am-32 DECLASSHUED Authority as 96-69 2 l SECRET Things to do for the Second Contingency Prepare public statement on our findings INR and Public posture statement AF and Prepare cables talking points for follow up briefings of governments we have already consulted UK France FRG Canada Australia others AF INR and Cable to inform other non African govern ments updating present Macfarlane draft AF Talking points for African Ambassadors in Washington per Jerry Funk list AF Update Macfarlane cable to AF posts AF Update Moscow cable AF and INR Review UN posture IO AF and Prepare cable instructing Edmondson to raise with SAG parallel with Sole AF and INR Prepare State positions on key policy issues for White House or other meetings AF and others All papers should be cleared by and INR and should clear on relevant papers NSC should clear on all but item 10 Seventh Floor clearances as appropriate 9 27 79 o DECLASSIFIED Authority wr 6691 SECRET September 24 1979 Actions to be Taken Should we Conclude a Test has Occurred and the Issue has Not Yet Become Public Knowledge Situation We mayor may not have specific evidence as pointing to South Africa as the source of the test but the presumption that this is so will be strong Further analysis of additional evidence may permit us to conclude with reasonable certainty that South Africa is the source will become public before long The facts The situation will be one in which we conclude that South Africa has tested and in doing so has violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty Actions to be Taken Decision on whether now to issue a public statement Before issuing such a statement consultations and informing other governments along the lines of the first contingency Further decisions on public posture Strength of public reaction denunciation etc Form of public reaction statement by President Secretary of State etc Question of calling for UN action Decisions on consultations with other nuclear supplier states Those covered by contingency 1 paper SECRET mu ALI-urn DMSSIED Authority @6577 2 Posture SECRET Possibly emergency meeting of Nuclear Supplier Group in the UN Whether to introduce a resolution or react to someone else's Whether consultations with key nuclear supplier states should include coordina tion on UN tactics Whether to seek a self terminating resolution Whether a sanctions resolution should be limited to the nuclear field U S South Africa relations Whether and when to approach the SAG Possibility of exploring a reversal of nuclear policy Question of whether to curtail bilateral relations SECRET 'c - -------- ------ • DECLASSIFIED h Authority 691 7 SECREt September 25 1979 Actions to be Taken Should Knowledge of Nuclear Test Become Public Domain Situation We know nothing more than we know now i e Vela sighting Credible inquiry is received from press public or other government indicating nuclear test in southern Atlantic is in public domain or about to be Decision is made to inform principals 7th floor and NSC and recommend that public statement be issued Actions to be Taken Statement should be reviewed for any needed update Question should informal working group be formed in Operations Center to coordinate subsequent actions Before issuance of statement advise urgently Other Bureaus in State H PA PM geo- graphic bureaus Assistant Secretaries only H to be consulted on who should be briefed in Congress Other agencies in U S Government who know of problem and might also be queried by press CIA DOD DOE Before or simultaneously with issuance of statement consultations as follows SECREt DELCASSI m_ m FIED Authority 3 My -- Congress Solarz Lack gale Mir-41y Gerard Smith Dick Moose and or Bill Bowdler digit Nd Turner briefed leadership of intelli- SECRET -2- Leadership and other key members Senate Glenn Percy Pell Javits or Ribicoff Church and McGovern House -- Zablocki Findley Bingham Wolfe and Briefings to be conducted by gence committees on Monday September 24 Talking points on intelligence and our assessment to be prepared by INR with AF and contingency points on test ban verification implications by contingency points on regional implications by AF Other governments United Kingdom Initially briefed on September 23 should be informed of public statement and fact that we are briefing other governments to be coyered by including London as addressee for cables to other posts with instruction to inform UK authori- ties France Briefing along lines of September 23 presentation to UK attached plus appropriate points SECRET ELIDCASSIFE Authority mf i y SECRET acknowledging France's special role in US-South African nuclear settle- ment talks i USSR Inform of public statement more on nature of our info if okay with intelligence people also seek any information bearing on this sub ject which the Soviets may possess In pattern of previous US Soviet exchanges on Kalahari inform Soviets through Vance Dobrynin channel Canada Australia Japan Italy and Switzerland To be informed along lines of September 23 discussion with UK We would not inform South Africa in advance of public statement if we only have Vela sighting with no further substantiation To do so would only risk letting them know how little we know Inform American Ambassadors at African posts and keep USUN informed SECRET DECLASSHHED Authority 5Q 6653 2 SECRET SOUTH AFRICA Contingency Talking Points for the Congress Information and Continuing Collection Effort The US Atomic Energy Detection System has received indications from satellite-borne nuclear detection instruments suggesting that-a low yield nuclear explosion may have taken place somewhere in a broad area encompassing most of the South Atlantic a portion of Antarctica the Southern part of Africa including all of South Africa and the south western part of_the Indian Ocean The information available so far is inconclusive as to the nature of the event The indications arer that it was an atmospheric test of a nuclear device with a yield of 1 5 to 3 or 4 KT The event occurred in the early morning hours GMT on September 22 We have undertaken other collection efforts and are reviewing evidence which might have been obtained from other sources in an effort to-ascertain more precisely the nature and origin of the event in particular whether a nuclear test in fact took place We expect to have some preliminary results from the collection and review by SECRET a - wza - - rcf raw-w pages tam Authority 2 i SECRET 2 e We will notify you as soon as more definite infOrmation is available IF ASKED We have informed other key governments of this information and of the inconclusive nature of our evidence at this time UK France FRG Canada Implications for Nonproliferation If in fact South Africa has detonated a nuclear idevice there are direct and grave implications for our nonproliferation policy For the moment we believe it is premature to address those implications in detail Our immediate concern is that the information we have will become public before we have determined whether or not a test took place -- Such a leak even if we subsequently conclude that a test did not occur will inevitably detract from our efforts to get international safeguards on South Africa's sensitive facilities ' In addition notwithstanding any proof we offered that a test did not occur there will be lingering suspicions that South Africa did test and managed- to get away with it SECRET '1 mm ECLASSIFIED Authority $5966 2 - SECRET -- This could encourage some other states of pro- liferation concern to take the risk they perceive South Africa to have taken Implications for Africa News of a possible nuclear explosion in the proximity of southern Africa Indian Ocean and Wsouth Atlantic will lead to a swift and hostile reaction from most African states They will assume' the South Africans are responsible and it will con- firm their deep rooted suspicion that this develop ment represents ultimate South African defiance of the rest of Africa and its indifference to world opinion ' The battle lines will be drawn more clearly 7 There will be immediate moves by the Africans to raise the issue at the Security Council and to call for comprehensive political and economic sanctions against South Africa _ This development even if the South Africans cannot be confirmed as the responsible party could derail the ongoing negotiations on Namibia between the Front Line the Contact Group and the South Africans These negotiations are at a sensitive stage and at SECRET IDECLASSHHED mix-w Authority 3M 3665 2 - The effect on the ongoing negotiations on Rhodesia SECRET a minimum we can expect the Front Line states to be less flexible than in the past It is possible the Front Line may refuse to negotiate further over Namibia _ It will also create the perception that the South Africans were prepared to risk having the Namibian negotiations sabotaged This would tend to confirm the view of some that they have already taken the decision to Opt for an internal settlement in Namibia and to defy international opinion in London will be less direct Since the South Africans are providing firm support to Bishop Muzorewa's government this development could possibly make him more reluctant to accept compro mise in London It could also increase suspicions and make them less willing to compromise Implications for Test Ban Verification IF ASKED Q What does this case tell us about the adequacy of our ability_to verify compliance with the A It shows that even in a remote corner of the southern hemisphere which has not been the SECRET- DIWASSIFEDW Authority $9665 2 SECRET primary focus of our verification efforts we were able to detect a very small atmospheric explosion kt Q But were we able to locate the event and identi- fy who conducted the test A We have not yet-completed collection and analysis of all the relevant data but are con- tinuing to do so This-answer can be updated as results of our further efforts come'in7 Q Aren't-such delays in being able to reach conclu sions with respect to verification of the treaty a serious problem A The faCt that it may take time to make sure of the facts and develOp an apprOpriate response does not seem to be a fatal flaw either with 'respect to a state conducting its first test explosion which it presumably would wish to analyze before conducting a second or the Soviet Union which could not do sufficient testing to affect the strategic balance in a short period of time I Q What does this case tell us about our ability to monitor a ECLASIS FIED Authority mfg y 2 r A SECRET The capabilities needed to verify complianCe with a CTB are- with res eCt to atmospheric tests such as that involved in this case -- the same as under an The additional requirement under a CTB to detect locate and identify underground nuclear eXplosions is not relevant to this case SECRET