Approved For Release 3 i - 2151-1-71 i $3417 14 APR 3932 MEMORANDUM FOR Executive Director ATTENTION Planning Staff FRDM Robert M Gates Deputy Director for InteIIigence SUBJECT DUI Participation in NINES LIVES IV and IVY LEAGUE 82 Exercises 1 The DDI was represented by 11 officers in the NINE LIVES exercise Senior Officers CRES was the rep for IVY LEAGUE 82 -'ri 2 Att ns written foIIowing participation in these exercises In addition Chief of the Operations Center has provided some 2551 general comments putting Agency participation in these eXercises into perspective 2531 -Robert M sages Attachments ais A377 SE RET Approved For Release 2006-09318 4 Approved For Release 14 April 1982 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT CIA Participation in IVY LEAGUE and NINE LIVES IV Exercises A portion or all of the JCS and FEMA exercise accounts have been lodged in the Operations Center since 1964 the year we established our representative in the National Military Command Center The military exercise program involving CIA participation has had an uneven history In recent years particularly since 1978 our commitment to JCS exercises has been low key and ineffectual Ne do considerable arm twisting to get CIA players--usually about four officers Currently these players support the JCS exercise apparatus as civilian intelligence officers but not as independent action officers for the DUI By our default the JCS procedures do not permit unilateral activities by these officers FEMA's continuity of government program--NINE new and moves the emergency planning community into a new era with significant budget and resource implications the National Intelligence Emergency Planning Staff This Staff performs a Community role but does not plan for much less implement an Agency doctrine or capability for nuclear emergencies In the context of either the JCS or FEMA programs DDI officers in theory represent the best substantive skills available Exercises are incomplete without their presence Moreover there are not many opportunities for civilian to ob rve and cope with the Single Integrated Operational Plan crux of military contingency planning If for 25XJ no other reason CIA should be assigned to JCS exercises to witness the SIOP environment A SIOP clearance is not necessary to gain an appreciation of this aspect of command and control As for FEMA the new concepts have made it possible to shed obsolete sites and communications in order to address presidential successor survival not survival of some 30-odd departments and agencies Presidential Directives enforce our obligation to FEMA There are no such instruments to enforce our JCS role 25 SECRET Approved For Release ZUUBIUBHB Approved For Release I In summary the Operations Center may no longer be an adequate referrent for the 001 on these matters Substantive are required in scenario preparation be it for JCS or FEMA and most important rather than should be enmeshed in the intelligence tasks to support exercise principals The higher priorities given these exercises impact on DUI resources Without making a value Judgment on the direction or realism of these programs the DUI undoubtedly will encounter more requests and Justifications for our participation than anytime in the past As a minimum SDVA and EURA plus CPAS are the most likely offices from which to select the substantive skills The Directorate as a whole however will be asked to respond to the Agency's new Emergency Coordinator and DINIEPS as these two come to grips in formulating an Agency-wide contingency plan ChiefFEenter -2- SECRET Approved For Release 20051139118 Approved For Release 2006109118 CIA-RDP03M00914R00 00 1 I5-4 o SECRET or 3 2 4 MAR 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Director for Administration Deputy Director for Intelligence Deputy Director for Operations FROM John N McMahon Executive Director SUBJECT CIA Participation in the NINE LIVES IV AND IVY LEAGUE 82 Exercises REFERENCE TS 82-0183 21 January 1982 1 In the referenced request for Agency participation in NINE LIVES IV I asked for a critique of our participation by the players The IVY LEAGUEIPETITE LEAG ALPHAININE LIVES exercises emerged as a connected set of contingency exercises and the Agency was called upon to participate in all four We did so but in accordance with procedures and relationships arrived at separately with the JCS FEMA and NIEPS Before we are called upon to participate in future such exercises we will need to review these arrangements and consider whether they are the most efficient and effective means of participation 1 request therefore that your officers who participated provide me through my Planning Staff with an evaluation of their participation and suggestions for improvement in the nature of Agency participation 2 As you can see from my comments attached I believe that it is important for the Agency to participate and that we can bring an added measure of realism to these exercises by our participation Attachment '25x1 25x1 John McMahon as stated cc CIEXDIRKPS Approved For Release 2006f091 18 I Approved For Release Executive Regism i 20 March 1982 MEMORANDUM FDR Deputy Director for Intelligence Director National Intelligence Emergency Planning Staff EXDIR Planning Staff FROM John N McMahon Executive Director SUBJECT IVY LEAGUE 82 l On 19 March I attended a session at the National Military Command Center with all the players in the IVY LEAGUE 82 exercise to review lessons learned by the services and JCS during the exercise as well as offer any comments that the players may have 2 My comments centered around the intelligence contribution and the role CIA played in the exercise I praised the scenario noted that the scenariosdevised for PETITE LEAGUE which preceded the outbreak of war in Europe was extreme y authentic--in fact disturbingly so Noted that the scenario reflected a great deal of our present day worldwide intelligence brief and in the course of the exercise with that as a basis the situation deteriorated into eventual war I suggested that in delaying to bring State and CIA participation into the exercise in the early stages the intelligence during that period was somewhat artificial It seemed strange to me that we could have war in Europe yet the intelligence reflected only military developments with no reference to the political and civilian sector I also noted that the intelligence offered took the form of outright reporting of facts with no assessment provided the President as to what those facts meant I urged that for the next scenario the Agency be brought in in the beginning and commended the own desire to have greater participation hy other national agencies I noted parenthetically that CIA would mourn the requirement to provide analytical assistance in developing the scenario but I felt it was essential to bring more realism to the program 3 I also noted that as the war went on with increased nuclear threat even to the extent of some use of nuclear weapons the intelligence reporting was extremely heavy and no filter was placed upon the informational flow to the President As a result he was inundated with information which should not qualify for his threshold of attention during such a serious situation SECRET Approved For Release 200610918 1 - -2- 4 I also noted used without any appreciation or understanding and for the ma er care as to what personalities were on the other and answering the message 5 Finally I observed as bad the critique itself that the corrmunications with the CINCs became saturated simply through the weight of the number of messages and as a result during the exercise as it heated up routine and priority messages were never received I contended that when it comes to a national security situation such as a nuclear holocaust we should have communications second to none I commented that the attempt to provide a video link between the NMCC the white House Situation Room and FEMA headquarters between the fallouts and snow made the attempt somewhat frustrating I urge continued effort to improve that link at least bring it up to modern day comercial standards Noted that while any President would want his key advisors with him during such a serious situation there may be circumstances which would preclude their presence and an adequate substitute would be a video link to the various Cabinet members where they could dialogue with the President over a voice video secure system 6 The next exercise the JCS plans to conduct is a mobilization exercise from 25 October through 5 November under the title PROUD SABER Approved For Release Approved F-o'r 3066 09 13 Distribution EXDIR DDA DDI DDO Chief Planning Staff Planning Staff Chroma DINIEPS Ex Reg 1 24 March 1982 Approved For Release 2006109118 1 Approved For Release 28 January 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR I Chief Pianning Sta f OlEx Director FROM Chief CIA Operations Center SUBJECT DDI Piayers for NINE LIVES IV 1 In his memorandum to you on 30 December requested that eieven DDI officerS'be assigned to participate in Exercise NINE LIVES IV Their names areas of specia1ization offices and grey Iine numbers are as foiiows -u-u n SENIOR OFFICERS SOVA W q he EURA 0E1sow i 5mm sovn 2 A11 have been informed of their seiection to participate in the exercise and that they wi11 be contacted shortiy by a member of the NIEPS who provide detaiis cc L' l NIEPS TOP SECRET ll - I n nn Pll I I - - L-J I I I- -r Approved For Release - 1 93 6 5-31 5 April 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Thoughts on Participation in Exercise Nine Lives #4 Fr 5 March 1982 I participated in Exercise Nine Lives #4 held at the Its objective was to test concepts for supporting possible Presidential successors dispersed from Washington during crisis periods I was the senior Intelligence Community 1C1 player and was assisted by The detailed scenario logistics and administrative arrangements connected with the exercise are contained in the Exercise Nine Lives #4 EXplan This memorandum is intended to record some of tie nrincipal - impressions gained from my involvement in the exercise 2 This was my first participation in an exercise of this sort Participants who had been involved in earlier iterations told me that it represented a major improvement over Nine Lives Given the operational communications and other problems encountered which I'm sure will be analyzed in great detail by the small army of exercise monitors however it 2531 is clear US not surprisingly still has a long way 0 go er it has developed 2931 3 As I anticipated the exercise was a hodgepodge of both realistic and implausible play The idea of some 30 people somehow managing a global conventional and nuclear conflict complex foreign relations with innumerable countries and a nation of 250 mdllion people although as one wag pointed out it became a country of considerably fewer people as the exercise progressed is--to say the leaste daunting Characteristic of play that strained credulity was that shortly after a notional massive US-USSR nuclear missile exchange and with both sides' bomber forces only 3 hours from their targets the main focus of attention in the command post somehow came to center on how to reconstitute the US Congress In fairness however much of the scenario seemed realistic- if overwhelming- and drove home many of the practical and substantive considerations which would impact in a real situation That has high-level support was demonstrated by President Reagan persona 1y telephoning the exercise directors at the conclusion of the exercise to give them his appreciation and encouragement 4 - Approved For Release 4 'Since getting a successor command post operating as quickly and as smoothly as possible would be critically important in my view maintaining dedicated teams thoroughly familiar with how they should operate is essential with no prior experience in such exercises and no formal briefings or preparations for the exercise I was told I'd participate four working days beforehand the 16 team had to fEel its way and scramble to integrate itself into the overall operation of the command center Given the potential importance of the mission and the unique requirements of the task serious consideration should be given to establishing a permanent cadre of specially trained individuals in the Is to support such command posts 5 A clearer definition of the role of the 16 team needs to be set out what is its responsibility for example for monitoring and evaluating military developments Once US forces are engaged US theater commanders are likely to have the most timely and accurate infonmation on the current military situation Nhat militany analysis responsibilities therefore should the IC have--e g status of reserve units and of force reconstitution efforts in the Other areas worth exploring are the degree of IC control of national collection assets management of covert action operations and interface with diplomatic activities I was really guessing at what matters would remain specifically under the direction of the DCI after a declaration of national emergency or war The IC team was not alone in feeling its way I1- 6 The overall operation of the center was not precisely established prior to the exercise and consequently evolved based on the mix of personalities and institutional perspectives in the successor support team In particular the NSC rep emerged as the true team coordinator chief of staff because he was used to interacting with the various national security agencies see attached organization chart He recognized the need for a ramrod to step in given the lack of experience of the Chief of Staff is staffer of the Secretary and the Team Coordinator a FEMA official in dealing with complex military and foreign policy matters In fact in the case of most successors a good deal of educating in the complexities of national security will be required in very short order Despite service on both the House and Senate Armed Services Committee for example Secretary Schweiker our successor had difficulty understanding the JCS SICIP briefing 25x1 7 The 16 team was supported by two 2531 I lwho had arranged to have 25x1 strategic forces biographic files etc set up in the command center It was clear very early however that there would be little requirement for such static data since the highest premium was on up-to-the-minute information on the rapidly changing strategic and tactical situation The greatest help in this regard would have been voice communications with Feedback the IC support unit operating This was deliberately not available in order to -531 2 - 1 R002200030005-4 Approved For Release 2006109 158E CIA-RDP83M00914R002200030005-4 BRET insure the here was a complete written record of the interplay between the team in dir ctly supporting the potential successor and the support team at As a result the NSC and USDIJCS players who did have telephone communications to their support te were generally more up to- date on what was going on than the If team 6E B Asl Ipointed out to me the 10 team displayed c1assic of becom ng cable junkies That is we tended to respond to cables rather than to events or to tny to anticipate events This was partly expected of course since was strongly urged prior to the exercise to keep the support team a ibusyl As a result we tended to respond to cables with requests for a one information clarification and analysis or agfusted collection coverage Because of communication and other problems failed to service a considerable number of our re uests There were apparently some major organizational problems atl probably due primarily to the fact it was the fiiff ffgf fuch a support unit had been formed Clearly in a real situation would have to be much more selective in what was transmitted to the It successor team and should probably indicate on the messages the actions already undertaken to deal with the information Three people-were not adequate to process-the volume of information encountered and also handle the briefing and meeting attendance demand This problem would have become more acute over an extended period 9 The team members took with them nicely packaged Exercise Kits containing maps overlay paper grease pencils etc have been handy fer the 16 team to have A word of thanks is due I the seniortIC controller who was a source of much useru gu ance and suppo 10 Overall six individuals from participated in various aspects of the Nine Lives #4 exercise An informal survey of their reactions suggests that on balance it was a useful experience which provided them with valuable insights into intelligence support requirements problems of interagency coordination and organization for crisis operations Most recommended that other SOVA managers and be encouraged to benefit from participation in future exercises As was true in my case however there was 3 ADDrov I -R 3M00914R00220003ODO5-4 25X1 25Xl 25X1 35x1 25x1 25x1 25Xl 25X1 2531 Approved For Release acknowledgement of the very uneven character of the exercise with much that was usefu and interesting but a good deai that was strained or boring There was broad agreement on the need for more advance preparation for these exercises To reiterate a point made above at a more advanced stage of COG system deveIOpment serious consideration shou1d be given to assigning DDI gedicatsg teams to this veny important support function not necessarily a1 ram 50 4 Approved For Release ZUDGIOQHB 4 9 Approved For Release CIA-RDPB3MODQ14R002200030005-4 Approved For Release 2006 09 Distribution Thoughts on Participation in Exercise Nine Lives #4 Copy NIEPS 2531 HIEPS 25X1 Deputy Director for Intelligence Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence Director of Soviet Analysis Deputy Director of Soviet Analysis Chief Programs Staff SDVA Chief Policy Analysis Division SDVA Chief Theater Forces Division SDVA Chief Current Support Division SDVA Director of Current Production and Analytic Support Deputy Director of Current Production and Analytic Support Director of Scientific and Weapons Research Deputy Director of Scientific and Heapons Research Chief Offensive Systems Division OSHR Chief Defensive Systems Division DSHR Chief Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff DDI Director of Imagery Analysis Deputy Director of Imagery Analysis Chief Missile Systems Division DIA 25x1 Director National Intelligence Emergency Planning Staff ha Annroved For Release zm t a Approved For Release ZODGIOQHIB SS DDA 1 APRIQBZ MEMORANDUM FDR Executive Director FROM Harry E Fitzwater Deputy Director for Adu nistration SUBJECT CIA Participation in NINE LIVES IV and IVY LEAGUE 32 Exercises REFERENCE Memo from EXDIR to Deputy Directors 24 Mar 82 same Subject 1 In reSponse to your request forwarded herewith are the critiques of empioyees from the Offices of Security and Communications who participated in the NINE LIVES IV exercise 2 I fuiiy agree with your position that it is important fer the Agency to participate in exercises of this nature In that regard we have not hesitated in providing Directorate of Administration support for these activities At the same time however this support has resuited in a sub stantiai drain of both manpower and funds at a time when our Directorate resources have been stretched dangerousiy thin As you wi11 note from the critiques because of our shortage of Communications personnei we were forced to take on a number of rehired annuitants to handie the requirements as indicated in some of the attachments it wouid have been most usefui if they had had an opportunity to undergo refresher training Nhiie a few of the reactions of our participants are somewhat negative I am proud of the overaii support rendered and the resourcefuiness and dedication exhibited by our personnei under the extremeiy difficuit circumstances refiected in the critiques uffy E Firzwofov Harry E Fitzwater Attachments Distribution 0 - Adse w atts i - ER wfo atts 1 - w o atts 1 - DXOC wfo atts ALL PORTIONS SECRET A as 7 SECRET Xp ggp Approved For Releage n Tr - - 1 _l oved For Release 2006f09 18 CIA-RDP83M00914RDO2200030 Eater-Hr 20 March 1982 DDCI During the exercise IVY LEAGUE 82 all participants in the military as well as the white House players were advised in writing that the telephone would be monitored to determine if classified conversations were being carried out over unclassified lines The JCS advised us that 9% of the IVY LEAGUE classified information exchange was conducted over non-secure telephone lines _tsi N McMahon - - - mac- n-oo-u Inc 0 - SECRET 6 Jo 3m Im-ou Approved For Release ZODGIOQHB I - 'auf J enmesecgegfm 116113511 - IG Dfl ers 11 DEA al- Approved For Release zoos Dena CIA-RU ms Uvqr h 11- Mohaimuu macxsz sewn - UNCLASSIFIED 0900 - 1030 1030 - 1130 1130 - 1230 1230 - 1330 1330 - 1430 1430 - 1500 1500 - 1630 1530 - 1000 1800 - 1900 Removed For Release - 1 - 1p EXERCISE THE WHITE HOUSE EXERCISE EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 mm 4 1902 Morning Up date Personal Staff Time meetings W'Ambassadors Lundh Meetings w Ambassadors Conference call to Successors Afternoon Up-date Eersonal Time use Heating UNQASSIFIED 1 5855 I white HOuse Situation Room Office Office Simulated hite House Hess Office Simulated Hhita House Situation Room--' White House Situation-Room hita House Situation Room 2 35 51 53H 0 Annroved For Release 2006f09r 1-B Wage 7- 1-1 - my EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Hunting Slip ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL EXDIR DHICS DDI DDA DUO DDS3T GE IG Bl-4 13 WEED MPH Cf WIA AWDCI I 5% i 351Imr- w VDL- - -DfExuu 1ra Sacralury 12 Fab 82 3 7 mm ejggq rm 53 - - - - n-L-nl - i' Approved For Release ZOOBIDQHB I Approved For Release 5 n If meg 4381 12 February 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR Executive Director FROM Director of Centrai InteiIigence SUBJECT Exercise 1 There is an exercise cailed scheduled sometime between the ist and 5th of March It concerns a post nuc1ear attack and scenario of how the NSC would function etc 2 Jim Wiliiams was over and toid me something about it and he said that somehow the impression had been created at the Pentagon that I didn't want to participate I hadn't heard about it at a11 It appears that I shouid participate Niiliams is sending over the papers on it you foiiow through and see that I get appropriateiy briefed Casey L379 SECRET Approved For Release 2006 09 18