DECLASSHHED AuthorityMZ ii 39 DEPARTMENT OF STATE 3 AMBASSADOR AT LARGE WASHINGTON October 23 1979 TO - Mr David D Newsom FROM Ambassador Gerard Smith South Atlantic Problem A meeting on the South Atlantic problem will be held at the White House on Tuesday October 23 I believe that once all reasonable efforts to collect and analyze addi tional intelligence are complete and if they are unpro ductive we should seek agreement on the following measures 3 1 Consultations with Congress Against the likeli- hood that our intelligence on the suspect nuclear event will become public we should now inform the Senate and House leadership and perhaps selected other members of Congress 2 Consultation with Allies We should review our evidence conclusions and policy analysis with the UK and France as soon as possible An opportunity to do so will be my trip to Europe next week when I hope to meet with Lord Carrington and M Francois-Poncet 3 Consultation with South Africa Since public exposure will focus concern on South Africa as the likely originator of a nuclear explosion we should raise the subject with Prime Minister Botha as soon as practicable We should not link explicitly our concerns to progress on the ongoing nuclear negotiations 4 Consultation with the USSR We should postpone a decision on whether to proceed with this step until com- pletion of the above measures in view of the sensitivity of allies and the prospect the Soviets would capitalize on the situation for propaganda 3533 r Tr Authority MW i -2- 5 Possibility of UN Sanctions We should not take the issue to the Security Council on the basis of the information we now have Should this information become public we should take the position on any sanctions resolutions introduced by others that our information is inadequate to support a conclusion that South Africa has tested a nuclear device Within the context of our nuclear negotiations we should not allow sanctions to foreclose the prospect of reaching an agreement with South Africa AF IO and CBS agree with these views PM would prefer that we put off consultations with Congress until after we have had a discussion with the SAG INR and believe that in the event that no corrobOrative evidence is obtained a convincing case has not yet been presented for the need to raise the subject with additional members of Congress the SAG or the USSR These issues are analyzed in the attached paper which Henry Owen asked us to prepare for discussion at the next White House meeting It has been reviewed within the Department but does not purport to represent formal positions on the issues Attachment As stated Clearance - Mr Hare Mr Helman OES - Mr Nosenzo Mr Humphreys Mr Cowey Mr Gallucci - - nuDECLASSHHED 7 Authoriwanaa l - Situation The Intelligence Community has high confidence after intense technical scrutiny of satellite 1 data that a low yield atmospheric nuclear explosion occurred in the early morning hours of September 22 some- where in an area comprising the southern portions of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans the southern portion of Africa and a portion of the Antarctic land mass Efforts to acquire radioactive debris have been fruitless but debris could have escaped our collection effort There is no cor- roborating seismic or hydro-acoustic data although those systems' existing capabilities to detect low yield nuclear events in the region of interest is poor We are unlikely to obtain any more information on the event in the near term- if at all Our information has not become public but it could leak at any time If it does most observers will assume that South Africa tested a nuclear device Eublic attention will also focus on what the USG has done about the event and on implications for the efficacy of U S intelligence systems generally and test ban monitoring capabilities A Specifically w Effects on U S Policies The likelihood that an atmospheric nuclear explosion did occur and the possibility that South Africa has tested a nuclear device impinge on our global nonproliferation and African policy interests Our nonproliferation policy is to prevent any non-nuclear weapons state from acquiring nuclear explosives or the means to produce them In countries at or near the nuClear threshold we seek constraints on nuclear facilities and activities so as to impede their use in explOsive programs 'ln the event a non 'nuclear Weapons state sucCeeded With a nuclear explosives program we would seek an international reaction that dis couraged others from following the same path For two years we have attempted to negotiate South Africa s acceptance of IAEA safeguards on its enrichment plant which if South Africa has tested a device is almost certainly the source of the material used and to obtain its adherence to the NPT We believe South Africa I only recently has begun to consider Seriously the economic and other consequences including inability to complete two nuclear to i 5 DECLASSIFIED power reactors now under construction near Cape Town if it fails to meet these conditions But in the absence of these controls South Africa faces no significant impediment to establishing a nuclear weapons capability if it is prepared to pay a political price South Africa might then support nuclear weapons pregrams in other politically isolated states such as Israel and Taiwan The nonproliferation stakes could be high if the September 22 event caused a rupture in our nuclear negotia- tions with South Africa But failure to take action in response to the September 22 event could make more difficult efforts to deter proliferation elsewhere e g Pakistan and India Public disclosure of a probable nuclear explosion in theSouth Atlantic region will lead most African states to urge strong action against South Africa almost certainly going beyond nuclear-related sanctions We already face the immediate prospect of a United Nations Arms Embargo Committee report calling for the end-of all forms of nuclear collaboration between UN member states and South Africa Should the nuclear event leak it will make even more diffi cult the daunting job of producing a draft resolution which Western members of the Security Council could accept Public disclosure of information about the nuclear event would also come at a bad time for'efforts to achieve settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia In Rhodesia disclosure of a possible South African nuclear capability might have some cautionary effect on_the negotiating positions of the parties at Lancaster House but most likely would sharpen the'lines already drawn With respect to Namibia the South African response 'to the most recent Contact Group demarche will when known to SWAPO and the Front Line confirm already strong African suspicions that the SAG intends to work toward an internal settlement while stringing along the West and the UN as long as possible Disclosure of the nuclear event would further diminish and perhaps finally end Front Line will ingness to pursue implementation of the UN plan 3 Tactical Issues The following elements must be considered in develOping a U S response to the September 22 event that minimizes potential damage to our nonproliferation and African policies Congress and the Public Because of the likelihood that information on the September 22 event will become public we should very soon inform key members of Congress in addition to the leader ship of the Select Intelligence Committees already briefed of our intelligence our conclusions concerning the nature of the event the foreign policy implications of the present situation and actions we are taking So as not further to enhance the likelihood of a leak these consultations should be conducted with members only excluding staff and with the minimum number of members We should stress the extreme sensitivity of the information and the perhaps irreparable harm that a leak would cause to U S interests particularly to other African and nonproliferation policy initiatives Appropriate members would be the Senate and House leadership perhaps the chairmen and ranking minority members of the foreign affairs committees and possibly a few other members with strong identifiable interestiin the problem We should have available a new contingency statement for use in case of a leak- Such a statement should confirm that the U S has data pointing to a nuclear explosion that no corroborating evidence has come to light and that we are in consultation with concerned governments Preposed contingency statement at Tab A In any public discussion of the nuclear event we must be in a position to respond to criticism of our test verifi- cation capabilities an approach to this problem is at Tab B International Consultations We have already informed the UK France the FRG Canada and Australia of our initial satellite information and have sought their assistance in obtaining corroborating information The UK and France in particular have politi cal interests that will be affected by the way we handle ENS - DECLASSHHED Authority sz 4 this problem particularly if it becomes a public issue The British have recorded their concern regarding the need to consult with them on how we plan to handle this _issue They have stressed the importance of arriving at a coordinated position covering public response handling in the UN and approaching the South Africans r We should consult soon with the UK and France and to some degree with others Specifi cally we should inform appropriate governments of the status of our evidentiary base and discuss with them the _tactical implications of our inability to prove or disprove that South Africa has tested a nuclear device While we should be prepared to take into account the concerns and ideas of other governments the U S as the potentially most politically exposed nation cannot allow other govern- ments to significantly modify a course of action designed to meet U S objectives 'Approach to SAG South Africa is the most likely responsible party by Virtue of its geographic location its advanced nuclear status which includes a uranium enrichment capability and evidence-that it has actively explored develOpment of a nuclear explosives capability No other threshold state meets all these conditions although We must consider the possibility that Israel could have detonated a device in this remote geographic area A case can be made for not going to the South Africans on this issue ' On the one hand the evidence is not strong enough to permit a categorical accusation on the other hand the South Africans are likely to treat our raising of the subject in any form as an accusation If the South Africans are guilty they are unlikely to admit it and in all probability will deny it vehemently If they are not guilty we must assume they will react violently and pro bably conclude that there is no further point in discussing broader nuclear issues with the U S Not to go to the SAG however leaves us vulnerable particularly if the intelligence on the September 22 event becomes public to charges that the USG did not respond with prudence or that we are unwilling to confront the DECLASSHHED Authorin 5 likeliest perpetrator On balance there seems more to be gained than lost by addressing the subject with the SAG Modalities Nuclear policy issues in general are treated by an extremely small circle of officials in the South African government In a matter concerning nuclear weapons development we should assume that very few govern- ment officials below the Prime Minister who is also Minis- ter of Defense and a few atomic energy officials would be involved It is entirely possible that the Foreign Minister would be unaware of the nuclear test and quite probable that Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie our usual contact on nuclear matters would be unaware even though the latter is a member of the South African Atomic Energy Board For maximum effectiveness an approach should be to the Prime Minister the most responsible offiCial and who without question knows whether South Africa has tested The approach should be on as restricted a basis as possible 7- the session should be private and other officials should not be aware of it The Prime Minister thus would have the greatest flexibility in responding and would have less reason to stage a hostile reaction for domestic consumption Finally raiSing the matter with the Prime Minister avoids using the channel Fourie in which our nuclear negotiations have been conducted We should avoid explicit linkage between the nuclear test problem and the nuclear negotiations The importance of the test issue transcends that of the details of the negotiations and should be addressed accordingly In addition if the South Africans are not guilty they will be disposed to look for any hint that we are trying to increase the stakes involved in the nuclear negotiation A proposed approach Since our credibility with the SAG is lowr and particularly so on nuclear issues we should consider asking the UK and France to join us in a demarche Both have standing in the matter the UK is the only other depositary power for the LTBT with which the SAG has diplomatic rela tions and the UK has important political interests in the region France is currently South Africa's most important nuclear supplier Both are nuclear weapons states A DEC LASSIFIED - tripartite demarche would underline the distance between this subject and our own nuclear negotiations and it probably would not be lost on the SAG that the three parties concerned are the three Western members of the Security Council Effect on Nuclear Negotiations ' Separate from the tactical issue of how to approach the SAG in a manner that preserves the possibility of reaching an accommodation with the SAG on broader nuclear issues is the question of whether our negotiating objectives should change The objectives we now seek NPT adherence and full scope safeguards establish a reasonable nonproliferation regime for South Africa's nuclear program Adding further conditions would almost certainly disrupt the negotiations Nonetheless our own suspicions and likely publicity concerning the September 22 event will increase the difficulty of justifying continuing nuclear cooperation with South Africa and of defending it politically in the U S and elsewhere In the absence of clarification of the nature bf the suspect event it is dubious that the Congress would accept a proposal to continue nuclear cooperation The policy choice here is between maintaining a willingness to continue nuclear cooperation under adverse political circumstances or abandoning efforts to reach a nuclear accommodation with South Africa and thereby relin- quishing all prospects -- slim as they may be of attaining our nonproliferation objectives in South Africa If we could offer the SAG a convincing case that we knew it had tested a nuclear device we would be in a strong position to demand more from the SAG in return for continued U S nuclear cooperation to demand that it meet certain ditions as a-prerequisite for resuming negotiations on nuclear cooperation or we could stop the negotiations- with the onus on the SAG- Our evidentiary basis however does not support such approaches Informing the Soviets We need to decide whether to inform the USSR of the situation It is possible although not likely that the Soviets have relevant information They seem already aware that we have some nuclear related concern toward South Africa and may learn more as a result of our consultations with other governments If in these circumstances we fail to bring the Soviets into our confidence we would leave them unrestrained to use their information in whatever way meets their own interests We would also damage the continued 1 4 A mm nngtu azl ewe 7 i effectiveness of US-Soviet cooperation on nonproliferation a subject we have tried to bring the Soviets to view in terms other than their own parochial interests Informing the Soviets cannot be done without risk in providing our evidence and its implications to the Soviets we may fail to restrain them from seeking political capital For this reason we Should defer a decision on consulting the Soviets_until after we have informed the Congess met with key allies and raised the_issue with the SAG UN Sanctions We do not have enough evidence to accuse South Africa of having tested a nuclear device but once our information becomes public others will demand sanctions Since our evi dence points to the possibility that South Africa conducted a nuclear test it will be difficult to argue credibly against adoption of some form of sanctions against South Africa particularly since the SAG has not met our conditions for nuclear cooperation after two years of talks Any UNSC response to debate on a South African test will reflect the mood in the General Assembly although in #2 practical terms the Western powers can exercise some control a through the prospect of vetoing an unacceptable resolution We could introduce a resolution both for the added political benefit of taking the initiati ejfand in the interest of shaping the outcome to conform to Our objectives It wouid be advantageous to build into a resolution an automatic termination under defined conditions Such condi- tions presumably would be at least South Africa s immediate 3% pledge of no or no further testing adherence to the NPT hf and placement of all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards This would be consistent with our nego- E tiating position with South Africa although as a precedent i for other proliferation cases it would go beyond the require- E5 ments of U S law A stiffer resolution would outlaw South E Africa until it had dismantled all nuclear facilities of an military significance and permitted international verifica gg - tion of its action This would be more acceptable to the g Africans but our support for it would imply that we believed g South Africa had tested South Africa would undoubtedly reject such conditions in a resolution DECLASSIFIED Authority An appropriate selfeterminating resolution would give the South Africans a way out of their situation and some incentive to take far-reaching actions of nonproliferation significance It is doubtful that they would take advan- tage of such an opportunity Sanctions of unlimited duration however would confirm for South Africa that its place in the world community is untenable this would reduce any prospect of a change of course in Pretoria Finally the South Africans have the capability to retal- iate against sanctions with some effect Whether they would wish to do so is questionable in view of the importance of uranium sales to South Africa's foreign exchange earnings The threat or fear of such action could however significantly influence the attitudes of our allies The UK for example receives something more than 50 percent of its uranium from South Africa there are financial relationships involved as well Similarly the West Germans look to South Africa for nearly half their uranium the Japanese would View with alarm any major dislocation in the world uranium supply market and a number of other countries would be affected to varying degrees The U S could make up any uranium shortfall caused by South Africa's withdrawal from the world market but only by dipping into the strategic stockpile Australia and Canada have the resources to make up the difference but we do not know what their attitudes would be We understand the Canadians are looking into this isSue Should information on the September 22 event not become public and the U S therefore does not raise the issue in the UN there is still the possibility at an appropriate point of introducing a sanctions resolution in response to lack of progress in our nuclear negotiations with South Africa _There is also the likelihood that we soon will have to take a position with respect to a nuclear cut-off resolution intro 'duced by the African States In the absence of a leak regard- ing the September 22 event we should face that contingency in the context of nuclear negotiations Anthem Mall TAB A Contingency Statement If asked Government has indications suggesting the possibility that a low yield nuclear explosion occurred on September 22 in an area of the Indian Ocean and South A Atlantic including portions of the Antarctic continent and the southern part of Africa No corroborating evidence has been received to date We are continuing efforts to determine whether such an event took place and are in consultation with other governments TAB Implications for Public Perceptions of Test Ban Verification Capability When knowledge of the September 22 signal becomes public critics of nuclear test bans may comment on the significance of this event as an indicator of U S capa bilities to verify test ban treaties If by that time we have additional high confidence information which resolves the ambiguities in the event s nature location and originating country the Congress press and public are likely to conclude that the event illustrates strong U S capability to detect and identify'even small nuclear explosions in the atmosphere However if any of these three ambiguities are not resolved before the event becomes public critics may attempt to use it to deprecate U S verification capabili- ties both for atmospheric tests and more breadly Adminis tration spokesmen should be prepared to respond along the following lines l The U S has several systems capable of detecting nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and plans to deploy additional systems with even greater 'sensitivity All such systems inherently provide higher confidence of detection for large explo sions than for very small explosions 2 If the September 22 event was a nuclear explosion it was of such a low yield that we would not have expected it to be reliably detected by the U S systems covering that region of the globe at that time Therefore there is no reason to conclude that U S monitoring systems were not operating at their expected level of performance 3 On the contrary this event illustrates the impor- tant fact that even very small explosions which may be below the normally expeCted sensitivity threshold of monitoring systems have some chance of being detected Thus any state which attempts to hide such a small explosion runs a risk that it will be detected Even when the information is ambiguous as in this case it can alert states to the possibility of an explosion which they may be able to investigate using other methods In the present case such investigations are continuing TAB Approach to South Africans on Nuclear Event To be handled with Prime Minister P W Botha I have been instructed to see you personally to inform you of a matter of great sensitivity One of our several world-wide atmospheric nuclear test monitoring systems during the early morning hours of September 22 recorded a signal identical with a low yield nuclear explosion in the atmos phere in the area of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic icluding the southern part of Africa -- We have subjected the data collected to intensive technical review Which supports the conclusion that a nuclear explosion did occur We are concerned about how the event will be viewed by the international community when it becomes public knowledge that an atmospheric nuclear explosion has taken place within an area which includes South Africa We are now engaged in highly restricted consulta- tion with other concerned states regarding the implications of the information -- Recalling the statements made by Prime Minister Vorster in August 1977 regarding the SAG's nuclear intentions and mindful of the obligations o the parties to the LTBT my government invites the SAGs comments If Asked Q Are you accusing South Africa of conducting a nuclear test in the atmosphere 11 21 A I have described the conclusions_that one draws from our technical evidence Do you intend to make this public No But we cannot exclude that it will become so If it does we intend to respond to inquiries along the following lines read and or hand over contingency press guidance Does the U S now intend to make additional demands on South Africa for nuclear cooperation We believe the arrangements set forth in the Joint Minute of June 1978 provide for a reasonable nonpro- liferation regime we intend to stick by them We are under no illusion however that completion of the arrangements will be made much more diffieult if the information should leak We are taking eVery possible step to prevent this from happening and should it leak we will vigorously support whatever agreement we reach There would be a greater possibility that the Congress would reject the settlement on the basis of suspicions that South Africa has tested The simul- taneous closing aspect of the proposed settlement prov tects South Africa from taking irrevocable steps in a situation in which the U S cannot complete its side of the arrangement