USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT WIELDING THE CYBER SWORD EXPLOITING THE POWER OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS by Lieutenant Colonel Randal A Dragon United States Army Colonel David R Brooks USA Project Advisor The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U S Government the Department of Defense or any of its agencies U S Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS PENNSYLVANIA 17013 ABSTRACT AUTHOR Randal A Dragon TITLE Wielding the Cyber Sword Exploiting the Power of Information Operations FORMAT Strategy Research Project DATE 13 March 2001 PAGES 30 CLASSIFICATION Unclassified Information Operations IO are rapidly becoming a new Battlefield Operating System BOS Until the last 3-5 years emphasis in applying the tenets of IO remained compartmented discretely within organizations at each level of war – strategic operational and tactical Given the infusion of technology and the potential merger of those levels information has become a currency for all operations across the spectrum of conflict With the goal for IO to achieve Information Superiority this study examines current IO doctrine and organization in light of expectations of the future battlefield and the transformed Army The fundamental conclusion is that to develop into a viable contributor as a warfighting domain IO should be formally recognized as a BOS and sub-divided to encompass two types of operations influence perception operations focused on the message and network cyber operations focused on the media In the final analysis current IO systems require radical modification with respect to doctrine organization leader development and training iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT iii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS vii WIELDING THE CYBER SWORD EXPLOITING THE POWER OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS 1 BACKGROUND 1 CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 3 VISION OF THE FUTURE FORCE 6 VISION OF THE FUTURE BATTLESPACE 7 CURRENT CHALLENGES IN MEETING FUTURE DEMANDS 10 REACHING FORWARD FOR SOLUTIONS 11 INFORMATION OPERATIONS AS AN ENABLER FOR THE TRANSFORMED FORCE 12 INFORMATION OPERATIONS VECTORS 14 Doctrine 14 Organization 14 Training 15 Leader Development 15 Synergy 16 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 16 CONCLUSIONS 18 ENDNOTES 19 BIBLIOGRAPHY 21 v vi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE 1 INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 3 FIGURE 2 OFFENSIVE IO FUNDAMENTALS 4 FIGURE 3 C2 PROCESS MODELS 5 FIGURE 4 WARFIGHTING DOMAINS 6 FIGURE 5 NOTIONAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS ENGAGEMENT TIMELINE 9 FIGURE 6 PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 11 FIGURE 7 DEFINING FUTURE IO FUNCTIONS 17 vii WIELDING THE CYBER SWORD EXPLOITING THE POWER OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS “The military establishment must acknowledge that the face of battle is changing Information as a dimension of conflict and competition has vaulted to the forefront of importance of the future national security landscape and now must rank as at least co-equal with air ground sea and space dimensions Yet even with its importance we have just begun the intellectual examinations necessary to develop a viable theory of IO that will underpin any discussion of war in the digital age ”1 Information leads to knowledge and knowledge to power With the advent of the Information Age the nature of military operations changed forever Battlefields dominated by mass are yielding to ones of precision – precise firepower supporting precise maneuver enabled by precise information The Post-Cold War security environment created a number of diverse challenges but the general maxims of success have not changed the combatant that develops and sustains military potential – trained manned equipped and ready – and is willing to decisively apply that potential emerges the victor This study addresses a significant wellspring of the new security environment – the emergence of Information Operations IO The study methodology analyzes current and future contingency environments and identifies why the future force will need to integrate information across the spectrum of conflict peace to major theater war After reviewing the information environment the study defines some of the implications on IO caused by a more complex environment An overview of current IO doctrine highlights the diversity of IO tools that a Joint Force Commander JFC must integrate Additionally a description of the future battlespace the overarching concepts from Joint Vision 2020 and the key concepts from the Army’s vision point to several unique demands and capabilities required from future IO systems Finally the author recommends areas where Information Operations can be better integrated making it a more responsive tool at the national theater strategic operational and tactical levels BACKGROUND The concept of using IO is nothing new During Desert Shield and Desert Storm employment of offensive and defensive IO sustained the Coalition and negated Saddam Hussein’s strategy Hussein’s attempts to intimidate neighboring countries with SCUDs his threat to inflict massive casualties and his efforts to rally fellow Arab nations around Iraq for the sake of Arab unity failed due to Coalition defensive IO measures In addition Coalition forces successfully applied deception and Operations Security OPSEC to fix Iraqi forces in place while hiding their intent to maneuver and attack Iraqi weakness The use of a sound information strategy throughout this campaign ensured Coalition success and never allowed Iraq to gain the initiative 2 In Somalia the use of information worked against the United States’ strategy When a UH-60 helicopter was shot down and an alert news crew captured the images of dead U S Army Rangers being dragged through the streets of downtown Mogadishu a major shift in U S policy occurred within 24 hours 3 A relatively unsophisticated adversary waged this information campaign against a technologically advanced society “The loss of eighteen rangers in close back alley fighting in Somalia dramatically underscored a corollary of General William DePuy’s maxim a tactical engagement fought for too high a price for too little return might very well by itself determine the strategic outcome of a national endeavor ”4 The most recent campaign the conflict in Kosovo demonstrates the power of combining the Internet and the media Both sides achieved the information upper hand for short periods and influenced popular perception and as a result influenced key decision-makers According to the Los Angeles Times the Kosovo conflict turned “cyberspace into an ethereal war zone where the battle for the hearts and minds was being waged through the use of electronic images online discussion group postings and hacking attacks ”5 The Kosovo conflict was characterized as the “first war on the internet Government and non-government actors alike used the net to disseminate information spread propaganda demonize opponents and solicit support for their positions … and people everywhere used it to discuss the issues and share text images and video clips that were not available through other media ”6 Rapid growth of the Information Technology industry has fueled changes within the armed forces and led to what some have called a “Revolution of Military Affairs ” The Army’s change dubbed the Army Transformation represents not only the physical arming and re-structuring of the force but also a window of opportunity to integrate all available tools and allow the force to deploy faster fight with unprecedented speed and lethality and win decisively With proposed changes the Army will move from the Industrial Age to the Information Age providing an Army with immense capability in terms of relative speed flexibility versatility adaptability and precision 7 The Information Age Army changes the architecture deep close rear of the battlefield and alters the accepted levels of war framework strategic operational tactical Now more than ever it appears that integrating information into our strategy campaigns and tactical plans will be the true impetus to success Intertwined with this transformation is an opportunity to capitalize on our ability to influence both through the threat of combat power and through the management of others’ perception Without a true peer competitor on the near-term horizon we have an opportunity to 2 strengthen our employment of all elements of national power political economic military informational to avert potential crisis The use of information cannot be exclusive to our national strategy Indeed for continuous success every echelon of leadership and command must have the tools and the know-how to integrate information In layman’s terms the goal of an information operation is to keep an adversary or potential enemy from doing what we don’t want him to do or to stop him from doing something that he is doing To be effective IO must be fully integrated and synchronized from national through operational level to achieve the desired effect CURRENT ENVIRONMENT The information environment provides a pool within which all other relevant infrastructure subsets operate As defined “the information environment is the aggregate of individuals organizations or systems that collect process or disseminate information including the information itself ”8 Relevant to this research are three information infrastructures shown relationally in Figure 1 Global GII National NII and Defense DII GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE GII Worldwide interconnection of communications networks computers databases and consumer electronics NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE NII Similar to and operating within the GII embodies the Governmental and Civilian Information Infrastructures Multinational Corporations Government Industry Academia International Organizations Commercial Networks Switching Systems Multimedia DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE DII Embedded within the NII and operating within the GII is the primary means that DOD uses to interconnect mission support Command and Control and intelligence computers and includes strategic operational and tactical and commercial communications systems Non-State Actors Defense Information System Network Warfighters FIGURE 1 INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 9 Like these information environments IO includes hardware but is not hardware-centric The current joint definition states that IO are “actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems ” 3 10 It goes on to characterize IO “as targeting information or information systems in order to affect the 11 information-based process whether human or automated ” The GII is the domain in which we conduct IO with the informational element of national power emanating from the NII and Information Operations generated from within the DII Embedded within all of these definitions is the term “information ” defined “as facts data or instructions in any medium or form It is the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representations ”12 Data is normally sensed reported arranged and processed Once processed these data become information and with cognition the information becomes knowledge To influence or alter an adversary’s perception joint operations employ both offensive and defensive capabilities The fundamentals of offensive IO which can best be described as “perception management ” are as indicated in Figure 2 PRINCIPLES OF OFFENSIVE IO • Ultimate target is human decision-making processes • Greatest impact in peace or at the initial stages of a crisis • IO objectives must be clearly established and linked to National Military Objectives • Selection and employment of a specific offensive capability must be appropriate • Offensive IO may be the main or supporting effort or a phase • Must be thoroughly integrated with all other aspects of the campaign operation PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT ACTIONS CAPABILITIES • Psychological Operations PSYOPS • Operations Security OPSEC • Military Deception • Electronic Warfare EW • Physical Attack Destruction • Computer Network Attack CNA STRATEGIC LEVEL • Directed by the NCA • Planned in coordination with other agencies organizations outside DOD • Objective – seek to engage adversary or potential adversary to deter crisis and end hostilities Examples Deter War Disrupt WMD R D Program Affect Infrastructure Support Peace Operations SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS • Public Affairs PA • Civil Affairs CA OPERATIONAL LEVEL • Conducted or delegated by the combatant commander in the AOR • Involves the use of military forces TACTICAL LEVEL • Conducted by the service functional component or single-service force commander • Objective – seek to engage adversary or potential adversary within the AOR Examples Expose Adversary’s Deception • Objective – Deny disrupt destroy or otherwise control an adversary’s use of information and information systems Examples Disintegrate Integrated Air Defense System IADS Isolate enemy NCA and or military commanders from forces Degrade and or Destroy Tactical Command and Control C2 Protect Global C2 System FIGURE 2 OFFENSIVE IO FUNDAMENTALS13 Defensive IO is similar in scope to offensive however its emphasis is on defending and protecting friendly information and information systems These operations are conducted through Information Assurance IA Information Security INFOSEC Physical Security 4 Counterdeception Counterpropaganda Counterintelligence CI Electronic Warfare EW and 14 Special Information Operations SIO Integration of offensive IO with defensive IO is essential as is the integration of IO with the other aspects of operations maneuver fires reconnaissance etc From the Army’s standpoint information is a tool which when leveraged with other elements of power and integrated with other operating systems can set and sustain conditions that lead to decisive results Given current definitions IO encompasses everything short of physical symmetrical combat For comparison purposes the Army defines IO as “actions taken to affect adversary and influence others’ decision-making processes information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and information systems ”15 This differs from the joint definition italics above emphasizing that the effort also targets the decision-making process and adding the phrase “and influence others’” to account for indirect supporters of an adversary and non-state actors As a target for IO the decision-making process is both continuous and dynamic For discussion purposes Figure 3 shows two command and control C2 process models with embedded decision-making OBSERVE OBSERVE SENSE SENSE ORIENT ORIENT PROCESS PROCESS EX TERN AL D A TA DECIDE DECIDE COMPARE COMPARE D ESIRED STA TE ACT ACT DECIDE DECIDE D ECISIO N A ID S ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT ACT ACT OODA LOOP LAWSON MODEL FIGURE 3 C2 PROCESS MODELS 16 The OODA Loop is a simple C2 model best suited to model tactical combat engagement decisions trigger pulling IO affects the entire process but would specifically focus on what and how an adversary or other observes something within the environment Therefore the main IO effort would focus on altering the environment or influencing the OBSERVE function In Lawson’s model IO not only affects the environment and the SENSE function but might also be 5 used to disrupt deny or alter EXTERNAL DATA or DECISION AIDS or may change the perception so that the DESIRED STATE is corrupted Regardless of the model the impact of IO is its affect on the decision-making process VISION OF THE FUTURE FORCE Joint Vision 2020 JV2020 embodies the overarching concepts that guide future joint force development More descriptive than prescriptive it portrays an environment of faster more lethal and more precise application of military power to meet national security requirements The heart of JV2020 is the concept of Full Spectrum Dominance which “implies that U S forces are able to conduct prompt sustained and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access and freedom to operate in all domains – space sea land air and information ”17 Information is so critical to success in the future that it has been explicitly listed as a warfighting domain Given these domains how many potential offensive and defensive pairings must the Joint Force Commander JFC account for SYMETTRICAL COMBAT ASYMETTRICAL COMBAT SPACE SPACE SPACE SPACE AIR AIR AIR AIR LAND LAND LAND LAND SEA SEA SEA SEA INFORMATION INFORMATION INFORMATION INFORMATION FIGURE 4 WARFIGHTING DOMAINS Symmetrical combat though undeniably important may become less significant for the JFC with asymmetrical combat and counter-asymmetrical defense mechanisms becoming the issue 18 Assuming symmetrical combat shown in Figure 4 i e land vs land air vs air the JFC must plan and execute in 5 offensive dimensions of combat Assuming asymmetrical combat i e air vs land land vs air the challenge expands to directing and controlling 20 possible offensive dimensions and 25 when including symmetrical combat If the adversary has similar 6 combat potential the defensive challenge is now 25 separate threats all which could conceivably be employed in combination Full Spectrum Dominance depends on Information Superiority – that is “the capability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same ”19 Information alone is insignificant unless we can translate the information into knowledge and decisions – decisions that are faster better and more precise Decisions that enable our forces to strike precisely maneuver with impunity and paralyze an enemy through its sheer speed and essence of uncertainty Within an asymmetrical framework it becomes clear that information enables the other functional areas affording the JFC positional advantage and an ability “to employ decisive combat power that will 20 compel an adversary to react from a position of disadvantage or quit ” The supporting Army vision describes a transformed force possessing increased strategic responsiveness and tactical staying power Designed to operate as part of a joint combined or multinational formation across the spectrum ranging from peacekeeping to Major Theater War MTW the transformed Army “will provide the Nation an array of deployable agile versatile lethal survivable and sustainable formations which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively ”21 The underlying premise of the transformed force is to transport decisive landpower to a theater of war to prevent or preclude combat Should combat be necessary the force must engage with precision fires and maneuver to win decisively 22 Under current roles and responsibilities the Army’s contribution to the joint team remains one focused on fighting and winning the Nation’s wars VISION OF THE FUTURE BATTLESPACE Future warfare promises to be more chaotic and complex It will be driven by both nationstate and rogue transnational actors who apply symmetrical and or asymmetrical tools either as force or the threat of force creating a mosaic of security requirements The National Intelligence Council report Global Trends 2015 A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts indicates that due to the United States’ strong technological lead in battlefield awareness and precision guided weaponry three types of threats will exist asymmetric threats strategic WMD threats and regional military threats 23 Asymmetric threats as described in this context represent terrorism sabotage cyber-crimes and the like Martin Libicki National Defense University offers similar views and states that as a result the advent of what he calls the “Global Grid” will support future warfighting in three general categories 1 7 The development of standoff warfare which focuses on destroying an enemy 2 New coalitions linked to the grid with common Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance C4ISR and 3 The attractiveness of low intensity conflict in a constrictive environment which he refers to as “mud warfare” as a response to total technological overmatch 24 Essentially both Libicki and the National Intelligence Council agree that potential enemies will attempt to negate or mitigate any technological edge and initiate warfare either where the consequences are extremely high or preferably in situations where technology proves to have marginal value-added As outlined above the transformed Army will field a versatile force capable of rapid deployment agile employment and self-contained staying power As the opportunity arises in combat this force will attack operational or strategic centers of gravity critical force C2 node seat of national power key infrastructure leading to decisive results Given these fundamental battlespace conditions there are several parameters that must be considered in developing “IOfuture ” First all future peer competitors will become increasingly capable and lethal with precision fires causing the battlefield to spread out even further 25 To preempt this the transformed force must remain dispersed and outside the operational reach of the enemy striking rapidly with precise maneuver against the center of gravity when the conditions are right The current response to this then is to increase speed Scales points out that “the challenge we face is very similar to the challenge that armies have faced for hundreds of years In order to collapse the enemy’s will to resist we have to cross the deadly zone We have to be able to get through the enemy’s area of effectiveness to strike at his operational center of gravity and collapse it in order to achieve victory ”26 The implications for IO here are threefold 1 IO along with the intelligence function must support pinpointing the attack objective and the avenues that will result in minimal impedance damage delay to the attacking force 2 IO must disrupt and paralyze the enemy commander leaving him unable to effectively interdict attacking forces and 3 we must know when commitment conditions are met Second the future environment will encompass the spectrum of conflict ranging from peace to war but with greater depth complexity and consequence than we know today As a result the demands placed on IO will increase with the nature and scope of a specific operation deciding the true mix of IO variables In peacetime operations we will engage in IO as a part of a CINC’s Theater Engagement Plan TEP to shape the environment and meet National Security Strategy goals Once a crisis erupts IO system flexibility must enable a shift from proactive peacetime engagement to reactive crisis while maintaining a sure hand on the 8 cause-effect history of past IO in the area of operations area of interest Additionally the importance of IO varies with time over the course of an operation For instance IO may start as the lead aspect during peacetime engagement i e CINC TEPs and may continue to remain dominant in the early phases of a crisis but will take a supporting role to physical operations during conflict and then return as the lead aspect during the post-hostility phase of an operation Nominal Level of Effort as depicted below n ructio t s e D cal Physi ttack nic A o r t c e El PSYOP urity ns Sec io t a r e Op ities ted Activ la e R d n sa apabilitie Other C Information Assurance Intelligence Command Control Communications and Computers Peace Crisis Peace Conflict 27 FIGURE 5 NOTIONAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS ENGAGEMENT TIMELINE The underlying issue is how to organize IO assets to meet functional requirements within a specific operation while providing consistent and coherent support across the conflict spectrum The objective system must provide an organization which implements IO equally well over the entire spectrum of potential conflict and ensures information superiority In other words the organization must maintain operational agility To achieve success in the future we must confront the enemy with all dimensions simultaneously – land sea air and space The fifth dimension of combat – information – underpins the synchronization of all others assuming some level of information superiority This implies that we must be able to perform all C2 information functions acquire process distribute analyze protect and others with impunity while denying our adversary the same As 9 a result our future systems must treat information and likewise “operations in information ” as a critical component of the Information Age force Finally human factors and human dynamics transcend military operations There is a limit to the amount of information the human brain can process The sheer speed of envisaged operations raise the demand for faster C2 processes Future leaders must direct the movement of units over great distances in short periods of time orchestrate and manage the enemy’s perception what the enemy sees or thinks he sees and synchronize maneuver with fires to fix maneuver and destroy the enemy – all at a minimum cost More than ever the holistic nature of these operations demand changes in how we train and prepare our leaders how we organize our C2 and IO processes to support the commander and how we leverage IO in support of dominant maneuver and precision engagement CURRENT CHALLENGES IN MEETING FUTURE DEMANDS To truly make IO a weapon we must be willing to answer several questions First have we changed the way we approach “information” as an entity An interpretation of the current definition shows that IO includes two virtual sub-systems 1 operations conducted to influence persuade or paralyze a potential adversary and 2 operations against a supporting system or an information infrastructure to degrade an adversary or potential adversary’s C2 ability Although JV2020 describes information as a fifth domain current joint doctrine leaves broad latitude for service-specific interpretation and implementation and has evolved to prosecuting IO through loosely affiliated ad hoc joint organizations Second is our doctrine sufficient to enable synchronization of the information effort Currently we use an artillery-centric Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess model to plan prepare coordinate and assess IO 28 Does this support “information maneuver” and enable identifying centers of gravity lines of maneuver and decisive points for information Will future doctrine drive change to account for 1 a future information environment that demands better interagency cooperation and 2 seamless and consistent joint operations across the full spectrum Third every IO has a different response time and a different set of information filters that can potentially alter the “sent” message Figure 6 Additionally each IO can result in different response or reaction times With the decision-maker at the center all other tiers or systems provide information input Are our techniques sophisticated enough to understand and manipulate these variables and achieve the desired outcome at the intended target Do we understand the affect of the information filters Given the human factors and cultural 10 differences do we have the appropriate measuring devices and metrics to determine whether we have met our objective External Filters Internal Perceptions Cultural Bias Values Societal Pressures Decision-making Processes Beliefs Hopes Fears Governmental Institutions Experiences Family Mass Media Group Dynamics FIGURE 6 PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 29 Fourth cyber-warfare presents unique challenges Do we really understand the impact of a full-scale cyber-attack What will the electrons affect how many intermediate systems will they travel through and what will be the total impact When someone launches an arrow in cyberspace like a virus we may be able to assess the impact What happens when that arrow becomes the size of a cyber hand grenade a cyber artillery round or a cyber nuclear munition Will it impact at a specific point or will it fracture continue to multiply until what was originally sent with the intent to shut down an adversary’s information network actually results in the alteration of the global positioning data flood gates on dams being opened nuclear reactors being affected or air rail network information distortion Finally are we structuring our future forces for symmetrical dominance If so which of our potential competitors is truly in a position to procure and maintain the quantity and quality of high technology equipment needed to defeat our future force If our adversary becomes unwilling and or unable to fight us symmetrically will we have the defensive protection mechanisms in place to defeat the asymmetrical threat With respect to information this means placing due emphasis on protecting infrastructure and information systems REACHING FORWARD FOR SOLUTIONS The integration of IO into future systems is inextricably dependent on the effect of future technology on the levels of war – strategic operational and tactical As information systems become more reliable the ability to share a common operating picture and achieve battlespace awareness at every level increases Since information is neutral this can also work against us 11 Gen Ret John Sheehan former Commander of U S Atlantic Command emphasized that “new information technologies continue to blur the distinction between tactical operational and strategic decisions Thanks to SkyNews and CNN a young officer’s or NCO’s decision in the field will be shown to millions around the world ”30 For future operations our ability to employ offensive IO and protect using defensive IO will be critical to success In a historical context and given “typical” circumstances in the need for military intervention we have fairly well defined roles and responsibilities for strategic operational and tactical applications of military force The National Command Authorities NCA establish objectives for the military forces and resources are organized to meet those objectives and the forces are then employed In the atypical environment of IO the method of deployment and employment are neither overt nor in most cases as measurable As a result the impact of a deception operation or the influence of a psychological operation targeted at the operational level but having significant consequences at the strategic level may have secondary and tertiary effects for all – the lines are blurry and in some cases the separation meaningless In describing future conflict MacGregor concluded that the “technologically altered battlefield dimensions of time and space will merge the three levels of war into a single new structure for the integration of complex air-land-sea combat operations ”31 The merged levels enabled by information will “allow actions at every level to instantaneously affect each other ”32 If an outgrowth of information age warfare is compression of the levels of war then coordination between all levels emerges as a fundamental necessity to ensure a common theme and consistent results Since each situation is different the target must be known with a clearly defined end state described The bottom line is that technology and globalization are changing the way that we categorize warfare More importantly due to increased situational awareness throughout the force actions that occur at any level will have an immediate impact at all other levels The IO system of the future must leverage and account for the offensive and defensive implications of these phenomena in future operations INFORMATION OPERATIONS AS AN ENABLER FOR THE TRANSFORMED FORCE Full Spectrum Dominance implies a force that can dominate every point along the spectrum of conflict In the future the force may be required to conduct multiple operations simultaneously at the lower end of the spectrum As we saw earlier this implies an IO system that transitions smoothly from peacetime to contingency support while remaining coherent from national through tactical levels It must be equally effective in peace support and major 12 conflicts and must provide the supporting commander with the decisive edge with respect to information and information systems Under current design parameters the transformed Army will deploy a combat Brigade to a contingency theater 96 hours after notification a Division in 120 hours and five Divisions in 30 days 33 To achieve this level of rapid deployment several information-dependent actions must occur Deploying forces must leave behind at least initially organizations that perform functions that can be done at a distance or those that do not directly contribute to immediate success on the battlefield This “reach back” reduces transportation requirements and intheater footprint thereby decreasing in-theater force protection During the deployment phase we need to hold the enemy in check to keep him from doing something that will affect the deployment flow including both physical nodes ports of embarkation debarkation and electronic nodes information systems The force must be capable of rapid assembly a task enabled by positively influencing the local populace The transformed force must be able to engage the enemy with exacting precision at distances that are unfathomable today while remaining dispersed and outside an adversary’s operational reach This killing range depends on the technological sophistication of the opponent Coupled with this is a force that must be capable of precise agile maneuver actual force speed may well exceed 200 kilometers per hour 34 This level of speed and precision mandates total knowledge on the enemy and countermeasures to reduce the enemy’s knowledge on the friendly force The technical sophistication of potential enemies will most likely increase More information will be available and many times it will be absolutely free and available to anyone who wants it Decision cycles will be increasingly shorter and C2 systems will mature to enable real-time transmission of orders With the compression of levels of war we may find hierarchical organizations extinct replaced by fluid architectures In all cases to be effective we must move well inside the enemy’s decision cycle so that he is constantly wondering how the friendly force is doing what it is doing and why they’re doing it As with strike operations windows of opportunity exist in IO We must know precisely when and where to apply available IO tools to achieve optimal effects which means that we must have systems to support that The transformed force must be decisive It must combine all available dimensions to disable an enemy then deliver a blow that brings conflict to a rapid conclusion and meets the prescribed mission objectives In order to do this our information systems must be able to provide relevant information at critical times while denying the enemy the same Information superiority increases the enemy’s uncertainty and can give friendly forces the ability to achieve 13 decision superiority In all cases IO-future must be tied to national informational efforts and must leverage the advantage gained by combining the effects of joint assets INFORMATION OPERATIONS VECTORS The Army is at a critical juncture The transformation will change not only what type of forces we employ but also how we integrate the resources available to the commander Now more than any other time in history information is the critical link for the transformed Army to conduct decisive operations Given the challenges of the future battlespace and the implications on IO-future there are critical requirements that must be met with respect to doctrine organization training and leader development Doctrine To stand the test of time doctrine must be the engine for change Changing doctrine requires a cultural metamorphosis We will not inculcate change without changing our mindset we must prepare to fight in the information domain We must refrain from thinking about information in a strictly technical sense and treat it more as a true dimension of combat make it a weapon to be used first as opposed to an entity acknowledged later In essence we must raise IO to co-equal battlefield operating system BOS status much like it is considered an element of national power an element of combat power and a critical facet of JV2020 To make IO more “user friendly” for the customer – the joint warfighter – it must be bounded what is and what is not IO integrated into every operation and roles must be defined within the joint community It can neither remain so broadly defined that it provides no measurable operational impact nor can it afford to be so amorphous that it is only understood by a highly specialized group of technical specialists One way to accomplish this is by separating out routine tasks normally performed by the entire force supporting tasks Additionally a joint warfighting IO doctrine must be developed and consistently applied The doctrine should embody “information maneuver ” developed and explained in terms of centers of gravity objectives avenues of approach decision points with IO-specific phases to an operation campaign and designed as a “how to fight” doctrine for the information domain not a catalog of capabilities Organization Sweeping changes are required in how we organize Since information is another dimension there may be some benefit in establishing a functional CINC that provides crossspectrum support similar to the present day Special Operations Command Currently we are 14 neither postured for peacetime engagement nor able to maintain full time links with national and interagency organizations Without question we must streamline our organizations to meet the demands of the uncertain and complex environment anticipated in the future battlespace – an Information Operations Command may help The objective IO organization should provide a basis for capitalizing on knowledge gained during peacetime engagement and make us more able to leverage national and interagency efforts At Army tactical operational levels this translates to a staff section subordinate to the Operations staff while consolidating IO “maneuver” units at Corps or higher level To meet joint contingency requirements we should investigate the feasibility of establishing Joint Information Operations Task Forces JIOTFs scaleable in size tailorable in scope and capable of remaining immersed through peacetime engagement Finally an empowered CINC-Information could provide the global reach and visibility necessary to accomplish both Computer Network Attack and Computer Network Defense Training In concert with established doctrine units designed to operate in the information domain must train to fight as a joint team In addition we must train our staffs in the nuances of information domain engagements teaching them to analyze multiple dimensions while educating them on information cause-effect relationships Our tactical and operational staffs must understand how to adjust priorities IO avenues of approach based on “information BDA ” and should become equally adept at planning lethal and non-lethal uses of force IO must be fully integrated in training at all Division and Corps-level BCTP exercises and embedded within joint validation exercises Leader Development Potentially the biggest challenge is leader development As we become increasingly reliant on Information Age technology our leadership must embrace this emergence and provide the energy and vision to exploit information Senior officers of today both decisionmakers and decision-shapers for Army-future spent a great deal of their developmental years learning the art of war operational art and tactical operations At some point we will want our warfighters to have the wherewithal to apply lethal and non-lethal force with equal ease and virtuosity This requires re-allocating available institutional training time so that we invest an equal amount of time training our leaders to understand and apply doctrine for operations and Information Operations 15 Synergy Taken together these vectors can provide a substantial edge to U S forces Since future operations promise to engage within a network-centric warfare environment forward deployed JIOTFs operating under the direction and guidance of the JFC will electronically reach back for much of their support Decreasing potential exposure reduces the footprint of deployed forces and eliminates some inherent force protection risks in the contested battlespace further facilitating global maneuver The JIOTFs taken from a pool of experts probably a mix of soldiers civilian technicians and social scientists will provide rapid transition through the full spectrum with established institutional knowledge Change will not just happen – Doctrine must lead the way and be the engine We can ill afford to apply scarce resources and build organizations that neither protect our service members nor set the conditions for decisive operations Modular scaleable packages must be routinely integrated while commanders must have authority responsibility for IO to influence the direction that they want information to move – this is how true Information Superiority can be achieved RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE Though IO have been used successfully for quite some time the methodology and processes for integration are changing This evolution may require another level of jointness possibly using information as the basis for a functional CINC CINC-Information Additionally the Army’s approach to IO-future cannot be done in isolation it must also be part of the joint solution The core mission of the Army must remain to fight and win Nation’s wars and as a result we can ill afford to bleed off scarce resources designated for killing or kinetic systems to establish the required IO structure The transformed Army’s contribution must complement the joint commander’s arsenal Doctrinally we must determine what functions comprise Information Operations By separating those functions that every unit performs OPSEC and eliminating physical destruction we bound IO to specialization in the non-lethal application of force A list of potential categories is shown in Figure 7 16 INFORMATION OPERATIONS - FUTURE Perception Operations Network or Cyber Operations Method Message Method Media Functions • Deception • Psychological Operations • Civil Affairs • Public Affairs • Counterpropaganda • Counterdeception Functions • Computer Network Attack • Computer Network Defense • Electronic Warfare INFORMATION SUPPORT FUNCTIONS • Physical Security • Operations Security • Information Assurance INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS • Counterintelligence • Computer Network Exploitation SUPPORTING OPERATIONS • Physical Destruction FIGURE 7 DEFINING FUTURE IO FUNCTIONS Though embedded in a number of lethal and non-lethal systems information becomes the critical ingredient to the Information Age force As a result IO “maneuver” must be developed and deemed as important as operational force maneuver At the operational and tactical levels this translates to moving IO to BOS-level status Our doctrine should address how to develop schemes of digital maneuver aimed at the enemy information centers of gravity and how to weight the main effort with information – collection bandwidth and processing priorities 35 This system could be supported by digital Integrated Preparation of the Battlefield or “cyber-prep of the battlefield” and high payoff information targets Information Operations must emerge from the cell committee-based focus and be fully recognized for what it is – another weapon in our arsenal Once recognized as a BOS and defined by information maneuver doctrine we need to re-structure our staffs to fully incorporate information This may require organizations that normally work “directly for the commander” to respond to taskings developed by the Operations Staff with an embedded IO planner Likewise instead of being relegated to a stand-alone cell lethal and non-lethal plans should be developed by one plans section Corps and Division-level planners should be equally capable of orchestrating lethal and non-lethal means to mass effects and achieve decisive results With respect to organizational structure we need to evolve develop and groom a standing organization – trained equipped and prepared for deployment – familiar with shared tactics techniques and procedures TTP and keenly aware of the national IO architecture 17 This organization the JIOTF should have peer status with other lethal and non-lethal combatants and will frequently be called upon to fully stand up early in crisis Once deployed it will be required to provide full IO capability through the post-hostilities phase and well after many of the maneuver forces have returned to homestation CONCLUSIONS The Information Age is not in front of us – we are in it The future of operations is uncertain the future of Information Operations is just as uncertain What is certain is that the battlespace will become increasingly complex As an institution we must take proactive steps to modify our toolkit by making our tools operable across the spectrum of conflict To maintain ascendancy and establish dominance in the future battlespace our transformed force must integrate every available weapon the most important of which may be information itself To achieve decisive results in the information domain trained leaders must understand the environment understand and implement a fighting maneuver doctrine for IO and be able to employ a number of diverse assets across that spectrum Information leads to knowledge and knowledge to power The organization that fully exploits information wields a mighty weapon – the cyber sword Word Count 5 904 18 ENDNOTES 1 Wayne M Hall “Information Operations Military Competition ” Cyber Sword The Professional Journal of Joint Information Operations 4 no 1 Spring 2000 6 2 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine for Information Operations Joint Pub 3-13 Washington Joint Staff 9 October 1998 I-20 – II-3 3 Mark Bowden Black Hawk Down A Story of Modern War New York Atlantic Monthly Press 1999 305-313 4 Robert H Scales Jr America’s Army in Transition Preparing for War in the Precision Age Carlisle Barracks U S Army War College 1999 20-21 5 Ashley Dunn “Crisis in Yugoslavia – Battle Spilling Over Onto the Internet ” Los Angeles Times 3 April 1999 6 Dorothy Denning “Activism Hacktivism and Cyberterrorism The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy ” p 1 Accessed on the internet at http www cs georgetown edu denning infosec nautilus html 7 Department of the Army “The Army Vision ” available from http www army mil armyvision armyvis htm Internet accessed 17 November 2000 8 Joint Chiefs of Staff I-9 9 Ibid I-13 – I-14 10 Ibid I-1 11 Ibid vii 12 Ibid I-9 13 Ibid II-3 – II 14 14 Ibid III-1 15 Department of The Army Information Operations Doctrine Tactics Techniques and Procedures Field Manual 3-13 Final Draft Washington U S Department of the Army 30 September 2000 8 16 Kenneth Allard Command Control and the Common Defense Fort McNair National Defense University 1996 154-156 17 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020 Washington Joint Staff June 2000 8 18 National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2015 A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts Washington Director of Central Intelligence 13 December 2000 14 19 19 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020 10 20 Ibid 21 Department of the Army 3 22 Scales 24 23 National Intelligence Council 11 24 Martin Libicki Illuminating Tomorrow’s War Fort McNair National Defense University October 1999 31 25 Gordon R Sullivan and James M Dubik Envisioning Future Warfare Fort Leavenworth U S Army Command and General Staff College 1995 11-12 26 Robert H Scales Jr Future Warfare Carlisle Barracks U S Army War College March 2000 87 27 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine for Information Operations II-8 28 Department of The Army Information Operations Doctrine Tactics Techniques and Procedures D-2 29 Chris Pilecki “Information Operations Joint Pub 3-13 Overview ” briefing slides with scripted commentary Carlisle Barracks U S Army War College 26 January 2001 30 John J Sheehan “Building the Right Military for the 21st Century ” Strategic Review 25 Summer 1997 12 31 Douglas A MacGregor Future Battle The Merging Levels of War Parameters 22 Winter 1992-1993 33 32 Ibid 41 33 Department of the Army “The Army Vision ” 3 34 Scales 4 35 Hall 8 20 BIBLIOGRAPHY Allard Kenneth Command Control and the Common Defense Fort McNair National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies 1996 Allard Kenneth Somalia Operations Lessons Learned Fort McNair National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies January 1995 Bishop Roy V Information Operations A Layman’s Perspective Strategy Research Project Carlisle Barracks U S Army War College 1 April 1997 Bowden Mark Black Hawk Down A Story of Modern War New York Atlantic Monthly Press 1999 Clinton William J A National Security Strategy for a New Century Washington The White House December 1999 Copeland Thomas E ed The Information Revolution and National Security Carlisle Barracks Strategic Studies Institute 2000 Coroalles Anthony M “On War in the Information Age A Conversation with Carl von Clausewitz ” Army 46 May 1996 24-34 Denning Dorothy “Activism Hacktivism and Cyberterrorism The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy ” undated Available from http www cs georgetown edu denning infosec nautilus html Internet Accessed on 11 September 2000 Doyle Kevin J Information Operations A Look at Emerging Army Doctrine and its Operational Implications Fort Leavenworth U S Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1995 Dunn Ashley “Crisis in Yugoslavia – Battle Spilling Over Onto the Internet ” Los Angeles Times 3 April 1999 “The Future of Warfare Select Enemy Delete ” Economist 342 8 March 1997 21-24 Gaston James C Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process Washington National Defense University Press 1992 Grange David L and James Kelley “Information Operations for the Ground Commander ” Military Review 77 March-April 1997 5-12 Hall Wayne M “Information Operations IO Military Competition ” Cyber Sword The Professional Journal of Joint Information Operations 4 No 1 Spring 2000 6-10 Libicki Martin C Illuminating Tomorrow’s War Washington National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies 1999 MacGregor Douglas A “Future Battle The Merging Levels of War ” Parameters 22 Winter 1992-1993 33-47 21 Metz Steven Armed Conflict in the 21st Century The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare Carlisle Barracks U S Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 2000 National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2015 A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts Washington Director of Central Intelligence 13 December 2000 Pilecki Chris “Information Operations Joint Pub 3-13 Overview ” Briefing slides with scripted commentary Carlisle Barracks U S Army War College 26 January 2001 Scales Robert H Jr Future Warfare Carlisle Barracks U S Army War College 1999 Sheehan John J “Building the Right Military for the 21st Century ” Strategic Review 25 Summer 1997 5-13 Sullivan Gordon R and James M Dubik Envisioning Future Warfare Fort Leavenworth U S Army Command and General Staff College Press 1995 U S Department of the Army “The Army Vision” undated Available from http www army mil armyvision armyvis htm Internet Accessed 17 November 2000 U S Department of The Army Information Operations Doctrine Tactics Techniques and Procedures Field Manual 3-13 Final Draft Washington U S Department of the Army 30 September 2000 U S Department of the Army Information Operations Field Manual 100-6 Washington U S Department of the Army August 1996 U S Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020 Washington Joint Staff June 2000 U S Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine for Information Operations Joint Pub 3-13 Washington Joint Staff 9 October 1998 U S Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare C2W Joint Pub 313 1 Washington Joint Staff 7 February 1996 U S National Defense Panel Transforming Defense National Security in the 21st Century Washington National Defense Panel December 1997 22