TION Attached to Document OFFICE as THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND cow I CONTROL NUMBER ROUTE SHEET 7 7 DATE APPROPRIATE ACTION OUT To 9 INFORMATION PREPARE FOR SIG PREPARE FOR 1323 cm sue PREPARE FOR SEC DEF SIG REMARKS m2 0 5 a WE11 9 SE 572 41 SUSPENSE DATE 03% 2 6 g so Iggy 223 Mu editions of this form are obsolete - -- h- mm mm BYX-77-27 REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC PANEL or 1977 use swan STUDY on CRUISE 77 4052 SECTION 1 tmuoxmcmuonr m 1 515 This report summarizes the deliberations and findings of the Strategic Panel of the D53 Summer Study on Cruise Missiles held in San Diego during the first two weeks of August 1977 The panel's overall goal was 1 to examine U S strategic cruise missile programs and assess their ability to be launched and penetrate current and reactive Soviet defenses and 2 to suggest modifications to current programs and new initiatives which would ensure effectiveness now and in the future The panel was also asked to illuminate critical SALT issues bearing on the effectiveness of strategic cruise missiles The Strategic Cruise Missile panel was chaired by Dr Michael may and included James Beebe James Drake Hue Lin Oliver Boilea'u Abe Goo and John Walsh as members The panel relied on data provided from a variety of sources including the navy Air Force SIA CIA AREA DMA and others I This report begins with a section presenting major conclusions in regard to the cruise missile programs and threats This is followed by a section discussing these conclusions and a sec- tion on SALT implications w mm cos oseonasa memos CArssosv 3 WATICAI LY ON SECTION 2 PRINCIPAL -Overall tithe panel finds the Strategic Cruise Missile program to be a highly desirable new direction for the strategic bomber force to ensure its continued viability as the air breathing leg of the Triad The panel however identified a number of concerns which while easily fixed if acted upon now could otherwise become substantial worries towards the mid- to late 1980's Several longer tern technological threats were also conceptualized for which Rs initiatives are warranted but none of these in the panel s view should or need delay the earliest possible deployment of a strategic cruise missile quite similar to those designs now in develop-4 ment Specifically with regard to the cruise missile design a l l'he present ALCM- and-Tomahawk designs surviue and penetrate well against present national estimates of Soviet defenses and probably against those - defenses augmented by the confirmedmut' not those steps missile threat _ 0 These cruise missile designs wand pedaablv homage in effectiveness gradually against reactive soviet defenses Such defenses could be 7y the mid-50's We estimate lethal radius of these improved defenses will be on the order of 5 20 run The cost-exchange ratio however still remains very much in the 0 5 favor although this fact has not prevented the Soviet Union from deploying defenses in the past EYX 77 27 0 25X4 E-0 13526 I euez' thEI 25X4 E 0 13526 P- 25x4 and 5 E 0 13526 The essential ingredient in maintaining continued effectiveness of the bomber-launched cruise missila leg of the Triad is sufficient cruise missile range we estimate sufficient to be taking into account the target struc- ture a prudent standoff distance and operational 25x4 and s E O 13526 d-w'J fwr'e- - - - BYX 77-27 range hazadaticns An effecdve-mazdmm operational wage of 25X4 and 5 110135267 Replaymt of a mdified cm se missile with sufficient mange arming-comm Weatmtem m mfm m m mdifieclicmiaemiaa est it dateso tat missiles With regard to the 3-52 0 Inxiewldf the 3-1 camellatim am of the possible Jack of timely rtell'igeme Micatorjsofadepressed mje cbary threat Vie-W devel p aga plan topmrideadeqmte 3-52 mac m tine Ihis planwill involve ue pmzifmtimof teriortalm suipsanamayimolve modificatiomtotm 3-523 The residual watering rst requires xat'the Soviets We Were remand mintain xgapbrtimofthis B 52 SRWfome This fame inedmt Wm l - an 77-27 mm mile it could Dwide 1WD With regard to'Ra a Annumber of technologies could prove essential should threat deVelopments call for a second generation strategic cruise missile Another order of magnitude or more reduction in RC8 and other observables is_ thought possible Advanced airframe and propulsion- technology cou1d lead to a practical too-stage sub- sonic cruise supersonic dash missile or to the prOn liferation of very small subsonic cruise-missiles a At some point a new design bomberfcruise missile launcher may be needed to cone with threats to base 19 59599 ight- A mam new deem I mime rim 9 we immense I pgga ial' sxans a la-I- To reach conclusions more quantitative than those presented above integrated studies under consistent assumptions oi the capabilities of present and future cruise missiles and cruise missile carriers against likely reactive Soviet defen- sive systems need to be carried out These studies should be done under the cognizance of a central office responsible for strategic cruise missile development Realistic testing of the results of these studies will be needed 1- i i - BYX 77-27 SECTION 3 DISCUSSION OF CRUISE MISSILE EROGRAMS w w In the sections that follow the characteristics of existing and modified cruise missile programs and defenses are described and key issues with regard to their relative effectiveness are 3 defined In this discussion we have adopted the following nomenclature for describing eech element co Currant cruise missile program Current Soviet Defense augmented with -systems confirmed to be in development- 1 Reactive defense options using present building blocks Ci Modified cruise missile evolutionary from co and reactive to D1 _' Note that in examining a particular cruise missile against a defense both quslitetive and quhntitetive aspects must be considered namely the extent of the deployment of each element must be no consistent with the time period in question as are their deteiled performance chereeteristics For ex ample co will not be deployed in large numbers until i 1985 while much of Do is widely'deployed today Similar imbalances will probably occur if modified cruise missile er reactive defenses D1 are developed In discussions that follow do and D0 will first be described hand then considered against each other Since co 'will not exist in large numbers until shout 1985 a reactive defense D1 can also be postulated and gamed for that time However 3-1 455m- - an 77 27 cO could itself be modified which results in a G1 vs D1 confrontation Each combination will he considered Chart Before beginning the discussion some comments concerning issues not covered are apprOpriate Chart In particular 3-52 ECM effectiveness hardness and performance improvements reenginingj are not evaluated Also the effects of barrage balloons or other physical barriers on penetration were not assessed The cruise missile itself is assumed to he air-i launched from a ass and is armed with a nuclear-warhead The advantages and disadvantages of other launchers wide- hody jets submarines ships etc were not carefully ' was the utility of a nonnuclear_warheed emmer 3 1 cesium- amuse sun assesses and 2' 'Charts'l and 4 summarize the characteristics of Cb and be as understood by the'panel co is the current 0 5 cruise mis- sile program while Do'is a nonreactive Soviet defense using existing components including those forecast to he in the field in the next decade In summary 60 is a subsonic lashaltitude low Ros vehicle launched from a 3-52 with a range capability of Do by the aid-1980's could include many hundreds of lowbaltitude SAMs SA-3 and seer-10 in particular modern and as well as capable of attacking 3-52 bases from the current SSBN patrol zones with mininun energy trajectories - Briefing charts summarizing the key points are presented at the end of this section The relevant chart for particular discussions is noted in the text I Inf - rem-'3 -- - 1 37x 77-27 In eaen nim the effectiveness of Co vs no Chart 5 the pmelemchdes that nei xerbese escapenernid-cwrse emvivel a significant ptdalem In edditim there is no Swiz t system with eigificant effectiveness agemst the AICM effer its land due to its low-altitude mean pmfiileand low - signe'twe I m mile smvivelof'the 3 528 mthe Whine points in 1985 unless 'eBASZWraneineeffec ve As amenity he to poorB-SZ meetivityapd the unitednunber 1500 '3 2 Z-ir mid-toletelQBOe frunbeilgengaged attz'iting the 3-52 during base escape and mid-came mt Specific major- mp3 my be WY mm Soviet 333st can approadu eimifiomtly xemmingendcamt 3 m an 77 27 --By 1985 et- se the Soviets ewld stiffen their coastal apmaeh defenses em to operating FWEBAT and FIDDIER possibly augmented by the KEG-25H to their ulltec miea1 capability mwmy m wbeeanem 3252's use of its radar timing erdezvom preter- te refuel and an attack m1 Seviet SAFE even those designed for low-altitude U S standards to fixandsenear'emt Byabmrt1985 the useful effective 1am radius mamas-mange puri ers These 031116 Of -7 -8 -10 Amaze - altmtive mndbe to deploy the Clam-Shell radarwi'di amnleart-arned Brendan scans capable of detecting very small mileitismtdesigzedasatseldng treating aecwseyemyatible with the large lads envelope of anmlearmhead me relatively high poses til-sophisticated an insecure design and perhaps aming 1 ut l' BYX 77 27 tiueure Speci uruly lree Escaping 3-52a' probably muld smvive well towi nn moo Inihexsmelmiv ah no con dent state-amt can be made with regard use penetrativity' hytlo Ihequu ie Ehelxnmerer en msmse kndamidhe and range cart 7 - MODIFIED csurss mssins' soenan The C1 program is- designed to cope with the reactive soviet defense D1 in the midr to late_1980's Its elements are_ summarized1 in chart 8 The program has two parts changes to 3-52 basing and Operations to maintain survivability to the launch point and 2 cruise missile design improvements to increase penetra- tivity Note that not all of these improvements need be implemented simultaneously In fact some could await the appearance of threat indicators but plans and apprOpriate provisions for all of them should be thoroughly thought through Shortened flight time SLBH attacks on the 5-52 bases call for measures which increase readiness shorten reaction time and proliferate aim points Continuous surveillance of Soviet proliferated interior 3-52 alert strips shortened 8-52 reaction time and 360 flyout during END base escape are all responsive to this problem They are however of varying cost and lead time - l'be danger from unconventional attacks can never confidently be eliminated but there are a number of obvious current - vulnerabilities There is only one ground station for DSP west and it is exceedingly vulnerable to' both electronic jamming and to direct attach - The 3-52 bases'are small in number and the 3-52's are soft to a variety of hand-held weapons Finally timely action like a positive control launch of the 3-52'3 which might save them from certain - unconventional attacks has not been practiced for over ten - years to avoid the danger of a crash and subsequent dispersal of radioactive contaminants The third fourth and fifth items on Chart 8 are three of many suggestions to reduce vulnerability to paramilitary or sabotage attacks I a camidez'ation asttime smpriaedtooearlyin ze ight Barberdefense mesa-Jennie carriedperbarber momemybedif mntm eldbye s period 2 avan330001n1nva1tozyby1985 mismallms for 20 on each of 100 alert 3-523 plus spams memes etc Addi- 77-27 I 11 the 3-52 preceed as deeply as possible into potential defenses 2 changing th altimeter s observables to pre- vent passive'detection 3 incorporation of a salvage fuze a on the nuclear_ warhead to enforce real and one-on-one effectiveness against systems with short lethal radii compared to their nuclear- hardness 4 reduction of ass and flight altitude as low as possible to shrink SAM and 335 effectiveness and 5 setting aside 10 to 20 of weight and space provisions for later incorporation-of some selected penetration aids such as a passive receiver that senses sau pr AAM loch-on and triggers evasive action 25x4 and 5 The evaluation of the modified cruise missile' 3 c1 effec- tiveness against the reactive defense D1 concluded that base escape probability and survival to the ALCH launch point 500 nm out would be good 8-52 penetration is not inproved 3-7 eves - mml-g-77-27 it remains poor Cruise missile penetration is good In particular and msnned interceptors are ineffective 3 4 ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES AND DEFENSES The panel's studies emphasized'esolutionary developments of the cruise missile program and reactive defenses up to the late 1980's time frame There are however a numher of threats which could appear in the 1990 s which could warrant a second generation cruise missile design and launcher and fer which R59 is thus- indicated Three pessible U 8 responses and the threats that require their deployment are described in the paragraphs that follow Chart 10 presents a summary of these points They are not roommended for deployment at present but for 3 4 1 Ultra-Low Observable Cruise Missile- 'An ultra-low observable cruise missile could he required if the Soviets deployed on overland ANACs with a Soviet equiva- lent of the Fel4 or advanced sans or a helicopter- or balloon- horne SAM or unconventional surveillance systems 25x4 E O 13526 I An order of mag-- nitude reduction in ass end other observables may be possible and would stress all such systems The problems cost and technology faced by the Soviets in developing and deploying these defensive systems are considerable but they may do so anyhow 3 8 ugh - BYX 77-27 3 4 2 Two-Stage Cruise Missile Against a Soviet SAM defense capable of operating at its horizon nm a twoestage cruise missile consisting of' a subsonic cruise stage and supersonic dash stage might be deployed This vehicle could defeat the SAM through leverage in reaction and response time It requires an aggressive improvement in airframe and engine technology however to offset the attrition of its much larger size - nu xns animat e anisehy man 3 4 3 New BomberdCruise Missile Designs Concentration on base attack and mid-course intercept would force an entirely new bomber cruise missile carrier design Possible threats include optimized SLBM Foss or M035 designs satellite-aided barrage or intercept new long-range manned interceptors with either autonomous or external target localization and a surface-ship- or submarine-based SAM sys tem The above threats nould force changes in bomber basing 'and reaction and favor greatly increased flyout capability speed in particular increased hardness reduced observables and increased lowhaltitude range capability 3-9 CHART TINELINES ANO FORCE CHARACTERISTICS 9 11 ' 100 LIKE NON FER IF ARV SONE PART 0E - TOTAL DEFENSE NOT RELEVANT DUE TO SMALL DEPLOYMENTS 0F CRUISE MISSILES 5 LANE LIKE HOH OROHTH NOHOERS BENITO-23 ANTI NIB-25H - 3000 BEST REACTIVE PDSTURE USING PRESEI BUILDING BLOCKS - RELEVANT IF PRESENT HROCRAH BOESN CHANCE RELEVANT IF ONLY SO REACTS RELEVANT IF BOTH REACT I CHART 2 STRATEGIC ISSUES NUT 2 5 3-52 Em EFFECTIVENESS HARDNESS 3952 REENGINING BARRAGE BALLOONS-I LAND ATTACK NUDE NONNUCLEAR NOTES 1 2 c3 CHART 3 co- THE PRESENT u CRUISE MISSILE 252m and 5 0 13526 0 NUMBER OF 13-52 BASES B-52 REACTION TINE 3 52 RANGE 0 RC8 NUT-IRERS 100 BY 1930 OVER BY 1985 o' ALTITUDE 0 SPEED 0 55 - 0 7 DTNER - - IR I 25 - so DEPENDING UPON ALERT MEDIAN DISTANCE FRDN COAST 200 25x4 and 5 CAPABILITY SPEC HIGHER FOR MODELS WITHOUT RAM CAPABILITY SPEC 100 FEET HIGHER IF MAXIMUM RANGE REDUCED - CIT-E O0 1985 90 THESE ARE SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF A SOVIET DEFENSE HONREACTIVE TO CRUISE HISSILES USIHO EXISTING COHPOHEHTS PLOS THOSE FORECAST TO CORE INTO THE FIELD OVER THE DECADE OF THE EIGHTIES ON THE BASIS OF CLEAR INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS - OEHOHSTRATEO CAPABILITIES OHLTT CONTROLLED MIG 23's AHO - 20o OTHER on STRANY OROHTH s 5 SA-3 TACTICAL IHTERCEPTORS ARO PARTICIPATION OHRAOHH OTH RADARS NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT OUTCOHE- NOT LIKELY TO SURVIVE INITIAL HOURS OF WAR VII-E CHART 5 c0 vs no 1935 ALERT ESCAPE FROM BASE AND SURVIVE TO HIGH ALT GCI DETECTION SURVIVAL T0 ALCM LAUNCH POINTS GOOD SURVIVAL SRAM LAUNCH POINTS INSIDE USSR GOOD IN '77 AND POOR IN - THIS ASSUMES B-52 ECM DOES NOT REMAIN EFFECTIVE NO SOVIET SYSTEM IN D0 HAS SIGNIFICANT EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST ALCM OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBER LEG OF TRIAD DEGRADES SIGNIFICANTLI ONING T0 POOR PENETRATION 0F 3-52 AND LIMITED NUMBERS OF ALCMs CHART 6 n1 REACTIVE DEFESSE THESE ARE FEATURES OF A SOVIET DEFENSE HHICH COULD BE CPERATIGIIAL IN THE T0 LATE EIGHTIES IF THE SOVIETS REACT SPECIFICALLY TO THE RANGE ALCM THREAT - 0 COORDINATEU DEPRESSED TRAJECTORY SLBM ARI ICBM BARRAGE NEAR - uncommon ATTACKS on BASES AND mums SYSTEMS 0 SIGNIFICANT BARRIER OUT TO 500 NM MOSS FIDDLER 0R MIG-25M- FULL USE OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITII 0 8-52 TAMKER RADAR INTERCEPT 1080 MOBILE SAMs HITH EFFECTIVE LETHAI RADIUS 5-10 NM AGAINST C0 INCLUDING TACTICAL ASSETS UITH NUCLEAR UH CIAMSHELL RADAR TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE LETHAL RADIUS CUT TO 20 NM 0 EQUIPMENT DETECT 0R JAM CRUISE MISSILE ALTIHETER 912-8 CHART co v5 n1__ BASE ESCAPE GOES FROM GOOD TO POOR DUE TO ATTACKS CATASTROPHIC RISK FROM UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACKS ESCAPING SURVIVE NELL TO NITHIN 500 NM OF SURVIVAL DEGRADE TO POOR BEFORE REACHING TARGETS SURVIVAL OF C0 ALCM AGAINST D1 DEFENSE HIGHLY MORE COMPLI GAMING AND TESTS OF POSSIBLE U1 OPTIONS MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN ISISTENT FASHION TO DETERMINE OUTCOME OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS 0F BOMBER LEG OF TRIAD BORN BECAU 0F BASE ESCAPE PROBLEM PROBABLE INABILITY or was IRSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF ALCHs AND INAOEQUATE ALCM RANGE LIFE cum 8 cit-momma CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM 1935 THIS IS A MODIFIED U S DESIGNED TO COUNTER A REACTIVE SOVIET DEF IN THE MID- TO LATE 1980's 3-52 BASIMS AND OPERATIONS - CONTINUOUS STRATEGIC WARMING OF SSBN DEPLOYMENT 0 PROLIFERATED ALERT STRIPS SHORTENED REACTION AND 360 - LOCAL FLYOUT BASE SECURITY PROGRAM PROLIFERATE DSP RECEIVERS AND POSSIBLY COASTAL RADARS COMPLETE SYSTEM EXERCISE ON ALARM CRASH-PROOF MARHEAD EMISSION CONTROL DURING REFUELING F-15 ESCORT OR POSSIBLY BOMBER DEFENSE MISSILE BT-E CHART a CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM 1935 noun CRUISE DESIGN 0 ALCI-I DESIGN SHOULD BE COMPATIBLE - CARRYING 2O ON EACH 3-52 - COVERING EVERY PART OF SO NITH 500 NM STANDOFF REAUIRED RANGE ABQUTI I 25314 and E - 3000 HE BY 1985 LON-ALTITUDE LAUNCH Withheld public releEse b3 0 E1 ALTINETER OBSERVABLES Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended and regulations issued 0 RC8 AS LOW AS POSSIBLE ALL ASPECTS - NONINAL COMMAND ALTITUDE I25th and 5 E 0 13526 I 0 SHOULD BE SET ASIDE FOR PENETRATION AID IO- 20 LBS NOTE I INTRODUCTION OF BONE OF THESE DEPENDS UPON APPEARANCE OF APPROPRIATE THREAT INDICATORS I I CHART 9 Ci vs D1 0 BASE ESCAPE PROBABILITY GOOD IRSSUNINO c3 RNO- BASE SECURITY IS MAINTAINED SURVIVAL TO LAUNCH SOO NN OUT - 3-52 PENETRATION PDDR CRUISE NISSILE PENETRATION - INEFFECTIVE HAVE FER NILES LETHNL RADIUSAT BEST- MAS INEFFECTIVE OZ-E F -- MDRE ADVANCED SYSTEMS AND THE THREATS THAT MIGHT REQUIRE THEIR DEPLOYMENT ULTRA-LOH CRUISE MISSILE ARACS 0R SCI DIRECTED SUE-1A DR SAM - DR- DALLDDA BDRME SAA o SURVEILLANCE I 25x4 and 5 E 0 13526 I THO-STAGE DASH ADRIZDM LIMITED SAM AER DDMDER CRUISE MISSILE DESIGN 9 OPTIMIZED SLDM OR A SATELLITE AIDED BARRASE - LDRS-RARCE INTERCEPTDR MDDIFIED BACKFIRE MDDIFIED I AUTONOMOUS SATELLITE BASED SAM