D I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I b 1 b 3 CIA History Copy I of 2 OFFICIAL HISTORY f 'OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION VOLUME II PARTICIPATION IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY pages 1-167 TOY ECRET DCI-8 October 1979 Copy 1 of 2 APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 25-Jul-2011 PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY I b 1 b 3 TOP S CRET e y CIA History Staff I Copy I of 2 I OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION I J I II VOLUME II PARTICIPATION IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY pages 168-255 DCI-8 October 1979 Copy 1 of 2 PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 25-Jul-2011 TOPfeRET volume II Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy Contents Appendixes 1 2 Guatemalan Revolt November 1960 Miscellaneous Cables 168 Memorandums re Special Force Trainers 230 A Four Memorandums of Agreement B Memorandum for Chief WH 4 from A DDP A 28 Dec 60 235 Memorandum for Chief WH 4 from A DDP A 30 Dec 60 241 c D 3 231 Memorandum for Deputy Assistant to the SecDef for Spl Ops 30 Dec 60 Portion of Oral History Interview with Ambassador John J Muccio 13 Apr 71 245 246 Appendix 1 Guatemalan Revelt November 1960 Miscellaneous Cables 168 COpy DATE NOV 13 1845Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41822 FROM GUATEMALA CITY EMERGENCY DIR PACY CITE GUAT 508 REF GUAT 507 IN 41125 MIDEF RUBEN GONZALEZ SIGUI URGENTLY REQUESTS ODYOKE SUPPLY ANY INFO CONCERNING fu Y ENEMY SHIPS NOW IN POSITION ACT AGAINST GUATEMALA END OF MESSAGE Reported attack by unidentified forces against Guatemala City at 0300 local 13 November - 1 6 k9 7- T COpy DATE NOV 13 1850Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41824 FROM JMADD EMERGENCY DIR GUAT CITE MADD 0541 1 IN VIEW OF LOCAL DISTURBANCES AND RIOTING IN SURROUNDING TOWNS STRONGLY RECOMMEND CANCELLATION OF MISSION GS-46-0Q7 2 PERSONNEL PREPARED TO DEFEND MADD WITH U S AND CUBAN PRESENTLY SUPPORT NG GUAT CITY WITH C-46 TRANSPORT OF GUAT TROOPS TO GUAT CITY 3 DISBURSED TWO B-26's TO GUAT CITY PER REQUEST SANTORO END OF MESSAGE SIGNAL CENTER NOTE THIS MSG HAS BEEN SENT TO DPD - L 7 RET COpy DATE NOV 13 2038Z 60 TO GUATEMALA CITY FROM DIRECTOR EMERGENCY JMADD JMTRAV OUT 91802 CITE DIR 11284 EMERGENCY GUAT EMERGENCY MADD TRAV JMNET IF NOT ALREADY DONE PLACE ALL CUBh PE RSONNEL ON FULL ALERT AND PREPARE FOR ANY CONTINGENCY ADVISE ON CONTINUING BASIS ANY DETERIORATION IN SITUATION - END OF MZSSAGE Releasing Officer C KING CHIEF WHD Authenticating Officer J D ESTERLINE CHIEF WH 4 - 1 171 SErT COpy DATE NOV 13 20S0Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO JMADD OUT 91807 FROM DIRECTOR OPIM MADD INFO GUAT KOLA RI 1 YOGU CITE DIR 1288 CANCEL GS-46-007 PLAN TO EFFECT EVACUATION IF REQUIRED AT DIRECTION OF AS REQUIRED 0 SUPPORT D I N INTERIM CARPENTER DUE TO TAKE OFF FRO -1 KWCA J IINE AT OSOOL 14 NOV IF SITUATIO WORSENS SEND DELAY OF MISSION MSG TO EGLI RPT EGLI OTHERWISE AIRCRAFT WILL PROCEED ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer Stanley W Beerli AIC DPD Coordinating Officer Mr Esterline by phone WH 4 - 1 SErT 17 DEP ARTMENT OF STATE CON FjENTIAL COpy FROM GUATEI1ALA CITY Control TO SECRETARY OF STATE Reed NO 223 NOVEMBER 13 3 P M 7063 Nov 13 1960 7 50 P M NIACT PASS ARMY AND AIR FORCE REFERENCES EMBTEL 222 ZACAPA XACAVA SECOND MILITARY ZONE HEADQUARTERS AND PUERTO BARRIOS MILITARY BASE INCLUDING AIRPORT ARE IN HANDS UNIDENTIFIED REBELS PUZZLE IS WHETHER ATTACK ON CUARTEL GENERAL FAILED OR WAS PLANNED MERELY TO OBTAIN VEHICLES AND ARMS AND AMMUNITION WHICH WERE OBTAINED EMBASSY OFFICER JUST TELEPHONED FROM BARRIOS SAYING GOVERNOR lXABEL DEPARTMENT ARRESTED AND MATIAS de GALVEX RADIO CALLING FOR ANTI-GOVE MENT REVOLT -- BUT SIGNIFICANT THAT SO FAR REBEL BROADCASTS MENTION NO NAMES OR PARTY AFFILIATIONS MID-MO ING GAF STRAFED XACAVA AND BARRIOS WITH ROCKETS AND 50 CALIBRE MACHINE GUNS DESTROYING SEVERAL TRUCKS EMBASSY UNDERSTM DS GOG PLANS ATTEMPT RETAKE BARRIOS BASE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH AIRLIFTED TROOPS FROM GUATEMALA CITY PRECEDED BY GAF STRAFING YDIGORAS DECLARED STATE OF SIEGE AND CONGRESS MEETING 4 P M TO RATIFY IT CAS RECEIVING CONFLICTING REPORTS RE NATURE MOVEMENT EMBASSY IGNORANT WHETHER MOVEMENT CASTROITE OR MERELY ANTI-GOVERN1lliNT AND TO WHAT EXTENT ARMY DEFECTIONS INVOLVED MILITARY GARRISON GUATEMALA CITY AND GAF APPARENTLY LOYAL AND NO ADVERSE INFORMATION YET FROM REST COUNTRY OTHER THM BARRIOS AND XACAVA ZACAPA MUCCIO Note Passed Army Air Force Ready by Mr Godfrey ARA 8 30 P M 11 13 CWO-JSW -17YCO FI TLAL SECfr COpy DATE NOV 13 2112Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41832 FROM GUATEMALA CITY EMERG DIR INFO PACY CITE GUAT 511 REF GUAT 508 IN 41822 1 AMBASSADOR REQUESTS I mEDIATE ARRANG MENTS BE MADE WITH APPROPRIATE ODYOKE OFFICIALS FOR SURVEILLM CE SOONEST BETWEEN PUERTO BARRIOS AND CUBA WITH IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION _ OF RESULTS OF SURVEILLM CE c --- 2 ADVISE I IASAP THAT TYPE SURVEILLAJ 'ICE TO BE EMPLOYED WHEN AND WHERE BEING SENT SO CAN ADVISE GOG TO ASSURE NO OPPOSITION TO SURVEILLANCE EFFORT BY GUAT AIR FORCE CHIEF GAP BEING ADVISED BY EMBASSY OF AMBAS- SADOR S REQUEST END OF MESSAGE Midef Ruben Gonzalez Sigui urgently requested ODYOKE supply any information concerning any enemy ships now in position to act against Guatemala - 17ySECi T COpy time illegible EHERGENCY DATE 13 Nov 60 TO GUATEMALA CITY OUT 91831 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11293 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE PACY RE GUAT 511 IN 41822 1 TWO PLANES PV-2 OF HONDURAS AREA HOURS 14 NOV NEAR PUERTO BARRIOS EARLY DAYLIGHT WILL CONTINUE PANAMA AND REPEAT SWEEP 15 NOV SAME HOURS 2 P2V WILL SURVEILL GULF DESTROYER BEING DISPATCHED TO PATROL GULF OF HONDURAS AREA APPROX ETA ON STATION 15 NOV 60 END OF MESSAGE Guatemala City advised that Mindef Ruben Gongalez Sigui ur-gently requested ODYOKE to supply any information concerning any enemy ships-which were in position to act against Guatemala Releasing Officer Jacob D Esterline SEr - 175 - COpy DATE NOV 13 2154Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41833 FROM GUATEMALA CITY CITE GUAT 513 INFO EMERGENCY MADD EMERGENCY TRAV SITUATION REPORT RE A B GUAT 507 IN 41825 GUAT 512 1 DUE NECESSITY TO COMMIT LOYAL TROOPS ONLY GUAT ARMY REQUEST I IMOVE ALL GUAT TROOPS FROM FINCA AND MADD FOR DEPLOYMENT AGAINST REBEL FORCES IN PUERTO BARRIOSZACAPA AREA 2 MADD C-46'S USED AS TROOP TRANSPORTS IN ORDER ASSURE DEFENSE OF MADD ARMING 200 TRAV CUBAJ S AND MOVING THEM TO MADD IMMEDIATELY 3 LT COL EGAN PROCEEDING TRAV AND LT COL NEAL PROCEEDING MAnD TO TAKE COMMAND RESPECTIVE BASES REMAINING WITH 4 D SANTORO FOR OVERALL COMMAND AND COORDINATION GOG HAS REQUESTED USE MAnD B-26'S AND PBPRIME PILOTS VOLUNTEERING FIGHT FOR GUAT IF NECESSARY REQUEST HQS IMMEDIATE THINKING RE THIS MATTER 5 MAJORITY CUBANS TRAV HAVE VOLUNTEERED TO FIGHT FOR GUAT AND GOG HAS INDICATED THEY WOULD LIKE USE TRAV CUBANS AGAINST REBELS IF NECESSARY REQUEST AUTHORITY THEIR USE IF NEED ARISES END OF MESSAGE No record in Cable Secretariat as of 1800 13 Nov Reported attack on Guatemala City by unidentified forces - 1_7_Z SE T COpy DATE NOV 13 2159Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41835 FROM MADD CITE HADD 0542 EMERGENCY DIR INFO EMERGENCY GUAT EGLI 1 REQUEST B-26's NOW AT EGLI BE PLACED ON STAl JDBY ALERT FOR POSSIBLE 2 REQUEST Y US AVAILABLE INFO ON AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD BE USED ON EVACUATION HAS ONE C-46 AT MADD DEFENSE OF I-ffiDD PLN S AS OF 132030Z MADD ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT AT GUA'r CITY UNABLE TO EVACUATE ALL PERSONNEL I I WITH - - - - - - PRESENT AIRCRAFT SHOULD THIS BECOME NECESSARY ADVISE END OF MESSAGE THIS MESSAGE WAS RELAYED TO DPD BY SIGNAL CENTER 71 T - Sr - 1 COpy DATE NOV 13 2354Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41848 FROM GUATEMALA CITY CITE BASED ON GUAT 512 D 1864 DIR PACY INTEL 21 SUPDATA SOURCES PARAS 1 AND OFFICER IN PUERTO BARRIOS I I PARA 1 I PARA 51 6 I __ I_F_R_O_M---'cI n-_ _ PA UL I F OM PARA 7 I I I ---- 132130Z FILED 1864 GUATEMALA SUBJ 13 NOV REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT AGAINST GUATEI1ALAN GOVT DOl 13 NOV 60 PADA GUATEMALA GUATEMALA 13 NOV 60 APR PARAS 1-4 2 PARAS 5-7 3 SOURCES PARAS 1 AND 2 HIGH GUATEMALAt 3 USIS OFFICER PARA 41 MALAN I I B OFFICIALS B PARA 1 GUATE- PARA 5 GUATEMALA1 JOURJ JALIST WITH ------------ GOOD POLITICAL CONTACTS B FROM RIGHTIST POLITICAL LEADER C PARA 6 RIGHTIST POLITICIAN AND ARMY COL F PARA 7 LEFTIST POLITICIA1 J Fl Comment No separate cable distribution is being made of t h i s C - pa - SE1ET COpy CIA INFORMATION REPORT COUNTRY GUATEMALA SUBJECT REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT AGAINST GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT REPORT NO IL --- ---J DATE OF INFO 13 NOV 1960 DATE DISTR 13 NOV 60 PLACE DATE ACQUIRED PRECEDENCE Guatemala Guatemala City 13 November 1960 PRIORITY REFERENCES IN 41848 FIELD REPORT NO 0 1 8 6 4 1 EARLY MORNING 13 NOV 60 GUATEMALAN ARMY REBELS MADE COORDINATED COUP ATTEMPTS AGAINST MARISCAL ZAVALA GUARDIA DE HONOR AND MATAMOROS GUATEMALAN ARMY INSTALLATIONS OWING PROMPT ACTION BY MINISTER DEFENSE RUBEN GONZALEZ SIGUI MARISCAL ZAVALA AND GUARDIA DE HONOR REMAINED IN GOVT HANDS 2 REBELS TOOK MATAMOROS UNKNOWN NUMBER GUATEMALAN ARMY TROOPS IN PUERTO BARRIOS LEFT THE CITY MORNING 13 NOV FOR UNKNOWN DESTINATION SOURCE COMMENT GONE TO ZACAPA l 3 TROOPS BELIEVED TO HAVE NOT KNOWN IF TROOPS HAVE DEFECTED PUERTO BARRIOS AIRPORT IN HANDS REBELS WAS STRAFED TWICE BY GUATEMALA I AIR FORCE PLANES - _7 SE7 T MATIAS DE GALVEZ RADIO STATION ALSO FELL TO REBELS NOW BROADCASTING YDIGORAS h TI 4 PROPAGh DA ON 13 NOV REBELS TOOK ZACAPA AIRFIELD AND MILI- TARY BASE AIR FORCE STRAFED BASE AND AIR FIELD WITH 5-INCH ROCKETS AND 50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS DAMAGED BY GROUND FIRE ONE PLANE ALL ARMS TAKEN BY REBELS IN NIGHT ATTACK ON CUARTEL GENERAL 5 REBEL FORCES LED BY THREE COLONELS WHO POLITI- CALLY UNAFFILIATED BUT WHO LEAN TOWARD NON-COMMUNIST LEFT PART OF GUATEMALAN AIR FORCE rS IN PASSIVE SUPPORT OF COUP CO rnITTED TO NEUTRALITY FAR LEFT WILL BE EXOLUDED FROM COUP BY FORCE IF NECESSARY COUP WILL REQUIRE 72 HOURS AFTER WHICH COALITION GOVT WILL BE FORMED WITH REPRESENTATlVE FROM EACH NON-YDIGORAS PARTY TO INCLUDE PARTIDO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA PUR 6 COUP LEADERS ARE LT COL RAFAEL SESAN PEREIlRA WHO FOUGHT AGAINST LIBERATION ARMY OF COL CARLOS CASTILLO ARMAS MAJOR JULIO NHINAS AN OFFICER ON DUTY AT MATAMOROS DURING COUP LT COL AUGUSTO LOARCA MILITARY SCHOOL INSTRUCTOR ALL HAVE NON-POLITICAL HISTORY SOURCE COMMENT POLITICIANS FROM EXTREME LEFT BELIEVED TO BE BEHIND THREE COUP LEADE RS 7 1 L- -----l IOF PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO PR SAID - - - - - l8 SE 'T CIVILIAN COpy PAGE 3 LEADER OF REBELS IS MANUEL COLON ARGUETA N D THAT PR SUPPORTS REVOLT 8 FIELD COMMENT 30 DAY STATE OF SIEGE PRESIDENT YDIGORAS DECLARED CONGRESS CALLED INTO EMERGENCY SESSION 9 FIELD DISSEM STATE ARMY AIR CINCARIB END OF MESSAGE ' - 1 8811 SE 'T COpy DATE 14 NOV 0001Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41849 FROM GUATEMALA CITY EMERG DIR CITE GUAT 514 1 IREQUESTS FOLL ITEMS THROUGHAIRATT A MINIMUM 200 ANTI-PERSONNEL DEMOLITION BOMBS 100 LBS EACH B 200 SUB MACHINFGUNS OR BROWNING AUTOMATIC RIFLES AND AMMO 2 AIRATT CA1 fNOT PRODUCE CAN ABOVE BE SUPPLIED BLACK THROUGH MADD END OF MESSAGE -182j- SErT COpy DATE NOV 14 0001Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41850 FROM GUATAMALA CITY TO DIR INFO MADD CITE GUAT 515 GOG REQUESTS IF AT ALL POSSIBLE SEND NAPALM BOMBS TO BE MOUNTED ON GOG B'26'S BLACK TO MADD DELIVERY TO BE PLEASE ADVISE END OF MESSAGE - 1 183 SECy T COpy DATE NOV 14 0044Z 60 EMERGENCY TO GUATEMALA CITY OUT 91823 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11291 TO EMERGENCY GUAT INFO EMERGENCY MADD TRAV RE A B GUAT 514 IN 41849 GUAT 515 IN 41850 WORKING ON REF REQUESTS BUT TO DELIVER NEED YOUR ADVISE SOONEST AS TO AVAILABILITY SECURE AIRFIELDS PARTICULARLY MADD AND SAN JOSE ALSO DO YOU HAVE UNLOAD- ING lND DISTRIBUTION CREWS AND FACILITIES END OF MESSAGE I I 11 request for arms and arnmuni tion through AIRATT Latter could not produce Queried if could be supplied black throughMADD GOG requested if at all possible send napalm bombs to be mounted on GOG B-26's Releasing Officer William Bradley bY' direction of A CSDO C Tracy Barnes ADDP A - 1 LSECr T DEPARTMENT OF STATE COpy UNCLjIFIED FROM GUATEMALA Control TO SECRETARY OF STATE Reed NO 225 NOVEMBER 14 1 a m 7268 Nov 14 1960 9 50 a m PRIORITY PASS ARMY AND AIR FORCE EMBTEL 223 STILL ONLY CONFLICTING REPORTS AS TO NATURE MOVEMENT FOREIGN MINISTER VISITED ME IN EXCITED STATE AT 8 P M AT BEHEST PRESIDENT SAYING HOPED US WOULD PREVENT SEA OR AIRBORNE INVASION FROM CUBA AND RSSIST IN CASE INVASION FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRY INSISTED UPRISING WAS CASTRO-INSPIRED AND THAT GOVERNMENT HAS LONG BEEN PREDICTING WOULD HAPPEN SAID HE HAD JUST SENT STRONG TELEGRAMS INCRIMINATING CUBA TO OAS AND UN ALSO SAIDPR AJ lD MARIO MENDEZ MONTENEGRO 'VHO LEFT FOR US TWO DAYS AGO HEAVILY INVOLVED SAID MENDEZ PLANNED RETURN TO ASSUME LEADERSHIP MOVEMENT IF SUCCESSFUL ACTUAL SITUATION LITTLE CHAJ lGED GAF HAS BEEN STRAFING BARRIOS AND ZACAPA ALL DAY AND LATE THIS AFTERNOON AIRLIFTED 100 OR SO TROOPS TO CHIQUIMULA TO MOVE AGAINST ZACAPA TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING ELEMENTS OF MARISCAL ZAVALA IS REGIMENT REPORTEDLY ALSO ON WAY TO PORT AREA GOVERNMENT PRONOUNCEMENTS HAVE VARIOUSLY BLAMED UPRISING ON COMMUNISTS PGT AND MENDEZ MONTENEGRO MUCCIO Note Passed OSD Army Navy Air 11 14 60 CWO-JRL -l L UNCLAS f IED COpy DATE NOV 14 0448Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 41880 FROM GUATEMALA CITY CITE GUAT 517 EMERG DIR CITE GUAT 517 GOG URGENTLY NEEDS AND REQUESTS MINIMUM 100 000 ROUNDS 50 CAL ARMOUR PIERCING A J JD TRACER AMMO SOONEST BY 14 NOV IF AT ALL POSSIBLE I IHAS DETERMINED GOG HAS ONLY 15 000 ROUNDS LEFT FOLLOWING 13 NOV ACTION AIRATT STATES THAT AT PRESENT RATE USE GOG WILL EXHAUST PRESENT SUPPLY EARLY 14 NOV PLEASE ADVISE END OF MESSAGE - 186 SEr T COpy DATE NOV 14 0613Z 60 E1'1ERGENCY TO GUATEMALA CITY OUT 91833 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11295 TO GUAT INFO MADD RE GUAT 517 IN 41880 1 ARRANGING TRANSPORTATION WILL ADVISE ETA 2 UTILIZE 50 CAL AMMO IF AVAILABLE MADD STOCKS ADVISE QUANTITY ON HAND END OF MESSAGE GOG urgently needs and requestsffilnlrnum 100 000 rounds 50 cal armour piercing tracer ammo soonest by 14 Nov if at all possible Releasing Officer J Esterline Authentication Officer W Eisemann -c L L s COpy DATE NOV 14 0636Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO JMADD OUT 91835 FROM DIRECTOR CITE TO MADD DIR 11297 RE MADD 0542 CIN 41835 1 B-26'S ON STANDBY EGLIN 2 EVACUATION PLAN WILL BE AUGMENTED WITH TWO C-54'S ARRIVING MADD P M 14 OV END OF MESSAGE ' MADD requested q B 26 at Eg1Ln AFB be placed on standby alert for possible use in the defense of MADD Releasing Off i cer Stan Beer1i Coordinating Officer J Esterline - 18Y - srm T COpy DATE NOV 14 1016Z 60 EMERGENCY TO GUATEMALA JMADD JMTRAV OUT 91920 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11321 TO GUAT MADD TRAV INFO RIMM YOGU 1 IN EVENT ANY OR ALL OF ABOVE ADDRESSESS FORCED CLOSE DOWN DUE ENEMY ACTION AND THERE IS NOT TIME FOR EVEN SHORT SITUATION REPORT SEND EMERGENCY QUEBEC SIGNAL INDICATING FORCED TO EVACUATE 2 3 QUEBEC SIGNALS ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS A FOR GUAT QWV'l B FOR MADD QXX C FOR TRAV QZZ ABOVE TO BE TRANSMITTED ONLY UPON AUTHORIZATlON SENIOR KUBARK OFFICIAL EXCEPTING AS LAST DITCH PROPOSITION COMMO OFFICER MAY SEND 4 RIMM AND YOGU COVERING ABOVE STATIONS RESPEC- TIVELY ON 24 HOUR BASIS 5 IF EVACUATION BECOMES NECESSARY REQUEST ABOVE ATTEMPT TAKE RS-l AND NECESSARY CRYSTALS AND PADS TO PERMIT CONTINUED CONTACT WITH RESPECTIVE BASES 6 ADVISE HQS ACTION YOU ABLE TAKE INCLUDING ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO RIMM AND YOGU END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer D CO Coordin ting Officers OC-S WH IV Stanulis by phone Authenticating Officer W S Georgla Jr I 8 - 1 - SErT COpy DATE NOV 14 1504Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 42027 FROM JMADD CITE MADD 0540 TO EMERG DIR INFO EMERG GUAT RE A DIR 11294 OUT 91832 B DIR 11295 OUT 91833 PER REF A RESOURCES FOR NAPALM BOMB PREPARATION AND INSTALLATION NOT IENCED IN Hill DLING AVAILABL GROUND CREW NOT EXPER- NAPALM BOMBS PER REF B ONLY 15 000 ROUNDS 50 CAL NEEDED FOR LOCAL RESERVE AND 16 ROCKETS AVAILABLE AT MADD END OF MESSAGE Stated arranging transportation will advise eta - 190 - COpy DATE NOV 14 1523z 60 OPERATIONAL TO EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE OUT 91865 FROM DIRECTOR CITE I DIATE DIR 11303 OPIM EGLI INFO OPIM MADD GUAT REQUEST CARPENTER AND KEKOLER PREPARE DEPART FOR MADD ASAP LOAD MAX AMOUNT 50 CAL COMMENSURATE FLYING SAFETY IN BOMBAY PRIOR DEPARTURE 1700Z WX DUE EGLI WHEN CARPENTER READY DEPART NOTIFY HQS BY PHONE END OF MESSAGE Eeleasing Officer Stanley W Beerli AC DPD -191 SEcr T COpy DATE NOV 14 1630Z 60 OUT 91832 TO GUATEMALA CITY CITE DIR 11294 FROM DIRECTOR TO GUAT INFO MADD TRAV EGLIN RE A GUAT 514 IN 41849 B GUAT 515 IN 41850 1 PER REF A FOLLOWING BEING PREPARED FOR SHIP- MENT VIA TWO C-54'S 200 SMG CAL 45 100 000 RDS AMMO CAL 45 AND APPROX 70 BOMBS J RAG 220 LBS 2 PER REF B TECHNICAL PERSONNEL NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR NAPALM BOMB PREPARATION AND INSTALLATION RECO 1MEND MADD MUNITION RESOURCES BE CHECKED AND UTILIZED 3 EGLIN PROVIDE ETA TO MADD AND GUAT PLAN MUST BE INCLUDED AND CREW FULLY BRIEFED RECALL ADVISE HQ OF PLAN DETAILS END OF MESSAGE requested a minimum of 200 anti-personnel demolitJ on bo s 100 lbs each and 200 sub-machine guns or browning automatic rifles and ammo The GOG requested napalm bombs be sent to be mounted on GOG B-26's I Releasing Officer J Esterline Coordinating Officers OiL DPD - OK per Stan Beerli Authenticating Officer W E Eisemann - 192 - COpy DATE NOV 14 2150Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE OUT 91993 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11352 OPIM EGLI MADD GUAT A MSN ES-54-049 AND ES-54-050 B TAKEOFF TIME WILL BE FURNISHED BYHQS VIAl IX TWO C-54G AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE LOADED AND PREPARED FOR TAKEOFF ASAP AFTER C 124 ARRIVAL C TWO C-54G DELIVER 20 000 LBS MUNITIONS TO MADD D EGLIN FIELD THREE E I'1 ADD F AUTHORIZED USE OF USAF AND OSTIARY CREWS OR COMBINA- TIONS G BOTH AIRCRAFT UNMARKED EXCEPT FOR TAIL NUMBERS 6096 AND 9069 CALL SIGN FOR FIRST AIRCRAFT ES-54-049 IS RASCAL ONE AND SECOND AIRCRAFT IS RASCAL TWO COMPLAN FOR RASCAL ONE IS LIMROT FOR RASCAL TWO IS PEKSOR H ROUTE TO GUAT IS DIRECT MERIDA DIRECT GUAT CITY DIRECT MADD AIRCRAFT CONTACT MADD TOWER WITH CALL SIGN II ON ARRIVAL AIRCRAFT WILL NOT LAND UNLESS COUNTERSIGN RHUBARB RECEIVED FROM TOWER IN EVENT TOWER IS OUT MADD WILL COUNTERSIGN LOW PASS WITH RED FLARE FOLLOWED - 193 - COpy PAGE 2 BY GREEN FLARE AMERICAN WILL MAN TOWER IN EVENT COUNTERSIGN NOT RECEIVED AIRCRAFT RETURN EGLIN THREE SAME ROUTE COMPLAN REPORTING POINTS AS FOLLOWS 1 2600N 8800W 2 MERIDA RBN 3 1750N 9000W GUAT BORDER 4 GUAT CITY 5 l1ADD EGLI ADVISE HQS MADD GUAT RIMM fu D YOGU OF ATD ' ETA AT MAnD AND ETA AT CHECKPOINT THREE I ACFT WILL NOT TAKEOFF MADD UNTIL FLIGHT PLAN AND DE- PARTURE TIME APPROVED HQS AND UNDERSTANDING AND CONCURRENCE ACKNOWLEDGED BY MADD J FOR MAnD ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING AND CONCURRENCE THIS MlG K FOR GUAT ADVISE MAJ BATRES ETAS AT GUAT BORDER CHECK POINT THREE UPON RECEIPT TO INSURE NO INTERCEPT END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer Stanley W Beerli AC DPD Coordinating Officer C JMCLEAR C COMMO DPD COpy DATE NOV 14 22082 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE MADD GUATEI1ALA CITY RIMM OUT 92016 CITE FROM DIR 11366 DIRECTOR OPIM EGLI MADD GUAT RIMM YOGU A ES-54-049 LIMROT AND ES 4-050 B MSNS APPROVED C LIMROT TAKEOFF 15 07002 D PEKSOR TAKEOFF 15 08302 E WILL ADVISE DEPARTURE DATE AJ 'l'D TIMES FROM MADD PEKSOR END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer Stanley Beer1i AC DPD Coordinating Officer C Barquin for C JMCLEAR - 195 - COpy DATE NOV 14 2225Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE OUT 92018 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11367 OPIM EGLI REF D 1 54-049 54-050 PER TELECON VARTANIAN HAYES FOLL BEING DELIVERED YOUR ST VIA C-124 FOR TRANSHIPMENT TO JMADD REQUEST SHIP- MENT BE FORWARDED ON PRIORITY BASIS CITED A 50 EA 220 LBS FRAG BOMBS 13 151 LBS 1ST PRIORITY B 16 800 RDS 50 CAL AMMO 6 531 LBS 2nd PRIORITY C 200 EA 45 CAL SMG 4 821 LBS 3rd PRIORITY D 60 000 RDS 45 CAL AMMO 3 530 LBS 4TH PRIORITY 2 PARTIALS OF ITEM PARA 1 A and B ABOVE SHOULD BE SHIPPED ON EACH ACFT FOR SPACE UTILIZATION AND FOR EACH AIRCRAFT NOT TO EXCEED 10 000 LBS OF CARGO 3 BALANCE OF C-124 SHIPMENT TO BE HELD OR FUTURE FLIGHTS 4 REQUEST HQS BE ADVISED WHAT FACILITIES AVAIL EGLI FOR STORAGE OF ABOVE TYPE MATERIEL FOR 7-14 DAY PERIODS END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer George Gaines C JMCLEAR Coordinating Officers DPD AS RLS WH 4 1----1 Telecon - L SErT COpy DATE NOV 14 22312 60 PRIORITY TO GUATEMALA OUT 92070 FROM DIRECTOR CITE PRIORITY GUAT INFO PRIORITY REF t D DIR 11409 T'RAV GUAT 513 IN 41833 HQS CONCURS ASSIGNMENT NEAL AS COB JMADD AND EGAN AS ACTING COB J1'1TRAV PLAN REPLACE EGAN ASAP FOR RETURN HQS END OF MESSAGE Lt Col Egan proceeding TRAV and Lt Col Neal MADD to take command respective bases proceedi g Releasing Officer R Bissell DD P Coordinating Officers J Hawkins C WH 4 PM Authenticating Officer J C King C vvHD _19 SE71' '1' COpy OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE DATE NOV 14 2233Z 60 TO RIMM EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE YOGURT OUT 92024 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11371 OPIM RIMM EGLI YOGU 1 TENTATIVE ETD MISSION ES-54-049 15 0700Z ETA MADD 15 1320Z PLill LIMROT CHECK POINTS A 2600 N 8800 W TAKE OFF TIME PLUS 1 45 B MERIDA BEACON TAKE OFF TIME PLUS 3 40 C 1750 N 9000 W TAKE OFF TIME PLUS 4 50 D GUAT CITY TAKE OFF TIME PLUS 5 55 E MADD TAKE OFF TIME PLUS 6 20 2 TENTATIVE ETD MISSION ES-54-050 PLAN PEKSOR 15 0830Z ETA MADD 15 1450Z CHECK POINTS SAME AS LIMROT FREQUENCIES FOR PEKSOR SAME AS LIMROT 3 IF RIMM RECEIVES TRANSMISSION FROM LIMROT AT CHECK POINT 5 INDICATING THEY ARE DIVERTING TO ALTERNATIVE BASE OR RETURNING EGLIN RIMM IS DIRECTED TO PASS SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY TO PEKSOR ADVISING QKDAWN D EGLIN AFTER ACCOMPLISHING 4 FINAL ETD THESE MISSIONS WILL BE FURNISHED VIA ------pABLE END OF MESSAGE Re1eas'ing Officer Charles F Quinette D DPD OPS Coordinating Officers I DPD AS MAJ SKINNER oC AD ----- COpy DATE NOV 14 2314Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE OUT 92069 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11408 OPIM EGLI INFO OPIM MADD GUAT RE DIR 11303 OUT 91865 RELAY CARPENTER DISREGARD REF PROCEED MADD 15 NOV SAME TIMES ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 14 NOV WX PERMITTING TACTICAL CALL SIGN B 2 i IS RASCAL THREE TACTICAL CALL CONTACTING MADD TOWER USE MADD TOWER WILL ANSWER COUNTERSIGN RHUBARB INDICATING SAFE LAND MADD EVENT ACFT RADIO FAILURE BUZ Z MADD TOWER ONE TIME MADD TOWER FIRE ONE RED THEN ONE GREEN FLARE INDICATING SAFE TO LAND SAME PROCEDURE APPLIES EVENT MADD TOWER RADIO FAILURE SAN JOSE ALTERNATE AIRFIELD END OF MESSAGE Requested Carpenter and Kokoler prepare depart for MADD ASAP Releasing Officer Stanley W Beerli AC DPD COpy DATE NOV l4 2355Z 60 PRIORITy TO JMADD GUA TEMA LA CITy JMTRAV OUT 92135 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11458 TO PRIORITY MADD INFO PRIORITY GUAT TRAV REF DIR 11294 OUT 91832 TWO C-S4 CARGO FLIGHTS DUE 15 NOV CARRYING 50 - 'O J RAG BOMBS 16 800 RDS 50 CAL ' EACH AIRCRAFT LIMITED 10 000 LBS DUE TO OPERATIONAL NECESSITY END OF MESSAGE Alert ng Guat of lanned two C 54 with ordnance items Releasing Officer william E Eisemann C WH 4 Support Coordinating Officers Tele Coord Maj Skinner DPD for C WH 4 PM Iror c WH 4 0PS Authenticating Officer James S Burwell WH 4 LOG I -200 s t COpy DATE NOV 14 2356z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE OUT 92025 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11372 OPIM EGLI INFO OPHl GUAT MADD MASH 1 COVER STORY FOR TWO C-54 A C AND CREW DEPART- ING 14 NOV 60 FOR JMADD FOLLOWS A A C DEPARTED FROM IMMOKALEE FLORIDA DESTINED FOR GUAT CITY ' ' B A C FURNISHED FULLY LOADED fu D FUELED AT IMMOKALEE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRD C CREW HIRED BY THE FRD ON ASK NO QUESTIONS BASIS 2 EVERY ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO JETTISON CARGO BEFORE EMERGENCY LANDING IN FRIENDLY THIRD COUNTRY IN ANY EVENT CREW SHOULD DISCLAIM KNOWLEDGE OF CONTENTS OF CARGO 3 CREW SHOULD BE GIVEN HR EMERGENCY CONTACT INI I ---c------- ADDRESS FOUND DIR 08685 OUT86419 END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer Stanley W Beerli SC DPD Coordinating Officers JMC SO S Stembridge WH 4 J MULLANE TELECON - 201 lAS COpy DATE NOV 15 0233Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO DIRECTOR IN 42405 FROM MADD CITE MADD 0543 OPIM GUAT INFO OPIM DIR 1 REQUEST MEETING WITH RE STATUS QUO AT GUAT CITY 1 CONCERJ ED - - - - OVER TWO C-46 IS WITHOUT CREWS REMAINING AT GUAT CITY MILITARY FIELD 2 INFO ON SITUATION RELAYED BY FOUR ARMORERS ' WHO WERE DETAINED BY OFFICER GROUP AT GUAT CITY FIELD THIS MORNING AND LATER RELEASED INDICATES GUAT ARMY MAY ATTEMPT TO SPIKE ALL MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO PREVENT ACTION BY AIR FORCE ARMY PERSONNEL ARE POSTED IN ALL GUAT AF PLANES END OF MESSAGE I -20 2 SEi T COpy DATE NOV 15 I0248 J 60 EMERGENCY TO GUAT MADD TRAV OUT 92236 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11518 EMERG GUAT MADD TRAV 1 ODACID REQUESTS FOLLOWING A SITREP B CONCRETE PROOF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT SUCH AS PRISONERS DOCS EQUIPMENT 2 N SWER EMERG DESIRED BY 15 NOV 1400Z END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer I Iby direction of J C King - 203 rVlrfrr COpy DATE NOV 15 1227z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 42628 FROM GUATEMALA CITE GUAT 537 EMERG DIR INFO EMERG MADD TRAV REFS 1 A DIR 11518 OUT 92236 B GUAT 521 IN 42024 SITREP A SITUATION AS REPORTED IN REF B STILL APPLIES B 14 NOV REPORTS OF LEFTIST-COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS NEGOTIATE REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE WITH REBELS TEND TO ' SUPPORT REF B PREDICTION THAT POLITICAL GROUPS MIGHT EXPLOIT SITUATION AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE ANTI-GOVT ACTS C EXCEPT FOR THE EXPLOSION OF SEVERAL TERRORIST BOMBS IN STREETS GUAT CITY NIGHT 14 NOV CALM STILL REIGNS IN CITY STATE OF SIEGE WITH CURFEW BEING ENFORCED D GUAT ARMY AND AIR FORCE CONTINUING MILITARY ACTION AGAINST REBELS AND IT STILL TOO EARLY DETERMINE OUTCOME E ALTHOUGH ARMY AND AIR FORCE CURRENTLY SUPPORTING GOG EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT SOME AIR FORCE OFFICERS ON VARIOUS LEVELS OBJECT TO SEVERITY OF ACTION BEING TAKEN AGAINST REBELS CONTINUED LOYALTY THESE ELEMENTS OPEN TO QUESTION 2 NO EVIDENCE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT END OF MESSAGE ODACID requested concrete proof of Cuban involvement Revolt appeared to be almost purely military with little or no political or civilian participation COpy DATE NOV 15 1509Z 60 TO FROM DIRECTOR JMADD PRIORITY IN 42700 CITE MADD 0546 PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY GUAT 1 REQUEST IMMEDIATE DELIVERY AMMO RESUPPLY AS FOLLmvS A CARTRIDGES CAL 30 LINKED BALL 50 000 B CARTRIDGES CAL 30 IN 8 RND CLIPS C CARTRIDGES CAL 30 CARBINE BALL 10 000 D CARTRIDGES CAL 30 BALL FOR BAR 10 000 75 000 - E MAGAZINES FOR BAR 50 EA F G MAGAZINES FOR CARBINE 100 EA MAGAZINES FOR THOMPSON SMG 50 EA H PISTOL AUTOMATIC CAL 45 I BELT PISTOL J CLIPS FOR 45 CAL PISTOL K CLIP CARRYING CASE FOR 45 PISTOL 24 EA 24 EA 2 FIRST THREE ITEMS MOST CRITICAL 3 TOTAL WEIGHT ABOUT 15 200 1bs 48 EA 24 EA CUT ITEM D FIRST IF NECESSARY END OF MESSAGE COpy DATE DEC 15 1559Z 60 PRlORITY TO DIRECTOR IN 17634 FROM GUATEMALA CITY CITE REFS A B GUAT 655 IN 12474 GUAT 693 IN 17002 C GUAT 699 IN 17440 GUAT 700 IN 13 DEC 60 MEETING WITH I L-I IMADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT NEW GOVT RESULTING FROM REVOLT BY MIL GROUP 1 AND PR-MLN-DCG COALITION WILL CONTINUE SUPPORT ODYOKE TI-CASTRO 2 WHEN 1 OPERATIONS 1 POINTED OUT THAT YDIGORAS FALL WOULD HELP CASTRO I IEMPHASIZ THAT BOTH MIL AND CIVILIANS INVOLVED ARE STRONGLY ANTI-COMMm IST AND ANTI-CASTRO AND WOULD BE EVEN MORE FORCEFUL THAN YDIGORAS IN THAT RESPECT HE RECOMMENDED THAT ODYOKE GIVE MORAL SUPPORT NOW TO PLOTTING GROUP BECAUSE YDIGQRAS SURE TO FALL SOON 3 ALTHOUGH AT OUR REQUEST I IHAS IN PAST SUCCESS FULLY PREVENTED PR ACTION AGAINST YDIGORAS HE NOW SAYS HE CAN NOT STOP COALITION AND CERTAINLY NOT MILITARY AND NEITHER HE NOR ANYONE ELSE CAN DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT YDIGORAS OVERTHROW END OF MESSAGE Sitrep giving view that another military revolt againsE YdLgoras could take place in the near future Request GALBOND ll check with ODACID regarding aid grant to GOG Report on Guatemalan revolutionary activities - 206 j- SEcp T DEPARTME T COpy OF STATE CONFJPENTIAL FROM GUATEMALA CITY Control 8173 TO SECRETARY OF STATE Reed Nov 15 1960 2 56 p m NO 230 November 15 noon PRIORITY EMBTEL 226 GOVElli MENT FORCES HAVE RETAKEN SECOND MILITARY ZONE HEADQUARTERS AT ZACAPA AND RE-ESTABLISHED COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CAPITAL GOVERNMENT PLANS SEND ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO SECURE ZACAPA PERMITTING OTHERS PUSH ON TO BARRIOS SEVERAL BOMBS WENT OFF GUATEMALA CITY LAST NIGHT CAUSING NO LOSS LIFE BUT SEVERELY DAMA ING MINISTER ECONOMY'S AUTOMOBILE FRONT HIS HOUSE CAS HAS REPORTS COMMUNISTS WILL ATTEMPT STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS PLAZUELA BARRIOS THIS AFTElli JOON MUCCIO - 207 I CONF IDEyr IAL COpy DATE NOV 15 1816Z 60 TO DIRECTOR FROM JMADD 1 IN 42807 CITE MADD 0549 REQUEST ONE C-54 REMAIN MADD FOR POSSIBLE OTHER C-54 TO RETURN EGLI FOR LOAD EVACUATION 2 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE AS SOON AS ONE RETURNS MADD WILL SEND OTHER BACK TO EGLI 3 PROPOSE CONTINUAL SHUTTLE RUN AS ABOVE UNTIL EMERGENCY IS RESOLVED END OF MESSAGE NOTE This message has been sent to DPD COpy DATE NOV 15 1858Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 42828 FROM GUATEMALA CITE GUAT 541 EMERG DIR INFO EMERG MADD REF GUAT 540 IN 42829 1 OPERATIONAL 2 REQUEST ASSIGNMENT TWO ADDITIONAL FULLY B 26 TO JMADD ASAP TWO MADD B-26'S BEING TUill ED OVER GUAT AIR FORCE 15 NOV DUE FACT 11AJORITY GUAT B-26'S NOT OPERATIONAL AFTER TWO DAYS COMBAT FLYING END OF MESSAGE - 20Y- SrT COpy DATE NOV 15 1901Z 60 EMERGENCY TO DIRECTOR IN 42829 FROM GUATEMALA CITE GUAT 540 EMERG DIR INFO EMERG MADD REF DIR 11343 OUT 91978 1 ON 14 NOV I IADVISED IT NECESSARY GUAT AIR FORCE RECEIVE ADDITIONAL AMMO AND USE OF THE TWO MADD B-26'S SITUATION CONSIDERED CRITICAL AS ARMY PURSUING REBELS AND ESSENTIAL IT HAVE AIR SUPPORT SHOT UP fu D 2 NEED GOG B-26'S MAINTENM CE AIR ATTACHE CONFIRMED 15 NOV THAT GOG B-26'S SHOT UP AND SHOULD NOT BE PUT o INTO AIR IN PRESENT CONDITION D 3 AMBASSADOR CONCURS WITH THAT ABOVE NEED EXISTS AND SHOULD BE FURNISHED THIS SUPPORT 4 MORNING 15 NOV I I REPRESENTING 1 ----PROCEEDED TO MADD TO OBTAIN AMMO AND B-26's _ 5 DREQUESTED HAVE GUAT PILOTS TALK WITH INSTRUCTOR TO MAKE CERTAIN THEY UNDERSTAND AND QUALIFIED OPERATE AIRCRAFT ------c D 6 o IN REF TO AMMO AGREED WITH THAT BULK TO BE STORED AT MADD AND GUAT CITY BASE SUPPLIED ON DAY-TO DAY BASIS END OF MESSAGE Joint ODACID KUBARK message concerning assistance to GOG - r l 1 S7 T COpy DATE NOV 15 19Q4Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO TRAV OUT 92431 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11564 TO OPIM TRAV INFO MADD GUAT 1 ZRMEDRICK SMALL ARMS AND BASIC LOAD AT MADD INCLUDE 66 PISTOLS 212 RIFLES 66 SMG'S 18 LMG'S 18 BAR'S 7 EA 3 5 ROCKET LAUNCHERS 4 EA 57MM RECOILLESS RIFLES 6 EA 60MM MORTARS 18 DEMOLITION KITS 4 INCENDIARY KITS 288 GRENADES 24 AN PRC-IO'S WITH EXTRA BATTERIES 40 AT MINES AND 4 CORPSMAN KITS COMPASSES BINOCULARS AND FIRST AID KITS PACKED WITH WEAPONS 2 FIVE-DAY AMMO RESUPPLY THESE WEAPONS WEAPONS BEING SHIPPED MADD ASAP PING DICAL ETA FOLLOWS FIELD SET WITH PLASMA END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer J C KING C WHD by I Coordinating Officerd ------------ f WH 4 0PS J Hawk1ns C WH 4 PM W Eisemann C WH 4 SPT Authenticating Officer W Eisemann C WH 4 SPT I h D TRAV ALSO SHIP- COpy DATE NOV 15 2120Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO MADD OUT 92476 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11582 OPIM MADD INFO OPIM GUAT EGLI REF MADD 0549 IN 42807 1 RETURN BOTH ACFT TO EGLI 2 EXPECT THIRD C 54 ' N SEND TWO DOWN NIGHT OF 17 NOV COMMISSION 17 NOV THEN ONE PER REF WITH ONE ALWAYS REMAINING AT YOUR C 1 WILL BE RETAINED __ END OF MESSAGE Requested one C-54 remain MADD for posslb1e evacuation Releasing Officer Stanley W Beer1i AC DPD COpy DATE NOV 15 2214Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE OUT 92497 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11592 OPIM EGLI INFO PRIORITY MADD GUAT HBJADE-X LOAD 1 EX-54-052 RASCAL 2 2 ACFT 764 WILL REMAIN MADDAFTER CARGO OFF CREW WILL RETURN WITH AASCAL 1 3 EXPECT 764 TO RETURN EGLI AFTER DELIVERY 577 MISSION OF 764 IS PROVIDE EVAC CAPABILITY EGLI INSURE CANVAS ROLL-UP SEATS AND SAFETY BELTS INSTALLED PRIOR DEPARTURE 17 NOV END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer Stanley W Beerli AC DPD Coordinating Officer C Barquin C JMCLE - 213 1 F rirp COpy DATE NOV 15 2352Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO GUATEMALA CITY OUT 92593 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11667 REQUEST IMMEDIATE REPORT SITUATION AT PUERTO BARRIOS WHICH ACCORDING RADIO NEWS REPORTS STILL IN HANDS REBEL FORCE END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer J C King Chief WHD Authenticating Officer J D Esterline Chief WH 4 - 21 SEC ET COpy DATE NOV 15 2357Z 60 PRIORITY TO GUATEMALA JMADD JMTRAV OUT 92605 FROM DIRECTOR CITE TO PRIORITY GUAT REF 1 DIRE 11679 INFO PRIORITY MADD PRIORITY TRAV A DIR 11294 B TRAV 0114 C TRAV 0108 D GUAT 517 E GUAT 451 OUT IN IN IN IN 91832 39199 36520 41880 36927 HQ HAS READY FOR SHIPMENT APPROX 151 025 LBS CARGO AS FOLLOWS A 20 FRAG BOMBS REF A 5200 LBS B 83 200 RDS 50 CAL REF D 32 000 LBS C 200 SMG and 100 000 RDS AMMO REF A 11400 LBS D BLASTING CAPS AND TRAINING AMMO REF B 1600 LBS E EVACUATION RATIONS REF C 24 000 LBS F FIVE 81 MM MORTORS AND 250 RDS AMMO FOR WEAPONS PACK AT MADD 13 775 LBS G FIVE DAY RESUPPLY SMALL ARMS AMMO FOR MADD WEAPONS PACKS 50 000 LBS 2 H 50 CAL MG AND I 52 FIVE IN ROCKETS JMCLEAR TRAINING 10 000 LBS O REF E 3050 LBS DUE CRITICAL SHORTAGE AIR TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES REQUEST YOU ADVISE IMMEDIATELY ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR ABOVE SHIPMENTS page 1 of 2 - 215SEC-1r COpy 3 FYI 50 CAL AMMO AND FRAG GRENADES SHIPPED VIA 2 C-54 ON 15 NOV NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE END OF MESSAGE ETA two Request Request Request Request C-54's for blasting caps ammo and hand grenades for evacuation canned goods for 50 cal ammo for anti-aircraft 50 cal guns and mounts Releasing Officer Ed stanulis Chief WH 4 0PS Coordinating Officers Tele Coord - Vartanian DPD I f WH 4 P1'1 E Stanulis C WH 4 0ps Authenticating Officer R W Brown Chief WH 4 Log - 216t SECr T DEPARTMENT OF STATE COpy CONFIDENTIAL FROM GUATEMALA CITY Control 8458 TO SECRETARY OF STATE Reed Nov 16 1960 1 42 a m NO 237 November 15 6 p m PRIORITY Dept Telegram 332 SOME INFORMATION IN RESPONSE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM CONTAINED EMBASSY TELEGRAM 226 THERE IS ALMOST NO EVIDENCE SHOWING CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN CURRENT UPRISING IN GUATEMALA REPORTS CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE HOWEVER THAT THIS IS THE CASE AND GOVERNMENT SEEMS CONVINCED THIS IS SO FOR EXAMPLE ARMY ATTACHE JUST APPRISED BY ARMY 'CHIEF STAFF OF MESSAGE RECEIVED BY DEFENSE MINISTER FROM MILITARY COMMANDER POPTUN BASE TRANSMITTING WHAT BASE COMMANDER SAID WAS INTERCEPTED MESSAGE FROM RADIO CUBANA PRESUMABLY TO REBEL FORCES AT BARRIOS ASKING WHETHER AIRPORT AT BARRIOS USEABLE AND INDICATING PROMISED SUPPLIES WOULD BE FORTHCOMING CHIEF OF IMMIGRATION ARTURO AGUIRRE MATHEU TOLD EMBASSY TODAY THAT ABOUT 10 DAYS AGO FOLLOWING A VIST TO HONDUMS HE'TURNED OVER TO PRESIDENT-INFORMATION SECURED IN HONDURAS IMPLICATING ACTIVITIES HONDURAS CAPT IN ARTURO CHUR DEL CID IN CASTRO CHUR DEL CID IS REPORTEDLY ONE OF LEADERS REVOLT WHO LED INITIAL ATTACK NOVEMBER 13 ON CUARTEL GENERAL EMBTEL 222 AGUIRRE ALSO TOLD EMBASSY THAT COL PAZ TEJADA CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF ARBENZ AND EXTREME LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY WAS THE MILITARY LEADER BEHIND THE REVOLT COLONEL ENRIQUE PERALTA MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE TOLD eontd _ 217 _ rnNFTDF N'T'TAT DEPARTMENT OF STATE COpy CONFfENTIAL Page 2 #237 November 15 6 p m from Guatemala City EMBASSY OFFICER YESTERDAY PAZ HAS RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED REPORTS TO EFFECT PAZ TEJADA RECEIVING MONEY FROM CUBA FOR HIS REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES NEWSPAPERMAN TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER SOME WEEKS AGO HE KNEW PAZ TEJADA HAD MADE A TRIP TO CUBA SEEKING FUNDS IN SUMMATION NEITHER THE EMBASSY NOR CAS SO FAR HAS BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP POSITIVE rROOF OF CASTRO INVOLVEMENT IN THE' CURRENT UPIUSING MUCCIO COpy DATE NOV 16 Q243Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO DIRECTOR IN 43052 FROM GUATEMALA CITY CITE GUAT 545 OPIM DIR INFO OPIM MADD OPIM TRAV 1 AT 1500 2300Z REPORTED THAT PUERTO BARRIOS AND GULL 1 lli I GUALAN WERE THE ONLY TWO TOWNS REMAINING IN THE HAJ DS OF REBE LS HE ADMITS THAT POCKETS OF RESISTANCE ARE PRESENT BETWEEN THESE TWO TOWNS HE FURTHER REPORTED THAT THE AIR FORCE IS SUCCESSFULLY INTERDICTING THE HIGHWAY AND RAILWAY BETWEEN THE TWO TOWNS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS 2 HE FURTHER REPORTED THAT I I DEPARTED FOR PERSONAL INSPECTION OF THE ZACAPA AREA IN MIDDLE OF AFTERNOON 15 NOV SMALL SCALE MOPPING UP EXERCISES STILL GOING ON IN VICINITY ZACAPA HOWEVER TOWN REPORTED IN HANDS OF GOVT TROOPS END OF MESSAGE - 219 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE COpy CONFrfrIAL FROM GUATEMALA CITY CONTROL TO SECRETARY OF STATE RECD NO 238 November 16 11 a m 8996 Nov 16 1960 3 05 p m PRIORITY EMBTELS 226 and 230 PRESS RADIO AND TV 9 p m LAST NIGHT REPORTED ON VISIT TO ZACAPA BATTLE FRONT SAID GOVERNMENT FORCES ROUTED REBELS AND COMPLETELY IN CONTROL THERE DECLARED GROUND ACTION AGAINST BARRIOS AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST BASE HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS WOULD BEGIN TODAY WITH ARMING OF CIVILIANS AND CONSOLIDATION REBEL POSITION THIS COULD BE BLOODY SAID GOVERNMENT WAS INFORMED REBELS HAD RECEIVED AIR FROM FIDEL CASTRO THAT WE ARE ALONE BECAUSE ONLY THE GOVERNMENT HONDURAS OF DR RAMON VILLEDA MORALES HAS OFFERED ITS HELP A1 D SUPPORT AND THit T GUATEMALA HAS SATISFACTION NOT A SINGLE FOREIGN SOLDIER AMONG ITS TROOPS DECLARED COMMUNISTS TRYING EXPLOIT SITUATION AND ENCOURAGED POPULACE HAVE FAITH AND BE VIGILANT AGAINST COWARDLY STREET BOMBING ACTIVITIES ET CETERA STREET DEMONSTRATIONS CALLED FOR LAST EVENING QUITE UN- SUCCESSFUL ESTIMATED 100-200 PERSONS APPEARED SOME OF THEM CRYING DOWN WITH YDIGORAS A1 D VIVA CASTRO BUT WERE QUICKLY DISPERSED BY POLICE WITHOUT UNTOWARD INCIDENT UNDERSTOOD CASUALTIES AMONG GOVERNMENT TROOPS ZACAPA ABOUT 50 KILLED AND NUMEROUS WOUNDED SOME REBELS TAKEN PRISONERS BUT MANY FLED TO RESIST ELSEWHERE OR TO TRY JOIN BARRIOS FORCES GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE ARRIVED BARRIOS EMBASSY AND CAS HEA ING NUMEROUS REPORTS TO EFFECT DISSATISFACTION WITH YDIGORAS GROWING AND THAT COMMUNISTS ACTIVE AND VARIOUS OTHER GROUPS ITCHING ACT MUCCIO - 220 CONFIDEfIAL DEPART MEjtOF STATE COpy UNCLrSIFIED FROM GUATEMALA CITY Control 9180 TO SECRETARY OF STATE NO 239 November 16 5 p m Reed Nov 16 1960 10 53 p m SENT DEPARTMENT 239 REPEATED INFORMATION TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY 10 RELIABLY REPORTED GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN CONTROL BARRIOS AHD COMMUNICATIONS RESUMED WITH CAPITAL AFTER FAILURE TO OBTAIN FAVORABLE TERMS SURRENDER UNDERSTOOD REBEL LEADERS FLEEING TOWARD HONDURAS UNDERSTAND ALL AMERI CANS ' SAFE MUCCIO - 221 - UNCLAS fED COpy SECRET DATE NOV 16 2329Z 60 PRIORITY TO GUATEMALA CITY MANAGUA OUT 93074 I FROM I CITE DIR 11884 DIRECTOR PRIORITY GUAT MANAc J1 REF ------ -- DEPTEL 329 NOT SENTI - - - 1 HQS URGENTLY NEEDS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CUBA BACKING ENEMIES OF REGIME OR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT GOC IN PLAL' lNING REVOLUTIONARY MOVES FOR FUTURE IS ANY PROOF SUITABLE FOR EXPLOITATION AVAILABLE YOUR AREA 2 DO YOU SEE ANY OPP@TUNITY TO FABRICATE HARD EVIDENCE OF GOC PARTICIPATION YOUR AREA 3 DOES GOVT HAVE CAPABILITY TO EFFECT QUICK ROUNDUP OF KNOWN ENEMY ACTIVISTS ON SUITABLE PRETEXT AND HOLD EVEN 24 HOURS WHILE LODGINGS ARE SEARCHED 4 ARE ANY CUBAN CITIZENS CURRENTLY HELD IN JAIL IF SO WHO AND ON WHAT COUNTS 5 WHAT CUBAN INSTALLATIONS EXIST IN YOUR AREA WHICH MIGHT BE EXPOSED AS REVOLUTIONARY BASES 6 PLS ADVISE ASAP HQS DESIRES ACCUMULATE USE- ABLE EVIDENCE SOV-CUBA INSTIGATION AND DIRECTION UPRISINGS YOUR AREAS END OF MESSAGE OCR CB notified of reference Releasing Officer J or J C King Chief WHD or lcers P E Oberst C WH CA Authenticating Officer E A Stanulis for J D Esterline Chief WH 4 - U Coora natlng - 222 - COpy DATE NOV 16 233QZ 60 PRIORITY TO JMASH OUT 93076 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11886 PRIORITY MASH INFO PRIORITY GUAT TRAV '1ADD REF MASH 1617 IN 41745 1 IN VIEW UNSETTLED CONDITIONS GUAT AND SATURA- TION TRAV FACILITIES DESIRE MASH SUSPEnD RECRUITMENT OF PM GROUND TRAINEES UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE GROUND TRAINEES ALREADY RECRUITED SHOULD BE RELEASED TO ON CALL STATUS READY FOR RECALL ON SHORT NOTICE AND MOVE HENT TO TRAV OR OTHER CM1P AS DIRECTED 3 FOR TRAV IF DECISION REACHED TO SEND ADDI- TIONAL RECRUITS TRAV YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED IN TO CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL BARRACKS ADVN CE PERSONNEL WILL NOT BE SENT UNTIL YOU INDICATE READY TO RECEIVE END OF MESSAGE MASH has 50-75 PM trainees available shipment TRAV within 10 days Request estimate when shipments to TRAV to begin again Releasing Officer Dfor J C King C WHD CoordlnatLng Officers II 'I C WH 4jSupport J ftaWKlnS CjwH 4 PM Authenticating Officer EAStanulis C WH 4 - 223 - COpy DATE NOV 17 0036Z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO MADD GUATEMALA CITY our FROM DIRECTOR CITE 93064 DIR 11880 OPIM MADD GUAT INFO PRITY EGLI REF MADD 0562 IN 43622 1 ODUNIT HAS REQUESTED NO B-26 AIRCRAFT RETURN EGLI EXCEPT LAST RESORT C-54 RETURN BLEHAR AND GREENE VIA DO NOT RETUAA ANY B-26 UNLESS PRIOR APPROVAL RECEIVED 2 FOR GUAT OPENING WITH I ABOVE ODUNIT POLICY REQUIRES REISUBJECT FLYING MADD B-26 AIRCRAFT COSTA RICA FOR HEAVY MAINTENANCE SIBLE GUAT VEHICLES AIRCRAFT TO BE OSTEN- _ _ _ _IMAY WISH RECONSIDER ORIGINAL REFUSAL VIEW SUPPORT HE NOW RECEIVING END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer Stanley W Beerl AC D D Coordinating Officers Mr Esterline CTelecon WH 4 - 224 - COpy DATE NOV 17 2021z 60 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO GUATEMALA CITY OUT 93106 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 11909 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE GUAT REF GUAT 546 IN 43126 1 TIONS TO REMOVE ANY DOUBT THESE ARE CURRENT INSTRUC- CUBAN TROOPS AIR AND GROUND ARE NOT TO BE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT YDIGORAS GOVERNMENT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY SHOULD NOT DEFEND THEMSELVES IF ATTACKED BY SAME TOKEN IF EVACUATION BECOMES A i'JECESSITY THEY ARE AUTHORIZED TO FIGHT THEIR WAY TO EVACUATION POINT 2 IF REF SHOULD BECOME A REALITY NEW INSTRUC- TIONS WILL BE FORTHCOMING END OF MESSAGE Base Cmdr at Poptun reported intercept of broadcast from Radio euoana re help forthcoming soon for rebels at Puerto Barrios Releasing Officer Richard M Bissell Jr Authenticating Officer J e King e WHD - 225 - SEct COpy DATE NOV 17 2242Z 6Q OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO GUATEMALA OUT 93500 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 12092 OPIM GUAT INFO OPIM MADD 1 MADD ORDER HQS ADVISES ALL KUBARK ACFT SHOULD BE RETURNED AF ORDBETTER PHYSICAL SECURITY FLEXIBILITY AND MAINTENANCE PROVIDED IN REINGRUBER OPINION WILL NOT PREJUDICE POSITION JI 1- 1 ' DUCTED FROM MADD 2 FOR 11ADD GOG SUPPORT TO BE CON- RE QUEST FUTURE I UREPORTS INDICATE ACTIVITY EACH ACFT ENGAGED IN EXAMPLE GOG TNG FERRY ETC 3 FOR GUAT AND MADD ALL MILITARY DETAILEES AND ANG PERSONNEL ASSIGNED MADD WILL NOT REPEAT NOT LEAVE PERIMETER LIMITS MADD UNTIL APPROVAL OBTAINED HQS END OF MESSAGE Releasing Officer Stanlex W Beerli AC DPD Coordinating Officer Mr Stanulis Telecon WH 4 - 226 SF Cr T DEPARTMENT OF STATE COpy FROM GUATEMALA CITY CONTROL TO SECRETARY OF STATE RECD NO 248 NOVEMBER 18 5 p m 10774 NOV 19 1960 2 32 p m PRIORITY EMBASSY TELEGRAM 239 AND PREVIOUS REBELLION APPARENTLY COMPLETELY DOMINATED ALTHOUGH SOME REBELS WITH ARMS AT LARGE IN COUNTRY AND OTHERS FLED TO HONDURAS SEVERAL DAYS AERIAL BOMBARDMENT CAUSED REBELS FLEE BARRIOS pRESIDENT ARRIVED BY AIR LATE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 16 WITH OCCUPYING TRIU HALLY TJl OPS YDIGORAS RETURNED YESTERDAY AND ADDRESSED LARGE WELCOMING CROWD AT AIRPORT DECLARING INTER ALIA GOVERNMENT VICTORY WARNING TO COMMUNISTS LEAVE COUNTRY OR BE EXPELLED LAST NIGHT YDIGORAS ATTENDED FOOTBALL GAME WITHOUT INCIDENT AND CURFEW MOVED BACK TO 10 p m PRINCIPAL EVENING NEWSPAPER EL IMPARCIAL SUSPENDED FOR 20 DAYS UNDER ARTICLE 14 LAW PUBLIC ORDER FOR ARTICLE BY LIMON BLANCO HE HAPPENED TO BE CAUGHT IN BARRIOS BY REBELLION DISPARAGING NAVY AND AIR FORCE ACTION TIME STRINGER ROSENHOUSE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON ON CHARGE HAD PASSED UNCENSORED INFORMATION ABROAD INFORMAL CENSOR- SHIP APPARENTLY BEING EXERCISED AT TELEGRAPH OFFICE POLICE ANNOUNCED WOULD SEEN INDICTMENTS AS ACCOMPLICES REBELLION ALL ARRESTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS UNAUTHORIZED MEETINGS DISTRIBUTION SUBVERSIVE PROPAGAJ DA AND ACTS TERRORISM SPORADIC LOCAL BOMBINGS CONTINUING GUATEMALA CITY NUMBER OF LEFTISTS AND RADI- CALS ARRESTED INCLUDING EDGAR IBARRA PRESIDENT LEFTIST STUDENT ORGAt' lIZATION FUEGO - 227 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE COpy CONFInjNTIAL Page 2 #248 November 18 5 p m from Guatemala City EMBASSY HAS STILL SEEN NO EVIDENCE CASTRO INSTIGATION OR SUPPORT REBELLION CAS HAD REPORTS HOWEVER COMMUNISTS TRIED JOIN MOVEMENT AFTER IT STARTED BUT REBUFFED BY REBEL MILITARY ALSO IT GENERALLY BELIEVED MARIO RENE CHAVEZ GARCIA MEMBER PUR At'JD KNOWrJ COMMUNIST WAS IN BARRIOS DURING REBELLION PRENSA LIBRE REPORTER CALLED HIM CIVIL CHIEF BARRIOS OPERATION AND SAID HE DIRECTED PUBLIC MEETING BARRIOS MONDAY NIGHT AT WHICH GOVERNMENT WAS DENOUNCED AND VICTORY REBEL FORCES PREDICTED THERE WA S ABORTIVE MOVE BY EXTREME LEFTIST DEPUTIES TO HAVE CONGRESS DECLA RE YDIGORAS INC MPETENT TO RULE JUST PRIOR SUCCESSFUL QUELLING REVOLT EMBASSY HEARD NUMEROUS REPORTS OF PLOTTING AND INDICATIONS FAIRLY WIDESPREAD FEELING YDIGORAS' S DAYS NUMBERED EMBASSY HAS IMPRESSION HOWEVER YDIGORAS'S POSITION MAY NOW BE STRONGER TH1 L BEFORE HE GAINED PERSONAL PRESTIGE FROM QUICK VICTORY AND PERSONAL DIRECTION OF OPERATIONS LEFTISTS AND DISPARATE RIGHTISTS HAVE SEEN EVIDENCE HE COURAGEOUS HE APPEARED COMPLETELY CONFIDENT THIS MORNING WHEN I TOOK SENATORS HICKENLOOPER AND BUSH TO SEE HIM HE TOLD US OF HIS RELENTLESS EFFORTS ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY IN GUATEMALA CITING DIFFICULTIES DOING SO IN VIEW AUTHORITARIAN TRADITIONS AND POINTING EXAMPLES PROGRESS THIS FIELD SINCE TOOK OFFICE HE EMPHASIZED HIS GRAVE CONCERN TODAY NOT MILITARY OR POLITICAL BUT ECONOMIC MUCCIO - 228 CONF I DrT IAL COpy DATE NOV 25 2337Z 60 PRIORITY TO GUATEMALA CITY JMTRAV OUT 96343 FROM DIRECTOR CITE DIR 13413 PRIORITY GUAT INFO TRAV REF A B 1 GUAT 575 IN 44738 DIR 12520 94390 Out HQS DECISION NO KUBARK FLUTTER TEAMS TO PAR- TICIPATE IN INTERROGATION OF REBEL TYPES CITED REF A 2 SUGGEST AS ALTERNA IVE GUAT GOVERNMENT ENGAGE SERVICE OF PBPRIME COMMERCIAL FIRM THIS PURPOSE WILL RENDER APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE HQS ADVISE END OF MESSAGE Re uest assignment of FLUTTER team for interrogation captured rebels GUAT Response to re uest from GUAT for FLUTTER Team Releasi ng Offi -cer E A Stanulis for J D Esterline C WH 4 Coordinating Officers by phone OS IRD J Langan C WH 4 SEC Authenticating Officer Wm E Eisemann C WH 4 Support o - 229 SECRE'T' Appendix 2 Memorandums re Special Force Trainers A Four Memorandums of Agreement B Memorandum for Chief WH 4 from A DDP A 28 Dec 60 C Memorandum for Chief WH 4 from A DDP A 30 Dec 60 D Memorand for Deputy Assistant to the SecDef for Spl Ops 30 Dec 60 - 230 - IJ ' V to ' e 3 ned lee 0 -e ai lc d C - I '-------- I - q ' p endix 2 - A It is the pu -p0 ie of this d ocument to -ecord certain agreements _ - J d - _ _ - _ _- - sid nt Hguel Ydigoras Fuentes ursuant to the latter's resuest - _--_ _- - a U S _rmy military training group to t -ain L furt1 e -anc'e of this purpose 1 be veen sele ted t CL be furnished elements of tne Guate alan ' 'rmy it is agreed as follows The group will be transported securely by CL- to that area of Guatem ala ' vhere L-l f ' r- '1' _ _ it will for a period of about eight weeks conduct training of selected inciiviciuals in paraxnilitaryactivities 2 It is stipulated that all financial indebtedness incurred he eunder by this group includL' 1g payments for s laries allowances medical care food o odging equipment injuries or death and any other support incident thereto wiil e born y CIb 3 ecessity It is agreed that Guatemala will in the event of assist in providi l g nedical support a means of evacuation of this group and any other support considered ecessary for its safety and security at the expense of CIA 4 In addition members of the group are to be allowed entry ethod which would as a a L- -U J iL 0 a ticipati' ' J n his area of activ ityL their safety and protection J ' ea lS of a secure pra cticable preclude local k lo' 'ledge of their '- L y I I A J ' t the essence oi this ocun e lt i'- 7 1 -rt z- 1 GBP b- l -- J ' I I S 'ould any illquiries be directed to official sources in Guatemala regardi 1g' he subject hp t hey persor nel such i nqui des will e answereci to the eifect are ir itees of the 'i govern ' nent and are raining 5- 5 Gi 'ss ea t'j 'C A-ZD troops to ci efend Guatemala against any th eat of bvasion 5 T his c ocu -nent which is in eeping iith J S olicy is e te reci 'nto or he pur ose of maintai ling peace and orc e i l the ' Veste -n Hernispnere ar a i-' 'l o -de to prevent the exoansion of Corn unism herein o fo u 6 It is greed that this cG t will r mab undisclosed tmless oth parties ' '--'lo _ _ a ree - - - t '2 J- -ad j - 7 2 a0 l J- ----'-'- and ill oe retained i the C' l stoc r of he 1t J A o J JPY - U lited 3 3 te s ' 9 5C all e -nade The list oi -lames of _ 5 ag e r e 5 availa le to t e e -soc s COr - p i5i lg x c' ed ' 5 eside t ' - 'igc -as a is e ues the cao e is c tac 'ec 2ereto as ciay 11 -------- -''' 1 'I J --------- t1 l1 J t'UP7 1nal' diIlg ar Oll u o- CO Q CtU 1l o 1 p mt 7 1njm 1QII or eec - thod m1d ' lhiQ ' zcmld ic Qt1on i l t '1 J r lJ Qa 1cu m r O acpJXil t iJ i 1Cenio all a l J ls c Ccc m ' $ I J _ - - - -- - - o vill be boTr Cl rscl de loco l k t - laGZ3 ot i ' o l A t17itj Biica to'HIi ' at7 a ld -c tk l - l tl o- t e ' 9u It 1 1 l t ' a t th 13 tr 'tl -ce 6 to vod -- _-- - -m -e- i n -cr d1 c lo ed - 0103 bata -- -- - --- '-'--' -- - - 0 - -- Q - C Q c t 1- et Co ' 1 c e ' t3 bct r 'C'e l CA c a _ ' c y _ a 'C i t - l y ' S'- z te 7- - t o l t a'3 t 'U f'l 8 -_ ta l 7 act1vitic 3 ' 2 ' I t 1a tivuJ J tzd 10 o ll anc t'l b t 1nc l - red 1l CJ y U n t a to cc %t J cl ocl a t 'for iOl1la -1e-s t lt e ed1c 1 - 001 'tr r t W1 ' n vo l d 3 Uabl G 'Y' - ' L ci Stata o t Qa I't - 3 f O I _ ' o f ' -------------''' '_J '' j ' J r i cqu1 n ' 1njUO iQI tid cloc- - - be 3 C' cC 7 0 n itz d -- _ i UJ ' I ----- -- --- ------- La 'j - - C2 _ J - - __ wr siC 2 d I -o ce5 or i f'et7 4 In c ion s ' ' ' ar- t l C l -it'7 at a e a o CL o o bers eGBP t ' __' a -e to allC ' ed e 1 j o a s 7 llC7 C ared o --- c- ---- _ -_-_' '_ _ o_ _-_ l - 43 7 - ' 7 - ---' - - --'- ' C3 ' J a ' 8 __ -- - Appendix 2-B COpy 28 Dec Memo For Chief WH 4 From A DDP A Subject Special Force Trainers 1 b the the for 160 Attached is a Memo to Lansdale w draft Memo for Record copy of Lansdale's memo on his talk with Douglas approving draft Memo for Record and c memo to Mann transmitting draft Memo for Record Also attached is the original Memo Record which is now to be signed by the Guatemalan Ambassador 2 If it would be of any help to you at all I would be delighted to go along with you to see the Guat Ambassador I am not asking to do this only offering At any rate if as and when you are successful with him I think that I should pick up the strings with Defense as I have essentially been the ball carrier there on this problem We received phone calIon Tuesday 28 December advising that both Mann and Merchant had approved the draft memo for the record - SE r 235 - I i Append 2-B i contd I j l' E MOItl NDU M FOR Deputy A 5fjiGt nt to fb S2C rCt L'Y 'II Defcr 3 for SV ci l Ope tlcr-ti l FQUO ning our m Un g or Decernbar 2 Jitb Aa 8 stant Scc1 cb1 Y I yln VJO met on De mbel' Z-3 with z' $iGt3 nt Secretari' lyfut' Ma nn ' las extremely 1P 3itant t grc'3 to any sign lture by 3 A'ep es-ontatlve of i'he S C De r ent to 0 dvc ument Afte con s de abt0 dl3cus$lon 1- oweve1 ' he did ng ee to th # possibility of having a em04at' 1 Jum or tha Rocord p -e 'Z d Guggost d draft tt J chc -d wblch could b sisned by the GuatemalGBP P Amba3Gadvr as an aCcU ate ststc- ent oGBP L'le uOOeratanding - eached between the GO'llcl'oment t f G a em lla and tho United States The Department then could -rero this signed roertlo andu m to tb 9 D-apartment of D3fcn9 tor- app ropi lare ac tion 2 I beUev6 that this ar angement it it could be cai rled out v outc' n10et the poirJ i3 r 9cd by Mr Irwin 1 r Man ott L -lat lle would at least have to obt3in the CO Cu eDC of Mr Mell'Cbn cl and p03 Jibl of the Secretary nef' o a kL g him to do this it i or couZ'tla impo rtant that we knv W d nnit el1' whether or not tha abo e proposa l would satisfy the DOD i carried out Of cou rse bava no e s9ttt3nc at tho mom nt A3 to whether Qr 'n t th G t atemalan AmbaQsador witl be willing to agree c Attachment Pro D3ed Draft - 236 - T CY BARNES cont oL---T ' '''_OJ -' Append 2-B The U 1tod 5t t a p trSL ant to the re'1U-est t l th oGcvern l ' t - - -- - Th -- - - - - - - - abo -e l ll cll -ataty states the -- - - ur4 rst3-nClng roached betwe n c -- c C-- - dati l s t I -1 t1 l '' rw7Jt - 237 c- -- ' ---- --- Append 2-B contd HEt-10Rc l'iDUM F 1 ' t CAPTAIN SPORE SUJ3 JECT P-E Tee neut -w ith Guatemala Tnis afternoon Deputy Secreta D las I discussed the legal bs sis for introcluction of U S nilitary personnel L'1 to Guatemala for tra ining tfCROSSPATCH personnel I shoved him the me co from Tracy Be rnes subject Speciel Force Tra iners de ted 21 December end its attached 1 1emorandU l1 for the Record to be signed by the Guate nalan ft mbassador to Washington Also I told him of the previGus docu nent and Assistant Secretary In-riu f s cbje tions to it After a thoughtful pause Nr Douglas said that this Memorandum for Record Would be acceptable to Defense He then asked nat the next step was I said that I 'iOuld inform CIA Who iVould then handle through ste te according to Barnes' meRlO to me llhen this oemorandwn was received by Defense it ' 'Tould be best if Hr Douglas held a meeting v1-J tJ 9 rvice representatives and told them that this r'aS Defense policy Mr Douglas ed to this suggestion After leaving Secretary Douglas I told Tracy Barnes that Douglas believed the me llorandum vas acceptable I asked if he needed a note on this but he said that my verbal word vas sufficient He se id tha t he would then try to get both state ana the Gua te a1f'_'1 fJ loassador to approve I suggested t l a t state's transn itte 1 be addressed to the cretary of Defense but be delivered to 080 vho would then get it to Secretary Dougle-s Barnes said he would hs ve the signed documents hand-carried to 000 for action by Defense l ote When the signed docum ents are received by 080 Deputy Secretary Douglas should be infonned 080 should promptly arrange a meeting for -ir Dotg las With the Service representatives so that he can tell them at first-hand tha t this is policy Suggest tha t the llurn ber of' representa tives be kept to a min1r rum 60 that it doesn't become a big mob in his office on this very sensitive subject If John Irvin is in toWIl he should be included If for SC1 le reason such a meeting ccnnot be held promptly then a memo for the Services should be sent to them signed by Mr Douglas EDTrlARD G LANSDJl LE Brigadier General US A F Append 2-B r' I I -' contd ' ' 27 Dcccmher F 60 ME MORA ND U y FOR A asistant Secretary of Sbti for Into2 -f rnel'ican A f ira -------- ---c----- Spacial Force Trainer 1 SOBJE'C'r 1 l ttached ia a copy of the propo$ d Meroor ndum for the cco d u fOl submission to the Guatemalan Ambassador in conn ction with t ' e Spedai Force Trainers dlaeu3sed in your ofIlcG on Friday 23 Decamoor If as it is hoped the Guatemalan Ambassa dor will sign tha statement in the lowel left hand corner or the attached dra t the document can t ben be sent from the Depart-mont of State to th Secl etaxy of Defense for a propr ate a ction This internal U S document should 1 think be h a ndled by cnty your offic Qnd Om'S lthough tb 'O 7'ec tving office in Defense I e Gorteral Lanadat t l officc wQuld be informed a The attached document and the above procedul o l1ave 'be n xamin d a ' ld appl ovod by Deputy Sec retary of Defen se Douglas and ho baa advised u s that he wiH see to it that the S ecl l Force Trainers are rete ged i n accol danct'J wit l our request a l soon as aU tep3 have been completed 3 I would appreclat it there ore H you could giYe me your reaction as aocn as possible by tebpbone so that we nlay take appTopri te steps t9 obtain the sigpature of the Guatemala n Ambass-ador I 3S6t1rPO that YO 1 would' pre fer to have U3 do thia in via w o the fact that we had tho previous dealings with him We propose to ask him fo thlfJ 3e cr o d slgnature on tbe g1 otmds t at a document pf this tYP0 will provide f'-J m and hia Gove nmc nt with lnor sect2 re and soundar p 'otection than tM fi - t docn -nento Attachment Memorandum fOr the Record - - ' Append 2-B contd military group to provide specializ ed training in Guatemst 3 to selected ments of tbe Gu tematan f 'l 'c 3 Tne detaHs of tM 9 agreement and the procedures wbe t'cby it ehatt be ricd out aro to ba wQrkcd out by appr0L trli t rcp-reaen- tatives of tll Ur ited State Depa rtrnen of Defens0 and of the Government of Guz teme la -- - - - -- - --- The bove accurahty states the undel Gtanding reached between the Govcrt4 Xlent of Guatemal 1 and tM Government f the Unit d States 1 Sign t J Xe Data j Appendix 2-C f DDP A S cci J Force T ca i nexs l w cli c-d are the lateG-t doC1T C '1-cS in corulection w i th the Special Force Tcti '1ers Q 1- io a mero to Frank llivine v t ing 3 suggested L -aft letter of' tran6ai aJ to the I2 fense D3p t covering the signed l for P eco rd fue second is a mEUR O to Innsda le trO- '1srrltting'the t 1 O original si c enta r - 241 - Appendix 2-D 30 Decemher L960 ME'i ORA NDUM FOR Deputy A 6siatant to thn Secretary of Dcf' nse for Special Operation3 SUBJECT Special Force Trainers t Attached are the origir a t 5ig ed documents in conn ection with the Spedal Force TrainerfJ with which you al'e familiar The first ia the ag L'eement dated 21 December signed by both t lejo9 tho Guatemalan 1 mb 3sador to the U'nitad St l tes and by Jake Esterline and the second is 4 1 1emorandum for th Record signed by ' lajos on 29 December The latt r dccument is d ntical to the one sc o yn to Secretary Douglaa by General LanadOlle a few days go 2 The State Depa i tment wiU pro oide I hope today the - lett er of transmittal cov ring the l'Aemo rand for the Record and discussad with General Lansdale Sinc as you ow we are very amdou3 to take action as soon as possible_ I hope that you win be willing to act on the attached documents without waiting o-r eceipt of the letter of transmittal frQm the D partIDeut of State A3 you know both Assistant Secretax-y Mann and Secretary 1v erchant approved tho proceduri ' eso there is not the sUgbtest doubt that such a lstter 'ill be provided 3 I asaumit that when tb e le docnmenb have served their pU pose you wilt either hold them in Y0t1 file 03 if you prefer return them to me and wilt fila tha-m ha re Anything that yon can do to e x pedito this rnatte will be very much uppredated in thltJ conn ction in orde to keep me up-todat would you be good enough to giy me a call when th matter i s under way A ttachm enb 1 Agroemont dtd 21 Dec Z Memo for Record dtd 29 D c Appendix 3 Portion of Oral History Interview with Ambassador John J Muccio 13 April 1971 - 246 - Appendix 3 Portion of Oral History Interview with Ambassador John J Muccio 13 April 1971 Washington D C by William W Moss for the John P Kennedy Library MOSS Ambassador Muccio you were ambassador to Guatemala beginning in late 1959 if my information is correct The sources that I have indicate that the Eisenhower administration went ahead with funding of a project to invade or to do something about recapturing Cuba in March of 1960 The money went towards training guerrilla bands in Guatemala I was wondering what the first knowledge you had of this was How did it come to your attention in what way under what circumstances MUCCIO When the liaison to Ydigoras man arrived in Guatemala he had a note to me from one of the Assistant Secretaries of State saying that so and so will approach you on a program we intend to be inaugurated in Guatemala Pages 1-6 One such note to Muccio in Guatemala City from R R Rubottom Jr Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs 15 Jul 60 read as follows Dear Much I have asked Bob Davis Robert K Davis I I I I who will bring this letter to you to convey some information which is very closely held Source State PADRC Micro card file 60-242 Geneva 762 3-16-62 -Interior Dept 7-10-62 Operations S - 247 - MOSS All right Were the terms of that program made knCMn to you at that time MUCCIO No MOSS All right In what way did you begin to discover what was going on MUCCIO Well there were two sources of information that were available to me I received nothing o ficial out of Washington but the liaison man had been my CAS Covert American Source chief for several months before being pulled out and he and his replacement didn't get on too well But the former liaison man was more or less of a compulsive talker and he felt freer to talk to me than elsewhere o o MOSS In what terms did he put it MUCCIO o and in that way he brought to my attention a lot of developments as they occurred in implementing and carrying out the program MOSS All right Did he discuss the program itself with you or merely the logistic steps the business of taking over the plantation Alejos's finca and so on MUCCIO I doubt whether he knew except what was going on in Guatemala very much of the overall strategy MOSS Yes all right Now you say you doubt that he knew the particulars or the purpose of what he was doing at that time between ece er 1960 when r- ------'l-- l-- However II I and as noted ln This mi FJL ------------ Ljlr - 248 - l NC SIFIED the MUCCIO As far as he was concerned this was a training project As to whether it was going to be used where and when it would be used was very nebulous to him MOSS Right When did you begin to see the thing build up and change character I assume that in the early days it looked rather like a gerrilla warfare school much as the Panama school is I wonder at what point you began to sense that this was a major development and in what ways MUCCIO Anyone that knew anything about President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes would know that he couldn't keep anything to himself Ydigoras assumed that I knew hat was going on and he talked Almost every time I saw him he brought out some new fact of what was underway MOSS Yes Now let me ask this As I understand it the story broke in the American papers after -- what is it --La Bora in Guatemala picked it up It broke in the American papers around October just before the election and then was picked up again by a chap named Paul P Kennedy curiously enough for the New York Times in January and Kennedy was expelled from the country over this as I understand and then brought back What was your involvement in this little episode MUCCIO Practically none Ydigoras invited me up to the two fincas where the training was underway repeatedly and I repeatedly avoided going up there I never did go up there except on one occasion That was when after Apparently Muccio's CIA source was not such a compulsive talker as Muccio had indicated or else the source was not I I -- I Iwas fully aware of the operational plan Presumably this is a reference to the use of Guatemalan sites for training the Cubans - 249 - UNCLA IFIED UNC IFIED i t had become a matter of conjecture in the American press and media Ydigoras invited the whole diplomatic corps up there for an asado with a sleight of hand he had all the Cubans run up to the other finea and brought in some of the Guatemalans who were being trained at the same time He took all of us around and said See everybody's saying that there's been Cubans here there's nothing but Guatemalans My boys are being trained MOSS Did anybody swallow this MUCCIO Dam n few Laughter You must remember that most of those Cuban youngsters were from the so-called better classes They had means and they ran all ove that country There were these specially marked jeeps or unmarked jeeps going in all directions at all times I'm sure that more were killed on the roads of Guatemala than were killed at the Bay of Pigs MOSS The whole ineptitude of the operation is amazing not only what you're talking about now but I was struck by the simple tactics at the beach It was just incredible to me that it could have been done that way but that's an aside -- my opinion MUCCIO On that point let me mention that I understand the same chief of operations handled the Bay of Pigs preparation implementation or whatever term you want to use that had handled the famous Guatemalan incident The Agency cable traffic does not reflect any such outing for the diplomatic corps US newsmen and members of the Congress of Guatemala were given such escorted tours - 250 - UNC IED MOSS Oh yes MUCCIO When -- what was his name -- Jacobo Arbenz MOSS Yes MUCCIO 1954 was left isolated and CIA Central Intelligence Agency supported Castillo Armas who came in from Honduras I doubt whether a single shot was fired by one or the other side in the march from Honduras into Guatemala City Guatemalan military are brought up in a s chool where no officer no member of the armed force ever points a gun at another member another individual in uniform period And I'm afraid some of the haphazard planning was due to the ease of the Guatemalan In 1954 MOSS I see MUCCIO o incident in 1954 They were not aware of the control that Fidel Castro had already established in Cuba MOSS Yes Yes I understand Now in March of 1961 after the new administration took over Roberto Alejos went to Washington with a letter from Ydigoras MUCCIO Go ahead MOSS Yes I was going to say had you foreknowledge of this and were you aware that Ydigoras was trying to put pressure on the Americans to get this thing moving MUCCIO Well on two occasions the liaison officer came to me and said that they were having trouble keeping the boys under control that they'd been trained to such a pitch that they were eager to get this thing going He wanted to know if I wouldn't write to Washington saying that it was time to use these excellently prepared laughter __25 UNCLA7IED UNCLASS ED MOSS Yes And what was your response to this MUCCIO My response was that I had not been consulted in any way and I had no role to play in that particular phase of this operation MOSS Were you informed before the Alejos trip that he was going MUCCIO No I know that Alejos had been going back and forth MOSS When did you first receive official word of what was going on from the department MUCCIO That was before anything really was underway when the liaison man came down to establish his role therein Guatemala His role was merely liaison between the operating group and President Ydigoras Roberto Alejos was right in the midst of this MOSS Now did you have any specific instructions from the State Department on this MUCCIO Not any MOSS Okay now let me ask you when the operation was underway when it became apparent that it was going to end in disaster what was the reaction of Ydigoras of Alejos and other Guatemalans to this and of the CIA people who were in Guatemala at that time MUCCIO Well None of the CIA men responsible for that operation ever came anywhere near the Embasssy They were always up in the They had their own transportation their own communication facilities and everything -252 UNCLAsjrFIED else I took the position that I had not personally seen anything going on which was the reason why I dismissed Ydigoras' repeated invitations to go up and see how fine the boys were doing I could legitimately say I had not seen them myself That was very helpful particularly when it became a public issue MOSS Yes Do you recall how Ydigoras responded to the failure of the invasion Do you recall his mood his attitude MUCCIO Well his whole attitude was that some of the people in Washington were scared of their own shadow MOSS How about your CAS liaison man there after it went off MUCCIO For a while yes MOSS Do you recall his reaction MUCCIO Well that something had gone wrong MOSS Nothing specific MUCCIO He was there for a while because the question as to what to do with all this equipment that had been brought down there came up Now I had a role to play in that MOSS All right Let me sh ft the topic somewhat Well let me ask you first I would be negligent if I didn't ask you about your personal feeling about the operation its wisdom its implementation and so on with hindsight of course and realizing that this is one man's perspective Would you comment in general on it I Was he still lin the American Embassy - 253 - MUCCIO Well I had good grounds to be very skeptical of Ydiogras He was a man who preferred to be mischievous even when it was not to his advantage They were not under CIA or the US These were his boys He talked about them incessantly every time I saw him He talked loosely about this to many others His lack of perception and sensitivity was evident in the baffling attempt to use Cubans to suppress the revolt of his army on November 13 1960 I heard of his plan to inject Cubans into this purely Guatemalan fray as follows Midnight Saturday November 13 a third of the Guatemalan armed forces took off against Ydigoras At La Aurora Air Force headquarters junior officers disarmed and isolated the Chief of Staff Shortly thereafter some had misgivings could not agree on the next move and decided to let the Americans know what was underway particularly since they had received word that Ydigoras had secretly ordered some DC-3 planes loaded with Cubans flown to Puerto Barrios where the revolt was most active They'd first called in Lieutenant Colonel William J Cavoli who was the air attache Cavoli didn't know what to do and called Colonel John Berry senior Army attache Just as soon as Berry arrived there and saw what was underway he called my deputy Robert F Bob Corrigan Bob 'Corrigan said this is something the ambassador should know about right away The whole American group carne up td the embassy residence The liaison man carne in a few minutes later and said that the Cuban trainees were already airlifted and should have landed by now in Puerto Barrios I turned around to the liaison man -- he had instant access to Ydiogoras at all times -and I said You go tell President Ydigoras that those Cubans should not be used in Puerto Barrios that if they have landed to keep them at the airport if they have not landed to return them back to What was the name of that airport It - 254 - Anyway the airport nearest the training firica sic Well apparently the first DC-3 when it came down for landing was fired upon whereupon the pilot took off immediately and he was still in the air President Ydigoras sent his own pilot down there to tell these fellows to go back to camp back to the airport Before I knew what action had taken place by Ydigoras the telephone rang and it was a call from Washington It was Secretary Christian Herter asking what was underway down there I told him and he said Well good I'm glad you sent word to Ydigoras but you go over there personally right away and tell him that he's to return those men to the base immediately The aircraft were C-46's and according to a more reliable witness than Muccio the C-46's were not fired on -- the pilot of the first C-46 mistook guns being fired from escape hatches and ports on his plane for ground fire and didn't stop rolling - 255 UNCLASrIED TOP S ngT Access Controlled by CIA History Staff I ' ' - - UNCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top fled when filled in form is detached from controlle document ' DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION SOURCE CIA Risto Staff OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION DOC NO OCtober 1979 1 of 2 OF P GES 255 Volurre II DOC D TE COpy NO HUMBER Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy NUMBER OF TT CHMENTS none ATTENTION Thl form urlll be placed On top 0 and attached to each Top Secret document received bV the Central ltiieLZfg Agencv' ' or cla rified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time a It u downgrad d destroi ed or tran nnltted outside 0 CIA Acceu to Top Secret matter u limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those Indivldual Whose offictal ' dutle relate to the matter Top Secret Control Officer who receive and or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this orm and indicate period 0 custodv in the left-hand column pr9vided Each individual who sees the Top Secret document wlll rign and Indicate the date 0 handling in the right-hand columns OFFICE RELEASED RECEIVED REFERRED TO SIGNATURE D TE DATE TIME TIME SEEN BY SIGNATURE OFF ICE o'l V NOTICE OF DETACHMENT When this form is detached from Top'Secret material it shall be completed In the appropriate spaces and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control or record DOWNGRADED Signature tE D TE DISPATCHED DESTROYED 'BY Signature TO WITNESSED BY Signature BY Signature OUTSIDE CIA I A A - - I- A A I - cl I I luu'j7 nn1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION Volume II PARTICIPATION IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY October 1979 Jack B Pfeiffer TOP FOREWORD Nearly 20 years have elapsed since the Agency was authorized by President Eisenhower to undertake a program of covert action to overthrow Fidel Castro but despite voluminous writings subsequent to the activity intending to show the disastrous nature of CIA's guidance of the operation no attention ever has focused on the Agency's participatory role in the formulation of United States foreign policy visa-vis Guatemala and Nicaragua during the course of the operation One purpose of this volume in the Official History of the Bay of Pigs series is to examine in detail the extent of those relationships as they impacted on -- or in fact became -- the policies of the United States government toward those two countries In Guatemala the Agency dealt directly with the President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes or his personal representative Roberto Alejos and the relationships were far more complex -- and covered a longer time span -- than was the case with Nicaragua - 11 - In addition negotiations initiated by the Agency with the Government of Guatemala heavily involved both the Departments of State and Defense and during the Eisenhower administration the Special Group The Nicaraguan story principally concerned the Agency's efforts to obtain an air base and port facility for launching the anti-Castro strike force against Cuba and the involvement was directly with the President of Nicaragua Luis Somoza Debayle and his brother Anastasio Somoza Debayle the Commander of Nicaragua's Armed Forces The US embassy in Nicaragua and its representatives were kept informed and in general supported the Agency as the ball carrier with the Government of Nicaragua The story was relatively straightforward with the Agency being given the green light to negotiate in many areas affecting US relations with that country A third Central American country Panama was involved marginally in the Agency's anti-Castro effort Forts Randolph and Sherman in the Canal Zone were the sites initially selected for PM and communications training for the cadres which were to help organize the dissident elements inside Cuba and France airfield' - 111 - in the Zone also was used by Agency aircraft during the course of the project CIA's negotiations for use of these Panama sttes therefore were with the US Departments of Defense and Army rather than with the government of Panama As the anti-Castro program of the US was implemented a sometimes embarrassing relationship with the United Kingdom developed because of the frequency with which aircraft of the anti-Castro Brigade made emergency landings on the airstrip at Grand Caymen Island and in one instance at Kingston Jamaica Agency personnel assigned to the anti-Castro project were not directly involved in the negotiations with the senior UK representatives for release of either the aircraft or their crews Acting upon instructions received from the DCI level CIA sl _ ___________________Iwas principally responsible for resolving such problems and consequently s ch nego- tiations are not subject to discussion in this volume The topic is discussed in Volume I of this history Air Operations - lV - As with the preceding volume of this series the author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the other members of the CIA History Staff Mrs Sharon Bond and Mrs Eulalie Hammond to the completion of this segment of the Bay of Pigs history From substantive research to typing and proofreading they did whatever needed doing regardless of their job descriptions For any errors of fact or questions of interpretation they are blameless -- the author assumes full responsibility VOLUME II Contents Foreword Part I ii Guatemala 1 A Background 1 B Establishing Contacts with Ydigoras and Alejos 3 Cover Security and Latin Pride o o 12 D Quid Pro Quos 24 E November Revolt vs Pragmatists C F G Part II Minor Skirmishes Intra-Agency Policy Makers Inter- and The Special Forces Trainers -Pragmatism and Patience 52 57 73 80 H The Changing Political Climate I Third Country Involvement J GOG - JMATE and the Kennedy Administration Nicaragua 28 84 100 A Background B Initiation of Discussions with President Somoza 101 - vi - 100 Part III C Rip Robertson's Excursion into Diplomacy o o o o 108 D Qualms at High Levels E Back to Robertson -- Activist with Foresight 127 F Who Would Do What for Whom G Down to the Wire with Somoza o 138 o 122 133 Conclusions 147 Source References Part I Guatemala 149 Part II Nicaragua o o 161 Appendixes 1 2 Guatemalan Revolt November 1960 Miscellaneous Cables Memorandums re Special Force Trainers o o 230 A Four Memorandums of Agreement o 231 B Memorandum for Chief WH 4 from A DDP A 28 Dec 60 C D 3 168 Memorandum for Chief WH 4 from A DDP A 30 Dec 60 235 241 Memorandum for Deputy Assistant to the SecDef for Spl Ops 30 Dec 60 245 Portion of Oral History Interview with Ambassador John J Muccio 13 Apr 71 246 - vii - T rCRET -- -------------- The clearest case to me of the CIA affecting directly negotiations with another Chief of State was Ydigoras I think that was frankly unavoidable and inescapable because we had almost constant problems of a kind of operational nature Here we were training a force that Col Jack Hawkins once characterized to me as the most powerful military force from Mexico to Colombia in his Ydigoras's country He himself faced a lot of domestic opposition -at one time they tried to overthrow him as you remember He wanted to get this Cuban group out of there as soon as possible and I am sure that you have seen a lot of the traffic and memoranda of discussion but it seems to me really to characterize especially the period in November-December 1960 when Torn Mann wanted to get the Brigade the hell out of Guatemala and Ydigoras would have welcomed it There was no place for them to go I still remember that we even talked about ferrying them to that training site lin I which was a measure of the desperation -- or desperate desire -- to get them out of there Guatemala We talked again about trying to find a remote si te in the continental US but Tom Mann with the State Department would have none of that In that period when sort of cQnstant operational problems with Ydigoras were all wrapped up in the larger question of where this training activity could be carried on and how it could be made less obtrusive -- I think it was just inevitable that Agency representatives found themselves dealing directly with Ydigoras I Richard M Bissell to Jack B Pfeiffer 17 October 1975 - viii - THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION Volume II Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy Part I Guatemala A Background Direct participation in the affairs of Guatemala was not new in Agency history' In 1954 CIA had pro- vided support and had motivated Guatemalan forces which ousted then President Castillo Armas a pro-communist in favor of the presidency of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmann On 26 July 1957 Arbenz was assassinated and the political situation in Guatemala evolved into a threeway dog fight among the forces of the left the right and the center _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________________________ Iand were opposed to both the leftists and to the party of Ydigoras Fuentes -- the rightist candidate who also had the support of the Army When it became clear Ithat Ydigoras was the most popular figure in Guatemala - 1 - 1 1 o arranging for a behlnd the scenes conrerence between Ydigoras and the_ MDN Cruz Salazar's party A deal was arranged whereby the assembly would elect Ydigoras and the MDN would get three seats in the cabinet forgiveness for the sins committed under the Castillo regime and a financial pay-off to Cruz and other MDN leaders On 12 February 1958 the Assembly elected Ydigoras as President 1 In the interval from the election of Ydigoras until the announcement of Eisenhower's anti-Castro program both the government of Guatemala and through the Agency the United States Government began to focus closer attention on Fidel Castro's revolution which led to the overthrow of the Batista government at the beginning of 1959 Although the Department of State hesitated to classify Castro as a communist there was little doubt among Clandestine Services personnel about the direction in which Castro was tending and by the early part of 1960 it was clear that the Government of Guatemala GOG was willing to take some risks in opposition to Fidel Castro Not only did Guatemala sever official relations with Cuba but before the end of February 1960 President Ydigoras offered the use of his territory to support propaganda activities directed against Castro and he also made - 2 - TOP lET a specific offer through the CIA to groups favorably regarded by us of training facilities in the Peten area of Guatemala 2 B Establishing Contacts with Ydigoras and Alejos It was more than two months following President Eisenhower's announcement of an anti-Castro program before Chief JMATE Jacob D Esterline and I - Robert K Davis met with representatives of the GOGi but in the interval between the announcement and Esterline's first meeting Davis had already estab lished contact with Roberto Alejos -- the principal representative of President Ydigoras Fuentes in all It is interesingto observe that this specific reference to the use of the Peten area in Guatemala was reworded for use by the DCI in a memorandum to the members of the Special Group to read this training and holding of anti-Castro Cubans would be conducted in a secure remote area of a friendly Latin American country 3 The Special Group 5412 was a group composed of the Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense the DCI the President's National Security Advise and a CIA Secretariat Its principal purpose was to review proposed paramilitary and clandestine operations and to provide guidance on such proposals for the President President isenhower made extensive use of this group but President Kennedy largely abandoned it until late in the period of the Bay of Pigs operation TOP FRET subsequent matters involving the CIA Esterline in- cidentally had been the senior officer in the Headquarters end of the operation which had forced the resignation and ouster of President Arbenz in 1954 During the first meetings with Alejos and Ydigoras in Guatemala City on 30 and 31 May 1960 plans were initiated for the use of a portion of Alejos's coffee plantation -- Finca Helvetia -- as a communications training site and discussions were held concerning additional sites for the training of paramilitary candidates At the same time it was made clear to Ydigoras that the Agency sponsored Cuban exile organization the Frente Revolucionario Democratico FRD would nominally be responsible for whatever training activities of Cubans took place in Guatemala The names of Antonio Varona and Justo Carrillo were given to President Ydigoras and Robert Alejos as two of the Eisenhower's anti-Castro program was dated 17 March 1960 CIA's anti-Castro effort was located within the Western Hemisphere Division Branch 4 WH 4 Initially WH 4 was given the crypt JMARC but when this was compromised the crypt was changed to JMATE Throughout this history except when direct quotations are given the term JMATE is used key figures in the FRO According to Esterline's report of the meeting it was never said in so many words that CIA in effect is supporting these people it was implicit in President Ydigoras's attitude that he well understood that support is being given to these people through indirect means In playing his own game of plausible deniability Ydigoras point d out that the less he knew of the operation the better would be his denials to the Organization of American States OAS or others who were concerned that antiCastro activities were being mounted within his country's borders It was also during this first session between Chief WH 4 and the Guatemalans that plans were made to introduce Esterline to the Guatemalan ambassador Arthur Schlesinger put the situation quite accurately in the following comment The Frente was appropriately named it was a front and nothing more While its members talked among themselves CIA was engaged in a recruiting drive among Cuban refugees in Florida and Central America It had also persuaded President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permit the establishment of a secret training camp and air base in the Guatemalan mountains 3a - 5 - TO CRET in Washington Carlos Alejos the brother of Roberto Alejos y Portents of things to come followed shortly after Esterline's first meeting with Roberto Alejos On 8 June 1960 Alejos as he had indicated in his initial meeting with Davis and Esterline was in the United States where he met with Esterline Among the subjects discussed in addition to the utilization of Guatemalan territory for the training of anti-Castro Cubans Alejos said that he would be taking a look at the airstrip at Retalhuleu to see if it was capable of handling C-54 aircraft Construction and renova- tion of this airstrip would later give rise to both some intra-agency squabbles and also some strain in the relationships between the Agency and Alejos At this time too Alejos was very much concerned about the United States ambassador to the OAS John Dryer who according to Alejos was pressing the GOG Carlos Alejos apparently was appointed US ambassador a short time prior to Esterline's meeting with Ydigo as and Roberto Alejos A cable to the Department from Guatemala City on 18 May 1960 noted that Carlos Alejos Ambassador-designate to the US would arrive in New Orleans on 25 May 60 4a - 6 - to respond to a Cuban charge that Guat6mla was being used as a staging base for a planned invasion of Cuba and that an OAS inspection was in order Alejos's response was that if Cuba would agree to a similar inspection Guatemala could be freely visted by the OAS team In what would be a continuing irritant through the course of Project JMATE Roberto Alejos also expressed his displeasure with the failures of the governments of Honduras and EI Salvador to break relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba 5 Whether Esterline actually met with Ambassador Carlos Alejos at this time is not known but it appears possible that such a meeting may have taken place In any event a cable sent from Guatemala City to the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington D C for Roberto Alejos dated 7 June 1960 addressed itself in part to Raul Roa's Cuba's Foreign Minister request for One of Roberto Alejos's cards with the following note translated from Spanish was found in Chief WH 4 records Carolio The bearer is a good friend I pray that you will assist him and make use of his contacts in the US the OAS investigation of Guatemala and it also contains the following tantalizing message Impossible to give proof of what is happening in Cuba Members of the Premier's personal guard have been shot according to some sources of information j By mid-June 1960 plans were well in hand for establishing training activities in Guatemala Roberto Alejos who had gone from Washington to Miami had been introduced to Casimiro Chick Barquin of DPD the Agency's air arm -- who was about to take off for Guatemala to survey the airfields at San Jose and Retalhuleu to check the airstrip at Peten and to see what other airstrips might be available 1 Robert Davis was in Miami to perform the introductions - - - - - - - - As proved to be the case in Nicragua ---' -----_____ IGUatemala planned to iso late I 1 I activities from the PM and communications training programs which In Spanish the message read as follows PRUEBAS LO QUE PASA EN CUBA IMPOSIBLE DARLAS FUSILARIAN MIEMBROS GUARDIA PERSONAL PREMIER UNA DE LAS TANTAS FUENTES INFORMATION STOP Apparently in the transmission or in the cablese some words and punctuation were lost ' omitted or goofed up were about to be established situation where But unlike the Nicaraguan was better able to do this such isolation was more theoretical than practical 7 Davis did tell Roberto Alejos that matters pertaining to the training sites for the anti-Castro Cubans would henceforth be discussed with Juan Paula Argeo Paula was a member of the FRD and it had been agreed between the head of the WH 4 political section Gerald Gerry Droller and the FRD that Paula would work out details of reimbursing Alejos during the course of this initial survey trip The funds were ostensibly coming from the FRD through Paula In the course of arriving at decisions on the financing and the funding of the training it was pointed out that Droller should urge the FRD leadership to increase its own fund raising program 8 While on the one hand the Agency was concerned with masking the funding for the FRD from the Cubans it was at the same time concerned with disguising DrQller was known to the Cubans as Frank Bender -a cover identity that wasn't blown until the publication of Arthur Schlesinger's A Thousand Days in 1964 Juan Paula was in fact Manuel F Goudie Alejos's position from the Cubans -- his role would be as a private Guatemalan citizen cooperating with the FRD element for idealogical reasons 9 In ad- dition to the Agency's interest in protecting the cover stories Ydigoras himself was very much concerned that the training program not be revealed to the public In one instance when he heard that a Guatemalan Congressman was trying to promote support for a group of pro-Batista Cuban recruits to overthrow Castro he made it quite clear that such a program would find no support at the presidential level Ydigoras even went so far as to suggest that perhaps he should expel a few pro-Batista and a few pro-Castro Cubans from Guatemala for propaganda purposes in order to protect the Agency's on-going operations 10 By mid-July 1960 construction work had begun on the communications training base and the search was underway for a suitable airstrip By early August despite some reservations of the DPD element in charge Source reference numbers 11 and 12 not used - 10- TO CRET TOP ET of the air operations it had been decided particularly since it had been favored by the President of Guatemala that the Retalhuleu airstrip a graded sod-strip of approximately 4 300' in length lying in the NW corner of Guatemala roughly 40 km from the Pacific coast and 50 km from the Mexican border would be expanded to 5 000'xlOO' with a crushed stone and asphalt surface Suitable hanger type structures and other necessary airfield facilities would be installed at that site for the air training base 13 Although the details are given in another history a word should be said here about the highly commendable performance of one of the Agency's engineers from Office of Logistics th r who on 3 August I 1960 was assigned to the Retalhuleu project as the resident engineer arld who on 13 September saw President Ydigoras officially ina gurate the opening o the air- strip with the landing of some DC-3's a C-46 and a couple of Aero Commanders By 30 September all con- struction was completed including the extension of the airstrip to 5 000' and the base was ready for the inauguration of training activities 14 Despite some severe criticism from the A DDP A C Tracy Barnes about cost overruns inefficient fa nued on following page C Cover Security and Latin Pride A high degree of cooperation between the President of Guatemala and the Agency was clearly evident in the plans to provide a cover story for the increase of air activity at Retalhuleu At the dedication of the base JMADD Ydigoras pointed out that the airfield was being renovated to provide protection tor the northwest border of Guatemala and to provide a training base for new B-26's which were being acquired under the Military Assistance agreement with the United States The infantry base JMTRAV was to be provided cover by GOG troops -reportedly the palace guard for President Ydigoras -who had begun training in the area in order to disguise Agency activities with the Cuban exiles In quest of support for his anti-Castro effort Ydigoras was not reluctant to devise cover stories of his own In the early part of August for example Ydigoras told Carl Jenkins then COB JMTRAV that he Ydigoras had invented a Cuban warship that was supposed to be lurking off of the east coast threatening I I management by and similar other charges drawn exclusive y from hindsight rather than on-site investigation Mr I I did a magnificent job when faced with heavy obstacles not the least of which was approximately 100 of rainfall in the Retalhuleu area during the period when the airstrip was being extended The Chief of WH 4 Support said in fact the resident engineer is to be commended for the excellent performance of a difficult task 15 TOP- ' ET invasion He then leaked the word that he was ac- cepting offers of Cuban exiles in Guatemala to assist his country in its defense against a Castro attack All of these activities were being carried on directly between the President of Guatemala and the Agency's representatives in the field The Department of State if informed of the GOG support for JMATE chose to appear ignorant of any involvement of the us Government Beginning in early August of 1960 Guatemala Air Force B-26's and P-Sl's flew to all parts of the country to provide additional support for the cover story and as Ydigoras had indicated in the earlier part of the month joint Army Air maneuvers began in the San Jose Retalhuelu and Champerico areas to give further support to the story that the increase in training activity was related to improving the status of the GOG's own military To insure the security of the area where the Agency activities were centered the newspapers and the public were advised that they should not trespass in the training areas because live ammunition was going to be employed in the exercises 16 The President of Guatemala was interested in doing more than simply providing a cover story for the Agency activities to the invasion the invasion Throughout the period prior and even through the course of he or his chief spokesman Roberto Alejos made it quite clear on numerous occasions that they would be willing indeed were anxious to see Guatemalan Army and Air Force personnel actively participate ln the operations against Castro's Cuba As early as September 1960 when the first resupply overflight was being planned Alejos and the Defense Minister of Guatemala were in serious discussion with Carl Jenkins the COB of the ground training base JMTRAV about the possibility of using some Guatemalan personnel as either PDO's or assigning a counterpart Guatemalan Air Force crew to the C-54 It is possible that this training was made possible in part at least by the 5 000 pounds of small arms and perhaps as much as 100 000 pounds of machine guns ammunition and rockets that CIA provided to the GOG at this time 17 - 14 - TO ECRET that would be used in the overflight 18 The pros- pect of utilizing Guatemalan personnel in addition to the Cubans appeared attractive to Agency personnel in the field but it created negative responses from Headquarters Sounding in one instance Very much like a reply originated from the Department of State the Headquarters response to a c Jrequest that a Guatemalan cadre be infiltrated with the Cuban teams read ative Neg- Possibility adverse political repercussions too great to justify this action 19 The enthusiasm in Guatemala also went beyond those immediately in charge of the government In October 1960 pending a Guatemalan congressional investigation of activities An odd feature about the cable from to Headquarters with Ydigoras's request was the following query Do you have Cuban crew selected Would they come from air group already in Guatemala This would appear to be the long way around to get an answer to the question and may reflect the incipient antipathy between the WH 4 contingent at JMTRAV and the DPD elements at the air base at Retalhuleu which would later lead to harsh words and bitter recriminations that would only be solved -- and then in part -by thEUR DDP Richard M Bissell As nearly as can be determined Carl Jenkins was the first COB at JMTRAV serving from early September until 9-10 December 1960 18a 1 - 15 - _ _ at Retalhuleu the principal political opponent of Ydigoras Fuente Jose Cruz Salazar who was scheduled to testify before the Congress about the air base was briefed by Alejos and Ydigoras concerning their support for Project JMATE Upon completion of this briefing Guatemala cabled Headquarters that Cruz enthusiastically endorses effort and will assist provide cover for project before Congress Also feels it advisable to have picked Guat in project In turn he said in two days he can easily raise an extra hundred who would be willing to fight against Castro and communism 20 By way of showing some appreciation to the GOG for its support the Agency provided numerous name traces at the request of Alejos or Ydigoras -- name traces which turned up Castro agents in Guatemala or indicated legitimate Cuban defectors who wished to enter Guatemala 21 CIA assisted in having reported sightings of submarines of unknown origin off the west coast of Guatemala checked out -- submarines suspee ted of carrying arms or bringing pro-Castro guerrillas to Guatemala In one instance I - - - - - - - - suggested that Headquarters fabricate a photo of a Soviet submarine supposedly off the Guatemalan coast c Jsaid the hoto could be placed in the Guatemalan - 16 - TorrRET press and suggested may be good way greeting Khrushchev on arrival UN 22 It was also during the early period of initiation of activities in Guatemala that the Agency accommodated the request of President Ydigoras for about 20 000 rounds of 20mm anti-aircraft ammunition valued at about $30 000 The ammunition was to be used for trainihg of AA gun crews both as part of the cover and diversion from JMADD JMTRAV activities and also as an actual part of the Guatemalan defense program against incursions of Cuban aircraft over their east coast 23 Relations with the GOG and its representatives were not all sweetness and light A couple of annoy- ing problems which came up in the early fall of 1960 concerned air operations and the key figure as in most of the disputes between the Agency and the GOG was Roberto Alejos In one instance he was exceedingly upset by the change in an incoming aircraft schedule and Guatemala cabled Headquarters to insist -- again CND actually had P2V's sweeping the Pacific coast of Guatemala during the period 14-18 October 1960 in an attempt to locate a reported Soviet submarine -with no luck - 17 - TOP fRET apparently -- that last minute changes in flight schedules were unacceptable to Alejos and that if he could not be given 24 hour notice of planned flights then schedules should be revised in order to accommodate Alejos's demand 24 Some preliminary discussions between the Agency's representatives in Guatemala and the Thompson Cornwall Company the construction company responsible for the improvements of the Retalhuleu airfield over the question of providing cover for the Agency's PBY came to naught when Alejos pointed out the numerous difficulties which would attend the attempts to cover the aircraft commercially Alejos noted that it would be much simpler to bring the PBY in black or chartered in his name rather than to attempt to use it under commercial cover 25 The problem of airc aft maintenance posed a more serious question in terms of both cover and diplomatic relations with Guatemala In the early summer of 1960 negotiations had been undertaken with a Costa Rican aircraft maintenance-organization known as SALA The Development Projects Division DPD which was in charge of air operations for JMATE had initiated the contacts with SALA through I ------------- - 18 - TOprRET L- I a controlled Icorporation which was Agency For cover purposes it was owned by two members of the FRD Agency employees in key positions in the company could monitor its activities and conduct necessary business The B-26 and C-46 aircraft for use in the JMATE project were nominally to be sold to the FRD byl I which in turn would support the cover that the aircraft at JMADD belonged to the Guatemalan Government I I would negotiate with SALA for maintenance of the Guatemalan aircraft All of this of course to involve ferrying of B-26's from CONUS into Guatemala black removing and replacing of GOG insignia on aircraGBPt as they might move from Guatemala to Costa Rica where SALA had its principal maintenance base and generally conducting operations in such a manner as to rovide viable cover 25a By mid-September however no agreement had yet been reached A few days prior to the time that the DPD representatives planned to close the final agreement ith SALA a dispute arose between DPD and WH 4 PM The question oncerned an apparent DPD attempt to go it alone in the negotiations with SALA TOP The upshot TOP CRET was that a SALA representative arrived in Guatemala City accompanied by the Costa Rican ambassador The two Costa Ricans had then visited various Guatemalan officials seeking information about a damaged C-46 which DPD anticipated that SALA would be called on to repair DPD planned to have the SALA representa- tive who had never been cleared by the Agency visit the JMADD site This visit was denied and in addi- tion Joseph Langan Chief WH 4 Security in his memorandum on the incident stated In view of the fact that relations between Guatemala and Costa Rica are apparently in a rather strained state at this time these inquiries have resulted in placing the JMADD activities in an embarrassing situation relative to the Guatemalan government and in our dealings with various officials of said government Had the Guatemalan government been aware of the need for aircraft mechanics this need might possibly have been filled from within Guatemala and obviated the necessity for bringing the SALA Corporation into the JMADD activity and as a by-product considerably re- duced the expense of such activities 26 The maintenance contract between the Agency and SALA was never put into force because it got into these very sensitive political areas 26a Because he played such a significant role in the Agency's relationship with his gove nment a special word should be said here about Roberto Alejos who was Ydigoras's alter ego in practically all matters concerning the Agency's Guatemala program Alejos was informed on even the most minute details -- or if he was not informed he let it be known that he was dissatisfied displeased and disagreeable Where on the one hand he was almost solely responsible for covering the death of the first Cuban trainee Carlos Rafael Santanya whose dog tag number would be used to identify the exiles as the 2506 Brigad on other occasions Alejos could behave as though he rather than the Agency were in charge of the training operation in Guatemala with reference to the accidental death of the Brigade trainee a cable from Guatemala to Headquarters noted that after the recovery of the body the autopsy and t e burial that Alejos moved quickly to cover incident with local officials from Governor down to adjoining finca manager Thank God they all belong Government Party and he can control them Believe total costs ops gifts no more than $1 000 27 In the early part of October 1960 Alejos was one of the principals in a potentially explosive incident which could have had serious repercussions including possible loss of Guatemalan and US lives and the closing out of the training bases in Guatemala The unfortunate situation seems to have occurred in part at least because of the inability of Agency personnel to communicate in Spanish with their Guatemalan hosts Col Antonio Batres had requested per- mission to enter the JMADD signal center in order to transmit a message Batres was not only Chief of Guatemalan Air Force operations he was also the personal pilot of President Ydigoras The Agency officer in charge of the communications center had delayed Col Batres a moment in order to secure sensitive materials in the area According to the report to Headquarters Batres thought that he was being denied access to the commo facilities which he apparently had utilized previously and he departed the scen only to return again with Roberto Alejos half a dozen Guatemalan soldiers and the commander of the Guatemalan security guard at JMADD Alejos also was told that he would have to wait for a few minutes while the area was made secure -- at which pcint Alejos accompanied by the commander of the Guatemalan guard unit and Batres forced his way into the signal center and informed the Agency officer that he was under arrest Prior to and in anticipation of Alejos's return and the probability of a forced entry the JMADD security officer had informed the communications officer that such an event would probably occur and that no resistance to Alejos should be made Fortu- nately in the ensuing discussions between Alejos and the Agency's representatives the situation was sorted out -- despite Alejos' angry statements that it was his intention to close down the communications activity in order to bring the number of negative aspects of the operation to the attention of the big boys in Washington 28 There were however no repercussions nor security breaks resulting from this incursion by the Guatemalans into the commo center The communications officer whom Alejos had declared to be under arrest was never technically arrested and by way of apology Alejo invited the officer to his home as a dinner guest TOP RET D guid Pro Quos Alejos's displays of temper may have had a less than subtle influence on subsequent negotiations with the Agency's representatives in Guatemala Shortly after the foregoing incident Chief WH 4 Jake Esterline requested authority to obligate $150 000 for compensation to property owners in the area of the Retalhuleu air base for damages resulting from renovation of the airfield Seventeen kilometers of road- way were reportedly damaged considerably when used as an access road to Roberto Alejos's finca and repair on the seventeen kilometers was set at $100 000 -plus an additional $50 000 to pay for rock taken from the river on property owned by one Senor Ralda on 5 acres of his property 29 Following Headquarters authorization of the payments to Alejos and Ralda went to Headquarters with a cable on ------ 4 Nov 1960 reading 1 Payment of the $50 000 has to be made to Ralda immediately upon preparation and delivery of the local legal documents as this Alejos understanding and he had made the commitment to Ralda 2 Operational activities and liaison with high Guat government officials would have been seriously affected and the success of the project materially jeopardized if payment is delayed 3 Copies of legal documents will be forwarded Headquarters with the receipt 30 Despite the fact that the $100 000 was supposed to make the finca roadway and the 17 kilometers passable during the rainy season an engineering report indicated that the steep grade was washing out the ballast and the road would need to be paved Thompson Cornwall the engineering outfit which had restored Retalhuleu had given an estimate of $185 000 to do the job Alejos had tried to raise the difference between the $100 000 Headquarters had approved and the total contract price but had been unable to do so A cable of 25 Nov 60 from Guatemala indicated that _________Imight be able to make a deal with Alejos for less than the full contract price and requested that he be authorized to offer a maximum of $130 000 The message to Headquarters ended with the standard plea that the negotiation be authorized as the matter was extremely delicate and the project ould cause embarrassment to An outgoing cable from the Director on 26 Nov 60 authorized c Jto negotiate up to $130 000 if that proved to be necessary and the releasing officer for the cable was the DDP Richard M Bissell 31 In addition to these sums approved for payment to Alejos other legitimate expenses the Agency incurred were for the use of Ydigoras's aircraft and for repaving and maintenance of the La Suiza airstrip on Alejos's property -- a total of $32 000 32 Alejos's various claims appear to have been legitimate expenses incurred under the terms of the openended oral contract-which had been in effect since the initiation of the project in Guatemala Despite the failure of Alejos to sign documents for using an alias identity John Black -- or his failure to execute a written contract 1 1 wrote that JMATE does feel morally and legally obligated to reimburse Alejos for any expenses he incurs in his efforts for the Project if he submits a claim for reimbursement It is on this basis that the relationship with Alejos now stands To sum up the relationship between the Agency and Alejos there has been no discussion of paYment of salary or other monetary benefits Alejos expects to be reimbursed for any expenses incurred in behalf of the Agency and the Agency to maintain its self respect and relationship with the Subject is committed to pay for such expenses 33 Oral agreements notwithstanding there is evidence that Alejos tried to take advantage of the situation on a number of occasions As early as August 1960 for example Alejos's brother-in-law an engineer was proposed for a contract of $1 000 per month for work related to the development of the JMTRAV training site and in January 1961 or shortly prior to January Alejos had proposed that Agency transport aircraft flying between Guatemala and Florida be used to carry shrimp to the United States The numerous difficulties attendant upon such an operation were sufficient to cool this proposal but far more pressure was exerted by Alejos during the period shortly before the invasion in an attempt to get the Agency to help him sell his coffee crop -- presumably because his participation in project activities had forced him to miss numerous opportunities to obtain the best price for his coffee The Agency found an export agent in the US for Alejos but the coffee sales were to be within the Guatemalan quota 34 How such relationships would be regarded in light of the investigative morality of the mid-1970's is a moot point At a time that the Bay of Pigs was being planned the activities which now might seem footnote continued on following page - 27 - E November Revolt -- Policy Makers vs Pragmatists For all practical purposes the voice of the US Government in Guatemala during the months when the ground and air training bases -- JMTRAV and JMADD respectively -- were being established was that of the Central Intelligence Agency Agency training programs were developed with the full and complete cooperation of the President of Guatemala his principal spokesman Roberto Alejos and other high GOG officials Such interest as the Department of State evidenced in the affairs of Guatemala were concerned principally with embarrassments that might result from Cuban charges in the OAS or in the UN relating to US support for Cuban exiles training in the Guatemalan area By mid October of 1960 this point was causing some consternation to Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann 35 From this time forward until his replacement as Assistant Secretary of State for American Republican Affairs Mann was the Agency's prejudicial were unquestionably necessary in view of the fact that CIA was forced to use the Guatemalan training sites The Agency's preference for the use of CONUS facilities for the training had been continuously denied principal protagonist in the Department of State Despite this however he was a man who in retrospect at any rate was held in the highest regard by both Richard Bissell the DDP and Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 While Tom Mann would continue to be embroiled in the Agency's relations with Guatemala the United In an Oral History Interview with the author in the fall of 1975 Esterline had the following comments to make about Mr Mann If you discussed a project in general terms and he didn't like it he would tell you but if you could bring him around to the point where he said well go ahead and do it but be damn sure that you do it all out that would be the end of it I think he was one of these who felt that the prestige of the United States was getting very thin in the hemisphere -- in the sense of relating it to our gunboat diplomacy days when we could of sort of rape the lock and there would be no problem with it I think that he felt that the odds of being able to put everything into it were very sli i but again when he finally realized what the alternatives were he finally said Well if this is it then let's do that plan and let's go the whole way on it I had many goarounds with Tom on something until I finally got him to agree or he said I am not going to agree In this case he finally agreed No it would be very hard to fault Tom on the thing 2GBP - 29 - States ambassador to Guatemala John J Muccio who preferred a back seat with regard to all activities concerning the Cuban Brigade was also going to be forced into an active role in at least one event where the Agency played the key role -- the preservation of the Ydigoras presidency in November 1960 early as July of 1960 Ydigoras expressed to As 0 Ihis fear that the Partido General Trabajo ------ and the Partido Unidad Revolucionario could possibly overthrow his administration With this in mind Ydigoras had discussed with I land Carl Jenkins the possibility of forming a multi-national force composed principally of anti-communists from all parts of the world including Guatemala and other Latin American countries As part of this program Roberto Alejos had suggested to and Jenkins that Guatemalan volunteers be trained as a part of the JMATE operation While the field was favorably disposed to undertake this sort of training for the Guatemalans no progress was made with Headquarters on the plan 37 In fact Ydigorasand his Cabinet had decreed -and the Congress had approved -- a 30 day state of footnote continued on following page TOplRET By mid October 1960 the internal situation in Guatemala had worsened and Ydigoras was pressing hard on Washington for loans and grants-in-aid to assist him in maintaining control The GOG faced a financial crisis -- salaries had been cut people were unemployed and the Leftists were making strong inroads in the political life of the country A general strike had been called and this posed a possible threat to the overthrow of the Ydigoras government Reports of varying reliability sug- gested that Castro might be supplying funds to and training cadres of anti-Ydigoras groups in Guatemala in an attempt both to oust Ydigoras and consequently put an end to Guatemalan support for the Cuban training program The situation had become so serious that by the end of October and the early part of November JMADD had completed preparations for a quick evacuation of all the aircraft and all station personnel seige on 19 July 1960 Carl Jenkins assigned to WH 4 PM was providing operational guidance to c J prior to assuming his job as COB TRAV In September 1960 Ernest W Sparks was named Chief JMATE activities in Guatemala and thus became the adviser to I I I Ion ops plans 37a - 31 - to France Field in Panama Ydigoras himself was facing strong congressional opposition from those who refused to believe that he had not permitted the use of Guatemalan territory for the training of the anti-Castro Cuban group How desperate the situation appeared to the GOG was noted in a cable from Headquarters to Guatemala JMARC principal Department of State contact told Gerard Droller that Alejos presumably Ambassador Alejos had informed President Eisenhower of Guat plan stage Cuban invasion Guat According this plan it is intended for number of Cubans land Guat beach and dig for arms caches ostensibly placed there by Castro agents Invading Cubans would be apprehended by Guats and brought to trial Trial proceedings would be extremely fair and sentences extremely light Ydigoras desires contrast Guat application justice with that of Castro Intended that the entire operation be bloodless and without shooting 38 It was not clear whether the invaders were to be volunteers from among the troops in training at JMTRAV but before any such operation could take place a real crisis broke in Guatemala On 13 November 1960 an emergency cable from JMADD was received in Headquarters' at 0931 Washington time stating that Roberto Alejos had arrived at the MADD base to tell the Agency representatives that various cities including Guatemala City were having minor skirmishes with communist elements At this time Alejos made a request that MADD be prepared to participate in show of strength in form of flyovers and it was the plan of the Acting Chief of JMADD to comply with Alejos's request pending Headquarters approval 39 The American Embassy's initial message was received in the Department at 1234 hours Washington time and said some kind of uprising in Guatemala City had been aborted 39a Within a few hours of the first announcement of the revolt there began a rash of emergency cable traffic among Guatemala City JMADD and Headquarters that continued for the next three to four days Almost immediately for examp e key Agency personnel in Guatemala were hit with requests for support and assistance from the Ydigoras government One of the first requests came from the Minister of Defense Rubin Gonzales Sigui who fearful that the revolt was being directed and sponsored by Cuban elements asked that the US provide surveillance for enemy ships which might be oprating between Cuba - 33 - and Puerto Barrios one of the principal centers of the revolt In re- sponse to this request which also was supported by the US ambassador in Guatemala City the Navy authorized two P2V aircraft to survey the area as far south as Panama and in addition assigned a destroyer to patrol the Gulf of Honduras area 39b The charge that the revolt was Castro backed would be repeated throughout the period of the revolution but no evidence was ever found to indicate that it was anything other than an internal uprising of dissident Guatemalans principally elements of the Army In fact before the revolutionary episode came to a conclusion the Political and Psychological warfare unit of WH 4 was to suggest that if legitimate evidence was not found to implicate Castro that such evidence be manufactured to show that the basis for the revolution w s in fact from Fidel Castro and his coterie During the course of the first day's action the Cuban forces in training at JMTRAV were alerted to prepare for any contingency The Guatemalan troops which-had been used as part of the cover and security Unsourced comments in the following paragraphs are based on cables reproduced in Appendix 1 Guatemalan Revolt 13 November 1960 Miscellaneous Cables - 34 - TofRET forces in the TRAV and DD areas were called to service by Ydigoras and the Agency's C-46 aircraft out of JMADD participated in transporting these troops to Guatemala City There was considerable concern about the fact that this left only one C-46 at the Retalhuleu airfield and this would be insufficient should an emergency evacuation of the Cuban Brigade and Agency personnel be required Headquarters directed however that air transport support continue to be given to the Ydigoras government An additional problem presented almost immediately to JMATE was a GOG request for large amounts of ordnance to replace expenditures from the first day's strafing and rocket attacks by Guatemalan Air Force B-26'son various points which had fallen to the rebel forces The Guatemalan government requested among other ordnance components for manufacturing napalm bombs but this request was rejected for technical reasons Requests from the field went to Headquarters for the standby of additional B-26's that might be needed by MADD and for C-54 flights to bring in small arms and ammunition The Chief of Air operations at JMADD Major Billy B Campbell had been to Headquarters I for meetings with DPD and was visiting lliDD Eglin Air Force Base en route back to outbreak of the revolt I at the At one point it was planned that Campbell and another B-26 pilot would make an emergency flight to MADD with the bomb bays of the 8-26's loaded with ammunition and arms noon on 13 November I I By mid afterLt Col Frank Egan who would soon 9 10 December 1960 take charge of the TRAV base and Lt Col Quentin V Earl who in the absence of Billy Campbell was proceeding to the MADD base as commanding officer went forward to Headquarters with a GOG request to use JMATE's B-26's and US pilots if they would volunteer to fight for the Ydigoras government MADD also indicated that --------r--------r--L In an Oral History inte view with the author on 15 June 76 Lt Col Billy B Campbell USAF Ret offered a somewhat different version of the GOG approach to JMADD Campbell stated that Alejos had been at the base just prior to my getting back down and had Guat troops and had threatened to take over the base -- JMADD -- and take over the aircraft and use his own pilots to quell the invasion which was coming up through Puerto Barrios and Honduras 39c footnote continued on following page Ydigoras would like to use the JMTRAV Cubans -- the majority of whom had volunteered to fight for Guatemala -- to help put down the revolt As the first day wore on the situation of the Guatemalan government became increasingly difficult Ydigoras ordered a 30-day state of siege and called an emergency session of Congress The rebel forces were gaining more ground literally and figuratively Apparently failing to receive an answer from Headquarters concerning the use of US pilots and Cuban I troops I cabled Headquarters shortly be- fore 0300 hours Washington time on 14 November 1960 with a request from Ernie Sparks and Col Egan for permission to commit 218 Cuban volunteers from JMTRAV as airborne infantry for an assault landing at the Puerto Barrios air base at dawn In addition they also requested permission to utilize MADD B-26's piloted by US personnel -- volunteers again -- to Although the cable traffic fails to mention this incursion by Alejos it is verified by an eyewitness who was present in the communications room at Retalhuleu when Alejos forced himself into the secure area This witness recalled Headquarter's instructions to cooperate with Alejos and also the authorization for Seigrist and Beale to fly strikes against the rebels in Puerto Barrios 39d L TOP tCRET support the attack The reason for the use of US B-26 pilots was given as follows Due fact Guat pilots have had no practice this type op and Cuban pilots have not yet participated in combined air ground exercises plus need for precise timing and coordination air strike with air assault landing request authority use us volunteer pilots to insure success this op Request authority use one AEDEPOT volunteer with each assault transport aircraft to provide best leadership available 40 The Headquarters reaction to this request is best explained in the words of the then Deputy Director of Plans Richard M Bissell who said I remember with some vividness that I was called up by the Watch Officer at about 2 30 in the morning and a cable had come in I think from Egan and Ydigoras had asked to borrow some of the Brigade to put down an uprising in Puerto Barrios Egan wanted an answer within an hour or something of that kind I-did at that hour in the morning get in touch with Tom Mann but I could get no decision out of Tom Mann He said he couldn't possibly act on a matter of that kind until he could AEDEPOTS were defectors from the USSR who had been trained initially by the Agenc for various types of I loperations I Because their prlmary mlSS10n was phaslng ou some 26 of them volunteered and were used as training officers at JMTRAV See also pp 66-67 of this volume - 38 - TOP r ET see the Secretary in the morning So here again you have Ydigoras levying a request on an Agency representative locally under circumstances and with a time schedule that as it turned out made effective reference to the State Department just impossible The State Department was not equipped to decide something like that within an hour r know that r sent a cable to Egan saying Yes on my responsibility and my reasons for doing that - very definitely at the time -- were that r didn't think that decision ought to be left to Egan 41 There seems to have been some confusion as to what actually happened following the request which Mr Bissell approved The initial cable reporting the action stated simply that Upon Ydigoras's instr tions through Alejos aircraft and troops launched on schedule However when planes at Puerto Barrios order countermanded as it discovered majority rebels had evacuated base during night All aircraft and TRAV troops returned JMADD 42 On 17 November however in an after action report it was stated MADD B-26's commenced airs trike against Puerto Barrios air base at 0607 hours local strafing area with rockets and 50 cal As first C-46 started to land B-26's strafed in front landing C-46 C-46 made successful -landing encountering sporadic small arms fire Cuban trainees aboard aircraft returned fire through ports during landing Recall order given before C-46 completed landing Therefore pilot did 180 degree - 39 - TOPfRET TOP fCRET turn and took off immediately and all C-46's and B-26's returned directly to MADD LUI The most accurate story of the air operation mounted by the Agency however comes from the principal eye witness to the actual operation against Puerto Barrios C W Connie Seigrist who had initially ferried one of the B-26's to Guatemala from the Agency's operations in the Far East Seigrist has written I believe the Guatemalan Army Colonel who was in charge of our base informed us of the revolt This was late in the afternoon of 13 November 60 I offered my services if needed in support of President Ydigoras So did some of the Cubans We felt what we were working for would all go down the tubes if the revolt was successful and we were exposed Late at night our offer was accepted The Guatemalan Air Force refused to participate I flew a B-26 with a Cuban pilot-observer named Crespo he was lost later flying a B-26 at the Bay of Pigs I strafed and rocketed the airfield at Puerto Barrios to soften the field for the C-46's that were carrying the Cuban troops who were to repluse a revolt The Guatemalan Air Force Colonel Antonio Batres asked me later to fly cover for Guatemala army troops who were flown into some airfields in the mountains to counterattack a part of the revolt Although I flew cover no close support action was required of me I flew alone Also later Col Batres asked me to patrol the entire southwest portion along the coast of Guatemala and to fire - 40 - TOPt-RET into any grouping of people or vehicles I patrolled most of the day stopping to refuel once but no action was required as there wasn't a soul or vehicle in sight I flew alone 44 Among other details provided by Seigrist was the fact that two B-26's were involved in the Puerto Barrios action the second being flown by W H Beale who also had flown a B-26 in from the Far East Seigrist flew a total of four sorties including one to Puerto Barrios one in the mountains and two along the coast Except for the operation in the mountains when he refueled at Guatemala City National Airport Seigrist confined his flights to Retalhuleu With reference to the actual strike Seigrist noted as follows Our targets were restricted by Col Batres in the Puerto Barrios sortie There is support for Seigrist's comments re the Guatemalan Air Force in the cable traffic Cables to Washington from both I I and the Ambassador indicated that the Air Force officers were unhappy about both using the Cubans and shooting their fellow Guatemalans In a meeting of the Special Group Livingston Merchant of State regarded this matter with extreme gravity commenting that it might well lead President Ydigoras to withdraw permission for us to continue in Guatemala 45 Inasmuch as Ydigoras had already decided that his control of the government depended on support from JMADD and JMTRAV Merchant's fears seem unwarranted TOPfRET Some of the airfield buildings were supposed to be holding hostages but the field proper with its supply sheds and such were pulverized We strafed ditches bushes or anything where someone could find cover lose enough to the runway to harass the C-46's that were to land with the Cuban troops We never were informed of KIA or wounded counts We did hear that a couple of Americans on the ground watched Bill and I at a safe distance and reported that we did a tremendous job -- whatever that might mean Three C-46's were involved They were flown by Cubans One C-46 landed As it was rolling to a stop the Cuban troops started firing out the doors and escape hatches The pilot thought he had landed in a trap and continued to take off without ever having come to a stop They refused all three C-46's to land after that and returned to Retalhuleu with all other troops still aboard I would guess around 100 troops were involved I can only estimate at what I saw As to Agency trainers -- here again time has slipped my memory -- but I believe their American Commander was on one of the C-46's but not the C-46 that landed He was still the sa e Commander for the Bay of Pigs This is a reference to Lt Col Frank Egan the PM trainer Egan's version of the incident is somewhat different than Seigrists In his testimony to the Taylor Committee Egan said President Ydigoras requested that we make an airborne landing which we did I was in command of the outfit Washington gave us permission to do this but I operated under the Mission Chief in GuatemaId footnote continued on following page I personally flew a total of around 15 hours on the four sorties This covered a two day period My last sortie in the late afternoon on the coast of the second day 15 Nov 60 ended at MADD I was informed that the revolt was over I heard that Col Batres had flown to Puerto Barrios and was negotiating with the ones in charge of the revolt I was not privileged to find out the results of the revolt but it was over I believe the Guatemalan Air Force cancelled our flights when they informed us of Col Batres' actions I did accept my orders at the time and did support Col Batres' command but my bosses were Americans and I would have responded to their orders None were given after their first permission for me to follow Col Batres -i Jacob D Esterline Chief of J ARC project had some subsequent conversation with the Americans who were mentioned in Seigrist's report In discussions where he had suggested that the B-26's operating Inasmuch as Egan did not give any specifics about deplaning his troops both he and-Seigrist could be technically correct The Deputy Chi f of DPD claimed that 216 Cuban troops were committed to Puerto Barrios airstrip at 0600 hours on 14 November If it is possible these troops will have to be evacuated if the situation worsens Once again however the language is vague enough to be true since the referenced evacuation of the Cuban troops does not specify that they were to be evacuated from Puerto Barrios There is no argument of course that they were committed to Puerto Barrios airstrip but only in what amounted to a touch-and-go landing 45a against Puerto Barrios had been flown by Guatemalan pilots Jake was challenged several times by people from the United Fruit Company who were there at Puerto Barrios at the time and they said look we have been living around Guatemala for years and we have never seen Guatemalan pilots fly or shoot with the precision that these fellows shot They didn't kill anybody Anybody that they weren't supposed to kill I guess is the way to put it There wasn't a stray bullet anywhere they strictly hit military targets But there was a case of a green light from State Department and then they said they didn't mean it It was academic because it was done 47 Esterline's additional comments are indicative of the confusion that one faces in trying to sort out details of the Bay of Pigs 16 years after the event In contrast to Bissell's previously noted remarks with reference to the cable requesting permission to act in response to Ydigoras's request Jake noted that We got this urgent call requesting the use of our troops We got it and we looked at it and didn't know what to do with it We called State Department and said We suppose this is critical The whole thing is going to pot I suppose that it was Rubottom or somebody at that level over there that we called They said Well I guess you had better give him what he wants -So we gave him what he wanted and that was about the time that it was in motion and we got a call back from State Department saying they'd checked and they didn't mean it but it was in motion at that point 48 When the critical request for assistance came in from Egan the operation -- per Mr Bissell's decision -- was approved in an outgoing cable from Washington shortly after 0500 hours on the morning of 14 November and it was stated specifically that only CAT pilots could be used -- if they volunteered 49 Although the outgoing authorization indicated w concerned that Cuban troops being committed ln advance of Guat troops also feel part of the strike force must be Guatemalan to offset stigma of attack by foreign mercenaries there is no indication that Guatemalan troops were aboard the C-46's headed for Puerto Barrios and as Seigrist pointed out he flew the Puerto Barrios strike with a Cuban in the right seat and presumably Beale also used a Cuban as his co-pilot 50 In addition to the transport of Guatemalan and Cuban troops by C-46's and the B-26 sorties other events also occupied those Agency personnel at JMADD and JMTRAV One of the most immediate was the GOG's This was to eliminate the possibility that any of the Agency's USAF assignees at Jr4ADD might be involved in a shoot down or accident need for additional small arms and ammunition During the course of 14 November there was a heavy exchange of cable correspondence on this subject with the ultimate plan being that C-124's would pick up materiel from 1 1 atl_D land would deliver the required submachine guns ammunition for the submachine guns and large quantities of 30 and 50 caliber ammunition to Eglin Air Force Base where it would be picked up by two C-54's and flown down to Retalhuleu air base 50a authorized to use USAF or The C-54 flights were I contract air crews OSTIARIES or any combination of these crews for the deliveries Flight plans and landing approaches to Retalhuleu were given in great detail in the cable traffic to insure that the materiel -- and personnel -- arrived safely Discussions concerning emergency evacuation plans for the TRAV and MADD bases were initiated with DOD representatives and an emergency signal plan was also prepared 50b Emergency plans were for air evacuation of Project personnel from Retalhuleu to France Field in the Panama Canal Zone Contingency planning in case of loss of the airstrip at Retalhuleu called for surface transport from TRAV and MADD to Champerico on the west coast and transfer to small boats at that point for evacuation footnote continued on following page with this flurry of activity it is interesting to note that it was more than 24 hours before Headquarters got around to giving its concurrence to the assignment of Lt Col Earl as Chief of Base at JMADD and Lt Col Egan as Acting Chief of Base at JMTRAV The Chief of the JMADD air operations Billy Campbell who was up at Eglin Air Force Base when the revolt broke out was off-again-on-again in terms of his return to Retalhuleu Before the close of 14 November Campbell's orders had been changed back to the original date and time of departure 15 November and the plan to have him fly ammunition down to MADD in a B-26 had been scrubbed Before committing any DPD aircraft Headquarters carefully inquired if any Guat air assets defected or been taken over by rebels which sic can knock down JNCLEAR aircraft Are their sic any Guat areas to be avoided 51 About mid-day on 14 November 1960 Headquarters informed Guatemala City that there had been a telecon by vessels of the USN Coincidental with possible evacuation were discussions of alternative training sites for the Cubans including bases in the Z I or transfer tol Itrainin g facility SOc between Ambassador Muccio and Secretary of State Christian Herter concerning use of the Cubans to help quell the revolt On this point Ambassador Muccio would cable later In justification Ydigoras attempted use last week must report that understand prior Washington authorization given to use trainees I knew nothing their use until half hour prior Secretary's call I sent message through urging Ydigoras confine the m t O m l'I'l t a r y bases and not operate out into civilian areas _ By mid-afternoon a joint State CIA message originated by C Tracy Barnes ADDP A was sent tol - - - - - - - - - stressing that if there were any Cuban trainees at or near Puerto Barrios they should be recalled to Retalhuleu This cable also suggested the possibility that all the Cuban trainees might be removed from Guatemala this would be an on-going ubject of speculation until the close out of the revolt 53 Even as the joint message was going forward Headquarters was aware of the fact that the Cuban The admission by Muccio that he was unaware of the fact that members of the Brigade -- to say nothing of the B-26 sorties by Seigrist and Beale -- were being airlifted to Puerto Barrios speaks poorly for the Ambassador's awareness of the situation and indicates that the Agency was playing it close to the vest visa-vis Muccio TO ET troops had not been deplaned at Puerto Barrios but the Department of State wanted to put into the official record that they were in opposition to using Cuban troops to support Ydigoras and that Guatemala should request the US to assist in preventing the importation of foreign arms or forces -- Cuban that is -- into Guatemala Following its request to the US the De- partment wanted the GOG to ask formally for OAS action under the Rio Treaty The joint State Agency message also asked that the field supply any information that could be discovered of Cuban involvement in the Guatemalan revolt and then it went on to walk the line between the possibility of Ydigoras's survival and Ydigoras's overthrow Lest the record be unclear 1 lwas directed as follows To avoid ambiguity the following actions are now authorized A Continued use of C-46's for troop movement and for other necessary transport Assume pilots are either CAT or Cubans B Provide GOG with ammo and other materiel if and only if senior responsible GOG officer specifically requests such materiel D i n consultation with Ambassador agrees that need exists and transfer otherwise proper C Provide GOG with B-26 aircraft if and only if critical need exists use likely give substantial advantage and GOG can provide pilots In connection with any decision support Ydigoras weigh possibility whether not remote that rebels may not be left wing nor anti-US as active support for Ydigoras under such circumstances could be undesirable 53a Before the afternoon 14 November was over a cable from Headquarters went to all Latin American stations alerting everyone to the possibility of Cuban intervention in any of the Latin American countries It warned As events unfold keep in mind we want picture Castro intervention as result clandestine subversion money As already reported ambiguity was not avoided -Connie Seigrist has noted that he flew some 15 hours in the course of two days 14-15 November According to this message -- which was received at approximately 1400 hours Guatemalan time on 14 November -- Seigrist technically should have been grounded As Seigrist reported however he was taking orders from Col Batres because no one had told him otherwise Seigrist continued to follow the initial orders that he had been given- to support Col Batres's requests and he stopped flying missions when Guatemal n officers told him the revolt had ended payments arms traffic illegal Cuban Embassy participation etc and not give false impression Cuban revolution catching on in popularity other WH countries Also use any pertinent news peg as occasion mention continued shipments and training in use Soviet bloc arms including artillery by Castro militia 54 By 16 November 1960 the revolt for all practical purposes had come to an end At that time there were pockets of resistance reported in the area between Puerto Barrios and Gualan but no evidence had been found which would support charges of Cuban involvement Before the conclusion of the fighting however President Ydigoras did request -- and received -- two of the JMADD B-26's because the Guatemalan Air Force B-26's had been shot up to the point where they were in no condition to fly additional combat missions As a result of the unsettled situation in Guatemala recruitment of PM ground trainees for JMTRAV was suspended until further notice the B-26's were recalled to the JMADD air base and for the moment all Air National Guard ANG and military assignees to fined to the base ffiDD were con- During the course of the revolt It was reported to Headquarters that on the mOLning of 15 Nov 60 four armorers from MADD had been briefly detained by an officer group at the Guatemala City airfield The detainees probably were USAF military assignees - TOP FCRET in Guatemala Headquarters informed the base in Florida to discourage Tony Varona from sending any FRD volunteers into the Central American area and Headquarters also rejected a request from the GOG to have Agency lie detector experts participate in interrogating the captured rebel prisoners D As an alternative was told to provide guidance to the GOG to hire a commercial firm to participate in the interrogation of the prisoners F Minor Skirmishes Inter- and Intra-Agency In addition to the two B-26's JMADD supplied to the Guatemalan Air Force during the course of the revolt upon completion of the revolt it was recommended by the Agency by the Air Attache and by the Chief of the US Air Mission in Guatemala that eight new B-26's be procured for the Guatemalan Air Force and that these be configured in a manner similar to the aircraft being operated out of the MADD base Unfortunately however at this point in the game the US Ambassador was willing See Appendix 1 for copies of cable traffic on the various items mentioned in the foregoing paragraph TOP send recommendation only upon formal request from GOG and does not wish ask GOG unless first assured US Government willingness grant request if made 55 Even as the revolt was being quelled the US Ambassador was renewing his pleas for the Department to get behind the economic aid program he had been discussing with the GOG since the late spring In fact in mid October 1960 Mr Muccio had recommended that a loan and grant package totalling almost $13 million be approved The requests were approved be- fore the end of November about the same time that the Department of State was expressing concern about the Agency's role in Guatemala 56 Headquarters requested contact Ydigoras and ask him whe continued presence Cuban trainees is placing undue strain on his government One sector State at least contends their presence is unwarranted liability and strongly urging removal JMTRAV elements soonest Ydigoras completely frank estimate urgently needed 57 '-----__ I Immediate said Ydigoras's personal message emphatically Delivery of the ight B-26's was never made to the Government of Guatemala stated that any speculation on above matter is completely unfounded and that he will back this project to the end Also recommends strengthening forces to avoid failures When action finally taken we must be sure of success S8 It appears probable that the regional area of State which was evincing concern was the office of American Republic Affairs ARA directed by Assistant Secretary Mann Although the author believes that State's perspicacity during the BOP operation was limited by it's extreme caution there is nonetheless evidence to suggest the Department may have had reason to regard those involved in the JMATE operation with some suspicion A ca le of 30 November 1960 to lof Central Amer1ca read as follows I 1 CIA deliberately fomented leak by State of earlier fairly solid report re Cuban 'militiamen' flights over Guat which should be useful Guatemala in case against Cuba and should be played WH assets througho t area to prove Cuban aggression Central America 2 Washington Evening Star 22 November and better yet New York Times 24 November said Cuban recon flights with armed militiamen aboard occurred end October In Times version several flights took place 29-31 October total 150 Cuban militiamen carried and fewer returned to Cuban airport than -left According Star two Cuban plane numbers were 601 and 631 631 independently confirmed as Cuban recon plane which buzzed Swan Island 27 October This fact now overt Attribution both papers were 'diplomatic sources ' 59 footnote continued on following page - z TOP CRET The fact of long continuing support from the government of Guatemala showed in an incident of early December which also reflected some internal dissension between JMTRAV 1 1 and the Chief of Base at Colonel Egan had apparently arranged for an air reception and field training exercise for a group of Cuban trainees at the finca San Jose probably the finca San Juan in the San Jose area which was another of the properties Robert Alejos made available to the Agency but somewhere in the process Egan had failed to clear the exercise with ei ther D o r the local authori ties -- military and civil -- in the area of the finca The result being that Airdrops attracted attention local security forces who appear considerably more alert and effective than in TRAV area Night 7 December delegations from national police military and my MP visited finca Fortunately Alejos was visiting and explained that no invasion in progress only secret army maneuvers In his cable to headquarters reporting the incident Chief of Base TRAV also had indicated that a planned This particular cable is another of the relatively few concerning the JMATE operation which were released by Richard Helms as Chief of Operations DDP - 55 - TOP CRET increment in the number of trainees into the TRAV area was reported to have gotten a negative response from Alejos 60 But following receipt of his copy of the cable ________________ 1 sent an OPIM to the director pointing out that COB TRAV had failed to properly coordinate his cable for in truth Alejos was reported to have been enthusiastic about additional 400 men ln training program and furthermore according to c J Alejos had taken a nurnberof steps to place additional facilities at the disposal of the incorning trainees including additional housing and the laying of a pipeline to insure that there would be no shortage of water at JMTRAV c Jchewed on COB TRAV for failure to coordinate because this was the sort of thing which could lead to the brBakdown of the cover story and embarrassment to the message closed on the following note GOG wishes to make a matter of record for efit COB's future action and DIR information the fact that COB's will not repeat not release cables to HQS on policy or political matters until subjects have been properly staffed out with Dintends to relieve COB from o Tor0ET - 56 - TOP sf-ET duty the next time this occurs 61 G The Special Forces Trainers -- Pragmatism and Patience As mentioned in the introduction to the discussion of the relations with Guatemala a second episode in volving the Agency in a unique situation with the GOG concerned the use of US Army Special Forces personnel to train the Cuban ground forces Almost immediately following Eisenhower's approval of the anti-Castro program in March 1960 WH 4 faced the problem of acquiring trained personnel to instruct the cadre being prepared for small unit guerrilla warfare operations and later there were numerous difficulties in acquiring I unlikel Jduring the course of the activi ties relatea to tile Ba of Pigs I Iwas very positively identified in all of the actions involving Agency personnel and he was particularly close to the center of power with his relationships to Roberto Alejos and President Ydigoras While the author has no way of knowing what Colonel E anrs reaction was tO -m Billy Campbell indicated that relations between and the air operations at JMADD were also sometim ther strained and that he too had been threatened with removal It is not known however whether Campbell erring to ------ --- or to Iwho carne in as DecemBer 1960 - even though r---L----- - - --- o -------' for Cuban ops from Dece of the invasion Whoever made said that he ran theJMADD air DPD not c J 6la - 57 - I l TOPfRET personnel for training the invasion force Although not without difficulty small unit cadres were trained at Fort Randolph in the Panama Canal Zone for infiltration the establishment of commo activities and sabotage With the move to Guatemala it was obvious that additional trainers would be required and as a result Chief JMATE worked very closely with Soviet Division particularly the Domestic Operations Base to obtain the services of the so-called unofficial Americans who had been recruited by SB under the AEDEPOT program to serve as trainers for the Cuban Brigade Formal arrangements between the Soviet Division and JMATE were concluded in early September 1960 62 Despite the fact that the AEDEPOT program had been initiated _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 a total of 21 agents and five staff personnel joined the JMATE project The actual recruiting was run through the FRD recruitment program headed by Juan Paula Argeo The WH representatives were introduced as US Government officials sympathetic to the cause of the anti-Castro Cubans It was pointed out however that the US TOP ET Government could not officially sponsor or openly support the movement and therefore these Americans were working unofficially to assist the Cubans in their search for volunteer instructors cadre leaders and so on As one report put it the cover story didn't hold up well and the agents soon knew they were working for the CIA however in almost all cases the agents believed that Army intelligence had loaned them to CIA and compartmentation was maintained 63 With the closeout of the Panama training activity and the move to Guatemala and with the opening of the JMTRAV activity and the increasing number of recruits the small number of Soviet Division assets who were being used to train the Cubans were being spread too thin and JMATE turned to the United States Army Special Forces for assistance The problem of the acquisition of the requisite number of Special Forces training officers was the one which would involve Chief JMATE in a unique relationship with the GOG and would precipitate a lengthy often acrimonious series of discussions which involved the Special Group the Department of State the Department of Defense the Department of the Army and even the President of the United States himself Dwight D Eisenhower The Agency's request which was to touch off the brouhaha was initiated by Col Jack Hawkins USMC Chief WH 4 PM on 19 October 1960 After approval through the chain of command to the DDP was formalized 16 November 1960 then J C King Chief Western Hemisphere Division prepared a memorandum for the Mobilization and Military Personnel Division MMPD Office of Personnel CIA asking that 38 US Army Special Forces personnel be acquired for training JMARC assets in a foreign area In his memorandum Col King noted that Captain Burns Spore Office of Special Operations Department of Defense had been informed about the requirement but since no official action had yet been taken by DOD regarding the spec al Forces personnel MMPD was being asked to make it official At a subsequent meeting between representatives of WH 4 and Captain Spore the DOD representative apparently got his back up about the lack of information that DOD -- in his opinion at any rate -- had about the Agency's operational plans against Cuba Inasmuch as the Agency's request came about the same - 60 - time that serious thought was being given to the possible removal of the Cuban trainees from Guatemala the DOD representative was much concerned about the actual base at which it was intended to station the Special Forces trainers Until this matter could be cleared up to the satisfaction of DOD Captain Spore assumed the position that no further action would be taken with regard to the Special Forces personnel Jake Esterline Chief JMATE made a strong plea to the DOD representative based on the argument that the question about the actual site of the training activity was up in the air as a result of Department of State cautiousness and Esterline expressed the opinion that as a result of State's greater interest in the program of economic strangulation of Cuba the situation for the United States and for other Latin American governments friendly to the United States would grow increasingly desperate He further suggested that the Department of Defense was being tainted by State's opposition rather than by realistic appraisal of the situation in Cuba and he volunteered to brief senior DOD personnel at a time convenient to them 64 The question of the use of Special Forces personnel was brought before the Special Group in its meeting on 30 November 5 December and 8 December of 1960 From the 8 December meeting came the unique suggestion which Thomas Parrot Executive Secretary for the Special Group noted in the minutes of that meeting Mr Douglas James H Douglas Deputy Secretary of Defense went on to say that he is anxious to make the 38 trainers available but that L e Army wants to have them as fully protected as possible He therefore asked that CIA explore the situation further to see if the Government of Guatemala could not make a formal request for trainers from the DOD Mr Esterline said that he thought a secret agreement could be negotiated with President Ydigoras but that it would not be feasible to have an open agreement of any kind Mr Mann expressed some fears about having anything in writing with Ydigoras because of his somewhat unsure tenure He asked that this be taken up with him later ' At the later meeting referred to above Mr Mann agreed to a plan suggested by CIA whereby a secret agreement would be negotiated but no signed copy would be in the hands of the GOG 65 Following the suggestion that a secret agreement be negotiated with the government of Guatemala plans were made for Jake Esterline to fly black into Guatemala to undertake negotiations with Ydigoras - 62 - The affair then became a comedy of near misses It was anticipated that Roberto Alejos would be contacted prior to the meeting with Ydigoras to get the President's opinion on signing the proposed secret agreement Unfortunately however Alejos was arriving in Washington about the time that Esterline was scheduled to land in Guatemala With Esterline in Guatemala and Alejos in the United States Esterline sent an OPIM cable to the Director requesting that Dick Drain Chief of Operations WH 4 attempt to contact Alejos to discuss the proposed secret agreement regarding the request by the government of Guatemala for US Special Forces trainers But unfortunately Mr Alejos instead of being in Washington as anticipated was somewhere in New York and there was no possibility of getting his advice and guidance prior to the time that Esterline had his meeting with Ydigoras 66 In any event the results of a two hour meeting that Dand Esterline Al ejos was coming to the United States at this time as a member of the Guatemalan coffee group -- thanks to the Agency's efforts on his behalf - 63 TOP CRET had with Ydigoras on the night of 14 December were negative The report of the meeting stated Written agreement discussed in general terms but not shown him Ydigoras as he said he would not sign any secret pact Made reference to secret agreement he signed with Castillo Armas 1953 which has since caused him serious political problems Expressed continued willingness give any and all support including receiving training personnel short of signing any agreement 67 The cable went on to request that Headquarters contact Roberto Alejos requesting that he remain in Washington to meet with Esterline and Robert Davis I _ who would be flying up to Washington on 16 December the thought being that discussion with Alejos might yet bring about a change in Ydigoras's thinking Esterline's remembrance of this visit to Ydigoras is at some variance with both the cable traffic and subsequent events but it is interesting to observe the comments which he did have to make on the subject I actually myself executed with Ydigoras Fuentes the agreement At the time that I did it -- in true name -- I thought I suppose they'll be reading about this someday and I'll have to save _ that piece of paper He Ydigoras said that piece of paper will never be exposed and it hasn't to my knowledge - 64 - In response to a question of how it happened that he was sent to Guatemala Esterline remarked state said Oh we don't want to touch that and Ydigoras said well I'm not going to do it unless it is signed by some responsible individual We looked around the Agency and said to J C King J C this kind of No no he said I don't think I ought to do that He said Jake you are in charge of the project why don't you do it So being a brash young man I said Well we're never going to get this thing going unless somebody signs it So I flew to Guatemala black with Roberto Alejos who is now a substantial banker in Miami and with Bob Davis who I lat the time and I thlnk with the powers and full knowledge of the Ambassador although I didn't meet him because I was there black I went in illegally and left illegally We drew up the particulars of the base agreement -- if you will a Status of Forces Agreement When asked if Bissell and Dulles were aware that he had been sent to negotiate with Ydigoras Esterline's response was Oh hell yes Ohl hell yes an instructed delegate from Washington 'an expendable pawn ' I went as The wording No I went on specific instruc- tion from Bissell and Dulles ' 68 Despite Esterline's conviction that a piece of paper actually passed between himself and Ydigoras the author thinks it more likely that Esterline's story as noted above reflects an honest confusion of the footnote continued on following page Esterline's failure to get Ydigoras to sign the Status of Forces Agreement must have gone down hard with Agency representatives because of the extreme difficulties that had been encountered in reaching an agreement with the Department of Defense particularly the Army representatives to undertake the negotiations in the first place Richard D Drain who was Chief of Operations for the project at the time in an oral interview with the author told some other details of the story which are believed worth repeating here because Drain was involved in the negotiations with DOD and was responsible for drawing up the actual agreement which it was anticipated Ydigoras would sign To the question of whether he had drawn up the agreement Drain responded Jesus yes On self-destructing paper Well this was all typical of the idiocy that prevailed because of the failure of Mr Nixon to succeed Mr Eisenhower From the time the vote was in -- the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November -up until JFK took the oath on January 20 personnel and the details involved in the negotiations with the GOG at the time As will be pointed out subsequently what Esterline did sign was the agreement with Carlos Alejos Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States the Eisenhower government was increasingly zombie You know you would go over there to talk to James Douglas Smith sic Undersecretary of Defense and well Mr Smith probably won't be in much any more he is in New York looking for a job Mr Irwin is in charge and so on I guess this is one of the maddest anybody ever saw Eisenhower because three times the President of the United States had to be involved in this weighty matter -- should Special Forces troops be made available to the Agency for this matter Doubly stupid because as I said earlier Colonel Yarborough and Dick Drain were entirely in accord on this Yarborough wanted these guys to get some Latin American experience on the ground and we desperately needed them Three times the cock crew before the President of the United States had his order carried out The first time it was discussed the President of the United States authorized it and the Undersecretary of Defense went back and told the Secretary of the Army -- that goddamned fool Brucker or whatever his name was from Michigan You are authorized to do this I went over to see Yarborough and expected to see him jump for joy and he hadn't gotten the message So I take this problem to Tracy Barnes and he says I think this is something that we will negotiate I said Well you do what you want with it but the President of the United States has ordered it and nothing is happening He said well I will go see Jack Irwin Well he came back with the word that the President had not directed it he had only authorized it and the Secretary of the Army did not feel that authorized to do something he was required to do it O K we take it back to the NSC and the President says Is that so And again all right I order it nothing happened I checked with Yarborough and it hasn't dropped down his tube yet and find out that the Secretary of the Army has said that even though directed he has to as a statutory matter assure that something equal to the Status of Forces Agreement is in effect with the host country lest there be a court martial proceeding or some host country o da da da and it goes back to the President again Willyou authorize or direct that this be done in the absence of a special Status of Forces Agreement and the President of the United States says Goddamnit Blanketyblank you do it So Mr Barnes negotiated it and he came back saying that if President Ydigoras will sign the document that says that the Status of Forces will apply -- even though not technically in force --then the Secretary of the Army will let this go forward So I worked with TSD to see if we could come up with some paper which after a certain amount of time whether exposed to light or not would just disintegrate Whether we actually typed it on such paper or not I don t know but I wrote up a very learned piece of paper and goddamned if Jake Esterline didn't have to drop everything else that he was doing and go down and get the old Indian to sign this thing 69 In response to the query of the origin of the idea for the Status of Forces Agreement Drain explained this as follows Well now I remember -- and I haven't thought about it until this moment -- that TOP faced with this weighty problem which had now lost us three weeks directed or authorized o I remember what- T l1 ' ln u Truscott I I L-- _ I 10 How the actual negotiations in Washington were conducted is not clear from the records that are now available In a Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence dated 21 December 1960 however C Tracy During an Oral History 9 January 1976 interview Mr Drain had indicated that Esterline had signed the agreement with Ydigoras but in a telecon with Mr Drain on 19 August 1976 when the author raised the question of whether Drain was certain that Esterline and Ydigoras had signed the agreement -- pointing out to Drain the indications in the cable traffic were contrary to this -- Drain said that he could not be positive With reference to the possibility of having met with Roberto Alejos in Washington Drain did remember one meeting that he had with Roberto Alejos and his brother Carlos Alejos the Ambassador to the United States in which he thought that this subject might have been discussed and that Roberto Alejos did get in touch with Ydigoras Drain however could not be positive that it had been over the matter of having Carlos Alejos sign off on the Status of Forces Agreement 70a - 69 - TOP SECRET Barnes the A DDP A mentioned among other things Although we failed to complete these arrangements with Ydigoras e g the signing of the Status of Forces Agreement we have since been successful in making identical arrangements with the Guatemalan Ambassador to Washington who acted as the Government of Guatemala representative in place of Ydigoras 71 Esterline continued as the principal in the negotiations that led to the signing of the agreement 21 December 1960 with the Guatemalan Ambassador This however was not the end of the story In a meeting on 22 December with representatives of the Department of Defense John M Irwin Assistant Secretary for Defense and a newcomer to the negotiations raised a question about the utility of the secret agreement that had been signed and he indicated that the agreement showing that the CIA was providing US military forces to another government to train personnel of that government would not serve the primary purpose of providing a secure cover for the SF trainers As a result of Irwin's objections it was decided that an attempt would be made to get the Department of State to sign a Memorandum of Agreement with the Guatemalan Ambassador settin forth that in response to a request from the Guatemalan government the US would provide military training for selected elements of the Guatemalan armed forces 72 The ball continued to bounce however with no one wanting to assume responsibility overtly for the United States Government action and it was reported on 27 December 1960 for example that in a meeting with Thomas Hann the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs concerning the suggestion that State sign the agreement with the Guatemalan Ambassador Mann was extremely hesitant to agree to any signature by a representative of the State Department to a document After considerable discussion however he did agree to the possibility of having a Memorandum for the Record prepared suggested draft attached which could be signed by the Guatemalan Ambassador as an accurate statement of the understanding reached between the Government of Guatemala and the United States The Department then could refer this signed memorandum to the Department of Defense for appropriate action 73 This in fact was the method that was finally evolved to solve the problem and on 29 December 1960 Carlos Alejos Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States signed the document Once this document was completed -- and even before he had CIA1s firm requirement in hand -- General Erskine Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Special Operations -- issued instructions that active military personnel would be made available as requested by CIA 73a In his formal request to the Office of Special Operations on 5 January 1961 where he spelled out the detailed requirements for Special Forces personnel for the project Jake Esterline neatly summarized the situation that had finally been resolved Because DOD desired certain agreements between governments before it was willing to act affirmatively on the original 16 November 1960 requirement the Agency with the approval and concurrence of the Department of State negotiated an agreement with the host government which Appendix 2 contains copies of the complete set of documents involved in this episode of the Special Forces Trainers and clearly illustrates the degree to which nits were picked on what to the pragmatist would appear to have been a relatively simple matter Included in Appendix 2 are the four versions of the Memor ndum of Agreement which Esterline initially attempted to negotiate with Ydigoras and the series of memos related to the Memorandum for Record which Ambassador Alejos eventually signed per the request of the Department of State provided protection for US military forces in that country supporting project CROSSPATCH A copy of this agreement was provided to DOD by memorandum dated 30 December 1960 74 H The Changing Political Climate Following resolution of the Special Forces program the beginning of the new year was marked by a spirit of close cooperation between the Government of Guatemala and the Agency's representatives Roberto Alejos the The same could not be said for the degree of rapport between the Department of State and the Government of Guatemala Between the end of November 1960 and the beginning of 1961 there was a noticeable effort on the part of the Department of State to keep US relations with Guatemala at something less than the level of an abrazo When planning a US response to President Ydigoras's message thanking the US for instituting naval operations which prevented outside forces from giving support to the Communist-inspired revolutionary movement Secretary Herter cautioned the President that Since the degree of direct involvement of pro-Communist and pro-Castro elements in the recent Guatemalan uprising has not yet been determined the' text of the suggested reply reaffirms that our action was aimed at prevention of intervention from abroad 74a In planning a response to President Ydigoras's greeting for the New Year Secretary Herter again cautioned The Department feels that an exchange concerning the Cuban question with President Ydigoras would not be appropriate at the present time It is recommended therefore that you merely acknowledge brie ly his telegram 74b Even though this advice was followed the Department directed the Amembassy Guatemala to understand that after delivering President Eisenhower's message White House desires text this message not rpt not become public 74c TOP syiET Minister of Defense of Guatemala and the President of Guatemala all visited the various training sites and indicated considerable pleasure at the progress that was being made It was also reported that these leaders of the GOG were impressed with both the trainees and their armament and considering the political unrest it is possible that Ydigoras wanted to get some idea of the materiel -- if not the personnel Cuban -- that might be used for or against him in an emergency Where a few weeks earlier there had been some confusion over airdrop operations training by mid-January 1961 it was reported that there was close cooperation be- tween and Roberto Alejos with regard to an upcoming program of this nature To belay the charges that the GOG was permitting CIA a tivities in his country R9berto Alejos personally escorted some Time magazine reporters and a photographer and an NBC reporter whom President Ydigoras had invited to visit the JMADD and TRAV sites Prior to the recep- tion of the newsmen however the Cuban trainees and Agency personnel except for sev ral pilot instructors and a couple of ground force trainers had all been moved either into restricted areas or out of sight of the newsmen -- the Cuban air trainees being orbited over the ocean in a C-54 Guatemalan soldiers were moved into the areas to pass as the ones who were being trained by the few Americans posing as mercenaries hired by the GOG to provide the training Ydigoras believed that the guided tour procedure was the best defense against both the heavy internal political pressures as well as the inquiries from outside news sources for information on the activities which were being observed at the Retalhuleu airstrip Through the device of admitting to a certain amount of US technical help in the form of mercenaries he hoped to blunt the charges that he was preparing and supporting the Cubans who planned to overthrow Castro 75 US newspapers and periodicals began to show so much interest in possible CIA involvement in Guatemala Robert Zunzer presently Executive Officer to the Deputy Director for Administration clearly recalls having to take to the woods in order to get out of the path of the media investigators who were brought into Guat mala at this time He said it provided one or two of the few days of leisure that he experienced during the course of his participation in the JMATE activity toward the end of 1960 that early in January 1971 Carlos Alejos the Ambassador to the US released a statement to the Associated Press from Guatemala's Minister of Defense Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia which claimed that all US military personnel in Guatemala were official members of the US Military Mission The Minister of Defense not only stated that US person nel were engaged exclusively in training Guatemalan forces for self defense but he went on to emphasize the GOG's fear of Castro and communist intervention Guatemala is not an aggressor country Guatemala is not receiving ten ships every week loaded with war material sic and equipment manufactured in Communist countries Guatemala has no Chinese Communist instructors Guatemala has no jet Communist planes Guatemala has no Communist guided rockets and missiles The only thing Guatemala has is men with great hearts ready to fight for their independence and political liberties Batista is not in Guatemald but Arbenz is in Cuba 75a Even more significant was that the news stories inspired some members of the US Congress to make inquiries about CIA involvement and this in turn caused President Eisenhower to express himself very strongly on the constitutional issue of the separation of powers In a 10 January 1961 meeting of the Special Group the President reportedly Raised certain questions as to the right of a Congressional committee to ask questions on foreign policy affecting the security of the United States He commented that when this is demanded as a right you are sunk and wondered how much right have they got inasmuch as the Constitution says that it is the responsibility of the Chief Executive 75b In an attempt to divert attention from the Agency Chief WHD apparently forwarded a suggestion that the Agency sponsored Cuban exile organization the FRD publicly acknowledge that it was involved in sponsoring the military training in Guatemala Jake Esterline however noted that such an admission would contradict statements already issued by the Government of Guatemala and he also emphasized that it would be used by It is assumed that this was a Special Group meeting In addition to the President the attendees were the usual members of the Special Group on Cuba -- National Security Adviser Gordon Gray Secretary of Dejense Gates Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas Under Secretary of State Merchant Assistant Secretary of State Mann and Ambassador Whiting Willauer Willauer was Eisenhower's appointee to assist the incoming Kennedy Administration in the transfer of the antiCastro activities The memorandum of the meeting however was prepared by Colonel J C King Chief WH Division not by Thomas A Parrott who normally acted as Secretary for Special Group sessions 75c the opponents of Ydigoras to discredit his administration 75d Initially however Col King must have ignored Esterline's warning but the DCI failed to support King's Plan 75 The hassle with the media would continue throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation but in no instance did the Government of Guatemala back off from providing cover for the training activity being sponsored by the Agency at Guatemalan sites If any- thing the GOG went to extremes to protect the cover story In late March 1961 for example following an article in the Washington Post which stated an army estimated at several thousands is presently training at a clandestine camp in Guatemala Carlos UrrutiaAparaicio Guatemala's Ambassador to the OAS wrote a letter to the editor ofthe Post stating On behalf of my government I categorically deny this to be a fact Not one Cuban exile is receiving training in Guatemala There are several hundred of them in my country but we strictly enforce the Pan American instruments governing territorial asylum Whenever these have been overlooked or disregarded my government - has immediately requested the Cuban refugees concerned to leave the country It is our own army which is getting military training but for defensive reasons alone The present democratic and constitutional government of Guatemala is duty-bound to defend itself from extracontinental forces based on Cuba which are determined to overthrow it by force Nobody can deny Guatemala the immemorial right to self-defense recognized as such by the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations 76 The training facilities in Guatemala also had other visitors during the early part of 1961 -- the leaders of the FRD Tony Varona Antonio Maceo and Manuel Artime The FRD visit was precipitated in large part because of charges that were filtering back to Miami that the Batistiano factions were trying to penetrate -- or perhaps had even captured -- the leadership in the training camps at JMTRAV and JMADD In mid-February 1961 the FRD leaders were moved to Guatemala by black flight and they were met by Roberto Alejos who played host for a s ssion at which Ydigoras was ip attendance indicated to 1 Prior to the meeting Ydigoras had 1 and to Jake Esterline who was in Guatemala that he Ydigoras will handle meeting any way Agency desires i e stressing need for Cuban unity need to keep military leadership apolitical based on ability etc 77 With the reorganization of the political structure of the Cuban exile group in the United States demanded by the Kennedy administration the leaders of the newly formed Cuban Revolutionary Council CRC visited Guatemala from 29-31 March 1961 Again Roberto Alejos played host and President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes met with Jose Miro Cardona Chairman of the CRC Tony Varona Manuel Artime and Carlos Hevia Once again Ydigoras lectured the Cuban political leaders about the need for unity and cooperation with the US government and once again the political leaders were impressed by the visit to the training facilities at JMTRAV and JMADD 78 I Third Country Involvement During the summer of 1960 as negotiations were proceeding with Guatemala for the training bases an incident occurred which foreshadowed one of the few areas where the US would be in contention with the GOG during the course of Project JMATE In a cable of This visit of the CRC leaders to Guatemala in March of 1961 caused considerable consternation to President Somoza of Nicaragua when he learned that his country would not be visited by the CRC 10 July Guatemala informed the Director that British military maneuvers were being planned for Belize Bri tish Honduras and Ydigoras had informed I D that the GOG would have to send troops and - - - - - - planes to the border in order to maintain the prestige of his country if the maneuvers were held GOG requested that c Jtry to get Washington to intervene with the British to call off the exercise 78a Whatever action was taken the JMATE project personnel were not concerned with the Belize issue again until 14 February 1961 when Ydigoras requested that Chief JMATE and D meet with him to discuss the subject He gavelo land Chief JMATE the - - - - - - - - original of a paper on Belize which he requested be given to appropriate authorities within the Department of State - - a rather interesting method for transmitting material to the Department when the US had an Ambassador in Guatemala City Ydigoras emphasized that Whether the Agency actually approached State at this time has not been investigated for purposes of this history There is no question however that the Department was well aware of the dispute between the GOG and Britain over Belize TOP his government had been negotiating for some time with Her Majesty's Government over the subject of granting greater autonomy to the Government of Belize on economic matters particularly on the right of that colony to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with its neighbors As pointed out to the Agency's repre- sentatives by Jesus Unda Marillo the Guatemalan Foreign Minister Jorge Garcia Granades Guatemala's Special Representative on Belize affairs and Ian Munn the son-in-law of Ydigoras the economic development program which the GOG was then promoting for the Peten area bordering Belize was dependent in considerable degree upon reciprocal trade relations with that British colony Although not specified in the dis- cussions Chief JMATE believed that what the Government of Guatemala wanted specihically was a guarantee of a direct outlet to the sea for the oil chicle timber and other products from Peten Both Chief JMATE and I I told Ydigoras that international negotiations such as had been discussed were not within the province of the Agency but they did agree to give the paper to State - 82 - TOP sj RET The President and the Foreign Minister both indicated their desire that said paper corne to the attention of Mr Adolph sic Berle a man whose past career they seemed to know very well C JMATE assured them that this would be done 79 Available records do not indicate that the Agency was further involved in the promotion of this particular activity on the part of the GOG however it was quite clear that Ydigoras continued to be very sensitive about Belize In March of 1961 one of the JMADD C-54's was forced to land in Jamaica after an airdrop over Cuba -- said aircraft having filed a flight plan out of San Jose Guatemala Unfortunately the GOG had not given prior authorization for this flight plan When word from Jamaica apparently got out that the flight originated at San Jose Roberto Alejos was constrained to make an immediate press release denying that the aircraft had ever corne out of Guatemala and he suggested that the British were tyring to embarrass the Guatemalan Government in part at least so that there would be no pressure for negotiations on the Belize issue In any event Headquarters sent an OPIM cable to Guatemala recommending that Alejos and Ydigoras -83 TOP RET be dissuaded from making any press release which would be critical of the British for it was pointed out to 1 1 that the British had been most helpful in terms of getting the C-54 released and in cancelling the original flight plan without any 'further publici ty 801 J GOG - J TE and the Kennedy Administration Even though President Ydigoras had already assured the Agency that the training activity could continue he felt some concern about the change of administrations in the US and an EMERGENCY cable from I - - - - - - - - on 25 February 1961 indicated that c Jhad been called to a meeting with Ydigoras c Jwas told that Ydigoras was writing a personal letter to President Kennedy At the end of 1961 in his New Year's Eve speech of 31 December 1961 Ydigoras for the first time acknowledged that his government had participated with the exiled Cuban leaders and that Guatemala had been used as a training site for the Bay of Pigs invasion In that same speech he reportedly said that as a fair price the friendly government that was supporting the Cuban exiles -- the US -- had agreed lito request good offices to convince Britain to return Belize to us under certain conditions acceptable to a majority of tfiat colony's inhabitants Reportedly the training activity did not begin until after this agreement with the US had been reached 80al setting forth his views and recommendations on policy vis-a-vis Cuba particularly suggesting that it was time to get the Cuban Brigade off the dime and into action The letter was to be hand carried to JFK by Roberto Alejos and ---- 1 was to accompany Alejos to Washington During a private luncheon with Ydigoras and Alejos 1 1 heard the discussion of the proposed letter that was being readied for President Kennedy Among other things the letter would point out that Ydigoras more than any other Latin American leader was taking direct action to oppose the spread of Castro communism and cited the 13 November 1960 revolt as a part of that plot though as has been noted there was no evidence of Cuban involvement Ydigoras pointed out that it was his firm conviction that the Brigade -- both air force and infantry -was quite ready and remarking on the Cuban temperament suggested that if they weren't engaged soon they were very likely to lose their spirit and be unwilling to continue Moreover the Guatemalan President emphasized that the longer the Brigade delayed its - 1 TOP LRET TOP Sl-RET invasion the more training the Castro militia was going to have and the more difficult it would be for the Brigade to overcome them Ydigoras claimed that there was extensive antiCastro sentiment throughout Cuba and that if the attack took place soon this force could be applied in support of the invasion Continuing he noted that since Kennedy had said that he was opposed to Castro the United States should actively support the anti-Castro movement at this time By so doing the standing of the US in the eyes of Latin America would be greatly enhanced and Kennedy would be looked on as a savior who kept his promises Ydigoras closed the letter by saying that if the attack were postponed much longer the people of Cuba would lose faith that anything could be done the insurrectionists in-the Escambray would be defeated and other governments in Latin America would be even more fearful and subject to takeover by the leftists Copies of this letter dated 28 February apparently hit the Department of State like a lead balloon a chance meeting with Ydigoras In was told TOP RET that after a session with Thomas Mann the Guatemalan Ambassador Carlos Alejos felt that the Guatemalan cause was lost IL ----- I apparently was unaware of the contents of the Ydigoras letter to Kennedy which presumably precipitated Mann's reaction but in any event he cabled OPIM to Headquarters reporting on Ydigoras's feeling Roberto Alejos was successful in setting up a meeting with President Kennedy on 7 March 1961 with Thomas Mann and an Agency representative also in attendance The letter from the President of Guate- mala which incidentally had been prepared in both Spanish and in a bad English translation was discussed Mann's Memorandum of Conversation and copies of the Spanish and English versions of Ydigoras's letter were transmitted to Ralph Dungan of the White House Staff on 16 March 1961 and in the transmittal it was noted It is believed that Tracy Barnes rather than Jake Esterline represented the Agency The English translation had been prepared by GOG not by State that the material had been reviewed by the Secretary of State In the transmittal to Dungan the Depart- ment said As you will note President Ydigoras' letter takes up extremely sensitive matters regarding Cuba We believe that the President's comments on March 7 to Mr Alejos obviate the need for any written reply to President Ydigoras Moreover it is believed that it would not be desirable in any case to reply in writing to the letter 81 Of interest with reference to the letter from Ydigoras to President Kennedy are the following In briefing the Special Group on 2 March 1961 the DCI noted That Roberto Alejos is in Washington with a letter from President Ydigoras addressed to President Kennedy and that he is attempting through his brother the Guatemalan Ambassador Carlos Alejos to obtain an appointment with Mr Kennedy Mr Dulles said that he understood the letter took a strong position on the necessity of early action visa-vis Cuba but -- in answer to a question -assured the group that we CIA had neither written nor inspired the letter 82 Then whether incidental or intentional at that same meeting Mr Dulles also said that he thought we should discuss soon with the Special Group actions to be taken with respect to employment of the forces now in training in Guatemala In other words the identical subject that Ydigoras was raising with Presiden Kennedy In 1964 when he appeared in an NBC television White Paper on the Bay of Pigs Roberto Alejos put a somewhat different emphasis on the meeting that was footnote continued on following page Shortly following the visit of Roberto Alejos to the Department of State Carlos Alejos the Arnbassador of Guatemala to the United States paid a formal calIon Secretary of State Rusk mainly to get acquainted and to extend greetings personally and in behalf of President Ydigoras Wymberley Coerr the Deputy Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs who would replace Thomas Mann and Richard Godfrey the Officer in charge of Guatemalan affairs were also in attendance at this session along with an interpreter The Depart- ment of State Memorandum of Conversation is couched in the general platitudes of diplomatic language and while Alejos probably was hoping to get some support from the Department for the employment of the Cuban Brigade against Castro nonesuch was forthcoming What he got instead was'the big picture about developments of an interAmerican anti-Castro program from Secretary Rusk One interesting comment which appeared in State's held with Kennedy He said that he carne to vashington at the request of President Ydigoras to discuss getting the B igade out of Guatemala 83 Although this was of concern to Ydigoras this was not the principal thrust of the letter which Alejos carried to Kennedy Ydigoras's principal concern was whether the Brigade was in fact going to be employed in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro from Cuba - 8 Jr TOP 7 RET memorandum -- particularly in view of the position later adopted by the Secretary of State -- was the following The Secretary said the united States was concerned because a number of Latin American countries did not see the threat from Communism as clearly as did the Foreign Minister or else these countries felt certain restraints in dealing with it 84 In early April 1961 Jake Esterline had a session at State to give Adolf A Berle a thorough briefing on the recently completed visit of the CRC leaders to Guatemala and to give Berle some positive guidance for his upcoming visit with Jose Miro Cardona Chief WH 4 also discussed the planned operation particularly the negative effects that a cancellation of the projected strike against Cuba would have on US relations not only with the Government of Guatemala but also on the whole of Latin America -- particularly those nations with ambivalent feelings about Communism Esterline Esterline mentioned that among other topics Dr Miro probably would raise questions about US funds for a ne Cuban government US recognition and open support use of US personnel with the Cuban Brigade at the time of the invasion and US reaction to various Cuban poli- tical leaders concluded his remarks by saying that the cancellation blow would be so severe that the administration's plans for the Western Hemisphere which have received so much publicity would probably lose all meaning 85 During the period immediately prior to the invas ion but after the bulk of the Cuban forces and the operational aircraft from JMADD had departed Guatemala President Ydigoras requested that he receive daily situation reports in case he had to respond to either internal or foreign crises which might result because of GOG support for the Brigade In the con- fusion attendant upon the operation the system could not be maintained and on 19 April 1961 following attacks on the GOG in the United Nations and by the opposition Congressmen in Guatemala Ydigoras informed ____Ithat he had been forced to agree to permit a visit to Retalhuleu and to the La Suiza site by opposition Congressmen JMADD was ordered to sterilize the base in the same manner as had been done three months earlier when the newsmen had been escorted through the area Two US mercenaries were to remain on the base as advisers and all the other Agency personnel including L TOjECRET communicators and Cubans were ordered to go to TRAV The Agency was to provide two bilingual advisers to be in attendance at La Suiza when the Congressmen came through on their inspection Moreover a halt was called on all incoming flights to JMADD until further notice That Ydigoras was expecting some domestic difficulties was apparent in a cable from reading c J to Headquarters GOG request andD concurs immediate air- shipment 500 to 1 000 tear gas grenades for use control possible mob activities next few days This went for- ward to Headquarters on 19 April 1961 87 The Agency also displayed considerable concern for its commitment to the Ydigoras government in the period following the collapse of the invasion and early in May in response to Ydigoras's request that the Agency continue to support the training activity for a Guatemalan Special Battalion until the end of In anticipation of possible difficulties from his political opposition Ydigoras had requested that make inquiries about the possibility of obtaining a 100-man pack for caching It is not known however if these weapons were obtained even though a number of such packs reached Florida between 17 March 1961 and 17 April 1961 88 c J -92 TOPrCRET June -- JMATE already had made a commitment to support it through May --I 1supported the request He made the case that this was a security measure because the press was still trying to prove that the Cuban Brigade had training bases in Guatemala furthermore noted that continuing the training of the Guatemalan Battalion would help to deter the revolutionary activities against the Ydigoras Government 89 Headquarters approved the request for the add itional support but one problem did come up -- the question of whether or not the Special Forces trainers would be continued through the month of June The Special Forces personnel began to get quite edgy because their commitment had only been through the end of May and I Iwas notified that if the training of the Guatemalan Battalion was completed by 20 May the Special Forces personnel would then be returned Pushing for an earlier exit the Special Forces personnel had contended that the Guatemalan trainees and officers were completely indifferent toward the ongoing training activity Headquarters did say that while the SF trainers would be released beg inning on 20 May I I was not to approve any departures of Special Forces personnel until further authorization from Headquarters 90 How close the ties between the Government of Guatemala and the Agency's representatives were was revealed late in April 1961 at a meeting that was called at the request of Carlos Alejos the Ambassador to the United States from Guatemala He requested that Jake Esterline meet with him at the embassy residence to discuss some sensitive information that he had recently received from his brother Roberto The sensitive information concerned an offer that General Truj i llo of the Dominican Republic had reportedly made to both President Ydigoras and to President Somoza of Nicaragua to make available to them in the Dominican Republic airfields training sites and other facilities needed to continue to wage war against Castro According to the report that Esterline prepared on the meeting the only quid pro quo involved would be that the United States give sanction to this arrangement in thB first instance and in the second instance agree to let Trujillo live out the rest of his days in peace without further interference from the United States Carlos Alejos said further that his brother Roberto had been authorized by President Ydigoras to deal with Somoza and Truj llo on the matter and what Roberto Alejos was looking fOr because of this responsibility was some reaction from the US directing his attention not to the US Department of State but to the Central Intelligence Agency Chief WH 4 apparently suggested that there was some problem in dealing with Trujillo because of his unsavory reputation and this suggestion was not particularly well received by Ambassador Alejos who with some heat replied that Trujillo may be unpopular but he is certainly antiCommunist and prepared to do something whereas the alleged great friends of the United States such as Figueres of Costa Rica and President Betancourt of Venezuela have made many friendly noises but never once have made a firm offer of real estate or material sic support to the battle against Castro The Ambassador went on to indicate that since the collapse of the invasion he had been getting what he considered a rather unfavorable reaction from Adolf Berle arid other members of the State Department with whom he had been holding discussions - 95 - TO RET This perhaps TOP explains why he had come to the Agency with this particular story rather than going to the Department In any event however Chief WH 4 ended his memorandum with the following suggestions Action required Exposure of the Trujillo offer to the DDP and or other interested parties and early advice to the Guatemalan Ambassador with simultaneous notification to I I of the answer given Recommendation That acceptance of assistance from Trujillo be given the greatest scrutiny In the writer's judgment exposure of Trujillo's assistance at this time could well swing increasing support to the United States in the wrong direction No serious consideration should therefore be given to this offer 911 Except for the story of the retrograde and dis- position of the materiel which will be discussed ln a later volume this concludes the story of the Agency's policy I 'elated if not policy making -'-- contacts with the Government of Guatemala during the course of Project JMATE Agency representatives rather than Department of State personnel dealt directly with the President of Guatemala and his closest associates over actions which involved relationships with the United States Government and bore heavily on the formulation TOP of US policy for Guatemala There 1S little question that in his choice of working with the Agency rather than with the US Ambassador in Guatemala John J Muccio Ydigoras was no fool As who D Fn 1 December 1960 indicated ----------- -- relations between '--I -----ll and the Ambassador were strained to the point where the I I ioperated al- most as a separate entity until the departure of the Ambassador in the Fall of 1961 92 If the oral history interview which Muccio made for the John F Kennedy Library in the Spring of 1971 is indicative of his character it is understandable why relations between Muccio and Agency personnel were strained In that interview the pertinent portions of which are reproduced in Appendix 3 Muccio tried to indicate on the one hand tha he was uninformed about CIA activities in Guatemala yet on the other hand he As indicated earlier in this chapter I overlapped as rand 1n fact each i - - L - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J in his own particular bal 'lw l C -r---r- W l e Bay of Pigs Operation and with the operation f MUCC10 s successor John Bell was named 10 November 1961 93 J L I TOP S TOP IRET pointed to an unidentified Agency contact who was keeping him fully posted on the Agency's operations As revealed in the cable traffic Muccio participated in various of the operations related to Project JMATE both before and after the fact Some of Muccio's remarks in the JFK Library interview may have been the reflection of interviewer biases but they also indicated that Muccio was trying to avoid any tie-in with the bad guys of CIA The question of interviewer bias for example shows through in the following comment made at one point The whole ineptitude of the Bay of Pigs operation is amazing not only what you Muccio are talking about now but I was struck by the simple tactics at the beach It was just incredible to me that it could have been done that way but that's an aside my opinion With this kind of an aside could the interviewee not have detected a bias of the interviewer During the course of the operation of the air base at Puerto Cabezas I had one security officer ' He came up to me quite concerned He said We 1 ve got a bunch of Nicaraguans who are in our secure area What 1 11 I do I looked out ' ' Christ Almighty They were all generals and were led by General Somoza I said It 1 s their country you had better let them come in So they carne in and we gave them a general briefing But Somoza was concerned His concern was the United States willingness to follow through Garfield M Thorsrud to Jack B Pfeiffer 6 February 1976 -991 TOP S RET TOP t RET Part II Nicaragua A Background Al though Project JMATE operations in Nicaragua were of considerably shorter duration than in Guatemala there were many similarities in the degree to which CIA personnel were involved directly with the nation's Preside t or his close personal staff on issues which were of direct importance to US foreign policy This section therefore focuses on the rela'tions between the Agency and President Luis Somoza Debayle The internal situation in Nicaragua presented the Department of State with difficult choices Somoza was an absolute dictator and particularly after the 1960 election of John F Kennedy State was much concerned that in appearance tit least the abrazo for Somoza be formal rather than friendly lest the US risk loss of support in the GAS and UN from the reputedly democratic Central and South American nations The Agency had no such problems -- it needed a base from which to mount air operations against Castro's Cuba and the - 100 - TOP iRET RET TOP most likely available site outside CONUS was in Nicaragua B Initiation of Discussions with President Somoza Puerto Cabezas on the northeastern coast of Nicaragua lies approximately 650 miles due south of Havana During WWII Puerto Cabezas had been developed as one of the principal airfields in that country and despite having fallen into some disrepair it nonetheless looked like the most feasible site for launching air activities against Castro On 13 June 1960 less than three months following Eisenhower's decision to act against Castro I __________1 I Louis P Napoli had made arrangements to talk privately with President Somoza about Central American politics with particular emphasis on Cuban activities in the area At this first meeting President Somoza made it quite clear that he needed assurances that the United States Government would back whatever actions or operations were to be put in motion to the end of overthrowing Castro I On 10 December 1960 the Puerto Cabezas facility was assigned the crypt JMTIDE - 101 - TorrRET Al though he was IL - - - - - l i n July of 1960 Lou Napoli was sent TOY to Managua to participate in a meeting between Agency representatives and the President of Nicaragua in September 1960 Accompanied by 1 _ Walter S Holloway the CIA representatives met with President Somoza on 17 and 19 September 1960 The purpose of Napoli's TOY was to inform Somoza that the Frente Revolucionario Oemocratico FRD was the organization of anti-Castro Cuban exiles which deserved the support of Somoza's government This information for Somoza was in response to a question he had raised with Napoli in the previously mentioned June meeting l Somoza agreed that he would receive an FRD representative to discuss the situation and in addition indicated that he would make available a landing strip at Puerto Cabezas a training site for about 100 men and a shortwave radio station The Nicaraguan leader was not at all reluctant to raise pointed questions with Th radio station incidentally that had been used during the course of operation PBSUCCESS which resulted in the ouster of the leftist Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1958 the CIA representatives asking specifically what the position of the United states Government would be toward his country if Cuba should formally charge -- in the OAS or the UN -- that Nicaragua was fomenting war against them Somoza wanted it understood and accepted by all levels of the us government that Nicaragua was on the side of the angels and therefore no us official should be allowed to attack Nicaragua for either its actions or its position vis-a-vis Cuba Depite his cordial relations with the United States Ambassador Thomas E Whelan Napoli reported that Somoza believed that There are some long-haired Department of State liberals who are not in favor of Somoza and they would welcome the chance to use this as a source of embarrassment to his government by verbally blasting his country for her actions against Cuba I It should be emphasized however that in dealing with the Nicaraguan leaders the Agency representatives while expressing that in their own opinions Somoza's requests were reasonable did make clear that they poke only for themselves Their views did not represent formal US policy -- that would have to come from higher levels 51 saying that Napoli was quite specific in It is the opinion of the writer that guidance must be passed to Holloway by Headquarters in line with Somoza'squery in order that I Iwill be properly informed and prepared to answer Somoza's questioning on this matter This query is certain to arise again from time to time until a satisfactory reply is given to Somoza I Napoli also indicated that The Acting Chief of the US Embassy further said that inasmuch as he had no instructions or prior notice of the mission plus the fact that only the US Ambassador to Nicaragua was authorized to sit in talks he would prefer to remain clear of The Department of State representatives in the foreign areas which were the sites of JMATE operations frequently got quite goosey particularly those of less than ambassadorial ranks In this instance for example _ noted in his transmi ttal The aspect of urgency which brought Napoli to Managua has given the Acting Chief of the American Embassy the impression that we might be operating on a noncoordinated uncontrolled free wheeling basis particularl since Na oli was I Ih as o n e m u - c - tC - o --o v - e - r - c -o -m e -- p - a -s t---- a -- d -m -l n i s i ve resistance here and improve the relationship of this office with the rest of State the cooperation of which we need It is incumbent upon the Agency that the American _Ambassador be thoroughly briefed while he is in the United States on the circumstances of Napoli's visit to insure no future conflict of interests and continued maintenance of rapport 21 - 104 - TO CRET any talks that Napoli had with Somoza This was agreeable to Napoli The writer wishes to emphasize that relations between Napoli and the Acting Chief of the American Embassy remain completely cordial and no change is anticipated In mid-October of 1960 a survey team from Agency Headquarters under the direction of Napoli made a trip to Nicaragua to inspect Puerto Cabezas Again the Agency representatives dealt directly with the President of this Central American country receiving his full support and cooperation Somoza volunteered to foot the cost of the DC-3 aircraft that would be provided to the survey team including the pilot and the crew He also was asked to provide a senior official who could act as his spokesman and in this connection Noel Pallais Debayle a cou sin of Somoza's who had accompanied the survey team was identified as the contact Except for Napoli who-I I the other members of the survey team travelled asl opportunities in Nicaragua looking for The visit by the Agency TITe other members of the survey team included E A Stanulis who was Executive Officer for WH 4 Ralph Brown a logistics officer Norman Imler and Robert Moore PM officers - 105 -- TOPfeRET TOP S ET representatives had been cleared by Napoli with the US Ambassador to Nicaragua Thomas Whelan and in addition WH 4 had advised Frank Devine of the Department of State of the trip and Col King had informed Thomas Mann 9 In a meeting with the leader of the survey team Napoli on 14 Oct 60 Somoza agreed among other things that the airstrip area could be isolated for the exclu sive use of the Agency Somoza would provide a guard force construction of some temporary housing for personnel at the base would be permitted and initially he would help out with the transportation and supplies for repairing the airstrip He agreed to the use of a practice bombing range on a nearby lagoon about 10 miles south of Puerto Cabezas he agreed to the use of Puerto Cabezas as a strike base for attacks on Cuba and he also agreed to permit the exile air force to use the Nicaraguan Air Force insignia during any internal flights It also was apparent that at least Mr Mann was Assistant Secertary of State for InterAmerican Affairs and Mr Devine was Special Assistant to Mr Mann two US companies located in the Puerto Cabezas area would play significant roles in the Agency's plans for Puerto Cabezas Facilities of the Nicaraguan Long Leaf Pine Company NIPCO a lumber company controlling the terminal facilities and the Standard Fruit Company controlling the rail line and the docking facility were critical to both planned air and maritime operations 10 In return for his support Somoza wanted assurance that once action against Castro started there would be no backing down by the USG and he also wanted to be sure that the proper levels of the US Government were sanctioning the activities of the survey team When he was told that the US Ambassador was thoroughly familiar with and involved in the planning he was somewhat mollified but he did raise the question of wanting a contact to whom he could turn if he believed that the operation was not going as it should -- or if he had complaints or suggestions to offer Somoza was told in this connection that the best thing he - could do would be to go to Holloway As before Napoli made clear that these talks were exploratory and that - 107 - Tor1'CRET they represented no firm commitment Somoza of course was told that he was dealing with f but there is little doubt that he knew exactly with whom he was negotiating Following the return of the survey team toward the end of October 1960 representatives from WH 4 PM WH 4 Support and DPD recommended that 1 Policy approval be obtained for the use of the Puerto Cabezas complex 2 Repair of the airstrip be commenced at once for JMARC use and as a long term CIA asset because of its overall strategic location 3 Construction of buildings be commenced for an air-maritime base including storage of ordnance ZRMEDRICK pack and other supplies 4 An infantry training holding base be constructed if no facility is to be made available in the US 11 C Rip Robertson's Excursion into Diplomacy Following the return of the survey team in Octo- ber Napoli was succeeded by William Rip Robertson A a portent of things to come the team recommended that it would be advisable to acquire the infantry base because of the crowded conditions at the Guatemala base as the Agency's principal contact with President Somoza In August of 1960 Robertson wrote to the Agency from Nicaragua indicating that a business venture in which he had been involved was terminating A former contract employee he asked if there was any need for his services at this time His letter went forward froml to the DDCI General Cabell and it ended up with the Deputy Director for Plans who suggested to Chief WH Division Col J C King that Robertson be brought into the JMARC program for operations in Nicaragua 12 With the concurrence of Chief WH 4 Jake Esterline Col King prepared a Letter of Instruction LOI for Robertson on 2 December 1960 The LOI confirmed Robertson's verbal orders to proceed to Nicaragua as coordinator of JMATE activities in that area Among other of the operational duties and responsibilities Robertson was told You will have authority over all JMARC personnel and responsibility for the coordination of all JMARC activities including JMTIDE as set forth in Para 11 You will be the sole JMARC official in contact with the President of Nicaragua and authorized to be in Nicaragua 13 Although cautioned concerning the responsibilities' of the US Ambassador in Nicaragua and the relationship RET TOplcRET ofl Ito the Ambassador Robertson was given a free hand to determine the extent of his contact with other US personnel in the Managua area As a point of some contention Robertson was also told that he would be responsible for the coordination and general supervision of JMTIDE construction activities and air and maritime operational activities when implemented under their specialized senior officers 14 Rip's Letter of Instruction indicated that the facility at JMTIDE should be completed by 15 January 1961 and that as soon as Robertson concluded satisfactory arrangements with the President of Nicaragua the 5-man construction team would be sent black into the Puerto Cabezas area to conduct a survey estimating the scope and cost of the work And then somewhat paradoxically in view of the previous comment about Robertson's authority i t was stated that On Headquarter's approval of the plan for base construction a Base Manager will be provided with the responsibility for maintenance operation and support of the facility On activation JMARC PM Personnel _ will be assigned in connection with both air and maritime operations and your responsibilities regarding these various JMTIDE activities include 1 Being the sole JMARC channel to the President and Government of Nicaragua 2 Assisting and expediting local procurement of materials and equipment and 3 Assuring that JMARC security and general operating standards are maintained at JMTIDE 15 Even though the matter of the base at Puerto Cabezas had not yet been formally resolved it was apparent as Robertson was getting ready to depart for Headquarters that the air element in DPD which had been assigned to the JMATE function was readying itself to move into action at the base Not only were plans outlined for the survey team to go to Nicaragua at the earliest opportunity following Robertson's negotiations but plans for housing messing cover security and air operations also were being outlined - by Jim'Cunningham Assistant Chief DPD before the end of November 16 Robertson's assignment in Nicaragua which had been preceded by Napoli's trip in mid-October 1960 At this time operations anticipated maximum sortie rates of lOO a month for 3 months and probable maximum numbers of aircraft to be accommodated as 10 B-26's 4 C-46's and at least two C-54's -_l L T07CRET caused varying reactions within the Department of State U S Ambassador Thomas Whelan was a strong supporter of the Somoza government and consequently looked with great favor on the Agencyls attempts to negotiate directly with Somoza believing that this was a proper step not only from the US point of view vis-a-vis Cuba but also in terms of our relations with the government of Nicaragua 17 On the other hand Thomas Mann 18 the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs preferred to tread very cautiously with regard to Nicaragua adhering to the formalities of diplomatic nicety vis-a-vis that government Within the Agency itself Mr Bissell's Assistant Deputy Director of Plans for Action ADDP A C Tracy Barnes was apparently nervous about the implications of using the Nicaraguan site because Somoza was such a bad guy and Barnes at one point stated that in the long run we would lose an unacceptable amount of face with these more democratic countries in Central America if we worked closely with Somoza 19 Barnes however did realize the urgent need for developing a strike base - l TOP CRET Another concern at the time that Robertson was about to depart for Nicaragua was the possibility that Guatemala at least the ground training site might be subject to an GAS inspection team and in late November 1960 the prospects for an internal US training site for the Cuban Brigade was being investigated Among the possible areas discussed were Fort Benning Fort Bragg the Belle-Chase Naval ammunition depot in Louisiana Camp Johnson in Louisiana and Camp Bullis in Texas While the possibility of holding and or training of ground force troops within the continental united States was a subject for discussion there appeared to be little question that the forward strike base would have to be outside of the continental United States and Puerto Cabezas was consistently regarded as the most likely -- if not the- only -- site for that strike base 20 Shortly prior to his departure for Nicaragua Rip Robertson raised a series of pertinent questions which he hoped to have answered -- or at least discussed -- prior to his departure Among the questions were several which clearly indicated Robertson's TOP TOP 7RET awareness of the political implications of the position that he was assuming 1 Am I cleared to speak frankly with local President and local Chief of Army as to US Government participation 2 General but not spec fic operational concepts example we plan supplies and infiltrations until we can stir up something and then we will support it with plenty of firepower 3 Announcement of the number and type resupply bombing strafing etc air missions daily on the day i t is to run 4 When the local President asks for politics and identity of indigenous movement or movements we are supporting do we tell him Where can I get a good briefing on this point 5 Have arrangements been made for reimbursement to local President abroad for expenditures he may assume for us What do I tell him re this subject at first meeting 21 Also as Robertson was about to depart there was considerable concern about the problem in Nicaragua Robertson also asked for guidance on the most pragmatic questions of contracting authority cover and base-security -- particularly whether DPD would be subject to WH security practices even at the expense of air ops that was being raised with the Special Group particularly the concerns of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs Thomas Mann In an apparent response to a question raised by Mann Chief WH Division sent a note to Mann on 1 December 1960 in which it was stated As one of the actions to be taken in response to the Presidential and Special Group Meetings we would proceed to survey construct and man a staging and refueling facility at Puerto Cabezas This ction is in accord with preliminary conversations with President Somoza There would at no time be a substantial force at the installation and no US personnel would be in the capital of the nation except one agency contract employee with ion local experience who would I I I Iby dealing with the Presl ent on thlS operation The initial survey team of 5-men would fly into Puerto Cabezas on or about 7 December Subject to their findings it is expected that such minimum airstrip repairs and construction of temporary buildings would be completed by 15 January 1961 22 The Agency presumption that it had been acting in response to the directive of the President and the wishes of the Special Group apparently met with opposition from Mann for in a handwritten note on a copy of the memorandum cited above Dick Drain Chief WH 4 P P recorded Later that morning 2 December 1960 Devine called C WH to say that Mann had referred the matter to tivingston Merchant and felt there had been no Special Group discussion or decision underlying the Nicaragua proposal I called ADD A who after speaking w C WH called Joe Scott to see where we stood Scott said Merchant felt this was a matter for secretarial review For this review State would need more detail Barnes undertook to provide same Used Thomas A Parrot to inform Gordon Gray and DOD and himself inform DCI 23 In order to insure that the Special Group was p operly notified WH 4 prepared a memorandum on Nica- raguan aspects of the Cuban operation on 3 December 1960 and on 6 December 1960 another memorandum was prepared concerning several problems among which was included that of the Nicaraguan strike base These materials were forwarded for use at the Special Group meeting of 8 December 1960 24 Although formal sanction for his mission was still being debated Robertson departed for Nicaragua Mr Merchant was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Joseph W Scott was his Special Assi tant Thomas A Parrot served as Executive Secretary for the Special Group 5412 and Gordon Gray was President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser - 116 - TO CRET early in December and I - - - - - - Iwas instructed that either he or the Ambassador should advise President Somoza about Robertson's role and arrange for an early meeting 25 On 8 December 1960 Robertson had his first meeting with President Luis Somoza and Noel Pallais Debayle Somoza's cousin and contact man with JMATE The purpose of this initial meeting was to establish his identity with Somoza and to arrange for the black flight for another survey team that was coming in to examine the Puerto Cabezas area For all practical purposes from this time forward until his departure in mid-February of 1961 the conduct of a major segment of US foreign policy was in the hands of a CIA contract employee -- the State representatives standing to one side as the Agency forged ahead with its anti-Castro program 26 Not only did the State representatives stand aside but also In his transmittal of Robertson's first reports'c Jreported as follows CADICK Robertson is now operating completely outside of I because c J wan ts to kn-o-w-n-o---- t h ---l n-g-m-o-r-e-'t'h-a'---nwhat is absolutely required that he know regarding these activities he has given CADICK the essential cryptonyms I footnote continued on following page - 11 L TOP jCRET l Prior to his first meeting with Somoza on 8 December 1960 Robertson did meet with Pallais on 7 December 1960 to make arrangements for the session with Somoza 28 The delicate situation in which Robertson found himself is quite evident from the questions which were put to him by Pallais in his initial meeting The President's cousin pointed out that Somoza would be pushing for a promise that we would back him if and when he was caught in the act and Robertson was faced with a similar question during his session with Somoza Rip straddled the line very carefully and pointed out in all instances that he could only express his own personal opinion and make quite sure that the Nicaraguans understood that he had no official verification that Somoza would be supported in case of difficulties with other member states of President Luis Somoza l General Anastasio Somoza and Noel Pallais de Bayle which he has memorized This has been done for his own and operational security Hereafter c J will receive CADICK's finished reports sealed in an envelope 27 - 118 TOPJEeRET TOP S cRET the OAS the UN or with Cuba Robertson did play down the likelihood of serious military intervention by Cuba because of the strength of the Brigade's Air Force once it moved into Nicaragua The care with which Robertson was treading the line with Somoza is quite similar to the handling of the situation by Lou Napoli at the time of his visit to Nicaragua in mid-October of 1960 Napoli also avoided very carefully indicating that views that he expressed represented anything other than his own personal thoughts However in a conversation with a member of WH Division on 9 August 1972 Napoli stated that he had assured the Somozas that the United States would not back out once the Cuban operation started and further that if Castro retaliated either militarily or in the UN OAS Somoza could expect full support from the us When the interviewer questioned Napoli about the authority that he had for making such statements the response was that he had this from Headquarters He further stated that he did not worry concerning the authority that Headquarters had 30 For whatever reason Robertson's role in the negotiations with Somoza apparently left a bad after taste with Napoli for in this same interview in 1972 he was quite pointed in noting that it was he rather than Robertson who had played the principal role in negotiations with the head of the Nicaraguan state 31 footnote continued on following page -- Robertson's on-going dialogue with Somoza continued throug0 December quite successfully from the standpoint of acceptance of Agency proposals for developing Puerto Cabezas Robertson noted that aside from the political discussions which could not be escaped every point raised by the engineering advance party was agreed to by Somoza 32 Even though the Agency's representative ln Nicaragua was making good progress the same apparently did not apply in Headquarters area On 28 December 1960 the Chief of WH 4 was requesting action on the part of the A DDP A to get a formal policy decision The question of the quid pro quo's requested by Somoza apparently had been put to Assistant Secretary Mann and according to Chief WH 4 Mann was rather cold on the subject with the inevitable result that nothing had happened I would appreciate therefore if you C Tracy Barnes A DDP A in your role as coordinator would take the matter up with Ambassador Willauer We are now at the point that we must obligate funds and commence rehabilitation of JMTIDE if we are to meet the 15 February - 1 March deadline The record verifies that both Napoli and Robertson acted in a highly commendable manner during the touchy negotiations with the Central American dictator - 120 I TOP iCRET Obviously we cannot in good conscience expend government funds unless we have reasonable assurance that we can use the area Given the absolute essentiality of JMTIDE to our operation r the need for early resolution is quite apparent 33 Despite the concern over the official policy for Nicaragua Headquarters apparently missed or ignored one very important point made by Robertson in midDecember 1960 It was a point which from project in- ception until near the collapse of the Brigade was to plague the JMARC operation Robertson pointed out that the real problem is that though all preliminary activities can be explained away by cover schemes devised thus far r we much face fact that once shooting starts it is certain that JMTIDE will corne to light for what it is 34 Had this comment been carefully considered at this time perhaps the whole question of plausible deniability could have been laid out on the table or laid to rest before it became a critical factor -- if not the critical factor -- in modifying the operational plan While Robertson went about his business in Nicaragua there was an increasing flurry of activity in the Headquarters area concerning the anti-Castro - 121 - TOP jcRET movement and the situation in Nicaragua was consistently introduced as a part of that on-going prob1em D Qualms at High Levels With reference to the use or non-use of the Nicaraguan base -- a question which was still unanswered at the turn of the year -- Tom Mann was looked on as the villain in the piece by the Agency's representatives In preparing material for the DCI to use at a high level meeting Tracy Barnes indicated that Mann would probably oppose the use of the Nicaraguan strike base Barnes argues that Mann would reason that since the operation was essentially one backed by the United States Government the attempt to establish a covert Agency operated base was improper The united States Government should openly admit its anti-Castro posture for continuation of the attempt to maintain covert activities in Nicaragua and Guatemala would in Mann's thinking according to Barnes jeopardize the already somewhat shaky governments of Ydigoras and Somoza 35 In his memorandum noting Mann's position Barnes chose to ignore or at least to pass over the merits of overt US intervention Instead of looking at the question in issue he pointed out that the Agency's position was that unless bases in the US could be obtained the only acceptable land mass from which we could fly the B-26's to strike Cuba was Puerto Cabezas In preparing material for Barnes prior to a 5 January 1961 meeting of the Special Group the Chief of WH 4 P P the hard-nosed hard-talking Dick Drain noted an even more significant problem concerning the situation in Nicaragua Drain pointed out that the Special Group in its meetings of 8 and 15 December had left a number of points hanging including the authority to use the airstrip at Puerto Cabezas for spoiling raids and tactical air support and in reference to those two meetings of the Special Group Drain wrote There was considerable discussion of the logistics timing involved in the development of the strip for strikes in the time framework of 15 Feb - 1 Mar Even though the logistics factors alone would seem to make it necessary for the Group now to approve this facility for airstrikes it was felt that the more basic question was the very approval of airstrikes It was therefore agreed that this Special Group would be asked TOP sj CRET to approve spoiling raids and tactical airstrikes from Puerto Cabezas beginning D-l 37 Despite discussion of these issues when Barnes prepared his background memorandum for the DCI to use at the 5 January meeting of the Special Group the questions and problems which have just been mentioned were totally ignored With reference to Puerto Cabezas Barnes said that steps had been taken to prepare the strike base and we are planning to move to Puerto Cabezas substantial amounts of material sic starting around the 15th or 20th of January including aviation ordnance resupply ammo and weapons for ground forces aviation gas diesel fuel and possibly some extra one-man packs although work on the base did not actually begin until late January or early February 1961 38 In view of what would subsequently become one of the most controversial issues concerning the whole Bay of Pigs operation -- the number and nature of the airstrikes -- it is interesting to note the reference at this early date to D-l air activity On 11 Jan 61 according to one source a Headquarters 'team arrived at JMTIDE to arrange for and supervise the construction and Rip Robertson was notified to report to Headquarters on 27 January 1961 for participation JMCLEAR planning for JMTIDE construction 39 The Chief WH 4 PM Col Jack Hawkins also noted on 4 January 1961 that necessary construction and repairs' at this base are now scheduled to conunence 40 Completely ignoring the issue of authorization for use of Puerto Cabezas or the question of permlsSlon for airstrikes which had previously been brought to his attention Barnes chose to focus on the economics and the potential loss of US inventories which might be moved into Puerto Cabezas and lost -- that is appropriated by Somoza -- if the decision should be made either to move the training activity to United States bases and or to back off from the use of the Nicaraguan air base What motivated Barnes to suggest this approach is unknown and in view of the real problems requiring decisions it was a unbelievable performance Even as the Agency as seeking policy guidance with respect to utilization of Puerto Cabezas Robertson alerted Headquarters that the Nicaraguan situation would soon be complicated by requests from the Government of Nicaragua for a $ US 2 million loan to rebuild motor and railroads which had recently been flooded -- a request which the Nicaraguan Ambassador Oscar SevillaSacasa would present to the Department of State In addition a Development Loan fund of $ US 8 million was also pending 41 When General Anastasio Somoza - 125 - TOP RET TOP SftRET President Somoza's brother -- came to the United States to attend the Kennedy inauguration he also met with Allen Dulles to discuss the problem of JMTIDE and of continued US support for Nicaragua At the same time the General also pressed the DCI for assistance in obtaining the loans that were just mentioned DCI however The pointed Somoza toward the Department of State suggesting that Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann was the logical contact for discussing loans 42 The question of the quid-pro-quo of loans for Nicaragua in return for the utilization of Puerto Cabezas continued through February with the Chief WH 4 and the Chief WH Division both playing active roles in attempting to get a commitment from State for the $2 million loan -- and State support for the $8 million World Bank loan 43 On the'last day of February 1961 a proposal from Chief Western Hemisphere Division to the DCI suggesting that the DDP the DDCI or the DCI press the Department of State for favorable action in Nicaragua's two pending loans was signed and approved at least through the DDP level Whether the DCI'actually approved this recommendation is a moot point and one which was not clarified even subsequent to the close out of the JMATE operation At the same time that he was suggesting that pressure be put on the Department of State to assist Nicaragua in obtaining the loans Chief WHD also was recommending that Ambassador Whelan be designated to discuss Project JMATE with President Somoza King in speaking of Whelan r marked Col as follows His relationship with President Somoza makes him an ideal representative to convey assurances that the project will be implemented will continue until Castro's defeat and be conducted with US awareness of Nicaragua's contribution and with support for her position should the operation produce pressures on her in the UN the OAS or otherwise Should it not be possible to extend such assurances during Ambassador Whelan's availability then such assurances should be extended by a representative of the US government as soon as possible thereafter 45 E Back to Robertson Activist with Foresight While negotiations over the formalities of the use of Puerto Cabezas dragged on at Headquarters To the author's knowledge the suggestion for a commitment to support the project until Castro's defeat was never officially made to either President Somoza or President Ydigoras nor to the anti-Castro Cuban political or military leaders l l TOP 7'--'RET TOP sjcRET Robertson on the scene in Nicaragua made solid progress in establishing a base at JMTIDE Between 3 and 17 January 1961 for example he reported on three meetings with General Anastasio Somoza and in the course of these made arrangements for the movement of guards into the TIDE area in anticipation of the arrival of the first supply ship toward the end of January 1961 He also worked out arrangements for housing and paying the guardia nacional contingent which would be responsible for base security and he set up the bookkeeping for the expenditures for the guardia Although he gave no specifics Robertson indicated that he had set up a system for alerting JMTIDE when doubtful persons or newspapermen board the local airlines and apparently this system was considerably more successful than the program established for the JMADD and JMTRAV activities 46 With reference to the security problem Robertson reported that the arrival of the team reponsible for In this context Rip did note that he was being pestered by Cora Waterhouse a newspaper woman from the United States who was trying to find out what was going on TOP fRET supervising the re-creation of Puerto Cabezas tipped the local Americans off as to who was behind the activity at the airfield Rip was particularly high in his praise of the Agency engineer who both reduced the time for getting the operation in order and also had saved money in the process In reporting on his activities through mid-January Robertson made one complaint which he voiced as follows In the future I would suggest that the size of such groups be cut to a minimum There is something uncommon about a group of four men of whom only one is occupied to the eyes of observers and only one of which knows the business for which they are there In reality one engineer would accomplish all that is being done at TIDE with the exception of course of commo 47 In terms of security at JMTIDE Robertson also had some other problems which he seemed to have handled very well especially considering that they concerned US military representatives in Nicaragua The Chief of the US Military Assistance Group to Guatemala in the course of an inspection of National Guard facilities had come into the TIDE area and upon his return to Managua had prepared a report on the activities and installation The US Ambassador requested that this report not be forwarded to Washington but as a result of the trip the Military Attache and the Air Attache in Managua got the hots to trot down to TIDE Ambas- sador Whelan however backed Robertson's request that such trips be denied but fearing that the Ambassador would be unable to contain future requests from the Department of Defense representatives Robertson asked Headquarters for assistance On 1 February 1961 a cable went to Robertson from Headquarters stating Headquarters has arranged with Pentagon superiors Mil Attache and MAAG Chief to send them today orders neither visit nor report on JMTIDE 48 Rip Robertson performed yeoman service in his stint in Nicaragua in the early months of 1961 In An additional problem with a us military contingent apparently was headed off when the Agency requested the Pentagon to scrub the planned visit of an Army Map Service NIS National Intelligence Survey group to TIDE Toward mid-June 1961 the arrangements which the Agency had made through the Subsidiary Division Joint Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence US Army still held At that time 12 June 1961 howeve4 the Agency did authorize access to JMTIDE to US military personnel who were involved in decisions concerning disposal of the materiel still stockpiled at Puerto Cabezas 49a - 130 - TOP RET TorI-RET addition to what has already been noted his relationships with the Somozas -- President and General -were carried on in a direct and friendly manner If the situation demanded there was no hesitation on Robertson's part to make a direct approach to President Somoza Based on reports of these meetings it is clear that Robertson was regarded as the de-facto representative re US foreign policy in Nicaragua Robertson reported however that he always emphasized to the Nicaraguan leaders that his opinions were not necessarily those of the USG By the same token Robertson made clear that he would forward Somoza's views to the proper authorities in the US Government Even though the United States had an Ambassador in Nicaragua who was quite friendly with Somoza Robertson s knowledgeability about the Agency's anti-Castro operations really made him the key figure in the ongoing relationships between Nicaragua and the United States With his detailed knowledge of the operational plans for Puerto Cabezas Robertson was in a much better position to understand and appreciate Somoza's TOP desire for a more formal commitment for the United States than he had received by mid-February of 1961 In a lengthy exit session with Robertson at the time of his departure 14 February 1961 the Nicaraguan President emphasized how difficult it would be for him to survive his pro-Castro opponents once Robertson and Ambassador Whelan -- who was being replaced -had both departed the country unless the United States provided him with some greater guarantees of support for his assistance in the USG's anti-Castro activities As Somoza put it to Robertson I need to meet a man who can say he just left Mr Kennedy and Mr Kennedy sends assurances that we are all in this together 50 When Robertson departed Nicaragua for Headquarters on 14 February 1961 he received high marks from all sources fabled back as follows - - - - - - - Robertson noted that Somoza in response to a question concerning whether Mr Dulles was of sufficient stature to give the proper assurances responded that certainly Mr Dulles was of stature enough to be able to assure him but as he Somoza had pointed out to his brother General A Somoza Mr Dulles had talked 'only in generalities' to the General and had avoided the main issue This was with reference to the General's visit to the US at the time of the Kennedy inaugural 51 TOP resires commend Robertson for excellent presentation and accomplishment mission Robertson's detached objective approach vis-a-vis Somoza Ambassador and underlined positive results 52 I I - - - - F Who Would Do What for Whom Robertson's suggestions for discussions were taken to heart in Nicaragua and in Washington Almost immediately upon his departure a series of cables indicate that meetings were held between the President of Nicaragua and Ambassador Whelan and in Washington between Lou Napoli and Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa A principal subject of the conversation was the status of Nicaragua's pending loan applications to the USG and the DLF In neither Managua nor Washington did Nicaragua get any commitment that the loans were going It should not be inferred from the foregoing that all of Robertson's activities were devoted to handholding with the Somozas He got down to the very nitty-gritty things directly related to the planned operation against Fidel Castro concerning himself with such matters as port security planning for fueling and watering the vessels which would be used to transport the Brigade to Cuba and probably to negotiating an agreement with Nicaragua to dispose of the Brigade dead resulting from the invasion One knowledgeab e source recalled that an arrangement was made whereby the bodies would be transported to Nicaragua by boat or air and that Somoza had offered to give them a hero's burial TOP ET to be approved or authorized but it was quite clear that the Agency wished to defer to State on the matter of the formal loan applications and to put the political burden on the Department's back 54 At the same time that the Agency was holding Somoza's hand Headquarters was being extremely concerned that none of our assurances to Nicaragua got put into writing 55 On a very local level Somoza pointed out to Ambassador Whelan that because the government of Nicaragua had diverted funds which had been appropriated by the Nicaraguan Congress to keep the railroad and road systems operating in order to support TIDE activities he was going to be in a very embarrassing position should TIDE collapse and should the US fail to provide the $ US 2 million loan 56 In Washington Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa pressed Napoli for assistance in getting high level assurance that Nicaragua would not suffer in either the UN or OAS because of her anti-Castro position Sevilla-Sacasa suggested that Berle Rusk or President Kennedy would be a suitable US spokesman to indicate that Nicaragua's position would be supported should any international or regional sanctions be threatened for assistance given the Brigade by Nicaragua should the invasion of Cuba take place 57 As the date for the invasion approached and with the approval of Jake Esterline and C Tracy Barnes Lou Napoli was reassigned 27 March 1961 to Managua on TDY to maintain personal contact with both President and General Somoza on the upcoming operation insofar as it might affect the Nicaraguan government and like his predecessor Rip Robertson Napoli was to confine his activities to Managua and avoid JMTIDE Napoli expected to do a certain amount of hand-holding on the matter of the loans and make reassuring noises without any firm commitments and similarly he hoped to be able to assure the Nicaraguan government that it would receive support from the US should their Latin American neighbors take umbrage at Somoza's anti-Castro posture Probably the most significant duty he was to undertake upon his return to Nicaragua was to brief Somoza on the upcoming military operation without of course revealing the strike date -- in fact the instruction indicated that Napoli himself would not know the exact date TOP Among the points outlined in his scenario for the military briefing of Somoza the following items are worth mention in view of the situation as it actually evolved with reference to the Cuban Brigade members it was to be emphasized that once they were on the ships they would never return to Nicaragua With reference to the air strikes the scena'rio stated Air strikes will begin once landings are made and will continue until Castro knocked out Fifteen B-26's will be used Somoza need not worry about Cuban Air Force following the B-26's as the mission of those planes in sic the total destruction of the Cuban Air Force The success of the operation hinges largely on the continued uninterrupted use of TIDE for strategic and logistical support for rebels Once we start we must go until Castro falls 59 Despite the fact that Lou Napoli talked rather glibly about promises and assurances that should be given to Somoza Jack Hawkins Chief WH 4 PM in testifying to the Taylor Committee made the point that neither the Agency nor the USG ever gave Somoza a high level promise of support as a condition for use of Puerto Cabezas In fact Hawkins emphasized that up until the last moment the use of this base might have been denied at the whim of Somoza 60 TOP The situation was complicated by the fact that Washington was sitting on its hands waiting for a policy decision to implement the operational phase of JMTIDE and this was further complicated by the question of the utilization of US military personnel at the Nicaragua base As pointed out in the discussion of the Agency's relationships with the Government of Guatemala Jake Esterline had been forced to negotiate an agreement which in effect was a status of Forces Agreement with the Government of Guatemala before permission was granted for the use of us Army Special Forces personnel at the ground training base JMTRAV When it was time to consider the initiation of operations at Puerto Cabezas the question of utilization of us personnel in a foreign area again came up In early March 1961 a memorandum to the DDP from the Assistant Director for Operations Office of Special Operations Department of Defense stated in part The services and the Joint Staff have all reaffirmed that the Department of Defense policy established for Guatemala must apply to Nicaragua in the same manner This subject has been discussed with the See Part I of this volume pp 57 ff - 1 7L TOP jCRET TOP Deputy Secretary of Defense by Brigadier General Lansdale with a proposal that it be raised at the next Group meeting 61 The end result was that neither Army Special Forces nor USAF assignees were officially permitted to move from Guatemalan bases to TIDE The number of USAF ground crew personnel who were at TIDE unofficially cannot be determined G Down to the Wire with Somoza Whether or not adequate formal assurance of sup- port in the OAS or UN was actually reached between President Somoza and high level officials of the United States Government is uncertain -- what is certain however is that Somoza gave his full cooperation to the Agency effort to mount the operation out of Puerto Cabezas As of 10 April in a meeting with the Agency representative it was made clear that the Somozas were going to do everything in their power to insure the security of the operation Measures to be taken included the monitoring and censorship of radio outgoing cables international telephones television and the press and control of the airlines -- on 15 April 1961 for example commercial air traffic to Puerto Cabezas and all other air traffic except for Agency operated aircraft would be completely prohibited Somoza also was going to go so far as to make an announcement on 15 April that the activity which certainly would be known to be taking place at Puerto Cabezas was in response to the threat of possible incursions from Costa Rica and the need to have the Nicaraguan military forces in a state of readiness 63 At the same time that this cover story was being discussed with the representatives of the Nicaraguan Government General Somoza was visiting TIDE and spoke with Colonels Hawkins and Gaines who were in Puerto Cabezas to give the final briefings prior to the beginning of operations and Somoza raised the question of possible attacks by Castro's Air Force should any of his planes get off the ground The Agency's repre- sentatives regarded this as a legitimate concern and even though convinced that Castro's FAR Fuerza Aerea Revolucionario would be destroyed on the ground they asked Headquarters to approach the US Navy about establishing a radar picket operation off the Nicaraguan coast to relay warnings of incoming Castro aircraft The picket would not only assuage Somoza's fears but would be insurance against any unorthodox surprise attack on TIDE The emergency cable from TIDE to Headquarters recommended that the radar picket be established by 0800 local time 15 April 1961 or as soon as possible thereafter and it also suggested that instructions be provided for communications to link the Navy picket with both TIDE and Managua 64 One of the few points of contention between the Agency representatives and the highest officials of the Nicaraguan government occurred at the time that the operation was being mounted at Puerto Cabezas One of the Garcia Lines ships -- the Lake CharZes which was to be one of the backup ships of the invasion fleet -- arrived in Puerto Cabezas where 10 of her Cuban crew membe s were detained as potential prO- Castro security risks These crew members were re- moved from the Lake CharZes and turned over to Captain The idea suggested by General Somoza -- that bombs might be rolled out the doors of Cubana airlines C-47's or other transport aircraft -- undoubtedly struck a familiar note with the air ops people at TIDE After all they had tried to develop a make-shift napalm bomb to be rolled out -- or dropped out on a pallet -of a C-46 or C-54 See Volume I Air Operations TOP 'RET Quintana the commander of the Nicaraguan Gardia Nacional unit which was the security force for TIDE and then they were confined to SOIDe of the nearby military barracks 65 As early as January 1961 General Somoza had told Robertson that Nicaragua would provide detention facilities for any of the Cubans who proved to be reluctant warriors when it was time to embark for the invasion 65a This action however apparently did not fit the case or else it had not been cleared properly with General Somoza for a cable from TIDE to Headquarters reported that General Somoza had visited TIDE on 13 April and in strong terms ordered removal from JMTIDE immediately 14 detainees currently in custody Capt Quintana 66 The order for the immediate removal of the Cubans who were being held under guard of bhe Nicaraguan The only explanation for the discrepancy in the number of detainees is that there were additional Cubans who had been pulled out of the Brigade units when they were being embarked at Puerto Cabezas The figure of 10 from the Lake Charles comes from a Havana news release attributed to one of the detainees 66a As of 25 April 1961 the crewmen were still in custody and Headquarters instructed TIDE to release them ASAP to the Captain of either the Lake Charles or the Atlantica 66b - 141 7 TOP SrRET troops was apparently rescinded for on 22 April a cable from Managua to Washington indicated that President Somoza had approved delaying the removal of the Cubans until 24 April Somoza himself was characterized as continuing to be quite cooperative with the Agency representatives but fearful that with the reopening to commercial air traffic of Puerto Cabezas that the detainees in TIDE would be discovered and consequently his cover story for TIDE activities would be exposed In any event the Cubans who were being held prisoner were returned to the United States aboard the Atlantico which upon the collapse of the invasion had returned to Puerto Cabezas and thence to the US via Key West Norfolk and Baltimore From the last port the prisoners were then sent to Washington and from Washington on down to Miami and thence to Cuba 68 The Agency's relations with Nicaragua also became somewhat strained because Miro Cardona was never brought to Nicaragua to meet with President Somoza despite the fact that this had been requested by Somoza on several occasions Why Headquarters was so reluctant to approve such a meeting is in hindsight difficult to understand Just prior to moving the operation from Guatemala to Nicaragua Miro Cardona was completing a tour of the TRAV MADD installations Why he could not have been taken on to the JMTIDE area at that time is not made clear in either the cable traffic or other data that are available 69 -1 2L TOP1CRET As an appropriate final note to indicate the dominant role of the Agency in determining US foreign policy vis-a-vis Nicaragua a cable of 15 April 1961 from Managua to Headquarters reads oas follows Napoli requests know if Ambassador Brown who ETA Managua 16 April briefed on JMATE JMTIDE If not does Headquarters authorize briefing if Ambassador so requests 70 0 This was a strange question to have to be asked of Washington at this particular time Even stranger perhaps is the fact that the Department of State was scheduling a new Ambassador to arrive at the time that the planned attack on Cuba out of the country to which he was being assigned was about to kick off Whether this was an indication of relative indifference on the part of the Department or a sign of supreme confidence in the ability of its personnel to cope is left to the reader's jUdgment H Postscript on Nicaragua Two interesting postscripts to the story of the Agency's involvement in Nicaraguan foreign policy concern the period following the collapse of the invasion In May 1961 Lou Napoli was informed by former Ambassador - 143 - Whelan that Somoza through Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa expressed the opinion that Napoli had not kept him properly informed regarding the military activities at the time of the invasion In the memorandum of his conversation with Whelan Napoli pointed out that this undoubtedly was true because he himself had not been informed immediately of the developing military situation and in fact it was through Captain Quintana of the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional at TIDE that he first learned that the beach at Playa Giron was being abandoned Moreover Napoli pointed out that the Agency had violated its own commitment to Somoza that none of the Brigade wounded would be brought back into the TIDE area -- a commitment that Napoli had made to President Somoza after receiving prior Headquarters guidance Further the Agency failed to meet the date that it had agreed to for removing those wounded In addition some of the vessels returning to TIDE from Cuba had wounded aboard but through Napoli's efforts apparently they were not off-loaded Somoza apparently bore no ill will toward Napoli for upon the latter's departure the President told him that he looked forward to his return Napoli in the hope of maintaining the close and supportive relationship with the Nicaraguan Pres ident expressed the desire to be able -- in the future -- to pass on full and complete details of planned activities that might relate to Nicaragua 71 The other postscript concerns the apparent reluctance of newly appointed Ambassador Brown to step on the Agency's toes In June 1961 the Agency had ap- parently evolved a plan for using some of the Cuban pilots who had been trained during Project JMATE as instructors for the Nicaraguan Air Force Ambassador Brown in objecting to this requested that the following message be sent CIA Now that Cuban invasion is over and we are closing out the NIC operation it seems to me that we should not open up the possibility of raising future problems or bad local press by bringing back Cuban exiles as instructors It seems we could avoid all chance of adverse local reaction by the use of already existing mechanisms such as Col Hardee and his unit which capable of doing good job I would not like to hamper progress of negotiations but I would like to express the opinion based on my present knowledge of the situation that I would prefer no Cubans be used as instructors 72 - 145 - The rather cautious wording of the cable which the Ambassador asked to be sent to the Agency indicates that he apparently was aware that the Agency more than his own Department was conducting the close out of activities vis-a-vis the Nicaraguan government particularly the question of what materiel would be turned over to the Somozas - 146 - TOPS RET Part III Conclusions In the instances of both Guatemala and Nicaragua from the Spring of 1960 until the Spring of 1961 it has been shown that Agency personnel involved in Project JMATE were the principal figures in the on-going relations between those countries and the US Government In the instance of Guatemala the US Ambassador for all practical purposes became inoperative and in Nicaragua the opposite condition prevailed -- anything that the Agency suggested received ambassadorial blessing Neither extreme was desirable and in both instances what the Chief Executive of each country most wished to avoid -- that it become known that his country provide a base for the anti-Castro Cubans became unavoidable That the relationship between each nation and the US could be plausibly denied when the concept of the anti-Castro plan shifted from guerrilla type operations to invasion was a snare and delusion That the White House and the Department of State were prayerful that the USG would not be criticized by the UN or the GAS -14 TOPpCRET as a partner in crime was similarly wishful The one voice of reason in Washington was that of Thomas Mann Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and it was Mann who from the fall of 1960 until he was replaced in 1961 railed against the failure of the US to abandon plausible deniability and openly support an anti-Castro program with use of arms Mann won no converts Unfortunately In the end he too played the game The question that will always remain unanswered is whether the whole shooting match at the BOP might have been cancelled if the Department of State representatives in either Guatemala or Nicaragua had been better qualified and had been given better guidance from Washington about the fact that there could not be degrees of plausible deniability either the operation was deniable or it was not If it was not -- and it obviously was not -- an alert and forceful Ambassador might have precipitated a decision either to stand down the operation or to openly support the Brigade TOP CRET Source References Part I Guatemala 1 Cox Alfred T Paramilitary Ground Activities at the Staff Level 15 September 1955 - 31 December 1961 Mar 70 Vol I pp 81-85 I I 2 Memo for DCI from J C King 29 Feb 60 sub What We Are Doing in Cuba 3 Revision of General Covert Action Plan for Cuba by C Tracy Barnes 14 Mar 60 3a Schlesinger Arthur M Jr A Thousand Days Boston Houghton Mifflin 1965 p 228 U 4 Cable for Director from Guatemala 31 May 60 GUAT 811 IN 45788 Memo for Record from Jacob D Esterline 20 Jun 60 sub Negotiations with President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes re Use of Guatemalan Terrain for JMARC Operations 4a State Incoming Telegram to Sec State from Guatemala City 18 May 60 Control No 13560 5 MR from Jacob D Esterline 8 Jun 60 sub Meeting with Roberto Alejos Personal Representative of President Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala Unless otherwise specified all sources are classified SECRET A copy of or a note on each of the references cited herein is filed in' the CIA History Staff under HS HC 2632 Source References BOP History All subsequent references to commercial publications books magazines and newspapers are UNCLASSIFIED 6 Cable ETAT R rbo Alejos Embaguate Washington D C 526 RCI YW190 WN GU234 Guatemala via Tropical 54 GUATGOVT 7 60 1834 U 7 Cable for Director from MASH 15 Jun 60 MASH 0063 IN 11927 MR from Casimiro Barquin 22 Jun 60 sub Trip Report -- Miami to Guatemala City and Return 8 Same as Source 7 9 Same as Source 7 10 Cables to Director from Guatemala 6 Jul 60 GUAT 891 IN 20434 and 21 Jun 60 GUAT 855 IN 14802 11 Not used 12 Not used 13 Cables to Director from TRAV 12 Jul 60 TRAV 003 IN 23432 from Guatemala 23 Jul 60 GUAT 944 IN 28495 and 30 Jul 60 GUAT 965 IN 31262 14 Office of Logistics Engineering Staff RECD Agency Engineering Activity 194 -66 DDS HS OL-ll Vol I 63-67 Vol II 132-193 J Feb 72 15 Ibid Vol I pp 55 16 Cables To Guatemala from Director 5 Aug 60 DIR 44035 OUT 55613 to Director from JMTRAV 7 Aug 60 TRAV 009 IN 34609 to Director from Guatemala 27 Aug 60 GUAT 124 IN 44288 17 Daily Progress Reports -- Support 5 Aug 60 Job 63-42 Folder 7 18 Cable to Director from Guatemala 8 Sep 60 GUAT 192 IN 49342 18a Daily Log --PM Section 8 Dec 60 Daily Progress Reports -- PM Jun 60 - Mar 61 19 Cables To Director from TRAV 5 Dec 60 TRAV 0171 IN 12064 i to JMTRAV from Director 8 Dec 60 DIR 15481 OUT 50885 i to Bell from Guatemala 7 Jan 61 GUAT 789 IN 1124 20 Cable to Director from Guatemala 6 Oct 60 GUAT 362 IN 23228 21 Cables To Director from Guatemala 7 Sep 60 GUAT 190 IN 49039 to Guatemala from Directo 9 Sep 60 DIR 49902 OUT 68098 i to Guatemala from Director 16 Sep 60 DIR 00989 OUT 70502 22 Cables To Director from Guatemala 13 Sep 60 GUAT 232 IN 11587 i to Director from CINCLANFLT 20 Sep 60 CITE 038 IN 15111 to Director from Guatemala 20 Oct 60 GUAT 414 IN 30311 23 Cables To Director from Guatemala 8 Sep 60 GUAT 192 IN 49342 i to Guatemala from Director 9 Sep 60 DIR 49839 OUT 68022 Daily Progress Reports -- Support 19 Sep 60 Job 63-42 Folder 7 24 Cable to Director from Guatemala 11 Sep 60 GUAT 231 IN 11074 25 Ibid 6 Oct 60 GUAT 360 IN 23292 25a Russo 26 MR from Joseph F Langan 23 Sep 60 sub Security Incident Andrew J Air Support of Cuban Operations 1960-62 pp 58-62 Draft MSS HS CSG 2627 26a Job 64-739 Box 1 27 File JMADD i- PM Cable to Director from JMADD 10 Sep 60 MADD0026 IN 10581 - 151 - TOP ET 28 Cables to Director from MADD 8 Oct 60 MADD 0205 IN 24370 9 Oct 60 MADD 0212 IN 24738 11 Oct 60 MADD 0214 IN 25364 13 Oct 60 MADD 0237 IN 26794 29 Memo for Chief WH Division from J D Esterline 21 Oct 60 sub Authority to Obligate $150 000 for JMARC PM Activities -- JMAOO Land Compensation 30 Cable to Director from Guatemala 4 Nov 60 GUAT 463 IN 37955 31 Ibid 25 Nov 60 GUAT 599 IN 47673 Cable to Guatemala from Director 26 Nov 60 DIR 13543 OUT 96600 32 Cables to Bell from Guatemala 13 Apr 61 GUAT 1254 IN 3135 31 Apr 61 GUAT 1255 IN 3137 Cable to Guatemala from Bell 17 Apr 61 BELL 4642 OUT 6803 33 Dispatches to Chief WHO from Guatemala City 9 Aug 60 sub JMARC Use o as by Guatemalan Contacti 3 Feb 61 sub Engagement of as Independent Contractor 34 Dispatch to Chief WHO fromDGuatemala 9 Aug 60 sub Justification for Use of Guatemalan Engineer at JMTRAV Cables To Guatemala from Bell 14 Jan 61 BELL 0530 OUT 6579 i to Bell from Guatemala 7 Apr 61 GUAT 1226 IN 2140 i to Bell from Guatemala 12 Apr 61 GUAT 1243 IN 2922 35 Memo for DCI from J C King 21 Oct 60 sub Observations on Briefing of Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann re JMARC Guatemala Operations on 20 Oct 60 36 Oral History Interview Jacob O Esterline by Jack B Pfeiffer 10-11 Nov 75 Tape 4 p 51 r U This and all other Oral History Interviews all C0nversations and all correspondence conducted by Jack B Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFIEO - 152 TOP S CRET 37 Cables to Director from Guatemala 22 Jul 60 GUAT 938 IN 28195 and 24 Jul 60 GUAT 943 IN 28530 State Incoming Telegrams to Sec State from Guatemala City 19 Jul 60 Control No 13308 20 Jun 60 No 37 C 37a Dispatch from Chief WHD 3 Oct 60 sub Jr1ARC Administrative Instructions for Bernard M Parks -301 I 38 Cables To Guatemala from Director 8 Nov 60 DIR 10654 OUT 90384 to Director from Guatemala 12 Oct 60 GUAT 389 IN 25980 to Director from MADD 31 Oct 60 MADD 0434 IN 35850 to Director from MADD 1 Nov 60 MADD 0444 IN 35917 to Director from Guatemala 1 Nov 60 UAT 445 IN 35899 to JMADD JMTRAV from Director 15 Oct 60 DIR 06269 OUT 81460 39 Cable to Director from MADD 13 Nov 60 MADD 0539 IN 41791 39a State Incoming Telegram to Sec State from G temala City 13 Nov 60 No 222 U 39b Memo for Chief WH from Richard Helms 18 Nov 60 sub US Naval Patrol in the Caribbean 39c Oral History Interview Billy B Campbell by Jack B Pfeiffer 15 Jun 76 Tape lA p 10 39d Discussion between Sidney Stembridge and Jack B Pfeiffer 12 May 76 and telecon 17 May 76 sub Alejos Violation of Commo Area JMADD 13 Nov 60 40 Cable to Director from Guatemala 14 Nov 60 GUAT 522 IN 41922 41 Oral History Interview Richard M Bissell by Jack B Pfeiffer 17 Oct 75 Tape 2 p 25 42 Cable to Director from Guatemala 14 Nov 60 GUAT 526 IN 42903 43 Cable to Director from Guatemala 17 Nov 60 GUAT 567 IN 44141 44 Letter from C 20 May 76 U 45 Cable to Director from Guatemala 14 Nov 60 GUAT 526 IN 4 290 3 w Seigrist to Jack B Pfeiffer State Incoming Telegram to Sec State from Guatemala City 14 Nov 60 No 226 U T A Parrott Special Group Meetings - Cuba 16 Nov 60 45a Taylor Committee Report MR's of PM Study Group Meetings 7th Mtg 1 May 61 p 3 MR from Casimiro Barquin 14 Nov 60 sub Support of JMADD JMTRAV and Other Elements in Guatemala JMC-0131 46 Letter from Seigrist to Pfeiffer op 47 Esterline-Pfeiffer OR Int op cit Tape 1 p 20 48 Ibid p 18 49 Cables to Guatemala from Director 14 Nov 60 DIR 11290 OUT 91822 and 14 Nov 60 DIR 11299 OUT 91846 50 Cable to Guatemala from Director 14 Nov 60 DIR 11299 OUT 91846 50a MR from Casimiro Barquin 14 Nov 60 Ope cit 'J C 1- v o JMC-0131 SOb MR from John F Mallard 14 Nov 60 sub Conference with Department of Defense Representatives - 154 - TOP ET SOc Memo for Asst to the Sec Def OSO from Jacob D Esterline 16 Nov 60 sub Emergency Evacua tion Assistance MR from Richard D Drain 21 Nov 60 sub Meeting with DDP JMARC 51 Ibid DIR 11304 OUT 91871 52 Cables To Director from Guatemala 14 Nov 60 GUAT 526 IN 42093 i to Guatemala-JMTRAV-JMADD from Director 14 Nov 60 DIR 11319 OUT 91906 State Incoming Telegram to Sec State from Guatemama City 25 Nov 60 No 262 TS 53 Cable to Guatemala from Director 14 Nov 60 DIR 11343 OUT 91978 TS 53a Ibid 54 Cable to LA Stations from Director 14 Nov 60 DIR 11416 OUT 92077 55 Cables to Director from Guatemala 25 Nov 60 GUAT 602 IN 47786 29 Nov 60 GUAT 611 IN 48900 i 15 Dec 60 GUAT 709 IN 17807 56 State Incoming Telegrams to Sec State from Guatemala City 31 May 60 Control No 22443 OUO 14 Oct 60 No 174 Ci 17 Nov 60 No '240 C MR from John F Mallard 21 Nov 60 sub of SWGC Job 63-42 Folder 1 Meeting 57 Cable to Guatemala from Director 21 Nov 60 DIR 12667 OUT 94811 58 Cable to Director from Guatemala 22 Nov 60 GUAT 583 IN 46366 59 Cable to Guatemala JMASH Havana et aI from Director 30 Nov 60 DIR 14227 OUT 98163 -w 60 Cable to Director from JMTRAV 9 Dec 60 TRAV 0182 IN 14725 61 Cable to Director from Guatemala 10 Dec 60 GUAT 678 IN 15261 6la Campbell-Pfeiffer OH Int op cit Tape lA pp 7-8 Activities 62 Cox Paramilitary Ground Vol II pp 388-391 63 I-------H --n---rFeb op cit 69 pp 29-31 64 Memo for Chief WH 4 from Col J Hawkins 19 Oct 60 sub Employment of Army Special Forces Training Cadres at TRAV Memo for DDP from J C King 28 Oct 60 sub Employment of U S Army Special Forces for Training PM Cadres DD P 0-5722 Memo for Chief WH 4 from Richard M Bissell Jr 7 Nov 60 sub Employment of US Army Special Forces for Training PM Cadres DD P 0-5861 Memo for MMPD from J C King 16 Nov 60 sub Requirement for US Army Special Forces Personnel MR from John F Mallard 30 Nov 60 sub with Captain Burns W Spore 65 Informal transmittal to Ed Brig Gen Edward B Lansdale Dep Asst to Sec Def OSO from C Tracy Barnes S Dec 60 MR from Thomas A Parrott 8 Dec 60 sub of Spl Group Meeting 8 Dec 60 66 Conference Minutes Cables to Guatemala from Director 9 Dec 60 DIR 15777 OUT 51475 and 14 Dec 60 DIR 16285 OUT 52820 to Director from Guatemala 11 Dec 60 GUAT 680 IN 15363 and 14 Dec 60 GUAT 691 IN 16784 67 Cable to Director from Guatemala 15 Dec 60 GUAT 702 IN 17704 68 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit Tape 1 pp 10-12 69 Oral History Interview Richard D Drain by Jack B Pfeiffer 8 Jan 76 Tape 2B pp 50-52 Richard D Drain Personal Notes 9 Dec 60 70 Drain-Pfeiffer OH Int Ope cit 70a Drain Personal Notes 15 Dec 60 71 Memo for DCI from C Tracy Barnes 21 Dec 60 sub Cable GUAT 702 IN 17704 dated 15 Dec 60 72 MR from John F Mallard 22 Dec 60 sub Meeting with DOD Regarding Personnel Support for JMATE ' DO P 0-6704 73 Memo for Deputy Asst to Sec Def for Spl Ops from C Tracy Barnes 27 Dec 60 sub Special Force Trainers 73a Memo for OOP CIA from Graves B Erskine 3 Jan 61 sub US Military Personnel Support of Project CROSSPATCH TS 74 Memo for Asst Sec Def OSO from Jacob D Esterline 5 Jan 61 sub Requirement for US Army Spl Forces to Support Project CROSSPATCH 74a Memo for the President from Christian A Herter 25 Nov 60 sub Message of November 19 1960 from the President of Guatemala U 74b Memo for the President from Christian A Herter 12 Jan 61 sub Telegram from Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes U 74c Telegram for Amembassy Guatemala from Secretary 13 Jan 61 Amembassy Guatemala 464 C 75 Cables to Bell from Guatemala 1 Jan 61 GUAT 805 IN 1489 13 Jan 61 GUAT 822 IN 1699 14 Jan 61 GUAT 829 IN 1808 15 Jan 61 GUAT 831 IN 1883 and to Director 12 Jan 61 GUAT 816 IN 30054 75a Office Memo to Chief WHD from C WH 4 11 Jan 61 sub Press Release by Guatemalan Ambassador to US 75b Official Routing Slip to Chief WHD from Walter Elder 9 Jan 61 sub Article from The Nation New York Times U 10 Jan 61 MR from J C King 11 Jan 61 sub Meeting to Discuss Proposed Release to the Press re NYT Story etc Extract from The Nation 19 Nov 60 Memo for the DCI from Stanley J Grogan 9 Dec 60 sub Transmittal of magazine article for Victor Tasky U The Nation 7 Jan 61 pp 7-9 Memo for the DCI from John S Warner 10 Jan 61 sub Request of Representative Frank Kowalski D Conn ER 61- 374 75c MR from J C King 11 Jan 61 sub Meeting to Discuss Proposed Release to the Press re NYT Story etc 75d Memo for Chief WHD from J D Esterline 11 Jan 61 sub FRD Fronting for Paramilitary Activities in Guatemala 75e Ibid 76 Washington Post 24 Mar 61 -l t TOPi CRET TOP rCRET 77 E Howard Hunt Give Us This Day N Y 1973 pp 113 -13 7 New Rochelle Cables To Bell from MADD 13 Feb 61 MADD 1498 In 4765 i' to Bell from Guatemala 15 Feb 61 GUAT 974 IN 4943 R D Drain Personal Notes 20 Feb 61 78 MR from Jacob D Esterline 5 Apr 61 sub ing with Adolph sic A Berle Meet- Cable to Bell from Guatemala 31 Mar 61 GUAT 1200 IN 0949 78a Cable to Director from Guatemala 10 Jul 60 GUAT 903 IN 22607 79 MR from Jacob D Esterline 24 Feb 61 sub Meeting with President MiguelYdigoras Fuentes et aZ Cable to Bell from Guatemala 15 Feb 61 GUAT 974 IN 4943 80 Cables To Bell from Guatemala 21 Mar 61 GUAT 1160 IN 4224 i to GUAT from Bell 21 Mar 61 BELL 3003 OUT 7693 80a New York Times 2 Jan 62 Cuba Ediciones Venceremos - History of an Aggression Havana 1964 pp 190 192 253 81 Memo for Mr Ralph A Dungan from L D Battle 16 Mar 61 sub Letter from President Ydigoras of Guatemala TS Cables to Bell from Guatemala 25 Feb 61 GUAT 1048 IN 1014 27 Feb 61 GUAT 1052 IN l230 i 4 Mar 61 GUAT 1094 IN 2129 Cable to Guatemala from Bell 25 Feb 61 BELL 1993 OUT 5131 82 MR from Thomas A Parrott Minutes of Spl Group Mtg 2 Mar 61 83 NBC White Paper Cuba Bay of Pigs 1964 CIA Film No T6134 84 Memo of Conversation from R A Godfrey 22 Mar 61 sub Guatemalan Foreign Minister's CalIon the Secretary C 85 MR from Jacob D Esterline S Apr 61 sub with Adolph sic A Berle 86 Cables to Bell from Guatemala 14 Apr 61 GUAT 1267 IN 3419 17 Apr 61 GUAT 1279 IN 3982 18 Apr 61 GUAT 1292 IN 4340 19 Apr 61 GUAT 129 8 IN 4491 87 Ibid 19 Apr 61 GUAT 1299 IN 4492 88 Ibid 17 Mar 61 GUAT 1134 iN 3765 89 Ibid 2 May 61 GUAT 1393 IN 1113 90 Ibid 18 May 61 GUAT 1449 IN 2094 from Bell to Guatemala 14 May 61 BELL 0550 OUT 9176 19 May 61 BELL 0656 OUT 9370 91 Memo for Chief WHD from Jacob D Esterline 29 Apr 61 sub Meeting with Carlos Alejos Arzu etc 92 93 Meeting I Ibid p 1 Foreign Service U List January 1962 U Source References Part II Nicaragua 1 Cable from Managua to Director 14 Jun 60 3226 IN 11800 2 Dispatch from c JJManaguato Chief WHO 23 Sep 60 sub JMNET IMR concerning his TOY Managua 2357 r I 3 Ibid 4 Ibid 5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Ibid 9 MR from L P Napoli 11 Oct 60 sub Nicaragua MANA Trip to Memo for Chief WH 4 from J Hawkins 30 Sep 60 sub Survey of Nic Air Maritime Support and Op Sites Results of 10 MR from L P Napoli 15 Oct 60 sub Nicaraguan Trip 11 MR from N Imler R W Brown and I I 25 Oct 60 sub Nicaragua Survey T r-1 -p---I 3 to 20 Oct 60 12 Letter from Wm Rip Robertson to General C P Cabell 26 Aug 60 and subsequent notes memos etc pertaining to letter dated 25 Aug 60 - 16y- TOprCRET TOP sJRET Memo for Irving G CADICK P from J C King 2 Dec 60 sub Letter of Instruction Ibid Ibid Memorandum for Chief WH 4 from Asst Ch DPD 30 Nov 60 sub Status of JMTIDE JMC-02l1 Memo for Record from L P Napoli 28 Sep 60 sub Telephone call to Ambassador Thomas B Whelan Memo for Record from Jacob D Esterline 24 Oct 60 sub Meeting withDCI and Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Thomas Mann on Cuba Memo for A DDP A from Jacob D Esterline 28 Dec 60 sub JMTIDE 19 Memo for DDP from C Tracy Barnes 18 Nov 60 sub Points re Cuba for Discussion at Special Group Meeting Saturday 19 Nov 60 20 Memo for DDP from J C King 18 Nov 60 sub ' CONUS Military Installations for JMARC Training Sites MR from Richard D Drain 21 Nov 60 sub Meeting with DDP JMARC MR from Richard D Drain 22 Nov 60 sub Meeting with DDP JMARC 21 Memo To Whom it May Concern from William Robertson 30 Nov 60 sub Questions Robertson Feels Should Be Answered or Discussed Prior to His Departure 22 Blind Memo as Revised by C WH anp Delivered by Col J F Mallard to Frank Devine for Thomas Mann Evening of 1 Dec 60 Includes handwritten note 2 Dec 60 from R ichard D D rain Ch WH 4 P P 23 Ibid 24 Memo for the Special Group from WH 4 3 Dec 60 sub Nicaraguan Aspects of Cuban Operation Memo for DDP EMB from Jacob D Esterline 6 Dec 60 sub Four JMARC Problems for 8 December Meeting of Special Group 25 Cable from Director to Managua S Dec 60 DrR 14854 OUT 99557 26 Dispatch fro r 'lManagua to ChiefjWH 9 Dec 60 sub JMNET JMA ransmittalof Reports by Irving G CADICK Regarding JMARC Activities I r2410 27 Ibid 28 Ibid 29 Ibid 30 MR from David R McLean 9 Aug 72 sub tion with Louis P Napoli 31 Ibid 32 Cables From Director to Managua 10 Dec 60 DIR 16028 OUT 51871 from Managua to Director 19 Dec 60 MANA 3358 IN 19 07 i from Managua to Director 19 Dec 60 MANA 3359 IN 19238 33 Memo from Jacob D Esterline to A DDP A 28 Dec 60 sub JMTIDE 34 Cable from Managua to Director 19 Dec 60 MANA 3358 IN 19007 35 Memo from C Tracy Barnes for DCI 2 Jan 61 sub Material for Policy Meeting on Cuba 3 Jan 61 36 Ibid - 163 TOP CRET Conversa- 37 MR from Richard D Drain 4 Jan 61 sub with A DDP A Meeting 38 Memo from C Tracy Barnes for DCI 5 Jan 61 Material for the 5 January Special Group Meeting 39 James Burwell Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba March 1960 - October 1961 DDS Historical Series OL-7 April 1971 p 3g Cable from Director to Managua 21 Dec 60 DIR 17569 OUT 55338 40 Memo from J Hawkins for Chief WH 4 4 Jan 61 sub Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba 41 Cable from Managua to Bell 14 Jan 61 MANA 3391 IN 1797 42 Memo from J C King for DCI 19 Jan 61 sub Visit of General Anastasio Somoza de Bella sic Director-General of the Nicaraguan Army MR from L P Napoli 23 Jan 61 sub Visit of General Somoza with the Director on 21 Jan 61 43 Memo from Chief WH 4 for Chief WHD 9 Feb 61 sub DLF $2 000 000 Emergency Loan for Nicaragua Memo from Radford W Herbert for Chief WH 4 10 Feb 61 sub DLF $2 Million Emergency Loan for Nicaragua 44 Memo from J C King for DCI 28 Feb 61 sub Nicaraguan Aspects of Project JMATE ER 61-1687 with Transmittal Slip from I I 11 May 61 and Official Routing Slip from WH Q P P 12 Jun 61 45 Ibid 46 Situation Report JMTIDE from Irving G CADICK 17 Jun 61 Contact Report Three Meetings CAD ICK since 3 Jan 61 17 Jan 61 u -- 164 - TOPfRET' 47 Situation Report JMTIDE from Irving G CADICK 17 Jan 61 U Contact Report Three Meetings CADICK since 3 Jan 61 17 Jan 61 U ---------- 48 Cable from Managua to Bell 1 Feb 61 MANA 3428 IN 3433 Cable from Bell to Managua 1 Feb 61 BELL 1071 OUT 7894 49 Cable from Bell to Managua 9 Feb 61 BELL 1370 OUT 8693 49a Memo for Special Plans and Operations Branch J-5 Division JCS DOD from R K Davis 12 Jun 61 sub Restrictions on Travel of Military Personnel in Nicaragua DPD 3695-61 50 Contact Report from William Robertson 15 Feb 61 sub 14 February Meeting between President Somoza and William Robertson 51 Ibid 52 Cable from Managua to Bell 15 Feb 61 MANA 3445 IN 4961 53 Cables from Managua to Bell 5 Feb 61 MANA 3443 IN 3901 14 Feb 61 MANA 3453 IN 4874 28 Feb 61 MANA 3479 IN 1454 Cable from IN 1029 J WAVE to Bell 25 Feb 61 WAVE 3964 Letter from R ichard D D rain to Jack B Pfeiffer 24 Jan 76 U 54 Cables from Managua to Bell 17 Feb 61 MANA 3462 IN 0290 19 Feb 61 MANA 3465 IN 0494 Cables from Director to Managua 24 Feb 61 DIR 26695 OUT 76761 24 Feb 61 DIR 26738 OUT 76962 24 Mar 61 DIR 31559 OUT 87849 Memo for Record from L P Napoli 15 Mar 61 $ub Conversation between Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa and Napoli - 16 f TOP SiRET 55 Cables from Director to Managua 24 Feb 61 DIR 26695 OUT 76761 24 Feb 61 DIR 26738 OUT 76962 56 Cable from Managua to Bell 19 Feb 61 MANA 3465 IN 0494 57 Memo for Record from L P Napoli 15 Mar 61 sub Conversation between Ambassador SevillaSacasa and Napoli 58 Memo from L P Napoli for Gerard Droller 27 Mar 61 sub Principal Officer -- JMATE Activities in Nicaragua 59 Ibid 60 Taylor Committee MR's of PM Study Group Meetings Conversation with Colonel Hawkins n d presumed subsequent to 30 May 61 pp 5-6 61 Memo from Capt B W Spore for DDP 7 Mar 61 sub Utilization of Us Military Personnel by Project CROSSPATCH 62 Cable from Managua to Bell 11 Apr 61 MANA 3561 IN 2888 63 Ibid 13 April MANA 3568 IN 3164 64 Cable from TIDE to Bell 13 Apr 61 TIDE 527 IN 3230 TS 65 Dispatch from COB JMWAVE to Chief WHD 31 61 sub Operational JMATE Mario Guyon Diaz 1666 - 65a Cable from Managua to Bell 24 Jan 61 MANA 3415 IN 2569 66 Cable from TIDE to Bell 15 Apr 61 TIDE 569 IN 3486 66a Dispatch from COB JMWAVE to Chief WHD 31 Mar 61 Ope cit - 166 - RET 66b Cable to TIDE from Director 25 Apr 61 number OUT 7991 No TIDE 67 Cable from Managua to Bell 22 Apr 61 MANA 3615 IN 4968 68 Dispatch 0 1 6 6 6 31 May 61 op cit 69 Cable from Managua to Bell 15 Apr 61 MANA 3582 IN 3518 70 Cable from Managua to Bell 15 Apr 61 MANA 3583 IN 3517 71 Memo for Record from L P Napoli 4 May 61 sub Conversation between Ambassadors Whelan and Sevilla-Sacasa 72 Cable from Managua to Director 22 Jun 61 MANA 3680 IN 29002 TOP SE ET Access Controlled by CIA History Staff TOP