MORl DoclD 369610 9P SEfIU JC J o l p 98ly 1teea Q nfs Rul CIA History Staff TS'795052 Copy 1 of 2 CIA HISTORICAL REVIE AJ PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED -' GBP 99 Q 7 J - _ ' fl 'r - tt i 1 l ooo j ' o n OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION III OF CIA's VOLUME EVOLUTION ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES 1959-JANUARY 1961 pages 1-203 lap SEGRfJ TSf7950S2 DCI-8 Deceinber '1979 Copy 1 of 2 PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY I TOP Sl CR-I T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEHCY OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATIon DCI-8 Volume III EVOLUTION OF CIA'S ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES 1959-JANUARY 1961 Decemiber 1979 Jack B Pfeiffer r 0_ _ _ l'III $a -- HlP SECRE'f Foreword This is the third volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the problems of establishing a policy for the United States Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts came to power in Cuba The policy decided on by the US Government in March 1960 called for the displacement of Fidel Castro and it was by no means a unilateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency -- althou h it is demonstrable that the Agency was far more perceptive than the policy making bodies in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere posed by Castro's communist affiliation Because the policy makers feared censure by the United Nations and or the Organization of American States the myth of pla usible deniability was the caveat that determined the CIA would be the principal implementing arm for the anti-Castro effort From inception to termination The preceding volumes were I - Air Operations II Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy - iii - deniabi1ity would be the albatross around the necks of Agency planners and from D-Day minus 2 i 15 April 1961 i t became the strangling cord insuring the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs This volume describes the Agency's organization designed to accomplish the assigned task and it records the interaction between the Agency and other government components State and the military in 'particular between the Agency and the White House and among various CIA components as the program evolved o oII II II II II II o The relationships we e sometimes less than harmonious Particular attention is focused on the roles played both President Eisenhower who author ized the anti-eastro program and Vice President Nixon who has been charged time and again -- unjustifiably as the reccrd reveals -- with being the mastermind behind the operation Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change in the concept of the operation between the spring and fall ott 1960 From April's plans for the infil- tration infuo Cuba of small teams of Agency trained specialists in communications sabotage and paramilitary operations to provide training and guidance - iv p SEERET --rep S CIt r to anti-Castro dissidents November's plans called for an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a provisional government k-t J J approved ands eR30red by CIA could issue its clarion calls for US UN or OAS intervention Encompassed in this volume are the records of the policy level meetings which considered such items as funding the operation possible use of US personnel in combat roles the use of US bases for training or for operations types of dirept action programs e g propaganda drops vs sabotage and the host of other problems related to Castro's overthrow It also makes clear that various US corporate interests played an active sometimes overactive role in support of the anti-Castro efforts of the Government 1his volume also examines official records in light of the allegati ns of the Senate Select Committee's investigations that the assassination plans being oo o o o developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the official US Government program to overthrow Fidel Castro There is no basis in fact for this - v - OR SECB E F- Q9 ' rop SECRET Finally the reader of this volume should gain some insights to the character of various of the principal actors -- Agency and non-Agency who were involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro policy during the period from its inception through the close of the Eisenhower administration Not all of these impressions are flattering but the author who was in no way associated with the operation or the Directorate of Plans now Operations hopes that the presentation of the evidence has been as free from bias as pos ible Again the author wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions of the other two members of the CIA History Staff Mrs Eulalie Hammond and Mrs Sharon Bond to the completion of this volume Without their unfailing willingness to perform either the 'substantive l esearch or the grimly mechanical tasks required in preparing a volume such as this the task could have been interminable For any errors of fact or questionable interpretations the author alone is responsible - vi - rep SECItE i Volume III Contents Foreword Part I Background A B Part II 1 17 32 Organizing for Covert Action 32 Forging the Tool o o o o o 80 Cooperation and Challenge o o o 104 Personnel and Training o o o 126 Changing Concepts Part IV Presidential Resurgence Part V Direct Action 1 Part III A Watching from the Sidelines Castro Takes Over Castro I-lust Go A B C D o iii o 143 Progr s Propaganda Sabotage and o 165 204 204 the 'Ex r i e 233 Part VI Mr Nixon's Role Part VII The Question of Assassinations Part VIII Conclusions 241 277 290 Appendixes A Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from J C King 11 Dec S9 - vii - 296 Page B C A Program of covert Action Against the Castro Regime 16 Mar 60 300 CNO Correspondence with Department of State and NSC 1 Letter for Allen Dulles from Arleigh Burke 17 Mar 60 TS DDjP 0-1436 o 2 Letter for Gordon Gray from Arleigh Burke 16 Mar 60 o o 3 Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Haydn Williams 16 Mar 60 sub US Policy toward Cuba 313 318 D Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director Plans - Action from J D Esterline 2 May 60 sub Liaison with US Agencies on JMARC Activities o o o o o o o 332 E Attack on Petroleum Refinery at Santiago de Cuba 13-14 March i96l o o 335 Richard M Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro 19 April 1959 o o o 337 F G 311 Memorandum for DCI for Briefing Vice President Nixon 29 Feb 60 sub tihat We Are Doing in Cuba o o 344 Source References Go Part I Background Part II Castro Must Part I I I Changing Concepts Part IV Presidential Resurgence - viii - 347 352 366 369 Tep SECRET' Page Part V Part VI Part VII Part VIII Mr Nixon's Role Assassination Conclusions -Direct Action Programs - ix -- - ' n GBP0 _ 374 382 386 388 TOP SECRR THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION Volume III Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro policies 1950 - January 1961 Part I Background A watching from the Sidelines Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the earliest reports in Agency files as one of the young 'student leaders' in Cuba who manages to get himself involved in many things that do not concern him 1 Beginning in 1948 the activities of Fidel Castro came to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the United States Government USG By early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action program designed to remove the Castro government from control of the island of Cuba The policy of the USG was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de Cochinos from 17-19 April 1961 Beginning in 19'8 and continuing even after the United States had formulated its official policy of - 1 TOP 3ECRET removing Castro from the leadership of the Cuban Government the principal questions faced by CIAts Western Hemisphere Division by the Department of State and by other concerned principals in the United States were What is Fidel Castro controlled What does he represent not a Communist By whom is he Is he or is he The nature of the Agency's interest in answers to these questions is reflected in various of the records for the period beginning in the mid1950's when it appeared that the Agency depended in considerable part on the reporting from the American Embassy offices in Havana Commenting on a report entitled Antidemocratic Antecedents and Activities of Fidel Castro prepared by President Batista's Military Intelligence Service SIM -- apparently in response to a request from the Bur6 de Represi6n a las Activadades Communistas BRAC to the Counselor of the American Embassy Amembassy in Havana Lincoln Vinton Chapin told the CIA representative among other things that Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities - 2 - yap SECRET The SIM report is nothing more than a summary of allegatio s and accusations made against Fidel Castro during the period 1948-1950 This summary has apparently been slanted in an effort to make Castro a Rojo but the result is a rather poor one 2 The Department of State reporter refuted on a paragraph by paragraph basis all of the allegations which indicated that Castro had been tied in with Communists or Communist sympathizers ever since his university days and in forwarding the report to - Chief Western Hemisphere Division the COS Havana indicated that he w s furnishing the information be- cause of renewed interest by the State Department in Fidel Castro 3 The tenor of State reporting continued in a similar vein well into 1957 Charges that Cas ro was a Communist could not be substantiated but State did note that in his student days he'was in gangster-type activities 4 invo ved Havana Embassy reporting also reflected another of the problems of continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista and were is basic feelings toward the US friendly - 3-- In the mid-1950's Havana Station ian seven approved FI projects most of which were aimed at the Cuban Communist Party the PSP Partido Socialista Popular Agency funds also were used to support the efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged principally in propaganda activities 6 LYman Kirkpatrick CIA's Inspector General apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and his party to a meeting with President Fulgencio Batista in the summer of 1956 a meeting which prompted the'Cuban President to write to the DCI Allen Dulles in praise of the meeting 7 In fact Agency support for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a democratically elected successor and amnesty for Castro and his followers as well as other anti-Batista dis- sidents was proposed in a memorandum from the Inspector General in November 1957 8 David R McLean a former member of the IG's Inspection Staff attached a cryptic note to the copy of Dulles' letter of response to Batista which he McLean included in the file of miscellaneous documents on the Bay of Pigs which were inherited by the present author McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick helped organize BRAC but the present author has not confirmed this story - 4 - TOP 3r CR ET In view of subsequent developments one interesting suggestion made by the Inspector General in November 1957 was the following On the island of Cuba probably only a us citizen in some way known to be connected with the US Government and assumed to be backed by Washington would have the ability to act as intermediary between the various opposition groups in the Batista Government and work out a possible cease fire This would have to be done covertly and any results achieved either not ever publicly announced or certainly not advertised until after the election Any public attempt to bring peace would be foredoomed to failure by each side probably indicating exorbitant demands and then being unable to withdraw from its announced position 9 Although it may have had no relation to the Kirkpatrick memorandum on 25 November 1957 less than a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum William Wieland of the Department of State notified Adolf erle one of the country's leading experts on Latin American Affairs and a former member of the It is interesting to speculate whether at this time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D Pawley former US Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an American businessman who operated significant enterprises in Cuba to negotiate with Batista Within year's time Pawley who also stood high in the ranks of the Republic Party contributors was designated to undertake such a mission to Cuba - 5 - yep SECRET' State Department that he was enroute to Cuba according to Berle to see whether anything can be done to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of an orderly conclusion I' 10 Berle with remarkable prescience noted It is rough going anti-intervention is all right up to a point But we are responsible for keeping order in the hemisphere quite aside from the proprieties and a rather bolder policy in that regard seems indicated 11 By early 1958 the Agency had become sufficiently concerned about the pro-Communist orientation of Castro's government and particularly the pro-Castro proclivities of his two principal deputies Ernesto Che Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz Fidel's brother that penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a priority concern of the field t least two agents were successfully placed in PSP ranks and in March 1958 one Agency officer managed to join the Castro forces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and to observe their tactics in combat In June 1958 Robert D Wiecha COB Santiago de Cuba got himself captured by Raul Castro's forces in order to be able to assist 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US - 6 - businessmen who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro In both instances the Agency representatives returned unharmed and both reported on the radical and antiAmerican nature of the Castro movement According to one source Wiecha found Ifdefinite communist overtones If among the Raul Castro forces 12 Additional documentation of the pro-communist nature of the Castro organization was reported with great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province Whether Castro's contingent was communist oriented or not others such as Adolf Berle and his friends State Department both in and out of continued to reflect their concern about the possible ways to combat the growing strength of the Castro movement in Cuba 13 Berle was most hopeful that the Castro situation could be remedied by cooperation among Latin American liberals working in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans who had broken with Castro for example Felipe Pazos and Pepin Bosch with additional support from the OAS The historian for WH Division provided the figures us captives shown here but Hugh Tho as indicates 19 us businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured - 7 - and only minor participation from the US Department of State 14 At a time when the Agency's fears about the Castro movement were increasing a rather different proposal was put forward by the Chief of the Paramilitary Division Political and Psychological Staff of the Clandestine Service Rather than trying to whip Castro Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the wisest move for the Agency would be to join Castro It was apparent according to Cox that since Batista wason the way out we should now try to remedy Castro's hostile attitude toward the United States because of our efforts to prop up Batista To accomplish this Cox suggested that A practical way to protect United States interests in this m tter would be to make secret contact with Castro assure him of the United States sympathy with some of his objectives and to offer him support The individual chosen to make the contact should be of such background that'it is clear that he speaks with the authority of the United States Government Obviously the support must be given covertly so as not to endanger United States relations with Batista The most effective means of help to Castro would be arms and ammunition Air dropping of - 8 - I UP SECRE I this equipment might be dangerous from the security aspect Allowing a shipload of equipment manned by a Cuban crew to evade our Coast Guard would probably be a better method The most secure means of help would be giving the money to Castro who could then purchase his own arms A combination of arms and money would probably be best 15 By late fall of 1958 when it became apparent that the Batista regime in Cuba was about to go under the Agency in conjunction with the Department of State supported a plan to have Batista bow out more or less gracefully and to have the government of the country taken over not by the Presidential candidate who had been elected in the rigged election but by a junta pending subsequent free democratic elections When Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban rea was biasedagainst Castro One report in the fall of 1958 'indicated that Castro definitely was not a Communist citing as a reasQn for this Ninety-five percent of his fo lowers are good Catholics Three Catholic priests have joined Fidel Castro and his forces in the Sierra Maestra and one has joined Raul C stro and his troops in the Sierra Cristal The rebel forces under the Castros therefore have four chaplains while the entire Cuban Army does not have a single chaplain Source comment The United States should not be taken in by President Fulgencio Batista's attempt to label the revolutionary movement as Communist in spired dominated or influenced 16 The source for this evaluation of Castro was one might surmise a Catholic priest - 9 - s TOPOECRET traveling to Miami with William Snow an Assistant Secretary of State and Henry Holland formerly a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Col J C King Chief Western 'Hemisphere Division met with William D Pawley on 18-19 November 1958 to discuss a plan which would have Pawley travel to Cuba to meet with Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out gracefully Pawley was a long-time acquaintance and friend of Batista from the days when Pawley had been running the Cubana Airline In return for Batista's support for a friendly military junta -- nominally to be responsible for his ouster -- the representatives of the Department of State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be provided safety for himself his friends and his close cronies particularly those whose lives would be endangered should there ever be a truly violent overthrow of the government Batista also was to be provided protection for his personal assets in Cuba Various individuals were identified as possible candidates for the junta and according to King the objective was that various of these members would have - 10 - J 0 I or I CR E f sufficient political strength to weaken Castro's support Following the meeting in Miami Pawley did undertake the mission to see Batista in Cuba Arriv- ing on 8 December in Havana he had a series of prelimin ry meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister who strongly supported the proposals that Pawley indicated that he was going to make Unfortunately however the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it was unlikely that Batista would accept the proposals The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually took place on 11 December 1958 when according to the report from Havana station Pawley met with Batista for two hours this evening Laid his plan before Batista without pulling any punches B atista took ft calmly He agreed with much of Pawley's analysis of situation but said he could not take the junta way out 17 Batista made no promises and went through the reasons why he couldn't possibly give up the office for fear of being called a coward and traitor that there would be a blood bath and that he had both moral and constitutional obligations - 11 - on a C T COS Havana rOPSECRET noted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows Batista will not accept plan and will make every effort turn government over to Rivera Aguero the Batista candidate who had been named Presidential successor in a rigged election However unfavorable developments may produce change of attitude on part of B atista 18 Following Pawley's visit with Batista the situation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of the US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent A representative of the Archbishop of Havana Father Bez Chebebe approached the American Consul in Santiago to float some proposals for resolving the differences between the two countries The priest emphasized that although a Castro take over was inevitable Both Fidel Castro and US interests had important stake in sugar crop and both undoubtedly wish resolve problems caused by present situation Also said that there were matters now mostly minor on both sides which ave been sources mutual irritation and misunderstanding and that these should be eliminated soonest so that they would not grow to affect future relations which Father considers inevitable 19 In addition the representative of the Archbishop of Havana indicated to the Amconsul that He though tl US Government could profitably send person of confidence - 12 - T PSEeRE WP SECRE1 not necessarily an official to discuss mutual problems as discreetly as possible with Fidel Implied that such would be well received 20 Despite the fact that the communist proclivities of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated by Agency personnel in Cuba on 18 December 1958 COS Havana cabled He dquarters strongly supporting the position that the Archbishop of Havana's repres ntative had proposed to the American Consulate saying Havana Station feels proposal merits serious State CIA consideration Operation this nature could pay' big future dividends if fully qualified person could be found for job and dispatched quickly Regardless how we may feel about Castro and his movement both will be important political forces for a long time to come Perhaps candidate could be found through National Catholic Welfare Organization 21 At about the same time this proposal was being put forward WH Division had asked the P ramilitary Division PMD to establish-a small contingency task force capable of making air drops into Cuba representatives of PMD L 3 Jwere sent to Havana 3 --l 3 survey possible drop zones and 3 Two andr to locate and J to get himself into position to see if he could locate dissidents who - 13 - fflfJ SECRE TOP @CRE'T were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista What WH hoped to accomplish presumably was that they could organize these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro from taking over the government if Batista should suddenly resign or decide to flee the country 22 On 31 December 1958 Paramilitary Division reported to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe and the Office of Logistics would have an arms load rigged for a drop by 2 January 1959 23 It was not until the last week of December 1958 that President Eisenhower became actively involved in discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward Cuba His interest was precipitated by a 23 December - 1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's National Security Adviser Gordon Gray who discussed the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 December The President apparently indicated that he had not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA - 14 - -r-op SECRET -l OP 3 EC R E r regarding Castro and he suggested that meetings of the Special Group under NSC 5412 2 should be held on a weekly basis with Cuba to be a regular subject for discussion Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other individuals into the act Gray suggested that the President's Board of Consultants later the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board be made party to the discussions but Dulles rather strongly suggested that there was a significant difference between the discussions which were intended for the Special Group 5412 on Covert Operations and PFIAB responsibilities 'for general problems related to foreign intelligence Dulles made the specific point that if the Board of Consultants was going to get involved in the details of planned covert operations they were then in a position of reviewing US foreign policy The discus- sion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress to attempt to oversee covert operations -- a point about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly noting that such action by Congress would be an in fringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief 24 - 15 OP SECRJ f SECRET At 3 40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958 there was another high level meeting attended by Messrs Herter Murphy and Rubottom Department of State Irwin Department of Defense Admiral Burke the CNO General Cabell DOCI and Gordon Gray at which the Cuban situation was again discussed Even as the meeting was in progress Batista was preparing to flee Cuba and possible US action including irect _ intervention by US Marines was among the topics that were discussed There also was some suggestion that the US take the responsibility for naming members to a junta to succeed Batista rather than permitting Fidel Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban Government 25 With some benefit of hindsight Eisenhower recalled this period in the following manner During the rush of these last events in the final days of 1958 the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the best interests of the United States Earlier reports which I had received of Castro's possible Communism were suspect because they originated with people who favored Batista Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement Allen Dulles said If Castro - 16 TOIi 3f CRi 'f pOP SECRE - takes over they will probably participate in the goYernment When I hearq this estimate I was provoked that such a conclusion had not been given earlier At another point the ex-President wrote Though our intelligence experts backed and filled for a number of months events were gradually driving th m to the conclusion that with the coming of Castro Communism had penetrated this hemisphere - 26 B Cas tro Takes OVer During the first few weeks of 1959 following Castro's take over there was a flurry of activity as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the changes in government The Station seemed assur d that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements especially on the d veloping military capabilities In fact when the US Army suggested that the Station provide support for the Army's covert collection of military intelligence under-commercial cover in Havana COS took strong exception to the propo als emphas zing the Station's own capabilities in this area COS was overruled by Headquarters however and General Cabell assured the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army that while he was aware that - 17 - -rop SECR12T Havana had OP SECRet objected to the Army's proposals the cos nonetheless had been instructed to cooperate oo 27 In these early weeks of 1959 US representatives in Havana were predict1ng that Castro would have a difficult time holding his government together and among other things one report emphasized the proba- bility that Castro would soon find that he would have to get along with the United States 29 The most likely threat to relations with the United States was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay but neither CIA nor state Department representatives saw any threat to this installation and this belief was supported ip early March 1959 by a Special National Intelligence Estimate that at most Castro sooner or later is likely to ask for major increases o An interesting side note to the discussions at this time was that the Army Attache apparently had planned to use a negro Lt Col who was on TDY in Havana to do a study of the new Castro Army In a memorandum to the Chief Western Hemisphere Division and to the Chief Foreign Intelligence Staff Al Cox Chief Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using the term black -- that General Erskine Army Special Forces believed that a color barf did exist in the Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt Col Reuben Horner the black officer in question could be made 28 - 18 - -r-OP SECRE - 'FOP SECRET in the nominal rent now paid for the Guantanamo Base revision of employment practices which appeared to discriminate against Cuban workers and perhaps other changes 30 In the early spring of 1959 as Castro made known that he was planning to visit the United states COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the importance of the castro trip He noted for Headquarters information that Washington yisit can make or break Castro Unless he gets a strong helping hand from the United states many serious observers feel his regime will collapse within a matter of months 31 Pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the new Cuban Government COS Havana indicated that Castro's popularity was very low among the middle and upper classes but at the same time he emphasized that Castro was the idol of the masses 32 COs Havana did an excellent job of predicting how Castro would act when he arrived in the United states suggesting that Castro would probably make his pitch not to the heads of the State Department and to the press but that he would appeal to the workers the farmers the - 19 - -TOP SECR r j' students and the masses in America to support his revolution COS emphasized that Headquarters should make nd mistake that the Castro Government while not openly avowed Communist vas heavily infiltrated with Communists and had taken no stamd in opposition to Communist positions and moreover there was little question about who would eventuaL1y control the Cuban Government COS did suggest that Headquarters give serious consideration to planting embarrassing questions with reporters to stick in the US 33 castro while he was Both the Deparbnent of State and COS Havana were'in general agreement about the results of the Castro visit d spatches COS Havana rized one of his as follows It would be unwise to assume from the minor indications to date that Fidel has undergone a serious change of heart as a result of his visit to the United States 34 In a memorandum to Gordon Gray President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for tional Security Affairs Robert Murphy Deputy Undersecretary of State noted that Despite Castro's appar nt simplicity sincerity and eage ess to reassure the United States public there is little - 20' - F C CRE i probability that Castro had altered the essentially radical course of his revolution From his experience here he has gained a valuable knowledge of American public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to deal with on his return to Cuba It would be a serious mistake to underestimate this man with all his appearance of naivet unsophistication and ignorance on many matters he is clearly a strong personality and a born leader of great personal courage and conviction WWUe we certainly know him better than before Castro remains an enigma and we should await his decisions on specific matters before assuming a more optimistic view than heretofore about the possibility of developing a constuctive relationship with him and his government 35 With the benefit of hindsight it seems that in this period shortly following Castro's visit to the United states the cos Havana may have misjudged a significant development which surfaced almostimmediately after Castro's return to Cuba Remarking on an apparent rash of anti-Communist statements appearing in the Cuban press one dispatch speculated that These demonstrations obviously welcome but possibly most significant aspect is demonstration once again enormous power Castro who with few words made antiCommunism popular position By same token he could reverse trend at any time and skeptics speculating that current stand is sop intended to make it more difficult for u s interests o protest effectively against stringent agrarian reform law 36 - 21 TOD QRaD ex or $ECItET A follow-up dispatch within two days of that cited above provided a more accurate insight as to the depth of the struggle which was in fact being waged within Cuba Communist factions between the pro- and the antiReporting on comments made by the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista Popular PSP with reference to the confusion among party members regarding statements that Castro had made while he was in the United States Anibal Escalante laid it on the line that there was a struggle between the left and the right and he emphasized that the conservative element was trying to take advantage of remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in the United States According to the source reporting on Escalante's talk Vice-President Nixon had told Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the Communists the United States would cut off economic aid to Cuba and this threat had struck Castro as so serious that he made some unwise statements The source however noted that the liberal forces of the 26 July movement in the Directorio Revolucionario the DR were in control of the revolution and that the - 22 - PSECREi duty of the PSP was to work toward unity and overcome the counterrevolutionaries 37 In a Special NIE of 30 June 1959 on The Situation n the Caribbean through 1959 the intelligence com- munity again indicated that the internal situation in Cuba had not been decided The SNIE commented The Communists probably do not now control Castro but they are in a position to exert influence in his regime and to carryon further organizational work 38 Through the summer and into the early fall of 1959 the degree of Castro's commitment to Communism continued to be a major subject of discussion within the intelligence community and in the weekly reporting that was begun by COS Havana in early June this topic continually occurred In August 1959 when the Deputy Chief of Western Hemisphere Division Rudolph Gomez assisted Leo Churn in the preparation of an Urgent Report on Cuba for distribution to members of the Research Institute of America Castro's Communist association was prominently featured At this time and reflecting the views of both Western Hemisphere Division and the Department of State with whom Gomez had coordinated the paper Fidel Castro was not - 23 - toP eltEI considered to be a Communist His brother Raul Castro however was clearly identified as a hard-core Communist 39 The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante had referred in mid-summer came to a head in midOctober 1959 when Hubert Matos a military leader in Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of Castro broke with Fidel over the increasing number of leadership positions which were being turned over to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than to members of the 26 July Movement Matos resigned as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 and was arrested on 20 October During the months prior to his trial in December 1959 when he was found guilty of treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment a In view of the trend of recent years i t is interesting to note that the ChuAn report found reason to be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security Committee Sen Eastland's Committee for getting involved in matters which were principally of concern to the intelligence community In this case the Senate Committee was criticized specifically for taking Diaz Lanz the head of Castro's Air Force who had defected and questioning him before turning him over to the intelligence agencies for initial interrogation - 24 - number of others who had been prominent anti-Batistianos also broke with Castro Among these were Faustino Perez Minister for Recovery of Illegally Acquired Property Rufo L6pez-Fresquet Minister of Finance Manuel Ray Minister of Public Works and Felipe Pazos head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro and replaced by Che Guevera whose expertise was in revolution not in banking As Theodore Draper has said this was the second civil war for Castro 40 Coincidental to the internal squabble that led to Matos's resignation the Deputy Chief of WH Division Rudy Gomez was in Havana 15-18 October 1959 promoting an increase in Station efforts to penetrate the PSP In the course of this tour the qualifications of the best of the agents who might conduct this penetration were reviewed with COS Havana and Station personnel Gomez also pointed out that th anti-Com- munist efforts in Havana should not be limited to those who were FI or PP designees but everyone in the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities to push into the Partido Socialista Popular In re- porting on his visit with COS Havana Gomez noted that - 25 - e-f3 SECRET the Ambassador and other members of the American Embassy in Havana also were very much interested in th program being advanced and in fact asked Gomez if CIA could send a qualified Communist expert to Havana to indoctrinate appropriate Embassy officers on Communist doctrines particularly on their modus operandi and how Communists working under cover could be recognized Upon his return Gomez received J C King's approval to comply with this request 41 Even as Gomez was promising State s representa- tives in Havana assistance in understanding Communist activities J C King Chief of Western Hemisphere Division was going forward to the Director of Central Intelligence with a memorandum complaining about the Department of state's failure to provide CIA with a policy action paper on Cuba -- a paper which according to King had been promised as early as May 1959 yet had not been received by the end of October Nor was there any indication when such paper might be It would appear from this and State were remiss in the personnel That the Station for support on such an issue - 26 - request that both the DDP training of their overseas had to request Headquarters is difficult to imagine WP SECRE 1- expected despite numerous meetings with Department representatives King also was particularly critical of the fact that Ambassador BonsaI had been called to Washington on two occasions but in neither instance had he called on the Agency for consultation -- this despite the fact that there had been indications from the Department that such consultations were to be held The ambivalence regarding Castro's relation to the Communist Party was illustrated by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959 in testifying at the hearings of the Judiciary SubCommittee which was investigating the Communist Threat to the US through the Caribbean In response to the question of whether Fidel was a Communist General C P Cabell stated Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party member or even a pro-Communist On the other hand they are delighted with the nature of his government which was allowed the Communists opportunity - free opportunity -- to organize to propagandize and to infiltrate We know the Communists consider Castro a representative of the bourgeoise o Our conclusion therefore is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist however he certainly is not anti-Communist 43 In an attempt to resolve at least part of the dilemma a Related Mission Directive was approved on - 27 - 42 J QP Sl CRE 6 November 1959 and would remain ln effect until further notice The RMD stated in part as follows For the moment CIA operations should be carried out on the assumption that the revolutionary government is basically nonCommunist with legitimate reform goals that deserve US respect and support Covert operations should support overt efforts to arrive at a rapprochement with the present government and to eliminate the conditions described above without resorting to forceful means If it should be established that the Cuban government is Communist-led or Communist-dominated or if that government cannot be swayed from adopting measures which intentionally or unintentionally accomplish Communist objectives the question of direct attacks against Castro will be re-examined In planning for such a contingency each existing or new asset should be evaluated in terms of possible future utility from a paramilitary point of view nor will the development or recruitment of assets be precluded merely because they lack a paramilitary capability Under no circumstances would any asset be apprised of this-contingency planning In fact any disposition to undertake violent action should be promptly and emphatically discouraged pending a change in policy at the policy-making level 44 Even as the RMD was being dispatched to the field another and more significant program was being evolved in Headquarters On 1lDecember 1959 J C King Chief WH Division prepared a memorandum for the - 28 - rep SECRE Director of Central Intelligence through the Deputy Director of Plans forwarding a program having as its specific objective The overthrow of Castro within one year and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will call for elections 6 months after assumption of office To achieve this objective Chief WH D put forward a program to include among other items the following 1 Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba from liberal Caribbean countries 2 Intrusion operations against Castro's TV and radio to be mounted from within Cuba 3 Formation of pro-US opposition groups to establish by force a controlled area within Cuba Colonel King then went on to suggest that Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro None of those close to Fidel such as h s brother Raul or his companion Che Guevarra sic have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government 45 The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A see page 296 which reproduces the original 11 December 1959 J C King memorandum to the DCI In light of subsequen ' investigations hearings and publicity regarding the Agency's complicity in assassination footnote continued on following page - 29 - J 8P 3ECRt 1' As 1959 drew to a close a final Special National Intelligence Estimate tiThe Situation in the Caribbean through 1960 indicated that Castro was in to stay despite internal difficulties The SNIE saw no serious threat to Castro's continued rule and it pointed out that if there was direct US intervention Most Cubans including the military would react violently 1t 46 As 1960 began General Cabell the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence held a joint briefing plots aimed at Fidel Castro and others pages 2 and 3 of Appendix A show two significant corrections in Allen Dulles's own handwriting to the text submitted by Col King In paragraph 3d the phrase Itthorough consideration be given to the el imination of Fidel Castro lt carries Dulles's pencilled correction making the text read Itremoval from Cubalt rather than ltelimination 1t At a later point in the same paragraph the original text said Itmany informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would-greatly accelerate the fall of the present government Mr Dulles has substituted the word Itremovallt for the word disappearance These significant changes in the text on the original copy of King's memorandum -- which the author has recovered -- support the contention that the author has made in the Foreword to this Volume that the component WH 4 officially charged with the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program was neither charged with nor responsible for programs designed to assassinate Castro in the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation Colonel King's memorandum of 11 December 1959 with the pencilled corrections noted above was concurred in by Richard M Bissell and approved by Allen W Dulles on 12 December 1959 - 30 - OP ScCRE -' 8 January 1960 on Cuba for the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff He reviewed the in- creasing hold that the Communist idealogy and those affiliated with the Communist Party were exerting the Castro government At this time the DDCI also discussed the need for increased covert and semicovert programs aimed at Castro -- psychological warfare political action economic action and paramilitary action all of which had been conducted in some degree during the past year 47 This 8 January 1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning of the serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelligence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs - 31 - Part II Castro Must Go A Organizing for Covert Action January-March 1960 The first mention of a formal Agency structure to deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by Colonel L K White then Deputy Director for Support in reporting on the DCI's morning meeting of 8 January 1960 White's diary noted There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba -and the Director requested Dick Bissell to organize a special task force to insure that we were attacking this situation from all possible angles II The instruction was taken to heart for on 18 Jan- uary 1960 the WH Division organized Branch 4 WH 4 as an expandable task force to run the'proposed Cuban Op erations The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons with 18 at Headquarters 20 at Havana Station and 2 at Santiago Base 2 Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere Division was Jacob D Esterline recently returned J 1 -J7 and formerly one of the principals - 32 - TOp SECRET in Project PBSUCCESS the operation which had resulted in the overthrow of the Communist-dominated government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 Esterline was the choice of J C King Chief WH Division and to the best of Esterline's recollection toward the end II of his two year tour in1 by King about remaining in t I' he had been queried J or coming back to Headquarters to work on the Cuban problem It was shortly after his return to the States in January of 1960 that Esterline became Chief WH 4 3 In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan episode and his extensive guerrilla warfare experience in World War II with the OS5 Esterline thinks that he got the job because J C King had pretty much confidence in my judgment 4 The relationship - bet ween Esterline and J C King- Chief WH Division and the rel tionship between King and Richard Bissell Deputy Director for Plans DDP during the course of The author had heard that Esterline had been directly selected 'by the DDP Richard Bissell to be the head of WH 4 Bissell made no mention of this and it is contrary to the story noted above as told by Esterline - 33 - 0 33 EC R E F the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of considerable speculation ever since the close out of the invasion It seems appropriate that some atten- tion should be devoted to this subject before going further into detail about the evolution of the covert plans to oust Castro One source close to the DDP at the time of the anti-castro activity stated flatly A task force was formed under Bissell excluding J C King Chief WH D from having in fact any control whatsoever over the activity 5 The WH O history states There was an informal but understood short cut in the chain of command basic decisions were made at the DDP DCI or Presidential level Although some of the key personnel were detailed from WH Division the Cuban Headquarter's unit was in another building and no one pretended that J C King was running the show Jacob D Esterline ooo was the Chief of the Cub Unit during the build-up and invasion attempt and took his orders from the DDP 6 Walter Elder formerly Special Assistant to Allen Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep King on the outer edges of the anti-Castro activity but according to Elder Col King always knew what was going on and was thoroughly involved in the Bay of - 34 - rerSECKI r Pigs activity from its inception until its conclusion 7 Esterline himself declined to comment for the record on this particular speculation but indicated that he was not sure what J C King was up to at all times It is clear however that Esterline was in very close contact with Col King throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation Additional insights c ncerning J C King's role in Bay of Pigs Operation have been provided by Richard D Drain who was Chief of Operations for WH 4 and by Richard Bissell the DDP Drain has stated J C King never was told I think for understandable reasons to what extent he Elder suggested to the author that they wanted King out of the operation because of his strong Republican affiliations They were never identified but Ki g was well acquainted with highly placed figures and contributors to the Republican Party This will become most apparent in the subsequent discussion of the relationships between WH 4 and William D Pawley During the author's initial conversation with Esterline about the Bay of Pigs Esterline did state in a manner similar to Elder that J C King was out of the mainstream of the anti-Castro effort b cause he had known Republican Party affiliations 8 There was no elaboration indicating the impact of-such affiliations on King's role and there is nothing in the record to support this allegation - 35 - For SECReT was in it to what extent he was not in it Therefore from time to time he would protrude ' sometimes saying that he was sorry to protrude and then he would retract and then he would be in and then he would be out ooo that's as a person Then again his Deputy Ray Herbert would call and say ttl just don't understand Cable 18963 IN from Guatemala today Would you come over and explain to me what that's all about and I would step out of the maelstrom of JMATE ooo they were just working flat out ooo and go over There would be the old WH types doing their thing in the old WH way Maybe two cables a week from the stations and quite leisurely ooo I think what had happened to J C King was that he had stayed overlong in the same job and he was ttMr WH by Gawd with the exception of first Guatemala and then Cuba there was very little that ever happened in Latin America whi h got to be given our other worldwide responsibilities in the DDP a very front priority matter and consequently at Staff meetings for example they would go around and talk about the Soviet Union and China and Europe and even Africa Then if there was any time left J C King would have his time at bat and repor some relatively minor thing Except in the case of Guatemala there was as everybody krtows now a very substantial paramilitary operation which was run by Richard M Bissell in his capacity as Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination I think that one of the many reasons and I never was able to get much in the way of history on Gu temala as an aid to the study of the Cuban operation while the latter was in process was - 36 - TOP SECRI I that this had never set very well with J C King He was divested of the Guatemalan experience and particularly when it turned out to be a success o o PBSUCCESS was a success through dumb luck more than anything else J Coooo couldn't take any of the bows for it All right that rankled I am sure Now this one comes along and rather than expand WH 4 or whatever the hell it was and leave this JMATE Project within that Branch and build up that Branch -- oh no Once again the same man Dick Bissell -- now however DDP instead of SAPC -becomes the case officer for the thing and his assistant Tracy Barnes is all over him One of J C King's few very good men Jacob D Esterline is pulled aside and made Chief of the project ooo The old man had a great deal of amour propre J C King did He was very vain He had all of the area expertise that one would like to see in a Division Chief but he had been at it an awful long time It was a very incestuous Division In terms of the rotation it was solely within WH There were very few people in WH who had served outside of the Western Hemisphere except in Washington They were a tight-knit little group and here now for the second time running one of their big chances to shine -- there was a lot of money and all that k1nd of stuff -- again had been taken away and it was o o it was tough 21 Where Drain implied that J C King was cut completely out of WH 4 activities and operations Mr Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhat different In the course of an oral interview the - 37 - fflP SECRET former DDP responded to questions concerning J C King in the following manner Question I would like to clarify at this point J C King's relationship to the Bay of Pigs project I have heard it on both sides -- that he was involved and that he was deliberately end-run Mr Bissell There is no doubt in my mind that that was the case I was going to say that both of the things that you have heard have an element of truth in them There was a deliberate decision fairly early in the game -I doubt if i t was as early as March 1960 In fact I am pretty sure that it wasn't but I am reasonably sure that the decision 1 speak of was made by some such date as June 1960 -- that Esterline would take charge of this Project and Esterline would have direct access to me He would not be under the usual requirement of all the cases going through J C King Now as the scope of the scale of this operation increased and with the passage of time Esterline's direct channel to me came to be more exercised and there was frequent interchange between Esterline and myself that didn't go through J C King in the sense of a command channel On the other hand J C was brought into all the consultations and was fully informed from the very beginning about this operation His advice was sought and given and 1 usually found it very good and followed it I remember no specific case where either J C King's specific advice or general attitude toward the operation was inconsistent with or in conflict with my own - 38 - 'fit SP SF in J'S ' TO SEC RET Question Why did you make this decision with regard to Jake coming directly to you and not going through King Was it just a matter of great efficiency or what precipitated that Mr Bissell I think i t was in part on the model of the Guatemalan operation and in part I think a feeling probably on my own part -- in some degree perhaps on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J C was not effective enough to handle this kind of very fast moving quite large scale quite complex paramilitary operation Question Do you recall any where there was a serious tween what Jake wanted to J C King thought should instances conflict bedo and what be done Mr Bissell I don't remember many if any and I believe that the relationships between Jake and J C were pretty good throughout 10 Certainly the written record bears out B1ssell's contention that King was fully informed and that the relationship between King and love at least mutually Es erline was if not respectful The only point of contention between King and Esterline that surfaced in the records concerned the degree to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs related to the organization of the Cuban exiles At one point Jake suggested to the DDP that all contact with Pawley be cut off but in sending Esterline's memorandum through channels J C King noted that he was against cutting Pawley completely off from contact with WH 4 In fact Pawley was in continuous contact -- even though in disagreement -- with both Jake and King until the close out of the operation - 39 - -fOP SELRE Another of the questions which must be addressed in s tting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is the failure of Richard Helms -- at that time Chief of Operat ons COPS for the DDP -- to become more than marginally involved in the Cuban project Oral inter- views again provided the best explanations and consequently are entered into this record in rather fulldetail Dick Drain who became COPS WH 4 made the following comments Helms was COPS Chief of Operations Either on his own volition which I suspect or on order -- which I doubt -- Dick Helms completely divorced himself from this thing I mean absolutely The one time that I heard from Helms during this entire project was oo I am sitting down there in my chair as COPS of the project on a Monday having spent the entiregoddamned weekend working with ' J ' J trying to get an airplane nd som CUbans out of Montego Bay before the Brits in Jamaica carne back from their long weekend I am sitting there congratulating myself that the plane is out and the Cubans are out and the British are back and it hasn't hit the fan and I get a telephone call from Dick Helmsfs long time secretary Mr Helms would like to speak to you Well fine well the whole thing on his part was so to me incredibly apolc etic three times he said to me in different parts of the co versation HAs you know I have nothing to do with this project What he did have to do with ever since ffl P 3 EC ft r I the Francis Gary Powers thing he had been a member of an inter-Agency committee that met with periodic regularity to discuss air matters of any sensitivity I guess he'd had enough to do with this project so that somebody who had been reading the cable traffic told him Well those nuts down in Quarters Eye seem to have lost an airplane this weekend He was going to the regular committee meeting that afternoon so he had to ask me the details ooo veryapologetically The third time that he said You know i have nothing to do with this project I said Well Mr Helms I don't want to be fatuous about this but I wish to Christ that you did have because we could use your expertise He said Hahaha ooo yes well thank you very much and that was the end of that He avoided the thing like the plague One of the reasons may have been that of course life went oni and if Bissell was getting increasingly immersed in this one thing somebody had to watch the whole worldwide store ooo which of course Helms was damned good at A less attractive suggestion is that Helms figured that there was a high likelihood that this thing would screw up and he didn't want to have the tar baby around him I don't know 11 - Bissell in responding to the question about Helms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs commented as follows I think that he Helms saw most all of the cable traffic and I think he was pretty well informed as to what was going on very well informed but he was really out of the line of command on this operation There was something of a tacit agreement between us that he would be devoting himself to a lot of the other on - 41 - I1JP SECRef going business of the DDP office because this was taking a great deal of my time Question This was a tacit agreement this wasn't a session in which you and Helms ooo Bissell Let me say this was probably not that explicit I would make an observation here and I don't want you to infer anything really beyond what it says it was not particularly easy -- I did not find it particularly easy -- to discuss things clearly and derive a clear understanding with Dick He s about the division of labor between us when he was my Deputy I don't imply by this any sense of conflict or rivalry but he would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters and I would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters We saw one another of course all the time Quite often I would consult him about something that I was handling I think rather less often he would consult me I don't mean to imply however in that any kind of concealment from me -- I never had that feeling at all -but it really was our habit during the whole time that we were in those positions that the division of labor between us was more tacit than explicit 12 Simultaneously with the decision to create a separate Branch in WH Division to handle the antiCastro activity discussions were begun by both the Special Group 5412 and on an inter-agency basis as to the nature of the anti-Castro effort Among the many questions raised early in the game was whether - 42 - the US program should be overt or covert with the overt implications being the ultimate application of US military force to oust Castro DCI Dulles emphasized that contingency planning should be undertaken by the Special Group without necessarily involving either the President or the National Security Council The Department of State was concerned that if Fidel Castro were deposed perhaps his successors Che Guevara and Raul Castro would be even worse than Fidel As reported in subsequent congressional reve- lations concerning CIA's role in assassination plots i t was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January 1960 that the Director of Cen tral Intelligence emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold 13 At this same Special Group Meeting President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser Gordon Gray predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation which would ultimately develop as one of the key weaknesses in the whole concept of the Bay of Pigs Operation According to the report on the Special Group Meeting - 43 p lFPRFT TOP SECRE I Mr Gray commented that a problem would be posed for administration officials if a decision should be taken to change our attitude toward Castro as outlined earlier in the meeting He acknowledged that any such decision must be kept highly secret but he foresaw difficulties which would arise for example during testimony by the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury before Congress at public gatherings etc if they should have to give an impression that the US was not doing anything about Cuba 14 This in fact was the damned if I do damned if I don't position in which Richard Nixon found himself in the Fall of 1960 and the position in which the United States found itself with reference to both the United Nations and the Organization of the American States throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as the myth of plausible deniability overruled common sense Following the initial Special Group meeting there was a flurry of activity seeking some solid proposals and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960 C Tracy Barnes the Assistant DDP for Action J C King Jake Esterline and Dick Helms among others discussed a whole series of issues which would be basic to the program from this time forward fication of the principal Cuban leaders - identi- Ramon Barquirr Justo Carrillo and Hiro Cardona who Hould eventually - 44 TAP REAl cr l OP SECttl r head up the principal anti-Castro organization supported by the Agency were mentioned radio propaganda operating out of either Third country or US areas was raised the training program for both cornrnunicators and for PM trainers at' Fort Randolph in the Canal Zone was discussed and the possible acquisition of aircraft for support operations and the question of US business as a cover for the operations of the exile groups in the United States were all discussed The possible involvement of US businesses to put overt pressure on the US government for the possible imposition of economic sanctions and as a covert means of raising money for the support of Cuban exile organizations also surfaced This initial meeting also recog- nized the problem of trying to gain the support of the more liberal Latin American Governments e g that of Betancourt in Venezuela 15 Al Cox one of the senior officers in paramilitary operations was in attendance and he would subsequently note Stringent security precautions were placed on JMARC including the exclusion of the PP Staff and other Agency components from all cable and dispatch traffic and from access to correspondenc'e between - TOP 45 RFF FT fOP SECRET the project and the office of the DDP In point of fact such restrictive measures were somewhat meaningless insofar as keeping awareness of the project's activities away from PP PMG The A DDP P granted permission to PP C PMG to read the daily project traffic with Esterline's knowledge and permission Esterline personally knew the majority of the PP PMG senior officers and in no time he had drafted six or seven of these including the Deputy Chief PMG for assignment to JMARC ooo This of course was valuable as a built-in penetration of JMARC in the best FI and CI tradition 16 Early in February of 1960 Allen Dulles was briefed in general terms on the planning that was being initiated by WH Division and at the same time J C King told the Director that the Branch concept was used in establishing WH 4 rather than the term Task Force for greater security and to simplify channels of conunand ll The Director subsequently explained to the Special Group 3 February 1960 some of the activities that were being undertaken noting that within the next week or two the Group would receive The crypt for theWH 4 anti-Castro operation was initially JMARC Following compromise of this crypt the project became JMATE sometime in the period between 6-13 December 1960 Throughout this volume the project will be identified as JMATE except in direct quotations - 46 fAn qFPR PT TOP SECIt I T a paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs which had been initiated against the Castro Government 17 The proposals of which the DCI had spoken were discussed in a DDP review session on 11 February 1960 which was attended by Tracy Barnes Jake Esterline Al Cox Dave Phillips and Jim Flannery The focus was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry propaganda broadcasts and funding Noting that WH Division had roughly $50 000 available for immediate use it was speculated that the ultimate magnitude of the anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars -an estimate that would in effect be some 40 million short of the eventual cost It was stated however that funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency reserve to meet any shortages At this planning ses- sion the training program for the PM cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama was given minor attention and In addition to the Special Group which included a DOD representative WH 4 worked directly with other representatives of DOD regarding current developments and the possible coordination of activities vis-a-vis Cuba 18 The big sugar sack - 47 - o TOP SeLkE I here too the seeds were planted by Tracy Barnes for an attitudinal survey of Cuban society which could have and should have caused CIA planners to re-think the whole anti-Castro effort 19 A very similar briefing with somewhat more emphasis on possible paramilitary action was given to a high level group from DOD on 12 February 1960 and the agenda for the 17 February 1960 meeting of the Special Group again emphasized that the Castro Government was dependent on sugar revenues for both continuation of popular domestic and hemispheric subversion programs 20 It was further suggested to the Special Group that dissidents within Cuba might also be stimulated to sabotage with the ultimate result leading to Castro's ouster 21 The recommendation that the DCI made to the Special Group was as follows This refers to the Lloyd Free Report which is discussed subsequently in this Volume see pp 222-226 The DOD representatives who were briefed were the Deputy Secretary Mr Douglas Mr John Irwin Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs General Erskine and General Lansdale Tue R 48 or CD CT TOP SECRET That CIA be authorized to initiate operational planning including covert spotting and assessment of potential agents for eventual sabotage of both Cuban and American-owned sugar mills Should this course of action prove feasible and desirable the ion would be designed to deny Castro as Euch as possible of the revenues anticipated from the 1960 sugar crop_ 22 Interestingly enough although the briefing for DOD had placed considerable emphasis on paramilitary planning apparently no mention of the subject was made to the Special Group On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group he emphasized that he was not asking for perDission to engage in action only that he was looking for a Special Group approval Mr Irwin Assistant Secre- tary of Defense for International security Affairs noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense Mr Douglas were all for the plan and the Group agreed to present the plan to the Secreta- - of State and to Gordon Gray so that the latter cou1d get the President's reaction President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic about the sugar sabotage plan reportedly doubting that the loss of sugar revenues - 49 ' f ' GFPPC r woul impact on eUfeJP SEC R E1 Castro's ability to continue to finance subversive activities in other Latin America areas President Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic sabotage and he would not agree to the plan to identify assets specifically for sabotage operations against the sugar industry Eisenhower was willing to support a program to identify assets for the sugar industry and other things as well including even possibly things that mCgh be drastic In addition to identifying assets on a broad basis the President also requested that a comprehensive covert action program be prepared by Hr Dulles This i t was suggested should go to the Special Group and if they approved the plans then the President wanted to discuss them In any event action on the PM pr - gram would be delayed until Eisenhower returned from his upcoming Latin American visit and gave his specific approval 23 The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960 also noted that 0 Mr Joseph Scott State also reported later that Mr Herter had made exactly the same point This appears to have been o e of the few instances where Department of State r presentatives indicated support for possible direct action programs rather than political solutions to the Cuban problem - 50 - TOr' SE R fT I Qop I C R E l Despite the rather positive doubts that the President had about the sugar sabotage activity J C King charged ahead almost immediately following the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960 On 18 February King arid Milo Perkins had a detailed discussion concerning the disruptive effects which might result from interference with the Cuban sugar operation Perkins was planning meetings with Am- bassador Hill and Thomas Tommy the Cork Corcoran and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran had been willing and able to provide valuable assistance to the Agency in the past Later in the month l Col King met with Thomas Mann the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs subsequently Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs who reportedly was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct sabotage of Cuban sugar mills According to King Secretary Mann also would support both cut backs in US oil companies deliveries to Cuba and actions which might cut back on US tourist trade with the island 24 Col King also consulted with former Ambassador William Pawley whom he asked to make arrangements for the publication of Diario de Za Marina in Miami - 51 AJ I FCR rr rOP SECItE and also to raise at least a portion of the money which would be needed for this operation In addi- tion to Pawley King also contacted Henry Holland in New York City suggesting that Holland raise money through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo to help pay for the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donor that the money was going to be used on behalf of non-Batista groups who were going to make a serious effort to remove Fidel Castro 25 In addition to J C King IS high level contacts Jake Esterline and Mr Dulles had a meeting with Abbott Washburn Deputy Director of the US Information Agency who had requested a briefing on the 4 current state of activities in Cuba -- Washburn was concerned lest there be a conflict of interests between USIA and the CIA's ongoing effort in the area Washburn presented he Agency with a copy of some proposals which the State Department had approved for implementation by USIA in Cuba USIA's pitch would be that the long-standing friendship between Cuba and the United States was being endangered by the infiltration of Communists and Communist ideology - 52 - - fOP SgCR lZ T TO Ii I C Rtf into Cuba -- at the same time not denying that the US was sympathetic to the need for a change in Cuba The'Director and Mr Esterline agreed that it would be advisable for Mr Washburn who was planning to visit Cuba to meetl line the USIA program for COS Havana and out- 3 J benefit 26 As the propaganda activities were being pushed forward as plans were being made for training Cuban exiles and as the possibilities of sabotage PM action and other measures against Castro were being contemplated a cautionary memorandum apparently was drafted by one of the individuals most closely concerned wi h the potential anti-Castro operations The memorandum undated and unsigned reviewed the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in light of what was being planned for Project J TE It noted some 'of the similarities or differences with respect to the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the possibilitiesof removing Fidel Castro and in light of the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs some of the One result of the meeting with Washburn was a decision to turn over a planned USIA anti-Castro cartoon effort to CIA - 53 - if'Ofi ECR ET key points made in this memorandum are worth repeating -- even though it is not known who read the piece Among other things for example the author of the memorandum stressed the unique coincidence of favorable factors with reference to Guatemala and suggested that it was unlikely that any of these would operate with reference to Project JMATE It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was unusually inept that Communist support for Arbenz came from the local Communist Party which was immature badly led and generally weak and that we had unbelievable luck 27 The memorandum also noted that there were a number of circumstances which would not recur during the course of the anti-Castro activity Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a weak leader Castro was obviously a strong leader that Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high character and standing but no one of similar stature had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro and that in Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed forces of Guatemala and when the crisis came he could not depend on his army_ Castro on the other hand had eliminated the Batista influence and filled - 54 - df OP SECRE I the key military positions with his own followers and introduced a system of intense ideological indoctrination Furthermore the unknown author pointed out that while MOscow's interest in Guatemala was compartatively mild -- the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico City was the nearest Soviet official available to the Arbenz Government -- in Cuba the heavy economic and propaganda support from both Moscow and Peiping were a matter of record 28 The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas where the writer claimed that tactical -- not strategic -- errors were being made It stated that the blunt propaganda attacks on Castro were forging all anti-US elements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro as a victim of international Communism and the Communists both Cuban and foreign Secondly it was pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US commercial radio stations even if the time were legitimately being purchased by Cuban exile groups would be a kiss of death for anyone who tried to deny US intervention in Cuban affairs In part re- lated to the propaganda activities the planned use - 55 - TOP FPR FT fOP SEC E I of us business groups as a cover for the Agency's support of the Cuban opposition particularly the use of US business as a funding mechanism was also hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum under study If the author was correct in assuming that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny it would mean that the anti-American contingents would have additional ammunition to use against the us The memorandum suggested that many of these risks could be eliminated if propaganda activities were moved to Third countries and if fund raising activities were run out of Latin America or Western Europe 29 Based on the language the familiarity with the Guatemala activity and the nature of the critique it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum in question The memorandum may have been prompted in part by the increasing attention which the aCB and the Cabinet had been giving to fire bomb attacks on the Cuban cane fields by light aircraft flying out of the United States The Agency fully supported Gen- eral Quesada's effort to put an end to such flights 30 Quesada was Director of the Federal Aviation Agency o - 56 - TOP SFPRPGf ' Ofi SECRET From 2 March 1960 when the Director briefed Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba and the state of Cuban affairs until 17 March 1960 when President Eisenhower formally approved the covert anti-Castro plan CIA personnel most closely involved in the anti-Castro effort were fully immersed in the efforts to define -- and refine -- a US policy which would be acceptable to President Eisenhower In the course of this two week period they were engaged in efforts to satisfy the 5412 Group the National Security Council and themselves that they had developed a viable program which would lead to the downfall and ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal cohorts Che Guevara and Raul Castro and the elmimination of Communism from the island of Cuba and in eff ct from the Western Hemisphere During this period of evolution of national policy WH 4 held its first official meeting as a branch on 9 March 1960 ' J C King and Jake Esterline were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general nature of the programs that were going to be put into operation propaganda activity PM training commo training and they emphasized the need for cooperation - TOf l 57 r FPR -- L PSEC cT and support from all of the offices that were representeq at the meeting including among others the Office of Training the Office of Communications the Comptroller's Office the DDS DPD the PP Staff Personnel particularly the Military Personnel Division and the Office of Security At this initial meeting Jake Esterline mentioned that Bob Reynolds Deputy Chief WH 4 Dave Phillips Propaganda Officer Phil Toomey Political and Psychological Stategist J the Economist and Ed Stanulus his Plans and Ops Officer would be the principals who would be in contact with other Agency elements which would be called on for support In addition Esterline also noted that liaison channels would be established with other elements of the US Government particUlarly with the Office of Special Operations of the Department of Defense 31 It was during the period between 8-17 March 1960 that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro program which Allen Dulles had agreed on 17 February 1960 to provide to the Special Group evolved Among those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing a suitable paper for the Director's presentation were - 58 - tt'OP SECK i C Tracy Barnes Richard Bissell Dick Helms Jake Esterline J C King and Tom Parrott among others Those who figured most prominently among the Special Group representatives at this time were Livingston Merchant Department of State John Irwin ' ssistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Department of Defense Admiral Burke Chief Naval Operations and Gordon Gray the President's National Security Adviser Other than the more than a dozen memorandums and drafts and other papers related to the development of the policy paper perhaps a note from Richard Helms to C Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960 best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agency approached the task of writing a paper for the Director Mr Helms's note to Mr Barnes read as follows Torn Parrott gave me for security late this afternoon the attached paper for the 5412 Group outlining the proposed covert action program against Fidel Castro After reading it I asked Tom to defer consideration of Cuba until next week since I feel that this document needs re rafting whether it is used by the Director for an oral briefing or handed to the designated representatives for their enlightenment I think you will agree with me that the paper is poorly drafted and needs considerable pointing up in various - 59 - -TOP CRET o rop I6EURR F i places I do not disagree with the listed recommendations in paragraph 6 but I do feel that the backup material in paragraphs 2 and 3 needs recasting For example the reference to a short-wave radio station patterned after Radio Free Europe is no way in my opinion to describe what we have in mind Also the paragraph on covert economic action is not sufficiently precise and raises more questions than it answers There are other points but there is no sense in belaboring them in this note to you May I ask that you take this matter 'in hand and advise WH how to put it in suitable shape for use by the Director with the 5412 Group next week 32 In the paper to which Mr Helms referred the problem facing the US was stated rather simply as follows To replace the present Government of Cuba headed by Fidel Castro with one that will be acceptable to the United States and to cause this change to occur in such a manner that anti-US repercussions are not induced in Latin America -33 Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role in the anti-Castro activity there was a tremendous concern that there be no anti-US repercussions not only in Latin America per se but particularly among the Latin American representatives in the Organization of American States and in the United Nations The constant quest for plausible deniability would - 60 - TOR CRE 'f become the holiest of grails -- constantly and unsuccessfully to be sought throughout the course of the operation by Agency planners The proposed paper for the Special Group the paper which Mr Helms found somewhat lacking emphasized those areas highlighted in previous Special Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda disruptions of the Cuban economy including large scale sabotage operations and the development of instructor cadres to provide both communications and PM training cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba Interesting too is the fact that at this early stage of US planning mention was made of the offer from the Guatemalan Government of a training site for the PM cadres or action groups as they were called A financial annex included in the proposals for the Special Group indicated the need for $900 000 for the remainder of FY 1960 and $1 6 million for FY 1961 34 Apparently Mr Helms failed to read the financial annex carefully enough for the estimated requirement for fiscal 1961 which is shown as $1 6 million was either a typographical error or a mistake in addition -- the sum of the parts shown for FY '61 is $1 7 million It also was noted that for the remainder of FY '60 the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to meet these non-program requirements - 61 TQI I 1QR FF rOP SECRET As the paper was being prepared for Special Group consideration J C King Chief Western Hemisphere Division had forwarded a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence providing him with additional information for use during the Special Group discussions and the transmittal to the DC recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr Nixon on 2 March 1960 King's memorandum covered much the same ground as the paper which went to the Special Group but contained considerably more detail about the activities of the Castro Government which were directly aimed at over rowing the legiti- mate governments and replacing them with Communist oriented governments Col King's paper also re- vealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua the only two governments in Latin America which were to throw their full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro activity -- had made offers at this time for both radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and also for training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the Agency might wish to sponsor 35 Despite President Eisenhower's previous objections to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's - 62 T-AD GBP CGD CI TOP SECRET sugar industry King's paper did reflect considerable emphasis on disruption of that economic sector Another item which Col King saw fit to include in his memorandum was the following We have available a drug which if placed in Castro's food would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him 36 Even as the Special Group was planning its sessions on the anti-Castro program so too was the National Security Council being geared up for discussions of the same situation Again there was great concern over the question of possible loss of prestige should the US act independently of the international organizations There also was interest in protecting us business and in the protection of US lives and the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was of considerable concern to the President's National Security adviser Gordon Gray The policy that Gray was advised to recommend to the National Security Council regarding US bases stated Take action as necessary including military action to insure the continued For comments on this subject see Part VII of this volume - 63 - i TOr' I CR E 1- availability to the United States of bases and base rights in Latin America that are considered vital to the security of the United States 37 An additional aspect of the basic national security policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was being encouraged to promote with the National Security Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within take all feasible measurers to thwart it including military action if finally required and appropriate to cope with the situation 38 Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National Security Council on 10 March 1960 President Eisenhower approved the following rather innocuous actions 1 Every effort should be made to influence the other members of the Organization of American States to recognize the dangers involved in the Cuban situation and support action with respect to them Mr Gray also was advised to play both sides of the street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of non-Communist groups the position he was being urged to promote was the following The United States should be prepared if required to protect US interests to take similar actions against subversion or armed rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile to US interests - 64 - FO SECRGBP r 2 The responsible Departments and Agencies should keep current plans to deal promptly with likely contingencies which might develop with respect to Cuba especially those involving the safety of us citizens in the Guantanamo Base 3 Tpe developments with regard to the situation in Cuba should be reviewed by the Council each meeting for the immediate future 39 Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960 Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special Group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March to discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities in Cuba 40 Prior to the 14 March meeting Messrs Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum from Allen W Dulles offering some suggestions as to possible added 'starters' for our Cuban paper use your own judgment as to adding them II 41 Among these starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load dangerous munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles made the following rather unusual suggestion In addition to the International Transport Union Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to induce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives that were sent to Cuba but as he himself pointed out Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the dockworkers refuse to do the unloading - 65 - TGP SECft 'f Stress point that while the dynamism is running out o f the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Russia it still remains in China This explains ChiCom special interest in supporting the Cuban revolution and expanding it with the ultimate aim of facilitating mass emigration of Chinese to the Latin American continent to meet their over-population problem This may be premature but there may be something to it 42 As promised by Gordon Gray the Special Group Meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the Cuban problem and Mr Dulles presented the members with the paper entitled General Covert Action Plan for Cuba Much of the ground was already familiar to the participants but the memorandum of the meeting reflects a number of items worth review though Even Dulles's paper placed heavy emphasis on the propaganda needs even greater emphasis was urged for covert and overt propaganda activities not only through WRUL the commercial broadcasting operation but also through the efforts of USIA's programs for Latin America -- programs which apparently had been sharply curtailed in the recent past The question of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting activity was again raised and discussed the question being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida - 66 - TO' SELRE I Keys in some Caribbean country or elsewhere Somewhat more attention was focused on the paramilitary plans during this discussion than had occurred before and Mr Gray was particularly concerned by the Agency estimate that it appears no large scale para military effort other than wholly overt will be feasible in less than 8 months and he wondered if a crash program program 43 wa feasible to speed up the training The questions of economic sanctions OAS and individual Latin American country involvement the choice of the proper Cuban exiles to represent the government in exile and the question of a budget -the $900 000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1 6-1 7 million for 1961 were also the subjects of discussion One additional subject of disucssion at this Special Group meeting as recorded by Col J C King ' was What would be tne effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevarra sic should disappear simultaneously 44 In the reported context of the discussion it is not believed that the term disappear was a euphemism for assassination but rather referred to the ouster of - - iF s n 67 E f i' PSECRET Castro's government from political power The para- graph which had raised the question then continued Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were sic the Communists and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control Mr Dulles felt that this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS Colonel King said that there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified One possibility was Nunez Jiminez the head of the Agricultural Reform Program No other names were widely enough known to be mentioned Other discussion notwithstanding the focus of Mr Dulles's recommendations on 14 March 1960 was that the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized to take a number of steps which were specifically related to the development of the guerrilla capacity of the anti-Castro groups both within and without Cuba The Agency should be responsib1 for broadening its contacts with such groups and attempting to unify This comment and one made five days earlier 9 March 1960 by J C King that unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package -which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a long drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force were discussed pp 93 114-116 in SSC report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and it is apparent from the recollections of the participants in the meetings that assassination was not the issue in these two instances Ii 68 - 'j them to direct their efforts against Castro The DCI proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting these groups to develop friendships among various of the Latin American Governments which were skeptical of Castro and that the Agency should be responsible for identifying and training -- in facilities in the United States or elsewhere -- those who would be the leaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups At the conclusion of the 14 March meeting it was agreed that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis of the discussions and plan to present i t to President Eisenhower later in the week 45 As part of the effort to improve the paper on the proposed anti-Castro operations the Agency prepared additional backup material which could be cranked into the version which would eventually go to the President On 14 and 15 March the records reveal copies of two drafts of such a paper one of which was labeled as -revised version done by C Tracy Barnes evening 14 Mar which went into more detail on both the political opposition to Castro and on the propaganda activities that were Castro bei g mounted against These papers also noted that paramilitary - 69 - TOp S CCDCT Jap SECftE r activity would take the longest to become a usable asset 1t 46 The most important difference between these papers and the covert action plan presented by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY '61 -- from $1 6-1 7 million to $3 5 million -- with the heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed paramilitary operation The sum for PM operations was revised from an estimated $500 000 in Dulles's 14 March presentation to a total of $1 3 million for that same year From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert action plan 14 March until President Eisenhower approved it 17 March there was an interesting bit of bi-play between the National Security Council and the Special Group 5412 One of the princip l concerns of the National SecuritY Council was the proper US re sponse should the Cubans try to intervene or interfere with operations of the Naval base at Guantanamo Bay including a possible takeover of the Base On 16 March 1960 after Gordon Gray had been fully apprised of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by Allen Dulles Gray was the recipient of a briefing - 70 - - - -- ------------- JQP SEC E I note from a member of his own Staff Samuel E Belk for the planned National Security Council meeting of 17 March which again focused exclusively on the situation at Guantanamo Bay It appears as though Mr Belk even though he was a member of the NSC Staff was completely in the dark as to the planning that had already been undertaken with regard to Castro's ouster At a time when the President had already indicated that proposals for economic action or direct sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were less than what he desired Mr Belk for whatever # reason suggested again that with the new sugar legislation perhaps Castro could be straightened out In addition Belk suggested a plan which was unconventional and radical -- having President Eisenhower send a message directly to Castro telling him that he was concerned over the deterioration of relations between the two countries and suggesting that Castro have private conversations with an emissary whom the President would personally designate Staffer Belk believed that this was a can't lose situation for the US If Castro refused to meet with Eisenhower's representative then he would - 71 - reF 3r CRE I be condemned throughout Latin America The US on the other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and the UN for its efforts If Castro did agree to meet with the President's representative then relations between the US and Cuba probably would be improved 47 Mr Belk's suggestions apparently never went beyond Mr Gray At 1430 hours on 17 March 1960 Mr Dulles presented his covert action plan to a combined meeting of the National Security Council and the principals of the Special Group In attendance with the Presi- dent were Vice President Nixon Secretary Herter Mr Merchant Mr Rubottom Secretary of Treasury Anderson Secretary Irwin Admiral Burke Richard Bissell Colonel King Gordon Gray Major John Eisenhower and General A J Goodpaster Based on General Goodpaster's report on the meeting The President said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situation The great problem is leakage and breach of security Everyone must be prepared to swear that he has not heard of it He said we should limit American contacts with the groups involved to two or three people getting Cubans to do most of what must be done He understood that the effort will be to undermine Castro's position and pre tige - 72 p 'li FPRF k The President told Mr Dulles he thought he Dulles should go ahead with the plan and the operations He and the other agencies involved should take account of all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the actions that we would take in response to these ooo The President said he would like some groundwork laid with the OAS to let the Latin American countries know that if the Cubans were to start to attack our people in Cuba we would be obliged to take action The President said that at the next meeting he would want to know what is the sequence of events by which we see the situation developing -- specifically what actions are we to take He said our hand should not show in anything that is done In the meantime State should be working on what we can do in and out of the OAS ooo Essentially the job is to get the OAS to support us 48 During the course of this meeting Secretary of the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the welfare of the US firms which had investments in Cuba and he was push1ng for US intervention to protect these private property rights The ever cut him rather short on this Pr sident how- Vice President Nixon too indicated some concern with the American business interests in Cuba and suggested that steps might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital investment by US firms in Cuba terminating private - 73 pi i '5 iC i t L i - - - businesses already there and reducing American tourism 49 President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March 1960 covert action program against the Castro regime thus set US policy Briefly restated the four major courses of action called for the formation of an anti Communist exile political opposition located outside of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the anti-Castro elements provision for a powerful propaganda offensive against the island perfection of a covert intelligence-in-action network organization within Cuba and the development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba with the necessary logistical support for covert military operations on the island Col King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting but strangely enough failed to include a list of the participants The fact that the President Vice President and Secretary of State were in attendance could not be known from King's memo alone 50 Not in attendance at this meeting was Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 This was one of numerous instances where higher level personnel -- in this instance the DCI Col King and Bissell -- were the principals in a meeting at which Esterline would seem to have been an equally legitimate participant Even as President Eisenhower was approving the antiCastro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate was in process and would state that Castro was not demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement SNIE 85-60 22 March 1960 p 3 S - 74 - - OP SECR ET_ -TOP ECREi It is particularly important in light of changes which were subsequently made in the covert action plan to note the language of the approved policy with reference to the paramilitary operation Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors In a second phase a number of parawilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the US so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance At no point in this Presidentially-approved plan for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of invasion The paramilitary activity was clearly to be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leadership and training to the dissident activities inside Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States technicians Finally with reference to the approved Colonel Jack Hawkins USMC who was Chief WH 4 PM correctly noted in his memorandum for record of PM operations for Project JMATE that The only approved ritten policy governing paramilitary action against Cuba is contained in paragraph 2c of the Policy Paper approved by the President on 17 March 1960 Emphasis added by author 51 - 75 TAP QFCQ FT TOP 31 CRE I plan the overall budget for the remainder of FY '60 and FY '61 of $4 4 million was approved with the caveat that should there be cost overruns these could be drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingencies A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime is given as Appendix B Appendix B page 300 The reader is also urged to examine Appendix C a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke and Livingston Merchant the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Appendix C page 311 Admiral Burke apparently had become extremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power in Cub 'and on 26 February of 1960 he had forwarded a paper on US action in Cuba to both Secretary Merchant and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Irwin in which the Navy's senior officer took i t upon himself to examine the various options available to the United States to reassert itself in the Western Hemisphere vis-a-vis the growth of Communist power represented by Castro Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were available to the United States such as multilateral action through the OAS unilateral overt action by the US or covert unilateral action by the us ' Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine and Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947 Burke made a series of recommendations covering the same ground -- propaganda organization of the anti-Castro exiles who were in the US or direct US military intervention -- which had already been considered at high levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries Merchant and Irwin On 10 March 1960 Merchant replied to Burke's memorandum noting a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve footnote continued on following page - Tap 76 SEC FT J QP 3t CI E I With reference to his action of 17 March 1960 President Eisenhower subsequently wrote this result Merchant then went on to review the bidding that had already been done particularly in the Special Group on the question of how to handle Castro emphasizing of course that State was very much concerned that precipitate action against Castro's government would work if not immediately certainly in the long run to the detriment of the United States particularly in its relations to the other governments of Latin America Whether the response did not satisfy Admiral Burke or whether he sincerely believed that the Navy more than any other US Agency should be principally responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not known In any event on 16 March 1960 he forwarded another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both Gordon Gray the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and to Allen W Dulles Burke's comments on the transmittal sheets to these two individuals are interesting To National Security Adviser Gray he wrote Dear Gordon Enclosed is my copy of a memorandum on U s Action in Cuba which may be of interest to you Sincerely yours Arleigh Burke To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote Dear Allen Enclosed is a memorandum my Staff prepared containing some suggestions which might be useful to you in your work Naturally I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum but I know that you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered Warm regards Sincerely Arleigh Burke Why one of the recipients was cautioned about the impatient young lad and the other was not is something footnote continued on following page - 77 - rap SEC FT rd On March 17 1960 less than two weeks after my return from Puerto Rico I ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to begin to organize the training of Cuban exiles mainly in Guatemala against the possible future day when they might return to their homeland More specific planning was not possible because the Cubans living in exile had made no move to select from among their numbers a of a mystery Certainly the proposals by one J E Pond Jr reflect at least Pond's youth and immaturity For among other things in his memorandum Mr Pond suggested that the Navy Accept Mr Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of a complete briefing of State Department activities vis-a-vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster Or with reference to action that the State Department should take he suggested Brief all individuals and groups of U S nationals going to Latin America on the Kommunist sic threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel Two items which had not appeared in other of the papers related to the evolution of US policy to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr Pond were that the IADB Inter-American Defense Board become involved in the anti-Castro effort -- an exceedingly naive suggestion considering that the members of this group were far from unanimous in condemning the Castro Revolution And the second unique contribution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to forward to two very senior members of the Executive Branch was the spelling throughout the paper of Communist with a K These last proposals that Admiral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief Western Hemisphere Division The memorandum having been sent down from Mr Bissell's office with the following notation to Col King Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March and the latter handed it to me I do not believe it requires a reply but pass it to you for any value it may have - 78 ffip ECR ET leader whom we could recognize as the head of a government in exile 52 In preparing this comment the former President apparently had to calIon his own memory on the memory of Gen Goodpaster and the memory of Gordon Gray Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that neither his own nor Goodpaster's records contained anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting Similarly Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower You may recall that not so very long after I became your Special Assistant in a meeting you had with Allen Dulles and me you gave instructions that activities of the so-called Special Group should not be recorded in any place except the files of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency You did not wish that there be other copies It was foro this reason that I did not seek a copy of the March 17th paper for my files nor did I make notes at that meeting Subsequent to March 17th I began to make memoranda of every meeting on that particular subject because I had a hunch that someday these might be important and I intended to put them in your hands at the appropriate time understanding of course that you might wish to have them destroyed Incidentally there were no carbons or other copies mad of these memoranda By not making copies and by planning to put the documents in your own hands for whatever disposition you wished to make of them I sort of rationalized my violation of your instructions about not making such memoranda I hope I need not assure you that it was not my practice to violate your instructions and this is the only instance of such that I can recall 53 - 79 - f DF SEC r T 'l OP SECRET B Forging the Tool Following President Eisenhower's approval of the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the numerous discussions meetings and briefings previously mentioned the Agency's leadership then faced the problem of acting directly to implement the antiCastro program Problems which had been discussed philosophically prior to this time now had to be put to the test of practicality Among the problems of principal importance during the period from March to September 1960 were the following The establishment of the leadership of WH 4 and the acquisition of personnel for WH 4 Extensive coordination between Agency representatives and representatives of other us Government Agencies and at the same time a high level of intraAgency coordination The initiation of a paramilitary training program for those Cubans who would be directly involved in helping to dispose of the Castro Government Attempting to establish project parameters and to give proper consideration to' possible changes in the concept of the program as time passed - 80 - 4 -0P SeCRET TOP 3ECrtl I And finally to retain the credibility and viability of the operation despite numerous wild haired proposals that were being put forward at various times during the months under study -- proposals which never should have been offered let alone given any serious consideration As previously noted WH 4 was established by Col King in January of 1960 however i t was not until 24 March 1960 that Mr Bissell apparently officially got around to approving the new Branch for in a memorandum for the Deputy Director for Support DDS i t was noted The SSA-DDS has advised of the DDP's approval of the creation of a new operational Branch the abolishment of an existing section and the creation of a new Section within the WH Division Headquarters Staffing complement The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be more than offset by decrease in the DDP complement he The same memorandum indicated that the Wage and Salary Division of the Office of Personnel had approved the various grades that had been proposed and then the memorandum went on to state The approval limits the usage of the requested positions to the duration of the - 81 - - rOf' EC R l i Cuban crisis after which all the positions in the new Branch and Section will be reviewed for reclassification purposes 5q The question of financing and budget for project JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy and soon after the President's approval of the project the question of budget and finance surfaced By 2q March _ 1960 the Deputy Director for Support noted that Jack Earman advised me that the Director had approved of the paper calling for the release of $900 000 from the reserve for Project JMARC 55 Indeed the Director had signed such a paper calling for the $900 000 as an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds are not available 56 In his memo to the Comptroller concerning the release of funds from the Agency reserve the Director was also careful to point out that i t would be the responsiblity of Chief WH Division to certify that the funds had been expended as specified for the project that additionally the DDP or his designee would have to approve each certification that the only Headquarters file on the budget for the project would be maintained by WH Division and that the - TOp 82 - SECRET IOP SECRE'f file would be complete as to the purpose of the expenditure the date those who were involved as payees and any other details and finally that access to this financial file would be limited to persons specifically authorized by the Deputy Director Plans 57 In the first meeting following the Presidential approval of the anti-Castro program Jake Esterline called the members of WH 4 together to announce that the program had been given the crypt of JMARC and he further pointed out that 1 May 1960 was the target date for the beginning of training at Fort Randolph in Panama This date was predicated on the assump- tion of a satisfactory report from the Inspection Team which was to travel to Fort Randolph on 27 March Medical and security officers were to be assigned to the training base and the communications link was to be established with Headquarters In this early Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by the WH 4 Finance Officer Michael King the Director's Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility with the DDP and Chief WH Division Chief WH 4 was not even included on the routing for the Director's Memorandum The WH 4 Financial Officer on the other hand had suggested that cer ain of the responsibilities for approval of funding be given to the project Chief or the Chief WH Division 58 - 'lOP 83 5ECR rf 'P SEeR Ear meeting Esterline emphasized that training at the Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas of Panama was going to be extremely limited and since there would be no training areas in the United States third country training activities would need to be established He emphasized again that secrecy was of paramount importance if the operation was to succeed and stressed that the establishment of a Governmentin-exile was a key point to making the planned operation credible Esterline further indicated that such a government hopefully could be announced by the early part of April and that the Headquarters for such a government could be located either in Puerto Rico or Costa Rica Esterline also made an appeal for personnel to staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would be known as JMWAVE One interesting point made at this first meeting was that Mr Scudder Georgia reported that the DDS Offices concerned had nominated nearly all of the personnel required by 1 and 15 April respectively Action was being taken to make all these aVailable at once and it was agreed that DDS representatives would meet once a week - 84 - TAP SF0R FT yelP SECRtT to review activities determine the status of commitments and prepare a brief report for Chief Branch 4 59 In another Branch meeting soon after the one just-mentioned Esterline reemphasized as he and others would do throughout the course of the operation the need for security practices designed to protect the fact of Agency involvement in this covert operation He also indicated the considerable degree of cooperation which already was being required from other services Dave Phillips provided a specific example of this emphasizing that without the close cooperation of the united States Navy it would have been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters which were going to be installed on Swan Island Moreover Phillips reported that a crew of Seabees would be responsible for consbructing the facilities to house the transmitters and the quarters for personnel who would conduct the propagahda effort from Swan Island Because the activities then established on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal Aviation Administration C Tracy Barnes the A OOP A was to meet with the Director of FAA Gen Elwood Quesada to clea with him the problems that were - 85 - tgp 3ECR E 1 involved in establishing this Agency activity on the island 60 Coordination also had to be effected with the United States Coast Guard in order that there be no interference with maritime activities and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cuban defectors 61 As attempts were being made to establish the parameters for the operations against Castro a most prescient memorandum was directed to Chief WH 4 from Paul Oberst Chief Covert Action WH Division Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz Government in Guatemala in 1954 and recalling some of the pitfalls and counter-productive aspects of that particular operation Oberst wrote as follows I have the impressio that our basic JMARC plan Gomrnits us to a rather firm timetable In my jUdgment we should have great flexibility in deciding the appropriate time for kicking off any paramilitary operations Before such operatiorts are initiated we should have firm evidence that our propaganda and political action operations have irrevocably undermined Castro's prestige both in Cuba and abroad We should not initiate paramilitary actions until we are convinced that they will not enable - 86 - Castro to recuperate lost prestige and rally local and foreign sympathy and support Generally speaking current area attitudes toward the Castro regime are satisfactory from our CIA point of view However this could change radically and rapidly if there are any premature paramilitary actions When the time comes for paramilitary activity we should make every effort to conceal any invasion actions To avoid or minimize Castro s counter propaganda the paramilitary operations must appear to be an inter Z uprising by dissident elements ithin Cuba This of course would require clandestine infiltration of personnel pnd arms before the hostitlities begi In my opinion Castro will inevitably charge the US with responsibility for JMARC operations and many Latin Americans and other foreign observers will be inclined to accept such charges with or wi thout supporting evidence Therefore what we need is a massive diversionary effort that will either obscure the fact of our involvement or make our involvement palatable This diversionary tactic might be accomplished by exploiting unanimous Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo regime ooo If i t became known or strongly suspected that we were supporting operations to bring about a transition to cernacratic government in the Dominican Repub ic the waters would be suitably muddied and a climate prepared for the Cuban effo t 62 Debatable though Oberst's philosophy regarding the Dominican Republic might be serious attention to his initial comments regarding paramilitary activities against Castro might have halted -- or at least seriously altered -- the operations which would ul ima ely conclude at the Bahia de Cochinos As with ober of the cautionary and restrained proposals whic w ulc be put forth prior to launching the invasion little heed footnote continued on follQwi S page - lOP 87 Sh FT OP SECREi In mid-April of 1960 WH 4 made the first presentation for the DCI since the basic program had been approved by President Eisenhower in mid-March attendance in addition to the DCI were In Gen Cabell Mr Helms C OPS Herman Horton CI Staff and C Tracy Barnes Mr Bissell's Deputy This high level group was informed that broadcasting activity from Swan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and that very special operations were being carried out in order to provide stories for propaganda use Ac- cording to Dave Phillips who made the presentation apparently was paid to Mr Obers 's proposals About the same time that Oberst's memorandum was going forward the DDP was calling for WH 4 to prepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminating the need for crash-type responses or actions In discussing the contents of such reports it was indicated that The Progress Report should generally not exceed one page in length and that we should not hesitate to include it in items which were not favorable to our progress in other words setbacks or handicaps which we might have encountered 63 Also by way of keeping informed about developments related to the operation Chief WH 4 instituted a series of weekly meetings with the operational elements of the DDP for the purpose of insuring operational coordination similar to that achieved by the meeting of support elements every Tuesday morning 64 - 88 - 40P Sf-eRr i J OP SECREr on propaganda excellent results were being obtained The reports on the evolution of the government in exile and the buildup of the stay-behind network and on paramilitary activity indicated that much work still remained to be done to get these activities off the ground Further it was pointed out to the DCI and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly escalating principally because Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment were being charged against the project which in fact was the major cause of the project's over-obligation It was the opinion of all concerned that such property should be held on a Memorandum Receipt basis without cost to the project and that charges if any should be reflected as direct costs only if property was found unserviceable or was not returned to communications stock supply after the project 'is terminated The DCI was advised that this matter would be discussed with the Comptroller for resolution 65 Most important in connection with this briefing was the DCI's comment that With respect to personnel needs he assured all no matter whether personnel were overseas or in the US he would arrange to obtain personnel required in support of JMARC 66 The meaning of Chief WH 4's comments to the DCI was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment No 1 to the project was submitted to the Director - 89 - -rOP SECltECF J fi' for approval SELRE I The amendment concerned the need for more money and pointed out that Not only has the initial $900 000 already been expended but it is currently estimated that an additional $1 0 million is immediately required to carry the activity through 30 June 1960 Note is also made o o of possible contingencies amounting to an additional $1 4 million for which no funds are requested at this time 67 In addition to an early updating for the DCI WH 4 also undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisenhower approval of the anti-Castro program On 8 April 1960 General Cabell headed a CIA delegation including Mr Bissell Col King and Jake Esterline which briefed a very high level group of Department of Defense representatives in the JCS conference room at the Pentagon General Cabell made only introduc- tory remarks and the bulk of the briefing was conducted by Mr Bissell with some assistance from Included among the Defense participants were Thomas Gates Secretary of Defense Gen Twining Chairman JCS Gen Shoup CornmandantU S Marines Admiral Burke CNO General Erskine Chief Special Ops U S Army Gen White COS USAF and Gen Woolnough representing COS Army 68 - 90 - oP SFPR rq J 8 $ EC RET J C King Apparently Jake Esterline the man who had the monkey on his back as project chief sat quietly by The suggestion which had been made by Paul Oberst that the waters be muddied by making it appear that the US was backing the anti-Trujillo forces in the Dominican Republic was not introduced during the course of this briefing of the JeS even though the Dominican Republic was included as a part of the ov rall briefing What did emerge with refer- ence to the Dominican Republic was a concensus that if Trujillo were ousted there was a strong possibility that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic where he probably would be received as a conquering hero In the course of the discussion which followed the briefing Admiral Burke emerged as the principal hawk indicating his willingness to move fleet units into the Port au Prince Haiti area because the suggestion had been made that if Castro went into the Dominican Republic it would only be a few days time before he also would be welcomed into Haiti In ad- dition Bur e made it quite clear that should the - 91 - rop SFP lciJA J O P 81 C RGBP't Cuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo the Navy was prepared to defend that base In Burke's opinion the Navy had adequate force available to do that 69 Whether a direct result of this briefing of the JCS or not there was a noticeable improvement in WH 4's relations with the military services before the end of April 1960 On 19 April for example $150 000 was to be funneled from the CIA's Director of LOgistics to the Comptroller US Army ostensibly as a working fund for the 0 GBP J J 9 ' J This money of course was to be used for necessary construction renovation procurement of material and hire of native labor as necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site for the PM insturctor cadre 71 Before the end of April 1960 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved in principle the Agency's This briefing for the senior personnel in the Department of Defense would have taken place in any event but it may have been prompted by the reluctance of the designated DOD liaison officer with WH 4 Capt Burns Spore USN to do much more than listen to tVH 4's requests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the project and for real estate for use in the training program until he received a green light from the SecDef 70 - 92 - J OP SECItI T request for overflight photo coverage of the islands offshore of Cuba The decision on this matter was taken up not only with the Air Force but also with J Lampton Berry of the Department of State Al- though the authorization and plan for these overflights presumably by the U-2 antedated the shootdown of Francis Gary Power's U-2 in the Soviet Union it was recorded that Ambassador Berry had called to say that the Department oo had approved the mission but insisted that extremely tight security be exercised throughout and that Col Benson USAF Operations inform Ambassador Berry before each sortie so that the Department would 'be properly prepared to respond to any emergency_ 72 The first flight incidentally was tentatively scheduled for the weekend of 30 April - 1 May of 1960 In April of 1960 in addition to working with the Army the Agency representatives also began to work with the Covert Limited Warfare Committee of Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary AE P to Ceylon who was at this time assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Powers was shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960 - TAP 93 qf7e f f O SEC the Office of Special Operations Department of Defense One of the particular problems of concern in this relationship was that of covert sea transportation which might be necessary to lift anti-Castro forces back to the island of Cuba Even though all the planning about which there is a record at this time concerned only cadres for guerrilla warfare training and the infiltration of communications experts on 25 April 1960 Savilion Chapman of DDP's Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas USN and a Col Anderson USMC who were members of the DOD CIA Covert Limited Warfare Stockpiling Committee and discussed among other interesting subjects The acquisition from the Navy of two Landing Ship-Tanks LST and four AirSea Rescue Craft AVR the training of the Cuban crews for these vessels and the means of covert transfer of the vessels from the Navy to the Agency 73 In addition to the requested overhead reconnissance of the Cuban coastline by the Air Force the It is rather strange that at this early date in April 1960 discussions were being held concerning the acquisition of LST's There had been no discussions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban troops back into their homeland and consequently the discussion re LST's seems highly out of place - 94 OPSFP FT xOP SCCRE Maritime Branch representatives also discussed beach gradient problems with the Marine Corps aL repre- sentatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office_ was ascertained that much work needed to be order to upgrade information suitable for rt don in p aDDiDg the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops and vehicles 74 In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's announcement of the anti Castro policy tt - Department of State seemed to be operating in a world of its own making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the flow of information on Cuba's internal develcpmemts On 25 March for example Roy Rubottom Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs was the originator of an elaborate memoran mn provided a check list of current operatior E which d ten categories of activity related to developw- nts Ln Cuba From the tenor of the paper itself i t se s as though Rubottan was ignorant of the Cuba issues before the Special Group of the discussio s aillODg CIA State and Department of Defense and of the President's approved plan for covert actic or was there any evident awareness of the var '- JU3 o'J ert -'-OP FiFCrJ JAr Tor SECRET programs with reference to the Cuban problem 75 About this same time Allen Dulles made known to the Special Group his displeasure that the Department failed to consult with the Agency prior to announcing the reappointment of Philip BonsaI as US Ambassador to Cuba 76 The Rubottom plan apparently had some impact for by the end of April 1960 Gordon Gray was calling on Douglas Dillon the Undersecretary of State to find someone in the Department -- Dillon himself -to be constantly seized of the Cuban problem and who would take steps to assure that all of the activities of various groups were in harness and that all needed decisions were made when needed 77 Mr Gray also specified some of the problems which would face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activi y noting Livingston Merchant has set up two groups one under the cnairmanship of Mr Mallory In addition there is the Special Group of which Livie is a member and in his absence Ray Hare sits Further there is a special activity This 0f course apparently i ores or disregards the creation of WH 4 and the responsibilities designated to the Agency by Gray's boss President Eisenhower TOp 96 GEGD r r ' OP 8ECl'tI T proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob Anderson with which you mayor may not be familiar Allen Dul les has a particular liaison with Bob in this matter The Defense Department of course has many interests 78 The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the programs with reference to Cuba did not sit well with the Agency and after the matter had been surfaced at a meeting of the Special Group on 28 April Chief WH 4 prepared a memorandum stating in part with reference to Dillon The Agency would not look with favor on this arrangement Mr Barnes and the Director therefore plan to go over to State on Monday afternoon 2 May 1960 and head off this new development Mr Barnes believes that a short paper setting forth what we are already doing in the fields of coordination and liaison should be adequate to support their point of view 79 Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon become Chief of Staff for the nation's anti-Castro program was in itself distasteful to the Agency or whether i t was simply opposition to the idea that State should take over the direction of a program which would basically be carried out by the Agency is not revealed in the records Presumably both elements - 97 - IQP 3t CR E I entered into the picture In any event Gordon Gray seemed cavalier in disregarding the creation of WH 4 and the liaison arrangements which had already been made See Appendix 0 But whatever the explana- tion Mr Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for the nation's Cuban program Although it was not included on the list of Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and contacts at this time mention should be made of the CIA-FB contacts concerning Cuba Technically the FBI was prohibited from engaging in intelligence operations overseas but in mid-June 1960 Chief WH 4 revealed that the FBI reportedly had plans for installing a stay-behind network -- using Mexicans and Cubans -- to be activated in case diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba were broken Chief WH 4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with the FBI Liaison Officer Sam Papich and ask for an explanation of the Bureau's plan 80 About the same time that Chief WH 4 was evincing concern about FBI activities in Cuba Chief WH Division noted in Appendix 0 page 332 - 98 - 3 012 ' 'itO B FX rop 3ECItE'T a memorandum for the Acting Director of Central Intelligence that A thorough investigation has been made of the relations between the Havana Station and the flavana Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation It has been concluded that the operations of the FBI have neither interferred with nor conflicted with the Station's operations 81 Col King's memo also stated the Bureau's longtime contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to both the Bureau and to the Station pointing out that freq ently the Station was called on to participate in or actually undertake e debriefing of various individuals who had come into the FBI offices to volunteer information ' On occasion the Bureau had even turned over specific operations to the Station Chief WH Division went even further when during the course of one of the'weekly interdepartmental meetj gs in State it was suggested by Mr Gray and Mr Mallory that the FBI was exceeding its jurisdiction and that perhaps this should be brought before the NSC for consideration Col King reported that he remained non-committal at this time but did point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue should be soft-pedaled He did say however that - 99 - fOP SECItET - 0 Ii SEc RET the memorandum he had prepared on this subject was being held in the files should questions about this particular Bureau activity ever be raised King also recommended that the Agency not take the initiative in raising the question 82 Neither Col King nor anyone else involved in the anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana area By mid-summer 1960 the relationship became even Qloser particularly as the Agency expanded activities at the Forward Operations Base JMASH later JMWAVE in Miami In one report concerning the number of the Cuban exiles in the Miami area who were under suspicion of or were -- working for Castro or who were trying desperately to get support from one or another US Agency an FBI agent made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA representative with whom he was exchanging information According to the report from Miami an FBI agent told me that his personal opinion was that it would be virtually impossible if not completely impossible to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime using Cuban exiles He thought the only solution to the problem and the one that stood the best chance of success was to - - 100 COli C cro J T go in with the US Marines He admitted that this was only his personal opinion but he felt that in view of his experience and contact with the Cuban exiles he had a good point I could not help agree with him 83 Agent George Davis apparently was extremely interested in full cooperation with the Agency quickly accepting the Agency representative's proposal that they visit the FBI offices once or twice each week to co pare notes and the CIA field representa- tive in turn agreed to pass on to Mr Davis in the FBI any information which the Agency might acquire pertaining to FBI interests The Forward Operations Base FOB opened in May 1960 in Coral Gables Florida and it was the second FOB that had been established since the formation of WH Division -- the initial base having been set up during the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 19531954 In general the Miami FOB paralleled the organization of Headquarters with FI CI CA Support and PM units FOB reported directly to the Chief WH Division not to Jake Ester1ine Chief wa 4 Initially the satellite communications center for relaying commo between Headquarters and the field -- including facilities in the Florida Keys concerning the maritime operations -- was established and ultimately the commo link would connect Headquarters with the operations in Guatemala and Nicaragua The cover firm for the base was Clarence A DePew Sons a notional cover for an organization engaged in classified research A series of some 32 reports has been prepared on the FOB and the reports are available through the Records Management Officer of WH Division These footnote continued on following page - 101 - I J P- 3 ECR ET In addition to its concern with the interests of other government agencies in the Cuban proble f in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required to provide intelligence briefings for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates of the major po1itical parties While the intelligence briefings were scheduled to consider the world situation considerable emphasis was being given to both Cuba and the Dominican Republic In preparation for Mr Dulles' brief ing of the Democratic nominee John F Kennedy on 23 July 1960 WH 4 prepared detailed Cuban briefing pa er touching on the principal aspects of the exile organization the propaganda plan penetration of Cuba by personnel from communist countries including the Soviet Union Red China Bulgaria Czechoslovakia and East Ge-rmany and the play-that Castro was Eaking in the l atin American world for pro-communist synnpathizers In addition emphasis also was given to the reports deal basically with the period between L962 and 1968 and while there is some feeling that the story of the Bay of Pigs operation should go into extensive detail on the initial operations of th FOB this author has chosen not to do so fOCUSLng instead on only those broad aspects of Lhe problem relating to the Miami Base 84 - 102 - J GP SECRr r planned program for paramilitary training and operations under the aegis of CIA Insofar as can be determined however there is no indication that in his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential candidates that Mr Dulles went into any specifics on the Agency's anti-Castro plans 85 As mentioned previously one of the continuing problems requiring coordination within the Executive Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project JMATE From an estimate of some $2 5 million of budgeted and reserve funds which had been made available for the program by mid-August of 1960 Mr Bissell appeared at a special Group meeting requesting that an additional $10 75 million be released from reserve funds to meet the ever-increasing needs particularly for the paramilitary and propaganda programs The decision of the Special Group following Mi- Bissell's appeal was that This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days This was believed to be wise 'not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which - 103 - TAP FPP r c should not be undertaken without a reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward 86 On 22-23 August of 1960 after discussions with Mr Stans and Mr Macy the Agency was notified that the requested $10 million for FY 61 would be made available from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies 87 C Cooperation and Challenge As already mentioned immediately following the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro program th re was a considerable degree of coopera- tion between CIA and other of the concerned Agencies -- the Department of Defense the Department of State the Federal Bureau of Investigation Immigration and Naturalization Service and others As WH 4 continued to expand and develop the various programs -- propa- ganda covert action staybehind networks and paramilitary operations -- there were ever increasing contacts between CIA and the representatives of other One explanation for the sharply increasing demand for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel was being written off upon issue rather than upon c nsumption -- an aspect of the operation that was explained to the author by William E Eisemann formerly Chief Support WH 4 88 - 104 - -TOP SErRE l' J OP SEEftr T government agencies Perhaps the best way to describe the period from the summer of 1960 until the early fall was as a period of cooperation and challenge Cooperation because the needs of the Agency represented National Policy Challenge to most if not all of CIA's proposals -- proposals which concerned the nature of the propaganda effort the size and make-up of the exile military force which was being organized the location of training sites the types of technical materiel including aircraft being requested and most important by the end of this period the specific nature of the military-operation which was to be mounted against Fidel Castro By early June 1960 the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees -- even though the actual ing of the initial instructor cadre at Fort train andolph in Panama had not yet begun and the FRO was only in the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo training facilities in Guatemala It was anticipated that the increased number of PM trainees would be recruited out of the Miami area frow other Latin American countries where Cubans had taken up residence - 105 - TOP nrCJPY F F rOP SECRET o and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba The emphasis on the PM training at this time was to be on weapons demolitions sabotage and guerrilla warfare tactics and the weapons familiarization was to be with the M-l carbine the Garand and Springfield rifles the Thompson sub-machine gun and the 45 Colt automatic pistol This of course was the weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard arms packs 89 It must be presumed that the call for increases in the number of PM trainees was related to the continued importation of Soviet weapons and technicians and the increasing strength of the Communist Party in Cuba An NIE written in mid-June 1960 on The Situation in Cuba for example noted that the Castro regime was deeply and increasingly infiuenced by Communists no longer any prospect of democratic government under his Fidel Castro's regime As was past estimates this particular NIE was unable to answer the question of whether Castro himself was a Communist The NIE also mentioned that no strong opposition leader to the Castro regime had emerged -nor did the opposition at that time pose a serious threat to - 106 - op SEEURRET LGP sr CRET the regime One weakness touched on by the National Estimate concerned the Castro militia which was characterized as only partially armed and for the most part poorly trained o and appears to have little if any effectiveness as an organized combat force in conventional operations For either of the fore- going reasons perhaps an increase in the number of PM personnel might a assist in bringing a strong dissident leader to the fore or b develop the capability to overcome the Castro militia 90 The question of an increased number of PM trainees surfaced in a late August briefing for Presi dent Eisenhower Secretaries Gates Dillon and Anderson and Generals Persons Lernnitzer and Goodpaster by the DCI and Mr Bissell After President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser Gordon Gray summarized developments since the March announcement of the antiCastro program Mr Dulles provIded some specifics concerning the organization of the FRD and its principals noting that the Headquarters for the FRO had been established in Mexico City in lieu of the invitation of President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permit the FRO to operate from-his country - 107 - I OP SECREf Mr Dulles OP SECreEI noted that at this time it was particularly important that the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed When the discussion turned to the PM forces the Department of Defense representative Mr Gates made i t quite clear that he was concerned about the possibility of US military personnel being involved directly in the military operations inside Cuba Mr Bissell responded that US military personnel in third countries would be used only as instructors not as cadre leaders for either an invasion or a guerrilla warfare effort Bissell did stress however that there was need for a standby force preferably of non-Americans with special training in guerrilla warfare to provide a leadership complement to the Cubans when push came to shove a -recommeridation that provoked some differences of opinion during the course of this briefing for the President when it was suggested that US officers might be required to direct these forces Mr Dulles proposed withholding this dis- cussion until the Agency and the JCS could talk the matter over Mr Gray seemed to be determined that the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved - 108 - rep SFPRF - rop 3ECRE I at this particular time According to his own report of his position at this meeting Mr Gray pointed out that it would be unwise to mount any kind of an operation without the determination to see it through and that an abortive effort would be worse than no effort at all He therefore thought that if this backup force was essential to ultimate success full consideration should be given to it at this stage in the planning Mr Dulles again urged that a decision on this be deferred 91 In support of Mr Gray and in some contradiction to Mr Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM force would be able to carry off the effort without any outside help the President was reported to have indicated that He would go along so long as the Joint Chiefs Defense State and CIA think we have a good chance of being successful He wouldn't care much about this kind of cost the $10 million inc ease noted earlier indeed he said he would defend this kind of action against all corners and that if we could be sure of freeing the Cubans from this incubus $25 million might be a small price to pay In light of today's relations between the united States and other of the major world powers with the third countries Gordon Gray displayed -- in the summer of 1960 -- a degree of foresight with which he has never been properly credited For he noted at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly with Cuba there was an obvious danger that other small nations would be encouraged to undertake harassments of the major powers 92 -109 - TOP SECUET J Op 3 EC R T The President concluded the meeting by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves with the result' of starting something before we were ready for it 93 One of the most persistent problems which was to surface by early fall of 1960 concerned the need for the anti-Castro operation itself and the bulk of the questioning came from the Department of State principally from Thomas Mann who soon was to become the Assistant Secretary of State for American Repub1ic Affairs Mann already had been involved in some of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on 17 August 1960 Gordon Gray noted that in discussing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August that in addition to Messrs Dulles and Bissell a third CIA officer might possibly be in attendance and he also noted that the Vice-President had been invited to attend the briefing According to Gray's record however neither the Vice-President nor the third CIA representative were in attendance at the briefing of 18 August The attendance of the Director and Mr Bissell but with no CIA representative fromWH 4 was further illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism that at too many high level briefings CIA's representatives were individuals who high ranks notwithstanding were the furthest from the operation -- yet they were responsible for informing the nation's policymakers about the details of the anti-Castro program 94 It is also interesting to note that thisoff-therecord meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted only 23 minutes and this included at least a short time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary' Powers 95 - 110 - rOP SECRET Economic Affairs In early September of 1960 Chief WH 4 learned from a member of the Department of State that Mr Mann was going to ask for a restudy of the basic concept of JMATE or if he did not ask for that re-evaluation he would ask for immediate review and rescheduling of the timetable for the JMATE operation At this time and in view of the lack of prog- ress both in developing any great cohesion within the FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba the questions seemed in order The reaction of Chief WH 4 however was that an attempt should be made to blunt Mr Mann's efforts noting for example The degree to which we are already committed in JMARC would pose a monumental security problem alone if we were suddenly instructed to cease and desist from further activity As of this moment they have well in excess of 200 people engaged in air ground and communications 'training in Guatemala Additionally our acrossthe-board propaganda activities are being stepped up daily A drastic rescheduling of either activity therefore could bring about serious repercussions 96 The precise nature of these serious repercussions was not spelled out As time passed however it wonld be charged that the cessation of the Agencysponsored training activities would loose a flood of - 111 - YOP S2CRE - p SECRET Cubans back into the exile communitYi and they would charge that the United States feared to undertake t re task of ousting Fidel Castro This in turn would mean that the US would lose face in the eyes of the Democratic Latin American republics Jake Esterline speculated that Mann did not believe that the Cubar5 were willing to support an insurrection a ainst Castrc A suggestion which was made to counter the possible Mann proposals was that To strengthen our position therefore we are bending every effort to get at least one supply airdrop into the target country prior to the Assistant Secretary's return to the United States ooo Successful action in this area should weig heavily on Assistant Secretary Mann's alleged new attitude 97 Just how one -- or even more -- successful air drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a possible insurrection effort was hot explair d there were dissidents on the island was That s estio d the problem was the degree of strength and effecti7eness that they might be able to demonstrate Fortunately for the continuation of Pr ect J L E the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline refe r 6 did not set the criteria for the continu2tian or cissolution of the project This air drop as a corn et footnote continued on fcllowing g - 112 - Mr Mann would continue to raise questions concerning the feasibility of discontinuing the training in Guatemala and in on-going meetings with Agency representatives including the DCI the DDP Chief WH as well as Chief WH 4 and others Mann continued to raise questions about the effect on Project JMATE should all the American trainers and C an be pulled out of Guatemala immediately trainees Mann also questioned the exact timing for Project JMATE As he raised such questions the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs was informed by eLA that they would much prefer that the training of the Cuban exiles take place in us bases bQth for purposes of security and for efficiency But they also pointed out that it had been the decision for the Special Group and the highest levels that such training should take place in third countries rather than in the US Mann persisted however suggesting that the question of maintaining the training base in and total bust the supplies being droFped to the guerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's forces and the aircraft itself made a forced landip g in Mexico and was not recovered See Vol e I of this history Air Operations - 113 - pep -SECRET' Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised again with the Special Group The Agency's repre- sentatives agreed to this suggestion with the strictest proviso that no move from Guatemala could or should be made until adequate staging facilities in the Zone of the Interior have been prepared 98 Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in a somewhat different context than had been suggested by Esterline and J C King Barnes recommended con- sideration be given among other items to The fact that a move from the present training sites to the US should not be made too hurriedly and the importance of avoiding a decision at a later date that the training in the US is a bar to operational use I realize that this latter point would be a complete contradiction of the present theory but after all there is an intervening election and political views can shift so that everything possible should be done to avoid our getting ourselves into the box where we move to the US for one reason and then find that the US move is used against us to prevent or limit ultimate operations 100 One additional point which was made by Jake Esterline and J C King in their conversations with Source reference No 99 not used - 114 - J OP Sf-CR FT secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the training program in Guatemala might very well lead to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the procommunist elements which were already in evidence in opposition to the Ydigoras regime It was indi- cated that should the troop training be moved from Guatemala to the United States 300 Guatemalan troops would be trained as a special security force for the Guatemalan government 101 During these discussions in the late fall of 1960 Mann also raised the issue of economic sanctions which had been touched on in the early spring At this time however the Agency's representatives believed that Mann was talking in terms of a one to three year quarantine period in an attempt to disrupt the Cuban economy -- a quarantine however which would not interfere with the flow of goods from the Communist countries This was a point of some contention between State and CIA with the Agency people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the economy of Castro's Cuba 102 In the context of a possible move of the training facilities to the United States Chief WH - 115 if fi 0 '1 cx prep red J OP SECltE I a memorandum for the DDP indicating that the need for training bases to be located in the southern part of the United States should include an infantry training base capable of handling 3 000 men with range facilities tactical training areas an airfield for training air and ground crews in the utilization of B-26 C-46 and C-54 aircraft aerial gunnery and bomb range facilities and maritime training and staging facilities It was suggested that the air- field logistical base should be located in southern Florida and permission to use Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico to stage black over-flights to Cuba should be obtained The maritime facilities would be located on Vieques Island Puerto Rico and also in southern Florida In a meeting with the Special Group the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence put forth the proposals concerning the movement of training bases to the United States and although he was supported by the Department of Defense representatives -- Mr Douglas and Gen Lansdale -- Livingston Merchant of the Department of State normally one of the hard liners of the Department seemed to have ambivalent - 116 - lP H I FT_ rOD gECRET feelings at this time about the training program Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann's arguments suggesting that the time for military action was so far down the line that US efforts should be concentrated on economic sanctions at this time 103 Adolf A Berle who would become one of the Kennedy administration's principal advisers on Latin America also seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in favor of economic sanctions Berle suggesting that the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of arms and ammunition both to Cuba and from Cuba to other parts of Latin America 104 Although i t has been indicated that the Department of Defense would apparently support the Agency in its request for the establishment of training facilities in the conti ental U ited States DOD did balk at the use of military personnel in third country areas in support of Project JMATE Although Deputy Secretary of Defense James H Douglas began to question whether his department had actually been committed to support CIA's anti-Castro effort it seems clear that policy approval for the use of Department of Defense personnel in Project JMATE had been established - 117 - 1 ' T l _ c p 0 D __ '- I' J QP 3f CR ET with the approval of the President's comprehensive program of covert action against Fidel Castro in March 1960 105 The difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense concerning the 'assignment of Special Force trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training bases has already been spelled out in considerable detail in another volume but even as the Department of Defense was taking a negative attitude toward the possible use of DOD personnel in either training or combat activities the Agency was proposing the re o cruitment of either American or foreign volunteers to serve as combat troops for Project JMATE The Bureau of American Republic Affairs of Department of State however put the quietus on the plan for obtaining foreign volunteers but J Foster Collins - the Chief of the Covert Action Staff suggested to the Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he the DDP could convince Livingston Merchant of the need to re-examine the Department of State policy The problem of the Special Force trainers is discussed in Volume II of this history Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy - 118 -TAP Q on r-r - TOP ECRE f Collins was particularly enthusiastic about the prosspects for recruiting Germans Greeks and ks to serve as volunteers but in the end State s 7ie_ prevailed and there were no contingents of either American or foreign volunteers 106 During the period of buildup and organization of WH 4 for the Jl1ATE effort against Castro e Agency encountered some problems with the us javy di ic lties but none of these were as serious as the encountered with the Department of Defense per se the Air Force or the united States Army ence of the United States Naval Base at T e exist- Guac Bay in Cuba presented an unusual situation i view of the planning that was taking place Appa ently however there was no disagreement between e Agency and the Navy that prohibited Guantanamo froe being used to mount anti-Castro activities or fro used as a safe haven area for'those who migc been detected engaging in sabotage other anti-Castro activities being have propagar a or The purpose c such restrictions of course was to prevent the Cuba ls from claiming violations of the legal and international agreement between the United - 119 H iP P 'b C I b c a s 'fOfJ SECREt and the Government of Cuba over the lease of Guantanamo Bay So serious was this issue in fact that the Agency agreed that all Cubans participating in overflights of Cuba would be told that Guantanamo Naval Base was not to be used as a safe haven and that if they landed there they would be turned over to the Cuban authorities 107 The Guantanamo Base also presented a major difficulty for the Department of State Evidence of this surfaced in early October of 1960 when it was reported that during a meeting of the State Working Group on Cuba a suggestion was put forward that the US try to influence Latin American nations to approve US retention of the base One proposal had been made that this be done through the Inter-American Defense Board B where a resolution apparently was about to be introduced asking for a definition of the relations between Cuba and the USSR with the expectation that this might force Cuba's resignation from membership on the IADB Agency's According to Col John F Mallard the liaiso officer with the State Working Group In addition State desires that the IADB ma e sane statement on the importance of Guantanamo Bay to Latin American hemisphe -e defense This statement would in effect give Latin American approval to U S retention of this base 108 - 120 - WP EEURRE TOP SECRE I This frame of reference concerning Guantanamo Bay led the Executive Officer of WH 4 Ed Stanulis to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief Western Hemisphere Division raising some questions which are as pertinent to CIA today as they were when they were raised in 1960 Stanulis wrote as follows I realize that this Agency is an implementing arm of the Executive Branch and has no right or privilege in the area of formulation of U S national policy I believe that within this framework we who are part of this Agency are permitted to co ent on certain State Department or other Executive Department propositions that appear on the basis of our own personal observations and experience to be counter-productive to the best interest of the United states I am convinced that the course of actio described in paragraph 1 that the U s use the IADB to win Latin American support for the U s retention of Guantanamol is in fact within this category It is igh time that the U S take an understandable public position in matters of international agreement compact contract and treaty The rights of the u s to the Guantanamo Bay area have been clearly and legally described in several documents which bear the signatures of the then reigning and cognizant governments of the United States and Cuba respectively Certainly the assistance of any single or plural Latin American national entity ies seems to me to be indicative of an admitted weakness on the part of the United States - 121 xon or and its conviction of its legal international rights I suggest th t this Agency make known to the State Department its feelings in this matter as described above if addres agree I realize that considerable discussion could be waged in terms of legally and or logically presenting our case This memorandum is not intended to meet these requirements One observation that might be included is the fact that the current Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke has on at least o occasions in U S mass media of sizable circulation stated that the United States would not tolerate any invasion of Guantanamo or hostile abrogation of our treaty arrangements to the base I believe it is significant to note that no responsible member of the Executive Branch including the President of the United States has contradicted his statements On the basis of this evidence it would appear to me that the official overt position of the United States is crystal clear and we need not at this time place ourselves in a position of indebtedness or vulnerability with any other Latin American nation in terms of the Guantanarne issue 109 By early November 1960 Secretary of State Christian Herter had cecided that the matter of Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level an consequently he introduced the subject on the agenda for the National Security Council meeting of 7 November 1960 The Secretary emphasized the need for coordination of mi i ary - 122 - and political planning 1 e P SELkE I in case of an attack on the naval base indicated two extreme possibilities Herter one that in case of an attack the United States respond with only sufficient military force to protect the base itself and another that the United states decide that an attack on the base was in fact an act of war and apply such military power as necessary Herter also suggested of course that there would be possible responses between the two extremes with activities in the OAS or the UN possibly having some bearing on the us response -- the sort of contention that undoubtedly must have raised the hackles on Mr Stanulis again The Secretary of State did specify however that the us response to an attack on Guantanamo would be the result of a decision made by the President of the Unite States As will be pointed out subsequently the Cubans would make charges about Guantanamo be1ng the center for anti-Castro activities and there would be a few instances where anti-Castro Cubans were able to find refuge within the confines of the base Overall however there was a surprising degree of neutrality with respect to the naval installation during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation - 123 - ' UP SECRET It is also important to mention at this time the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief CINCLANT Admiral Dennison Before the end of October 1960 the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's representatives that he believed i t impossible for him to conduct the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in the Cuban area properly until he received further information -- specific information -- about the Agency's planned operations against Castro When this report on Dennison was brought to the attention of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff F P Holcomb Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request for information which he cared to lay on the Agency would be promptly answered By this time Dennison indicated that he had already been in touch with General Lemnitzer Chairman of the JCS and the expectation was that such briefing on Cuban affairs by CIA was being laid on ' Holcomb quite truthfully indicated that neither he nor the Agency's liaison officer to CINCLANT Commander Ray E Millard were privy to the planned operations of WH 4 Once having assured the Admiral of the willingness of CIA to c00perate and provide - 124 - pcp SECREl J QP BECkE I him with the necessary information Holcomb then noted It was the impression of the CIA officers present that Admiral Dennison is a cooperative officer and favorably and objectively inclined towards CIA and that if his needs can be met he will undoubtedly follow a positive and helpful course 111 On 2 November 1960 Richard Bissell Jacob Esterline and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk to Admiral Dennison's headquarters The CIA representa- tives received a general briefing by the Navy on contingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba and in return they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE Mr Bissell gave an overview of the CIA operation Esterline discussed the political and propaganda aspects and Hawkins talked about the PM program including the plan for a 1 500-man invasion force to seize a lodgement on the island of Cuba Hawkins emphasized that this last objBctive could not be met until March or April of 1961 112 In a telecon with the author of this history on 15 May 1978 Admiral Dennison indicated that it was extremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs operation before he received any briefing rrc CIA on the anti-Castro operation He made it sound in fact as though he was not briefed until shortl before the footnote continued on follc ing page - 125 - OP ECRE I _TOP SECftE I D Personnel and Training From the time of the official approval of the anti-Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question of personnel and personnel management for Project JMATE was of constant concern Even though the Director of Central Intelligence emphasized the significance of the Project by saying that he would recall Agency personnel from any station in the world if the individual's abilities were required for the successful achievement of JMATE objectives some of those who were closest to the personnel problem believed that DCI Dulles failed completely to keep that promise 113 Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 has re- marked as follows It'was obvious that as the operation began to increase in size that the Divisi didn't have the personnel the senior personnel to staff out the organization or if they did have them they weren't about to release them from the LSD Landing Ship Dock which was to carry the landing craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion As the text above confirms however the Admiral was read into the act relatively early in the game and should have had plenty of time to make preparations for the activities of April 1961 - 126 - 1 'OP SECRET JPYor SECRtf things they were doing because they were considered indispensable which was probably correct It was on that basis I think that when people like Dick Drain came back home from -- in Dick's case I think he carne in from II r l-- where he had a pretty good record -- but he was not returning to Headquarters to go into an assignment and Dick Bissell put him in tne operation with us Gerry Droller had been around Headquarters for a long time had been quite a bit of a replacement problem He was very bright he was a German specialist had a pretty good political background and Gerry and Howard Hunt for whatever reason were sort of selected not by us but they were told they were going to be the people who would handle the political aspects of the operation 114 r Esterline also noted that the shortage of competent personnel became particularly critical when the operational concepts began to change and to expand He claimed that when serious problems came up none of the GS-18 case officers were available to make decisions 115 Bill Eisemann Chief Support WH 4 was more specific in his criticism of the personnel management for Project JMATE After emphasizing that Colonel L K White the Deputy Di1'ector for Support DDS did insure that the support elements got the best people for Project JHATE he White directed all support office heads that if there was a need for any - 127 - Tal' SECRE'I senior officer or any position to be filled that they would fill it without any hesitation whatsoever 116 But in contrast Eisemann pointed out I can't say that was true on the operational side of the shop A Contingency Task Force a program developed by the Clandestine Services was designed to make available Agency personnel who could be pulled out of any position that they were assigned to and moved into any urgent high priority type of project JMATE Project was a high priority project and the Contingency Task Force concept in my opinion failed at that point because the Clandestine Services did not provide the top quality people we needed for the position to be filled After JMATE Project ooo the Contingency Task ' Force was completely abolished Many people in the Agency were designated from the Support and the Operational side to fill various positions as they would come up but it didn't work from the Clandestine Services side We had real problems trying to get qualified ooo top qualified people ooo to do those jobs In my opinion the Contingency Task Force was a failure It was set up and designed so that qualified personnel would be completely immunized and processed and ready to go with passports at any given time But you couldn't get the people you wanted -- I'm talking about qualified key professionals in the Clandestine Services -- because the Division heads in the Clandestine Services would not release those people 117 Dick Drain who became Chief of Operations for Project JMATE was among the severest of the critics with reference to the personnel assigned to Project JMATE Pointing to his own case Drain stated - 128 - TOP SECItf l T TOP 3 CRE 1 I don't mean to be unduly immodest but really I didn't have any qualifications for this WH 4 except that I was there and unemployed -- had no Spanish language whatsoever and my entire exposure had been punching cows in Arizona in 1940 That doesn't really bring you up much on Latin America and latinos and any of that ooo I had never been on an amphibious operation and if that was characteristic of my qualifications i t really characterized the whole damned operation oo about which it seemed to me there was a good deal of well-meaning hypocrisy Allen Dulles always meaning what he said would say repeatedly no I want the very best people assigned to this project o there is nothing more important that we are doing than this and I want directed assignments o I want people pulled out of tours overseas if necessary this thing must be manned ' Everybody would solemnly nod and then much like the case of Vietnam ooo humans being humans ooo we would tend to get the people that the area Division Chiefs found excess -- which normally meant 'found insufficient With many notable exceptions we did not get the very best people avai - able 118 Although Drain levelled his broadside at a l of the Divisions in the DDP he was most critical of the Western Hemisphere Division More of this staffing would have come from WH if there had been more competent people within WH WH suffered in my opinion from a surfeit of ex-FBI officers who had been picked up at the time that the Agency took over from the Bureau in Latin America but there were damned few of them that had any particular experience One of the main things that plagued me was that I c0uld never - 129 i tD Wi 0 tB'r rOP SECft r T figure out because nobody ever made it clear where the hell the project stood vis-a-vis WH o J C King never was told I think for understandable reasons to what extent he was in it and to what extent he was not in it 119 As with other of the principals who were involved in the WH 4 effort Drain was extremely complimentary of the Support element assigned to WH 4 stating as follows This is a little ironic because with Bissell as the DDP you would have thought that if the directed assignment thing worked anywhere it should have worked within the OOP It worked less well there than it did within the DDS Red White soldierly like he was took absolutely sincerely what the Director said when he said I want the very best people assigned to this So we got Mike King to run the finance not some stumblebum with garters on his sleeve the best finance officer they had Our logistics support and Bill Eisemann they were really hand picked by Red White ooo The DDS or tne DDA whatever they called it then deserved very high marks f r being uniquely the people to put their back into it The 001 really wasn't askedi and that was too bad because we could have used it seems tome some input from the 001 Our own intelligence repo t structure was not bad The Chief FI was a nice old guy ji ji and we had some reports officers who were quite competent in the DDP sensei but the thing was so compartmented from the 001 in any event that the idea of drawing down on DOl talent to get in on this was not well received I had suggested it because I had been - 130 - rop SEEREUf in the DDI and I knew where the talent was For example on just such a mundane but important thing as topography and geography and beach stuff o Christ I well knew from the time that I worked for Lofty Becker o that there was in old ORR o o in the geographic thing oo Jim Bramrnell o Otto Guthe ooo I mean they would have been glad to supply people oo and we didn't ask So you can't say that DDIdidn't provide unless you understand that they didn't provide because they really weren't asked 120 Although the Agency's own personnel assignments have been criticized the assignment of two of the key military personnel involved in the JMARC operation proved to be quite successful Col Jack Hawkins United States Marine Corps and Lt Col Frank Egan United States Army were in charge of the overall PM activity Hawkins and the PM training Egan for the Cuban exile brigade Hawkins who was serving on the Staff of the Marine School at Quantico Virginia at Drain's suggestion that the DOI was left completely in the cold during the Bay of Pigs operation overstates the case As ear y as January 1959 there is evidence that Mr Helms agreed to cut the OOI in on useful intelligence to which it would be well for the DO I to have access from State cable traffic on Cuba being carried over CIA channels A massive study of Cuban telecommunications facilities prepared by ORR in the fall of 1960 led Mr Bissell to send a memo of commendation for the Communications Branch through the OOI Obviously the OOI knew something was afoot 120a - 131 - 'i8P gECRGBP'f - ep SEC T the time that he was assigned to Project JMARC had taken part in the battles of Bataan and Corregidor had been taken prisoner with the fall of Corregidor and escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp at Davao Mindanao and joined the Philippine guerrilla forces leading raiding parties and harassing attacks against the Japanese army in the Philippines After seven months of such activity he was evacuated by submarine from the Philippines in November 1943 and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for these actions After returning to the United States for additional training in November 1944 Hawkins again returned to the Pacific area where he was an assistant operations officer taking part in the assault and capture of Okinawa Bronze Star Medal For this service he received a During the Korean conflict he was Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion 1st Marines and he led the Battalion in cornbat'during the Inchon landing and in subsequent operations in Korea For his participation in the Inchon-Seoul op- eration Hawkins had received the Silver Star Medal for heroism From March 1956 to the summer of 1959 when he entered the Naval War College Hawkins had - 132 - fflfJ SECR ET TOP SECRI T served as liaison officer with the Amphibious Forces Atlantic in Norfolk Virginia -- a pertinent assignment for his transfer to Project JMARC Lt Col Egan's military record showed a welltrained infantry officer who had served overseas in the European Theater during the course of World War IIi an infantry officer including an infantry train- ing officer in much of the period following World War IIi and a staff officer in the Special Warfare Division of the United States Army in 1958 serving with the Director of Plans in Washington from 1958 to 1960 Immediately prior to his assignment to Project JMATE Colonel Egan had been on the Operations and Training Staff of a Joint Support Group headquarteredin Washington Egan EOD'd with Project J TE 27 une 1960 and Hawkins on 29 August of 1960 121 Both officers received high marks from Mr Bissell and Jake Esterline an particularly from Dick Drain who stated I thought they Hawkins and Egan were first rate oo I mean first rate not compared with the jaded World War II memory but first rate in terms of officers then serving in the armed forces of the United States The Hawkins selection was an excellent one I don't myself know how - 133 - reF 3ECrtl T r p ECtt ET one could have found a better man People have said Well the son of a bitch just worked out in the Philippines as a stay behind what did he know He knew a lot He had written a book on guerrillas He was sharp he was smart and honest and not overly ambitious I am sure that he saw this as a way to further his career of course Military men I think tend to maximize that more than Agency people But that was not his motivation -- or his primary motivation He had around him some really first rate help not very high ranking o but we didn't need an awful lot of high ranking o we needed some hard workers Frank Egan who went down to do the training was the man that I would have picked He was probably the most disputable of the bunch because he was pretty volatile He has been condemned for leading the Cuban manpower to believe that they were going to get more support than he had any right to let them know about Well I wasn't there but I know damned well that if I had been I would have been priming up the Brigade to do this tough job not by counseling them as to the difficulty of it ooo at least exclusively o or giving them lectures about now you will really have to do this on your own because you are not going to get one iota of assistance from the armed forces You don't normally train a group to conduct an operation of this sort by playing on heir fears If down there at the end of the line -- first in Guatemala and then in Nicaragua -- Egan led them to believe that they were going to get them more help than he had any right to let them know well I can understand why that would have happened 122 With reference to Colonel Hawkins Jake Esterline has noted footnote continued on following page - 134 - TOP 3ECRE By way of illustrating some of the problems encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the JMATE operation on the very day that President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program a memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for Plans from the Chief Western Hemisphere Division noting that two individuals assigned to the Office of Training were urgently needed for service in WH 4 Colonel King reported to the DDP that although Colonel Matt Baird Director of Training was agreeable to the release of the two individuals to serve as PM trainers Baird insisted that the men could not be I guess that it is only fair to say that that assignment Project JMARC cost him his general's star and a good many other things in terms of his record 123 The author of this history attempted to arrange oral history interviews with Colonels Hawkins and Egan but in neitQer case would the individuals consent to such interview In addition the author also asked each man if he would be willing to respond to a series of written questions and neither would agree to this It was made quite clear to the author that both individuals harbored considerable resentment about their relationships and association with the Agency at the time of the Bay of Pigs In a similar manner Col John F Mallard United States Marine Corps who was Liaison Officer between the Agency and the Department of Defense at the time of the Bay of Pigs also rejected the author's request for either an oral interview or a response to written questions - 135 Ol' SECREt 170 r SEC Rt T fo released until suitable replacements could be to take over their tasks in the Office of Trainins_ King therefore appealed to the Deputy Director Ior Plans for their immediate release 124 Not only did the Clandestine Service encoun difficulty in obtaining personnel from within its units to serve in WH 4 it also appeared to dra in terms of Cubans willing to volunteer for the gle against Castro that they supply t e S l 9 In response to a November memorandum to all WH field stations and bases lzn s as names of Cubans who would be willing to work as agents against the Castro Gove ament WH 4 FI reported the results of its search stating that as of June 1960 Many of the Agents who were proposed by other WH Stations for use in Cuba were either found unacceptable or did not want to accept such an assignment Other stations were unable to corne up with any assets ho might gain access to the desired targets in Cuba 125 The problem which Col Baird had raised bacGBP March concerning replacement for personnel who mi ht be assigned to Project WH 4 was not actually res01 until June of 1960 when Colonel White announced that DDS personnel on full time detail to JMARC - 136 - 1'01' seclt OPSEC Y would be transferred to the project Table of Organization effective the beginning of the first pay period in July 1960 Employees on detail to the project from the Clandestine Services offices will not be transferred since DDP considers them temporary assignments with the personnel returning to their parent office when the project is completed Colonel White pointed out that although DDS personnel would be transferred to the project thereby relieving slots in the various DDS elements each office h ad should keep in mind that his employees will be returning to him and he should plan accordingly 126 Colonel White's comments are quite understandable in view of the fact that of 104 personnel on duty with JMATE on 7-8 June 1960 only 32 were Clandestine Services careerists and excepting a few with DDI career designations the bulk of the personnel were Support careerists By 14 June 1960 Colonel King was appeal- ing to the DDPfor an increment which would bring total JMATE personnel to 234 including 131 employees who were to be in the field Apparently however the Deputy Director for Plans approved a total ceilirig of only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960 and in August of 1960 Chief WH Division forwarded a revised staffing guide calling for a total of 274 positions and requesting that as soon after 15 August as is possible a total of 40 additional staff personnel - 137 OPSECRGf -TOP SECltf 1- be added to the 158 who were then on duty -- making a new total of 198 Although Mr Bissell approved the recommended increment he nonetheless wrote a memorandum to C Tracy Barnes the ADDP A suggesting that Barnes and Dick Helms surprisingly take a close look at the JMATE staffing pattern to see if there were areas of duplication particularly between the field bases and Headquarters The DDP suggested that in the areas of FI and PM there might be slots in either the Forward Operations Base in Miami or in JMOARSMAN -- the Panama Training Site where possibly the staffs could be transferred during slack periods to conduct similar operations in other parts of the JMATE operation 127 Lest the reader be confused by the term Forward Operations Base this was the Jf 1WAVE activity in the Miami area which continued to operate subsequent to the Bay of Pigs At the same time that the Bay of Pigs operation was getting under way there was considerable emphasis from various individuals in Headquarters for establishment of a Forward Command Post which also might be located in the Miami area possibly in the communications complex Some even suggested the possibility of establishing a sub-command post in a third country In any event no Forward Command Post was established 128 - 138 - TOP 3ECR WF SECREr By early November 1960 as the concept of the operation was shifting from one of guerrilla warfare and infiltration to invasion the staffing pattern for WH 4 was again increased a total of 308 positions Mr Bissell authorizing Even as he signed the approval however Mr Bissell noted his reservations saying I have signed this request to indicate my approval but do so with a good deal of concern I realize that this is a very major and top priority activity and I also realize that the senior officers engaged in it continue to be heavily overworked On the other hand I am fearful that the addition of large nt nubers of personnel will not in fact reduce the load on those individuals who are most overworked but may instead create additional burdens of management without contributing significantly to the success of the underlying activities I am concerned also that we may be simply running out of suitable people in the Agency in certain categories Accordingly I urge you to re-examine even the double-starred positions in the staffing guide submitted with your request to se9 whether they are all in fact of a high order of essentiality 129 Much of the staffing problem of course traces back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that only the best people be assigned to the WH 4 project As early as August of 1960 it had been indicated that the DDP might be leaning toward the use of directed assignments but nothing ever came of this 130 - 139 - mp RFP kI TQPSEC T Even before Mr Bissell's memorandum of early November 1960 indicating the possibility that experts in certain areas might no longer be available from within the Agency proposals had gone forward requesting permission for the use of American contract personnel in the maritime operations Unlike the brouhaha that was precipitated by the early suggestions for the use of American volunteers from the ground forces the authorization for the use of US contracts in maritime activities apparently was granted without much debate The statement of the requirements for the use of the us contracts indicated that US citizens would be put under contract to act not only as trainers for the crews of LCI's LCU's LCVP's and SK's but also that they would serve in key positions as LCI captains LCI diesel engineers and LCU coxwains during training and operations where qualified Cubans cannot be obtained This would require their entering Cuban coastal waters and on occasions toucning on Cuban beaches when operations so require It is essential for operations that these key positions be held by qualified and dependable men At this time i t is not expected that Cuban trainees qualified for such positions or possessing the necessary aptitude and character to permit successful training will be found If - 140 - T QP SEER ET they are located the use of U S contract personnel will correspondingly be cut down staff personnel will assist in the training of all crews but will not be used in operations 131 Not only were such contract employees authorized but by early November 1960 a cable from Headquarters to the Forward Operations Base noted In view degree risk involved rendezvoustype mission request Case Officer advise all Maritime contract personnel bonus this type mission be hereafter $100 00 Bonus for Cuban territory beach landings or caching would remain $500 00 132 By the early fall of 1960 the question of rotation of staff personnel for Project JMATE had become a serious matter Many of those who had initially joined the project had corne in on 90-day rotation periods and in a cable to Headquarters Ernie Sparks the overall Liaison Officer for Project JMATE for COS Guatemala requested that Headquarters approve a rotational plan since Most personnel adjusted family and business problems to period they told they be absent and fact they on duty seven days a week as well as being confined to training areas which lack recreation facilities 133 Bill Eisemann who was Chief of Support for WH 4 was particularly critical of the 90-day TDY assignments saying - 141 - FOr' 3ECrtE I They the DDP would bring a man in and then another man would come in to replace him It was really a tremendous task to keep up with it because a lot of these people had personal problems In some cases they would cable and request release from their assignment for personal reasons We attempted to satisfy most of these requests Herb Juul was the assigned Personnel Officer within the project He had to constantly keep a check on the location of our personnel and when their time was up for replacement he would then visit with the Clandestine Services and also the Support components and give them a listing of the names of potential TDY returnees The Support components and Clandestine Services then provided names of people who would be replacements That was a hell of a task now believe me When you have a full time project running 15 months or more you have people returning on a 90 day basis and constantly being replaced o you can't expect the greatest efficiency in operations 134 ' - 142 - TOP r CI ET IQP ECR T Part III Changing Concepts It has already been pointed out that the initial planning for paramilitary operations against Castro was to be based on extremely small units_ Tw or three man units including a communicator would be trained and infiltrated or dropped with a dissident group i ta Cuba to work One trainer wculc be the adviser for the types of guerrilla war are activities which the anti-Castro dissidents might undertake safely and reasonably securely There had been some signs of dissatisfaction with this particula prior to the summer of 1960 e of program By the late summer of 1960 and through the fall there was to be a complete and radical shift in the concept of the operations in which the forces engage par litary back d y In late August-September the e CIA should Nere some clues that changes in the nature of operations were being contemplated During the last week of August and in the initial week of September 1960 Savilion Chapman claimed that he and a Col Chief PMG DDP were briefed by - 143 - TOP 3ECR E r EV s WH 4 Acting l2 - Tlers on the p ECRET approximate number of troops tanks and vehicles for which sea transport would be required In that same period Lt Col Frank Egan and Commander Norman Imler of the WH 4 staff reported they asked the Maritime Branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving information on the foreign cargo vessels that would be required for troop transport including their ownership their costs and on the methods of their acquisition 1 Inasmuch as Egan had been requested for the project to become the trainer for the PM forces it was apparent that some changes were contemplated The reference to the use of vessels for the transport of tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run exercises were being contemplated Before mid-October Lt Col Egan and a representative of the Logistics Branch of WH 4 had spelled out some additional details for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations At that time according to Mr Chapman's report WH 4 was talking about deck loading of 3 LeV's with 5 armored tanks 5 2-1 2 ton trucks one caterpillar dozer and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man guerrilla teams 3 - 144 - tTOP gbCRCr p 5ECREI By the first week in November 1960 it had become clear to the most senior planners of the antiCastro effort -- Jake Esterline J C King Tracy Barnes and Richard Bissell -- that decisions were going to have to be made about all aspects of the paramilitary program The basic question being whether a paramilitary program under CIA aegis should be launched at Castro or whether at this time such a program should become a joint operation between the Department of Defense and the Agency In the dis- cussion among Agency personnel in the discussions between Agency personnel and representatives of the Special Group and in discussions within the meetings of the Special Group the whole gammut of options was being explored Barnes apparently deferring to Bissell suggested that rather than small team activities something on the order of 10-20 man teams be formed and tried out Barnes was very emphatic that what was needed at this time was a willingness to run some risks -- including the risk of defeat Barnes was critical of the Special Group pointing out that the apparent belief of the Group was that every opera- tion had to succeed and that if there were losses - 145 - TOP SECREI I UP S CFtET failures or mishaps the Special Group seemed to want to cancel everything This was contrary com- pletely to Barnes' concept of operational activity What both Barnes and Bissell supported in terms of the smaller team activity were that The implementation of such teams would indicate whether the dissident elements in Cuba were likely to rally around such groups once it had been established that such groups could provide guidance and supply for the anti-Castro activities These teams also would provide a test of the Castro forces Could Castro's militia or his army contain the guerrilla forces if such forces were led by cadres trained by the Agency Or would the Castro resistance crumble in the face of effective d1ss1dent elements 3 Even as this discussion was going on it became clear that the small team concept was going to go by the board and when the Agency tried to jump the option to a 3 000 man force for making a lodgment in Cuba 1n the conventional manner e g amphibious - 146 - T-8P 3ECftFf assault the plan was rejected by the Special Group in a meeting of 3 November 1960 The Department of Defense supported the Agency but State objected and suggested that perhaps the point where covert intervention was possible had passed Gordon Gray even went so far as to raise the possibility of a fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying overt US intervention It was at this same meeting that Mr Livingston Merchant of the Department of State raised the question of whether plans were being made to assassinate Fidel Castro Raul Castro and Che Guevara at which point General Cabell the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency pointed out that such activities as assassination were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA had no capability for such an operation 4 Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was being debated Headquarters cabled to Guatemala 4 November 1960 that the small team concept had gone by the board and that planning should begin for training a conventional amphibious assault force of at least 1 500 infantrymen Outlines sent to the infantry training base in Guatemala JMTRAV emphasized - 147 - Tor SEERET rap SECRE t the need to instill an esprit de corps among the trainees To do this JMTRAV was urged to provide for unit separation competition in the military arts and s cific identities for the individual units through the use of scarfs caps or some other device This new training program was to be instigated in November 1960 and to be completed by the end of January 1961 Even as the discussions over the changing concept were going on the Director of Central Intelli gence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduled to brief President-elect John F Kennedy on 18 November 6 The concept to be presented to the President was that a force of 600 men would be landed by LST on Cuban shores and that these men would move inland to create a safe area in a mountain fastness These men with possibly another 600 man unit in another area and those who' joined them from wi'l hin would be resupplied by air drop 7 In addition there would be new recruits in the pipeline to provide support for those who had landed An airstrip in Nica- ragua would be used to support air operations and it was intimated that the US and possibly allied - 148 TO '5ECRCF Ofi SELRE I governments would recognize that the force lodged in Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional Government of Cuba One strange and contradictory note which appeared during WH 4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan the briefing for the DDP prior to his participation with the DCI in bri fing the President elect was the following item stating Our CIA IS original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned Our second concept 1 5003 000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip is also now seen to be unachievable except as a joint Agency DOD action Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed 9 How if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the 1 500-3 000 man force to secure a beachhead with an 'airstrip was envisioned by the senior personnel in WH 4 as unachievable except as a joint CIA DOD effort did it become achievable in March 1961 with only 1 200 men and as an Agency operation What was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs - 149 - TOfl 3EC T Fer SeCkEl Operation in March 1961 Certainly there was no lessening in the controls that Castro had instituted nor in the efficiency of the military forces and militia that he had at his command by April 1961 One of the principal problems posed by Project JMATE -- both before and after the concept changed in November 1961 -- was whether the training activity at JMTRAV and JMADD in Guatemala should be or could be continued without reflection upon the position of the United States Government Thomas Mann of the State Department became increasingly concerned about this situation and the discussions within the Special Group and among the concerned Agencies during the period from the middle of November until the end of the year focused very frequently on this question Considering the continuingly favorable reception to Agency activities from Ydigoras Fuentes Guatemala's During interviews with the author of this history Messrs Bissell Esterline and Drain had only slight remembrance of the details of these meetings of 15-16 November 1960 when they ruled out what would be in effect the invasion plan implemented in April 1961 at Playa Giron -- and at that time it was minus the joint support of the Department of Defense This point was completely overlooked by both the Inspector General and the Taylor Committee post mortems on the Bay of Pigs - 150 - -1 OP SECRc1' J DR 8 EC R r T President State's concern that the training places too much strain on the government of Guatemala appear unrealistic The Department's real concerns were with potential criticism from the OAS and the UN Certainly Ydigoras was not interested in the removal of those military units which could most effectively guarantee his continued reign as President of Guatemala -- the Cubans in training for both air and ground activities 10 Even as the Special Group was trying to determine whether or not the forces in training in Guatemala should be removed the Agency proceeded apace with plans for the staffing necessary to put a 600-man strike force in training Chief WH 4 Personnel estimated that in addition to 14 staffers there would be a requirement for 146 military personnel if such training were to succeed Well prior to the officially agreed-to change in concept Chief WH 4 had anticipated a significant increase in funding The internal situation in Guatemala vis a vis the training operations is discussed in detail in Volume II of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy - 151 - I UP SECR EMf- -lOp SECRt l' for JMARC requesting of the DDP that With your approval in the interim period as new budget estimates were being prepared project funds will be used as required to meet operational necessity without strict adherence to the preliminary estimates of last June 1960 lOaf Although Mr Bissell approved the request he made this interesting comment What is disturbing is that the overrun reported in your memorandum seems to have occurred long before you could be feeling any effect of the planned expansion in PM plans lObi Contrary to suggestions that the President of Guatemala was concerned about the Cuban training activity a cable of 22 November 1960 to the Director from Guatemala indicated that the ground training base was undergoing a major reorganization because permission for the establishment of a tactical training area at another of the fincas estates controlled by Roberto Alejos -- this one near San Jose -- was being undertaken Inasmuch as Alejos was Ydigoras's right hand man and conducted the liaison with the WH 4 representatives for the establishment and operation The increased budget being suggested was on the order of $42 ml1lion compared to $3 milli0n being discussed in June - 152 - TCTI SELkE I of the Guatemalan training bases the contradiction in positions between State and the Agency was obvious 11 As the Special Group discussions were going on Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 was in Guatemala taking a first-hand look at the air and ground training bases As noted in another volume Esterline went strongly on record in support of the Office of Logistics engineer who had been responsible for the reconstruction of the airstrip at Retalhuleu Jake noted that even though there had been a sizable cost overrun the task had been performed on time under the most adverse weather conditions and consequently suggestions from Headquarters that there had been gross inefficiency were unwarranted and unfounded Ester- line's review of the situation at JMTRAV the ground t aining base indicated that the situation there was considerably more difficult than what he had encountered at the air training base He noted for example tha there was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers stating For details on construction of the airfield at Retalhuleu see Office of Logistics Engineering Staff RECD Agency Engineering Activity 194 -1966 Vol I 63-67 Vol II 132-193 DDS HS OL-l1 Feb 72 S - 153 - 'FOr SECRET WP SECRET While a few of these men from the Domestic Operations Base in Miami impress me as being good types for the most part I found them to be too immature and lacking in experience to qualify for the job at hand In any event they are not in my jUdgment worth the $1 000 per month which we have to pay them I would like most of them to be GS-4 5 and 6 students that sic we trained at Fort Benning in 1951-52 Under no circumstances would I consider putting thes people into Cuba with the Cubans In closing his report on the visit to Guatemala Esterline presented the following critical observations of the situation as he saw it Reflecting on the mission and on the resources available he wrote I also reviewed the problem in the light of the many gaps in policy approval for JMARC all of which complicate project planning By the time I arrived back at Headquarters I had fairly well convinced myself that i t is unrealistic for the project or the Agency to try to go i t alone in opening up another major base in a third country to train from 1 500 to 3 000 Cubans for a maJor 1nvaS1on effort I discussed my thinking with Col Hawkins at length and found that he shared my view As a result of this discussion we re-evaluated our capability and presented you the DDP with the recommendation that we limit ourselves to preparing a force of 600 maximum to be used in the manner we outlined to you on 16 November I still feel this recommendation is quite valid given the limitation on real estate that we are presently working under If it turns out that we can acquire policy approval for the real estate in the interior - 154 - WP SeCREl WP l CRE I I would then agree that with limited additional help from DOD we could train a maximum of 1 200 and commit them along the line outlined during the 16 November meeting Even our present scope of operations however continues to be endangered by the gambit that Mr Mann and Mr Merchant are engaged with in the State Working Group II I cannot emphasize this too strongly if we are required to evacuate Guatemala for reasons of high policy or because of the situation the project will be seriously damaged unless we have immediately available real estate where these people can be put to work 13 Some relief would be provided for the ground training program with the opening up of Alejos finca near San Jose but the adequacy of the training facilities for the ground forces would continue to plague JMARC through the course of the project Moreover even though the discussions concerning plausible deniability reached near fever pitch during the discussions of November 1960 at n9 point did the Special Group of presidential consultants ever step forward with a firm recommendation that the United states assume responsibility and so admit The most persistent advocate of this position was Thomas Mann of the Department of State and why his proposals were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved - 155 - SECREI olIOi' SECRET questions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation_ Esterline1s visit to the bases in Guatemala was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence between the field and Headquarters with specific emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground training base JMTRAV of senior training officers Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority need to secure Special Force trainers from on an ASAP basis e Requirements for materiel xmy j peC particularly in the number of personal weapons which would be required for added numbers of troops in training With the acquisition of the additional training site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos requests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps to transport troops to these training areas The There also is evidence that at least one of the principal Agency planners C Tracy Barnes contributed to the November confusion At one point when serious consideration was being given to the cssi- bility of increasing significantly the training activity that might be done in Nicaragua Barnes iLtroduced what amounted to moral objections to the association - or to strengthening the association -- with the Somoza Government Barnes emphasized that this would go down hard with the more liberal elements i Latin America 14 This argument of course was v y c ch in line with the position being advanced by o OEUR art- ment of State -- Thomas Mann excepted - 156 - TOP SECRCF 'fOP SEer ET field was aware that the increasing number of trainees would create problems but at the same time there were indications that the trainers were hopeful that the infiltration teams that had been developed could be held intact 15 Just as there was confusion within the Headquarters area over the nature of the program so too was concern reflected in the field's messages to Headquarters A cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to Headquarters requested Recent cable traffic suggests maJor changes in near future and COS feels it would be of great assistance to have complete story to assist in dealing with Alejos and Ydigoras 16 Even as COS Guatemala was requesting information the situation in Washington remained in a state of flux On 29 November Col King made a speci ic at- tempt to obtain positive guidance through the office of the Deputy Director for Plans Chief WH D out- lined his understanding of the paramilitary planning as follows a On or about 1 February 1961 land by amphibious means a guerrilla force of about 600 trained Cubans to establish a perimeter defense and resistance center in a selected area of Cuba - 157 - rep SECREr E XQP SECRfT b Continue present operations of infiltrating small paramilitary teams to organize train and lead resistance forces and report intelligence information c Follow up this effort by providing air logistical support to the GOO-man guerrilla force in Cuba and all additional guerrilla elements who join to collaborate with this force 17 Having outlined his understanding of the planning Col King then went on The following major questions must now be resolved by the Special Group or referred to the President for decision before proceeding further to implement the paramilitary aspect of this program as described above a Does either the Department of State or the Department of Defense view the proposed paramilitary concept as not in consonance with policy or for any other reason open to question If so why and what alternatives are proposed what course of action is approved b If there is agreement as to the paramilitary concept then is there agreement that training shall continue in Guatemala c If continuance in Guatemala is disapproved will DOD air-lift the present trainees at once from Guatemala to Saipan for training and provide similar air-lift for up to 300 additional men as they are recruited The entire group would later be returned to a staging area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation - 158 P TOP SECItl' T- I02 S CREr d Will the DOD also provide the following 1 Thirty-eight Special Force officers and enlisted men to be used as instructors in Guatemala or in Saipan or both 2 One reactivated LST 3 Supplementation of logistic resupply air-lift to resistance after 1 February As detailed an estimate as can be made will be forwarded to DOD if the paramilitary concept is approved 18 Col King then closed this memorandum to Mr Bissell by noting that if the paramilitary concept was approved certain policy approvals would be required These were listed as follows a To use one Florida base such as Opalocka for air supply missions in sup'port of guerrilla forces in the target country b To use a small number of'American civilian contract personnel in air and maritime operations No such personnel are to be used in ground operations c To mount air strikes against Cuban air and other military targets 19 Whatever else can be said it is clear that by the end of November 1960 the original concept of the Agency's anti-Castro effort as one focussing on the use of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with - 159 - 'TOP SECR 1r-- TOP BtClfET the dissident elements located within the country had gone by the board What was now to be undertaken was an annphibious assault in strength -- the strength as yet to be determined -- with the concomitant requirement for heavy air support for resupply and possibly for ilitary support as well Indicative of the con- fusion which surrounded this period when the concept was changing were Jake Esterline's remarks shortly fallowing the collapse of the Bay of Pigs when he testified before the Taylor Committee It appears as though Esterline had been informed -- incorrectly as i t turned out -- that in his testimony of 1 May 96 Lt Col Frank Egan had indicated to the commit- tee that the strike force concept has been in being since his EOD in June 1960 In rebutting what he thought Egan's testimony had been Esterline reported My recollection is that Lt Col Egan' came to us about June 1960 and that he Egan had actually testified that following the revolt he had been sent down to organize the brigade and he stated that the number of Cuban t -ai ees had been on the order of 420 on 20 November 2-960 ar d had risen to nearly 600 by the first week of December 20 Guatema an - 160 - TetP SECRE I - _- _-- - _--- ---- - Of' 3l CREl arrived with certain ideas which he carried from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the Cuban problem This however did not constitute JMATE policy I am sure you Col Jack Hawkins -- or more particularly members of your staff -- will find that we had no approved philosophy of the operation within the Project until well in to September The training program which Rocky Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed solely toward training an instructor cadre in small unit or guerrilla type operations This cadre when i t arrived in Guatemala in addition to working on building the camp with Carl Jenkins continued to train the first recruits in the same kind of training they had received Another example of my positiveness that we were not at Project level thinking of the strike operation is the first conversation that we held in my office in Barton Hall when I referred to the fact that the PM staff had been talking about the development of a strike operation but that I myself was not convinced of i t at the time and that I preferred to put small teams into existipg units at the appropriate time As I recall you Col Jack Hawkins had an open mind at that point although without positive study of Cuba you leaned to the concept 1 outlined It was at a somewhat later date therefore probably before the first of October that we talked'again and you Col Jack Hawkins stated your conviction that Castro could not be overthrown without a major or catalytic effort being made against him After deliberation I came to the same conclusion and we then began to think in terms of expanding the force to the strength of a reinforced battalion more or less The foregoing is important only because General Taylor is going into very - 161 - pop SE CRE l -- JQP 81 CRE I fine points in his analysis of government policy It is incumbent upon us therefore to get the record straight in this manner and although Lt Col Egan may have had in his own mind the idea of a strike operation -- and I believe he came to us with some idea on hitting the Isle of Pines -- this nevertheless was not approved Project or Agency policy until quite a few months later In point of fact as I look back over that period I am sure during that period I found myself drifting along devoting myself merely to creating basic capabilities in a var ety of fields without any clear-cut idea of what national policy would permit us to do 21 Richard Bissell who was the Deputy Director for Plans at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation has a In a discussion with the author of this history in the fall of 1975 Esterline introduced another thought about the change in concept to wit That the small team concept had been planned to be put into operation early in November of 1960 and Esterline seems to believe that this would have been feasible 'However the Presidential election of that year made the Eisenhower administration extremely cautious about anything that might have an impact on the out ome of the election and consequently such delays as were incurred gave added time for the buildup of Castro's internal forces By the time that the election was over it had become apparent that the small team concept was no longer viable Esterline in fact suggested that the emphasis for the buildup in the brigade forces came from the White House But even though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the Special Group during the period from November to the end of the Eisenhower administration -- did support the idea of increasing the size of the force there is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this came from the White House 22 - 162 - 'fOP Sf CR f pOP S E 1 'tT rather more positive recollection of the change in concept having noted That decision as to the character of the operation was rather gradually modified during the late autumn of 1960 and it's very difficult even for someone who was close to those developments to put a finger on the exact moment when a clear decision was made or the circumstances or really the people who made it It was a decision rather forced by circumstances 23 When discussing the situation in October of 1975 however Bissell volunteered the following observations about the change in concept for the operation He said One of the clearest impressions I have of the whole planning period and of this change in concept was that by November 1960 o and I don't think Esterline bought this view either as completely or as soon as I did ooo I also remember the feeling that I was well ahead of King in my belief that we had to place nearly exclusive reliance for the initial phase on whatever force i t was possible to land So I also reme ber very clearly -- and I think as early as November -- here I think there were probably under 500 people in the brigade in training _ I remember repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Esterline that if we are really going to have to place this heavy reliance on a landing force this is an all together preposterously inadequate number I remember being told that people did not see how i t would be feasible to get up to the size I was talking about in the time period but secondly I have a clear recollection that he Jack Hawkins had a lesser sense - 163 - lOP SELRE 1 0 F S ECltET of urgency at that point about a buildup in numbers than I did I felt that I was consistently urging upon Hawkins the necessity of a larger buildup than the plans then contemplated and I also remember at a later stage in a some t similar fashion urging upon Beerli the necessity of a significantly larger air arm than his plans contemplated ooo I think that Hawkins likewise felt that he had to rely on what the recruiting mechanism would turn up which wasn't really his direct operation and that he wasn't at all sure that he could get the sort of numbers that I was talking about But I do remember an awareness of what seemed to me to be the inadequacy of our resources in the light of an altered concept of the operation 24 - 164 - fflP SECRE I rep SECItET Part IV Presidential Resurgence The previous section of this volume has examined the activities that occurred during the period from the early fall through November of 1960 with the shift away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla warfare type operation to a new concept emphasizing amphibious invasion During this period most of the discussion and the decisions aside from those within CIA were at the level of the Special Group The principals involved from the Department of State were at the Under Secretary Assistant Secretary level at the highest and at the Agency both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans were involved On 29 November 1960 the level of in- volvement of the US Government escalated sharply with the sudden resurgence of interest on the part of President Dwight David Eisenhower In contrast to the period from July 1960 through the Presidential election of early November -- when as noted earlier there was at most minimal attention to the developing anti-Castro program at the White House level -- - 165 W SECRE FOP 3ECRE suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal decision ma ers in the period prior to the take-over by the Kennedy administration wben asked for an explanation of this sudden resurgence Jake Esterline then Chief WH 4 stated I can't explain it but I will say this i t probably had a political basis They the Republican administration realized that they had lost and they realized that they were going to have to brief a new administration along with the British on the things that had been going on I suspect that they didn 1 t want to brief on something that would emerge that they hadn't been giving anything other than their full support Iam guessing but I would think that was a pretty good guess 1 On 29 November of 1960 the President had a meeting which included Messrs Dillon and Merchant of State Gates and Douglas of Defense Gray and Goodpaster of his own StafGBP and Dulles and Bissell of CIA In his report on the session with the President Mr Bissell the DDP mentioned among other things the following two points of particular interest The President made it clear he wanted all done that could be done with all possible urgency and nothing less on the part of any department and the President l d a discussion as to how best to orga ize the total US effort against the target There was some feeling that an - 166 - rap SEER er overall coordinating executive might be desirable but it was left that the Director would make Mr Barnes available to work closely with a State Department officer to be designated It was also felt desirable to use Mr Pawley's services initially in connection with C -' assistance 2 J The points of view attributed to the President at this time by Mr Bissell reflect very closely the position of William D Pawley who had met with the President immediately prior to the President's session with State DOD and the Agency's representatives According to Livingston Merchant who had a long session with Mr Pawley on the day prior to Pawley's meeting with President Eisenhower Mr Pawley said that two things are necessary and I inferred that these would constitute his Pawley's principal recommendations to the President 1 The President should appoint a single experienced individual he said he was personally qualified and would be available for the job if asked to conduct the entire covert operation In thls connection he cited the role which he had played in the Guatemala case 2 We should recruit several thousand good young Cubans in Florida and give them basic training This could be done in five or six weeks rather than months according to him He was extremely impatient at the thought of moving any Cubans who may now be in Central America expressing himself - 167 - WP ECrrET forcefully as being sure their host would object I asked if he was proposing overt intervention by us armed forces He said absolutely not The essence of his plan would be to land in Cuba presumably in the next month or two a force of 600 trained Cubans following up this landing with additional Cuban elements and then installing a government in the bridgehead which would calIon us for financial and logistics support He mentioned a number of names which were unfamiliar to me of Cubans who he said are politically unblemished in Cuba neither pinks nor reactionary rightists 1I On 30 November 1960 a Special Group meeting was held at which time Gordon Gray Considering that discussions within the Agency and within the Special Group had only recently arrived at the figure of 600 men for an invasion brigade plus the fact that this brigade would establish a bridgehead from which a provisional government opposed to Castro might be announced one might speculate on the source of Pawley's information Jake Esterline has tended to denigrate the role played by Pawley during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation but nonetheless throughout the course of the ope ratio Jake was charged with maintaining close liaison with Pawley JMATE records indicate not only the numerous face-toface meetings between Pawley and Esterline during the course of the operation but also reflect an amazing number of telephone conversations between the two during the life of the operation In terms of the operational plan per se Esterline appeared to be most cagy in handling this subject during the discussions with Pawley The recorded conversations focus on the potential leadership for the FRO -- with Pawley's best leadership choices usually being far to the right - 168 - l QP SEEItCf -rap SECRET Solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a concensus sic of vie s as to what exactly had been decided as a result of the high level meeting the meeting with the President of the day before y According to the memorandum on the meeting there was agreement that the US would deny its participation in any training activities in Guatemala that there would continue to be a prohibition on the training of Cubans in the United States and that evacuation plans should be kept in readiness in case the Cubans in training in Guatemala had to be evacuated -- the plan to evacuate was not clear as to whether the Cubans would be taken into Florida as ordinary refugees or whether the evacuation would call for transporting the troops toe 3 - J 31 training base The problem that apparently created the greatest difficulty at thfs Special Group meeting was the President's suggestion that a single individual should be placed in charge of the anti-Castro program The Special Group decided that there should be two individuals with principal responsibilities one to handle the overt and the other to handle the covert activities After reviewing a list of potential candidates - 169 - TOP CRfT It was finally decided that taking all things into consideration including the aspect of quick availability Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice On the CIA side Mr Dulles nominated Mr Barnes It was recognized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr Gray's associates 51 When Mr Mann suggested that Ambassador Willauer might also assume responsibility for contacts with the FRD Mr Dulles rejected this out of hand emphasizing that this liaison must be done covertly and that it must be done by the Agency There apparently was unanimous agreement that Mr Pawley not be given any official status with the US Government but no one objected to Pawley's plans to visit Argentine President Frondizi in his capacity as a private US citizen S I Following the President's suggestion of 29 November Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon forwarded a memorandum for President Eisenhower on 2 December 1960 recommending that because of the differences in responsibilities two senior officials rather than one be charged with managing the anti-Castro program Dillon suggested that Ambassador Whiting Willauer be named as a Special Deputy to Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs Thomas Mann to act as the officer responsible for the - 170 - US Government's OP SECRGBPT overt position vis-a-vis Cuba and with the responsibility of coordinating the covert activities of the Agency into that US position On the covert side Dillon followed the DCI's suggestion that C Tracy Barnes should be appointed to devote full time to the direction of the Agency's program with respect to Cuba and to concert with Amb Willauer Dillon's memorandum then went on to recommend that the members of the Special Group -- Dulles Gray Douglas and Merchant -- should continue to exercise general supervision over the covert operation and to provide the Agency with general guidance in the operation and -- now at the tag end of the Eisenhower administration -- went on to say that the Group should continue and intensify its general supervision of the covert-operation ooo and maintain close and regular liaison with Secretary Anderson of Treasury or his designated representative ooo and should meet together with the member's individual principalS with you from time to time as it deemed necessary or as you desire 7 In response to this recommendation the Pres ident wrote I approve of the suggestions regarding the reorganization of the government's - 171 - Tefl SEeR I l - program with respect to that country Cuba except that I think Mr Willauer should have a position directly subordinate to the Secretary of State for so long as Cuba remains a critical problem in our foreign relations There should be no doubt as to the authority of the Special Assistant to the State Department Mr Willauer to subordinate covert and overt activities nor as to his responsibillty for conveying policy guidance to the operating agencies In their broad outline these policies will of course be subject to the approval of higher authority V An interesting aspect of the Eisenhower memorandum is that he elevated the position to be assigned to Mr Willauer from that of being a Special Deputy to Assistant Secretary Mann the Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs to that of being directly subordinate to the Secretary of State A Parrott who acted When Thomas as secretary for the Special f - '-C ' Group meeting transmtted a copy of the draft of 9ttr1es' ' 11' _ i i _t t - t 1 4 1 I io l memoraiiaum tO T'ra y Barn'es- 'Parrott had been made aware of the possibility that Eisenhower was in favor of raising the position of Willauer In an aside to Barnes in his transmittal note Parrott indicated that even if Eisenhower did want Willauer made directly responsible to the Secretary of St te in fact He Willauer will be instructed that he - 172 - 1 0 P 8 CC RASs rm J-' F tl TQP IZCR El darn well works for Mann anyway regardless of the title 2-1 Even as the negotiations just mentioned were underway by early December 1960 the Agency's position on the nature of the PM action decidedly hardened On 8 December at a meeting of the Special Group Colonels Hawkins and Egan proposed a military program which combined the use of infiltrated small paramilitary teams as a test to see if the dissident elements would rally round and also recommend a training program for a force of 600-750 men possessing extremely heavy fire power for amphibious assault Prior to an amphibious invasion however i t was agreed that I there would be sorties into Cuban air space but the precise nature and number of these was disputable ranging from possibly 100 a month for a three month period beginning on 15 January 1961 -- and inclUding some B-26 sorties to bomb and strafe military targets -- to an undefined minimum of sorties for a three week period to soften up the opposition The Agency apparently thought that it had a pretty good handle on Willauer because of his long term association as Executive Vice-President President and ViceChairman of the Board of Civil Air Transport CAT - 173 - fOP CRET or SECRtl In the course of these discussions of ground and air operations there were some interesting contradications among Agency spokesmen as to what was needed or what was wanted Tracy Barnes seemed to have a great deal more to say than was warranted by his knowledge and apparent understanding of the planned action In one discussion with Secretary Douglas when Barnes was pushing for the use of an increased number of troops he stated that the number of antiCastro dissidents who might rally round the invaders would be no different if the size of the invading force were 600 men or 3 000 men A rationale such as that and Barnes's comment to Gen Lansdale when he forwarded one proposal -Please recognize that this proposal is a draft and is off the top of the head without any detailed knowledge of possible applicable regs and procedures -help make understandable the consternation within the ranks of the Department of Defense concerning the Agency's understanding of which end was up 10 There was also an ongoing discussion during this time period regarding the assignment of US Army Special Force trainers to the Guatemala bases This is discussed in detail in Volume II of this history Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy - 174 - TGP SECRET J O P SEC R2 t T In one of the longer and more detailed papers being prepared toward the close of the Eisenhower administration the State Department drafted the political action recommendations and suggested collective action through the Organization of American States to effect the ouster of Castro Failing in that State then outlined a unilateral political action program for the United States The paramilitary and covert action segments of this paper were prepared by the CIA Neither the State nor the CIA paper introduced ideas that had not been thoroughly discussed These recommendations were made just as if the Secretary of State the Special Group and the President had approved or would approve the courses of action that were being outlined ca e This being the i t was suggested that the concurrence of the President-elect should be sought for the proposed program In the best of all possible worlds on could hardly find fault with this optimistic approach -- in the pragmatic world it is difficult to understand that anyone would go on record with the expectation that such recommendations might be followed - 175 - TOP 51' CRE I W SECREI across changing political and administrative lines 11 with WH 4 in the throes of revising the antiCastro program on the basis of the increased efficiency of the Castro military forces an SNIE Prospects for the Castro Regime was issued belaboring the obvious -- that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba The SNIE also proceeded to make the following observation about Castro's military forces The militia's overall combat efficiency is low many units are still on a part time training basis However there appears to be emerging a nucleus of well organized well equipped and well trained units loyal to Castro and strongly Communist-influenced we believe that within the next 12 months or so these units will develop into a reasonably effective security force 13 The estimate continued noting that the Cuban Army was still disrupted and combat effectiveness of the Air Force is virtually nil 2 The concept for Project JMATE however had shifted from small unit guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960 Senator Kennedy came to the White House for a briefing and that among the subjects discussed was Cuba this being one of the first three items that Kennedy wished to talk about and that He JFK had previous- ly been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and had some familiarity with the details 12 - 176 - TOP JEER ET - -TOP St RET increased efficiency of Castro's forces and it would appear that the operators and the estimators were not making evaluations from the same intelligence inforrna tion Despite his promotion early in the month it was not until 23 December 1960 that Ambassador Willauer called a meeting with the Agency's principals to explain both his role and some of the problems that he anticipated the President wanted him to handle Ap- parently i t was an inauspicious beginning for according to a memorandum of the meeting Mr Willauer stated that his role as explained to him by Secretary Herter was to be that of the chairman and major shareholder of a corporate board with Mr Tracy Barnes the executive director for operations and minority shareholder Col King asked for clarification on this point noting that Mr Esterline is the director for operations for CIA with the chain of command going from the Director to B1ssell to Col King to Mr Esterline Mr Barnes is a coordinator with the other inberested agencies Mr Willauer agreed that this was the case noting that he had used the term operations in the looser sense of overall coordination 14 Once having had the pecking order set straight Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to a discussion of various problem areas indicating his very strong bias in favor of Agency positions as opposed to - 177 T F' EeR Ff- oooooooooooo - T-8 I ooooo -- oo oooo - o o - -'-' o o - SEC R T positions being taken by the Department of State For example Willauer noted that there was a strong aversion to attempts to set a firm date for D-Day with the oppon nts basing their arguments on the fact that the OAS would be sure to get in on the act and moreover that military planning should be deferred until it could be determined if the economic sanctions would work to Castro's disadvantage On the question of economic sanctions Willauer pointed out to the people in State that since the Soviet Union was so strongly committed to support the Castro government economic sanctions would have little or no impact on Castro's position Willauer also argued that there was going to be revolutionary activity in Cuba whether the US had a hand in it or not and he emphasized that in any event the US would be blamed for it Both Jake Esterline and Col Jack Hawkins pointed out that another reason for firming up the D-Day date concerned the logistics of the troop movement and both urged as early a date as possible because of the already mentioned improvement in the military capability equipment and training of Castro's - 178 - WPSECREI o __ _ oo _ oooo __ o _4 _ fOt-J ECRcT forces Esterline also emphasized that most of the arguments urging delay of PM planning particularly concern re the GAS had been debated with State for months and the time had come for direct action The WH 4 representatives also stressed that the period of training for many of the Cub s had been extended and re-extended and that to hold the be- yond 1 March 1961 increased the problem of maintaining high morale among the troops Esterline took the position that the Cubans the Agency was training knew that the US had the force to thro Castro out any time that it so desired but the months and months of training was indicative to them at least that the US was not really interested in the welfare of the anti-Castro Cubans During the 23 December 1960 meeting Wi1lauer's expertise and familiarity with air operations led him to ask almost immediately why the I so thin in the air I rojec is Willauer was told that the rules of the game were that only Cuban air crews could be used and this was the reason for efforts to obtain permission to use - 179 - OP SECftFF L e Agency's cor ract erican Tor SECRET crews for both resupply and combat The air opera- tions were the subject of considerable discussion Concerning the possibility of launching air strikes for three days before the invading force landed Willauer objected pointing out that this would give the OAS ample time to get involved in the act Wil- lauer then raised the question of whether all of the tactical bombing could be done on D-Day The answer to that from Col Hawkins was no but Hawkins said that it could be done on D-2 if permission were given for dawn airstrikes to take out Castro's air force and military targets with additional sorties during the course of D-l and follow-up raids on D-Day prior to the landings Moreover Hawkins pointed out that if an attempt were made to withhold the airs trikes until D-Day the Castro air force would have an opportunity to attack the ships which would be carrying the invasion troops In a similar manner a strong case was made for the use of the Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua air base to Hawkins wanted pilots wh6 can work over key targets without tearing up installations we will later need - 180 - TOP SECRET TOP SEeR E I launch strikes against Cuba Apparently there was some discussion of limiting use of this base to only two or three days -- at least some of the State Department people pushed this idea -- but WH 4 pointed out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature of the planned air operations that the air support operation could be in and out of Nicaragua in this period It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts had been made to get permission to use US bases or other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua but without success Willauer himself was positive that no US bases would be made available for the strike against Castro One other interesting aspect of this initial meeting with Willauer concerned the transition be- tween the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations willauer stressed that the ground rule at the Department of State was that the Kennedy pEURople could not be sought out to discuss specific problems unless they initiated requests for information and it was Willauer's opinion That the only practical way to get decisions on the project before 20 January would be to have the Director the DCI - 181 - fori 5ECRE rap SECRET whose position re the new administration is different than Mr Herter's to go to Mr Kennedy in person and seek to get him committed It would be very difficult for State people to try to approach Mr Kennedy via Mr Rusk and Mr Bowles 15 During the 21 December 1960 meeting of the Special Group Allen Dulles briefed the attendees on a meeting that he had participated in the previous day in New York with a group of American businessmen The meeting had been called by Henry Holland who was one of the principal fund raisers for the FRO and in attendance at this meeting were the Vice President for Latin America of Standard Oil of New Jersey the Chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar Company the President of the American Sugar Domino Refining Company the President of the American Foreign Power Company the Chairman of the Freeport Sulphur Company and representatives 'from Texaco International Telephone and Telegraph and ot er American companies with business interests in Cuba The tenor of the conversation was that it was time for the US to get off of dead center and take some direct action against Castro Suggestions were made to sabotage the sugar crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane - 182 - Ter 3r Cft C' F WI' 3t C ET fields or ruin the refineries to interrupt the electric power supply and to put an embargo on food drugs and spare parts for machinery Dulles opposed the embargo on food and drugs but the feeling of the business group was that it was time to get tough and hopefully the blame for an embargo would be laid on Castro Another interesting suggestion volun- teered was that the US Navy should blow up a ship in Levisa Bay in order to force the shutdown of the nickel plant at Nicaro which formerly had been owned and operated by the US Governmen t o 16 In his usual cautious manner Gordon Gray suggested that the Special Group not authorize any action until he had cleared the matter with his associate This group of businessme lso indicated that they were going to undertake he publication of specific papers on issues and programs related to the post-Castro Cuba which would be designed to help US policy planners Mr Dulles of course emphasized that policy planning was not his responsibility this was the responsibility of the Department of State He did comment that what he was interested in was getting rid of Castro as quickly - 183 -' -rop SECRET as possible and in this field he had direct responsibility and would welcome any ideas or suggestions on how this might be achieved 17 The high-level business group which Dulles met with was also extremely concerned about the possible orientation of any anti-Castro government in exile particularly that it should not be left-oriented Michael Haider Standard of Jersey's Vice President for Latin America for example forwarded a memorandum to Col J C King in early January 1961 identifying as members of an extreme leftist group which had formed in Miami to oppose Castro Manolo Ray Aureliano Sanchez Arango Rufo L6pez Fresquet and Dr Raul Chibas among others Mr Haider worried that unless more positive steps were taken to force the conservative Cuban exiles into a cohesive organization that any post-Castro government would automatically be in the hands of the leftists 18 In addition to strong positive suggestions from US businessmen Brigadier General Lansdale Office of Haider was consistent at any rate -- leftists with Fidel or Fidelistas sin Fidel d were held to be equally bad for US business interests - 184 - SEtR E'T Special Operations Office of the Secretary of Defense also had some suggestions which he made to Mr Bissell about the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program For whatever reason in late December 1960 Lansdale forwarded to Bissell'a number of suggestions which had been presented to him by an Army reservist who had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lans dale's direction researching Cuban political objectives Inasmuch as the Agency had devoted many months to the study of this subject and all other aspects of the anti-Castro effort it appears a rather gratuitous insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind of paper to Bissell 19 What response if any Bissell made to this memorandum is not known The Special Group held its last meeting of 1960 on 29 December and there were jn addition to the standing problem of the use of US air bases to support the operation against Cuba the questions of the use of a Nicaraguan air base the political organization of the Cuban exiles and considerable discussion about the possibility of initiating action against C CD J I I ' It was emphasized that Mr Pawley was strongly in favor of intervention - 185 - FO in C II SELkE I J ' overt operation against even suggesting that an t J be mounted concur- rently with the Cuban operation The members of the Special Group however were unwilling to buy this particular plan of action but they did support Mr Bissell's proposals for some limited covert action operations aimed at theL J regime James H Douglas Deputy Secretary of Defense questioned the feasibility of expanding the initial beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the Cuban Government but Mr Bissell pointed out that such a project was unrealistic unless One or all of the following situations develops a overt support b a major revolutionary uprising of air support 20 e massive use The Group was apparently in agreement that the Agency shoul make every effort to insure that no abortive small-scale insurrections be attempted to overthrow Castro 211 In view of the fact that the US would break diplomatic relations with Cuba n 3 January 1961 the minutes of the Special Group meeting of 29 Deeember 1960 present an interesting historical problem In summarizing Livingston Merchant's report of his - 186 - J9P'SEeRET meeting with President Eisenhower on 28 December the minutes of the Specia Group Meeting of 29 De- cember read as follows The latter President Eisenhower made two points a it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American Governments b it would be desirable if possible for us to break relations with Cuba in concert with other countries some time before January 20th 22 In contrast to the suggestion that the US break realtions with Cuba prior to the inauguration of Kennedy General Goodpaster's record of the MerchantEisenhower meeting of 28 December reported that He President Eisenhower thought however that Presidents Frondizi Prado and others should take diplomatic initiative to get Latin American countries to take a position that they would like to remove Castro from power but lacking the means to do so would like the us to take the lead The President said it was clear to him that Latin Americans must be brought to see the necessity of action He was inclined to think that it might be time to recognize the anti-Castro front as the Cuban Government He added that he would like to see a definite move taken in this matter before January 20th and said that the State Department should be thinking of some definite action that could be brought about before that time 23 Thinking of some definite action differs considerably from the suggestion that the President thought - 187 - TOP SECRFF I9P SELRE I it u d be wdesirable to break relations with Cuba prior to 20 January of 1961 At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960 it also was suggested by Mr Merchant that the Group's membership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to incruce assaccr illauer Kann and Assistant Secretary Thomas c Tracy Barnes 24 As already has been noted in ris retrospective view of the Bay of Pigs Q9eration Jake Ester ine was quite forceful in his Q9inion that the Agency's representatives at such high level meetiIl Js should have been someone like either himself or Col Jack Hawkins who were the most owledgeable about the status of the operation and indeed the whole operational plan It is the considered opinion of the author of this history that Esterline had a valid criticism A review of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation indicates that one of the most voluminous correspondents vas C Tracy Barnes that a great deal of the written taria is repititious ad nauseam and that Barnes eLabored iS Jes which were common knowledge to the principals in WH 4 Illustrative of this for example was a 28 December 1960 memorandum which Barnes wrote to Jake Esterline It began as follows It has been a Eittle whi e since we have had an internal DDP hoe CQ ll on your project In the meantime a number of nFXJrtant POL-its have been raised 25 The memorandum then proceeded to run through 'all of the issues which by this time were common knowledge footnote continued on following page - 188 OP SECft EGf - Ofi SECREr On 2 January 1961 Fidel Castro notified the United States Government that it would have to cut its Embassy staff in Havana 'to eleven persons On 3 January 1961 President Eisenhower held a meeting at the White House to discuss the Cuban situation In addition to the President and the Secretaries of State Defense and Treasury the participants included the members of the Special Group plus General Goodpaster Mr Bissell Thomas Mann and Tracy Barnes Among principal questions of course were if and when the United States should break off diplomatic relations with Cuba and after some initial hesitation before the day was over the United States did break relations officially with the Cuban Government to those who were even' marginally involved in planning the anti-Castro operation and contri uted nothing in particular to understanding of any of them Similarly Barnes' memorandum for the DCI in preparation for a 3 January policy meeting rehashed the same information that Barnes had presented to Chief WH 4 just a few days before 26 Barnes appears to have suffered a severe case of-Verba 1 diarrhea Before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic relations there was great concern within the Agency that the COS a communicator and a PM officer and possibly a fourth individual be retained as members of the Staff 27 - 189 - 'fOP SI- CR F - LQP SECRtl The other subject of conversation was whether there now was cause or reason for direct us intervention in Cuba and the decision was that no such action should be taken unless the Cuban Government took aggressive action against us citizens in Cuba or damaged official us property e g Guantanamo In the course of the discussion about the status of Agency planning for anti-Castro activities the question was raised about increasing the number of trainees This was ruled out pending the suitability of training sites to handle additional numbers Training sites in the US still were denied in part again because of the fear of compromising the US position in the Organization of American States or in the United Nations The high level White House meeting also agreed that it would be useful to brief members of the new administration particularly the Secretary of State but no definite schedule was agreed upon but the concensus sic of the meeting was that appropriate briefings should be considered for the near future 28 In the few days following the 3 January decision to break relations with the Castro Government the - 190 - TOP SECRET- or SECRET Agency retained control of US communications out of Havana -- the Ambassador deciding that he preferred to relieve the female Department of State communications officer and retain the services of her male counterpart from the Agency During this hectic period the communications officer was instructed to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that which remained Even if all the gear were not destroyed CIA's Director of Communications indicated there would not be any extreme compromise In any event however the last message from Havana Station -- on 7 January 1961 at l638Z -- stated This last msg from HAVA Station All files and crypto material destroyed on evening 6 Jan 1961 Swiss amb placed Carta de Proteccion notices on emb doors minimizing possibility takeover of bldg by GOC 29 Even as the 'debate over the breaking of diplom tic relations was taking place within the Eisenhower administration Col Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum to Jake Esterline Chief WH 4 which provided an excellent summary of the policy decisions which needed Authorization for complete shutdown had been set for 0300Z on 7 January 1961 30 - 191 - rep SECRET r ep SECRET to be made if strike operations were to be conducted against the Castro government In the course of his eight page memorandum Hawkins reiterated the need for resolution of the problem that had particularly bothered the Special Group that was wpether the Kennedy administration was interested in following through on the plans that had been made Assuming that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow through on the program which had been initiated Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build up of Castro's military forces the strike operations be conducted not later than 1 March 1961 The ques- tion of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning -- on this he was quite firm In discussing the general question of air operations Hawkins said It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in' the objective area is absolutely required The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run in to the beach If this is not done we will be courting disaster Then by specific recommendations Hawkins urged the fvllowing 1 That the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day - 192 - -'rOP SELkE T QP 3ECRr T 2 That any move to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted 3 That the operation be aba 1 doned if pOlicy does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support In order to insure the success of both the air strike and the air drop operations which would provide the logistical support for the troops holding the lodgment on Cuban soil Hawkins urged as he had in the past authorization for the use of contract American pilots the use of the airfield at Puerto Cabezas as an advance strike base and the use of air bases in the United States for the logistical flight operations aunching of 3 Much the same ground indicatec in Hawkins memorandurn was rehashed in preparing M r _ Barnes and the DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961 There is'no indication that Hawkins ever changed his attitude about the need for L e introduction of some US pilots into both the strike and logs tics air operations even though his much quoted cable of 13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high praise for the B-26 pilots who were about to undertake the D-2 air strike See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation Air Operations Part III A for discussion of the Ecwkins cable in the context of the air operations - 193 - for gECRR lOP S CJ ET Somewhat more emphasis than Hawkins had given to it was placed on the political organization and the needs for' structuring the exile political group to conform accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans who did oppose Castro Otherwise much of the same focus was to be given to the questions regarding air bases the size of the invasion force and the number of trainees who could be accommodated in the camps and other of the problems that had already been discussed time and time again 32 Similarly in dis- cussions prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of the Special Group much of this same ground continued to be replowed without any positive resolution by the Special Group members 33 During the course of the frequent sessions of the Special Group in the final weeks of the Eisenhower administration the Director of Central Intelligence also was required to make a presentation before the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 6 January of 1961 Among other things the record of this meeting stated as follows Mr Dulles then gave a fairly detailed picture of CIA action with respect to Cuba mentioning the two-pronged program of - 194 - 'I UP SeCRET tOP SECRET propaganda including radio and publications and the paramilitary effort Again he pointed out that this is an expensive program running to approximately $28 million Mr Dulles discussed the radio effort and paramilitary effort in some detail indicating the numbers of Cubans being trained and the supply efforts and the bases 34 Because of the subsequent charges which would be made by historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr and others writing on the Bay of Pigs it is important to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attending this briefing was Robert Amory Jr the Deputy Director for Intelligence who according to Schlesinger and some of the later experts was supposed to be in almost total ignorance of any planning for an operation such as took place at the Bay of Pigs Other Agency personnel in attendance at this briefing were General Cabell DDCI Colonel L K White Deputy Director for Support Richard Helms Chief of Operations for DDP Emmet Echols Director of Per onnel and John Warner Legislative Counsel It also should be noted that Mr William A Tidwell Jr of Amory's office was appointed in January 1961 to be Chief of the Office of Operations in Miami 35 Organizationally at this time the Office of Operations was under the Deputy Director for Intelligence In view of the efforts being made in the Miami area to recruit Cubans for training in the exile Brigade it is inconceivable that Tidwell and the Deputy Director for Intelligence were not fully aware of the plans that were being made to unseat Castro until after the invasion had collapsed at Playa Giron - 195 - -'fOP SECRET On 10 January 1961 President Eisenhower got involved in a meeting concerning the planned operations against Castro On that day the New York Times broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops in Guatemala As the ex-President himself wrote On the morning of January 10 1961 the New York Times carried an article with a map describing the training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala o It told most of the story I decided that we should say nothing at all about this article Believing that my successor might want some day to assist the refugee forces to move into CUba I considered that we were limited in what we could say about them 36 Whether a meeting had been planned prior to the appearance of the New York Times article is not known but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call on the administration to send a representative up to the Hill on 12 January 1961 in order to provide further explanation of the Times article Of the two candid tes being considered to appear before the Senate Thomas Mann Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs or DCI Dulles it was decided to send Mr Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee However President Eisenhower raised certain questions as to the right of a Committee to ask questions on foreign - 196 - 'l'O'P SEC 1 TOP SECRET policy affecting the security of the United States He Eisenhower commented that when this is demanded as a right you are sunk and wondered how much right have they got inasmuch as the Constitution says that it is the responsibility of the Chief Executive 37 The culmination of the Special Group discussions which had taken place with increasing frequency between mid-November 1960 and mid-January 1961 was the report of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Willauer on 18 January 1961 The conclusions were predictable there were decisions that needed to be made but these could not be made until the new administration became fully aware of the extent of the anti-Castro programs that had been evolving As Willauer himself said in his final memo In the bsence of these decisions or at least most of them there is a grave danger that the December 6 plan updated may have to be abandoned -as an effective means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support and that the only practical course of action for the physical'overthrow of Castro will be either 1 open U S war with Cuba or 2 a seven-month overt training by the U S on United States soil of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force which will be planned to strike with at least overt U s logistical support 38 Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December 1960 plan See pp 173 ff - 197 T E ET p 3EClrrT Perhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-round which the Special Group had been riding for at least two months was Willauer's closing statement In our discussions we weighed without coming to a conclusion the advantages of a rapid effective action by direct war in terms of getting matters over with without a long buildup of world opinion vs the inevitability of such a build up under any seven month program 38 Having reviewed the meetings during the last few weeks of the Eisenhower administration it is interesting to review the comments of some of those who were principally involved as they looked back on that period One of the most immediate responses was found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance for the Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 when he explained the invasion to them Among other things Castro claimed That on certain occasions we have also been in danger f direct aggression This danger always has been lurking about us and at certain times has gathered considerable support in the minds of leading circles of the United States One of those moments when this type of direct aggression was very near was at the end of December 1960 and the beginning of January 1961 and that is to say during the last days of the Eisenhower administration 40 - 198 t CREI AreF'SECRET So concerned was Castro at this time that he put his armed forces in a state of alert for a two week period covering the transitton from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administratioi l 41 The other principal protagonist at this time to remembered i t in a somewhat different manner The former US President wrote of this period in the following manner Covert training of exiles for any possible future operations against Castro was going forward Units were growing steadily in strength and efficiency against the time when actual tactical planning could be undertaken In Decem- ber 1960 I suggested to the State Department that the time might be propitious for organizing a front against Castro among the r fugees with the United States recognizing the leader and his associates as the legal government of Cuba with the priviso however that the exiles themselves would voluntarily select from their own number an acceptable head of government 1Il I added that if they could do so at once Iid like to see recognition accorded promptly if possible before January 20 So to the incoming administration we left units of Cuban refugees busily training and preparing hopefully for a return to their native land Because they had as yet been unable to find the leader they wanted -- a national leader to be both ariti-Castro and anti-Batista -- it was impossible to make specific - 199 - TOP SeCREI _TOP 3ECR T plans for a military invasion However their hatred of Castro their patriotism and their readiness to sacrifice for the restoration and freedom in Cuba could not be doubted 42 In the statement just quoted Eisenhower's emphasis was on the fact that during his administration all that took place was a training program -- that there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held on 10 September 1965 when he said There was no tactical or operational plan even discussed when he turned the presidency over to John F Kennedy 43 According to this same interview The retiring President stressed that there had been no decision as to how the Cuban forces would be used if at all Eisenhower had made no commitments that might bind the new President in dealing with the Castro problem In fact the armed refugee group was still so small and relat1vely unprepared that 1t could easily have been disbanded if the incoming administration considered its existence unnecessary And more specifically Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared his judgment that the new administration need not rush a decision regarding the Cubans At no time did I put before anybody anything that could be called a plan to invade Cuba declares the former President He emphasizes that there was no mandate no - 200 - l eP SECRET Tor SECRET commitment by me or by anyone in my administration and he doubts that Kennedy felt ' he was frozen to any position by me 44 Gordon Gray President Eisenhower's National Security Advise also supported his former boss when quer ed about the Eisenhower role in the Bay of Pigs activity stressing that the emphasis during Eisenhower's administration was on training the Cuban exiles and providing them with equipment Like the former President Gray too said that there was Uno military plan The definition of a military plan however seems to have focused on an actual site for the landing and in this sense Gray certainly was telling the truth because no such choice had been made at the time that Eisenhower left office In his own words Gray stated There wasn't any military plan formulated by the time the Eisenhower administration went out Of course the President was fully aware of and conversant with the decision to train and arm individuals And the concept was one that was sort of chqnging in the Eisenhower Administration First we were thinking in terms of the old infiltration of small groups Then they were thinking of the possibility of landing of people unit sized groups And no decisions had been reached at that time It was only that - 201 - DdP SECREt rep SECRET there was training That was clearly authorized and it was clearly contemplated that there would be or could be a military action But it simply was not true that Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't change As a matter of fact the planning that was done in his administration was changed The Bay of Pigs was not the first landing point That was changed But none of that no planning process in the Eisenhower administration had got to the point of discussing what would be the landing point 45 What both Gray and Eisenhower conveniently ignored as has been pointed out in the preceding discussion was the major change that was made in the concept in November of 1960 What was to have been an infiltration of numerous small teams of communicators and PM trainers became an amphibious invasion plan calling for a major enlargement of the exile Brigade and an air operations plan which would be critical to both the Brigade's l nding to be sustained once ashore in Cuba and its ability What was yet undecided as Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy were the issues which the Special Group had argued throughout the weeks from mid-November into January -- the number of troops that should be or could be trained - the facilities that would be available for training sites possibly in third countries or in the United - 202 - mil SECRel ' OP ECR ET States the possible commitment of the United States personnel as volunteers or contracts and possible overt US intervention to remove Fidel Castro 46 Despite the availability of documentary records and autobiographical information about President Eisenhower's role in the anti-Castro program it is interesting to the historian that the subject of the Bay of Pigs apparently was banned as a topic in oral history interviews conducted with Eisenhower and various of his senior subordinates who were close to the operation Included among this group in addition to Eisenhower himself were James H Douglas Jr DOD Thomas Mann State Gen David Shoup USMC Thomas S Gates Jr DOD and Livingston Merchant State - 203 - 'JPYOf' SECltET reP SECRET CIA Internal Use Only Controlled by CIA History Staff Aa e ss TSf795052 Copy 1 of 2 RELEASE AS SANITIZED y ' i l' -' '1996 _''-' ''''-'''' OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAy'OF PIGS OPERATION ' VOLUME I II EVOLUTION OF CIA's ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES 1951-JANUARY 1961 pages 204-388 T'S 795052 CI-8 Qlecember 1979 Co y 1 of PERMAN NT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY l PdP SECRrT Volume III Contents pp 204-388 Part V Part VI Direct Action Programs o 204 A B 204 233 Propaganda _ Sabotage and other Exercises Mr Nixon's Role 241 Part VII The Question of Assassinations o 277 Part VIII Conclusions -- - 290 Appendixes A B C Memorandum for the Director of Cent -l Intelligence from J C King 11 Dec 59 296 A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime 16 Mar 60 _ _ 300 CNO Correspondence with Department and NSC 0 S te 1 Letter for Allen Dulies from Arleigh Burke 17 Mar 60 TS DD P 0-1436 _ _ 2 Letter for Gordon Gray from Arleigh Burke 16 Mar 60 3 Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Haydn Williams 16 Mar E ' sub US Policy toward Cuba f' SECRET 311 313 318 TOP SECF - D E F G Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director Plans - Action fro J D Esterline 2 May 60 sub Liaision with US Agencies on JJPY C Activities 332 Attack on Petroleum Refinery at Santiago de CUba l3-l March 1961 335 Richard M Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro 19 April 1959 o 337 Memorandum for DCI for Briefing Vice President Nixon 29 Feb 60 sub What We Are Doing in Cuba o o o o o 344 Source References - ' Must Go Part I Background Part II Castro Part III Changing Concepts Part IV Presidential Resurgence Part V Direct Action Programs 374 Part VI Mr Nixon's Role 382 Part VII Assassination Part VIII Conclusions 388 - - - - 347 352 366 369 386 JOPSECRET Part V Direct Action Programs A Propaganda The desire of WH Division to undertake the propa- ganda operation against the government of Fidel Castro antedated the formation of Branch 4 in the Division by more than two months for on 27 October 1959 in a Memo' randum to the Director of Central Intelligence J C King proposed That CIA undertake clandestine propaganda operations targeted at Cuba These operations would employ primarily radio broadcasts and other means of propaganda and at informing the Cuban masses of the truth 1 Col King's memorandum pointed out'that representatives of various of the Cuban opposition g oups organized in the United States had requested Agency assistance to set up propaganda operations directed against the Cuban mainland and in addition he also indicated that he and the Director of Communications Gen McClelland had his people studying the best methods for carrying out such propaganda broadcasts - 204 - 'TO 13 SEC R ET King's initial memorandum contained no information about potential locations of transmitters personnel security inter-Agency coordination or costs Almost immediately following the memorandum from Col King to the Director the subject of propaganda directed against the Castro government was introduced to discussions in the Special Group Following the first such meeting at which the subject came up seriously the DCI requested that ' We Division provide more specifics on such matters as requirements for real estate recommendations for someone to be in charge of the propaganda operations the equipment that would be required and how the broadcasting might be controlled By mid-November foll6wing additional discussions both within the Agency and by the Special Group WH Division proposed that the broadcasts originate from C J I 0 of Manuel Benitez and fromC under the guidance IJ 1 under Cristi Group headed by Col Ramon Barquin sumption was thattheL sufficient but that 101 operation the II the Monte The pre- would be self- -1 operation would be CIA funded supported and directly under Agency control The estimated costs that were mentioned in - 205 - TOP SECR r T mid-November 1959 were roughly $80 000 each for the operations in C I L bJ nd j I plus an addi- tional $12 000 for intrusion broadcasts which would originate within Cuba 2 Before the end of November the plans to utilize C 10 was feared that J had been abandoned because it J would not give his approval for such an activity and by the early part of December J r b had made it clear that h' ganda operation to be set up in J r I r r did not want the propa- r II J Conse ' ' quently there was considerable discussion about the possibility of getting permission from II 7- to agree to permit the broad- casts from his country Some members of the Special Group also suggested the possibility that the anti- Castro broadcasts might e originated from other of the Latin American countries a project which Mr Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitable broadcast facilities that would be available in countries outside of the immediate Caribbean area Some- where along the line C Tracy Barnes the ADDP A and Mr Bissell's right hand man came up with the T 'n c 206 C C I 1-' J O P 3 EC rt1 T suggestion that broa casts against Castro could be originated from continental United states How Barnes came by this proposal is not known for no such activity was ever given the slightest sanction 3 By early February of 1960 however an equivocal agreement apparently had been reached with J for a memorandum from WH Division indicated that One pilot anti-Castro tape has been made and has been playe for the benefit of J He has agreed not to interfere if we initiate broadcasts from available transmitters in t C II Even though ' ' 'J thought had been given to the establish- ment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente ' Revolucionario Democratico FRO or whoever would run the anti-Castro broadcasts J had made i t clear that he would not permit the establishmeht of special new transmitting facilities in his country On or about 17 March 1960 the same date that President Eisenhower approved the formal anti Castro program for the US Government JMATE had prepared its propaganda program which after outlining various phases of the activity stated - 207 - clear that funding of the propaganda operation was going to be a major problem and it was also clear that CIA was going to be responsible for a consider- able portion of this But even as the propaganda program was being formulated co J C King was in New York working with Henry Holland to approach a number of American businessmen whose companies had interests in Cuba Their objective was to raise funds to support the FRD propaganda operations which might be operated through Station WRUL in New York a station that was directed by Mr Walter Lemon who worked closely with the CIA Lemon in fact was ready to - TOP 208 ECftCf Tor ECRET mount radio pr gram opera ions a1most immediately pending receipt of material and guidance from the Agency 6 With reference to King's approach to e I ' 2 if 'J the 1 businessman stated that he would contribute his personal funds to the anti-Castro propaganda effort and in addition he would approach the directors or heads of other companies that were also involved in Cuba individ- uals whom he thought were well enough off to make personal contributions With reference to contribu- tions of this nature It was decided that personal contributions were most advisable because they would not require action and approval by Boards of Directors and therefore coulq be most easily concealed The sum discussed was $50 000 # 7 The plan for private funding of WRUL was in trouble from the start As early as April 1960 Chief Among those that Col King met with on 15 March 1960 werer 1 f# J' JC J 'I 1 Other companies including C r and- C 9 r made dona tl ons in the company names and the Agency notified the Commissioner of Internal Revenue about the donations so that they could be treated as corporate tax deductions 7a l J ' WH 4 had requested Chief WHO's permission to obligate JMATE funds for support of the station but Chief WHO refused indicating that private money would be available In October 1960 a similar proposal was made and rejected for the same reasons By December 1960 however payment from JMATE funds was authori ed because private funds were unavailable 7b In terms of the broadcast facilities that were to be established under the propaganda program CIA was to create and control both short and medium wave shipborne radio broadcasting operations and to investigate the feasibility of an airborne radio transmitter capable of black broadcasts into Cuba Aside from the broadcast operations there were a number of additional programs calling for printing facilities for the production of propaganda materials and secure The airborne medium wave transmitter apparently was ruled out early in the planning stages because it was a terribly expensive operation Based on DPD's estimates Phillips figured that three flights per week to six selected Cuban cities -- among others Havana Santiago and Cienfuegos -- over a two month period would show operating costs in excess of $83 000 plus an additional $fO OOO for transmitting equipment on a C-54 and a cost of $250 000 if the C-54 were lost 7c - rep 210 3ECrz Y TOP SECftff editorial offices so that the propaganda materials could be prepared It was shortly after the formulation of the propaganda program that David A Phillips became Chief of the WH 4 Propaganda Activity Phillips had done propaganda work for the Agency at the time of the Guatemalan activity but subsequently retired and had been in private business in Havana Accord- ing to his own story he had intended to stay in ' private business but in the course of Castro's rise to power he was recontacted by Agency personnel and persuaded to take on the job of running the Agency's propaganda campaign against Castro According toone interviewer In the Guatemalan campaign Phillips had worked with a handful of completely controlled Latin American propaganda writers and had been able to develop a single credible propaganda line Now however he had to w rk under Washington orders to offer radio broadcasting time to all the major and competing Cuban exile groups Much of the Phillips' For Phillips' own story of his employment and his re-employment by the Agency see his book The Night Watch New York Atheneum 1977 - 211 - rop seCRCT POP 3ECRFF effort went into overcoming the idea that CIA financed radio programs should become a forum for the varying views of rival exile splinter factions Phillips was principally in Washington but there were frequent trips to Miami and New York and Phillips himself coordinated CIA covert broadcasting with Henry Loomis Director of USIA's Voice of America 21 All indications are that Phillips had an excellent staff which was highly motivated and certainly extremely busy during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation The key point in Dave Phillips's propaganda operation was to be the 50 000 watt radio transmitter located on the larger of the two Swan Islands -- this so called larger n island being roughly 1 3 4 miles long by 1 1 4 miles wide US possessions the Swan Islands are located roughly 100 miles NEof Honduras in the Caribbean Sea Already located on the island was a Federal Aviatipn radio beacon and a Department f Commerce weather station In April1960 'the cover story_which was devised for the Among those who worked in Phillips's Political and Psychological Section in WH 4 were William Kent John Isaminger Phillip A Toomey Earnest I Harrison Paul Oberst and Michael J Maney 10 Illustrative of the desire to placate the various exile factions was the proposal by the Forward Operations Base to give the spokesmen of the factions air time on WRUL on a rotating basis to present the position of the particular group FOB was to assume responsibility for WRUL programming on 1 December 1960 and was of the opinion that such programming would have desired effect on creating semblance of united anti Castro opposition lOaf - rep 212 CRI t -TOP SEER C P- operation of the two radio transmitters one 50 000 watts and the other 7 500 watts was that the Navy was going to purchase scientific signal time from the Gioralter Steamship Company an Agency proprietary which was nominally the operator of a commercial radio station then being established The loading of- the transmitters the unloading the construction of the facilities to house the transmitters and the installation of the transmitters was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics James Burwell a logisitcs officer who was thoroughly involved'in the JMATE operation reported that the construction activity at Swan Island required the movement of 180 000 pounds of equipment frorn IC aboard Agency trucks for delivery to Norfolk and the reloading aboard two LST's In addition to locating the transmitters and constructing the facilities for housing the transmitters a crude landing field also was cleared The total time involved was approximately 20 days and the cost was something under $225 000 - 213 - TOP SECRET The first test signals from Swan Island were sent on 17 May 1960 and from that time until the close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation the station was one of the two or three principal voices aimed at Castro's government 11 Shortly after the initi- ation of the broadcast from Swan a true tempest in teapot was brewed over the question of whether or not export licences were going to be required for goods moving from the mainland to support operations at Swan Island Involved in this brouhaha were the Department of Commerce the US Customs Service and numerous Agency components -- Cover Staff Commercial Division the Office of Logistics and the Office of Security Bill E semanh had his hands full WH 4's Chief of Support Commonsense ultimately prevailed and the question of export lice ces was dropped 12 Even before Swan went into operation there was some question within the government as to whether the CIA or the United States Information Agency should be principally responsible for propaganda broadcasts directed at Cuba Within a few weeks following the beginning of operations at Swan this question was resolved in a meeting in Senator Mundt's office which - 214 - -ffJl' SI-C R 1- r TOP SECR ET included representatives from the-Agency Mr Abbot Washburn the Director of the United States Information Agency and various of Mr Washburn's senior people The meeting made clear that the Agency was doing medium wave broadcasting directly into Cuba Although i t was not specified at the meeting in Mundt's office CIA also was supporting station WRUL which had made a direct application on its own initiative for funding such broadcasts -- even though the Agency was behind such broadcasting and such financing 14 The Navy however got goosey about the cover story which was being presented Despite a strong effort on the part of senior Agency representatives to convince Rear Admiral S B Frankel r- who was designated as he Chief represe tative of the Office of Naval Intelligence by Admiral Fauste then Director of ONI -- the Navy declined further involvement in supporting the cover story The hassle with the The thrust of the Agency's 27 April 1960 briefing for Adm Frankel was that the USN was already so heavily involved in the project that it would do them more harm than good to withdraw Information on this meeting with the Navy and other information pertaining to the development of the Swan Island facility is contained in the sources listed under Reference 14 -215 - i OP GBPKC ET fflP SECker Navy was successfully resolved when the' Agency found that through its o n resources it would be able to provide for resupply of all of the Island's needs including transportation of personnel between JMWAVE in Florida and Swan Island without undue difficulty_ The problem of security of the island -- particularly the fear that perhaps Castro would send saboteurs to the island -- was never put to any real test In fact what might have been the only serious security ' ' incident was most successfully resolved bye 3 the Security Officer for the island and the Deputy Chief of Base The incident took place in July 1960 when a group of 14 Honduran students landed to assert a claim to sovereign y of the Swan Islands by the Republic of Honduras and it was reported as foilows A potentially dangerous situation was averted by the tactful handling of the group by Mr 3 'who persuaded them to leave the1r armament of 13 pistols and three submachine guns aboard their boat and conducted them on a tour of the island The group leader indicated that he wanted to take a census of the population and was furnished with pertinent information with no divulgence of Agency interest in Radio Swan or its personnel Upon completion of the census the group was permitted to raise the Honduran flag was given lunch r - 216 - 'fOP EC ET and refreshments and departed shortly thereafter The good judgment and discretion of Mr C 3 lare felt to be directly responsible avoidance of what could have been a serious incident involving loss of lives or injury to Agency and other island personnel lSI The question of the exact nature of the broadcasts from Swan was the subject of much discussion both prior to the opening of the station and subsequent to its first broadcast The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for example called Jake Esterline Chief Project JMATE to report on conver sation that he General Cabell had with a person of considerable importance who was very familiar with Cuba concerning the nature of the propaganda which should be aimed at the Cuban pop lation Cabell stated that according to this important person if tapes of Castro's radio broadcasts could be acquired and then patched together for rebroadcasting to the Cuban population for hours on end the effect would be to bore the people horribly with Castro but would The island was manned by 24 people all but nine of whom were CIA personnel The nine were unwitting technicians of the Philco Corporation - 217 - - rop $ c R IT also pointedly reveal the inconsistencies of his statements t Following receipt of this call from the Deputy Director Esterline passed the word on to Dave Phillips with the comment that he thought perhaps such broadcasts might be used as filler during the intervals when Swan was not doing its regular broadcasts 16 By early August 1960 however the official policy for the Swan propaganda broadcasts aimed at Cuba was to be the Revolutio'n Betrayed This theme was formalized by the Department of State and at the direction of the Secretary of State copies of a 105 page document addressed to this theme were presented to members of the National Security Council to members of the Inter-American Peace Committee and to US Embassies in the Latin American countries cos Havana forwarded another suggestion for a possible propaganda attack on Castro based on a May 1960 issue of ConfidentiaL magazine which apparently carried an article called An American Mother's Terrifying Story -- Fidel Castro Raped my Teenage Daughter It was COS Havana's suggestion that wide publicity be given to this article in the Spanish language presumably including broadcasts from Radio Swan 17 Available records do not indicate whether this-Suggestion was adopted - 218 - - rop SeeR E I p SECRET Instructions were that the Embassies could furnish copies of the document to the foreign ministers and to other high officials in th ir respective countries Additionally the NATO Council also received a copy of this document and it was the hope of the Depaitment of State that the document would have some impact on the upcoming meeting of th foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere countries which was to begin 16 August 1960 in San Jos Costa Rica According to one interview of WH 4's propaganda chief Dave Phillips the theme of the Revolution Betrayed Hammered across the idea that Castro had double-crossed the Cuban people by abandoning the programs and promises that originally won him support None of CIA's propaganda spoken or printed ever urged the populace to rise up against Castro This appeal suicidal before the invasion would be used when and if a Provisional Government obtained a lodgement on the island lSI Ac ording to Phillips's interviewer Friendly third country diplomats in Havana monitored CIA'S principal broadcasts and confirmed that the signals were loud and clear To verify its audience the Swan Island radio offered simple gifts ball point pens were a favorite to any listener who would write to the station Considering the police controls inside Cuba listeners' letters were an act of defiance to the regime There was a - 219 - FOP SECRU --fOI' SEcRET a flood of letters including during freak radio propagation periods re quests for ball point pens from New Zealand 19 Another evidence of the success of the Swan broadcasts was related to the Director of Central Intelligence by Col King Chief WH Division who pointed out that WH had a copy of a letter from a Cuban listener who in the form of a letter bitterly attacking Swan made it clear that the Swan broadcasts were coming in loud and clear 21 Before the end of the summer of 1960 Swan was on the air on both short-wave and medium-wave for a total of 10 hours a day in addition to which they also began to utilize programs that had been prepared by the FRO One problem which would plague Radio Swan as well as other elements of Project JMARC -- was the shortage of Spanish language capability Among It appears that perhaps baseball cards also were going to be offered as an inducement to get listeners to indicate that they had picked up Swan's broadcast A propaganda note from WH 4 for 9 August 1960 for example reported M aney spoke tOL 3 J Special Acquisitions He has contacted a company making baseball cards who claim 'this most unusual order ever received ' Will get cards but curious what was wrong with bubble gum 20 - 220 - TOP gECRLT -TOP SECRET other evidence of the need to have someone with Spanish language capability inunediateTy available at Radio Swan were the following A machine-run of Agency employees failed to surface anyone with sufficient Spanish language to undertake an announcer's job inability to exploit the fatal shooting of a VenezueIan child by a pro-Castro goon could not be turned to US advantage and by mid-November 1960 WH Division was requesting that a requirement be laid on to the Department of Defense for a serviceman with native fluency in Spanish who could be used as an announcer at Radio Swan In the instance of the death of the Venezuelan child the pro-Castro Cuban press was able to get the story out before it could be broadcast from Radio Swan The pro-Castro press claimed that the death had been caused by a counter-revolutionary Sources for the foregoing discussion related to the lack of Spanish language capability are listed in reference 22 The lack of Spanish language capability was felt throughout the project not only in the propaganda effort As late as January 1961 for example the training facility in the Canal Zone was pushing Headquarters for the services for a two week period of an Air Force sergeant who was fluent in Spanish The training base wanted the sergeant to assist in briefing and debriefing an infiltration team The request was denied however because there was a greater need for the man's services as an instructor at the air training base in Guatemala 22a In another instance a request from COB Miami for promotion of a clerical from GS-4 to GS-S was based on the fact that her services as a translator have been of the greatest importance to the Base since her arrival 22b - 221 - -fOP SECRU- --TOP SECREAfZ Despite the handicap imposed by the lack of Spanish language capability at the Station Radio Swan was the most effective of the propaganda activities supported by the Agency and with Station WRUL New York these Agency-sponsored radio broadcasts were the most effective means of providing the general Cuban population with anti-Castro ammunition Addi- tionally radio propaganda -- via both short and medium wave transmitters -- was to play an important role immediately following the landing of the anti-Castro forces on Cuban soil 23 Aside from radio broadcasts other media activi- ties in which WH 4 PP engaged were the newspaper Avance -in Exi l e and the magazine Bohemia Lib1 e Both of these were published in Miami by the exile g OUPS and at one time Bohemia Lib1 e was reputedly the most widely circulated Spanish language weekly in the world Al- though barred in Cuba selected items from both publications were broadcast by Swan or WRUL 23a One of the strangest of all activities in which WH 4 PP engaged was a public opinion survey conducted by the Lloyd Free organization to assess the attitudes of the Cuban people toward the Castro regime - 222 - ' 'iTOP SECRET If WH 4's FeFSECRfl planner expected that the survey would show a strong core of internal opposition to' the Castro government they were to be sadly disappointed Working with Ita competent Cuban research organization Free's report was based on a series of a thousand interviews with a cross section of the urban population of Cuba both in Havana and in other cities towns and villages throughout the island Among the findings of the Free survey the following comments were included in the summary ' report of mid-August of 1960 The great majority of Cubans surveyed felt that both they personally and their country were very much better off than during the days of Batista The prevaiLing mood as one of hope and optimism Attesting the apparently genuine enthusiasm of the great majority for the Revolution the Castro Government and its program were the replies when the ' sample was asked about the orst aspects of life in Cuba today Despite the fact that' this question was designed to illicit unfavorable comments a very sizabLe majority named as the orst aspects of the present situation items which impLied sympathy or support for the present regime At the top of the list mentioned by onethird of all respondents was regret or apprehension over the fact that there is opposition to the Revolution and to the Revolutionary regime and that there are m sguided counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries - 223 - TOP ECRET yOP SECRET Even in describing the worst aspects of the present situation only 30% of all respondents mentioned items which could be construed as criticisms explicit or implicit of the Castro regime Only a few such subjects received significant mention with each being referred to by only a small minority of total respondents e g the danger of or trend toward Communism 7% criticism of the Revolution's program 7% economic difficulties 7% unemployment 6% confusion and dlsorganization 5% In view of the overwhelming popularity of the Revolutionary program i t is patently clear that criticisms of Castro's program as such will fall very argely on barren i f not counter-productive ground The only positive statements that appeared in the Free report insofar as the objectives of WH 4 were concerned were to the effect that successful attack on the Castro Government should be made in terms of the inability of the government to meet the 'projects it had outlined because of the unwise and unrealistic means it is employing in the execution of its program and the Revolution and its program are being perverted through the insidious influence of the Communists The information concerning the Free report is contained in source reference 24 - 224 - i OP SECRF'T --- SECRET It is interesting to record the rea on within the Agency to the Free report C JMARC lamented the fact that the Lloyd Free report evidently has gotten into the hands of the Cuban Government and will probably be used with devastating effect at some point during the meeting the upcoming OAS Conference scheduled for San Jose Costa Rica He told ADDP A that he felt the Department of State would have to be prepared to sacrifice Mr Free's report on the proverbial alter of gold The point was made 'strongly to ADDP A that the Free report in fact is not at all valid other than for a limited sample of the City ot'' tHabana ADDP A agreed but said he did not think State should be made aware of the fact CIA actually pa d for the report He further indicated that he was still endeavoring to find out how the report copy of which CIA never received in full -- got out of control 25 The substance of the Free Report appeared in the New York Times and also in a Peter Edson column which was reported to be syndicated in 600 newspapers In passing this information on to the DDP Chief WH 4 suggested that the survey in the opinion of WH 4 Chief WH 4 apparently misread the significance of the Free report because as the report points out the most serious opposition was in fact in the Havana area which included the heaviest sampling of opposition sentiment - 225 - rot'SECRET Ot SECRET Prop will be used in Cuban propaganda -- something of an understatement 26 Logic would seem to indicate that if WH 4's principals could not subscribe to the results of Free survey's that WH 4 PP might have been tasked to make a serious study of the impact which Castro's propaganda and his achievements were having on the will of the Cuban public to resist outside interference In an interview with the author of this history Dave Phillips stated that Enno Robbing had provided the editorial guidance for WH 4's propaganda efforts but that to his Phillips's knowledge no study ever was conducted of the Castro propaganda effort In retrospect Ph llips indicated that this probably was an oversight 27 - On the subject of surveys of questionable value during the Bay of Pigs Operation mention should be made of a contract JMATE negotiated with Klein and Saks to initiate a survey of Cuba's present May 1960 economic position that will also contain an outline of proposals that would sound sic as a platform for a successor government to the Castro regime The cost which will be borne by JMARC will be about $20 000 This is merely the first phase of the projected comprehensive economic program Why with CIA's in-house economic talent in the Economic Research Area of the Office of Research and Reports and the surfeit of government economists familiar with Latin America WH 4 thought it necessary to negotiate an outside contract for a study such as indicated is truly incomprehensible That the Klein and Saks contract was not blocked at the DDP or DCI level is equally incomprehensible The company's Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Government Platform to Serve the Interests of the People of Cuba and to be Compatible with the Interest of the Hemisphere and the Free World of Which Cuba is a Part which was presented in typescript -- was 15 pages of platitudes about the best of all possible worlds 28 - --rop 226 - SECf 8' f' SECRET WH 4 PP also became involved in the propaganda activity that was intended to offset the planned visit of Nikita KhrushcheV to Cuba in the summer of 1960 In an Eyes Only memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence Col ' J C King informed Allen Dulles that i t had been learned that Khrushchev had accepted an invitation from the Covernment of Cuba to visit that country Working with Havana Station a two-pronged program was being developed with the ''9 intention of either forcing the cancellation of the trip or indicating the opposition of the Cuban people to Communism Havana Station was to be responsible for organizing church opposition to the visit and WH 4 and other elements of WE Division would be responsible for instigating rumors throughout Latin America that an assassination attempt would be made on Khrushchev's life if he appeared in Cuba One of the WH 4's contacts suggested that leaflets should be prepared depicting the crucifix upside down to signify the Soviet treatment of religion and that these leaflets should be distributed widely through Cuba There is no indication that this particular leaflet was ever devised but in at least - 227 ' p f Cn T ET one instance the Hammer and Sickle was used to form the 'T' in the word Traidor on a sticker that was being prepared for propaganda use 30 In anticipa- tion of the possible visit 10 000 stickers of an anti-Khrushchev anti-Soviet nature were forwarded from Headquarters to Havana Station The legend on one of these was Cuba Yes Russia No Khrushchev No and a second item showed a prisoner behind bars formed by the stripes of the Cuban flag with the words Sin Palabras -- Without word n 31 Despite these advanced preparations no opportunity was presented to utilize the p anda stickers Although both Castro and Khrushchev were in attendance at the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York 19-28 September 1960 and even though Castro flew out of New York in an Aeroflot jet the Khrushchev visit did not materialize at this time See following two pages for copies More det iled information on propaganda leaflets and the dissemination of such materials by air drop is given in Volume I of this history Air Operations Khrushchev flew from New York directly to Moscow at the close of the UN session On 22 October 1960 in the course of an interview in Moscow with a Cuban journalist Khrushchev did state that he wanted to visitCuba and its people as soon as possible 31a - 228 - -OP SECRET -J'OP-GBPECRET If not particularly successful in projects other than Radio Swan WH 4 PP cannot be charged with lack of imagination Among other projects it was proposed that the Office of Medical Services' psychiatric study of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the profile was not particularly flattering to the Cuban leader and the Castro image also would have suffered if a disorienting drug could have been placed in Castro's food These proposals were similar in intent to ' others aimed at the Castro image as revealed in the Senate Select Committee investigation of CIA plots against the Cuban leader In light of a rumor that had been picked up to the effect that the Cubans reportedly were painting some of their British Sea Fury aircraft wi th the American flag -- said planes to be used in a provoca tion action to discredit the United States -- WH 4 investigated the possibility of doctoring some photos of the Sea Furies with the flag being painted on in order to forestall any such provocations by the Cubans Unfortunately however the Agency art shop pointed out that it would be technically infeasible to attempt to make such fake photos - With the idea in mind of a 229 - propaganda campaign aimed at terrorizing Castro's militia and apparently at the request of Col Jack Hawkins Chief WH 4 PM WH 4 PP gave some thought to preparing a purported secret order to Castro's militia to establish an elite suicide squad which would fight on even after the defeat of the other troops The gentleman who would later become infamous in connection with the Watergate activity E Howard Hunt and Dave Phillips assessed the possibility of sending a white painted flight of truth airplane on a trip to several of the Latin American countries bringing -- in a Billy Graham type operation -- the message of Castro's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution But this esoteric plan too never got beyond the planning stage 32 None of the foregoing proposals however were in the same league with the propaganda plan that came to be known as the Dripping Cuban The WH 4 Propa- ganda Notes for 19 August 1960 stated P hillipsl dispatched cable on Special Operation to HAVA Cuban jumping ship in Bosphorous 33 In fact the cable that Dave Phillips had orig- ina ted was addressed not only to Havana but also to - 230 - TOP StDrI I fOfl 3ECR ET 3 J D J i in Miami and to the Forward Operations Base Remembering that Dave Phillips himself was something of an actor as well as a newspaperman it is believed worthwhile to repeat this cable in its entirety The cable read as follows 1 FYI HQS IS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING OPERATION SHORTLY AFTER A RUSSIAN BOAT HOMEWARD BOUND FROM CUBA PASSES THROUGH BOSPHOROUS A DRIPPING CUBAN CLIMBS ASHORE IN TURKEY HE CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL PRISONER ARRESTED BY CUBANS IN HAVANA BUT SENT TO RUSSIA FOR IMPRISONMENT CUBAN SUBJECT WILL CONTACT LdCAL LATIN AMERICAN CONSULS AND ISTANBUL PRESS FOR EXPLOITATION THEN RETURN LATIN AMERICA AFTER BRIEF BUT DRAMATIC EXPOSURE TO PRESS AN ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE ON SUBJECT'S LIFE FOR THIS REASON HE WILL GO UNDERGROUND SO THEY WILL NOT LIQUIDATE HIM 2 FOR HAVA REQUEST STATION RECRUIT SUBJECT OBVIOUSLY HE MUST BE SUPERB ACTOR WHO CAN CONVINCINGLY MAINTAIN ROLE IN SPITE OF SKILLFUL PROBING BY DUBIOUS NEWSMEN HE MUST HAVE MEMORY CAPABLE OF ETAINING THOUSANDS OF D TAILS ABOUT HIS ARREST AND FORCED JOURNEY HE MUST BE KNOWN IN HAVANA SO AS TO BE MISSED WHEN HE IS ARRESTED AN ARTICULATE STUDENT TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE SWIMMING ABILITY DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL 3 SUGGEST THAT IN RECRUITMENT STATION STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED THUS SUBJECT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAY-ACTING WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE DRAMATIZATION OF SOVIET CONTROL IN CUBA STATION ALSO AUTHORIZED PROMISE FINANCIAL BACKING LATER - 231 - RETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP PERMISSION WEEKEND WITH ALL THE WORKS IN PARIS ETC 4 IN RECRUITMENT IT SHOULD BE STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON SECURITY HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED AND STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS 5 ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS SELECTED HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME HOPE HE MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH 6 FORDJ- J3-13J APPRECIATE YOUR CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT COOPERATION C l9 SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT REPEAT NOT CONTACT NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FORWARD OPERATIONAL PLAN 34 J A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted above went to Chief WH 4 from Rudy Gomez the Deputy Chief of WH Division on 24 August 1960 re d Gomez's memorandum as follows The DCI General Cabell and Mr Helms discussed this cable on 24 August 1960 and concluded that since Fidel Castro is definitely identifying himself more and more with the Russians it is not worth the candle to launch an operation such as that one proposed in subject cable Mr Helms said that we may discreetly try to find a body for this operation providing we play it very carefully and do not - 232 - WP SECRE we let the body in on what definitely have in mind also that any further cables which go out on this proposed operation are to be signed off by him Examined in retrospect it would appear that Mr Helms had good reason to be nervous about the proposal 35 B Sabotage and other Exercises Where WH 4 PP was successful in putting Radio Swan into operation and in supporting Station WRUL in This proposal provided another of the very few instances where Mr Helms' name surfaced in relation to a Bay of Pigs related problem Because so many of the sabotage activities of the Cuban dissidents were uncoordinated uncontrolled and did nothing to impede the extension of Castro's control or lessen his support the author has tried only to illustrate something of the scope of those sabotage operations over which the Wrl or WH 4 could exercise a degree of control In responding to the Taylor Committee's request for an assessment of the effectiveness of its sabotage program the best that WHO could say was There are numerous acts of sabotage reported from all provinces of Cuba These acts included the burning of cane fields damaging of power and cOa unication lines and sugar mills burning of schools and commercial buildings and damaging of petroleum and sugar refinery sic It is extremely difficult to verify just what ''' sabotage damage were sic the result of our team's sic activities however they have claimed the burning of cane fields the firing of commercial stores high tension lines and the damage to the oil refinery at Santiago de Cuba was the result of a raider operation by one of our footnote continued on following page - 233 - rot' SI CR L I fl Sr CRET its broadcasts into Cuba Project JMATE could claim no similarly successful or continuing program of sabotage and disruption In fact one of the earliest and most thoroughly discussed sabotage programs against Cuba -- disruption of the Cuban petroleum industry -was a complete and total bust Being suggested even before President Eisenhower's authorization of the anti-Castro program attempts to sabotage and interfere with the operation of Cuba's petroleum refineries ' continued until well into the middle 60's -- with at least one of the sabotage experts displaying the same notable lack of success but excess of foolishness that characterized his activities during Project external action groups In addition we feel that a great deal of the other sabotage were sic the results sic of tpe demolitions we suppJied to the various teams and other action groups in Cuba with which we were in contact Approx mately 10-15 000 lbs of the over 100 000 Ibs of material sic placed in the hands of internal assets were demolitions supplies for sabotage action 35a The attack on the Santiago refinery was led by Rip Robertson but'his exciting cable about the action greatly overemphasized the damage and the plant operations were quickly restored to normal At the time however the DCI reported it to the Special Group Chester Bowles Roswell Gilpatrick and McGeorge Bundy as a successful operation 35b Robertson's cable is shown as Appendix E p 335 - 234 - reI' SECR T TOP SECKEl JMATE It isa story worth recordi g here because of the extremely close and continui g relationship between one of the major US oil companies operating J 9' a refinery in Cuba J and WH Division As early as 9 March 1960 the minutes of a Special Group meeting reflect conversations that both Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning the problems being faced by the major petroleum companies operating in Cuba -- SONJ Texaco and Shell -- and particularly the need for discreet eans pf intercompany consultation in order to avoid possible anti-trust prosecution In discussion of planned para-military operations against Cuba it was reported that on 14 July 1960 Chief Western Hemisphere Division was approached by C 7 v He Chief WH D indicated that it appeared that J will be willing to cooperate perhaps even carry the ball on certain selected sabotage targets DD P gave authority to push this contact immediately 36 Paramilitary Operation Plan I indicated that among the specific sabotage targets to be considered for attack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960 were petroleum targets 37 - 235 - - ror SELkE By August of 1960 'WH D had approved a program of subtle sabotage paying off without resorting to the more risky and sensational type of sabotage Unfortunately however there was a communications gap between the operations people and the intelligence analysts most familiar with the world petroleum industry and a number of demonstr y unworkable -- though subtle -- sabotage efforts came to naught The Cuban petroleum industry also was looked ' to as an economic-political target as well as a sabotage target When the US' refineries operating in Cuba refused Castro's order to process Soviet crude oil WH 4 began to think in terms of disrupting the flow of this crude to Cuba by pressuring Onassis and other independent shipping operators'to refuse to carry the Soviet oil It wa predicted that such The Agency's real petroleum expertise and knowledgeability -- both technically and economically -- on a worldwide basis was in the Fuels and Power Branch later the Fuel's Branch of the Office of Research and Reports later the 'Office of Economic Research Aside from the constant irritation of having to work half in' the dark in response to WH D or WH 4 ORR F P was constantly having to correct errors to make apologies or mend fences with the major US petroleum companies as a result of the lack of cOordination between DDP and DOl components - 236 - rop ECRET a plan would force the USSR then facing a shortage of tanker bottoms in the world market to transport its own crude to Cuba and to provide technicians and make modifications in existing refineries to process their crude This in turn was supposed to alienate Venezuela and Mexico normally among Cuba's crude suppliers 39 In addition to petroleum refineries as targets for sabotage plans were also made to disrupt the Cuban microwave system Unlike the plans to disrupt the Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directly involve properties of the international oil companies the sabotage program for' the microwave networks as late as February of 1961 specifica ly stated that attacks should be limited to the Cuban operated net with hands 'off RCA'and Dumont systems which are to remain intact for later consideration 40 Also In fact the Cuban refinery technicians themselves did an excellent job of adapting the plants to the use of Soviet crude The former manager of the t refinery commented to this ffect after reviewing the all source 'intelligence materials available on the plant He was pleased -- at least in one sense -- to note that t l ct l training program has apparently been quite successful C - 237 - z or SECltEI prohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba J C King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets by resistance forces not controlled by the Agency were far less efficient than such attacks would be if they were mounted through Agency efforts 41 In addition to planning for sabotag WH Divi sion's anti-Castro activity also included extensive plans for the formation of goon squads throughout much of Latin America in an attempt to counter the pro-Castro elements of the various nations This goon squad program also was of considerable interest to the Deputy Director for Plans Hr Bissell Be- cause of its areawide nature the activities of the goon squads were run out of WH D rather than out of WH 4 Among the operations which WH claimed credit for were the following Of The disruption in riD about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use of stink bombs set off in the meeting place in Ja l 'D counter demonstration against some 200 Castro sympathizers also gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement and in z - 0 238 - J A meeting ' rOP SEcR IiT of the r r wa 9 'J prominent broken up b y r r who sprayed the two principal speakers C f J leftists with 'Who Me f o 42 Among other assets which Chief WH D chose to mention in the same context with the goon squads were the t of one Latin American country Who can promote action of any of the J r In ano ther coun try an Agency member integrated into the l' f serving as an Advisor to the Pres dent on C 8 is in a position to recommend 1 l J to the President 43 t g l In what may have been a ploy intended principally to obtain a vessel for use in infil ex il operations Who Me was an obnoxious scent In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activities by the Senate Select Committee in the mid 1970's it is interesting that the reference to the Action Squads described above also included with reference to the Dominican Republic an agent In contact with a group of dissidents capable of violent action including assassination This group has killed a number of agents of the Servicio de InteLigencia MiLitar SIM Dominican Secret Police 45 - 239 - rOf SECRET rather than in direct action programs against Cuba representatives of the Special Projects Group Counterintelligence made a pitch to Chief JMATE to acquire a vessel which -- for its acquisition operational maintenance crew including incentive bonus would run roughly $200 000 for a 6-month period -- could also be used in deception operations against Castro In responding to this suggestion from the Special Projects Group Col Jack Hawkins quickly put the ' quietus on this request noting that it was doubtful that the Cubans had either enough sophisticated radar or commo gear so that they would react to the false radar presentation deceptive communications traffic noise makers signals smoke explosions etc sequently Hawkins concluded In vie - of the high cos t involved and the other factors mentioned above I do not concur in the acquisition of this craft for dece tion purposes as proposed in the reference 46 - 240 - t Con- roPSECRET Part VI Mr Nixon's Role Like so many other aspects of the Bay of Pigs story a great deal has been said about the role that Richard M Nixon played in the operation during the course of his Vice Presidency but woefully little solid evidence has ever appeared to verify either the pros or cons on the subject Because of the continuing repetition of many of these stories a careful search was undertaken of the voluminous CIA records of the operation in order to recover those items pertaining to Nixon1s participation directly or indirectly -- through his aides assistants or correspondence -- in the Bay of Pigs operation During the course of his unofficial visit to the United States in the spring of 1959 Fidel Castro accepted the invitation of the Vice President of the United States to meet with Mr Nixon in his official office in the Capitol for an informal discussion Nixon has stated that the meeting was arranged at the request of the Secretary of State Herter who suggested - 2 1 - fOP sEeR ET that the administration m ght profit if one of its leaders could gain additional inside information about what made Castro tick Nixon has said that he had a 3 1 2 hour meeting with Castro on 19 April 1959 and that as a result of the meeting he prepared a 4-page secret memorandum and sent copies to President Eisenhower Secretary Herter and to Allen Dulles In part at least Mr Nixon's version of the meeting with Castro was made public as early as November 1964 in an article he wrote for the Reader's Digest and these views were repeated in somewhat more detail in his recent memoirs RN The thrust of the meeting was that Nixon was emphasizing the need for Castro to establish a democratic form of government as he Nixon understood it with Castro on the other hand emphasizing that the In his Reader's Digest article of November 1964 Nixon indicated that copies of the memorandum went to the three individuals as noted in the text above however in his recent Memoirs RN Nixon states that a copy also' went to John Foster Dulles John Foster Dulles was technically Secretary of State until 22 April 1959 on which date he was succeeded by Christian Herter At the time of the meeting between Nixon and Castro however Mr Herter had been acting in Mr Dulles' place Dulles's death occurred 24 May 1959 - 242 - - 8PSECRE - J O P 3 C C REI type of government he believed in was that which was expressed most vocally by the people Nixon's most widely known remark about Castro as a result of that meeting was his statement that Castro is incredibly naive about communism or is under communist discipline Reportedly Castro was not particularly enchanted with the meeting either for according to a member of his party when Castro emerged from the meeting he was angry He swore and added 'This man has spent the whole time scolding me' Subsequent to hi y meeting with Castro in April of 1959 Agency records do not reflect any particular interest on the part of the Vice President in Cuban activities until the end of January 1960 On 27 Tanu- ary and again on 23 February Col J C King Chief Western Hemisphere Division bri fed Gen Robert Cushman Mr N ixon's Aide at the Vice President's Office Cushman made i t clear that the Vice President was It was only after making a direct request to Hr Nixon that a copy of the memorandum was obtained No copies were found in the files of CIA State or the Eisenhower Library The copy obtained was from Mr Nixon's personal files The memorandum was in fact classified CONFIDENTIAL rather than SECRET A copy of G e memorandum is attached as Appendix F - 243 - -rop 3ECR f 2a rap SECRET interested in supporting anti-Castro groups both within and outside of Cuba including goon squads or other direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro groups in Cuba Among the other subjects discussed with General Cushman on 23 February 1960 were propaganda attacks on the Castro government and the possibilities of economic sanctions similar to those which had been suggested by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland ' o whose views on the need for economic sanctions had not only been discussed with Agency representatives but also had been forwarded to the Vice President's office Another facet of the Agency's anti-Castro efforts which were of some interest to th Vice-Presi- dent were CIA's relations with the Department of State which obviously was not one of the Vice President's favorite organizations but Col King made it quite clear that all of CIA's actions were undertaken only after pOlicy approval 3 After it was pointed out to Gen Cushman that the Department of State's knowledgeability about Agency operations was on a strict need-to-know basis even for the Ambassador in Cuba - 244 - T'OP SECRET 1 -0 P rumm l' C I't ET then showed Col King some derogatory informa- tion that the FBI had provided the Vice President about both Ambassador BonsaI and William Wieland of the Bureau of American Republic Affairs Col King's memorandum provided no details about the nature of this information but the probability is that both were accussed of being too tolerant of Castro and communists 4 During one of these meetings in the early part of 1960 Gen Cushma noted that the V1ce Pres1dent had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to consult with or acquire the services of Col Edward Lansdale a member of Gen Erskine's Special Operations Staff in the Department of Defense Lansdale's activ- ities in helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the Philippines apparently were well known to Nixon 5 - On 2 March 1960 the Director of Central Intelligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed briefing on What We are Doing in Cuba The 7-page briefing paper which had been given to the Director provided information on Castro's pro-communist proclivities on the whole range of the anti-Castro propaganda effort which was being supported by Agency financing - 245 - wr SEER TOP GBPECRt T and went into details concerning ttempts to rally anti-Castro support not only in the other Latin American nations but in the Near and Far East and n Africa Details were given on the preparations being made for resistance activities including the acquisition of training bases in third countries ' and both Ydigoras Fuentes President of Guatemala and President Luis Somoza of Nicaragua were noted as having made offers of support for this country's anti-Castro activities o 1t Plans for economic warfare against Castro were also outlined for the Vice President Delaying de- liveries of necessary spare parts for the sugar industry tightening credit by oil companies to restrict delivery of the essential petroleum products and possible restriction in sugar quotas were mentioned as under study One other item which was mentioned in this briefing for Vice President Nixon was the fact that the Agency had a drug which if placed in Castro's food would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him 6 It should be emphasized that at the date of this briefing 2 March 1960 the United States did not yet have an official anti-Castro - 246 - I 01' ECRE WF SECftE' f ntil policy -- that would not come 17 March of 1960 Subsequent to that announced policy the author has foillrlno other references to drugs or other types of attack which were being considered upon Castro's person or the persons of any of the other Cuban leaders as a part of the Agency's official program There is some question as to whether it was the Director of Central Intelligence himself or whether it was Mr Bissell or perhaps whether it was Col King who actually briefed the Vice President on 2 March 1960 A stamp on the copy of the original Memorandum for the Director reads 28 March 1960 Noted by DCI This copy was sent to the DCI through the DDP and carries Mr Bissell's initials The car- bon of the memorandum does not show this stamp and the presumption is that it was the Director who did the briefing A third version of the memorandum is See Part VII of this Volume of the History of the Bay of Pigs Operation for clarification of the definition of the Agency's Official policy regarding the anti-Castro program as contrasted to the unofficial program The author assumes that regardless of reader's biases regarding the former Vice President that the fact that he heard about this drug in the course of a briefing will not be construed to make him a member of a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other of the Cuban leaders - 247 TO SECRET 65ECRE dated 8 March 1960 and was revised to read For the Director's use at the NSC 5412 Representatives Meeting which will consider the Cuban covert action program paper This paper was used for Mr Nixon's briefing This would seem to imply that perhaps the DCI did in fact do the briefing While the briefer may not be positively identified there is no question however that the Vice President did receive a detailed briefing on the Agency's plan for action against Castro prior to the time of Eisenhower's formal proclamation In addition to the meeting of 2 March when Mr Nixon was briefed on the Agency's concerns about Cuba the Vice President was also a participant in the 10 March 1960 meeting of the National Security Council when President Eisenhower emphasized that Cuba was a danger that he wanted contingency plans drawn up and that he wanted Cuba to be a subject for review at all future National Security Council Meetings Mr Nixon attended the 17 March 1960 conference when the President See Appendix G for copies of the first page of each of the three memorandums on the briefing of the Vice President on March 1960 For Appendix G see p 344 - 248 - gave a formal go to the Covert Action Plan of the Agency which had been agreed to by the 5412 Group Mr Nixon's only reported comments during this meeting concerned the cutting off of new capital to Cuba the pulling out of private American firms and the possibilities of reducing tourism to stop the flow of American dollars into Cuba 7 Perhaps one of the reasons why Vice President Nixon has been attributed with playing a major role in the Bay of Pigs activity h s to do with the re- lationship between Nixan s office and Mr William D Pawley former US Ambassador to Peru and Brazil and a US businessman with extensive investments in Cuba and interests in various other parts of Latin America Pawley also was a principal contributor to the Republican party particularly to Mr Nixon's cause Ap- parently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs -- assuming a Republican party victory in the 1960 presidential election -- Pawley was a idely known conservative In the spring of 1960 shortly following President Eisenhower's decision to promote the anti-Castro program Pawley's contacts with the Agency particularly - 2 9 - 1 OP SECRGBP I TOP SECRET with WHO and with Nixon's office became increasingly frequent and apparently quite close On 21 March 1960 four days after formal approval of the anti-Castro program Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan a meeting to be held in Pawley's Miami residence which would include the DCI Col King Gen Cushman and Walter J Donnelly Vice President of United states Steel and former ambassador to Venezuela as well as Mr Pawley Of the s ssion with Pawley Chief WH 4 wrote Details and the agenda were not discussed other than to say the principal emphasis would be on reviewing what work could be done throughout the hemisphere and public opinion on the pending operation against Castro Mr Pawley was told that the time had arrived for careful coordination of all activities that permission had been granted for an all-out op ration a government in exile will be formed post haste that the acceptable non-Batista groups will be put into contact with each other almost immediately and that Mr Pawley's contact Rublo Padilla will figure prominently in this effort o It was carefully explained to Mr Pawley that any action involving exiles now should be most carefully coordinated with Chief WHO and Chief Branch 4 to avoid any flaps 8 Esterline also mentioned in his memorandum that Pawley had provided some information on the Dominican Republic which he asked Esterline not to pass beyond CIA until he Pawley had the' opportunity to give the information directly to Vice President Nixon - 250 - POI' SEeR 'F- TOP ggCRET The meeting mention d in- the foregoing para- graph was convened in Pawley's Miami residence on 1 April 1960 and the Agency's representatives briefed among other things on the problems being faced by the Cubans in exile who were trying to form a governmente There was considerable discussion as to who should be the nominal leaders of this government in exile with Pawley pushing in particular for Dr Rubio Padilla and the Agency's representatives suggesting Dr Antonio Varona For the benefit of the Vice President's representative it was stressed that none of the Latin American countries seemed particularly anxious to provide a base of operations for the government in exile The group was informed by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Col King that in addition to US Government financing a range- ments were being made to have private confidential sources help defray the costs of the Cuban government in exile Col King pointed out that over and above a bond issue which will be floated in the name of the government in exile with Mr Pawley's help that donations are being made by private citizens and corporations He indicated that confidential arrangements - 251 - TOP ECR 1f- 1 01' SECRET have already been made with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to permit individuals or corporate entities making donations to claim these donations as contributions to the US Government for tax purposes He cautioned that this arrangement was being limited to a very small group The question also was raised about the relationship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of American States Mr Pawley suggested that rather than lean toward the OAS better use hould be made of the us Military Mission in the Latin American countries ' especially having them pass the word on about the dangers of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western Hemisphere Other items of importance that were dis- cussed by the group were the planned propaganda program and the present pathetic effort on the part of the Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in Cuba II This meeting demonstrated that from the very outset of the formalization of a US anti-Castro policy' Mr Nixon was being fully informed of the plans that were underway to accomplish the US objectives and that certain private American citizens were closely involved in the planning Within a very short time after the April meeting at Pawley's residence however - 252 - -FOP SECRET l GP 8 CrtET senior Agency personnel -- notably C Tracy Barnes the AOOP A -- began to question the Agency's relationship with Mr William Pawley particularly as Pawley's support for Rubio Padilla was apparently intended to establish a group of Pawley supported Cubans in exile in opposition to the FRD the Agency's supported exile group Barnes's concern was that if the US continued to support the extremely conservative element represented by awley's group it would be charged that any anti-Castro action undertaken by the US would be on the basis of protecting economic royalists What Barnes stressed to Mr Bissell the DOP was the need for the US to decide whether or not it wished to be charged with supporting reactionary movements in Latin America not only in Cuba but in the rest of the Central American and Caribbean areas as well Once having made up its own mind Barnes suggested that CIA's position be worked out with State and thereafter take it to Mr Nixon giving him at that time a thorough and complete briefing so that there can be no doubt in his mind - 253 - mp SECRET l Qp s r C REI as to where we stand and what we propose to do 10 When Rubio Padilla and the FRO failed to get together Pawley informed Chief Western Hemisphere Division that he was withdrawing from support of the Agency's anti-Castro operation and Pawley told Col King that he intended to make his views regarding the FRO known to Vice President Nixon In addition Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and probably with reference to Cuba In view of Pawley's recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of the FRO the DDP AnDP A Chief WH D Chief WH 4 and others discussed the pros and cons of cutting off the communications channel between Pawley and the ' Rubio groups into Cuba -- a channel which was provided by the Agency's communications facility Chief WH nivision got the group to agree that the communications channel should be continued because Mr Barnes's thoughts probably were transmitted to Director Dulles for in a meeting of the Special Grou on 19 May 1960 the DCI categorized the Cubans supported by Pawley as unreconstructed reactionaries - lOa - rer 254 - SEeR E'T -1'eJ I' SEC R T it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley group Moreover the Pawley group had a duplicate channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been restricted by denial of the Agency channel A restric- tion was placed on the transmittal of communications which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba but i t was agreed that Pawley should be advised of the cancellation of such messages by Chief Western Hemisphere Division The monitoring of such cable traffic however was to be the responsibility of Chief WH 4 Jake Esterline Because of Pawley's close ties to the Eisenhower administration the Deputy Director for Plans agreed that the discussion regarding Pawley should be brought to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence and that Mr Dulles should be urged to bring this matter before both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon 11 By the first week of June 1960 however Jake Esterline apparently had reached the end of his tether for in a Memorandum to the DDP he wrote It is our firm conviction based on months of discussion that Mr Pawley's views on the Cuban situation are highly - 255 - -r OP SEeRR lOP SECRET personal and rigid These views in our opinion are inimical to the best interest of the United States Mr Pawley has refused to budge from his position and has continued to seek official endorsement of his views at the high levels of the goverLment The flagrant disregard for security reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated 4 June 1960 requires Chief JMARC to recommend that all contact with the RubioPawley group be immediately and finally severed If such action is not taken no guarantee can be made for the security of the JMARC operation In point of fact the information in the foregoing message indicates that security already has been damaged sev rely 12 Among other things the Havana cable which hac aroused Chief WH 4 stated that the following information was being circulated in anti-Castro circl s Cuba US Government now backing Rubio group and no other group Group has entre to Veep For a time Pawley was having trouble with an Agency or Agencies who wa ted to back another junta but after Pawley offered to withdraw completely he was talked out of doing so and given assurance his group only would be backed and this resulted resignation person backing other group 13 Headquarters prepared a priority cable to sent to both Havana and to the Forward Base which had also picked up the being spread by the anti-FRO group - rep 256 - gCCR ET e Operatior disinformatic The text 0 th f or SECRE I cable read' in part as follows You have been authoritatively advised that US Government is not repeat not backing Rubio group and that i t has no intention of ever doing so It complete fabrication that Pawley was iven US Government assurance that on1y his group would be backed No resignations of any kind occurred nor are any foreseen Mention Veep in such context and on this particular level sheer foo1hardiness and can only reflect most adversely on those Cubans who guilty misrepresentation of facts and severest indiscretlilns 14 The cable apparently w never forwarded to either Havana or to Miami presumabLy because of opposition from Col J C King who had noted and initialed on his copy of the Memorandum from Jake Esterline recommending that all contact with the RubioPawley group be immediately and fin a1 l y severed the following I do not concur with severing of all contacts 15 As will be noted subsequently - rhether it was political expediency or conviction that Pawley could actually do some good the relationship among Pawley Chie WH Division and Chief WH 4 continued throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs C eration If anything in fact the relationship becNeen Pawley and Jake Esterline appears to have becane mutually supportive particularly as the operation drew to its unsuccessful conclusion - 257 - 101' SFCRt'T OP SECRET On 20 June 1960 at the request of General Cushman Jake Esterline joined him for lunch the purpose being to provide the General with sufficient information on the state of the anti-Castro program so that he could bring the Vice President up to date from the time of the Miami meeting that had taken place at William Pawley's house Among the points covered were the developments related to the organization of the FRO and the fact that Mr William '' Ie Pawley's candidate Senor Rubio had decided not to join the Frente According to Esterline's memorandum Dr Rubio's failure to join the Frente however has not held up progress in forming the junta and or the other important aspects of the operation General Cushman was told that the Frente's headquarters ' were to be established in Mexico and it was on this occasiqn that Esterline introduced General Cushman to E Howard Hunt who was going to move to Mexico with the Frente The meeting of 21 March 1960 Insofar as can be determined this probably was the first occasion on which Richard Nixon heard the name of E Howard Hunt - 258 - 'FOP sEeRI- r -I9P 3ECR ET Chief WH 4 also touched'on the programs that were being beamed out of Swan Island on the preparation being made for training paramilitary types base communications planned paramilitary activities the choice of a Third Country's staging area and that the operation was still scheduled to begin during the month of November 1960 Gen Cushman noted that the Vice President requested this information in order to prepare for an upcoming NSCmeeting at which he would ' be a senior official The Vice President's aide also asked if there were any particular problems with relation to the operation that Chief WH 4 wished to have brought to the attention of the Vice President Esterline reported that the only problems that had occurred concerned political differences among the exiles bu that for the moment all factions seemed to be quiescent Chief WH 4 also indicated to Gen Cushman that much had xetto be done vis-a-vis other countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMARC would have adequate support at the eleventh hour 16 On 22 June 1960 General Cabell -- Acting DCI at the time -- briefed a special meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban situation The Vice Except for Guatemala and Nicaragua such support would never be forthcomir g - 259 - r P 3ECR ET XOP 3r Cf ET President presided and the meeting was attended by the Secretaries of State Defense and Treasury the Director of the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization the Acting Attorney General a representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and among others Messrs Bissell King Esterline and McMahan of the Central Intelligence Agency - 17 A great deal of the briefing was devoted to the FRO and its leadership -- their policies their background and the internal difficulties and bickering The propaganda picture also was discussed with particular emphasis again on radio broadcasts from Swan Island Gen Cabell stated that the paramilitary plan was to develop a force of 500 men who would qe divided into 25 20-manteams Theteam would go into Cuba to organize and to train indigenous dissident groups Cabell emphasized that the implementation of the paramilitary program depended on the existence Knight McMahan was on the Staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence -- that component of the Central Intelligence Agency which according to some of the authorities on the Bay of Pigs was presumably uninformed and unaware of the Agency's antiCastro program - 260 - r 0 P S l- eRET WI SECREi of viable dissident forces which have not emerged in strength The ADCI also mentioned the plans to create an anti-Castro air force but his comments about this air force even at this time were very much in error According to General Cabell Some trained Cuban fliers are currently available and we hope soon to have access to additional numbers Sterile aircraft for their use have been mothballed by the Department of Defense and earmarked for CIA use These craft can be made available in a matter of hours 18 As reported in an earlier volume of this history neither the aircraft nor trained Cuban pilots would be available for missions against Castro's Cuba until late in the fall of 1960 In the NSC briefing Cabell also made some inter esting comments about the resistance that might be encountered in an attempt to oust Castro emphasizing that intelligence reports had indicated thae Cuba might organize a 'foreign legion' comprised of highly trained regular military personnel drawn from Communist nations mainly the eastern satellites this eventual ty Should oc6ur it would seriously affect the See Volurr e I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation Air Operations - 261 - T'9P SECRFF- probable success of any purely'clandestine paramilitary operations Cabell then introduced a suggestion which would be heard right up to the time that the invasion fleet was being boarded -- that volunteers be acquired for the anti-Castro forces such volunteers to be drawn from US Special Forces l8al As the presiding officer at the special National Security Council meeting Vice President Nixon raised a number of questions with the Department of State representatives concerning support that the Organization of American States would likely give to this o country's anti-Castro efforts and he also posed a series of questions concerning the economic pressures that the United States might put on Cuba The ques- tions concerned sugar oil and tariffs in particular and the Vice President urged that strong positive action be taken to avoid becoming labeled Uncle Sucker 191 No such volunteers were permitted in the case of the ground forces but in the last two days of the Bay of Pigs Operation such volunteers were accepted for combat air operations See Volume I of this History Air Operations - 262 - TOP gECRFT - rop SECRET On 1 July 1960 Jak Esterline received an inter- esting telephone call from General Cushman containing two messages from the Vice President First Mr Nixon was interested to know if there were any obstacles that the Agency was encountering vis-a-vis other agencies in support of JMATE and if there were the Vice President indicated that he personally would help to resolve such problems The second request was a bit more sticky Gen Cushman said that the Vice Presiden has commissioned him to keep Mr Willi am Pawley happy and in connection with this he has also been instructed to keep Mr Pawley briefed on how things are moving General Cushman said he realized that this is much against our desire as concerns Mr Pawley but the fact remains that he Pawley is a big fat political cat and as such the Vice President cannot completely ignore him 20 Esterline allowed that he understood the General's problem and suggested that with a few hours advance warning the Agency would provide the Vice President or the General with such briefing materials as necessary for any given meeting with Mr Pawley after first clearing the paper with the appropriate agency officials and within the security regulations that applied to Mr Pawley Esterline indicated in his - 263 - Ter SECRET- Tel' ECR E memorandum that he immediately' informed the Deputy Director for Plans and the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans Mr Bissell and Mr Barnes respectively about the call from General Cushman Jake Esterline apparently took the Vice President's offer to help CIA with difficulties it might have with other agencies to heart In a memorandum from C Tracy Barnes concerning a more effective commercial cover for Radio Swan it appears from Barnes's response that Esterline must have suggested that the services of Vice President Nixon be engaged to resolve a difficulty between the Agency and the FCC over the use of commercial advertising to make The following interesting comments qlso appeared in Esterline's memorandum on the conversation with General Cushman This information regarding Cushman's telephone call could not be given to Col King as he had just departed on a threeday trip This memorandum will be available to Col King however upon his return Wednesday 6 July Contrary to the opinions of many who have suggested that Col J C King was read out of the antiCastro operation this memorandum would indicate that in fact extreme care was being taken to make sure that J C King was read into the act - 264 - ep SECRr T Swan appear more legitimate Barnes however took exception and recommended that the US Government should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broadcasts 21 It was also in July 1960 that Vice President Nixon's office principally through the person of General Cushman first indicated an interest in the activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga Garcia was a Cuban exile who claimed to have extensive back ' ing both within the Cuban commUnity in Miami and among dissidents inside Cuba At one point he claimed that he could raise a force of 2 000 men in the Miami area and 10 000 men inside of Cuba -- if he were given proper financial support for training and equipping these men Garcia's name first came bef re the Agency in mid-June 1960 following a meeting he had with a Cuban exile who was an Agency contact During this Whether the FCC was chastened by Mr Nixon or whether a determination as made concerning the increased use of commercial advertising for Radio Swan is left in doubt But Barnes's suggestion of official USG participation in Swan was rejected A note from Esterline on the official routing slip from Barnes forwarding this memorandum read I believe Mr Bissell reversed this position To this query King noted Yes on the buck slip - 265 - WP SECRET p SECRE I initial meeting Garcia claimed 'that he had large stores of military equipment in Spain that he had additional promises of assistance from General Franco and that he had contacts in the White House who had given im the go ahead for an invasion of Cuba Word of Garcia apparently got to the FBI to General Cabell and apparently to the Office of Vice President Nixon In any event on 9 July 1960 Jake Esterline met with Mr Marshall Diggs a Washington lawyer and Garcia's sponsor where he was told of Garcia's grandiose plans to overthrow Castro In a follow-up meeting in Diggs's office on 11 July Mr Phillip Toomey WH 4 Prop met with Garcia Cameron Pulley and two reputed underwater demolitions experts Garcia went into his act about pow his force could overthrow the Castro Government assuming that he could get some financial assistance for and equipping the troops training Mr Pulley proceeded to tell Mr Toomey that Garcia's project was part of a - program that was being promoted by former Senator Owen Brewster for the entire Caribbean area -- apparently a program designed to eliminate all the bad guys Following another meeting on 13 July and after - 266 - lOP SECftE I listening to Garcia denounce the FRO leaders as Communists -- as well as being unimpressed by his credentials -- on 15 July 1960 Marshall Diggs was informed that the Agency had no interest in supporting Mr Garcia On 20 July 1960 Chief JMATE met with General Cushman to tell him that a full study had been made of the representatives of Senor Garcia and as a result the DCI probably would get in touch with Mr Diggs and or Senator Brewster and explain to ' them the wisdom of their desi sting from pushing Garcia as an outstanding Cuban military leader The subject dragged on however and at one point Mr Pulley who with Mr Diggs and ex-Senator Brewster was a strong supporter of Mr Nixon indicated that the administration's policies with regard to Cuba might hurt the Vice President in election th upcoming Moreover Pulley also is reported to have indicated that a congressional investigation of the anti-Castro plan was possible The Director of Cen- tral Intelligence was advised on 26 September that because of Garcia's threats to expose everything he had learned about possible Agency involvement in the anti-Castro effort including the Cuban exile - 267 - WP SECRC'f - organization in the United States that the time had come for Diggs and Pulley to be asked to forego their efforts on behalf of Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga This recommendation was approved by General C P Cabell on 13 October 1960 22 Insofar as the available records show the contacts between Vice President Nixon's office and the More nonsense from Mario Garcia Koh1y Antiga would surface again in the summer of 196'1 following Castro's offer to free the Bay of Pigs prisoners in return for us tractors when Garcia bounced up with another proposal for the planned escape of the prisoners -- providing of 'course that he be given a bundle of bucks In fact the hand of Garcia reached from beyond the grave to touch on the BOP operation On 2 August 1976 almost a year after Garcia's death the Washington star carried a UPI dispatch saying that Rep Thomas N Downing D Va had affidavits claiming that In return for support of the invasion of Cuba from Mario G Kohly a popular right-wing leader who was exiled from Cuba then Vice President 'Nixon agreed in October 1960 to order the CrA to arrest the leftist leaders and urn them over to Kohly for elimination after Premier Fidel Castro was thrown out of office The affidavits reportedly came from a former CIA contract agent and Mario G Kohly Jr son of the would-be invasion leader These materials were supposed to have some bearing on House of Representatives's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy but there is no indication that they were given any credence 23 - 268 - 101' SGBP CREi p SECRET Central Intelligence Agency -- except for the Garcia case -- for all practical purposes ended by August 1960 The only other significant involvement between the Vice President and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the change of administration on 20 January 1961 concerned a briefing of the Democratic candidates for President and Vice President of the United States prior to the 1960 election On 23 July 1960 follow- ing the Democratic convention Allen Dulles briefed Sen John Kennedy and on 28 July Senator Lyndon Johnson In his memorandum to President Eisenhower who had directed that Dulles give these briefings the nCI reported that in the two hour period for each briefing he had covered US relations with the Soviet Uflion developments in the Berli situation in the Whether this re lects the concentration of the Vice President's activities on the upcoming November election whether the principal contacts came to be maintained between Col J C King and Nixon's office -with the consequent reference memoranda being included in J C King's files which have disappeared from the sight of God and man -- or whether in fact this is an accurate reflection of the limited contacts the author cannot confirm His inclination is to believe that the contacts probably were as limited as describedabove - 269 - Fer S l C R Ei ifol' SECRET Congo and in Cuba Kennedy was briefed again on 19 September 1960 and again the briefing touched on relations with the Soviet Union and on the trouble spots in the world including Cuba The White House was informed of this briefing prior to the event and subsequent to the briefing of Kennedy Mr Dulles reported on the meeting to both Jerry Morgan of the White House Staff and also to Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster Staff Secretary to the President 24 - The exact nature of the 'briefings that Dulles gave to Kennedy on Cuba is of particular historical importance in terms of the election of 1960 In the last of the famous TV debates between candidates Nixon and Kennedy Mr Kennedy in the course of condemning the Castro regime and suggesting that the United States take stronger action against Castro made the statement that We must attempt to strengthen the nonBatista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile and in Cuba itself who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro Thus far these fighters for freedom have had virtually no s upport from our Government 25 Based on his knowledge and interest in supporting the anti-Castro program that had been authorized by - 270 - T-ef3 SECftET IOP SECRET Pres dent Eisenhower in March 1960 Nixon was put in a Catch-22 situation for as he said President Eisenhower had instructed Allen Dulles head of the CIA to brief the Democratic candidate on all operations including Top Secret operations I knew that Kennedy had already received two briefings from Dulles I immediately had a member of my staff call the White House on the security line to ask if these briefings covered Cuba A member of the White House Staff indicated they had Several months after the election Allen Dulles was to state that his briefing of Kennedy had included Cuba but not the training program fott Cuban exiles At the time of the debate however and after checking with the White House I had to proceed with the assumption that Kennedy had been briefed on the secret program I was faced with the heads-he-wins tails-I-lose proposition If in the TV debate I were to reveal the existence of the training program and point out that I had been one of its strongest advocates I would pull the rug out from under Kennedy's position But if I did so the project would be doomed and also the lives of the brave men both inside and outside of Cuba who were receiving training and assistance I had only one choice to protect the security of the program I had to oppose Kennedy on his position of advocating that the United States openly aid anti-Castro forces inside and outside Cuba 26 It is interesting to observe that Nixon became more philosophical about the impact of the final TV - 271 - IQP SEeftET debate with regard to the outcome of the 1960 election as time passed In 1964 he would write Most observers agree that our positions on the Cuban issue could well have been the decisive factor in -the outcome of the election But in his recent memoirs he_expressed doubt that any single factor in such a close election could really have changed the outcome 27 Following the TV debate in which Kennedy had raised the issue of assistance for Cuba Nixon quickly lashed back at Kennedy The result of the introduc- tion of the Cuban issue into the late stages of the In an interesting conversation with Fawn M Brodie who is writing a Nixon biography the avthor of this history in response to Brodie's concern about the fact that Nixon knowingly lied to the American public emphasized that plausible deniability was of real concern at the time of the TV debate He also emphasized the Catch-22 aspect of the situation as explained by Nixon The author also suggested-to Mrs Brodie that it seemed equally valid to infer that perhaps Kennedy had been leaked detailed information about the antiCastro program and that he used this device to put Nixon in a corner during the TV debate Arthur Schlesinger of course claimed that the Kennedy comments were no more than a rhetorical flourish Neither Kennedy nor his staff knew about the secret Cuban Army in Guatemala 28 - TOP 272 - gf C T election campaign struck sensitive nerves within the Agency and on 26 October 1960 General Cabell met with Gordon Gray President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser indicating that the discussion and debate about Cuban issues were touching on areas which in the end might be damaging to the nation's interest On 27 October at the Special Group meeting Mr Gray reported that he had talked to certain Nixon people in the White House in an ' attempt to enlist their support to bring such discuss ions to an end 29 It was not until 18 November 1960 that President-elect John F Kennedy was fully briefed by Direc- tor of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles and the Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell on the extent of the anti-Castro activities being planned by the United States Government 30 Mr Nixon's misconception of the extent of the briefing that Kennedy had received in the pre-election period was not finally clarified however until 20 March 1962 when Allen Dulles addressed a memorandum to John A McCone his successor as Director of Central Intelligence stating as follows - 273 - p 3ECR ET -pel SECRET I have read the portions of Mr Nixon's book with regard to the intelligence briefings which he understood Senator Kennedy had been given by me with respect to Cuba during the campaign I have also seen the White House statement issued today on this subject There has been here I believe an honest misunderstanding This was probably due to the nature of the message Mr Nixon writes he received as to these briefings The Cuban situation was of course dealt with in the briefings I gave to Senator Kennedy The last briefing I gave him was over a month before the debate in which the issue arose My briefings were intelligence briefings on the world situation They did not cover our own Government's plans or programs for action -- overt or covert 311 As previously noted however by 1964 if not earlier Mr Nixon had accepted the fact that he had made an error in assuming that Kennedy had received a more detailed briefing than in fact he truly had By way of concluding this segment on Richard Nixon's involvement in the Bay of Pigs activity it should be clear that by no stretch of the imagination was Nixon the architect of the Bay of Pigs 32 A statement made to DCI Stansfield Turner by Fawn Brodie who attributed it to Tom Braden an old CIA man in a TV documentary on the CIA made by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation - Tc F 274 EeRE t foO r SEC l ET It is equally clear that Mr Nixon principally through his aide General Robert E Cushman Jr was fully read into the plans that were being developed by the Central Intelligence Agency for the ouster of Fidel Castro This interest was especially strong in the period from the winter of 1960 through the late summer of 1960 It also should be apparent to the reader that while some of the Vice President's inter t -- particularly in his insistence on placating William Pawley especially in giving undue attention to Pawley's concerns that the Agency-sponsored Cuban-exile organization was being taken over by the pro-Communist groups was politically motivated his basic concern was the fear of the establishment of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere Certainly his constant i nterest and offers to provide help for the Agency in its relations to other branches of the US Government fall into the latte rather than the former category The unanswerable question of course is whether Cuban Communism would play such a large role in international - 275 TOP SECRET rop 3f CR ET affairs in 1979 particularly in the third world countri s if Richard Nixon had been elected Presi- dent in 1960 Indicative of the more forceful role that Nixon would have had the US play was the connnent that he reportedly made to William Pa ley several weeks before the 1960 election when Nixon indicated that he favored breaking relations with Cuba -- at that time -- recognizing a Government-in-exile and then assisting that Government in its efforts to oust Castro - 276 - rOP 3ECltE F l GP SECItt Part VII The Question of Assassinations In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee to Study GovenIDEntal Operations Intelligence Activities Richard M Bissell formerly CIA's Deputy Director for Plans testified fully and completely to the role that he Sheffield Edwards and William Harvey played in negotiations ith Robert Maheu and Mafia figures John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana on plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro In addition to the individuals just named it also appears highly probable that Allen Dul1es the Director of Central Intelligence and possibly both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy was aware that Castro was an assassination target Unfortunately the Senate Com- mittee Report and the media coverage of the investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency's participation in assassination plots made it appear that the Mafia involvement was a flli damental part of the Agency's response to President Eisenhower's March 1960 authorization for CIA to be princi ally responsible for the ouster of Fidel Castro In fact the activities of - 277 - p SECRT T Messrs Bissell Edwards and Harvey with Maheu and the Mafia remained strictly compartmented and isolated from the officially authorized Project JMARC -- the Project which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs operation Bissell himself stated I don't remember I have no recollection that there was any specific other plot against castro during this period when the Bay of Pigs operation was in preparation I do remember my own feeling that the Mafia plot had a very modest chance for success and that it was not something to be depende on in any way I don't remember others 1 Bissell also told the author of this history that Shef Col Sheffield Edwards Director Office of security would occasionally let me know what was going on vis-a-vis the Mafia In effect he and his immediate subordinate were case officers for that activity and I don't think anybody else was involved I think probably Tracy Barnes may have known about it but I do 't think anybody else involved with the Bay of Pigs operation knew anything about it whatever My recollection is that it never went to the Special Group and that is the view of McGeorge Bundy Interestingly enough at the same time that Col Edwards was concerned about the elimination of Castro CIA's Deputy Director for Support Col L K White noted Shef Edw rds and I met with General Cabell and Jack Earman on 22 March 1961 to point out to them that we were not fooG ote continued on following page - 278 - - FOP jECI1 CT LOP 8ECltE I Jacob D Esterline who was Chief WH 4 the component of Western Hemisphere Division specifically created to run the anti-Castro project disclaimed either responsibility or knowledgeability about the Mafia connection 4 Richard D Drain who became Chief of Operations for WH 4 was more voluble on the subject of the assassination attempts which were reported by the Senate Select Committee In an inter- view which touched arnongother things on the planned assassination of Castro by the Mafia types Drain com- men ted furnishing the Director the personal protection which we should be furnishing in these critical times particularly with regard to the dangers inherent in the Cuban situation General Cabell agreed to talk with the Director about this and to try to obtain his approval to increase Mr Tighe's force to six people 3 - Esterline claimed that on one occasion as Chief WH 4 he refused to grant Col J C King Chief WH Division a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types It was subsequent to the Bay of Pigs operation when he found out about this i and Esterline told the author of this history that he expressed his strong opposition to the funding of such activities to J C King 5 - 279 - OP SECR EF re-r SEt R GBP1 I've been giving you lessons here about how a COPS should know a little about everything Well I promise you until it came out in 1975 this allegation at least that Shef Edwards and Mr Maheu were working with the Mafia to assassinate Castro concurrent with the Bay of Pigs Operation that is the first time I ever heard about it Ever o My thought when I saw this was Jesus Christ I must have been a little over-compartmented because we had spent a considerable amount of nervous energy figuring out how are we going to get a shot at the old son-of-abitch concurrent with the landing If anybody with whom I participated in planning for that ooo something that we never had figured out how to do because so many of our agents went down just prior to the invasion If anybody that was involved in that ever spoke a word about any other exercise going on to get Castro I never heard iti and my initial reaction when all this came out during this last year was o well oo why did they give me the idiot treatment Then it occurred to me that maybe there was very good reason for me not to know You don't need to know compartmentation eve9 from COPS is not unheard of Well min you I am not saying what I've just said in any kind of piquei and I certainly don't want to leave you -- or this tape recorder -- with the impression that had I known about this I would have been opposed I must say I don't think I would have enjoyed the instrument very much -- whereas we put out an awful lot of bullshit to the Cubans about the restoration of democracy and all that Those Cubans that were working with us were not I submit working for the re-establishment of the Mafia as a controlling factor in Havana I had a helluva lot rather in - 280 - lUi' SECRET l YP SECrlT contemplating the assassination of Castro contemplated in the way that we were contemplating it -- that is can we get a Rip Robertson close to him Can we get a really hairy Cuban -- I mean a gutsy Cuban -- to be infiltrated with this one thing in mind We surveyed all of our agent material to see who could take a shot at him but the assassination of that charismatic guy coincidental with the invasion would have been a highly desirable thing Whether the instrument to be picked should have included the Mafia I 'thirik I might have questioned at the time It was part of my job o o to ask Now wait a minute ooo What are we doing here o If this comes out o what will we look likei ' Not only to ourselves which is important but to the Cubans I In light of Drain's comments about the desirabilityof having the good guys in the white hats eliminate Castro rather than the Mafia guys in the black hats a specific attempt was made to see what the official records revealed about such plans Although far from satisfactory or complete there is evidence to indicate that the white-hatted guys would h ve had no objection -- as reported by Mr Drain -- if a successful assassination attempt could have been made Contrary to General Cabell's reported put down of Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant for Merchant's query about the possibilities of taking - 281 - i 01' SI CRL p SECREr direct positive action against the Castro brothers and Che Guevara WH 4 records reveal interest and possibly limited direct participation in a number of such activities For the most part however the various pieces of evidence that seemed to implicate WH 4 in assassination plots against Castro or other of the Cuban leaders proved to be cold trails The peripatetic Howard Hunt claimed even prior to the Senate inves tigations that after a visit to Havana in the spring of 1960 he prepared a report recommending among other things that the Agency should Assassinate Castro before or coincident with the inva sion a task for Cuban patriots oo Barnes and Bissell read my report o and said it would weigh in the final planning So far as I have been able to determine no coherent plan was ever developed within CIA to assassinate As the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Cabell pointed out to Mr Merchant that such action was highly dangerous both in conception and execution and further he indicated that it was beyond the Agency's capability 7 The Senate Select Conunittee chased its tail at some length over the interpretation of the term direct positive action as used by Merchant OnlY someone even a Senator who consistently engaged and in omphaloskepsis would have a problem understanding the meaning to be anything other than assassination - 282 - T-er 3EClZET TQof SECRE1 Castro but it was the heart's desire of many exile groups 8 In another instance it appeared possible that an agen t named C J a Cu'ban exile might have been in training to make an assassination attempt because i t was reported that he r 9 'I was taken to the firing range where he was checked out in the use of the Special 38 Airweight semihammerless pistol British Welrod pistol single shot a 9mm parabellum with silencer carbine with folding stock and a 7 65mm British Welrod with silencer He is to be also checked out this w ek in the use of a sporting rifle with telescopic lens attachment It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration into Havana L t had two principal sabotage missions -- one against the Esso refinery and the other aimed at the Havana Electric Company In mid-July 1960 there reportedly was an internal Cuban attempt on Castro's life an attempt in which neither WH 4 nor the Mafia played a part A cable from Santiago de Cuba reported Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status of his recommendation he was told that it was in the hands of a special group Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of Pigs both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared by Hunt A search of WH 4 records failed to surface any such r-eport - 283 - TOP SECrte r On is July 1960 the Cuban Government uncovered a plot to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz on 26 July 1960 during his visit to Mina del Frio an army camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains between Bayamo and Manzanillo in Oriente Province Three captains and approximately 100 soldiers had been arrested and more arrests are expected 10 In addition to Richard Bissell and Dick Drain Jake Esterline the Chief of Project JMATE was also very emphatic in denying that assassination of Castro or the Cuban leaders was a part of the JMATE Program In response to a question of whether various of the special arms that were being forwarded to the PM training sites were intended for use against the Cuban leadership Esterline responded No I think it silenced weapons in particular is for hit and run operations where they could do their maximum damage and get out without necessarily alerting people o I know of no -- withinJMARC as I knew it -I know of no attempt no plans that were made to assassinate As a matter of fact the constant battle with Cubans during those years'was to tell them that we weren't going to get involved in any assassination that if there was going to be an overthrow it was going to be obviously a bloody operation but no Cubans were going to be sent in there to make an assassination attempt It was going to be a g ound-roots revolution 11 Some contradictory evidence however indicates that WH 4 if not principally responsible was certainly It is known that at least one assassination plot against Castro and his advisers -- an attack by four men using US rifle-grenades -- was proposed by anti-Castro Cubans to COS Havana but the COS gave the originator of the plan no encouragement whatsoever lla - 284 - Te fl r C It t T J p SEC T aware of some sort of planned assassination activity One of the principals of WH 4 recorded that on 24 February 1961 he Asked Ed Stanulis Dave P hillips Ed Hinkle Bob Moore and Jake Esterline why not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination 12 Although the author of that remark was Chief of Operations for Project J TE he was unaware as reported earlier in this chapter of the Mafia connection but he had indicated that one of his hopes was that the invasion might lead to the death of Castro In response to a specific question about the AMHINT program all he could say was I said that I was not failing to give some attention to the business of assassination Now here on the 24th oGBP February when I asked Ed Dave Phillips Hinkle Moore and Jake wny not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination either none of those bastards knew anything about Sheffield Edwards and Maheu in the Mafia or some of them did and didn't see fit to say Drain take your AMHINT and stuff it We've got this thing pretty well See pp 279-281 - 285 - fOP SECRET covered Wha t I woul d love now is to see an outline of _ AMHINT - --l 3L_ _ _ tI ------ l About the same time that the AMHINT program was mentioned WH 4 apparently' was involved in adisinformation action where're- ' ports of an attempt to assassi ate Che Guevara were tq be directedl ec f n AN r e 7r u n t n 0 n t nd ' I 4 o I p I phoned following line to Wilkinson for Sw an o o ' 15J d At- tempted assassination of Guevara l 1 In a cryptic entry in his personal notes Dick Dr in indica ted that the success of th'e disinformation ploy would be 0 I J followed as CI and D watch 'Gueverra sic assassination attempt I The Counter Intelligence and Division D alert -Division D was respons ble for intercepting radio tr ffic--would have been the most likely way to pick up word of an a ttempt' on' Guevara I slife o There is no indication ihat this project was 'intended to do more than annoy the Cubans but as suggest'e'd WH 4 wo-tild not have' objected if the broadcasts had' stimulated someone to elimina e Che The author of this h s tary has unsuccessfully trie t o track down this particular project AMHINT'was related to the work of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil DRE an anti-Castro organization inside Cuba The only evidence that has been found which might have been related to an assassination attempt concerned an AMHINT request of 14 January 1961 for tlSilenciadores Rifles de marilla telescopica A request for rifles with silencers and telescopic sights This might have had to do with a DRE plan to assassinate the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba rather than a plan to kill Castro When the FOB in Miami heard about the plan against the Soviet official they immediately sent oo word to AMHINT l forbiddinq planned latentado' assassination 14 - 286 - --_ OP GBPEGR - --- --'---' an attempt be ticularly since such th would l s or radio r - - - - - - - - - - ---- -- --_ _ --_ _ One final item which was surfaced during the course of research concerning the possibility th t WH 4 had actually included an assassination program as part of its operational planning concerns a carbon copy identified only as Must Go List nance The single sheet of unknown provel ven lists and identifies in the following order individuals Che Guevara - Minister of Industries Raul Castro Ruz - Chief of Cuban Armed Forces and wife Vilma Espin de Castro BIas Roca - International Communist leader and Secretary General of Communist Party Ramiro Valdez Menendez - Minister of Interior G-2 Carlos Olivares - Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Raphael Rodriguez - Communist leader editor of newspaper HOY Lazaro Pena - Communist leader - labor movement Abelardo C0lome - Deputy in G-2 Captain Rogelio Acevedo - Chief of Militia Anibal Escalante - Communist leader Armendo Hart Davalos -Minister of Education and wife Haydee Santamaria de Hart Pencilled in on the bottom of the paper is a note List forwarded E L by C WH 4 in Nov 1960 When A copy of the list follows p 287 The list should read Armando rather than Armendo Hart - 287 OP IiCRET - SECRET asked if he could identify the Must Go List the former Chief of WH 4 stated Well I know all these people o Some of them I know personally like Armando Hart oo I entertained Hart in my home a number of times ooo the miserable bastard I have never seen that list in my life but this is the whole top gang at that time Now many of them were later eliminated from the power structure by Castro and by Raul Castro ooo They got rid of Olivares and Roca was pushed aside ooo Armando Hart was also half nuts at this point and he still is I guess he is still fairly prominent but he is not really in the power structure Abelardo Colome I don't even know who he is I wish to help you but I don't know 17 The former Chief of Operations for WH 4 in response to the question of whether the Must Go List meant anything to him replied as follows No Huh List fo warded E L by Chief WH 4- o Eddie Lansdale o E L would be Eddie Lansdale Chief WH 4 was Jacob D Esterline In November I was there oo No Big Daddy Well whether this Must Go is in terms of the assassination or in terms of nobody none of these people must be allowed to have a role in the new government I guess Must Go came to pass eventually in the case of number one on this list Che Guevara Raul I myself contemplating the future government thought it might be interesting to try to keep Raul in with Fidel out Capture what magic there was in the name of Castro but do it with that little homosexual instead of with Fidel the real man I It - 288 - - f OP SEeR ET OP 3ECrtf T don't even know the rest of these guys -Hart Escalante etc 18 By way of summarizing it would appear that CIA's official anti-Castro program as reflected in Project JMATE did not include assassination as an integral part of its operational planning but would not have been averse to eliminating Castro or other of the Cuban leaders if the opportunity had been afforded Based on records however WH 4's principals were in no way privy to or participants in the Mafia assasination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs - 289 - -101' SECR '- TOP SECRET Part VIII Conclusions This volume has traced the history of the CIA's official anti-Castro program from its inception in 1959 through the end of the Eisenhower administration in January of 1961 It emphasized that in the initial period when Castro's revolution was taking place the Agency reflecting the policies of the US Government was caught betwixt and between -- to move or to move against Castro ith Castro Shortly following his take- over it became clear that Castro had little or no intention -- nor apparently concern for establishing cordial relations with the Colossus of the North If Instead he turned to the Soviet Union and its allies for military technical and economic assistance became clear that a new philosophy as It being intro- duced into the Caribbean basin and that this philosophy was directly contrary to the interests of the United States Government and to the governments of many of the Latin American nations whether democratically governed or governed by dictatorships of the right - 290 - I OP SECRET -IQP SECftET As Castro's threats became more serious and as increasing pressures were put on legitimate economic interests of the United States in Cuba pressures within the United States Government led to a decision that Castro must go With great concern about the impact any overt anti-Castro activities by the United States Government would have on the United Nations and on the Or9anization of American States i t was decided that a covert plan of action would be ' adopted This was the officially sanctioned program approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960 It broadly outlined the political economic propaganda and paramilitary programs which would be implemented in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro CIA was to be the principal action agent for the bulk of the program Once the official US position was announced CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy A separate Task'Force within the Western Hemisphere Division was established under the leadership of Jacob D Esterline on whose shoulder Col J C King Chief Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered Initial concepts of the Central Intelligence Agency called for a propaganda program to be run out of a radio - 291 - 'foG P 3 t C REf p SECRET station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City Strong support was to be provided for anti-Castro publications launched in the area of Miami Para- military programs initially called for the training of cadres of communicators and paramilitary instructors who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and training for the numerous dissident elements that reportedly were ready to move against Castro ' Unfortunately however as the summer of 1960 drew to a close it became apparent that Castro's military strength and training programs were sharply improving and that the initial plan to infiltrate small teams to organize the dissidents no longer was feasible Consequently the concept changed to one of a landing in force the acquisition of a defensible base in Cuba from which a Provisional Government might call for assistance from the United States Government if the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficient support to force the overthrow of Castro This volume emphasized that following his decision in March 1960 that there should be an anti-Castro program President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the - 292 - ffJP SI CRET ' F SECRrT question of developments of the anti-castro program until late in the fall following the election of 1960 and the defeat of Mr Nixon At that time I Eisen- hower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated action to the point where some of CIA s p1anners hoped that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was already underway -- paramilitary operations might be initiated Apparently this was fearee by Castro too for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs he said When our country was in danger of direct aggression and mobilized itself it waited for the Kennedy presidential inauguration thinking that this man Kennedy would do something different because all in all we didn't understand why a man who assumed the administration of the United States would want to bear the guilt of someone else's mistak 1 This was not to b however for aside fro emphasis on the propaganda activity there considerable cs only limited support for sabotage activities prior to the Raul Roa Castro's Foreign Minister charsec that in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon and General C P Cabell ADCr were tt- u of the most vigorous proponents of direct action vith Cabell proposing air and naval protection fc th i vcsion and if necessary use of US marines o h lc L e beachhead - r 293- $ECIZE I l OP SEe R T end of Eisenhower's administr tion There w s con- siderable concern over the necessary formalities of diplomacy in order that the United States not be involved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS for its anti-Castro program Because it has been so widely publicized that ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the principals in planning the Bay of Pigs Operation this volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon played into the proper context It was the role of an interested senior officer in the Executive Branch and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's role be construed to have had a major impact on the development of operational planning by the Central Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort Similarly because of the sensationalism which surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders including Fidel castro and the implications that the Mafia plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay of Pigs Operation thorough examination of the evidence was undertaken to determine if this allegation was supportable It was not The Mafia operation was run - 294 - IOP 9f CIZ'E i aside from apart from and independent of the formal anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA At most four or five senior officials -- Allen Dulles Richard Bissell Shef Edwards Bill Harvey and possibly Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable about the Mafia connection and Mr Maheu In terms of Project JMATE itself the few bits of information which indicate the possibility of assassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also fail to demonstrate any responsibility for their inio tiation on the part of WH 4 If anything the evidence would indicate that WH 4's position was one of watchful waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara The possibility of course that Agency-supplied weapons might be involved in such an attempt cannot be ruled out 3 Obviously it would be foolish to contend that those principally responsible for developing CIA's anti-Castro program would have objected to the assassination of Fidel Castro On the other hand this was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency - 295 - AppendiX'A Memorandum for the Director 0% Central Intelligence from J C King 11 Dec 59 U 'j l SSIF D ------ 3 5i T i j I iE l --' -- Y--1 l Y 0 - - - ------------ 1- -f '- -------------- k0UTING --- l - - - - ----- ----------J J c ai ' i ----------------_ _---f OM ___------'______11 --------_ _--- J T O - i Jr olion 0 f n b c d N - ld ' 1 1 _ 'Cr 'I - er cc 'r a- I n S cO at U 1'3 - f' 1 ot t each ' het cOr m nr J I 1 I 1 I '5- j I ______ ___ 0 2_ - - _ rL JJ I_1 1 51 lY 1 1 I I ' fJ lI Jf s1 i tf vL 1 i T''''' I I I I I ----_ '-'------ t 3 l ' _ tu _ - ' - 1 I I I I I 1 ts I i 1'- ------ __- I - I i- _ 5 II I i I - - - - --' -'--- _ 1 I - l fI o I i t L c I I ii I t I ------il---'---- -----' 'j 0 I I ---- _-_ j i 7 1I ----_ - -_ _- --- -----'-- 1 I j i r i i I I _____ -- -l_ _ --I I I I 1 o i I I I 'J ' _ GtJS -II i I - '_ '- U ' - r j J -_1 ' J - i v m T'ni n- o ' t1l e'lu rts a - mral c tions con - e'3 1 8 1 l 'L -azrapQ D1 i_'J of ' ' i Ji n- 3 0- lic to r sb i p by th2 tb _ ar l -rt 1' s l - f ' Un l d st e i a not only unf'rieniily to th - U o -a2 I -i i L 1 h 5 -t l' r s t en t1 cn aEa t A leri - n C i s o h - l- 3 i3 l o r d agricl Lt t l Jhi chJ' i f j e ttteci to u- d t l ill ' ' C L s l c act1v f ga1nst U S b 1 i ' gs j n Gt cr I rtin ' L-i c tri 3 o b e do and st eA ct '-' jD'r 'l creesc i l i 3C U Q l e f ---dc i rent $ J of' O GBP aid and pB r-ticlp a tioi in - -t olu t l 7 iocs c 133 j jot othC L cO'mt ies 01 I a t n cldl7 i co - b ose t Uni l Si t s t Tg t$ j 1Ca g' J e n 1 - r c t t lntell' 'g ce w t ndica-t2S 3 riC$ nCiY L aJ r to - - ay a i b 'l J z li li - ---_c li ec't ta -- -est 'ttY ia l i b C atr ColO' J oia and 2ru 13 t 3 cou -tIG I it ior 'le 6Z l -ou1 a Q g ve1 r 'le ned by Caat ro 9tlCCbJ 9 l_ 1 3 h i 7 c J r a c stion o t -c e b rore an p J l ce m 11d e e rt ab' 3 ed -i e 1 e pO -IenUl Ccatt nlst Party o V ner la nd t'hc C25tros c P id Dat iQI P liz l ion of tre i a '-S i 1U 3tl - 2 iC- cc rce is l'cpo t' tedly cont f' q g13 ted If thi s occurs t s P in cont - oJ 11i11 'hsve its dis'DOsition se7erai btzJ -e-i 'I l1 1 0n c0l1 ar J i rC l1 tne s 1 e o f -th S'J gar c i-' e l r 960 o - e l l3 r y b ned to fu Ler their r 'J01uti r 'Y obj cti s '- - t otb l' G' 1T t i B o f -the Caribb- ell sn l Bo lt ri 1 ' e h l 3i ' E' of t e ln r 13 o ac i O i t Jf still M- a rru f f 'ci - - ICl ti 't g f' Or 1 co at l n' ' il i t br bTC Q i c t - l 5 CdS-r ro 1l-i d J_O t3t 2 l1 ln Cl 3 S S ll to iIi ain 1n J nc e 5 ' ' J l ' o 5 U -tion pro cfl bly rt JD l old G l 3l lNrt the prG bf' ly 1 l d neE i 3 7 cc j ' h C l l t'-3 11l1 oe br o t or2y - I -2l sti C na6e 1 0 i tio 01 w Olltbs s r er a liber31 OCCill l ed arsb i p ' ' rihro f j ' t f -i c t J j y b t O t 1j i St ' ' 3' ' l Jy keb d w'c l A Gl T ' of Cast -o rlii ' C'o c l r Clld hi s ''' lace r I r t b r 3 lbic l ' li l ill 'oz lec Cior-s b to i be Unite 'l states J51 J' j tio' l o'f of' fice o CLmdes i in rallo at-t 3 s f r-o a e ribbean c '1GBP rt i25 of' t 'e c3 osely rrl t 1 u s nd usir g C1 U lc iOD2 1 S i or ou pr 'Wor1d n3 h -c d cast in 3_ b be Intrc1sio' l o P r3tic as 3ssi7 S t C3stro t from i'tOi Cube N d i0 1 -to J lted c he e cO' l ra3 '' Ant of p -o U S c Ositioa ' 3 3 1 t x ' si g B t is t - anil sfer r-er m P 9orte -s t s 1 blisb by f 1 rC con- n i l i area 'Witb' ' C' 1oa T cis ould h v e follc dlJ 6 iY9 nt ge 1 I t lO lld ex- nit -' 1 eS -2 lis - llt f 3 o lio stetioa t lonz e '1e s li l n ttla b c l l of th 3 wt O iZl Suba Si J i e iot - vuld be on G' lb '3o'il the p bl- s 0 ' j int ope-rs cions ' litc ot r cO' r rt ies 'rt ' ld be eli ll t 2 A controlled gr a - olc 1ld De a -311y ' l 3 f-oint fo ' th g t'O in g o'p9'J ii ic l to C3 t in the 3' 12 nr - -tbat 26' 0 oJ July lnOY'8lnen-t in 1 e ' iL of O ietlt bec 1li e the rr illybg Oint of l ny no t- J ' - 2ed 3aUlst tista It 0' 11d be a r - _ns of t stL'1S tbe i ren6'ch d bT cppoaition and se p 9 L$ L l g C ll '1 1 the 1x lys 3 of tb lJ T'c repv -tedly con3titut iolli C18aD 5 1 ni ei ble ueTrill l j a e ' nt 1 thin CUDS - rou1 d cu il a3 T013 c cc r 1 9 ' 3 f' - g r 1ted ' e1 en s of tbe lu- y l-1C' u d -m7 e vl e c - eo l 0T TeYol tio r action ga5 cO' mtries i -J iJ C 3St O i or co iCera o l ne ot os clJsc to 298 i' 1 11 his Cacl - ' n Oi1 C Gt y J' D a-i -tbc 3 ' 1l 1 7 - l to _ ' c co L 1i S ' 3 t '1Y i 'o - - d 1 pJ_e b 'i ve Ic t 1 ii e ' of id l ' 'O' 11d f rre tlJ ac cl te tne t U o r the re t k l- e lt Ca iei' cc -------- 299 Appendix A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime 16 Mar 60 - - - --_ '0 ------ r1inu - i -I This docu rnent is our basic policy paper It was approved by the President at a rneethlg in the White House on 17 lvGBParch 1960 ' I I i 300 -PItS GNff o II SE 1 March 1900 A PROGRAJ A OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGUviE 1 Obj cti ve The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring devo ed about the replacement of the Castro regime with one m ore to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U S in such a rna r er as to avoid any a ppearance of U S inte 'vention Essentially the raethod of accomplishing this end will be to induce support and so far as possible db -ect action both inside and outside of Cuba 'by selected groups of Cuba ns of a sort thE they r 1 ight be expected to and could undertake on their own in tiative Sbce a crisis inevitably enta iling drastic action in or toward Cub2 could be provoked by circurn stances beyond control or be U S before the covert 2 ctioa program has accomplished its objective every effort will be Illa e to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U S to act in a crisis 2 Su -rnrnarv Outline ------'-' ---- The program contemplates four hlajor courses of action a The first requirement is the creation of a respon sible appeal g and L l ified Cuban oppos ition to the Castro regime publicly declared as such a nd therefore neccss2 'ily locatec outside of Cuba th -t withL 1 one month a political entity ca t be Iorm ed L a COL l il or junta thi 'ough the g o'J PS with whic merg r sJ 2 e of of tnree acce table o osi tian the Cent al Intelligence The cou c c i l will be e coL' a ed to adopt e It is hoped c S _ g ncy i i s slo 2 2 ai e2 c L C ll 2 Ct Res o -e o e I i I i i -i i It 1 I I 2 I Rc volution ll to develop a political positio il consistent with that slogan and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political I I 1 alternative to Castro This vocal opposition will serve as a magnet fo the loyalties of the Cubans in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations Tab A i i I I I b So that the opposition may be heard and Castro IS basis of i I I popUlar support underznined it is necessa y to develop the zneans for mass com mun ication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the narne of the declared opposition The majo tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility probably to be located on Swan Island The target date for its completion is t-W'o months This will be supple- rnented by broadcasting from U S cOIn nercial facUities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestb -e distribution of written m aterial inside the country c Tab B Vork is already in progress in the creati on of a covert intelligence and action organization - ithin Cuba which will be rf spon i ve to the orde rs and directi o s of the exile II oppos ition Such a network rnust have effective cOrnr lU lication and be selectively rnar t 1ed to minim i ze the risk oi penetration A '1 eifective organization caa roSClbly be created within 60 days Its role will be 0 provide hard - ' - - ' intelligence to arrange fo the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals to assist in he internal distrib tion of illegal propaga nda and to planao i orga ize for the defection of key L '1 dividuals and groups as directed d Preparations have already been Inade for the developOlent of an adequate param ilitary force outside of Cuba together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic th Island 5U p rt of covert military operations on Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after care- iul screening and trained 2 S pa i anl ili y L'l stractors In a second phase a number of paraxnilitar C2 dres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U S so as tn be available for irnrnediate deplo 'IUent into Cuba to organize train lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishInen t of one or more active centers of resistance The creation Gf this capability will require a minim um of six months and probably closer to eight -In the meanwhile a liI l ited air canability for resupply am for iniiltration an d exfiltration already exists under CIA control the situation requi es G i a can be rather easily expanded i ' ' if and when tw o TIontns it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply ca 2-0ility 12 T lder deep cover as a corrune cial operation in acotheL COt l -y_ 3 a r ong Leadershio t2 It is i n J- - a c 0 a-void distract0 g and dcvisiv-e rivalry outstandL'1g Cub-2 1 C'J JC5 'tl O l leaders for the senio role i e tl e ry ' l I '_J J03 - 0ppOS ition hav Ace -d i gIy ever ' effort will be made to lon -ambi ious pcli ticc H C i s o of a s J ccessor perso alities a ' ' c uncontentioll5 chairm an selected - an eminent The emergence should follow careful assessment of the various ir he opposition to identify the one who can attract control and le2ti the se -eral forces As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becom es ore irn xninent the senior leader must be selected U S support focusec 4 1- 'm and his build up undertaken _ill actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of Cover' c Cil vill the opposi tion of course be e xplaL ed as activities of that entity insofar as the c c ions become publicly knOvr l The CLJ will however at all have to nave d '7e- ccz a cts with a certain IlUITlber of Cuba 2 ud to protect these will znal e e a st _ted interest b of a carefully screened group of u S businessmen with affairs and desire to support the opposition They will act as a fn -g r n echanisIn and charmel for guidance and support to the directorate of t' be docu 'nented a s e 7esentatives of h o 7' t cover it is su ort O FCsition under controlled conditions t e s bstan tial o ' OCl At ar app op - c e -e obligatio S or 2 -- c BliCg - s this group CT A personnel will In oreer to strengthen the funds can be raised from private sources to $100 000 has already been pledged from U S SOll ces 2 bond issue rill be floated by the council as an C' n goverLL -nent to reise an f ic pated adc tion2 l $2 000 000 tnai approxirYl2 tely S 400 000 of CL' f ds ' j reach its culmi nati on earlie - than 6 to 8 months from now the estimated reqld rem ents for FY -1960 funds is $900 000 with the balance of $3 500 000 required in FY -1961 The distribution of costs between fiscal years could of cOt rse be greatly ltered by policy decisions or unforeseen contin$en ies hich compelled accelerated paramilitary operations 6 Recom rnendations Tab C That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to underta lce the abo 'e outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5 from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies 305 THE POLITICA' L OPPOSITION 1 CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups the N ontecristi Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front These all m eet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance i e they are for the revolution as originally conceived-- anybeing former 26th of July m ernbers--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo They are anti-Castro because of his iailure to live up to the original 26th of July p atiorrn and his apparent willingness to sell out to COrrLTllunist domination nd possible ulthnate enslavement - These roupsJ the t efore fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of Restore the RevolutioLl 2 An opposition COlli '1 cil or Junta will be fore-ed within 30 day' from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representati ves of other groups It is probably premature to nave a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July i958 contains a nwnber of exploitable points Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto ' The following points are suggested as a few possibilities a The Castro regime is the ne v d ictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet inilue2 ce b Cuba is entitled to an honest democratic goverp-' 7lent based on free elections There is no hope of t is the rights of legitlr late Dotitical pa ties 2 d as long 2 S Castro throttle-s the h-eec o n of expressio l '- c A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of t 'ie land must be put-into effect d Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in conunerce and education must be eliIninated e Sino-Soviet i niluence in the aHairs of Cuba must be eliminated A special research group of Cubans with lunerlcau support is planned to refi le and expand these plaI'_l s and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platforin for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council - Tab B PROPAG A l iDA 1 Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begu a Private opposition broadcasts i e purchase of cOr 1 nercial time by priv-ate individuals have occurred in v iami medium wave and arrangements have been xnade with St a tion VrRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts short wave and Florida broadcast band L J andL l have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts 10 J CIA has furnished support to these efforts hrough encouragement negotiating help and providL 1 g some broadcast TIaterial 2 As the major voice of the opposition it is proposed to establisD at least one gray U S -controlled station This will probably be on S van Island and will em ploy both higb frequency and broadcast band equipment of substar tial power The preparation of scripts will be done in the U S and these transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting ill be After some e - -perience and as the operation progresses it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Is a n d station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba most especially the Havaaa region Such an additional facility nlight be installed on a U S base 1 '1 the Baba nas or temporary use might be made o ' Flo ida shipborne station if it is desired to avoid gray broa dc2 t l g f -orn 3 Newspapers are also bebg supported aad further support is planned for the future AV2 nce a leading Cuban daily Zayas' paper has been confiscated as has Ellv U ll do ano her Cuban daily Diario de la MarLrta -- one of the hemisphere' outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana is having difficulty and xnay have to close soon Arrangements have already been rnade to print Avance weekly in the U S for i J troduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis As other leading newspapers are expropriated publicatiU l of exile editions vill be considered 4 L'1 side Cuba a CIA-cont olled action group is producbg a 1O- distributir g anti-Castro and anti-Com rn unist publications regl'1arly CIA is in coat2ct witl group50utside Cuba who will be assisted in producing sL--nilar r laterials for clandestine introduction L'1 to Cuba 5 Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latb l'unerica will be followed by others of equal calibre to gain hemisphere support f r The m ission of these men will be the opposition to Castro HernisphE re assets press radio television will will selec ted A rne rican travel journalis s They SUPP0L t Controlled 'Western this mission as who will be brief 3d prior to Lati71 fuT eric2 n Tab C FINANCL L p J 'i NEX 1 Political Action FY -1960 FY -1961 150 000 300 000 Radio Operations and Program -n T g including establishme J t of transtnitters 400 000 700 000 Press and Publications 100 000 500 000 200 000 1 300 000 50 000 200 000 900 000 3 500 000 Support of Opposition Elem ents and other Group Activities II Propaganda ' ill Pararrlilitary In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and TrainL 1 g IV Intelligence Collection Totals These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur unf il FY -1961 If by reason of policy decisions or other contmgendes over which the Agency cannot exercise control the action Frogram should be acccl ratcd additional funds vill be -equired Appendix C-l CNO Corresp0ndence with Department of State and 1 NSC Letter for Allen Dulles from Arleigh Burke 17 Mar 60 _J_U N_T_l_A_S_S_O_ f_E_D-_'_- _ o _ _U _ _U_'SE '4 ' 1 i_' _ ROUTi '-J - j --- ------------_ -- - _--_ - ' ueJECT Optional L t - f r I' i - n ir 1 'I -of DDI I 2 s f' - I - I I f _o o _ - - - - - - - - - - _ _ o _ _ _ - - ' I J __ - - __ _ _ __o - _0 - -'_ ' 4' - --- J I 311 - - - ' _ ' - - - ' '-i 0 111 - CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ' _ ' - - - j i' A ' 'j i 17 March 19 60 ' ir j ' - PERSONAL - TOP ET Dear AUen Enclosed is a memorcmdum my st lff prepared containing some suggestions which might be useful to you in your work Naturally I do not agree with quite all t - e comments contained in tne memorandum but I know't'l at you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure no o p rtunity is eft uncovered Sincerely I cI ARLZJH The HOnor able Allen DuLLes Director of C nt l I teLli nce 11 BURKE Appendix C-2 CNO Correspondence with Department of State and NSC 2 Letter for Gordon Gray from Ar1eigh Burke 16 Mar 60 21 J 1 03 ' GorGon - c los 'c is U S c ol a ldt a 0 1 COl ' of 3 Cti011 l in Cuba hich may be of interest to you Sil ccrcly yours ' The Honorable Gordon Gray Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White Rouse Enclosure 314 r - L ' lD -'r_ 1' 60 VJ '''''' 16 L r -- - ' c' J-v u o 1 _' ' _ h '-' _ C0 L i - cc i U plp- r o 11 S Actio -as ia CUfJ l T'ore to proviJe t c hro o xtlir e for l c rcfally laic o t m o'r t fo ' C 'iusi 1 t Cc stro re -i c to be re l ccd by i fricncly v rnr c - t It U 5 i 1ter eCc - t ' tatc 'wvulc 10 ic 1ly cV l rol ane cocrdinate allZipccts and r- vicie t c uica lcc as to tile s ccific cctions rcqui ed of t ' e otr cr - - ' t - _o - t T ' - ' fcr - - co t 1' -- ' cr C' - a J o Jj l 0 no t VV L l oo 1 c 1 1 '- ooc -OT -- C' -0 bj' t osc ' ho received it a ld the search ap car- roo to be for specific actio - s hid C i l be cc to acco r lisn the e d de ired rcco ' i o 5 ' t - cc o -i i ' l j - loA ' oJ 2 '1'1 0 i llo i rc offered as possible s Ccif'ic actions ' icf C ll l be in Sl - iort of o r pvsitior on Cube - You L i ht dasiro to have 00 inject tl cse itc ' ir to U 5C ceti 16 arch tz en t'-e I't' 'el of ' L -_ L to '1 ' '1 vr 1 u oSo 'r''''1' -' '1'0 c 1 ot v d ' U 4 V a cclc t - m ot r t a U S in troc c J 3 tio 1 for t c l o rd to conside - the a in h lisp cric ccfense resultinb fro GBP t e Cuban situz tion or for the iioard to roco 1C t k t tl vAS stuc- i the ini1 ence of o - u is in Cuba -1' ' a C - o _L _oc l 0 o i b Co crci ll - Oil co np lnies arc not bcin D31 d TCub l State could 'J o rc lcst 1 he oil co r pa'1ies to point Ou t to tho -go 'ern nts ho produce the oil t1 o effcc s ' 1 i i cir c or o2ies of- t1 c loss of t c Cub n I arkct 0 # c Schocl c ''''ur Ccllc es - The Services could i lcl de in co rrses for forci r officer the affect on he spherc defense of the establisl' r cnt of a o ti st c dictators rip in Cuba Con rei ll - Do tin h cric3-'1S old stock in tl e ex rc-pri2 ted propertics If so 5 la e could request t e co r ies concer cd to incluce in i l Cuba' U c r dividend a aili l 5 infon ation pvinti '1 out the effect on tl c co par ies' ---- 9arninb s ar d the s to d loldcrs ' ci vicer-d s 0 roptiation of property i tnout cvL 3ation and fnr t c oil co pa es on-paj e t for oil c elivcrcc c tate in cnnj l ictiml l i th CIA paolish a wGekly or bi- - ceY ly let cr GBPJ- c c tiO 1S of t e Castro Covcra ent for t c pre 'ious Cried en c r f 1tiilL I cl ec ould be 1 V ol io oi' 1 J-''--'' riL t $ Ku ' 1ist t -cr C$ 3 j lctio 3 Dic to -i l 3 d lli dc ocr tic actio s ' _ f ' ' 315 ' ' Ii - o 1- - 'l - - -_ J _ -- 7' -- -- --- - '-'- - - r - _ - - --- _-- l - --- -- - ' ' '- '--- ' ' - unit or p - ' c r---ri a f' iCc- c ' r 2t _ s lC s't it l lc for cover L --- C l C - - J 2 'i c ' uf - - ' e- i l to - s_ e T c i t -iiJ 'is of t - Ct - -2--- r e 'c - ri r ts - pz x 0- cf t t - 'c-- - '- '1 c sc l ic i-I L S- c4et tOr t - -tV -z 'es f rj - ct -r EUR bold C H 'tc- j Ci -a c ccr i -E 3I t 2 CJ -- rec i e on t ki po cr to lO O L C ' i i t e- - ali r 3il e o - t ler ts I 5 ' 1 6 e C - - rr ct r i a''''- st cefe - se -j'- o s - c t If I B - ' ' ' C ra S 2 Director j f c St - r D3 inject into t t - i EURlli - a ce m' it t e - - 7 B i fo at 'on on the latest - Soviet 310c ct ic - i C e - re s -'er- c c' of Ke- z i r in Cuba o h it tc - ccr t oz ft en a c tt e e- ce i tel1' i G 1C 2 c cies hole s cci l r2 i - i a za c -c z ce - C t '2 - l i - tion in Cuba tith spaci l e - i S oc - he Xu c asrkC S -f - f ll -ro' - _ _- J i is-I li - c c - c - rc ' ' '' 0- - ' - ' --- -- involvinc _--- --- - c - ' - -c _ G - - c2sis c ilo GBP t a - c C- e '' - - _ - _ procCCC i l to C ib ' - S - - 2 - cr- _ j r-- - -_ '-'0 _ _ o __ _ _ _ _-- _-- -- ------ - - '--- _- _ _ _ --- -' - - -_ _ _ i _ I c - cccp't CrC l r oi cr i - his lct cr of c ' 10 tv r l c 'J c lc tc brlcl i ol tr te art cr t activ tics vis vi tLc- C b i U tiO l i l ' l cfi vrt to provo St ltc to l iOVC i tcr 1 c - all i vic lJ l or0up of' U S tion l i oir to Ltiil c ic on t c t I i t - 2 rc t in CU l fpr further 1is c' i tiorl to 1u it i 0 r t r ' l ' cl Very respectfully J 317 Appendix C-3 CNO Correspondence with'Department of State and NSC 3 Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Haydn Williams 16 Mar 60 sub US Policy toward Cuba ' ASSI 5TA 7 o SECR ' TARY CF DE GBPNSGBP i 6 i960 'NTCRNATtO i CCU '7YA FFAI S 4- MID ORA1wUM FOR TS SPECllL FOR SUBJECT u S lE 5rs -' 'i' Tv ' E PiCSIDE r AIT uFS NXi'Im u S2C I7 l olicytovarci Cuba closed is en Gxchan o subject bet aon ki rl ral Bark and or IGtt 0 tao above Unc r S - r -y irchcnt both of wh have authorizod that I m a tha co spondance available to you tor whatever help it oay be in connection lith the discusslon of this sabjoct at tho Council 1 p aQ t his c06l1 in g Thursday j - -- -- ' L - __ Dcr- -i' 4 _3t n 2 fuels A a 318 S cc ctar _-- Arl chl I h t ltc t a Jtcd L' our p3nx o 1 l lttcT o Fcb 26 C 1 od tha Car11h GBP sltu ltlan n ec ' 1Q I n tcd Q 1 L of sluUerlt y In t h USG otlod of the n of ettr lc Mro eml t ho c Jcd to DC tb 2 t In l c ld th J c JUo o b e ch O-t' l oo jt celcu13tc to lcw t lh 1t 19M tro l tm br c L l- 1 t l ch 01ek tt 0t2 0S1 J ' t 8 l Dot of t CC of actt GU'JGJst ed in tro i ro -- d 7d RO t1 let ' U S AcUono in C I lch you t r- lttcd vlth yc r lott er lnltltitad cc J tit J o Q 1 e ro con 1totly L g ld c wlno To A J jOU ora u1 t1 l Qlr I c t 'l J Joint Ch1e of St f tclG to ec rC' a thinking 00 U C to lcn C'St 0' 1 cCeo'lty 1ntcr Z o ttt ltlC4 CQ It lr te s h -o 000 Oll Y 11J1 Q o l tO Js th l of Intcttatlcc l1 Cc 1 lSe -- In thQ 1GBP dl7i'tOa I St un - u tba c oH t lcn of Q n rllcol cnt -Af 3t'1CO l Revolut lon r1 adly to tM USSR In C thtJ utlUoo tlen ofCtf2 Q l b to p o t 6l 21W rc l I CO nto fn t M Corl Th clnlJ l ii eb ctfV'o o tlt4 wu if 111 '0 Ul lo tollc IC Q J EEl ior'090t 13 to tho United SldOlS PJ o tJ high prlea' t lbl J for t ta ol1f 1tr tlm ot the und lDirablQ f turoo of tt- % C RcVOlut l In p rt culnr th 3 C lolt'J s t o pin by prow d us into Qneed 1ftte tlo c t d Into tl gt t10 1iJ 10 v1olntS of U to I n 11 r ch could 1 c ' oa it tb U21to 1 S W3 Wd tkl vsy $ Y'J ot 6 did in othu rotclll Malrol Arlo t l Job Olic f of U - J t tc Dc t of o r c vy 319 ir - b Unl l1 o l1Q ucS e 1nj d' nltdy to occ9f C 0c c H tcrl1 y tb c lY colut i 4 to t1' Cu I'robk l i ' c t J Jc -Uj C - c J$ of C Cc ' 1 c - h 9 llll ng to ccl lc of C -Jd 'l tGBP t ' t y olong 1 n Clpt$la to the O oal u s 1 ' e 1o Us o CGnG1stcnt -1th 1c t j eut u n L l Thio vill t--' '3 P'lL y t l Col t ho n it l t U thct C C-QN 1 n t O Q rQ u 5 d o r t Qr CXfc t ln 1c l tcd IQ ct Q' o GUS' 'U tJ- tnl O a t1 o dc i lt4 c r Get k - -o af l9tvln eoccrn nu CQ L it 13 R l olc t t t t h3 Ct lc n' o F t1it h t c l oly in C R l bt c iC'' -'' In thQ ro ImldhO GBP 1 o C t ' -y llt h t1 't GQ 't It l' Jcly otcl b a U t Sb to t lac scor elt in lCl d olc J the d Cj' tnt n k idc m P tc S t r1y h o S'ogOt l 9n 3 cU11 vc y c l ' lc O f 1 h l i c y u ovc n 4 slUolc u 1 m c ''t '' 'O b ro ycl to fir- 1 C clt znntlvc lc r Atj tq lieHcva t d t U y co - O' t 4'C o ' l c cc olC lAo C e on ll dc-' ' U c b tc1c tj c 1l ' ' ltS- Q ui GBP S1 ta r'C21 3 C- 'O l li Q c nd d cat tehl1c 'l n c Z G zJg oo n t ct o t be cr- 61a to 01 esc 1roO t 01 E Y' r o'O c1 C 1 t ct to 'till to r k ' 'J bafc 3 t -- GBP0- v o o Tho 1C 7 ebJ o of U S plley c b3 t 0a o Q G 1 e c n ci fdSV-J crisUc c t 1' 7i y tila Un t S t ltMn O h hs to e r Cu1 et o The t GBPg tv c et Q lr o e C3 fWla to co n cl b c Uil J d rl y C fic1 it CUa to e- c Ce5t UC1eg t1l1ch Q Q Ceo e 1 -h 3 GBP U s oM 'a 1st l C3 Un ltl 416 Ccclc OU'G tcl d t1o -d r- -o o dt d c 1 c j3'C9 Q elc- b to i ' ob d c eU to c jC -t r-- g l c ful - cllC t l oC cro fr Utlcnl Q t O 3 GBPo i 1 0 fi' S rOt i'OC 1 t n the 5 1' ci COa o B JW W2 sf ue w 1 b1 n 0 t b c t vit t ltn C J GO C l kn t hs v Z ts e feat J r ' 4 'oz Q yco x tA t ltgty er c a to r 6 b 9 lf 4 l lo C 3 t b Cc d t d c I t- Oo lo eo C CD o l 1 GBP9 C2Q -C 1 G D t 2 ill' a c 0 sL co b t i1U -o- - 320 - - 1r c c frd rly d1y 10 clC lZ t ' 3 t C t --o h ccl i9 r 3 b1a for p tUt lccl 1 c ic 1a cnc - C ef V1 z ec- 1 tttry HC 1IlVct H t ca ot t ' C7 O n 11 he 81 U ro C l C J j 1c' Y' tt-- neg of fC triot tl c d t le l l v4 h1 ther c 1d l the C6z1 o U ' t tcd Std CJ t gg o d t b c-t' c c JQ Cld tbt t U'tltcd St e J c 1 lf1 te r- iblc o-1 - to cHtf oclt JIl t - t tb 'at o a t' O o c t D t e ll C tJct tiC e c '1ly elf L'1 the cL le J d163-- t1 1tcrt lc l m vl fight bot t c G tcl S end r o lt- tGBPr J C 4 thQ ofiOO'd to ce' '''Zt 0 c t '1 Cc t o to Q f c s hLa ' Y d ilo ' l h 'ntel'- -' rlcQ tlcs t - so o Q 'J d or l O 1 l U u n t loJr c' rc- -3 o Ita d t 't o %lev' en k - t l 'Olc at the P' tt uo f 't t let L c s 11t c J 2 2 o c st d crlt ol r tlet x 1 tii11 be Jbl d ll c cltun vc l c J J yC U tb c ll1oct o l1d o 'cl -o1 'C3 o e uM b 1lGBP3 C l ' c n ro co 1 x f ze c l c- tWIQ q cr t --- U1U co t SG cSvll GBP0 ztt f J b ty G IC1 t I c -- t o e1 a B t 1c1 brl5 J o1 C3' to 1nUI'J O i 'Yt' tn# lc Cl l c3 in tha pro e of W lr o tbo J r- l- nC7 Hco to CQ the st d c r t 9 c4 L'A 01 t cl lon b 3 ve C i4 9 f Jr o- 1i lo 1 M t o n ' Q t' b l t t cj' C5 fO c aQ I c JO op P O lo O 2 1 C L n e tvCl 1 - 1 p It i'J U13 J III tb f- ' 1 tD V to th4 S tJ he Q1- o O- tf 't r ty e1tCQ' a 1 1 ' l3 4 1 C1 tCt ted va h-rw 62vel cd It r ' 4b J c f o est t p Q t4 @ rc1e e 6f Z 1l e a c Q o OU t o t CJ on o o t fold _ - COdA Z' A It g Co t le cx ' O do t i U a l et-'zi 1' c to C- Q'O l e oo 321 - t1 n X--- to c1 c a c C t - ol M 'J nce-1 - lcl C l to x B t CG ' ' ' 'l 01 2' tJ --__ '''-'---'' J _ H C t3 C N' J c - c -- l lli _ c - 4'o c ' - 7' V x ll Q 1S z' GBP0 n to Glkr r r _ - - U 0A_ th z lc t r tA c -v - 1 to d'lCJt v ly o J E J o l t t'G ' c c -2 ai L tce- '1 G 00 ' I 01 t J l1 C c S t- k e r t ' O t J J VJGBP nt 0 t ' o t c1 tb 1 ti et of cz n co l J'- A c a s L q- l o t s ' Z J all lW' n lc t' U1tl to -- s t - c J n o Jllc c C3 O a oth t s1t tC c- b the llc z Enst Cftd Cc L 1ca rAi c tiu I ' i d ta se cl fere not w bo c ctcd ti vo a1 'C1 fP ng o t tro Jo11cve UJ Oc t bt fi c t b t et 1o - u lc UJ O G l s t D 6 ct co o Ci' c --u ' u d c tolly thQ c J J d c c o J 1 i uo 0 11 dezlrc GBP3 p- ' ' _J_ vflo - l JY ll t - O le on t '1 C c t lt richt bo dr GBP r hl e J e s If c L 2 t ll alt ht c Cl b 1 1y - -- tCTe b nt c ' vlth S v1cu In t I t1Q-t Unlt e d EJ GBP c p 1tG It a t a zl t -tt ac Ct lr c ire ere s h t o t 'to tinlt e 1 S t1o i-' '- tb C S d y k- 'e '9 t tl c o'S fHl t ry to 0 1 ''cL J d tcl atn 4 mt t1 Q t l e t i tad int o o S3 o the ttt C' 1t uc EUR4 'JUcd t 'oat U- J c c t ton t e 'tcn J y th Q ' S CO 3t c l1y re- tf c l i t r ov tD Thlc 1 4U4C O f G vi c ent Edi 1 b t - c cns- c co be t en t lo ter by Q G a ct '9 Foreign rs f Rts 59 t 1dl 00 C' 4G 1' t h Rio '7 the Rcool 1t --d- AI2 d 1y 00 vt u n C'A 3 of b -nb 3 c ' r lt C 1 t a rG l ofcg u t fr tl n br tb n G of t b J tCN 2nd t tUtl n to ee 't' t r It M a 3 b t tll fr t to bd ll C e t 5t Ccl 2 t CS- n o - t cm Quae th4 l S ctcl Inte1HoGBPnCu o va h wo d to be lirA t C a hQ Cc - 9'dn z tG i t It tc yen c 'bot I'l 1ct a t hs it d dmi6 t1lt i4 n GBP tto 1 U-t d W 1th o Ht c 1 GBP t o c'l I tto - l l9t t l c t wa I - u o J n tor b Co' l J of vt C Z' Ao b lY 1r 9 til CliJ 1 J4-vbh i 'r coo t c t Y 1'L-U q h i I 1 cc JoGd it DOC Cat nl1 at lUJ Jc 'j14 C3ct lg 0 1 ttLb c t t tho rGBP l of 0 8 cti tr S r J' 01 S t H t ' - lk-y tJ t ll 'Ci C c b c l i bG cv cd t 'l 1dd c t h c ' H 'r of C1 n to ncatL'1g Uc t th a J1 1 In t1e1 v' o -s - ct t c tiUc u it i' tu1-o 1 3 o tho 1' 1 t c t'c c d _ 111 bG t' ts Gl d 6c- e- CC'dd b 0 tcc O c cnt lccrn g Ctma t tc rdn s t U c Ucy t tccl t hzt c un 'r f Zl vl cu ' t ttct tdGy' 0 ci id ty oL L'la t c C 2cd the tndtCilt cd C' ' t'' d t a t Q tL' J It u1d n - tz j t'3 101' nc Hcy - G lt --ttC 1 l t thta ti0 c c c 1y '0 lhe -' O' c 3c YF- O 11 1p lUG c U'3 U ' C' Sb ld y KJ at' '0 1 C' lloCG' thg Jo t Ch ' dcetsa Q U Df'td' n C1i 'O u eettc B dG- 4 ploJu c r tb ol Z1 I d bo r rc t gl eA U o it o Liv' 2n 1 Sd 323 t'v r oHt U'i'Q l 26 FEB 19 C l b cocit 1 ncr r D l C i1 r ca ov-or c te4'ic ratln con itl o ls l t1 c C2ri c 1n c pccicl1 y co ce d OVBr tr e p p Jen sitt E tion in C e in i' ccc se u-i'tj t a 'V- i2 dlrcctly irri erested oy r son o t is i51 - d's strat c loc tion ti th rc pcct to t w g tl Cl l l 'v C ce t t - -e so' tr e n S-nted St tes -GBP t 1C r n n J Cn l bec c c L t o loc tio l there o the GUZi tS o l tGBPL- i Uc C 4 tl pc s t 00 1 tb o p -ocess orr i11in U1 c r tl e cc c r tio l of i it r i Cc u lsa S loliLci tr is trei d CCt iti C ll l' c cl a - 1 a C '1l ' t- C l t d or Q rcrr cve r cntn b c o c E r litJ' lil t t t rcGt t c t ecct 'ity of t o t liicd C t c - - c l-O' -l r - - ' 1 'j '''''''''' ' i r c ccn J 'J 0 ll - 4 o1 _ - p- ec ' - 1 _ iJ state in Cu a o ld serve 3 D e o vp reti s for t e f rther Sl rEUR or co s r st ici 1 u r c6 in t e f cstern i e ni hEURre IilU as its a lu t e iscl tion 02 t c t r lteQ Stc tes fro9- Iktin ''''c -ica ' 4 _'- ' -_ _'-01_ ci u so of roy cc ccrnJ I c l k ki 11 t te lib 't r of scndir you t e ttscl cd pupcr $ indicative of C' er t nc Vj- th i illrc in t1 s matter n iely t at positive ction to reverse t preze t t e Jd - i uld be oj 1 ti cd to i em t t t e co ul1ist threat is clfui tEURd a'1d a tublc f icndly i1ov r t nt 6 t b1 is cd in Ccbo Action t e C 1 rGBPr i in tho c e 0 GBP Cuba ill cl so facili tato ar d provide a founoation for 2 t- y sL ll ctions wMph r ay be r cce Js y to prevent the sp -ead of CO llniS l h tin t leric md to stabilize other a' X S where ltrr Gst is e ppem-ing I e l mso ser rlL 1J a COP l of tJ'iis lett EURT Jack Irrrin 8 ilie enclozure to Sincerely 1'Co iIonorc ble Li in ston 0 - cri r eli tute Dtp lTt c t '2 u ld ' s 1 n- r - -' 4 2 c u ' j nclos- ro Copy to -f -' -' 324 - r J - 1 _ 'y' oo0_ ' - ctio e c a c to ov t ir c c t loll b c lt of a cO 'J U st C l j to rc Jto a Jt Jblc fric C1 y LOVp rl' mnt J ' v n 1 ' C r ' ' cc t -Ji #o oc njCt 4C i t n s t f i d ' - 'O r 'l '''' c ' c s J to t r at'on 0 1 J 1 1 12 I ' - ' iti l CO ' ' ii J l clc In t ati r lllc c '''''''''''''r - _ ' _ _ i - -_ v_ U - _ __ J- -ll 6 __ _ J 1 - ' 1 1 - ' lI or ev r l j 'c ir t rm tior Q cO ' lo - 1SiW lOS CCG l probi 1i tere rGBP J t p1accs in t J criC ls It fi 1 l11 - chb e Guate 1iJr s a spot - hich it eoo ld turn into an official b lse frolJ - i tc to brecd su bv rsion - hich -locid extend to othGr k icriecn TIepuhlics c t e J'e or 1 1i intr sio l of o 'iet despotism - as o f course a direct challco c to our t om-oo Doctrir e the first dud io t funfuGBPcntal of our foroi n policies I 'j e vnited 'ta tcs is bound by treaties 'ihich CO I1 'tit it to seck scttlc - crrt cf r e sp t ri c-dispute b-j gec ce ful i -ca lS Out t2hich cl sop vicc for letioe i l the eVCl t of at gre sion ci toor rolJ outside the hGci s tere or it11in rtic1e 5 of ti e Inte kerican Treaty oGBP Reciprocal I ss stance sl ied at i o de JC1r iro 1947 requires cach evl tl' cti'EUR rt - to se ld to thtJ Securit Cotl 1dl of tho t N co pkte infor lation nconcerni tc e 2 cti vities uncert - cn ooo for tte PllI osc of r aintaini Inter-k ican c ce a icsccurlty tI Artic16 6 01' t1ds tre it states Ii tL0 i r iol3 b 'itX or t c i ate rit Y of U- e tertitory Or' t vo -eic - O f vliti cal inc c cnder c of an - Cl C2 1 St ate O - - '' 0ctec J Z 4'essio GBP i icl is tot Cl '1 l d at tac r ooo ij u r ar r o r a t o ' it tion tr'ct ' t end 1 -cr the -v- ace of A ai t c 0r ' l of COI ult tion s ll o t b eciot0iy in a e 1 325 ' ' c ccl n'stic 1 tec C lr ca 1 'c c u la rC J u t o t b ti'GBP '1'c tGBP 1' 54 st t s C o - ir tio 0 cO l r ol a i r r eri 1 1 Stctc by t a C t lx i ' c to t i5 c i p - cl a r tcr- GBPric2 l Co fcrencc of t at political i4lStit utio - n i r 1Utic'lc l cOi tt ' list covcnc t t'i polltic l j'S c of an eA 1 ra- -o - cr ' oclc co' ' stitu te u u c t to ti e Go 'Crcl 1ty a oliticz l ir cC'p o cG f ti t ric l s t i teD cl1dant cril' e 'U c p ce of A crlc C 0' lB call lor H c j ' e in of C fl ltc tion to o l sic er tflC c Qopiion of 1 ropri te i ctio i 1 acco -Cz nc l1ith c i illi treaties If co ti t l Th 2 tIl cf Jw y - o7c cnt 811ccccdoa in -ci plr ci ' 2 ti ta on 1 J n 1959 5ir ce t - t ti c t ' c C tro rCii e has ollo ' cci i cr csi l 17 ti e cl sGic r t C # forc lbli udnc u ro U -li t 5tat 'i- e cO u -u 5t tit e table is ti li ' tcd La i cric lb is r ' a i - tc ' '03 catc 29 J cce bc 11 59 i - e r 'thl s e1hinatioa of t e o Oziti n os n 'tic l of dictatorial c - r c ' 13 0Z1 of C1l3C iOl s tt e l atc A crlca 1 the t cd r0 ' ' j 01' t C cco 'v me co u'i cc tion of pro crly tr- c i iti ation of rcl t io s Cl ' d 'tr dc titt tl oviet nion H c 'o 'bid - ilZ 0 a ti-eo 'l '1i t acti rit t nc t1 brca 'Jo n c - Ji raCCllstitution of t - iLri L d S rvlccs a d UCO r ll typic cor w ist r c uvurs c r jority of the CUOOJ l c rc root 'yet co tted '0 the acceptancc of no - arc t cy i't l'e of the trc d of the Rew lu tion i l this circction 'l't c lC ' c cl l cs I hOT-ever cont' nue to Live full st -pp rt to C 1stro and the Revolution co uni It n i IOt t been pro lCC th tt C stro hi elf iG a CO ZillQ iG't Ho-aevGr# SOI e of hi ri ncip3 1 QCpUtiC5 as iL'll as utmr leaccrs zra believed to bo co t i In z jr C lSO indivlc ls susccptic lc to coGBP ' u ist 1 li1 uznce are OCCU y-' r c r p03i tiots in the over - - t 5 Gll a s in all irupo 1 a t or 3-'1i ai io ' s 2 'l tr cc i nivf S 'l 'l kvelo 'nts arc noticeable Co ounists are rei Cl poi ltGC o u r Fu rl e b n elected i l trace u '1io 'os to key po itio 1 i - cn cc - u i sts in t e 26th of July - ovenent c ro taki positions in sse ll I op o3ition to tb cpe co ilrd sts At prese t t - e C bw'1 r- ca l-o -ces are ciisor a izGBPc c -d ar ltly ca ble 0 - a o - _- o-ce _ _ ' '_ _ _' - u t '3 t 4 o '- ' rrilla -r N Ir t 11-L r- v -4ic-V t' Sovi-' ' loc be SU9 lj ri cchnici to ist L tr iI i n the r e forces CJ c l linc ZI ' to t e 1 1 t ov r - r t i 'r 3 c 5 s 10 prEUR e r't iniicat iO l t bd ti f 11 of U c Castro Go r 1 ' t is i -il e it IT it s vw d fall h P ie re t c l - o' r l -GBP ht ouk ro t pTobabl r e rze w 2 cO' mis t overrCJ3 t b8C2 O l r o - - u7 ' lp i r - 't z li ' ' - c nd t c - J -r ' l t i 10 l crz of t t r l ' i t' ' i ' -' C r ltl c ' tro rlt1 -Co t d st o lc COlle rally c i ti j j C t 4 l l J ' s i - atcc _ - f l _ oo o _ oJi_J - -o '_ -t- _ oooo _ 11vc c c n r' f - - ' o J oo _ _ - # _ '' ' ' I _ c' ' _ ' __ '-- J r v_ o _ r o ' ctio lic oul -o ly Cui ''' ' rL lly iIi t1 c '- for - '-'r S vict u ' V sC c-zity r - C lt Ca11 l0t roC ro- r-ie-- s - - _ - 0 -' ' 4 - - - _ - _ - - '-- -1 ' 1 - 0 r ' nn o J Q a ' t ll Ao L - 1 u s 4 o ill u i i l _ct iv ucr cco o rc pre C 2 d o l s' o l ie 1 to 11 i t i l abo c tci i r ti 'rlt cl i lCl'J GBPOT' J J oiljeeti c shoci d lso 00 t kC l L a idition U exists ir ti' C d c1zr tion nc t Tec n#t of 1 ' 0 v 5 rc uc- t c wOC ltiv 'ilt sUt H 'qL'0 -lt im ciit tiDn of t c U S to Cl p oval Coc ffi ist of tt r l3 'Cr of H e Ort n of C01 aSd tr ion 0 tbo tte Lo crn' lt in Cuha and if states is o tair cc i - tervar io01 to p -evcnt a take-over a It - oulc be in eOI o ec -n t ur nztior al policy lr- d our treatJ co - -itC J ts rr GBPcr tb GAS 0 It n-Ol' strc JCt m tbe u s nO clc u z axe E e Free orl Cl 1G tho Iati l J c -ican tates of U S n'1 tj -'C lCSS to live - p to CO n - i'ti ents a uncertainty A eric n tatcs or $t rt fo '5 action by o her Latin Cb l J in 0iS 2ctio3 eo d esult CO Q i$t co trolled froat Lovcrni ent bc p a fait ieca pli i C b 3 c Cc result in t - i3 e tire probl cnd in t e Scc' lri ty J Co c i l of C c - ' -i o ' ii '1 i ti C c ' 2 m lity t ci b7 drcct cilitary cti _ a o ai'i - a coz- Jlictltion Cri ca' Se hli S ilt of a fric c l J o -CQ t -u ovEUR - r t a I t o be in co GBP - z ce it ZC Ar ' I octrir e r J c i till ic i policy it h respect to t - e - cster l e sphcre a 1' ' d solve ti c problc- a l It - ' crv lot tnlc 'o tc tl n $t s 11 in t cstc 1 ' _ez EUR n ti t t - c r - -r t the t S ll c a - -' - t c ist h ror t reei c c It 1 i t ill not ct 1 d It lQUlC dis l nrv illlUio lS - t rld it l2r c 1 j t t c iJ S is r i' il li ' l i l bk to c' ' ct iO t -c ' 2t t he provocation It oulo Qso pror l blf stop t 'fbait i - oi - 5 K in Tihicr SO i e irlor po vcrs t 1rvi oL t th orld ind c a It r ould violate ocr 0 3 co it Y n o seek settle nt by pC jccful r ual 3 b It 't' ncl d lead to ch ces o Qs i J- a ainst tte U S b-oth in t c i' S aa 1d L ti t J ited r tio i ulti 1 p05s1 lit r o X l lrl S ct iO l a oi It t the J S e It 'Houle pro t r t t S J C l li 16 to biGG b-J trcctie if its c CJ Tr 7 c G S rLA ' dcrc ts clict te otr - to c r L c l C ist --- rr ool c0 l7 - o cri - rou friz cl ' '7 t CJ C JT7 ti' l ' t o- ' t c -'- 5t lic - 4 c - ld '2 - all -o siblc '-' a $ cS to c t 2 2 -' L d y lt un GBP G t c re'J lo C C c - es of tf C u S c - o c t r tr- e ttl ' Gt j 0 PCGBPc 4 328 r _ - y o v_ _ _ - ' Ir consiccrin - - i ' ' _ -_ _v ' - _ c t __ 6 o o ' _ _ c - CS C- l - --- - - Gi-- t ti e c t - r - _ ' L t e h l c cti n 1 J r - _ 4 '1 - t oo oo 1c 0 _ _# L stD 'n O S io ' ' t e C H- t v _-e- '- ' 4t cc li -- d Cc b r t e tC ilntio COi ' i i n -G t -e if cth r cour s oi cti r fail tr c ' i t --t 'f ' - er z jGBP ' ' ' r iC rl o Ji lio 1 'tal U ih tox al c tlo j 'v ' __ ' 6 cC' t c itwtio l - c - c st J -e Ciret t -ulGtCl al s i t dy f't it a J 0 E zt a co binatioa atil by tee 4 cti o 1 of t ose rts of cour o r cti c c - a f -ir c cc of S lcces- sh J' lld ba fcUo' ood i l Z c r to q t cvc nt e t ive l under A i' -t v-' - _ - ttf' coc c L _ --t - 1' '- _ c -_ L t - -- OU' - l-_ - 'c-n 't-tes CI 6 tJ a' o r - 5 a l ' C'S blis tt O a c r ist i - ' -1 or a fN t c overn eat C l _ - -_ J ---r _--'' '' J 'C -''''_ C J - c ili ct r t to t follc- ' 1 ' _6 U s cu l j' vi' t G tnc 3 3 l r- 'r c s s o ad i - osit v tiu tv e j r t the th-rcat bsiora CJ z i - or i l ' 7' I7G- - C is a If iai t acc0U li n I c _ lt o t - vl i Ji ill c - S l t of t 1e i 3 i$es the -' ' 'It i - vv-or- -on- I - r -i- ' '1 - ' --- - r r _ r ' _t l L f' ' v z- u o _ c J 1 c icr ll Lc E'''''J- tJ f 2 a 2c L t 'e -tread to ard co m 1 s J Ca t h s ti e r o l l l r 0' e 5 - - _ - - _ _ ' _-' '-A LJ c 1- lV _ __ r c' l ol _- r i r 1 -' s t c ic a ' liveS L 2 - C2--- 'c i f zt bl J cS J - l o ' - -- - - ' __ t e 5 c i s _- be t j cc e c C S s c - l J M io 1 ' ' a ' 1 -7 ' - 2 t -or C l- to r- eCl t action i c i p ric c rity to si o' -l rx cc Qc _ nt e cxtC lt of infiltration oGBP in ' c -- pc i LJ i l 2 l U C c tcr t of cxtra- re tol n c -- ' i t -t of t r e l t Cu o ' t C - a i t s ci blic a - i s c -t -MO -- i itbt e a c r i' ' l to a rise 11 it S a 1encic t -$ ot cr ica 't t s of c ttTcat in order to t r a t ' ' ' t y h 3 take - j a J It ' - ' - - c lr t rr q irc d 5'U crt 'iO C re c GBPt it c c 1 'C rc tL ' i 'r - t joi'1 t tiQ l b ' t c c b ri of tLc V J e- 'C - t to l i j ' - c z ist L -t ' t a c ulis r a iri ncll sta l - - JVcl- l l 't in Ct D k _c S o J to cli i - c e t - E s G l -c- t res J tr rEUR-5 o a Ti ' 'c li ti telJ eCC- l lt L' e take--o ve r in Cuba b liSc all I'O iO' 'rcr S Jtates 2 are of 'tile tl re at l oclc CJ ist tal c t j r a ilatGral t blc Jilit lrY a -Jc the lct l co u ist ceCia tc t e the g and tt e ot cr A crican ' t e follO iir i sr euld be Vti1i26d to Ciccoz plish tl is _ e - _ e o aLta CC ' Ol S perso m cl G c Cat L- lic - '-- 1 4 _ Iatin k c -icz 0 fiI ci als $itirl' the iJ S a 10 D ins tallati0 lS 330 7 c oo l' 1 _ oo L OJ _ -' ''i t 1 o - - - Scl 1ct X1f r0 Y l tr ls tcd - c l o rn rlt c J i ' r t t' tocld 'i s t tic C C 'CO t Zi c ct o tc t t - c p i t d O -dC te el e i' tiort 1 lc foC ' lr e i r' f c 'cd o e ort 1 b ' SJ 'C t i l CO lj z 1Ctio - it tt er of _ ' J c# c l - t orz - cv s llt t on 0 GBP t j ' t - ' ' - 1 o -' c r cl t j of G r r-' icu to GBP bcJ cc l'l zus icc' cc u - i t ' 4 'ct _ _ - ' ' c - ' - ' J - '-' _'- oo i Q - l to ' I 'CSC -' i''-' C ' 1 t e 1 CU 3 to lacc ' - Glf cr 0 re 01 tin o t c people a c reve t t ' -o'Jel' Ct 'ld r w l ldj J 3 r ' r joint O 1 i or d to '-lcco ' P t e a keep r e p lrtici t tatc tv i O 1 to r i - in ereer tc fo -cc t 'lti 1 A crican i 'i - E ci ' e r o - ib'i i1 i t o the Ec ti 3ph Q d o co tcr tAc s tiortS of U S i I iC1-i t'i r oo t f _ E Y S COpy 2 May 1960 MEHORANDUM FOR Assistant Deputy Director Plans - Action SUBJECT Liaison with United States' Agencies on JMARC Activities 1 This memorandum contains information for the Assistant Deputy Director Plans - Action 2 The attached chart on liaison with other agencies of the United States' Government on JMARC activities is restricted to those contacts that are made on a regular basis such as the weekly policy meeting with the Department of State and to offices which we must conta t quite frequently to solicit their support such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service 3 As you know infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of the Executive Branch including a Brigadier General Cushman Vice President Nixon's military assistant b NSC c Certain United States' Senators and Repr sentatives particularly Senator George Smathers of Florida S 12 Representatives 4 In the early stages of JMARC we had almost daily contact with Rear Admiral S B Renkin USN who was the action officer on the movement of two radio transmitters and construction of the broadcasting facility on Swan Island_ S Through Raymond Millard Mallard the Agency is in close touch with CINCLANT at Norfolk Robert Reynolds Deputy Chief WH 4 has briefed selected senior officers on JMARC4 Mr Reynolds is the designated CIA alternate for the CINCLANT force under provisions of the Contingency Operations Plan for Cuba J D ESTERLINE Chief WH 4 Attachment Chart mentioned in paragraph 2 5 01 S E C E T EYEY ONLY OFFICE NATURE OF DISCUSSION COpy CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCY Weekly STATE DEPARTMENT Office Inter-American Affairs ARA Mr Rubottom Policy Col J C King Cuba Working Group State USIA Chaired by Ambassador Mallory Overt Programs C Consular Security Affairs Mr John Haynes Passports for Aliens Mr Pennington OS As required Office of Intelligence Research Ambassador J Lampton Berry IITalent Matters E A Stanulis As required Inter-departmental Defector Committee Cuban Defectors ll Latin America Task Force Chair d by John Hill ARA Program Coordination J -J J C 3 3 J J Daily As required Paul E Oberst Weekly DEFENSE DEPARTMENT Office of Special Operations Capt Burns B Spore USN Defense Support E A Stanulis Robert Young CC As required Office of Special Operations Capt Burns B Spore USN Briefing J D Esterline Weekly Cover Robert Young CC As Required Cover Robert Young CC As required Collateral Support Section Office of Naval Intelligence Cdr Frank Day USN Operations Branch Collection Division ACSI Army Col Stewart McKinney SEy ET EYY ONLY Continued COpy S E C E T EYEYONLY OFFICE NATURE OF DISCUSSION CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCY UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY Director Voice of America Henry Loomis Coordination IMMIGRATIO Office of the Director Mr Hennessey u David A Phillips Weekly AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE S Entry of Cubans f w w S E T EYy ONLY Mr Pennington OS As required Appendix Attack on Petroleum Refinery at Santiago de Cuba 1 March 1961 -- f --'-' ' 'V ' - _ i--- - y '_ ----- -ili --'-- ----- o --p' 00 If' 15 I 7 1 I IH BELL - - - -1----- - 7T COP I f P IA I il oc 0 g u 3 'JH i I MAR 1 4 f' O I OZ 61 -----_ -- I f r IN 3307 - I 8t LL KOLA - 4 o I_ -- - Jt r 'J rrOUT ASi 1 f 'II INc CAU dP ES t C 'fO - '- -_- _- STA T D c VA '00 - - - A cr I 'l' J_ o or - 'A _ 1 oo o oJ - ' r- ' i Co ' I L W E Tf ' h'GAGt D IS LUS PLENTY --_ STRONG SGBPARChL fGHT lr Fr SE ARC L'GH- 5 0' s POfNTfN3 FOLL GBPO Appendix Richard M Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro 19 April 1959 RICHARD NIXON L' C S PACI FIC S N CLEMENTE C LlFORNI July 27 1979 9kenftsinVJ ie e sunooary of my conversation with fidel Castro in 1959 as you requested in your letter of July 19th With best wishes Sincerely Dr Jack B Pfeiffer CIA Historian Washington D C 20505 enclosure 4 pages i I I COpy COpy COpy CONFrAL April 19 1959 Summary of conversation between The Vice President and Fidel Castro When Castro arrived for the conference he seemed somewhat nervous and tense He apparently felt that he had not done as well on Meet the Press as he had hoped He was particularly concerned about whether he might have irritated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard to him I reassured him at the beginning of the conversation that Meet the Press was one of the most difficult programs a public official could go on and that he had done extremely well -- particularly having in mind the fact that he had the courage to go on in Eng jsh rather than to speak through a translator The subjects we discussed were no different from those on which he had made public statements on several other occasions A brief summary however t might be of interest particularly' in view of the comments t made withregard to the positions he took I suggested at the outset that while I understood some reasonable tbme might elapse before it would be feasible to have elections i t would nevertheless be much better from his vieWpoint if h e were not to s tate so categorically that i t would be asbng as four years before elections would be held I urgea him to state his position as being in favor of having elections at the earliest possible date and that four years would be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before elections were scheduled He went into considerable detail as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not holding elections emphasizing particularly that the people did not want elections because the elections in the pas t had produced bad government He used the same argument that he was simply reflect ing the will of the people i n justi fying the executions of war criminals and hts overruling the acquittal of Batista's aviators In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that it was his responsibility- to carry out the will of th e people COpy COpy COpy COpy COpy CQ Y -2- whatever it might appear to be at a particular tLme_ It was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United States was concerned his primary interest was -not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a government Loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion It was this almost slavish subservience to p'revai1ing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even the most elementary economic principles which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a l eader he might eventually turn out to be That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the great gift of leadership but that it was the responsibility of a leader not always to follow public opinion but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not to give the people what they- think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make them want what they ocrght to have I pointed rot that it might be very possible that the people of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as eLections and representative government were concerned but that this placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date end thereby to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes Otherwise the inevitable result would be the sane dictatorship against which he and his followers had fouqht so gallantly I used the same argument with regard to freedom of the press the right to a fair trial before an imp al court judge and jury and 'on other issues whi came up during the course of the conversation In every instance he justified his departure from democratic principles on the ground that he was following the will of the peopl e I in my turn tried to impress upon him the fact t a W - l e we believe in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights which a majo ity should never have the power to destroy I frankly doubt that I made too much impression upon him but ill did listen and appeared to be scme- r- t receptive I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily 7n terms of how this place in history-would be affected y e courage and statesmanship he displayed at this time I eIDL nasized that the easy thing tom was to follow the mob but a L e right COpy COpy COpy COpy COpy COpy -3- thing in the long-run would be better for the people and of course better for him as well As I ave already indicatedre was incredibly naive with regar to the Communist threat end cppeared to have no fear whatever tfuat the Communists might eventually come to power in cnoa_ He said that during the course of the revolution there had been occasions when the Communis ts overplayed their hand ancll -my people put them in their place He implied that this WOJlilld be the situation in the future in the event that the Comm t e lls1t s tried to come to power As a matter of fact in his attitmde toward Communism both internally and from an interm atimmal standpoint he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno haC - S l lmded to me when I visited Indonesia in 1953 In our discussions of Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out tczt e revolution which 4e had led might be turneq against hi Im and the Cuban people unless he kept control of- the sii m -tiDn and made sure that the Communists did not get into the pos ii tions of poWer and influence On this score I feel I I1I2 Ce very little impression if any Speaking to him from a personal s anropo nt I urged hi m at the earliest possible moment to b -n g- good strong men into his government and to delegate r responsibilities to them in the economic and other areas WD e a e lIfe presently was making many decisions I tried to point out that unless he did this rewould have a workload which WlDp CE be so great that he could not provide the leadership and e sion-that the Cuban people needed for the great issues o I put as much emphasis as possible on the need for him be delegate responsibility' but again whether I got across w- s diDubtful It was apparent that while he pai Lip service to such institutions as freedom of speec css and religion his primary- concern was with developing osrams for economic progress He said over and over that a J L21l -w' 'ho worked in the sugar cane fields for three months a yeer and starved the rest of the year wanted a job some s to eat a house and some clothing and didn I t care a whit bont whether he had freedom alongwith it I of course tried o emphasize that here again aGBP a leader of his people he should try to develop support for policies which could 5u e economic progress with freedom rather than without i - _ COpy COpy COpy COpy COP - COpy -4He indicated that it wcs very foolish for the Uni ted S ates to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean country He said -anyOOdT knows that our countries are not going to be able to play any part in the defense of this heffi1sphere in the event a world war breaks out The arms governments get in this hemlsphere are only used to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution It would be far better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for capital investment I will hzve to admit that as far as his basic argwnent was concerned here r- fOlllld little that I could disagree wi th We had a rather extendEd discussion of how Cuba could get the investment capi tal itr eeded for economic progress He i nsisted that what Cuba prbJ JPYi ly needed and what he wanted was not private capital oUt government capital He gave me some rather confused ts as to why plants that were licensed and or owned and operated by the government would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately owned enterprises' I told him quite bluntly that his best hope as far as the United States vas concerned was not in getting more government capita but in attracting private capital I explained that gover rnment capital was limited because of the mmy demands upon it and the budget problems we presently confronted I point- d out that private capital on the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving the interests of Cuba far bett- r hy adoptlng policies which would attract it I pointed o t that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go to a COuntry ere there was any considerable fear that policies might be aaupted which would discriminate against private enterprise A this point he at considerable length tried to explain wey C had said and done some of the things which had appeared be anti private enterprise up to this time Here again on Gi s point I doubt if I made too much of an impression He explained his a rarian reform program in considerable detail justifying it prj rily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were le to buy the goods produced wi thin the country and that i t would make no sense to produce more in factories unless e amount of money in the hands of cons ers was increased COpy COpy COpy COpy COpy -5He rather bitterly assailed the United States press for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution after he came to power I of course tried to explain that speaking from some personal experience it was necessary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and unfair I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with l ticis regard to 2x t might eventually- lead him to take some rather drastic steps- toward curtailing freedom of th e press in the future He also spok e rather frankly- about what he felt was a ery- disturbing attitude on th e part of the American press and the American people generally His argument went along this line yours is a great country - the richest the greatest the most powerful in th e world Your people therefore should be proud and confident and happy But everyplace I go you seem to be afraid - afraid of Communism afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little rice and the market for your rice will be reduced -- afraid that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American factories will not be able to sell as much abroad as they have previously You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Coromuni sts may do in Cuba or in some other country in Lati n America Asia or Africa -y ou should be talking more about your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship In my turn of course I tried to explain that we welcomed the industrialization and development of Latin America that one of our best customers was Canada for example which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions improved in any country this was not only good for that country but good fur us as well I also tried to put our attitude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Communism was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set upmctatorships I also emphasized however that we realized that being against Communism was not enough -- that it was even more important that we make it by our actions by what we say and what we do abroad that we convince people every place that we want to help them achieve economic progress in a climate of freedom COpy COpy coPY COpy COpy COpy -6Several other subjects were discussed but none that I think are worth roting at this point Significantly enough he did not raise any questions about the sugar quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with regard toeconomic assistance His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere that he was not a Connnunist and that his policies- had the support of the great majority- of the Cuban people My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those tnde fLnable qualLties which make him a leader of men Whatever we may think ofhLm he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly' in Latin American affairs generally He s eros to be sincere He is either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discip-line - my guess is- the former and as rhave already im-plied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries o But because he has the power to lead to which I have referred we tave no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction COpy COpy COpy Appendix Memorandum for DCI for Briefing Vice President Nixon 29 Feb 60 f - 0 CS _ ' Jt 6 29 February 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR Director of CentraJ Intelligence VIA Deputy Director SUBJECT What ve are p oing in Cuba L This memorandum is fo Pl sris information only and 1 s for the Director's use at meeting vith the Vice President on 2 March 2 1960 Intelligence Some highlights of recent intelligence ilhich 'Justi fy the actions being taken or planned aga in st Cuba are Rapid build-up of events illtich indicate slide toward CoI lllll ID i s t orbit and intensified efforts implement internal programs tow rds establishment CmnIIuni st dictatorship Public feelingemong middle end upper cl ass station contacts ranging frotn left to right have decl a red tbat situation cannot be tolerated and that they are noy convinced Communists control Cuba b The Chief o'f Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip through Central America to initiate activities for the establ1s1nnent of a pro-Castro revolutiona t y' movement in each countri e ireed at the overthrmr of exist ng government Cuban Embassies serve as cover GBP Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to esta blish an operational relationship vi th guerrilla groups in Colombia lith ultimate goal of overthrmring the Colombian government J reports Che Guevara is talking of including Hcrlini J ue and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation heeded by him - 1 --- te uty Diroetor p usc at ting vith too- Vl l' rcttldon t on 2 March 960 rnte 2 h1ghlj ght8 re ecat 1ntcl J Jgenee which JWltlf'y t1 SO'UOWii being taken or pl aga 1 nst Cuba tu ' l _ Ra 91d buUd-up of evento W1 tnd1 c t Bllds toromrd Con t rmS at orbit end 1n-ten s L 1 ed ef' toruS 1l lpll '5ent 1nterAa l progrem s e ll t Comrmm1 at d 1 etato v PubliC f' l i l 8 among aiadJ e and upper- class C Wens and students M 9 reeclied IJ e J b tgh on C mmtm1 st isaue and IJl O erous station ccntaets ranging frott lett to rf ght haV'6 conr ot bo ttil erated end they axe de con vinced thai situation ComtunHrt8 control b Chicl' Cube n 1n ectivitl elS in Mexico 15 on n trip tfu-ouGh GBP Central kr erlca to Con a1d 0 eatabli sh en r in1t tc i ntel l- o--eucc ra t1oniU eci1Y1tie3 or too eutabllabment o f' rece1 ved of Cubm a ta to relationship V1 th gusrrllla g rou ps in Colombia 8 H rch 1960 VIA Deputy 3URJEC'i' % What 1 - 6 Direc or ara dolng ill Cuba This '1 etll ot andum i3 for information only and is for the Dirt9ctor's una at the NSC 5412 Representatives l GBPeo'ti ng rl ch 1d1l con3idor the Cuba This paper was used foi Mro Nixon '3 briofing covert action program paper 2 lans Int elligence S e hishli ht9 of recent intelligence ich justify the actions baing ta ken or pIe nne again Jt Cuba are Rapid build-up of Gvents 'i1 ich i11dicate slide c o rard Ce nmnist orbit and intensified efforts impl ent Cub JlS re ched and 8tudents hc 5 6t tion contacts ran ing intern J - rogr C13 new high on toti rds 8stablisp nent Co unist from left to right have issue and decl r d that n rous 5itu tion cannot be tolerated lind that they are now convinceJ Co - ilunists control Cuba b The Chief of Cuban int elligence throu sh Central n c t m rica ac ivltie8 xico is on a trip to initiat6 activities fer the GBPstabli llm ent of pro-Cs stro re ol tionary l Jovament in Consid3raOlo in int lliZ r ca ha b n e ch l country aim -ad at the over- received of Cuu 8tt mpt to il est ui ish an o nrational relation9 'J p ' lito g' 15rrilla gro' lP3 in Golo ' bia I i' -I - c t i t Source References Volume III Part I Background A Watching from the Sidelines 1 State Amembassy Havana Collins 17 Nov 48 sub 2 Memo for Chief WHD from COS Havana 20 Dec 55 sub Fidel Castro Ruz S HKH A-2261 3 Ibid 4 State Memo for Mr Braddock from Army Attache 14 Oct 57 sub Fidel Castro Ruz Memo No 185 S 5 State Memo from Vinton Chapin 19 Jun 57 sub Biographic Information Concerning Fidel Castro Ruz Memo No 869 C 6 David R McLean Western Hemisphere Division 1946-65 Vol I 191-192 DDO HP 324 2 Dec 73 S 7 Letter to General His Excellency Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar from Allen W Dulles 7 Jul 56 ER-84007 a u 8 Memo no addressee from Lyman B Kirkpatick 19 Nov 57 sub How to Bring P2ace in Cuba S 9 Ibid 10 Memo from V Lansing Fidel Castro Ruz C _ Beatrice B Berle and Travis B Jacobs eds Navigating the Rapids 1918-1971 N Y 1973 p 681 U o Unless otherwise specified all sources are SECRET Copies or notes of all sources cited are filed under HS CSG 2632 - 347 - T ET 12 MR no author 27 Jan 61 ' sub WHD Reporting on the Cuban Revolution and the Rise of Fidel Castro to Power p 6 S McLean Western Hemisphere Division Ope cit I 213-216 S Hugh Thomas Cuba The Pursuit of Freedom N Y 1971 pp 1000-1001 U 13 Berle and Jacobs Ope cit pp 685-686 Following CS reports S 3 345 281 3 345 282 3 347 126 3 351 466 3 354 755 3 367 468 3 373 470 13 13 4 15 12 21 10 Feb 58 Feb 58 Mar 58 Apr ' 0 8 May 58 Aug 58 Oct 58 14 Berle and Jacobs op cit pp 685-686 15 Memo for Chief PP Staff from Alfred T Co 25 Aug 58 sub US Course of Action in Cuba S 16 TDCS 3 376 032 30 Oct 58 ' sub Fidel Castro Ruz and Forces Strongly Catholic Npn-Communist S 17 MR from J C King 20 Nov 58 sub cussion of Pawley Proposal S Cuba - Dis- Cables to Director from Havana 9 Dec 58 HAVA 0661 IN 35522 11 Dec 58 HAVA 0068 IN 36486 S 18 Cable to Director from Havana 11 Dec 58 HAVA 0668 IN 36486 S 19 State Incoming Telegram from Amconsul Santiago de Cuba No 341 15 Dec 58 S 20 Ibid - 348 - TO ET 21 Cable to'Direc or fro COS 'Havana 18 Dec 58 HAVA 0704 CHECK NO 453 S 22 Alfred T Cox Paramilitary Activities at the staff Level 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dec 61 II 374-375 CSHP 183 Mar 70 S 23 Memo for Bob Dahlgren from Alfred T Cox and Col C H Heinlen 31 Dec 58 sub Support Arrange ments S 24 Memo for the President from Acting Secretary of State 23 Dec 5S sub Cuba TS no number Dwight D Eisenhower Library Gordon Gray Records 1952-61 Cuba folder Box 27 7 Minutes of Special Group Meeting on Cuba from Thomas A Parrott 7 Jah 59 S 25 Minutes of Special Group Meeting on Cuba from Thomas A Parrott 7 Jan 59 S Handwritten notes on Department of State Meeting on Cuba by Gordon Gray 31 Dec 59 Dwight D Eisenhower Library Gordon Gray Records Cuba folder Box 27 U 26 Dwight D Eisenhower Waging Peace N Y 1965 pp 521 524 U B 27 Castro Takes Over Cable to Havana from Director 9 Jan 59 DIR 07542 OUT 60805 S Cable to Director from Havana 15 Jan 59 HAVA 0900 IN 47617 S Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence Army from C P Cabell 6 Feb 59 sub Proposed US Army Operation Against the New Cuban Armed Forces fER 11-409a s 28 Memo for Chief WHD from Alfred T Cox 30 Jan 59 sub Research Projec t on Castro Movement S 29 Cable to Director from Havana 3 Feb 59 MSGNR 0984 CKNR 747 S Memo for Mr Braddock from Army Attache 16 Feb 59 sub Situation Report Memo No 412 S 30 Board qf National Estimates Threats to the Stability of the u s Military Facilities Position in the Caribbean Area and Brazil SNIE 1003-59 10 Mar 59 p 1 S 31 Cable to Director from Havana 9 Apr 59 MSGNR 1191 CKNR 004 S 32 Ibid 33 Ibid 13 Apr 59 MSGNR 2000 CKNR 017 15 Apr 59 MSGNR 2016 CKNR 039 S 34 Dispatch to Director from Havana 15 May 59 KAVA 2161 S 35 Memo for Gordon Gray from Robert Murphy 1 May 59 sub Forwarding Tentative Evaluation of Castro Visit C 36 Dispatch to Director from COS Havana 26 May 59 HAVA 2197 ' 37 HKH-1964 4 Jun 59 sub Comments of Cuban Communist Leader on Castro1s Trip to us C Theodore Draper Castro's RevoZution N Y 1962 pp 48-57 U 38 Board of National Estimates The Situation in the Caribbean through 1959 SNIE 80-59 30 Jun 59 S 39 Memo for DCI from Rudolph Gomez 4 Aug 59 sub Mr Leo Cherne S - 350 - TO T Dispatches To Director from Havana 5 Jun 59 HAVA 2233 5 Jun59 To COS Havana frOm DIR 9 Jun 59 DIR 30041 s 40 Draper op cit pp 61-62 65-69 Thomas op cit pp 1234-1271 41 Memo for Col King from Rudolph E Gomez 26 Oct 59 sUb Visit of Mr R E Gomez to Havana Cuba 15-18 Oct 59 s 42 Memo for DCI from J C King 27 Oct 59 sub Discussions between the Department and Chief WHD on Cuba S 43 US Senate 86th Congress 1st session Judiciary Sub-Committee Hearings on Communist Threat to the US through the Caribbean Part III Testimony of Gen C P Cabell pp 162-163 u 44 Dispatch for COS Habana and COB Santiago de Cuba from Chief WHD 18 Dec 59 sub RHO - - Cuba HKBW 3214 TS No number 45 Memo for DCI from J C King 11 Dec 59 sub Cuban Problems S DD P 4-9871 46 Board of National Estimates The Si uation in the Caribbean through 1960 SNIE 80 1-59 29 Dec 59 pp 1 4 7 13 S 47 Office Memo to Doris from Pauline 11 Jan 60 sub General Cabell's Briefing Qf JCS-State 8 Jan 60 S - 351 - Source References Part II Castro Must Go A Organizing for Covert Action Jan-Mar 60 1 L K White Diary Notes 8 Jan 60_ 5_ 2 CIA Inspector General's Survey of the Bay of Pigs Operation Oct 61 p 5 TS 1730 Q Hereinafter cited as I G Survey 3 Oral History Interview Jacob D Esterline by Jack B Pfeiffer 10-11 Nov 75 Tape I p 2 4 Ibid pp 3-4 5 Memo for James E Flannery 12 Dec 73 sub Review of E Howard Hunt's Book Give lfs Th s Day S 6 David R McLean Western Hemisphere Division 19461965 II 242-243 DDO HP 324 Dec 73 S 7 Conversation between Walter Elder Pfeiffer 14 Jun 74 u 8 MR from Jack B Pfeiffer 3 Oct 73 sub Conversation with Jake Esterline c 9 Oral History Interview Richard lJ rain by Jack B Pfeiffer 8 Jan 76 Tape 1 pp 6- 8 d Jack B Brief 10 Oral History Interview Richard aissell by Jack B Pfeiffer 17 OCt 75 Tape 1 pp' 2-3 11 Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview op pp 15-16 t r Tape 1 This and all other Oral Histo Inc views conducted by Jack B Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFILD - 352 - TO ET 12 Oral History Interview Richard Bissell by Jack B Pfeiffer 17 Oct 75 Tape 1 pp 5-6 Proposed Agenda for the Special Group Meeting 12 Jan 60 S 13 MR from Thomas A Parrott 13 Jan 60 sub Minutes of Special Group Meeting 13 Jan 60 S Senate select Conunittee on Intelligence Activities Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders 20 Nov 75 p 93 94th Congress 1st Session Report No 94-465 U Hereinafter SSC US 14 15 MR from Thomas A Parrott 13 Jan 60 op cit Memo for DDP from C TraGY Barnes 21 Jan 60 sub Cuba s 16 Alfred T Cox Paramilitary Ground Activities at the staff Level 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dec 61 II 384385 ODD HP 183 Mar 60 S 17 MR from J D Esterline 2 Feb 60 sub with the OCI S Meeting KR from Thomas A Parrott 3 Feb 60 sub of Special Group Meeting - Cuba S 18 MR from J C King 26 Jun 60 sub DOD'representative on Cuba - S Minutes Meeting with MR from E Scott 3 Feb 60 sub Meeting 3 Feb 60 0900 hours - 1015 hours S Memo for the DDS from Bruce Cheever 4 Feb 60 sub Request for Special Allowance for CIA Representative to CINCLANT S 19 MR from Jim Plannery 11 Feb 60 sub AjOOPjP Review of Status of Plans for Cuban Operations S MR from J D Esterline 12 Feb 60 sub Briefing of Deputy Secretary of Defense on Cuba S - 353 - TO RET - 20 Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412 2 from Thomas A Parrott 15-16 Feb 60 sub Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro S 21 Memo to Designated Representati underNSC 5412 2 15-16 Feb 60 Ope cit 22 Ibid 23 MR from Thomas A Parrott Minutes of SpeciaL Group Meeting - Cuba 17 Feb 60 S Memo of Meeting with the President on 17 Feb 60 from Gordon Gray 19 Feb 60 TS 189337-1 24 MR from J D Esterline 18 Feb 60 sub Conversation with J C King 110'6 hours 18 Feb 60 S MR from J C King 25 Feb 60 sub Meeting with Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Mr Thomas Mann on Cuba S 25 MR from J D Esterline 18 Feb 60 sub Conversation with J C King 1100 hours 18 Feb 60 S 26 MR from J D Esterline 19 Feb 60 sub with the DCI on Cuba S 27 Memorandum no author no date presumed written between 24-25 Feb 60 sUb Covert Action Against Cuba S 28 Ibid 29 Ibid 30 Minutes of aCB Meetings 2 Mar 60 9 Mar 60 S Dwight D Eisenhower Library Files of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray A67-64 Box 67 31 MR from E A Stanulis 9 Mar 60 sub Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force S - 354 - TO ET Meeting First Appendix D Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director Plans Action from J D Esterline 2 May '60 32 33 Note to Mr Barnes from Richard Helms 8 Mar 60 sub Revision of 8 Mar 60 paper for 5412 Group S Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412 2 from T A Parrott 8 Mar 60 sub Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro S 34 Ibid 35 Memo for DCI from J C King 8 Mar 60 sub What We AXe Doing in Cuba S 36 Ibid 37 Memo for Mr Gordon Gray from Samuel E Belk 9 Mar 60 sub Cuba TS 189337-2 Dwight D Eisenhower Library C1ean-Up Files Box 6 Cuba Briefing Note for NSC Meeting of 19 Mar 60 from S E Belk 9 Mar 60 sub Cuba S Dwight D Eisenhower Library Clean-Up Files Box 6 Cuba 38 Memo for Mr Gray from Samuel E Belk 9 Mar 60 Ope cit 39 Memo for the NSC from James S Lay Jr 15 Mar 60 sub u S Policy Toward Cuba TS no number Dwight D Eisenhower Libra y Gordon Gray Records 1952-61 Cuba Box 27 40 Memo of Meeting with the President on 12 Mar 60 from Gordon Gray TS no number Dwight D Ei ower Library Clean-Up Files Box 7 1960 Meetings with the President Vol I 41 Memo for Mr Bissell and Col J C King from Allen W Dulles 14 Mar 60 sub Starters for Our Cuban Paper S 42 Ibid - 355 - TOP ET 43 MR from J C King 15 Mar 60 sub Meeting 14 Mar 60 S Special Group Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412 2 14 Mar 60 sub Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro S 44 MR from J C King 15 Mar 60 sub Meeting 14 Mar 60 S 45 Ibid 46 Two draft papers on the Clandestine Service's anti-Castro efforts 14 and 15 Mar 60 15 Mar 6 pp plus Financial Annex 14 Mar 60 5 pp no Financial Annex S 47 Memo for Mr Gordon Gra from S E Belk 16 Mar 60 sub uba Briefing Note forNSC Mtg 17 Mar 60 S 48 Memo of Conference with the President 2 30 p m 17 Mar 60 from A J Goodpaster 18 Mar 60 TS no number Dwight D Eisenhower Library White House Office Clean-Up Files Gordon Gray et al 1953-61 Box 40 49 Ibid 50 Memo from J C King 21 Mar 60 stib Policy Meeting on General Covert Action Plan for Cuba 17 Mar 60 S 51 MR from Col Jack Hawkins 5 May 61 sub Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba CSHP 105 S 52 Eisenhower Dwight D Waging Peace 1965 p 533 U 53 Letter to William Colby from Gordon Gray 3 Dec 74 sub Letter to Dr Don Wilson ER 74-6355 4 U - 356 - T RET Special Group New York B Forging the Tool 54 Memo for DDS from John E O'Gara 24 Mar 60 sub Establishment of a New Branch and Section within Headquarters WH Division S 55 L K White Diary Notes 24 Mar 60 56 Memo for Comptroller CIA from Allen W Dulles 24 Mar 60 sub Project JMARC s 57 Ibid 58 Hemo for J D Esterline from Mo J King 18 Mar 60 sub Branch 4 Financial Support S s Memo for Ed Stanulis fromJ1ike King 22 Mar 60 sub Per Diem for Domestic Base S No 2 no author 25 Mar 60 sub 59 MR - 60 MR - No 3 no author 31 Mar 60 61 Ibid s JMARC S Savilion H Chapman The Cuban Invasion Maritime Aspects 1961 p 7 CSHP 86 Nov 66 s 62 Memo for Chief WH 4 from P E Oberst 31 Mar 60 sub JMARC - Timing and Tactics s 63 Memo for Chief WH 4 from R obert Reynolds 4 Apr 60 sub Daily Progress Reports S 64 Memo for DDP from J D Esterline 15 Apr 60 sub JMARC Daily Progress Report for 14 Apr 60 S 65 MR from Eleanor 27 Apr 60 sub by WH 4 14 Apr 60 S 66 Ibid - TOP 357 - RET DCI Briefing 67 Memo for DCI from J C King 26 Apr 60 sub Project JMARC Amendment No 1 S 68 MR from Jacob D Esterline 8 Apr 60 sub Briefing of the JCS on Cuba and the Dominica Republic S Memo for DCI from J C King 6 Apr 60 sub Briefing of JCS on Operations in Cuba S 69 MR from Jacob D Esterline 8 Apr 60 sub Briefing of JCS on Cuba and the Dominican Republic S 70 MR from E A Stanulis 10 Mar 60 sub with Capt Burns Spore USN S 71 Memo for Director of Logi tics from William E Eisemann 19 Apr 60 sub Funding of JMARC-3 72 Memo of Conversation from E A Stanulis 27 Apr 60 sub Aerial Coverage of Cuba and the OffShore Islands S 73 Chapman The Cuban Invasion Ope cit p 8 74 Ibid 75 Memo for the Secretary of State fr6m R R Rubottom Jr 25 Mar 60 sub Coordination of Activities Relating to Cuba C Dwight D Eisenhower Library Gordon Gray Records 1952-61 Box 29 Folder Cuba 76 Meeting pp 8-9 Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 23 Mar from T A Parrott 24 Mar 60 S 6 77 Memo for Honorable Douglas Dillon from Gordo Gray 29 Apr 60 sub Personal and Confidentia U Dwight D Eisenhower Library Gordon G ay Records 1952-6t Box 27 Folder Cuba 78 Ib id - 358 - Tor ET 79 t-tinutes of Special Gr u l--1eeting of 28 Apr 60 from T A Parrott 29 Apr 60 S Memo for E Stanulis from J D Esterline 30 Apr 60 sub Review of Coordination with other Agencies S 80 Memo for Chief JMARC CI from Jacob D Esterline 14 Jun 60 sub Bureau Stay-Behind Activity S 81 Memo for Acting Director of Central Intelligence from J C King 23 Jun 60 sub Operational Activities of the FBI in Cuba S 82 MR from J C King 30 Jun 60 sub FBI Intelligence Operations in Cuba and Mexico S 83 Dispatch to Chief WHD fro COB JMASH 30 Aug 60 sub Forwarding of Memorandum UFGA-113 S 84 Official Routing Slip for 3 j from I 3 6 Har 69 sub Review of papers on JMWAVEJ S 85 Memo for the President through the Secretary of State from Allen W Dulles 9 Jul 60 sub Briefing of Presidential Candidates ER-62-l750 S r I L Dwight D Eisenhower Library Clean-Up Files Gordon Gray eta l Box 64 Actions by the President Miscellaneous Action Notes 18 Jul 60 Telegrams to Sen John F Kennedy and Sen Lyndon B Johnson U Memo for Mr C T Barnes from John H Dyer 20 Jul 60 sub Briefing Material C Memo for Mr C T Barnes from E A Stanulis 21 Jul 60 sub Cuban Briefing Paper S Memo for the President from Allen W Dulles 3 Aug 60 sub Briefing of JFK 23 Jul 60 and LBJ 28 Jul 60l ER-60-6067 S - 359 - T ET 86 Minutes ofl Special Gro 'Meeting from T A Parrott 11 Aug 60 S Memo for OCI from c King 12 Jul 60 sub Project JMARC Amendment No 2 S Memo for George H Reingruber P from J C King 19 Jul 60 scb Instructions for the Obligation and Expenditure of JMARC Funds S Memo for the DCI fro J c King 19 Aug 60 sub JMARC ndnent No_ 3 S 87 Memo forI Mr Bissell fDOID T A P arrott 23 Aug 60 sub R lease of $10 million from the Agency Reserve for Project JMARC S 88 Oral History Inter ev lliam E Eisemann by Jack B Pfeiffer l Nov 75 Tape 3 pp 33-34 C Cooperati n and Challenge 89 Cables to MASH an R from Director 6 Jun 60 DIR 33225 OUT 8295J MASH from Director 22 Jul 60 DIR 41283 OUT 9927lt OARSMAN GUATEMALA PANAMA 4 Aug 60 DIR 3756 OUT 54882 S 90 NIE 85-2-60 The Si' uatio in Cuba 14 Jun 60 pp 1 5-6 S NOFO 91 Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60 from Gordon Gray 22 Aug GO TS 208101 Dwight D Eisenhower Librc nite House Office Project Clean-Up Records of Geraoe Gray et aI 1953-1961 Box 40 92 Special Group Papers 15 b r 60 - 31 Dec 62 Vol I 30 Jun 60 S_ 93 Memo of Meeting wiCi Ope cit L - 36 - President on 18 Aug 60 U TO RET 94 Memo of Meeting with the President 17 Apr 60 from Gordon Gray Dwight D Eisenhower Library White House Office Project Clean-Up Records of Gordon Gray et al 1953-61 Box 7 1960 Meetings with the President Vol II 22 Aug 60 TS no number 95 The President's Appointments 1960 Dwight D Eisenhower Library A 70-29 1 U 96 Memo for DDP from J D Esterline 7 Sep 60 sub Attitude of Asst Secretary of State for Latin America Thomas Mann on JMARC S 97 Ibid 98 MR from Jacob D Esterline 24 Oct 60 sub Review of Cuban Situation f r Asst Sec State for L A Thomas Mann S Memo for DCI from J C King 21 Oct 60 sub Observation on Briefing' of Asst Sec State Thomas Mann ore JMARC Guatemala Operations on 20 Oct 60 S MR from Jacob D Esterline 24 Oct 60 sub Meeting witn DCI and Asst SecState for L A Thomas Mann on Cuba S 99 Not used 100 Memo for DDP EMB from C Tracy Barnes 31 Oct 60 sub Attached Paper for Special Group 101 MR from Jacob D Esterline 24 Oct 60 sub Meeting with DCI and SecState for L A Thomas Mann on Cuba S 102 MR from Jacob D Esterline 24 Oct 60 sub Review of Cuban Situation for Asst SecState for L A Thomas Mann S Memo for DCI from J C King 21 Oct 60 sub Observations on Briefing of Asst SecState Thomas Mann re JMARC Guatema1a Operation on 2 0 Oc t 6 j S - 361 - TO - 103 TOP ET Memo for DDP from J C Kihg 26 Oct 60 sub JMARC U S Base Requirements S MR from Jacob D Esterline 3 Nov 6D sub Meeting with DDCI S 104 MR from J C King 7 Nov 60 sub Adolf A Berle Jr Dinner with 105 MR from J D Esterline 10 Sep 60 sub with James A Douglas 9 Sep 60 s Meeting Memo for Chief WH 4 from E A Stanulis 12 Sep 60 sub Policy Approval for the Use of DOD Personnel in Project JMARC S 106 Hemo for DDP from J Foster Collins 15 Sep 60 sub Foreign Volunteers for JMARC S Memo for Chief WH Division from Alfred T Cox 12 Oct 60 sub Recruitment of American Volunteers S 107 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 20 Sep 60 sub JMARC Progress Report for 12-16 Sep 60 S 108 Memo for Chief WHO from E A Stanulis 5 Oct 60 sub Guantanamo Bay S 109 Ibid 110 Briefing Note for NSC Mtg 7 Nov 60 from CAR Christian A Herter 4 Nov 60 sub U S Policy Toward China S Ill Memo for DCI from F P Holcomb 28 Oct 60 sub Concern Expressed by Admiral Dennison CINCLANT S 112 MR from J Hawkins 2 Nov 60 sub Briefing this date at HQ CIC Atlantic and Supreme Commander Atlantic on Project JMARC S - 362 - T T TOP ET D Personnel and Training 113 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 14 Apr 60 sub JMARC Daily Progress Report S 114 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview Ope cit Tape 1 pp 3-4 115 MR from Jack B Pfeiffer 26 Oct 73 sub conversation with Jake Esterline C 116 Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview Ope cit Tape 1 p 2 117 Ibid Tape 1 pp 2-3 118 Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview op cit Tape 1 p 5 119 Ibid Tape 1 pp 6-7 120 Ibid Tape 1 pp 9-10 Brief l20a Memo for Executive Officer DClfrom Richard Helms 19 Jan 50 sub Dissemination of Intelligence to DD I ER 11-552 S David Coffin Development of Ecnomic Intelligence in the Office of Research and Reports 1950-1967 II 44-45 DDI OER 2 Oct 74 S 121 Military biographic sheets 'on Hawkins and Egan U JMARC Daily Progress Reports 27 Jan and 29 Aug 60 S 122 Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview Ope cit Tape 1 pp 10-11 123 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview op cit Tape 1 p 5 - 363 - TO ET 124 Memo for DDP from J C King 17 Mar 60 sub Personnel Assignments to Branch 4 WH Division S 125 WH Field Memo No 12-60 to Chief All WH Field Stations and Bases from Oliver G Galbond P 19 Feb 60 sub Agent Candidates for Possible Use in Cuba S Book Dispatch No 1881 to All WH Field Stations and Bases from Chief WHO 22 Apr 60 sub Recruitment of Cuban Nationals S Rand R to WH FI from li H 4 FI 12 Sep 60 forwarding FI activity reports for months of Mar through Aug 60 S 126 DDS Chrono Files Minut of DDS Staff Meetings 20 Apr 18 May and 29 June 60 S 127 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 9 Jun 60 sub JI4ARC Progress Report for 7 and 8 Jun 60 S Memo for DDP from J C King 14 Jun 60 sub Staffing Guide for JMARC S Memo for DDP from J C King 9 Aug 60 sub Personnel Requirements for WH 4 - JMARC S Memo for A DDP A from Richa d M Bissell Jr 25 Aug 60 sub Personnel Requirements for WH 4 DDP-0-4402 S 128 MR from John F Mallard 6 Sep 60 sub with Mr Tracy Barnes S 129 Memo for Chief WH 4 from Richard M Bissell Jr 5 Nov 60 sub Personnel Requirements for WH 4J MARC DDP-0-5858 S 130 JMARC Daily Progress S Re orts - 364 - TO T Meeting - Support 19 Aug 60 131 Memo for DOP fromJ C King 19 Oct 60 sub Use of US Contract Personnel for JMARC Maritime Operations S 132 Cable to JMASH from Director 9 Nov 60 OIR 10738 OUT 90611 S 133 Cable to Director from IN 36407 S 134 VillO 1 Nov 60 MAOO 8452 Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview op cit Tape 1 p 7 - 365 - Source References Part III Changing Concepts 1 Savilion H Chapman The Cuban Invasion -- Maritime Aspects 1961 pp 11-12 CSHP 86 Nov 66 S 2 Ibid p 13 3 Memo for Chief WH 4 from Richard M Bissell Jr 2 Nov 60 sub Memorandum on Project JMARC S Memo for DDP EMB from FranC is W Barkley 2 Nov 60 sub WH 4 Paper for Submission to Special Group on 3 Nov 60 S 4 MR from Jacob D Esterline 3 with DDCI S Nov 60 sub Meeting Minutes of Special Group Meeting from T A Parrott 3 Nov 60 S 5 Cable to Guat from Director 4 Nov 6q DIR 09972 OUT 88974 S Cable to Director from MADD 5 Nov 60 MADD 0487 IN 38552 S Memo for Chief TRAV from Jack Hawkins 7 Nov 60 sub Organization and Training of Strike Force S 6 Memo for C CA from WH 4 15 Nov 60 sub Draft Cuban Operational Briefing for President-Elect MR GBProm Jack Hawkins 2 Nov 60 sub Briefing this date at Hq CIC Atlantic and Supreme Allied Cdmmander Atlantic S MR from Richard D Drain 16 Nov 60 sub Meeting with DDP S - 366 - TAP APPfi rT' JMARC S TOJ eECRET 7 MR from Richard D Drain 16 Nov 60 sub Meeting with DDP S 8 Ibid 9 Ibid 10 J MARC Memo for General Maxwell Taylor from Allen W DUlles 1 Jun 61 sub Briefing of President-Elect John F Kennedy 18 Nov 60 S Memo for DDP from C Tracy Barnes 18 Nov 60 sub Points re Cuba from Discussion at Special Group Meeting Saturday 19 Nov 60 S Minutes of Special Group Heetings from T A Parrott 16 Nov 19 Nov and 23 Nov 60 S ' lOa Memo for DDP from J C King 26 Oct 60 sub Budget DD P 0-5866 S JMARC lOb Memo for Chief vffiD from Richard M Bissell Jr 7 Nov 60 sub JMARC Budget DD P 0-5866 S 11 Memo for Chief WH 4 Support from Herbert B Juul 22 Nov 60 sub Staffing Requirements for 600 Man Strike Force Training Cable to Director from Guatemala 22 Nov 60 GUAT 584 IN 46427 S 12 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 23 Nov 60 sub Major Problems Confronting Operation JMARC S 13 Ibid 14 Memo for DDP from C Tracy Barnes 18 Nov 60 Ope cit 15 Cables to Director from JMTRAV 23 Nov 60 TRAV 0141 IN 46775 25 Nov 60 TRAV 0148 IN 47383 S 16 Cable to Director from Guatemala 28 Nov 60 GUAT 605 IN 48628 S - 367 - TOP ET 17 Memo for DDP from J C King 29 Nov 60 sub military Policy re Cuba S Para- 18 Ibid 19 Ibid 20 Taylor Committee Reports MR's of PM Study Group Meetings 7th Meeting 1 May 1961 p 3 S 21 Memo for Chief WH 4 PM from Jacob D Esterline 2 Hay 61 sub Straightening Out Dates of Strike Force Concept for the Taylor Committee S 22 Oral History Interview Jacob D Esterline by Jack B Pfeiffer 10-11 Nov 75 Tape 3 p 39 23 Oral History Interview fo the John F Kennedy Library Richard Bissell by Joseph E O'Connor 25 Apr 67 pp 3-4 u 24 Oral History Interview Richard M Bissell Jr by Jack B Pfeiffer 17 Oct 75 - 368 - TOP T Source References Part IV Presidential Resurgence 1 Oral History Interview Jacob D Esterline by Jack B Pfeiffer 10-11 Nov 75 Tape 1 pp 13-14 2 MR from Richard D Drain 29 Nov 60 sub Meeting with DDP S 3 Memo of Conversation with William D Pawley from Livingsto T Merchant 28 Nov 60 S 4 Minutes of Special Group Meeting from Thomas A Parrott 30 Nov 60 S JMARC - 5 5 Ibid rb I d 6 t J ec to -TS Memo for Allen W Dulles from Livingston T Merchant 10 Dec 60 sub Proposal to the President and President's Reply TS no number 7 Ibid 8 Ibid 9 Ib_ d OJ t l -Jt'iJ _'7 It d J o 0 'I fn-- fJPf' c ti t I p _ ' F' CO ' fC J- t I ' D dL - -s Ibid 5 nee 66 S- o1_ r ' r ' '1 T l L 11 o -1 S 1 G- c S v i J L A-N '- I nn 'T 'V 'f I o ' I o A 'flj 7 to kJ - ' Memo for DDP EMB from Jacob D Esterline 6 Dec 60 sub Four JMARC Problems for 8 December Meeting of Special Group S Memo for Gen Lansdale from C Tracy Barnes 7 Dec 60 sub Problems for Special Group Meeting of 8 Dec 60 S Memo for DCI from C Tracy Barnes 7 Dec 60 sub Special Group Meeting 8 Dec 60 S - 369 - T RET MR from Thomas A Parrott 8 Dec 60 sub of Special Group Meeting 8 Dec 60 S Minutes 11 Memo for Tracy Barnes from Joseph W Scott 8 Dec 60 sub A Suggested Program for Cuba TS no number 12 Dwight D Eisenhower Waging Peace New York 1965 pp 603 712 U 13 SNIE 85-3-60 8 Dec 60 Prospects for the Castro Regime S NOFORN 14 MR from C 3 23 Dec 60 sub with Ambassador Wi1hauer sic S 15 Ibid 16 Minutes of Special Group Meeting from ThomasA Parrott 22 Dec 60 S 1 J MR from r 3 22 Dec 60 sub arranged by Henry Holland 21 Dec 60 17 Meeting Meeting Minutes of Special Group Meeting from Thomas A Parrott 22 Dec 60 S C 3 J MR from 22 Dec 60 sub arranged by Henry Holland 21 Dec 60 Meeting 18 Memo for Attention of Col ' J C King from Mike Haider rec'd 10 Jan 61 sub Anti-Castro Leftists U 19 Memo for Mr Richard Bissell fromBG Lansdale 28 Dec 60 sub Cuba S 20 Minutes of Special Group Meeting from Thomas A Parrott 29 Dec 60 S 21 Ibid 22 Ibid - 370 - p SECRET 23 Memo of Conference with the President 29 Dec 60 from A J Goodpaster 6 Jan 61 S Dwight D Eisenhower Library DOE Clean-Up Files Box 51 Cuba 24 Minutes of Special Group Meeting 29 Dec 60 Ope cit 25 Memo for Chief WH 4 from C Tracy Barnes 28 Dec 60 sub Cuba S 26 Memo for DCI from C Tracy Barnes 2 Jan 61 sub Material for Policy Meeting on Cuba 3 Jan 61 S 27 Memo for Mr Frank Devine from J D Esterline 3 Jan 61 sub Personnel for US Embassy in Havana S Cable to Havana from BELL 3 Jan 61 BELL 0174 OUT 5669 S 28 MR from C Tracy Barnes 3 Jan 61 sub Outline of 3 Jan 1961 White House Meeting S 29 L K White Diary Notes 3 Jan 61 S Cable to BELL from Havana 7 Jan 61 HAVA 7405 IN 1184 S 30 Cable to Havana from Director 7 Jan 61 DIR 19746 OUT 60701 S 31 Memo for Chief WH 4 from J Hawkins 4 Jan 61 sub Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba S 32 MR from R D Drain 4 Jan 1960 sic sub Meeting with A DDP A S Memo for DCI from C Tracy Barnes 5 Jan 61 sub Material for the 5 Jan Special Group Meeting S 33 Memo for AnDP A from J D Esterline 9 Jan 61 sub Material for the 12 Jan 61l Special Group Meeting S - 371 - T ef SECRET J O p sec R tr Minutes of Special Group Meeting from Thomas A Parrott 12 Jan 61 S 34 MR from John S Warner 9 Jan 61 sub DCI Appearance before CIA Subcommittee on House Appropriations Committee 6 Jan 61 TS 174817 _ 35 Daily Progress Reports WH 4 Support June 1960 March 1961 28 Dec 60 30 Dec 60 3 Jan 61 S 36 Eisenhower Waging Peace Ope cit p 614 37 MR from J C King 11 Jan 61 sub Meeting to Discuss Proposed Release to Lhe Press re NYT story of 10 Jan 61 on Training of Guerrillas in Guatemala S 38 Memo for Under Secretary erchant from Ambassador Willauer 18 Jan 61 sub The Suggested Program for Cuba Contained in the Memorandum to You dated 6 Dec 60 S U Minutes Qf Special Group Meeting from Thomas A Parrott 19 Jan 61 S 39 Memo for Under Secretary Merchant from Ambassador Wil1auer 18 Jan 61 Ope cit 40 PZayaGiron Derrota deZ ImperiaZismo Ediciones R 1961 I 405 U 41 Ib id 436 42 Eisenhower Waging Peace Ope cit pp 613-614 43 Newsday 10 Sep 65 p 50 44 Ibid pp 50-51 45 Interview with Gordon Gray by Paul D Hopper 19 Ju1 67 Columbia University Oral History Project Part 7 pp 274-277 U Dwi ht D Eisenhower Library copy - 372 - 8P 3f J CRE I Habana u JOP1fCRET 46 The following Oral Etistory Inte rvi e r filed in the Dwight D EisenhoWlP-r library OH-14 OR-57 OH-117 OH-lS3 OR-206 OR-2SS Dwig t 11- Eisenhow-e - 28 Jul 64 ThoGLas c_ 23 Yeb 68_ Livi ' l'gsto Merchant -- Part I 4 May 67 Part Z 13 May 68_ Thomas $_ Gates Jr _ 3 Aug 67 Gen_ ca wi d Mi_ Shoup 29 Aug 72 James E_ tDglas 2 Oct 72 T Source References Part V Direct Action Programs A Propaganda 1 Memo for DCI from J C King 27 Oct 59 sub Propaganda Operations in the Caribbean 2 Minutes of Special Group Meeting 28 Oct 59 from T A Parrott Memo for A DDP A from She an Hoar 29 Oct 59 sub DCI Comments on Cuban Proposal Memo for DCI from J C King 3 Nov 59 sub tion Against the Regime of Fidel Castro Opera- Memo for Acting Chief WHD from Richard M Bissell Jr 16 Nov 59 sub Anti-Castro Broadcast Operations Memo for DCI from R E Gomez 17 Nov 59 sub Anti Castro Broadcast Operations 3 Minutes of Special Group Meetings from T A Parrott 18 Nov 59 9 Dec 59 Memo for Chief WHD from C Tracy Barnes 20 Jan 60 sub Cuba DO P-0-308 4 Memo for DCI from J C King 2 Feb 60 sub Report on WHD Plans and Activities Concerning Cuba etc 5 JMARC Propaganda Program March 1960 6 MR I S from J C King 15 Mar 60 sub Meetings with Messrs -l'3 3 J an C' J J 7 Ibid l e - 374 Jr - S TOP ET L 7 7a HR from J C King 9 -May 60 sub l JContribution to Support of Anti-Castro Radio Program Memo for Mr Lawrence R Houston from J C King 9 May 60 sub 'I J MR from J C King 9 Aug 60 sub to Cuban Broadcasting Program Contribution Ltr to Hon Dana Latham Commissioner of Internal Revenue 10 Aug 60 from J hn S Warner Memo for Col King from R E Gomez 19 Aug 60 sub Telecon with Henry Holland 19 Aug 60 7b Memo for Chief WHO from sub WRUL Radio Effort ' D Esterline 25 Oct 60 Cable to Director from MASH 19 Nov 60 MASH 1744 IN 45083 Cable to JMASH from Director 23 Nov 60 DIR 13132 OUT 95725 o Request for Payment of Confidential Funds to JMARC Finance from D Phillips 21 Nov 66 Memo for JMARC Finance from C WH 4 Prop 23 Nov 60 sub WRUL Monthly Payments Cable to JMWAVE from BELL 27 Dec 60 BELL 0022 OUT 5074 Memo for DPD AS from D A Phillips 25 May 60 sub ' Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft DPD-4426-60 _ - 375 - TOP ET Memo for DDP from D A Phillips 27 Jun 60 sub Estimates for Aircraft Broadcasts to Cuba 8 JMARC Propaganda program Ope cit 9 MR from David R McLean 27 Jul 72 sub with David A Phillips 10 Interview Ibid lOa Cable for Director from IN 46419 J 1ASH 22 Nov 60 MASH 1805 11 Memo for C T Barnes from E A Stanulis 21 Jul 61 sub Cuban Briefing Papers 12 Memo for Mrs Geraldine S DePu Director Operations Division and John P Hebrew Director Investigation Staff Bureau 'of Foreign Commerce Dept of Commerce from R W Lindsay Intelligence Division Investigation Staff Bureau of Foreign Commerce Dept of Commerce 20 May 60 sub Swan Islands FC-2040 2-37 Ltr for HaroldW Reeves Collector of Customs Tampa Fla from Geraldine S DePuy 25 May 60 FC-2650-FLB Memo for Chief WH 4 from Chief WH 4 Support 27 May 60 sub Shipment of Supplies and Equipment to Swan Island MR from C J ' 3 27 May 60 sub JMHOPE 13 MR from David A Phillips 27 Jun 60 sub Briefing of Senator Mundt on CIA Radio Operations against Cuba Minutes of Special Group Meeting from'T A Parrott 12 May O 14 Memo for Chief WHO from William E Eisemann 27 Jun 60 sub Administrative Plan for the JMARC 4 Phase of Project JMARC - 376 - T-eP SEcrET Phillips David A The Night Watch New York Atheneum 1977 pp 90-91 U C MR from 22 Apr 60 sub Proposed Implementation Plan for Cover Plan for JMARC 4 J Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 25 Apr 60 sub JMARC Daily Progress Report 22 23 24 28 Apr 60 Rand R Sheet for E Stanulis from David A Phillips 5 May 60 sub Annex A Operational Plan for JMARC 4 Memo of Conversation from E A Stanulis 28 Apr 60 sub Cover for JMARC Burwell James LogisticS - support for Operations in Cuba March 1960-0ctober 1961 DDS HS OL-7 Apr 71 15 Memo from WH Security for Cuban History May 61 sub Security of Swan Island 16 Memo for Mr David Phillips from J D Esterline 29 Mar 60 sub Random Notes of 29 Mar 60 which Require Attention 17 Cable to Director from Havana 30 Mar 60 MSGNR 3940 CKNR 208 Cable to Havana from Director 9 Mar 60 MSGNR 18435 CKNR 098 18 MR from David R McLean 27 Jul 72 sub view with David A Phillips Inter- Memos for the NSC from James S Lay Jr sub U S Policy Toward Cuba 20 Jul and 5 Aug 60 OUO Dwight D Eisenhower Library Gray Gordon Records 1952-61 Box 27 Folder Cuba Dept of State ARA Progress Report on Cuba 22 Jul 60 C Dwight D Eisenhower Library Gray Gordon Records 1952-61 Box 27 Folder Cuba - 77 - WP 8ECRET 19 MR from Davi4 R McLean 27 Jul 72 Ope cit 20 WH 4 Prop Notes for 9 Aug 60 21 Memo for DCI from J C King 1 Sep 60 sub Radio Swan- 22 Memo for DCI from J C King 2 Aug 60 sub Radio Swan DO P 0-4013 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 30 Aug 60 sub JMARC Progress Report for 25-29 August 1960 WH 4 Prop Notes for 23 Sep 60 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 27 Sep 60 sub J RC Progress Report for 23-26 Sep 60 - 't Memo for Mobilization and Military Personnel Division from J C King 19 Nov 60 sub Request for Personnel from Department of Defense - 22a Cables to BELL from RAND 7 Jan 61 RAND 0172 IN 1158 10 Jan 61 RAND 0179 1360 22b Dispatch to Chief WHO from COB JMWAVE 20 Mar 61 sub Request for Promotion Fitness Report 23 Memo from C T Barnes 15 Mar Effort 6l sub Propaganda 23a MR from David R McLean 27' Jul 72 Ope cit Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 6 May 60 sub JMARC Progress Report 28 Apr-5 May 60 WH 4 Prop Notes for 20 Oct 60 21 Oct 60 24 MR from Jacob O Esterline 13 Aug 60 sub Conversation with ADDP A Free Lloyd A A Summary Report on Attitudes of the Cuban People toward the Castro Regime August 1960 ER 60-5982 - 378 - TOP SECRE r 25 MR from Jacob D Esterline 13 Aug 60 op cit 26 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 12 Aug 60 sub JMARC Progress Report for 10 and 11 Aug 60 27 Interview of David A Phillips by Jack B Pfeiffer 11 l-1ar 75 28 Memo for DDP fromJacobD Esterline 24 May 60 sub JMARC Progress Report for 12-19 May 60 Klein and Saks Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Government Platform etc 17 Jun 60 u 29 Memo for DCI from J C King 5 Jul 60 sub Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to Cuba ER 60-525 WH 4 Prop Notes for 5 July 1960 6 Jul 60 30 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 23 Aug 60 sub J ARC Progress Report for 19-22 Aug 60 31 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 13 Sep 60 sub JMARC Progress Report for 8 and 9 Sep 60 3la Information on Khrushchev destinations from John Zabotto OCR USSR Div Pol-Mil Br 23 Aug 78 U 32 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 9 Aug 60 sub JMARC Progress Report for 8 Aug 60 WH 4 Prop Notes for 60 and 1 Dec 60 21 Oct 60 I 2 and l Memo for DCI from J C King 29 Feb 60 sub We Are Doing in Cuba Cable to JMASH from Director 2 Dec 60 DrR OUT 98992 rap ECRET vhat 1463 Senate Select Committee Alleged Assassination Involing Foreign Leaders 94th Cong 1st Sess No 94-465 20 Nov 75 p 72 u - 379 - Nov P otE R t 33 WH 4 Prop Notes for 19 Aug 60 22 Aug 60 34 Cable to Havana I l-3 r -t31 JMASH from Director 19 Aug 60 DIR 46287 OUT 60198 35 Memo for Chief WH 4 from R E Gomez 24 Aug 60 sub Outgoing Cable to Havana r -a J C -J3J and MASH OUT 60198 of 19 Aug 60 B 35a Sabotage and Other Exercises Information Request d for Green Study Job 63-289 Box 1 Folder 9 35b MR from T A Parrott 16 Mar 61 sub Group Meeting - Cuba 36 Special MR from Thomas A Parrott 9 Mar 60 sub of Special Group Meeting ' 9 Mar 60 Minutes Ibid Minutes of Special Group Meeting 14 Jul 60 MR from J D Esterline 15 Jul 60 sub Meeting with DDP 37 Paramilitary Transmittal Slip to Chief WH D from Chief WH 4 PM 21 Jul 6'0 sub Paramilitary Op Plan 1 ' 38 Routing and Record Sheet to WH FI from WH 4 FI 12 Sep 60 sub Monthly Reports of FI Activity March-August 1960 See Aug 60 MR from WH 4 PM 30 Nov 60 sub Operation to Subtle Sabotage Oil and Kerosene in Storage in Cuba Cable to BELL from WAVE 31 Jan 61 WAVE 3322 IN 3361 ' 39 Cable to J5 flfrom Director 23 Jun 60 DIR 36353 OUT 89214 380 - fOP SEe T TOP SECRET 40 MR from J C King 29 Nov 60 sub Sabotage of Cuban Television Services TS no number Cable to JMWAVE from BELL 24 Feb 61 BELL 1924 OUT 9992 Cable to JMWAVE from Director 24 Feb 61 BELL 1929 OUT 5001 41 Memo for DDP from J C King 1 Nov 60 sub Request for Approval for Sabotage attacks against Soviet and Soviet Bloc Targe ts in Cuba 42 Memo for DDP from J C King 18 Nov 60 sub Development of Action Squads by WHD Memo for Chief WHO from Richard M Bissell Jr 10 Nov 60 sub Goon Squads 43 Memo for DDP from J C King 18 Nov 60 op cit 44 Memo for Chief JMARC from 3 sub Approval of Special Operations J j 12 Sep 60 Memo for Chief WH 4 frOm J Hawkins 14 Sep 60 sub Special Operations - 381 TOP SECRET rOP SCCltr 'f Source References Part VI Mr Nixon's Role in the BOP Operation 1 Richard M Nixon Cuba Castro and John F Kennedy Reader's Digest Nov 64 pp 283-286 U Richard M Nixon RN The Memoirs of Richard Nixon N Y 1978 pp 202-203 u Theodore Draper Castro's Revolution N Y 1962 pp 62-63 U 2 Nixon Cuba Castro and John F Kennedy Ope cit Nixon RN Ope cit p 202 Rufo Lopez-Fresquet My Fourteen Months with Castro Cleveland 1966 p 107 U 2a MR from Jack B Pfeiffer 18 Jul 79 sub Telecon with Bob Zunzer re writing letter to Richard Nixon U Letter to Richard M Nixon from Jack B Pfeiffer 19 Jul 79 u r Memo for Jim Pittman from Jack B Pfeiffer Mar 79 sub Memo of Meeting with Fidel Castro on 19 Apr 59 ER 79-7295 U 3 MR's from J C King 27 Jan 60 sub Meeting in Vice President's Office on Cuba 27 Jan 60 Meeting with Mr Henry Holland on Cuba 25 Feb 60 sub Meeting with General Cushman Aide to the Vice President 4 Ibid 25 Feb 60 5 Ibid 27 Jan 60 - 382 - tt rop gEeRET 6 Memo for DCI from J C King 29 Feb 60 sub We Are Doing in Cuba What 7 Minutes of the 436th Meeting of the NSC from Gordon Gray 10 Mar 60 Dwight D Eisenhower Library Gordon Gray Box 79-NSC Minutes and Agenda 1960 TS no number Memo of Conference with the President on 17 Mar 60 from A J Goodpaster 18 Mar 60 TS no number o 8 MR from J D Esterline 30 Mar 60 sub Contact with Mr William Pawley in Miami 21 Mar 60 9 MR from J D Esterline 8 Apr 60 sub Review of the Cuban Operation and Examination of Possibilities for Hemispheric Support for Liberal Governments DDP 0-1956 10 Memo for DDP from C Tracy Barnes 17 May 60 sub Project JMARC lOa Minutes of Special Group Meetings - Cuba from Thomas A Parrott 19 May 60 11 MR from Jacob D Esterline 20 May 70 sub Review of Swan Island Operation and William D Pawley's Apparent Unilateral Decision to Work with Cuban Exiles pendent of CIA 12 Memo for DDP from Jacob D Esterline 7 Jun 60 sub Rubio-Pawley Group 13 Cables to Director from Havana 4 Jun 60 HAVA 4820 IN 48003 from MASH 9 Jun 60 MASH 0041 IN 49533 14 Official Routing Slip to C WHD from Gerard Droller 4 Jun 60 15 Memo to DDP from Jacob D Esterline 7 Jun 60 sub Rubio-Pawley Group 16 MR from Jacob D Esterline 11 Jul 60 sub Lunch on 20 Jun 60 with General Cushman Vice-Presidential Aide - 383 - T QP SECRET -WP 3f CrtE I 17 Minutes of Special Meeting of the NSC on 22 Jun 60 from James S Lay Jr I Dwight D Eisenhower Library Gordon Gray Records 1952-61 Cuba folder TS no number 18 Routing and Record Sheet for Chief WHD from Chief WH 4 21' Jun 60 sub Copy of NSC Briefing Paper sent General Cabell on 20 June l8a Ibid 19 Memo for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Jacob D Esterline 25 Jun 60 sub No tes on Policy Discussion which Followed the CIA Briefing of theNSC on Cuba 22 Jun 60 Memo for Mr Jacob D Esterline from James S Lay Jr 29 Jun 60 sub Esterline memo of 25 Jun 60 Notes on Policy Discuss n at Special NSC Meeting of 22 Jun 60 20 MR from Jacob D Esterline 1 Jul 60 sub phone Conversation with General Cushman Tele- 21 Memo for Chief WH 4 from C Tracy Barnes 7 Jul 60 sub Swan Island Broadcasts 22 Memo for DCI frOln Rudol Jh E Gomez 26 Sep 60 sub Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga ER 60-7645 o ' Memo for DCI fron J C King 18 Jul 60 sub Contacts with Mario Garcia Kohly MR from J D Esterline 20 Jul 60 sub of General Cushman Briefing WH 4 Prop Notes Jun 60 - J- l 61 18 19 20 21 26 29 Jul 1 Aug and 11 17 Oct 60 MR's from Robert w An ews 23 and 26 Sep and 4 Oct 60 sub William Jackson Powell 23 Memo for Gen Maxwell D Taylor from Allen W Dulles 17 Jun 61 sub Marshc l Diggs Proposals on Behalf of Garcia Kohly - TOP 384 - ECR E 0 P ELl ET Washington Star 2 Aug 76 24 u Memo for the President from Allen W Dulles 3 Aug 60 sub Intel'ligence Briefing for Democratic Candidates July 1960 ER 60-6067 U Memo for the Record from Allen W Dulles 21 Sep 60 sub Briefing of Sen John F Kennedy on 19 Sep 60 25 New York Times 21 Oct 60 26 Nixon Cuba Castro and John F Kennedy op cit pp 286-288 U Nixon 27 RN U op cit pp 220-221 U Nixon Cuba Castro and John F Kennedy op cit p 288 Nixon RN op cit p 221 28 MR from Jack B Pfeiffer 1 Mar 78 sub with Mrs Fawn M Brodie U Meeting Schlesinger Arthur M Jr A Thousand Days New York 1965 p 225 U 29 New York Times 23 Oct 60 U MR from Thomas A Parrott 27 Oct 60 sub ments by Presidential Candidates 30 Schlesinger op cit p 164 State- U Memo for C CA from WH 4 15 Nov 60 sub Draft Cuban Operational Briefing President Elect 31 Memo for the Honorable John A McCone from Allen W Dulles 20 Mar 62 sub Intelligence Briefing of President-elect Kennedy U 32 Letter to Admiral Stansfield Turner from Fawn M Brodie 4 Jan 78 U 33 MR from WH 4 15 Nov 60 sub Transcript of Tape of Telephone Conversation between C JMARC and William D Pawley on 14 Nov 60 - 385 - Or SEG ET -I-UI' 5LCi C I ' Source eferences Part VII Assassination o o ooo 1 Oral History Interview Richard M Bissse11 Jr by Jack B Pfeiffer 17 Oct 75 Tape 2 p 18 2 Ibid p 17 3 L K White Diary Notes 22 Mar 61 4 Oral History Interview Jacob D Esterline by Jack B Pfeiffer 10-11 Nov 75 Un taped conversation 5 Ibid 6 Oral History Interview Richard D Drain by Jack B Pfeiff r 8 Jan 76 'll ll lf l pp 19 '21 7 MR from Thomas A Parrott 3 Nov 60 sub of Special Group Meeting 3 Nov 60 8 Hunt Howard Give Us This Day New Rochelle N Y Arlington House 1973 pp 38-39 u 9 Daily Log - WH 4 PM Section 18 Ju1 60 14 Oct 60 Minutes No author Key to Map of Potential Paramilitary Assets no date but after 6 Aug 60 10 Cable to Director from SACU Santiago Cuba 18 Jul 60 MSGNR 609 CKNR 170 11 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview OF pp 16-17 gibE I upe 1 lla Cable for Director from Havana 9 Dec 60 HAVA 7133 IN 14488 - 386 - OP kCRbT TOIi cC T 12 Richard D Drain Personal Notes 13 Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview Ope cit Tape 3 p 60 14 Job 63-605 58 Folders I 2 3 19-132-16 1-3 HINT-Operations Cable to BELL from JMWAVE 24 Feb 61 WAVE 3931 IN 0915 15 WH 4 Prop Notes for 27 Feb 61 28 Feb 61 Richard D Drain Personal Notes 28 Feb 61 16 Letter to Jack B Pfeiffer from R ichardJ D D rain 24 Jan 76 Letter to Richard D Drain from Jack B Pfeiffer 22 Jan 76 17 Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview Ope cit Tape 1 pp 15-16 Must Go List 18 Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview Ope cit Tape I p 21 - 387 - OF SECRET XQP sr c I ET Source References Part VIII Conclusions 1 PZaya Giron Derrota del Imperialismo Habana Ediciones R 1961 I 436 U Maurice Ha1perin# The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro Berkley 1972 p 89 u 2 PZaya Giron Derrota op cit III 387 3 Oral History Interview Richard D Drain by Jack B Pfeiffer 8 Jan 76 Tape 1 p 21 - 388 - l Qp S'Lf'f I T U