SYSTEM II THE WHITE House smaem mnm4sygr MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN REYKJAVIK October 1986 First Meeting DATE October 11 1986 TIME 10 40 a m - 12 30 p m PLACE Hofdi House Reykjavik Iceland PARTICIPANTS United States President Ronald Reagan Dimitri Zarechnak Interpreter Jack F Matlock Jr Notetaker Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Mikhail Gorbachev General Secretary Central Committee Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikolay Uspensky Interpreter Notetaker 'k k The President opened the meeting by saying that he was pleased that Gorbachev had proposed the meeting since it was important to make sure that his visit to the United States is as productive as possible Gorbachev said that he and the Soviet leadership placed great value on the President's agreeing to the meeting The President said he was looking forward to the meeting and suggested that they alternate one on-one meetings with meetings with their foreign ministers Gorbachev agreed The President asked which issues they should take up first - Wm A sazm' SEGRH Gorbachev suggested that they have a short exchange of Views regarding the situation which produced the Soviet proposal for this meeting and then he would explain the proposals he brought with him He suggested that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be invited to join them when he presented the proposal He then said that he wished to make clear at the beginning that he was prepared to discuss whatever the President considers necessary The President agreed to the general procedure suggested and noted that he felt topics such as intermediate-range missiles the ABM Treaty and defensive space weapons nuclear testing and strategic arms reduction were all important He added that we are particularly interested in strategic arms reduction and noted that both agreed at Geneva to reduce them by 50% The world is watching in the hope that this will be achieved Gorbachev said that this coincides with his view of the issues Perhaps they could devote this meeting to the problems the President listed and then after lunch discuss regional humanitarian and bilateral issues The President said that although issues such as humanitarian ones those involving human rights and regional conflicts may not always be appropriate subjects for formal agreements progress on them has an important effect on how cooperative he can be in other issues These are important issues with our public opinion Gorbachev reiterated that he would prepose a short exchange regarding general principles and then a presentation of new Soviet proposals when Shultz and Shevardnadze join them The President agreed and said that he would be discussing the other matters because of the effect they have on the whole range of issues Gorbachev then began his initial presentation during which he made the following points -- Though public comment on their decision to meet here has been mixed he is convinced that this meeting is a highly responsible step by the President and the Soviet leadership It is testimony that the dialogue continues It is not moving as fast as people on both sides would like but it is moving Geneva summit set a mechanism of bilateral relations in motion It is a very complex mechanism and not everything moves smoothly There have been some hiccups -- and even a black or two has been delivered since Geneva But the main issue is how to avert the nuclear threat Much work done at Geneva but things are virtually at an impasse 50 or 100 variant proposals SECRET 36EGRE-F have been considered -- and this complicates things We need to concentrate on one or two options The purpose of this meeting should be to outline agreements we can conclude when he visits the United States The President observed that they had agreed on a 50% reduction of strategic weapons in Geneva It appears this is more than the Soviets are ready for now We proposed a warhead limit of 4500 while they proposed a much higher level on the order of 640026800 This seems too high to us It would leave the world threatened by these highly destructive weapons But we might look at the possibility of an interim agreement with the goal still the complete elimination of ballistic missiles Perhaps with initial reductions to a level of 5500 warheads Gorbachev indicated that he would like to discuss specifics later after he had presented the Soviet proposals and continued with his general observations as follows -- The Soviet leadership wants to solve the problem of the nuclear arms race Therefore it has formulated proposals which take into account the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States This is the only way the problem can be solved 5 since if proposals are one-sided it will suggest to the other side that there is an attempt to gain superiority and this would undermine the effort to get agreements In working out a solution to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons there must be parity and equality at each stage along the way Anything else is unacceptable The President observed that we feel the same way about the stages but that one of the most difficult subjects is likely to be verification He said that he was reminded of the Russian proverb Doveryai no proveryai Trust but verify Gorbachev smiled and acknowledged that he knew the proverb The President continued that he had discussed this with Gorbachev in their private meeting in Geneva and he wanted to make clear that whether reductions start in the intermediate-range missile area or in the strategic missile area they must agree on effective verification It would be a great step and the world would applaud Gorbachev said he supported the President's position on the importance of effective verification We have now reached the stage where we can commence the process of working out concrete agreements In working out a treaty one of the most important subjects is verification Both sides must be confident of compliance As his final general point Gorbachev said that he and the President were moving forward in their plans for a meeting in the WW United States Reykjavik represents a stage half way up the slope He noted that some said the location was chosen because it is almost exactly mid-way between Moscow and Washington The President noted that he had selected it over London because it seemed more suited to private serious conversations He then asked if Gorbachev had a date in mind for his trip to the U S Gorbachev said he was just getting to that Both have an interest in making sure that there are concrete results from the next meeting That is agreements on major issues affecting ending the arms race The two of them really cannot risk failure since it would be a scandal if they continued to meet and failed to reach agreements Therefore he felt that when they have exchanged views on the key issues have compared their positions have agreed on instructions to negotiators and estimated the amount of time it will take to complete agreements for signature then it should be possible to determine when the meetings in the United States might be held The President pointed out that it would not be enough to agree just on missile numbers throwweight is also important and must be dealt with Also it is important to keep in mind that what we are talking about are interim steps moving toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons Gorbachev suggested that the foreign ministers should be invited to join the meeting Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze then entered and joined the principals at the table Gorbachev then presented the following proposals Strategic Arms Noted agreement to 50% reductions at Geneva Number of proposals floating about since them Soviet leadership wants 50% not less Initially Soviet proposal had been for a 50% reduction of the nuclear potential that can reach each other's territory But now they are making proposals relating to strategic weapons alone leaving out intermediate range and forward-based systems In other words they have taken the U S point of View into account and have been making concessions Equality and equal security are necessary since strategic weapons form the basis of the military strength of both sides He also noted that historic factors had resulted in different force structures in the two countries So the Soviet Union will agree to 50% reduction and it is prepared to meet U S concerns regarding Soviet heavy missiles by reducing them substantially -- not just to a trivial degree but substantially But -- they expect the U S to understand Soviet concerns regarding U S The U S has 6500 warheads on its submarines 800 U S launchers are They are aware of the accuracy of U S warheads both and ICBMs We should meet each other half way and not push the other into a corner Medium-Range Missiles Propose total elimination of U S and Soviet medium-range missiles in EurOpe and will make the following major concession Soviets will drop the question of British and French nuclear forces This is a big step on their part since these forces are sizeable and will be growing in numbers and improving in quality Therefore this is a substantial compromise Regarding medium range missiles in Asia the U S should in a spirit of compromise withdraw this question or at least agree to continue negotiations regarding medium-range missiles in Asia while those in Europe are eliminated Regarding missiles with a range of less than 1000 km they propose a freeze and the commencement of negotiations on their reduction This is our proposal it is a huge compromise on our part ABM Treaty It is important to agree on a period during which both sides obligate themselves not to exercise their right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty We propose a compromise in which we adopt the U S approach of a non-withdrawal commitment and a period of negotiations following it We propose that we agree on a period during which both sides would observe the ABM Treaty strictly and in full What is important here is to get a mutual understanding which permitted research and testing in laboratories but not outside of laboratories covering space weapons which can strike objects in space and on earth This would not however affect testing of those systems allowed by the ABM Treaty Both sides have made proposals on non withdrawal from the ABM Treaty We propose a compromise as follows Non withdrawal for a period not less than ten years and A period of negotiations of three to five years concerning how to proceed subsequently Also logically if we are to abide by the ABM Treaty we should ban ASAT systems since work on ASAT systems could be a channel for working on ballistic missile defense Therefore we propose a mutually acceptable agreement on this question Nuclear Testing They understand that if there is no agreement on strategic arms reduction there could be doubts on one side about the usefulness of banning nuclear testing However within the conteXt of the proposals which he has made it would be reasonable to agree on a comprehensive test ban There have been negotiations on this before and the Soviets are proposing to renew either bilateral or trilateral negotiations together with the British in order to get agreement on a CTB While these negotiations proceed each side can act as it wishes regarding testing while negotiating on the following points verification lowering the threshhold -- reducing numbers of tests -- question of the 1974 and 1976 treaties Beginning these negotiations would help work out an agreement on reducing strategic weapons k i Gorbachev concluded by saying that this is the package of proposals he has brought He would suggest that they be discussed and that appropriate offices State and MFA for example or others if we wish be directed to work out drafts of agreements to be signed during his Visit to the United States He added that the Soviet Union is interested in effective verification and is prepared to implement verification by any means necessary including on site inspection They expect the same approach on the part of the United States He then presented a memorandum to the President containing the Soviet proposals The President said that this was encouraging although some points of difference remain For example zero INF in Europe is fine but there must be reduction of these missiles in Asia They are mobile and Europe could be targeted from the ones now in Asia There also could be reductions in Europe to 100 warheads on each side me SEQ-REI- Regarding strategic weapons we would also like to go to zero but we draw the line regarding the ABM provisions the Soviets have proposed The point is that SDI should make the elimination of nuclear weapons possible We are proposing to sign a treaty now which would supersede the ABM Treaty The Soviet Union is also researching defensive weaponry and both sides would go forward within the limits of the ABM Treaty If either reached the point that they decided it would be desirable to go beyond the ABM Treaty restrictions they would conduct testing in the presence of representatives of the other country For example if the U S were first Soviet representatives would be invited to witness the testing Then if testing should reveal that a system is practical we would be obligated to share it and we would have two years to negotiate a agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles and to share The reason for this is that we can't guarantee in the future that someone -- a madman like Hitler for example -- might not try to build nuclear weapons Also treaty now would bind our successors Gorbachev said that he hoped that these were preliminary remarks on the President s part He had made new proposals that these had not been discussed previously The President needs to give them appropriate attention Re INF Soviets are proposing zero in Europe and negotiations regarding INF systems in Asia U S seems to be moving back from its earlier proposal Re the ABM Treaty Soviets are proposing to preserve and strengthen the treaty U S is proposing to renounce it We want to preserve it you want to destroy it We just don't understand this Re SDI we have thought the matter through thoroughly We are not worried by the prospect of the three-layered ABM system We will respond to it but not in the same waywill just have the arms race transferred to a new environment If this is what the U S wants then we can understand why it has made the proposals it has However the resulting situation will simply be more dangerous to U S Allies and to the U S public So he hopes that the President will give careful thought to the new Soviet proposals He and the Soviet leadership will appreciate the President's reaction point by point It is important for us and for the U S to know just what you can accept and what you cannot accept -- and why The President said that he would look at the proposal but that Gorbachev was refusing to see one thing If SDI research is successful it would make possible the elimination of nuclear weapons We are accused to wanting a first strike capability but we are proposing a treaty which would require the elimination of ballistic missiles before SDI is deployed therefore a first strike would be impossible Gorbachev said that they had spoken of this in Geneva and that the Soviets had thought through it for a year now and know their attitude very well However he is willing to continue the discussion of the subject later if the President wishes The meeting ended at 12 30 P M