoped after Geneva Soviet military involvement in regional conflicts creates major problems in our relations and furthermore is dangerous He and Gorbachev bear a great responsibility they hold the fate of the world in their hands and such involvement increases dangers S Libya is a prime example the President continued It is hard for the U S to accept Soviet criticism of our maneuvers in international waters since we both agree that the Gulf of Sidra is international The U S has operated there many times the recent maneuvers were scheduled well in advance and were not intended to be provocative Therefore the Soviet stance could not be understood here 8 The U S seeks solutions to these regional problems but as long as our friends need help we will give it He had studied Gorbachev's remarks on Afghanistan at the Party Congress and wished to say that the U S has no desire to keep Afghanistan a bleeding wound Soviet escalation has done that S Regarding arms control he sees potential progress in some areas but is frustrated by a lack of Soviet response to the U S proposals For example there has been no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction In this respect we may have different approaches to negotiation Our approach is for each side to present its optimum desires and then to narrow the differences through negotiation when the differences in approach are clear S As for nuclear testing he regrets Soviet efforts to make propaganda on the issue The U S has made numerous efforts to make progress but it must be understood that the U S is behind the Soviet Union in carrying out its testing program A moratorium when one side has completed its program and the other is still in the middle of its program is unacceptable Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for the two treaties which have been signed It is important to take steps to build confidence since there is too much distrust On both sides to agree immediately to major changes As he had told the General Secretary in Geneva nations don't distrust each other because they are armed they arm themselves because they distrust each other We are ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions and they can deal with the concerns of both sides We see no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at the next summit S idie In if susuait tine lresident e Let we want 5 outcome He then listed the following as optimum - a on key elements of a treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50% agreement on key elements of an INF treaty sement on methods which eliminate both the threat of an ve first strike by either side and the use of space sive weapons capable of mass destruction Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests and commitment to create conditions which would permit the ultimate elimination of testing If we could make progress toward reducing nuclear weapons that would provide a basis for further limitations on testing Agreement on chemical weapons ban Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation S The President then pointed out that agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for meeting planned for 1987 which in turn would make ratification possible before the U S 1988 election campaign Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of General Secretary Gorbachev's January 15 proposal S He then noted that other important issues require attention conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence building measures and said that even if they could not achieve all these optimum goals substantial progress in some of these areas would be a achievement But we are ready to work constructively on all of them 8 The President then concluded his presentation by asking Dobrynin to tell Gorbachev that he very much is looking forward to his visit to the United States He hopes the General Secretary can stay here for at least a week since he would like to show him something of the United States The visit should not be all work although there will be plenty of time for working sessions But he would like to hear Mr Gorbachev's desires on this score 8 began his response by commenting that they are not trying to avoid a discussion of regional conflicts There will be further opportunity when the foreign ministers meet Our views of course differ but we can discuss this 8 I rolenos the war whi a ty Congress sneet s i inds however Eoreign be willinc tw take up three or four of use them in more detail with Secretary Shults The Soviets have made good proposals to Pakistan on Afghanistan and have even set forth a schedule for troop withdrawal The situation around Libva also bothers them very much and thai true also of Nicaragua but he would not take time now to sc1ss it he can go into these issues more thoroughly on other occasions S i 5 4 Pb 1 Regarding the central security issues the Soviets want something substantial to come out of the next summit We need to find a minimum number of issues to try to solve Diplomats must do the negotiation but they need instructions from the tep Some recent U S actions have introduced uncertainty on the Soviet side S For example they are concerned regarding the U 8 position on a nuclear test ban They are willing to discuss verification but why not discuss a test ban and verification simultaneouslyP' We could either resume the tripartite talks with the UK or just open bilateral talks on the subject S Secretary Shultz asked if he was proposing this as one of the summit announcements S Dobrvnin said yes and asked what would be wrong with an announcement that negotiation on U S and Soviet ideas would be resumed S The President noted that there is no agreement yet on the time for his next meeting with Gorbachev S Dobrynin said that thi is precisely the point Although there are no preconditions they do not want our leaders going blindfolded into a meeting History has shown that such meetings are not succes ssful For example Kennedy met Khrushchev without preparation in Vienna and it was a flop The same is true of Eisenhower's meeting with Khrushchev in Paris On the other hand the summits that Nixon Ford and Carter had with Brezhnev and that the President had with Gorbachev in Geneva were well prepared and were successful 8 We need to know what minimum will be achieved he continued We cannot risk failure at the top level Gorbachev wants success just as he feels the President wants success and he is setting no preconditions but he is asking specifically what areas we can reach agreement on S f yrri were - 3 Dohrynin pointed out that the Soviets are familiar witr th three broad areas of our relations security regional conflict and bilateral and are willing to work on all of them We began tC prepare well before the Geneva summit last year and although ts stopped for a while these preparations permitted the staff to work out the joint statement the last night This would not iave been possible without the prior work But the joint statement was a good one and had an impact on public Opinion 8 Now five months have passed and what do we have that we can announce at the next meeting That is if there is a meeting this year and Gorbachev assumes there will be one We have no clearcut minimum goal 8 So Gorbachev's main message is Let's sit down and find at least the minimum We can work on the proposals of both to define the minimum When Nixon came to the Soviet Union in 1972 he had 80 percent of the results in his pocket It is dangerous to go into these meetings entirely g promptu We have presented some ideas you may'have other ideas This is not to substitute for the work at the meeting itself but rather to insure that it is successful S The President said that we had in fact proposed a number of things and observed that we may look at negotiations from different viewpoints He recalled that for 25 years he had been chief negotiator for his labor union the Screen Actors' Guild In those negotiations the union would make a proposal and management would make a proposal and that way they came to understand the differences between them which had to be negotiated S Regarding INF we seem close to agreement We agree that we should go down to zero We do disagree on how to apply this globally But we could bridge that at the next summit S As for START we have agreed on a 50 percent reduction We apply this to different systems It is a complex question because of the types of weapons and the fact that each side has a different force structure But we have come a long way in agreeing on a world without nuclear weapons U S proposals have been presented in response to Soviet proposals and if our negotiators are freed up so they can discuss the differences we might hammer out an agreement on the remaining issues at the next summit If we could do that our public would clap their hands since they fear the nuclear threat and want to have it eliminated S As for agreements at earlier summits some of these seem to have been reached just for the sake of agreement There have been some violations of them which is evidence of this Therefore the President said he is not impressed by what had been achieved at these earlier meetings Previous agreements merely agreed on the pace of an increase not on reductions But he wondered what -- is keeping us from ttling how we do the SE percent reductions to which we have agreed 8 Dobrvnin said that what the Soviets are trying to do is to find a way for the leaders to give instructions to our negotiators to narrow the differences Negotiations will continue in the various fora but our Foreign Ministers should sit down and see what goals would be realistic We need something for our bosses to sign or announce Then they will have some birds in hand as they go into their meeting and can see how much more they can get during the meeting S For example a simple announcement that they agree to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and verification of testing is one possibility Or as regards SDI an announcement that we will begin talks on how to strengthen the ABM Treaty The point is that we need some definition of the minimum which can be achieved or announced S Dobrynin then observed that Gorbachev like the President is a politician and just cannot risk coming home from the summit without some definable result He observed that when the President meets with his Allies he always has something in mind in advance This is also a good rule to follow with others That way formal negotiations can go forward but at the same time we can reach an understanding on what the minimum results will be S Dobrynin then pulled out a paper in Russian and translated what he characterized as an oral message from Gorbachev remarking that it had been given to him when he saw Gorbachev the day before his departure from Moscow It contained the following points Gorbachev is committed to pursuing the obligation he and the President assumed in Geneva to work toward an improvement of the international situation Since Geneva the actions of the USSR have been designed to achieve the aims agreed at the summit These have been consistent with preparing for the next meeting agreed to at Geneva He Gorbachev is prepared to be guided by the mutual agreements undertaken at the Geneva Summit U S actions however leave a different impression Rhetoric has intensified Certain U S steps can be interpreted as unfriendly acts directed against the improvement of relations And all this has happened while there was no dialogue between the US and USSR regarding plans for the next summit meeting _m He is 1no icten wnat the F E wishes 3% ch He took ncte of Secretary Shultr s statement to tint nc President is committed to an im rovemcnt in relations The main thing is tc i meeting We need an unde be counted on neure t he sguccess of the next Summii s' at specific results can He wishes to invi the President's personal attention to this problem When matters or such importance are involved extemporaneous actions and meetings can be dangerous Khrushchev s meeting with Kennedy in Vienna which proceeled or such an -xtemporaneous basis aggravated relations He is not making an attempt to impose preconditions for the summit meeting Rather his desire is to agree in advance on the possible content of the meeting what we each will be bringing to the meeting and what we hope to achieve Specifically what agreements or understandings as a minimum will be the result He believes that every opportunity should be taken to prepare a productive meeting so he can visit the United States this year But he wants that meeting to be meaningful and substantial S Having read these points Dobrynin observed that our Foreign Ministers would be meeting in May Secretary Shults observed May Dobrynin then summed up his presentation by saying that his main message is that we should try together to clarify what the positive results of the next summit will be and that Gorbachev hopes to see the President in this country this year 8 Secretary Shultz said that he would like to repeat what the President had already said so that it would be clearly understood S First we want a meeting associated with progress in reaching accords S Second we know the only way is to work on the subject matter ahead of time We must know 80 90% of what we have in hand before the meeting It is therefore good that his meeting with Shevardnads has been scheduled S Third they should look carefully at what the President has said regarding potential areas for agreement He will go through them with Dobrynin later this week but he wanted to emphasize their importance now Note A written text of the President s optimum goals was given to Dobrynin's staff later and Secretary Shultz reviewed them again with Dobrynin at his April 9 meeting S The President observed that both sides have now made siniiar statements They have made proposals and we have answered thei We accepted some of the Soviet ideas and made some of our own But we have no response S However both of us have expressed a desire to achieve the same goal He understands the point that both he and Gorbachev are politicians and that a political leader cannot be pushed into a corner This holds true on both sides S If he and the General Secretary get together and come to an agreement some elements will be from the proposals of one side and some elements from those of the other That way each can say afterward what he obtained in terms of his own proposals S The President then said that he wanted to mention another subject human rights He has no desire to push the General Secretary into a corner on this issue He noted that he had discussed it previously with Dobrynin and emphasized that he was not pushing for an agreement as such However this is one area where if the Soviet Union takes some actions it will make it possible for him the President to do some things that both want S The President added that one out of ten Americans has relatives or ancestors in the Soviet Union They are emotional about what happens there If positive action is taken he will never open his mouth to say that we suggested it But it will be easier for him to say that he had agreed to this or that with the Soviet Union Therefore he hoped that we would see more progress in this area S Regarding arms control testing and the like he felt that we have enough areas to work on We use the same figures as our basis for negotiation But if the General Secretary proposes one date as a goal for something and we propose an earlier one that is not the sort of issue where one side caves in if it agrees with the other Rather it would be a compromise S The President then wondered if we have the same understanding of the word compromise We seem to look at it in different ways S Dobrvnin stated that compromise means the same in both languages and that Gorbachev is in favor of compromise He knows there must be compromise on security issues S As for dates when things can be accomplished Gorbachev had mentioned some in his January 15 proposal If the U S wants to speed them up that is all right with Gorbachev S Regarding the U S November 1 proposal this was made before the Geneva summit Gorbachev's January 15 proposal was based on the discussion at Geneva and took the November 1 proposal and the ITIVE 3 31 5 at the sunmit Geneva into We mu at the situaticr new and find a way out Regarding medium range missiles the Soviets have made major concessions They have agreed that there could be a separate agreement that the could be eliminated in Europe that deactivated missiles would be destroyed and not just moved and have even compromised on the role of British and French systems in any agreement It is natural that they would insist on a non transfer provision so that the agreement could not be circumvented but the U S has said no to this Secretary Shultr has said that this topic may be an area for a minimum achievement at the next summit but he is not sure we are close enough 8 Dobrynin continued by saying that there may be other subjects which could be agreed upon The 50 percent reductions for example but we still have the critical problem of how we define the content of the reduction S Dobrynin then asked if he could say that the U S is in favor of activating the negotiating process and simultaneously thinking about what results can be anticipated from the next summit S The President agreed and Secretary Shultz noted that the President has gone farther than suggesting goals for 1986 He has pointed out that if we are to have a successful meeting in 1987 as well as 1986 we must begin preparations now That means working on a solution in the strategic arms area S said that we should hope that the two foreign ministers can get a clearer picture of the prospects for the 1986 meeting S Secretary Shultz pointed out that Dobrynin would be here until Friday evening and that we would be pursuing discussion of these matters with him and with Deputy Minister He then asked if there is agreement on Shevardnadze's visit to the United States S confirmed that there is and Secretary Shultz suggested that by Friday they would try to sum up just where things stand at present S The President noted that we still need a date for Gorbachev's visit The Soviets are aware of our problem in the fall the election campaign and it is not desirable to have the visit at that time S Cm mwi h the the GCrhechev hee he desire t0 be involved 1n any wev in eemeetic F S ptlitice and understoe that a visit dur ing the campaign would not be good idea 5 The meeting endee about 10 50 Dohrynin stayed for a few minutes with the President after the others had left the room C x W