1 DECLASSIFIED Authority MAl D 6 8 I 7 r q --- - I _ SECRET ----- NEXT STBPS SOUTH AFRICA--POSSIBLE SCENARIOS Given the lack of any corroborating evidence to support the initial satellite indications of a possible nuclear event in the area of South Africa we remain where we were on September 22 unlikely that US intelligence sources will develop additional information confirming the event or its aturei by the end of the month the chances of additional if rl' fi JJ confirmatory information will be vanishingly small By that time at the latest therefore we will need to deal with the si tuation--most probably on the basis of the information now available T hOlding It is already quite Our basic rationale for this information closely--the hope that it will be supplemented by fresh intelligence--will accordingly become less persuasive as time passes A leak could of course occur at any time However the lack of corroborating US information gives additional credibility to the premise that the satellite data was in error as does the fact that none of our allies or the Soviets who we know to have been on the alert have further substantiated our own report This situation lends particular urgency to the findings SECRET DECLASSHHED - in Authority Aid 6 SECRET 2 of the independent panel of experts which began work on October 9 If they conclude independently that the chance of satellite error is miniscule that conclusion will present us with one situation on the other hand findings that satellite malfunction or other explanations might have explained the reported event even say in the 15 30 percent range would create quite another We should accordingly withhold further action until the panel has reported and we should push for as urgent a report as possible- Depending on the panelfs reports and the other on going intelligence collection efforts we will in the very near future be faced with one of the following contingen cies for dealing with the South Africans 1 We know no more than-we know now about the nature of the suspected event In the next several days to weeks a leak may or may not occur In either case our problem is much the same unless new information sur faCes Option A Pursue our current nuclear negotiating strategy urgently but as if nothing aiSe had happened 4 Pending further information make no reference to the SECRET Amnxmunuai hill SECRET _suspected event Also pursue further intelligence collection and evaluation with utmost urgency Ems Avoids rocking the boat while we await further data Gives us a chance to refine our options Keeps South Africans and others in the dark re our concern Avoids temporarily jeopardizing our other initiatives in the area Rhodesia Namibia Keeps our nuclear negotiations which are urgent anyway on track Absent new data becomes less tenable as time passes Opens us to cover up charges w Risks danger or unannounced leak which once it occurred would lessen-our leverage with the South Africans Option B Take the question up with the SAG as urgently as possible This could be the subject of a speical high level demarche or could be done in a more low-key manner in our next exchange on nuclear matters We would notify them that we have satellite indications SECRET DECLASSIFIED 4 SECRET of a possible nuclear explosion in the region that we intend to make a non accusatory public statement in the near future see Option below but that we desired to raise it privately with them first giving enough time for them to reply This approach would be non confrontational but We would request a reiteration of the 1077 assurances and confirmation that no South African test had occurred We would need to stress the necessity of a rapid and categorical South African response Pros A confidential approach would avoid public diplomacy and maximize likelihood of a responsible South African response Would not involve any accusations we couldn't back up -- Might elicit useful information even if not it underlines the need for South African cooperation with US Sends them a message whether guilty or not Cons Increases chance of a leak even in absence of new info SECRET Vu mn I '4 i DECLASSIFIED i Authoritmua il SECRET 5 'Not likely to elicit new info Could adversely affect our dealings on other issues Namibia Rhodesia though not as much as unannounced public dis- closure SAG could portray intended public state ment as blackmail attempt Would raise tough questions who else has told Have we singled SAG out as prime suspect Does this and how does this affect US policy on the issue Is our position on nuclear cooperation as before or even tougher 2 Option C Make a volunteered public low key announce ment in very near future not waiting for a leak and tell ing the South Africans at the same time or just prior to the announcement The statement would be along the_lines of theucontingency language already prepared would contain the basic information note our intention to continue investigating the-possible event and eschew finger point- ing To the extent that such statements would be factually sustained mention would be made of possibilities such as natural events and equipment malfunction We would give the SAG a courtesy copy shortly before but would not immediately ask for comment or reaction SECRET DECLASSIFIED Pros II SECRET Would preempt leaks and at least initially keep us in control of situation Would allow us to argue to SAG that we were not singling them out as prime suspects Commits us to no immediate action _ Credible short term course of action re Africans and UN Regardless of caveats would have the effect of pointing finger at South Africa and trigger ing chain of events at UN and elsewhere South Africans would reCOgnize this and would criticize us for not having told them privately well in advance Commits us to report further even though no more evidence may come to light Makes us less credible negotiators on nuclear and other issues with SAG if we later conclude SA didn't test We conclude on the basis of further evidence that there is substantial confirmation of a South African test SECRET Ti Authoritym zc l SECRET u_7 Option A Approach the SAG at a high level prie vately with our information and conclusions describe the implications as We see them ingluding for the play of events at the UN the LTBT and our broader relations but provide South Africa the opportunity to convince us that it has not tested Pros m Might give us cause to re eValuate our conclu sions in the knowledge that it is impossible to prove that a nuclear explosion did not occur but reCOgnizing also our inability to prove with certainty that South Africa was responsible for the event Would maximize remaining chances to salvage our nuclear dialogue Would be a publicly defensible action posi tioning us well for whatever further action deemed necessary Might elicit admission that SAG tested To extent that there is anything to be salvaged in short term bilateral relations 5 would be less likely to impact on other issues Rhodesia Namibia than Option II B SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authoritymn l d 1 i Cons Likely to produce SAG denial then what e Gives SAG additional time to marshal its forces and devise strategy to confuse the issue Would open us to probably unavoidable charges of blackmail Option B Without advance consultations with the gar-'5 SAG and with only the very briefest-of advance warning if any we would move the issue into the public domain with a statement summarizing the facts as we know them and our conclusion that the facts are best explained by a South African test Although we could not state unequivocally that the SAG did test it would be on them to prove the contrary Pros Keeps the initiative with us gives the SAG no option to develop a counter strategy Assuming we're right is an appropriate response to the situation A plus in our relations with the Africans and shows we're serious about noneprolifera tion at least in this case SECRET i DECLASSIFIED Authoritygma glz SECRET Cons The consequences of being wrong are great and there is no offsetting advantage if we are Commits us to action at the UN and probably elsewhere which almost certainly cannot be limited to nuclear field Nuclear questions aside lack of advance warning would be seen as evidence that we don't want to deal seriously with them on this or Other issues - NOTE The foregoing addresses the question of when and how to go to the South Africans It does not deal with when and how to approach the Soviets which is the subject of a separate paper being prepared by ObviouSly these two questions will need to be considered jointly along with aspects such as briefing the Congress and other steps depending on the option and timing chosen Presumably however we would not approach the Soviets prior to taking the issue up with the South Africans Drafted AF S LRMacfarlane jk x 28432le lO 79 S P MASpiegel OES LNosenzo SECRET i DECLASSIFIED i AuthorityMM l SECRET Not likely to elicit new info we Could adversely affect our dealings on other issues Namibia Rhodesia though not as much as unannounced public dis closure SAG could portray intended public state ment as blackmail attempt Would raise tough questions who else has US told Have we singled SAG out as s s prime suspect Does this and how does this affect US policy on the issue Is our position on nuclear cooperation as before or even tougher 6 Option C Make a volunteered public low key announce ment in very near future not waiting for a leak and tell ing the South Africans at the same time or just prior to the announcement The statement would be alonthhe linessf - of theucontingency language already prepared would contain the basic information note our intention to continue investigating the possible event and eschew finger-point 'ing To the extent that such statements would be factually sustained mention would be made of possibilities such as natural events and equipment malfunction We would give the SAG a courtesy copy shortly before but would not immediately ask for comment or reaction SECRET