Transcript of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks Final Meeting October 12 1986 Text G Shultz and E A Shevardnadze were present during the talks Reagan We have kept you a long time because it hasn't been easy reaching an agreement between us We have sought a formulation which would meet you halfway with respect to your desire regarding the 10-year period Here is the final option which we can offer “The USSR and the U S pledge for a period of 10 years not to exercise their right to withdraw from the unlimited ABM Treaty and during that period to comply strictly with all its provisions while at the same time continuing research development and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty “In the course of the first five years until 1991 inclusive there will be a 50-percent reduction in the two sides' strategic offensive weapons “In the course of the following five years of that period the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of both sides will be reduced “In this way by the end of 1996 the USSR and the U S will have completely eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles “At the end of the 10-year period each side may deploy defensive systems if they so desire provided that the two sides do not agree on something else ” How do you feel about that formula Gorbachev I have two questions for you by way of clarifying the American formulation You speak of research development and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty Your formula omits any mention of laboratory testing Was this done specially Reagan At the negotiations in Geneva our delegations discussed the question of what comprises research and other activities permitted by the ABM Treaty This question could have been settled at the talks in Geneva Gorbachev What I'm asking is did you omit the mention of laboratories deliberately or not Reagan Yes it was deliberate what's the matter Gorbachev I'm simply clarifying the American formulation For the time being I'm not commenting Another question the first half of the formula talks about the two sides' strategic offensive weapons which will be reduced by 50 percent in the first five years but in the second part which talks about the following five years it mentions offensive ballistic missiles What is being referred to here Why this difference in approach Reagan We were told during the break that the Soviet side would like a special mention of offensive strategic missiles That's why we included that formula It's true that in the first part we talk about all types of strategic nuclear weapons including missiles and bombs aboard bombers In the second part however we talk about ballistic missiles in the belief that that's what you want Gorbachev There is some kind of confusion here When it comes to strategic offensive weapons we agreed between us long ago that they include all components of the triad-ICBMs SLBMs and heavy bombers I don't see what could have changed in this question If we're talking about a different class of missiles--RSD medium-range missiles and those having a range of less than 1 000 kilometers--the reduction of them is provided for in a different part of the package We also are not removing anything from our proposals here But as for the first part of your formulation and the second part regarding the following five years the wording has to be identical If we're talking about a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons then in the following five years the remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive weapons must be eliminated Reagan I understand then that by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive ballistic missiles will be eliminated Gorbachev How about airplanes After all strategic weapons represent a triad which includes ICBMs SLBMs and bombers So it is clear between us what strategic weapons are And our group which worked this evening recorded that all elements of the triad are to be reduced by 50 percent Reagan What I want to know is will all offensive ballistic missiles be eliminated Gorbachev The first part of your formulation talks about strategic offensive weapons while the second part speaks only about ballistic missiles Of course strategic weapons include ballistic missiles--ground-based and submarine-launched missiles and also bombers Why does the second part of your formulation speak only about ballistic missiles Reagan Is that the only thing you object to Gorbachev I'm just trying to clarify the issue Reagan It will have to be sorted out Gorbachev What we need here is for both formulations to be identical If we talk about all the components in the first case everything also needs to be clear in the second case Reagan Evidently we have simply misunderstood you But if that's what you want all right Shultz We need to be careful here When we talk of eliminating all strategic offensive weapons it does not refer to shorter-range ballistic missiles I know that the question of them is handled within the framework of a different category but it is here it seems to me that we ought to take decisive measures Gorbachev Perhaps you could have your second paragraph say that in the following five years the remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive weapons will be eliminated including ballistic missiles As for shorter-range missiles we deal with them in the second point of our agreement Missiles having a range of less than 1 000 kilometers are being frozen and negotiations are underway concerning their future fate This is dealt with in the section on medium-range missiles but this question is also covered Shultz Perhaps we could formulate it this way by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive weapons and all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the U S will be eliminated Gorbachev But the question of other ballistic missiles is dealt with within the framework of another category and this has to be mentioned there Shultz But there the question of their elimination does not come up Gorbachev We will freeze them we will begin negotiations about their fate and I think we'll decide their fate Shultz In regard to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles we did not talk about two five-year periods We talked about an agreement which will exist until such time as it is replaced If we agree that this will happen in five years by the end of that period all missiles will be eliminated Gorbachev We can agree on all missiles including those having a range of less than 1 000 kilometers But here when we are dealing with the context of the ABM Treaty we are talking about strategic offensive weapons And we share with you our understanding of what constitutes strategic offensive weapons Shultz But the ABM Treaty has to do with all missiles not just strategic ones But perhaps we have nothing to quarrel about here Gorbachev I don't think there is any disagreement between us in this regard and we only have to find a way to reflect our agreement Shultz That's why I propose that we write that by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive weapons and all offensive ballistic missiles are to be eliminated Gorbachev But in that case we will again have different formulations in the first and the second paragraphs I think we can settle this matter when formulating our agreements Reagan Let me ask this Do we have in mind--and I think it would be very good--that by the end of the two five-year periods all nuclear explosive devices would be eliminated including bombs battlefield systems cruise missiles submarine weapons intermediate-range systems and so on Gorbachev We could say that list all those weapons Shultz Then let's do it Reagan If we agree that by the end of the 10-year period all nuclear weapons are to be eliminated we can turn this agreement over to our delegations in Geneva so that they can prepare a treaty which you can sign during your visit to the U S Gorbachev Well all right Here we have a chance for an agreement What I am seriously concerned about is another factor What we are talking about is to comply strictly with the unlimited ABM Treaty for the purpose of pledging not to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years We are doing this under conditions of reducing nuclear weapons We don't understand then why the American side does not agree to having research development and testing be restricted to the confines of the laboratory If we write it a different way this will enable one of the sides to interpret the ABM Treaty such that it can conduct such work where it pleases while claiming that it is not violating the ABM Treaty What effect will that have on the process of nuclear weapons reduction that has been undertaken by that time A negative one of course It will create an unequal situation impair the security of one of the sides and lose in clarity Hence the ABM Treaty has to be strengthened which means that we cannot remove the mention of laboratories from our text This cannot be done if we insist on precise compliance with the ABM Treaty The question of laboratories is of fundamental importance Reagan I do not agree that strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty means restricting the testing of ABM components solely to laboratories We have a difference in the interpretation of the ABM Treaty which we have acknowledged From the standpoint of the substance of the issue in my opinion it is of no importance Our aim is to safeguard ourselves from a revival of missiles after they have been destroyed in order to make a kind of gas mask against nuclear missiles and deploy a defense system Moreover we view this variant only as a possibility as one probable outcome I have already spoken of this And I have also spoken of the danger of nuclear maniacs Gorbachev Yes I've heard all about gas masks and maniacs probably ten times already But it still does not convince me Reagan I'm talking about one possibility of what can happen after 10 years Perhaps there will be nothing of the kind Perhaps the people who become the leaders at that time will decide that the system is too costly to deploy and will give up the SDI In any case the world would welcome it if we could undertake to reduce nuclear weapons and not make this issue a stumbling block We are asking not to give up SDI and you are trying to determine now what will happen in 10 years Gorbachev If we make a stipulation acknowledging the possibility of conducting research work relating to SDI within the confines of the laboratory that will not mean that the American government will not be able to decide questions relating to the program Such a stipulation will not prohibit research development and testing including the kind that relates to space weapons But it would make it possible to guarantee a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty it would make it possible to prevent bringing such weapons out of the laboratories out in the atmosphere and into space These are completely different things We are talking about an agreement that is supposed to strengthen peace instead of subjecting it to new dangers Reagan I'm not demanding the right to deploy ABMs in space I'm only talking about research permitted by the ABM Treaty By the way the Soviet Union is not entirely without reproach in this I'm referring to the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station We have differing interpretations of the ABM Treaty that's a fact Gorbachev What we are talking about is seeing to it that SDI testing takes place only in the laboratory We cannot go along with allowing it to come out in the atmosphere or into space That is unacceptable to us It is a question of principle Reagan You're destroying all my bridges vse v mosty to continuation of my SDI program I cannot go along with restrictions on the plan as you demand Gorbachev In regard to laboratories Is that your final position If so we can end our meeting at this point Reagan Yes it is The whole thing comes up against the fact that your side and our side differ as to what is permitted by the ABM Treaty and what is not Gorbachev From our discussion I conclude that the U S wants to reserve the possibility of conducting tests of the SDI program not only in the laboratory but also outside in the air and in space If that's so there can be no agreement between us Reagan But you have to understand that experimentation and research cannot always be kept within the laboratory sometimes it is simply necessary to go outside the laboratory Gorbachev You must understand me To us the laboratory issue is not a matter of stubbornness or hardheadedness It is not casuistry It is all too serious We are agreeing to deep reductions and ultimately the destruction of nuclear weapons And at the same time the American side is pushing us to agree to give them the right to create space weapons That is unacceptable to us If you will agree to restricting research work to the laboratory not letting it out into space I will be ready in two minutes to sign the appropriate formulation and adopt the document Reagan I can't go along with that You and I have different positions different problems In your country nobody can criticize you without winding up in prison In my country the situation is different I have a lot of critics who wield great influence And if I agree to such a formulation they will launch a campaign against me they will accuse me of breaking my promise to the people of the United States regarding SDI So I pledge not to deploy the corresponding systems for 10 years and to restrict ourselves to research permitted by the ABM Treaty I'm not asking you for anything out of the ordinary Gorbachev If I understand you Mr President you are now addressing me in a trusting manner as a man who occupies in his own country a position equal to yours Therefore I say to you frankly and in the same trusting manner if we sign a package containing major concessions by the Soviet Union regarding fundamental problems you will become without exaggeration a great president You are now literally two steps from that If we come to an agreement on strengthening the ABM regime on complying strictly with the ABM Treaty and on laboratory research which will not rule out work within the SDI framework it will mean our meeting has been a success If not then let's part at this point and forget about Reykjavik But there won't be another opportunity like this At any rate I know I won't have one I firmly believed that we could come to an agreement Otherwise I would not have raised the question of an immediate meeting with you otherwise I would not have come here in the name of the Soviet leadership with a solid store of serious compromising proposals I hoped that they would meet with understanding and support from your side that we could resolve all issues If this does happen if we manage to achieve deep reductions and the destruction of nuclear weapons all of your critics will not dare open their mouths They would then be going against the opinions of the overwhelming majority of people in the world who would welcome our success If on the other hand we are not able to come to an agreement it will obviously become the job of another generation of leaders you and I have no more time The American side has essentially not made any concessions not a single major step to meet us halfway It's hard to do business on that basis Shevardnadze Let me speak very emotionally because I feel that we have come very close to accomplishing this historic task And when future generations read the record of our talks they will not forgive us if we let this opportunity slip by Reagan I want to say one thing to you as one political leader to another I have a problem that is quite a substantial one for me I am being subjected to criticism which began even before I came here They were saying that I would make concessions that I would agree to a lengthy period of time of not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty And so I ask you as a political leader to take one step which will substantially facilitate our relations and the solution to many questions for both of us Let me say frankly that if I give you what you ask it will definitely hurt me badly at home Gorbachev All right then let's end it here What you propose is something we cannot go along with I've said all I can Reagan Are you really going to turn down a historic opportunity for agreement for the sake of one word in the text It is clear from our own text that we will comply with the ABM Treaty for that entire period Gorbachev You say that it's just a matter of one word But it's not a matter of a word it's a matter of principle Obviously if we undertake reductions we will have to have secure logistics rear services uverennyye tyly We cannot agree to a situation in which you are expanding your SDI and going into space with it while reductions of nuclear weapons are going on If I go back to Moscow and say that despite our agreement on deep reductions of nuclear weapons despite our agreement on the 10-year period we have given the United States the right to test SDI in space so that the U S is ready to deploy it by the end of that period they will call me a fool and irresponsible leader If you agree to restrict research to the laboratory then there will be a framework for 10 years you will have enough work to do research within the SDI framework and inside the laboratory And you will be able to say that you are continuing the SDI that you are not giving it up if that is so essential to you for the American people To us this whole question is not a matter of prestige I do not ascribe special importance to it it is a question that touches upon the interests of our people Reagan After our meeting in Geneva I was convinced that you and I had established personal contact of the kind the leaders of our two countries never had before You and I understood each other very well But now when I have asked you a personal favor which would have enormous influence on our future relations you have refused me Gorbachev There are various kinds of favors If you came to me and said that you were having trouble with your farmers they were demanding increased grain purchases by the Soviet Union that you were asking this as a personal favor I could understand that But I can't understand how you can ask the USSR to agree to grant the U S the right during the period of deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons to test a space ABM system in space to implement SDI in its entirety at the same time we were destroying our offensive nuclear potential If you think about it that wouldn't even be right for the U S It would create nervousness a lack of trust and is completely unacceptable to us You don't need that kind of favor either Reagan But if you don't have nuclear weapons you won't have anything to threaten us with The defensive system could not be deployed earlier than in 10 years' time we have gone along with that deferment As for the word “laboratory ” it has its own particular meaning and subtext They would simply tell me in that case that I had capitulated that I had given away what I promised not to give away All of the other formulations we have taken from you We are saying we will comply with the ABM Treaty for 10 years And now I see that nothing is coming of it and all because of one word which has such specific meaning I simply don't understand how you can think that I want to gain some special military advantage After all it's you with your actions who are violating the ABM Treaty Yet we are not telling you to eliminate what you have We're not setting that condition and we will not even mention it outside this room But now it's a matter of one word Perhaps you will propose a different formulation But the text now contains everything you have asked for--not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years strict compliance with its provisions and the conduct only of the kind of research development and testing which are permitted by the treaty For this reason I want to ask you once more to change your viewpoint to do it as a favor to me so that we can go to the people as peacemakers Gorbachev We cannot go along with what you propose If you will agree to banning tests in space we will sign the document in two minutes We cannot go along with something else We have already agreed to what we could we are not to blame Even though our meeting is ending this way I have a clear conscience before my people and before you I have done everything I could Reagan It's too bad we have to part this way We were so close to an agreement I think you didn't want to achieve an agreement anyway I'm very sorry Gorbachev I am also very sorry it's happened this way I wanted an agreement and did everything I could if not more Reagan I don't know when we'll ever have another chance like this and whether we will meet soon Gorbachev I don't either Source FBIS-USR-93-121 20 September 1993 Transcript of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks Part 4 93WC0112A MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8 Aug 93 pp 68-78