a Withheld under statutory authority of the 131512001 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 4033 The Iraqi Threat Saddam sees himselfas a pan-Arab leader and views his regime as the most glorioua chapter in Iraqi history Nurtured in a clannish nationalist and cutthroat political environment Saddam s parochial anti-Western outlook colors his domestic and foreign policies His decisionmaking is guided by opportunism distrust of others a personal need for poorer and the sense that he is an historic figure who must take hold risks to advance Iraq's interests He views state power primarily in IniIitary Icons twice Iaunching wars against neighbors and his strategic aim is to establish lraq as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf - He views the US and Israel as the chief impediments to his dominating the re ion and believes they want to divide and weaken the Arabs and control their oil resources Saddam s Threat to His People Saddam maintains a vise grip on Iraq through his multilayered and pervasive security apparatus which brutally enforces his authority and cultivates an image of invincihility Throughout his 22-year presidency Saddam has ruthlesst eliminated real and imagined adversaries to further his political goals and consolidate his power He has ordered the assassination of numerous domestic rivals former colleagues family members and dissidents in Iraq and abroad Ihe initiated cleansing campai as in 1999 at the large Aha Ghurayb and Radwaniyah prisons that continued into this rev-Ii - Saddam's obsession with ensuringr_egime security by force has led to repeated and devastating counterinsurgency operatimi ISadtlam personally oversaw military operations against the Shia ofposition in southern Iraq in l99l His forces leveled numerous villages killed tens of thousands and displaced thousands more no 13526 section I 4 c - He has overseen the destruction of Iraq s I marshlands and displaced their residents to deny Opponents and insurgents a hiding place IE As commander-in-chief during the Iran-Iraq war Saddam was responsible for-the repression of the Kurds including the infamous Anfa operation directed by his cousin Ali Hasan aJ-Majid in WET-38 which included mass deportations reSettlement torture executions and the use of chemical weapons The Iraqi Government razed hundreds of Kurdish villages and forcibly relocated the displaced population to wither Iraq' Withheld under statutory authority of the Saddam's Human Shields Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403- The Iraqi regime uses people as pawns and hostages It has taken Iraqi citizens prisoners of war and foreigners as human shields to protect its r political and military sites most notany during the Gulf war During a confrontation with the US over inspections in I997 Saddam ordered ranking members of the Ba'th Party to bring at least ten families a day to sit in government and security INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE EU 13526 SECTION ISCAP APPEAL NO 2008-013 document no 1 DECLASSIFICATION DATE December 3 2015 CO 5343905 al' I installations as human shielddtIELI 13526E section 1 4 c Conventional Military Capability Saddam has spent all but three years of his long tenure at war with his neighbors and the international community squandering Iraq s vast oil and other resources in the recess He believes a large conventional military is essential to making Iraq a great poorer The ltaqi military today is less than half its pre Gulfwar size and Baghdad s military capabilities have deteriorated slowly as a result of UN sanctions the arms embargo and damage in icted by Coalition and US military operations Iraq has received no major military equipment such as tanks APCS artillery or aircraft since the imposition ofthe arms embargo in 1990 It is importing increasing amounts of illicit spare parts and dual-use items but these shipments are only suf cient to slow not reverse the overall decline in military capabilities Despite these shortcomings the Iraqi military retains the capacity to threatcn US interests and the intelligence Community assesses it capable of Defeating any combination of internal opposition groups and rcasserting regime control over key roads and cities in Kurdish-controlled northern lraq Dverrunning Kuwait absent opposition from Western forces mod threatening other regional Arab I i Conventional Forces in Decline Iraq maintains 23 divisions in its ground forces down from the high of no 13526 section 1 4 c ijust before Operation Desert Storm The six Republican Guard divisions remain the most capable ground force units and I I Ithese forces are equipped to rough 1y 90 percent oftheir authorized strength of combat vehicles The 7 regular Anny divisions vary widely in six armored and mechanized divisions have roughly 30 percent oftheir authorized equipment but I sorne of the remaining infantry units have as little as half their authorized manpower The key vulnerability for the ground forces remains logistics leaving them dependent on the national rail network for movement in the country and limiting pDWer projection capability beyond Iraq's borders shortage of some 36 000 trucks at the division level and Iraq s eet of about 500 operational heavy equipment transporters is suf cient to move Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 SD U S C section 403g u- only one armored division at a time c 1 The lraqi Air Force has only 200 or so mission-capable ghter aircraft and training sorties have declined steadily since the end of the GulfWar Morale among pilots remains low lragi defectors have said some pilots must take secondjobs or engage in smuggling to earn extra income Iraq's air defense forces continue to challenge US enforcement ofthe bio-Fly Zone but are using less capable weapons than in the immediate aftermath of'Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 Iraq periodically rotates fully-operational surface-to air missile systems with re control radars into the Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g c0 343905 NFZs but most SAMs are tired ballistically without missile guidance to avoid detection Iraq has so far failed in its efforts to acquire advanced air defense systems such as the or Silt-20 Although Iraq has been unable to reverse the overall decline in military capability it has made some important advances Since September of I999 the government has been installing a ber-Optic network throughout the country signi cantly enhancing military command control and communications - infrastructure as well as reducing the intelligence Community's ability to intercept key communications - Iraq is diverting vehicles imported under the UN oil-for t ood OFF program to military uses and illicitly importing vehicles outside of the program Since January of last year the UN has approved Iraqi purchases of about $2 6 billion for at least 60 000 vehicles according to UN documents Most vehicles approved under OFF have not yet arrived and mum with these vehicles it will be three to five years before Baghdad can resolve its military transportation shortage 12 0 13525 section 1 4 c - iraq is supporting its military and WMD programs with limited amounts of dual-use goods acquired through the OFF program and in some cases with embargoed materials I Wcapons of Mass Destruction Programs I E O IiiISZtig section 1 4 c ISaddarn's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction an addiction am roves sue weapons are vital to deter longtime adversaries Iran Israel and the US as well as to showcase Iraq's and the Arab world s scienti c prowess and military potency Biological weapons program Iraq maintains an active and capable BW program that includes research production and Weaponization of BW agents lraq told UNSCOM it had worked with several BW agents anthrax and hotulinum toxin We assess these two agents are the most probable candidates for Iraqi weaponization but other agents such as anallpoit and plague remain a serious concern We assess the program is currently capable of producing thousands of liters of anthrax and botulinum toxin agent per month and if necessary can dry this agent for better dissemination Credible but uncon rmed sensitive reporting indicates that Iraq since 1997 has been producing BW agents using mobile laboratories Iraq maintains or has reconstituted several dual-use facilities capable of prodUcing even more BW agents E 0 13526 section 1 4 c We have detected increased levels of activin at Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute ea suspect BW-related facllity that can research produce store and test vaccines viruses and bacteria I 1 Chemical weapons program Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual-use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plants It is trying to precare CW-related items Wejudge Iraq is most liker to produce mustard satin GF or VX if agent production is ordered - I both the chlorine and phenolplants at Habbaniyah llfFallujah 11 outside Baghdad are operational and Iraq has built at least three facilities never discovered by 13 0 13526 section 1 40 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 Withheld under statutory authority of the U S C section 403g Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 Withheld under statutory authority ofthc U S C section 4033 c05343905 art'- lor authority lithe hilt'at und- Jr van 120an 01 re Jude - I E 0 13526 section Lam Demon systems lraq is nearing deployment of its two LIN-authorized ballistic missiles the Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 40% UNSCOM since the Gulfwar that may I be involved in CW production - liraq is seeking foreign equipment and technical assistance to rebuild its CW prog iam from rms Nuclear-program We believe Saddam has never abandoned his nuclear weapons program Iraq retains a signi cant number of nuclear program scientists program documentation and probably the manufacturing infrastructure to support a reinvigorated nuclear weapons program - Procurement activities detected within the past year show 1th is trying to jumpstart a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the ssile material for a weapon potentially by late this decade assuming it produces the necessary components indigenousiy This time frame could be shortened to mid-decade iflraq obtains signi cant foreign assistance or has clandestiner built the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle We believe a shipment of high tolerance aluminum tube was destined for use in Iraqi gas centrifuges We have not detected a dedicated Iraqi effort to obtain ssile material from abroad but Baghdad could produce a crude nuclear weapon within a year if it obtains fissile material on the black LED 13526 section 1 4 c liquid-propellant Al Samoud SRBM and the solid-propellant Ababil IOO continues to pursue longer-range ballistic missile capabilities jBaghmd since January of last year has been developing large diameter motor cases for a solid-propellant ballistic missile that could deliver a payload Sill to ll km as a single-stage SRBM or Leon km as a two-stage MRBM With substantial foreign assistance Iraq could ight-test an SRBM con guration by 2004 and an unauthorized MRBM con guration by 2006 which would put targets in Iran Israel Saudi Arabia and Turkey within range Iiraq is building a new test stand that would be more than capable oftesting large liquid-propellant engines for a proscribed system Iraq already has an engine test stand for the AI Smoud-L l 1 E O 13526 scction 1 4 c Iraqi defectors have said Baghdad continues work on unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs that it could t with a dissemination device for BW agents or less likely chemicaI agents Iraq also could use mIssiIe warheads aerial bombs and spray tanks already in its arsenal as other means to deliver BW agents From 1995 until at least October of last year Iraq s UAV effort was focused on converting L-29 aircraft out-of- roduction Czech 'et trainers to UAVs that could be used as BWICW deliver vehiclesl 13523 seam I lraq has been capable of using the L49 since at cost November 1 E7 13 0 13526 section 1mm C05343905 01 l l Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism altering its targets to re ect changing priorities and goals Over several decades Baghdad has evolved from an indiscriminate sponsor of anti-Weston terrorism to more narrowa focused efforts targeting primarily Saddam's political opponents including his attempt to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 and secondarily local regional foes Baghdad has reduced its reliance on surrogates preferring instead to use its own intelligence services for sensitive terrorist operations 1 ED 13526 section 1 4 e The Terrorist Threat from Iraq Baghdad continues to provide safehairen1 nancial support and low-lettel terrorist training to a number of terrorist groups it also has worked to rebuild intelligence networks abroad to increase its Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g capability to work against Westem interests procure weapons and further penetrate and undermine its oppositionJ Iraq is intensifying its contingency planning activities for attacks on US or Western targets a likely rcSponse to US attacks against Iraq lraq continues to support to varying degrees the Palestine Liberation Front PLF the Mojahedin-e K11an MEK the Kurdistan Workers' Party PKK Abe Ibrahim of the IS May Organization the Arab Liberation Front and the Alan Nidal Organization which appears to be rebuilding with help from Iraq I 13 526 section 1 4 3 12 00 3 I I Some reporting suggests Iraq has attempted to establish new networks of Iraqi nonoflieial cover I agents for some intelligence activities that also could be employed for terrorist purposes no 13525 section 1 4 c E O 13525 section 1 4 e ll Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of1949 50 U S C section 403g