NIC 91-10007 Impact of Republic Sovereignt on Soviet Strategic Force-SiI th l lt ght chords 8 Declass Dw WHS Lana FEB 11 2 2 15 cent-1 a 350 Information available as of 16 September 1991 was used In the preparation of or um which was prepared C41 JV-D ssistant National Intelligence Icer or trat Programs The Memorandum was coordinated within the Intelligence Community by the Nat tetligence Officer for Strategic Programs 351 -Secret- Seprember 1 99 I I Key Judgments C19 etc 031 1 5413 351 0 DECLASSIFIED PART Authority ED 13 26 Chief Records a Dcclass Div WHS Dale 0 2 FEB ans lrnpact of Republic Sovere' nt on Soviet Strategic Force Most Soviet strategic nuclear weapons about 65 percent of the ICBM warheads all of the SLBM warheads 35 percent of the heavy bomber weapons and about 45 percent of the medium bomber weapons are located in the Russian Republic Also most of the air defense and ballistic missile defense forces and a large rit the defense industry for strategic forces are located in Russia Nonetheless substantial otfensive'and defensive strategic forces are de- ployed outside of Russia - Ukraine hosts about 20 percent of the ICBM warheads about 40 percent of the heavy bomber weapons and about 20 percent of the medium bomber weapons Also some 15 percent of the defense industry is based in Ukraine including key production facilities for 33-13 and 83-24 ICBMs - Byelorassia has only about 1 percent of the ICBM warheads but about 25 percent of the medium bomber weapons - Kazakhstan the only Central Asian republic hosting offensive forces has about 15 percent of the ICBM warheads and about 30 percent of heavy bomber weapons Also several test facilities for developing strate gic weapon systems are located here - The Baltic states have numerous strategic air defense bases for protec- tion of the northwestern approach to the USSR an important ballistic missile early warning radar facility and a base for a regiment each of Badger and Back re medium bombers - About 30 percent of the air defense ghter regiments and air-surveil- lance radar units and 35 percent of st ic surface-to-air missile battalions are located outside Russi Depending on the precise nature of relations among the constituent states of the union strategic nuclear policy and capabilities could be affected in signi cant ways Sovereignty could Restrict and disrupt the deployment and operation of strategic forces except for the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force ill -Seerer MC 91-10007 September 139 i It resume casino 3m -- c - Reducelstrategic depth warning and engagement time for air and ballistic missile-defenses The likely loss of air defense bases in the Baltic states combined with lesSons learned from the Persian Gulf war about the dif culty of defending against massed air attacks that employ modern weapons could lead to a fundamental reevaluation of the practicality of large-scale strategic air defenses - Hamper the union s ability to develop and produce strategic arms Even if the Facilities in Russia remain dedicated to this task a loss of assets in other republics would at least complicate and could say lo the overall production and modernization of strategic forcerw We judge therefore that the members of the proposed new union will seek continued cooperation in national defense policy particularly as it relates to strategic forces For example the military leadership will press to negotiate basing rights with key republics and the Baltic states The emerging consensus on the need for drastic defense spending cuts and fundamental economic reform augmented by republic steps to control defense enterprises within their bound wever threatens to disman- tle the once powerful defense Miriam W There are a broad array of physical security and use-control measures that appear generally well-suited to prevent the seizure or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons but we face major uncertainties about the circumstances that could cause a breakdown of nuclear controls For example a nationwide ciWould call into question the continued effectiveness of these controls IN PART no 13525 at nodes Div WHS Discussion 4 4 3%th QUERILCCQ Substantial deployments of strategic nuclear forces and their supporting infrastructure exist in republics outside of Russia see table gures 1 to 3 and annex for details The disintegration of the Soviet Union will probably restrict and disrupt the deployment and operational practices of strategic forces and hamper the new union's ability to develop and produce strate gic arms The collapse of the Soviet Union also could disrupt central control over nuclear weapons and cause breaches of safety and security Although it is unclear to what extent the control of strategic nuclear forces directly will involve republic governments the General Staff will have to consult with republic leaders on strategic decisionmalri in etime and probably during a crisis or con iH Nuclear Control Security and Safety There are about 30 000 nuclear warheads in the inven- tory About a third of these weapons are deploye ICBMs and The rest are located in ove storage sites that serve forces in a particular area i 28 large national stockpile sites ssiny as many as 270 strategic SAM 5 sz Sovereignty for the republics raises the issue of whether the new union can maintain effective control of these nuclear weapons Over the years a broad array of physical security and use-control measures have been established that appear generally well- suited to prevent the seizure or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons But since the late 19805 the mili- tary leadership has been increasingly concerned about potential internal threats This has led the General Stall which has the pivotal role in nuclear security to take additional measures that we judge have included removing some warheads from storage sites in - nia Azerbaijan Georgia and the Baltic state If the new union s domestic environment becomes even further destabilized there may be particular dangers associated with shorts to consolidate nuclear holdings Large or unplanned movements of Weapons capecially by rail or road would increase exposure to 3 15 127 the E013 glazing-enema a Boolean Div WHS Bait 2 FEB ans potential seizure or sabotage These vulnerabilities could be heightened by unexpected bottlenecks in the rail net In some instances rail lines it blockaded by disgruntled ethnic groups example a nationwide civil war would call into tion the continued effectiveness of these controls Because of the General Staff s crucial role in control- ling nuclear weapons the maintenance of its cohesion in these situations would be a key factor in determin- ing th realrdown of nuclear controls would occur Deploying and Operating Strategic Forces Republic sovereignty probably will complicate seriously the deployment and operational practices of strategic forces Pressures for costly redeployments already are building Such redeployments might require the con- version of 46 existing SS-lli launch silos in Russia to accommodate 38-24 Mod 2 missiles removed from Ukraine Also concerns about Kazakhstan s future reliability apparently led the Soviets to seek in START the right to build new SS-IS ICBM silos presumably subst' 'n Russia there are 74 88- nd 13 SS- Kazakhstan An 2 88-1 are under conversion 3 Ice If the road-mobile 33-25 divisions in Byelorussia were redeployed in Russia all of the 7'2 launchers could remain in an operational status while former 33-20 bases were converted to accommodate the 53-25 force Even if these weapons remain in Byelorussia there could be domestic pressures to reduce or elimi- nate e 0 ions and restrict the weapons to garrison Redeployments of ICBMs from Ukraine and Byelo- russia also might involve missile support infrastruc- ture For example two large missile support rear '--'Autl'h3rtty chief Records a lactose Div Wl-lS 0 2 FEB 2015 I mph smug - Nuclear Weacoas Outside tattle lseptember Est Complex System Launchers Warheads Aircraft Ukraine I Derazhnaya 35- silo-based 90 540 Pervoma 55-19 silo-based 40 240 55-24 Mod 2 silo-based 46 460 Total l'r'ti 1 240 about 20 percent of total warheads May bombers UzinfChepelevlta Bear 2 126 Prilulci Blackjack 204 Total 38 330 about 40 percent of total heavy bomber warheads Medium bombers SAFJ Poltava Back re 19 5 Back re 13 I 30 Zhitomir Blinder 21 21 Total 53 253 about 20 percent of total medium bomber warheads Byelorussia ICBMS I Lida 58-25 road-mobile 36 36 58 25 road-mobile 36 36 Total 32 72 about 1 percent of total ICBM warheads Medium bombers SAF Balbasova Back re 2t 60 Bobruysk Back re AS'ltil 20 200 Minsk Blinder 22 22 Baranovichi Blinder 21 2 Total 83 303 about 25 percent of total medium bomber warheads Kazakhstan ICBMs a Zhangiztobe 52 520 Imcni Gastello Total 104 986 about 15 percent of total warheads Heavy bombers Dolon' Bear 4B 240 Total 40 240 about 30 percent of total heavy bomber warheads ICBM totals include only operational launchers and deployed warheads Heavy and medium bomber totals include only operational air- craft and exclude aircraft in operational storage or at training production and flight-testing facilities We in that the Bear is currently deplo ed with six Ih chamber at-heads blot all of peratlonal loads will vary with aircraft miSsion 1 There are at 40 Back re bombers based in Ukraine that have a conventional tactical role they are subordinate to the Navy This table is 030 may 3Y0 qt-5 9 Figure I Soviet Strategic Offensive Force - - admits-Elation 0 Strategic Rocket Forces division 1 - Heawbomberbase 1 SSBN base i-Teflehchem at Engels meaty l- all I - Edwin Kazakh star Will I I l - a start i depots might have to be replicated in Russia These Moscow would not fully compensate for the loss of depots have missile mainten rbishment stor these early warning radars If these radars had to be age and destruction facilitiesw relocated military planners would be faced with dif cult resource decisions and may be forced to Alternatively if the union chose to do so it could keep reconsider whether launch-W-warning is a all of the above mi res and reduce the size viable nuclear attack optic of the deployed fore Also if status of force agreements are not reached Republic sovereignty undoubtedly has heightened union strategic air defenses could be critically under- concern by defense planners over the potential loss of ruined For example the loss of bases in the Baltic key strategic defense assets For example the loss of states that protect the northwestern approach to the ballistic missile early warning radars in non-Russian union would result in a loss of strategic depth and republics would degrade Moscow s ability to obtain reduced warning and engagement time The loss of timely warning and detection of ballistic missile at- tack Other assets such as ABM radars based in 234 17 5 oso S wggm a beam Div st Date ll 2 FEB 201$ 3 Secret- Figure 2 Soviet ICBM Complexes in Non-Russian Republics and Baltic States 030 1 4 3 3 761 Ham 13% Arama- Ocean 5pr - were Russia ICBM launchers by Republic as of 1 September 1991 Byelorussia Ukraine Kazakhstan Ulla linen Bastellu 38-25 36 85-19 90 8843 52 Mom' Pemmaysk Zhenalztaha 88-25 36 88-24 46 85-18 52 Postaw 83-19 40 88-25 Total launchers 104 Total launchers 175 Total launchers '3 Total deployed 12 warheads T0131 #31310 1 240 warheads Total deployed g3 Warheads T313116 9-91 IN PART Au aonty ED 13525 Chief Records a Useless Div WHS Dill i 2 FEB 3915 l esta- IN PART Au E0 13526 Chg-mare Denies ll 2 FEB mm Figure 3 Soviet Heavy Bomber Bases in Non-Russian Republics - Arm Ocean Kazakhstan Dolon' it Mongolia China 3M 50o Em 7 ghoul-Ian mun Heavy Bombers by Republic 83 of 1 September 1991 Ukraine Kazakhstan Priluki nlnn' Blackjack 11 Bear UzWChepalavka Total heaw 40 Ba 3 bombers Total heavy 33 Estimated total of 240 bombers deployed weapons Estimated total of 330 deployed weapons 123117 9-9 1 1159 mm am oso 1 4m 35 5 such bases combined with lessons learned from the Gulf war about the dif culty of defending against massed air attacks that employ modern iveapons1 could lead to a fundamental reevaluation by the union racticality of large-scale strategic air defenses Building Strategic Forces Russia contains a large majority of Rats and production facilities for strate- gic nuclear forces but there are numerous crucial facilities for weapons components and testing in other republics Consequently even if the facilities in Russia remain dedicated to military production a loss of assets in other republics would at least complicate and could severely cripple overall defense production and the modernization of strategic forces The effects would depend in part on whether the republics successfully worked out new arrange- 0 continue to ful ll defense requirements Republics have taken various steps that suggest there will be dif culties maintaining the integrity of the defense industrial infrastructure that supports the strategic forces All republics have passed sovereignty declarations that assert the primacy of republic laws over union laws and have adopted initiatives that bear on defense policy Six republics have declared them- selves nuclear-weapons free states and a seventh Kazakhstan has banned with Russia's concurrence any further nuclear testing Kazakhastanalso has demanded that it be consulted regarding the station ing of nuclear weapons Other republics-most impor tout the Russian Republic'but also including Armenia and Georgia have claimed Soviet military installa- tions epublics will settle these claims is unclear Besides depending on the republics for defense bases and production facilities military planners must have resources from them especially Russia to fund de- fense programs The emerging consensus on the need for drastic defense spending cuts and fundamental economic reform augmented by republic steps to control defense enterprises on their territories how- ever threatens to dismantle the once powerful defense industry The pace of downsizing will be tempered by the leaderships cancer aiding worker dislo- cation and social unrest 6 24 Ao Ke can Mic DEGLASSIFIED lN PART EO 13526 331 me a Declass Div WHS onto a 2 FEB 2013 Annex - Se-ere-t- g1 8 524 OSD 1 4fe 2 179 Strategic Nuclear Forces in the Republics Strategic military forces and supporting facilities are located throughout the USSR Until now their dispo- sition was not governed by the boundaries of individ- ual republics but rather by considerations of strategic mission geography threat crien survivabil- ity See table and gures I to 3% Strategic offensive forceswequipped with long-range nuclear weapons are generally based centrally to enhance their protection from attack Many key facilities associated with strategic o 'ensive forces however are located outside of the Russian Republic Bombers and land-based ballistic missiles are general- ly based inland operate from ports located in the Russian Republic that provide ready access to remote territorial waters the so-called bastions Strategic defense forces are concentrated to provide barrier defenses particularly along the European periphery of the USSR area defenses of strategically Wat zones and point defense of key facilities Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are operation- ally deployed or stored in several republics Nuclear warheads for strategic offensive forces are located in Russia Ukraine Byelorussia and Kazakhstan All 28 national nuclear stockpile sites are located in these same republicsRussia Although the General Staff has taken steps to tighten security at these sites efforts by republics autono- my present additional security new Russia The bulk of the military forces are in Russia National-level commands for all forces as well as the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff eadquar ters are located in Moscow In addition a large majority of strategic offensive facilities are located in Russia These include 20 of the 26 ICBM divisions about 4 100 warheads all three rail-mobile ICBM divisions 360 warheads seven of the nine operational road mobile ICBM divisions about 250 warheads three of the seven heavy bomber regiments about 280 IN PART Austerity E0 13526 Chief Records a Useless Div WHS 2 sea as weapons about 45 percent of the medium weapons two tanker aircraft regiments an nuclear weapons storage and support facilit cs Russia possesses unconstrained access to the open sea and is home to most of the Navy All the units of the Northern and Paci c Fleets including all ballistic missile submarines and a majority of Baltic Fleet units are based in this republic The headquarters of three of the four fleets B i rthern and Pacif- ic are located in Russia Russia also contains the majority of the union s strategic defense facilities and forces including three large phased-array radars for ballistic missile detec- tion and tracking at Olenegorsk Pechora and Mishe- levka two over-the horizon radars at Nakhodka and Komsomoi sk the Moscow ABM system currently equipped with 84 launchers air defense ghter- interceptor regiments 70 percent of the total 625 strategic surface-to-air missile SAM battalions 65 percent of the total - air surveillance units 70 percent of the total Moreover a large majority of defense industry enter- prises are located in Russia Ballistic missiles and their major components are manufactured at facilities in Biysk Tver Kalinin Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy Kemerovo Krasnoyarsk Moscow Perm Petroltre- post Safenovo Volgograd Votkinsk Yurga and Zlatoust Most naval construction occurs at major Russian shipyards including Nizhniy Novgorod Gor'kiy Kaliningrad Khabarovsk Komsomol'sk- na-Amure St Petersburg Leningrad and Severed- vinsk on the White Sea Sea-launched cruise missile components are produced at Sverdlovsk-Kalinin Air- craft plants are located at Gor kiy Irkutsk Kazan Komsomol sk-na-Amure Moscow The headquarters of the Baltic Fleet is in the Kaliningrad Oblast which is physio ated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Byelorussi such bases combined with lessons learned from the Gulf war about the dif culty of defending against massed air attacks that employ modern Weapons could lead to a fundamental reevaluation by the union racticality of large-scale strategic air defenses Building Strategic Forces Russia contains a large majority of R850 and production facilities for strate- gic nuclear forces but there are numerous crucial facilities for weapons components subcomponents and testing in other republics Consequently even if the facilities in Russia remain dedicated to military production a loss of assets in other republics would at least complicate and could severely cripple overall defense production and the modernization of strategic forces The effects would depend in part on whether the republics successfully worked out new arrange- o continue to ful ll defense requirements Republics have taken various steps that suggest there will be dif culties maintaining the integrity of the defense industrial infrastructure that supports the strategic forces All republics have passed sovereignty declarations that assert the primacy of republic laws over union laws and have adopted initiatives that bear on defense policy Six republics have declared them selves nuclear weapons-free states and a seventh Kazakhstan has banned with Russia's concurrence any further nuclear testing Kazakhastanalso has demanded that it be consulted regarding the station- ing of nuclear weapons Other republics most impor- tant the Russian Republic but also including Armenia and Georgiauhave claimed Soviet military installa- tions epublics will settle these claims is unclear Besides depending on the republics for defense bases and production facilities military planners must have resources from them especially Russia to fund de- fense programs The emerging consensus on the need for drastic defense spending cuts and fundamental economic reform augmented by republic steps to control defense enterprises on their territories how ever threatens to dismantle the once powerful defense industry The pace of downsizing will be tempered by the leaderships' ccncer oiding worker dislo- cation and social unrest 3114 oso trite art s IN PART 50 13526 3 in at Declass Div WHS Data 0 2 FEB 2015 Novosibirsk and Taganrog Numerous weapons com- ponent producers and design develobr npnt and test facilities including the Plesetsk and Kapdstin Yar Missile and Spa - ters arc-also located in the Russian Republi Ukraine Second only to Russia in terms of the number of strategic offensive facilities and forces the Ukraine contains two silo-based divisions one with 88-195 and one with both 88-195 and for a total of about 1 250 warheads three former 83-20 divisions that could be converted to 33-255 two long-range heavy bomber regiments and 20 percent of the medium-range bomber weapons deployed on Back re and Blinder bombers The heavy bomber base at Uzin Chepelevka supports a Tu-95 Bear regiment about 125 weapons colocated with an 11-78 Midas tanker regiment The second heavy bomber regiment forming at Priluki as of 1 September consists of 17 Tu-l O Blackjack aircraft about 200 weapons and is projected to grow to a full regiment of 20 aircraft Ukraine is also home to a number of important naval installations and headquarters port facilities and air elds of the Black Sea Fleet Howev- er none of a1 facilities has a strategic nuclear rol Major air defense headquarters at Kiev and three other cities in Ukraine control strategic air defense operations over the southwestern approach to the USSR Strategic defense facilities and forces include the Mukachevo large phased-array radar the Nikola yev over-the horizon radar eight air defense ghter- interceptor regiments It percent of the total 148 strategic SAM battalions 15 percent of the total and surveillance units 10 percent of the total Ukraine also is second only to Russia in the produc- tion of military weapons and equipment Plants in Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd for exampie produce the 53-18 and respectively Several component and plants are also located in this republic The test range in Feodosiya plays an important role in deveWal and other aerodynamic weapon sys- tems Authority ED 1 Chief Records a Denies Div WHS ale 0 2 FEB an Byelornssin Byelorussia contains a substantial com- plement of forces and installations from each service of the armed forces Strategic offensive forces located in Byelorussia consist of two of the nine operational SS-ZS road-mobile ICBM divisions about 70 war- heads Byelorussia also contains a heavy concentra- tion of medium-range Back re and Blinder bombers 5 percent of the medium bomber weapons Major air defense headquarters at Minsk and Barano vichi control strategic air defense operations over the western approach to the USSR Strategic defense facilities and forces include the Baranovichi large phased-array radar projected to be completed in the mid-1990s three air defense ghter-interceptor regi- ments 5 percent of the total 42 strategic SAM battalions 4 percent of the total and two air surveil- lance units 3 percont of the total Also defense industry enterprises at Minsk and Gomel manufac- ture missile-associated vehicles and military electron- ics A key naval asset is located near Minsk- one of the ve very low frequency ra itters used to communicate with submarines The Baltic States There are no bases for strategic intercontinental offensive forces in Estonia Latvia or Lithuania nor do these states have strategic forces- relatcd industrial facilities of signi cance At Tartu in Estonia however there is a base for a re ch of Badger and Back re medium bombersW The Baltic states have a dense network of radars ghter-interceptor bases and SAM facilities that are used to provide for the strategic air defense of the northwestern approach to the USSR In addition to major air defense headquarters at Tallinn and Riga strategic defense facilities and forces in these repub- lics include four air defense ghter-interceptor regi- ments 5 percent of the total 38 strategic SAM battalions 9 percent of the total two air surveillance units 3 percent of the total an AWACS squadron equipped with Mainstay aircraft in Lithuania and ballistic missile early warning radars at Skrunda in Latvia large phased-array radar est has trims 35 g also is under The Baltic states also provide'naval facilities for the Baltic Fleet but none of these faciliti'es'has- a strategic nuclear role Moldova There are no bases for strategic offensive forces nor any major defense industries in the Moldo van Republic However Moldova provides compo- nents and for military equipment pro- duced elsewhere For examp inev plant produces military electronics Currencies Republics There are no bases 1' or strategic offensive forces nor are there any signi cant strategic forces-related industrial facilities in Georgia Arme- nia or Azerbaijan However an operational large phased-array radar is located at Lyaki in Azerbaijan Also Georgia has a major air defense headqua Tbilisi and ghter and SAM air defense forces Central Asian Republics The only Central Asian republic hosting signi cant strategic offensive forces is Kazakhstan This republic has two 8348 divisions about 1 000 warheads and two Tit-95 Bear heavy bomber regiments about 240 weapons Kazakhstan also has several vital test facilities for developing strategic weapon systems The facility at Tyuratam is used to launch spacecraft and to test liquid-propellant ICBMs The center at Aktyubinsk is used to perform heavy bomber weapons system tests Also the test center at Saryshagan is a key facility for develoteing strategic air defense ballistic missile dc- dvanced technology weapon systems A major air defense headquarters in Kazakhstan at Alma-Ala controls strategic air defense operations over the southern approach to the USSR Strategic defense facilities and forces within Kazakhstan in- cl ude the large phased-array radar modi cd-Galosh and Gazelle ABM missiles located at the Missile Test Center three air defense ghter-interceptor regiments 5 percent of the total 25 strategic SAM battalions 3 percent of the total surveillance units 5 percent of the total There are no strategic offensive forces in the Uzbek Turkmen Ta jilt or Kirghiz Republics However a plant at Taboshar in Tajikistan produces large-class ballistic missile solid motors Also an aircraft plant at Tashkent in Uzbekistan produces the 1-76 Candid transport A-SO Mainstay AWACS ll- lS Midas tanker as well as components for air to surface missiles Major air defense headquarters at Tashkent and Samarkand in Uzbekistan and at Mary in Turk- meniya control strategic air defense operations by SAM and over the southern approach to the USS IN PART ty no 13526 Chief Records a Useless Div WHS Fatal 0 2 FEB 2015 0313 1Alc3 3503 Cue 4 694 3 51