DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washintt r- 'J FROM 0 C 20$20 The Secretary ARA - Harry w Shlauderoan 1- ARA Monthly Report July The Third World War and South America · The military regimes of the southern cone of south America see themselves as embattled on one side by internatiopal Marxism terrorist exponents and ana its on the other by the hostility of the unc omprehending industrial democracies misled by Marxist propaganda In response they are banding together in what may hell become a political bloc pf some cohesiveness But more g significantly they are joining forces to euadicate subversion a word which increasingly translates into non-violent djssent from the left and center left The security forces of the southern cone l I J I ii I -1 31 '' ' I 00$ ' ' Efu Jl·· 0 il f o O l Cl'- ' 5 now coordinate intelligence activities closely operate in the territory of one another's countries in pursuit of u subversives ' have established Operation Condor to find and kill terrorists of the Revolutionary Coordinating Cornmitrtee in their own countries and in Europe Brazil is cooperating short of murder operations This siege mentality shading into paranoia is perhaps lhe natural result of the convulsions of recent years in which i he societies of Chile Uruguay and Argentina have been badly shaken by assault from the extreme left But the military ·leaders despite near decimation of the Marxist left in Chile and Uruguay alon with accelerating progress toward that goal in Argentina insist that the threat remains and the war must go on Some talk of the Third t1orld War with the countries of the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civilization - XGDS-2 WARiUNG NOTICE SENSIT TELLIGENCE SOURCES AND HETHODS INVOLVED DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR l - NClASSlfIEO 3NClASSllii -2- Some1·1hat more ra·ticr ally they consider their counter-terrorism every bi-t as justified as Israeli· actions against Palestinian terrorists and they believe that the criticis'TI f -om democracies t of their war on terrorism reflects a double standard The result of this nental jt internalll' is to magnify the isolation of the military institutions from the civilian sector thus narr9wing the range of political and economic options The broader implications ti s and for future trend in the hemisnhex·e a re di turbing The use of bloc 1y· cou11·Ct r ·terrorism b these rag t11r·e2-ce11s t11eir increasirlg isola·ticr1 from the « est and the open ing of qeep ideologica'l· divisions among the countries of the hemisphere An outbreak of PLO-type teri or ism on a ·1orldi·1ide scale in- restJonse is c tso a poSsibili t r Tl-'i e indus' r ial- demc cracies t· oul i l e tf e ba-'ctlefield Thi s -montl-i' s trends· IJape r itte1np·ts for the fiLst time to focus on lcng-·t i -n c1an• ers of a right-r ·1ing b2 oc- Our 5 ni tial· r ·21lic i' reccY 1 r1c ations are ------ ·--··--' ---- ·----·-------- --- • --- - ----- To empi·1a size t11c differences bet · 7 sen the six cour1 tr ic s a t · e' rer oppo ct'C· ·1i ty -- To depoliticize 1 1 l -u n rigti ts To oppose rhetorical exags rations of the Third·- · orld- ·iar type To bring tl1e poter1tial bloc-me rlbers back -int 1 our cog -ii ti 7 e U 1i rel se- tl1rougl-i syste n1a tic exchanges UNClASSIFIED v · · ------------1 i lASSlflEO -3- _ I Security Coooeration is a Fact ' 1 · -- ··-----·--· - -- ____ __ There is extensive cooperation between the security intell -i gence opei ations of six goi rernments Argentina Brazil Bali via Chile Paraguay and Uruguay Their intelligence services hold formal meetings to plan Operation Condor It will include extensive FBI-type excl1a11ges of information on sr aC cI1aracters Tl1ere are plans for a special corrtmunications net ·iOrk Tl1ese details are still secret but broad security cooperation is net Officials in Paraguay and Argentina have told us that they find it necessary to cooperate with each other and their neighbors against internationallv-funded terrorists an d subversi 'Jes 11 The problem·beqins'with the definitiori of· ''subversion'' never -t11e n1os c precise of te cr is One reporter t- r-i tes tl1at subversio11 ''11 s g Oh•n to i ncltlde near 1ran c or12 v1It 11 01 poses govtrr1n1e - t polic y In cour1tries 1here everycr r e knov rs tli a·t sub- 7ersi ves can ·lind up C ea d or tortured educat etl people have an underst2 r c1 J le corlcern v tout tl1e bollll rJa r ies of dissent Tb e concern C oublGs t·1he11· thGre is a cl1anc0 of-Pe r ·s2ct1·tion y foreign police i acting on indirectr u11 l O'i· rn i11fc rr at Lon t-Juinerotts Urugua a11 refug es have een murde ced in F rgen·tina and there are widespread accus tions that Argenti e police are doing their UrQguayan colleagues a favor TheS·8 c ccusatio11s are at · ·1east c cedifJle 1l1e-tller or no Jc tl1ey are e tct Uruguayan Foreign Viinister Blanco one of the brighter and norrn2 lly steadier members of the group -was the first to descr il -e the ca Y pa ign against terrorists 2s a Third World War The description is interesting for two reasons It justifies harsh and s eeping wartime measures It emphasizes the international and institutional aspect thereby j stif ·i g beyond national borders 1 ' ' ' UNClASSIFIEO It ' ' ·1· ' · I -------·-- ' · --- -4-'- The threat is not imaginary It may be exaggerated This is hard to suggest to a man like Blanco who believes -- probably correctly -- that he ahd his family are targeted One must admire his personal courage Even by objectiv standards the terrorists have had stt Jst antiaJ_ acco nplishraents O rer t11e years At one tirr e or othel - urb in and rt1ral g· 1e rril1 c s have creat ecl severe pro Jleit1s for alr 1ost e1 rery South P rn zr ican governn1en t ·· · democ acy including those where surviving is still Tr ·3y hav e provoked repressiv e r eactio r1sr including torture and quas·i-governrnental d ath squads The guerrillas typically clai1ned to v1elco1ne repression_ bt1t e onde t if -they really lil e what they got They still poss a serious threat in A ·gentina and -- arguably -- a lesser problem in t ·IO or tl1ree otl11So C countr Les Th2re is a terior-orientcd ''Revolutionary i Coordin ti g Ju11ta 11 pos sibJ_y he J clq' 1 1 rtere d in Paris 1hich is both a counterpart of and __ an inc en ti ve foi ·coopere tior bet '-'8en governde11 ts - - fJei rei -the less it is 2lso 'trtle tb a·t 0 c k t10 _ ·• r So broad _ bot 11 -p·-----o _ _ ct-s 2n' i 11--• t n' _ _ 'ire L •·' t-·j l o __ _ 'l _1 c· i °'·l '··- _J__ rrtiis is true e· le11 iB t fie mi11ds o i StUdi0 U$· '- __ fai led revolutio 1t tries Che Gt1evara' s row antic fias o crl1sl1ed l1opes for rural rei rolutio11 Allende's fa 11 is ta k8 r perhaps pessimistically as proving that the -electoral route cann ot v_or Urbap guerrillas collapse in- razil ' ·1itl1 Carlos l· arig·l1ela and in Uru t 3 'tlitl1 t11e Tupa ciaros Tli e lc t ter 1 -cpres nted a l1igl-i-t·tater ma rl T11eir solid efficie11t st r11ctt1re·- posed a real t·1artime threat Probzibly the military be·lieve that torture · as indispensable to crc ck this st ruct' lre ---- - ____ ---- -- -- - ---- - - ------------- --- - -- -- ------------ ----- UNClASSfffEO ·- -- -----------·- UN tltU -s-· There is still a major campaign in Argentina We expect the military to pull up their socks and win They have precedents to guide them ancl the terrorists have no haady rEofuge in neighboring countries ·lha t will remain is a chain of governn1ent s started by Brazil in 1964 r1ose origir t· as in battle against the extreme left It is important to their ego their salaries and their eqt1ipment-budgets to belie•jc ir1 a Tl1ird l'orld - ·Jar At best -1l 8n l rgen tina stabilizes we can hope to convince them that they have already won The· - arriors v ill net l ke this TZ SJ' al3 e d l snic - e c· at us for being worried about kid stuff like drugsmuggling w11c11 there is a real rr ilitary cn1 lpaig11 going on They accuse us of 'applauding the defeat pf terrorism in Entebbe but not in• Hontevideo Our differing percelJticns of tr e tt 1 eat o ce raisir g suspi ons _·3 boe t our relietbili t 'l ' 1 ti These govc_rnments -2 re reactive the zr derj_ved tl1eir in i ti al lc gi timacy tt o_m·- a re2 ction aaair1 t - terrot isin lef c-e trerni - rn 1r1stabili tyf a11d 2 s _i bey see i·t ' '· a ·J·r-n J ' c I - 1 il ffo c· Mhi - 1 - - _i · ·c• 1r s 2 ii l la Xl i i l a mo· · 1 c ' noli··- 1 _ __c __' --L-·-'-· - There is also an_- icJeolo_q tl_ is 3 or posi t i vc in origi11 t l1ai of r a7 ion l c ei rcl er1t · · The v-ision cf I1c _·tion 110 s been its ffc ctive in South P '11erica as i t · as ir1 Eu r -01 e It rna l· yet tu rn out to be as destructive this paper looks only briefly at -the potential for co_nflicts betv een Latin nations a11d blocs · t iilitar l establislm ents traditio11al oro· ecto1-s of bounda ics a d nati o11al inte9-r·it ina posi·tion to profit from the nc 1 · t nationalism ar·e Econ or c1J c d e'l Ji3loprnent is· a p cessir1g r1eed ar1d a public demand Disciplined military establishnv nts car t · ror t ·1itl1 tecI- nocrats to p -odu ce eco11om ic de- •elopn e· 1t In the co11ntr Les v1e are conside2 i11g tl1e mil i tar Ls al ·l2 _lrs ·tl1e strox1gest n2tional in·st i tution -- som etiJ 1e s J ClASSlf IED uN lfa·· --- -6almost the only one It has typically saved the nations from civilian chao s _ National developrneri tal ism is t erefore real medicir er ·closer to r H St citize ' S then trcr1C - left OJ' ' i-i Tl1t -t-lirlg ' causes To _this cxtez1 milit ry power can find a - popular base l fatio11al d c11eloprri en·talisn1 l as ob• riotIS and bo-thersome pa r 3 llels to t fatior1al Socialisr t 01 ponc nts of the military regimes call them fascist It is an · effective pej6rative the more so tecause i t cun ba said to be technically apcurate But it is a pejorative Tl-1ese days to call a man fascist is not prirna ril l to describe ·t1is econ9mic vie s In practice ·the military regimes tend to be full of the same inconsistencies that charactGrizc rion-military pi agrt atic no11-ideolcsical regin1es Local political institutions are reasonably1 considered to h ve been a failure and it is euaa s· -e4 ·l-'1·1 ci -iemu'C'' - c-r Cr- ·n·r-t ·1or _ for ur __ _ 1 - _ G l- - 1l • j _ _ Leade °S rant to build n 1ore ef Cicit nt insti l1 tior s to organize tii eir soc iet·i'2 s e 1 tirely dif fere r tly · -__ Yet there is at some level of consciousness · a11 acce2ta L ce tl1at c1en1ocra c is the ideal eventuully to be sought _ _ - 1 - l t -- ·-· t o othe c institutiort is allot· ed to challeri ge military pow r yet politicel parties nd courts often e ist ai1d Perfo ·· rn sorrie talid fu11ctions Brazil ts too1 1less parliamcrJ t for e cample does c2utiot1sly articulate public opinion and provide a doG 1ant llternative to militaJ y rule In secure repress i v-e go1 ernT e11 ts neic rerthe less allO V s1Jbstantial n den1ocratic freedon1s including varying degrees of freedom of eX£lression The ambiente is ' ore like Washington than Moscow Yo can buy a good newspaperr a pair of le aently-flowered blue jeans - a girlie magazir e or a 1nodern painting 11 UNCLASSIFIED U Cl•Ell - -7- These military regimes do not expect to la t forever There is no thought-of a-Thousand ·---- ­ ear Reich no pretense· of having arrived at ultimate Marxist-style truth Frorri tl1r sta11d9airlt of 01ir ·policy t11e u1ost imT or cant 1011g-·tern ci aract r i stic of tl ese regises may be precisel i Lh at tl'i ey are re •ersiblc in both tl1eory and practice Tt' ey k nov1 it But the do ilOt J nO'i ·7 wl1at to Co abot1t ii ·Political and social developr 1 c11t lag Long after left -i · in g· tl1re2 ts are squa shed tf1e regises are still terr i·f ied of tl1en Fighting the absent pin-i os remains a central goal of nat icnal security · T-hrea s and plots are discovered Some nmista1 es 11 al -e mc a e by tI·1e to turers - •ho 11a1 re difficulty finding logical viq_tims Murder S'quads kill harmless people and petty thie• -es When electio11 3 are held t 1e pei -' Jerse electorateShov1s ·a desire tG put tI1e I lilitai y out of - o 'er Officers see the trend ending ·ii th their· own bodies on the rack 1 No more electi s for a while ·1e do r ot suggest tb at therG is a fi cpelessl l - vicious circle Since some of these regimes are producing really solid economic successes The officers inay e l'eri_tu lly- trust ci iilia1 s to· sUcceed them and p1 ovide an hor orable e - i 1 So fai tl1e military h s fou d it easier to ride the tiger than to dis1rlOlJ 11 t' ·lher1 an al te cr1 -J t i r rs gc1ter11n1en t eventually 11as to be fo11nc1 it·- rrcight J e that the only one available 1·1ill beo at th0 far left But There re Also Lee d nq Diff2 rei1c·2s In discussing the gen ral characteristic- of tl1e souttiern military regimes i· e i1ave rr ade sor - e indefer1sibl r b coad generalizatior1s The fclloi ·ting is an attempt to corre t the wors distortions country-by-country It is important to be clear about the differences be cause for reason s v e sI1all develop later 011r oolicv s11011 lil hp t-o en1 pl12 siz• ' l at tl1e cOU11tries do r ot hav in corr rno1 rat l1er ti1an r rhat they do The fro11t-bu ner cases a re Arg entin a Cl1ile a nd Uruguay UHClASSlfIEll IClASSlfIED -8 - · ' Argent ina is the most interesting both because- -­ it is important and because the directions of the new rf gime are not clear The Ar gentines are politicall 1 sophisticated lil e the Et «J zilic_ns bc t u11lil c t11e B1 azilians the Argentin es lack socio l and even mili ta1 -y un-i·ty To reco rer econozuically r ·tl1ey mu st brea1 the po ·1er of tr2c 1 itional structures arld esp cial­ ly of the labor movement There is also a genuine cl1allenge f com left -r · ir g terror is ts e n d righ t -vlir1g coi 1ri ter-t error Tb e proble111 approacl es ci•ril-o 'ar a1r 1ensio11s l'·le believe that t 1e 3razilian moc1el ' v1ill p revai l In tl1e lo ng run t11us · · e thinic t11e mili ta ry will win Vide la -- or his successor -- 1 ·ill have more trouble ·Ji t11 11u rd--lir1e rail i ta r offic ers and right-wing terror than with the left FoEces probably Co11nectec1 ·to tl1e · regi1T z ha re already· beeil killi11g· e - iles and priests an o11g o t crs _ 7 1 C 1ile has beer tr 1 e subjec-t of so rri ucl1 acti n lately -tb a-C you profJe bl lo not need to l1ear ar1y more rr11e Cl1ilectns 113 '1 sn1a - l- ed tl e Left aln1ost aS tl1 0Y 'QU r'i-'1TJ o- 5 t'h 1 - 'lr -i l 2 'r··- J nttl e repZGSSi _ • · - -- _ ·- - - -- ---'--· '-'-'• --- -appa rc tus is nrc cr1 raore · unres·craJ J1 eQ 'I'l1ere is no 011e at tl1e to1 likr G isel ·ll10 e- _rert S8f Ins to v1isl1 O L n odn· - -'-D l _i s c t· ce · -· 1 '- L 1-- - rn-- ' _ _i 1 - - ' ji lJU Th i _ C i --i-l-i'a-o 1 lj regir i 2 p1 olrid2s tl1-t crcb -2t p of the rc2soni11g that cri- icism of to1·tJ _ · · ca11 cone or l f_rom int _err1 tion2l I t ar ist plot Cer s The mili tc J -y see par·ticularly insecure and isolated even · ith cespect ·to ·i l1e Ci-iilen 1 puJ Jlic Urugua r _ is tl1e tl1ird p ressiI' g c- s 2 · rith Argentina a11d Chile l ''oreign 1· iniste - Bla1 lc t·1as the firs·t ·to tal c about tl1e ulJ hird -Icirld ·· a1 - 1 11 and · he still insiSts that tl1e threat co -'cir1 J es higl1 in t1is co1J n try Given th is picture Urv guay i s 1 1 • of course e2gcr to coop raie with its neighbors in dc£e11si• e measures J Jev·ertl1eles s r unlil c t1 1e Chileans t11e Urt 1guavans ha 7 e n ainta i11cc1 son1e sense of prOF·O Cticn about hUrl'tEln right s and inte rnation tl publi c opinion Civiliari s are u p f i oi1t in tl1e go-ve1 1rrtsnt give the rnilita x y· st1 Jstant ial support ar1d ·interact relatively elJ NClASSlfIfD u ClASSlfIf0 •' _ __ i-i ' · Brazil We ca n and should relate to Brazil as an err erging world power rather than as a trouble-spot Yet its 1964 revolution is the basic r odel for its neighbors The biggest problem is that despite remarkable successes the Brazilian ·armed services still ·cannot find a wa to relax their held on power on· the o cher 11and t11ey are noi muc11 t·1or1 -iec about it They have been able to tao ci rilian talent for econon1ic pui poses The Left is sm _shed but i t is not olear whether the President can control the zeal of his security forces F-ttemp·ts at polit ical diste11s2 o have largely flopped Tho word carries both the English sense of-''distending or enlarging authority from a narrow militarv base and the French sense of relaxing Better than detente Brazil like the otl1er larg1 cou11tries does sse itself as c - rorld actor and this inhibits extremism ' 1 Boli ·ia is an interesting case but not_ a hot problern 'lfhis is the scene of 0 1e of the t11 'ree genuit1 soc al r-sv-olu t ions in Lat in· Arr eri ca -- · hicl1 makes it all the more puzzling that Che Guevara though he had a contribution to ma e Dcsoite l1is fa il ure 11e ieft lasting worrif s 'l I1a B li - rians st ill con sider 1 a Cl1e rs ' t h aJ e · the 1 a t g t of rev t2 t1 ge for in terr a tior-l s l te·rror is·ts '· ' ca11no·I quite percei-ve the s2 n1e rr enace In 5oli rian i er rns tl·ie gove rnr i2n t is no·i ably s·to le an ct eccy or 1icall successful It has i ieen moderi 1 'c on l1u1r 1 ri_gI1·ts Pc re gl1B ' is marclLir1g to t l1e se rri e tt1nc as i·ts Th is is the k ind of nineteenth-ccutury military r giwe t at J ooks good en the cartoon page Pa 1 agua_y· _ 1101 G ' ler ha s eminently sou d reaso11s ·for bei11g bac - ard and is no·t in tr e least apologetic The Paraguay o r s remember that in the Chaco War they cl' ght off the maf sively superior armed forces of three neighbors for a ridiculously long time Pride was saved if rrothing lse There is no de - - ocratic t aditior1 · 7l1ate er The government has reacted to fear of the left rather than the kind of specific challc 1ge posed in the oth2r couni-ries neig -Lbor3Dl t is a rr i1-e b l1i11c1 1 - UMClASSlftEO µ - m lASSIFlfD A Political Bloc In Formation ·-····· --· rf·-poTiEe type ccio peration ·evolves·'- infO forrnat lon '- - __ of a political bloc our interests will b involved in a s ·that are ne ·1 for Sr tlth P n1erica Sucl1 a JJlcc is·· not 1ere - tet Tl1e conditions for its £0 -r at ion are largel r pres- r t 1 The conviction that an international leftist tl1rea t amounts to a - rr 'Jorltl and hence i 4 eql tircs a 1 alliance Highly compatib philosophies and· political objecti 'Jes in o_ther respects Impro •ed tra11s1 brt and COi i i'TI unica·tion C tr · reen neight oring cour1ti -iest ··v1i1ich previously 11ad better links with the U S and with each other Euro than --_ A suspicion that even the U S has 1'lost its vrill 11 ·to stand fir -rn a gai r st cow rri o nisro becc us of Viet-L-12 n detente ar d social c leca P ese ntment of h urna n-rigl 1 •3 critici m - r ·1ic ii is of-t 2n taken as jt1st· or1e r 1ore sign of tl1e-c0En7 i0 e 1 C irclerce n t ExcJ usi Jn b ' t11e n1il i tc r of the Civ-ilian derr oc c2tj_c interplay ' ihicl2 helps to maintai1 a sense of proportion There a -e a fc 1 inhil i t ions c1n forrna ti on of a bloc 'rationalistic thinJ ing is tr e ob vious one Traditio11C l feL ds have largely shaped t11c sens' of nation With the excep ion of the Peru Chile tension ho -re- -er border disputes are n o longe art o lei -1 'iding factor in the southern cone To predict a political bloc ould still be speculati re Commor scnse could assert it self TI1ere is plenty of it available in these countl i t s and e ren sorr e in t11eir arnies ie do thir that t t i e trend toward bloc thinking is present clear and troublesome NClASSlf IEO ---------·- ' AASSlflfD -11- If a Bloc Does Form ·In the ear ' stages r · e ill be a casual b0n e fie iary as ori e reporter 1' t s it for reasons t a t are too oiJv ious to need eluboration here On the main East-l·Test stage rig 1t- ·1ing regirr es can hardly tilt toward the Soviets and Cubans The fact that Ke are an apparent beneficia ry can e2sily lull us into trouble as has his co ri cally bGen tl-i e case in this 11en1is _ J1e re 1 But v e i · ould e r1ect a ran ge of groo · iirig problems_ S6me are already with UG Internationally the Latin generals look like our guys We are especially identified with Chili It cannot do us any good _ Europeans certainly hate P inocb et c Co · with a passion J hat rubs off on us - l·1oFe J robleras are o n tl1e sc11 a u1e f tlffiO r1 i igb t s o buses as a1J k11 0 1 are more a11d n1ore pro Jler 1s of conscience dirJlornac • · - c sai ir g la 1 2_·2 g­ Cl1ile' s blac -sl1et P s a i t1s 11as a li ead• m i de trotible for it- -scCr1omic r2cover lTl1e fa1 ti1e J to tl1e r igi t the d ift gees in o·tl1er · cc tlr tries· the i - c ce difficult ies· ' re ca11 exrJect in o-u r · econoniic links with them We woc ld like to she re -lith say the B r2 zilia isa erception that we are natural allies B cazilii 1n partic Lpa tion ir1 a rightr-- - ing blc C would make ti-1is unlikely Ever1tualJ_y · c couJ_d even s'-'i i- seriou -st rains with the dem oc acies fa rtl er i1orth O-cfi·la 11as told us that he thinks a confrontation is possible Urugtra r and e r1 e uels l1a -_re ju t bro en re1al ·ions over e- incid211t inv·ol liJ 1g political asylu1n A preceC c1 1t UNClASSlf IEO t ---------- ' mss1f1fn Over the horizcn there is a chance of serious world- scale trouble This is specula ti ve_but no lor ger ________ -·ridiculous The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta now · seems to have its headquarters in Paris plus consi erable actj_vity in other Eu ropean capitals t·Ii h t 2r -f istfu being forced out of Ars 211·tin 1 tl1eir concen tra t i on il1 Europa and-possibly the U S will in crease The Soui h P rnerican regimes l nc- ·i about this The r _e pla nni - 'J t_h· i c Ot1_•11 ccu 1 f sr- -te ccir oµe a t iori 2 in ELtropG Argsri i ir 2 Ci1ile and Drusi let ' are in t 1e 1-ead Brazil j_s rz ry but is providing s 1 Jr te technical support The next step might be for the terrorists to under- • ' take a v Jorld• -iid e at c2 cl- · on en 'ibassie - c nd ir terests of tl1e six hated regiI - es The PLO 11as shohrn tl- e t ay '72 can picture Sou-tI1 J nerico n a ctj_vitiss on a e- rr pa -able scale agaijl using t11e industrial Ce2· crac ies as a battl efield The i rrt r_ ossibil it c f peaceful chs nge 1iJ l ra dica li ze e ile·s v1ho might in earlier days · l1a 7 e lookc d fcJ r ·12t r ·d ·i o r•2tur11ing ho1 'l e peacefuj_l - Till nov thot1g1-i 1·1e ha te ti- iec1 to exerc_i _se a rnocleJ -ai ing i nflt enc e ha1le not ta ce11 a lon r-terr - strc teg ic 'lie1 ·7 of tl1e problems t ha t a r ight- ' ing b1 c·c v101J ld ere ate ir·11i s pciper 11a s ·tr j_ed for 2 sharpei f J - us Vie sf a 1 1 l1a t•2 iv ore reco1r ncndations i i tr q 1 th s to corr s 4 but th0 following are a fair sta t l Disti ngl1i h bet · een co11r · iss riJch specia l I-f------ -·- -· ---' care ·1e trea ·c r12 t t as a VlJ 1 e 1 e i·1i •_J oe encot i ging· them to view themselves as an e battled bloc In our dealings ·1i th eacl1 country a11d ii1 Col1g r essio11 l testirr rJny we sl1ould fc r ex2 rr ple 1 re fl ct re cg11ition t U at·_ - _ 1 l rg·en tina ·li th its virtual ci 1 il 1ar fa ces a prcblsr i l ' lch diffcren· £ 01v it s r1ei' l bor s UrugD ay v1i th its sui_ stc 1tt ir l rerrir1 ' nts of mili a cy ci ilian i -J terpla is r10 co ac-a ra -Jle to c nile B t a ' j l has t he t1eigl1t so9l istic i ticn anc1 1' Torl l- perspc cti re tc sl1are - z ri_ of our concerr s UNCtASSIFIED ' _____ ---------- ' -tllASS FlEO -13- ' I Ii I' i ' Our military-sales programs nay also' provide an opportunity for distinction Aid no long r provides significant leverage There is vast interest in overall ecor1omic relc tions but not muci1 freedom move1ner t 2 _Tr t o get tI18 J Olitics a1 d ideology ct ·c of humc r1 cigi 1 t - r litis cb ec·tl •e - il L b'2 bard ·to ceco nci1e 1 l i -tl1 tl 8 eguilly· pressing need to hltlltilateralize our concern To a oicl c 1arges of intcr reP tior e rnu si increa sir c ·ly t· OJ k i I 1 0L1gl1 tl'le In ter-J _rner ican HLLrnan l is 11t s Cor rrai ss ion The court tries ·t 11t t support us th ere 110- · rever v1il l tend to be 3 12soc z cies a11d peri1a ps one or tvlo re die al Car ib 9ean gover11ments Right-v ing regiffics -1ill feel besieged IO callyr v1e should J- eGp one oi - r Iol -e of the1n 1it h us If t1'12 t is irr possibl2 Cas no seems lih 2ly We s1' oui a ta e spec ic l car2 to v - cl a t c l t - O t lt 9 i · · - - -- · - OI - C l18 1 J g · · h m o - _ t I c -' no c l _ _l 1 J-L _ C h· 'i te no r ' t1 2 y__ ablr seS You - Sa 1 tiagoS i2e ct1 c _gAt 11 a d t 11e b2la11c2 l·'i ah e clear ir O l r Sc Ju'C l1 A 1 1c ci 1 2 n cleal Lnr Js that t11e • T11 i rd· l' 01 -2 d Vlar iC c a is overdra 1 1 arid leads to dangerous ·cons2 ces 11 In Congressional testimony here stress that tt1e threa t is ho1·1 ' £ 3-1 cour t r y for a like· Arge11t ir1a 4 Q1 i_ - _s _ • l f n11 _ -- to CJt1r co i ti ·Y· n i - ' rsc E-ui Our 'r· ac· r 1 n La p J c r· r·r- - _n 1 1 tl at r 'I - • -c - · - - _- - - '-'· '-·--·'--I • ' ' -' i • excnange in elligc ce c · brieti gs witn ne Bolivians Tl1is migl·it pro•1icle a 1· rc to reacl1 s1 sp i cj_ous military off ice rs and · - ork on tl'1eir f Tl1i rd · orld ·c rar 11 s 1 ndrO' e ·But tli erc a_ -e 11a Zards T 12 · ould f 1il to rJroduce i11J -crmation sustlli ' ir g t11eir t 1e4is t a11d the t might -cox clt1C e t 1at re · ere Dadl t in for11 e J or l211coo ei-at i re Insteacl t'le tl1 i11J · e E ould t1cr z on s steraai ic r tid-leve e ct c nges -- sorr1etl1ing rr ore t b an e cl1a110es of info r tr rJ t5 0 1 on te r rorists · e nec d to ac11ieve a p8rcep· io -1 tl1at neit L 2r deter1te r1cr C ister s2 o is a ·tl1 ceat i o the legi· in1c r y· of frienaly reg5 es ' -'lf - - - - - ----- - - - - ---- - --------- --------- • - - - - --- UNClASSlfIED - - - · lUIFIEO -14- In time perhaps we can convince them that a Third World War is undesirable D' - J J'A L t 8 2 76 • • DCP Coper ' ·IBLller s x-29192 I I I I - -- --- - --- - - - UNCLASSlflEO - - -- --- - ----- -----