DECLASSIFIED Authorityw 0840 0900 1138 1153 1158 1430 1500 IEJI ihifietl' ADMIRAL DIARY THURSDAY 2 SEPTEMBER 1971 NOTE Remained overnight at Memphis Coudtry Club Departed Memphis Country Club by sedan Departed Memphis International Airport by C l40 Jet Star ETE l 40 lose one hour Arrived at Andrews AFB with immediate departure by U l for Pentagon Arrived at the Pentagon HelOpad with immediate departure by limousine for the building Arrived in Office at the Pentagon Met in my office with LTGEN Vogt LTGEN Knowles MGEN Seith RADM James Col Platt and LCOL Langlands to hear the Advanced Airborne Command Post briefing presented by LCOL Langlands The briefing pointed out that the logical Advanced Airborne Command Post would necessarily be a C-SA or a 747 production line will close after the initial 80 aircraft but the 74 line will be open through the 80 s It appears that the 747 would be the best vehicle for this Airborne Command Post The purpose is to provide suStained communications to the outside world in-the event of a nuclear attack I asked them if they were having any problems with electro magnetic radiation and the accompany ing shielding and they apparently are having problems Col Langlands said that there were two options 1 selecting an L lOll or a type aircraft 2 selecting a or 747 type aircraft The JCS in both the JSOP and JFM have recommended selecting option two The main problem with option one is that scheduled testing is still 5 years away It is apparent that the need for the airplane is current It was pointed out that we made a recommendation in August 1970 and it was 7 months until a reply was made on the Airborne National Command Center av We hashed over the previous brief and it was apparent that DSD wants to control the management of SIOP from here in the Pentagon We need satelite terminals in all of our delivery vehicles concerned with either the control of missiles or aircraft I ointed out that an Command and Control mean dEnly the SIOP part but we must also be prepared for post strike management I feel that there will be a lot of repositioning of forces following the initial nuclear exchange Received a telephone call from Dr Tucker concerning SALT I said that I had received his noteFabout SALT and that it was fine except that his recommendation of a change which said we would have to require the destruction 3 37 DocId 31291446 DECLASSHHED wwiwm Authority a of land based k might be clearer av if we said we might to require compen- satory reductions of land based I would not fall on my sword either way Dr Tucker said that he felt it was a policy matter beyond the Back Stopping Committee and that it would escalate to Dr Kissinger in short order He is preparing a note from SECDEF to Dr Kissinger indicating cancurrence I agreed 1510 The briefers departed but LTGEN's Vogt and Knowles remained behind to discuss the JTD for the Readiness Command I indicated that the President had approved the Readiness Command but not the billets for it 'Vogt said that we must now go to SECDEF to get the President to authorize a 4 star billet In short we had to start from the beginning General Knowles concluded that we could not convert directly from the present billets without disestablishing STRIKECOM and rewestablishing Readiness Command I indicated this was bureaucracy at its best or worst as the case may be and that it was a lot of horse shit I could not understand why it was necessary to go through this drill just because there was a 3 and 4 star billet involved General Vogt indicated that he would discuss it with the OPDEPS and let me know what they recommended 1516 I called Dr Cooke and told him that I understood he was having a little trouble establishing the Readiness Command to which he said yes procedural problems I said we would do the paper over just to formalize it but I wanted him to know that it was just a lot of horse shit He went on to say he agreed but that'it was backed up in a hell of a lot of other placas and that technically we didn't change the name of the CINC I said the hell we didn t He said we had reduced' and disestablished the STRIKECOM and formed a new Readiness Command I said that was his idea Cooke tried to point out that the President approved the UCP paragraph 4 which stated that STRIKECOM would be disestablished and furthermore he approved paragraph 5 which said that Readiness Command would be estab lished I said that we would go ahead and send him a new paper and that he must be blessed by the Hammond Paper Company and electric typewriter companys both 1517 Met with VADM Gayler LTGEN Vogt LTGEN Knowles and LTGEN Bennett regarding Admiral Gayler's latest suggestion on reducing US SIGINT cap abilities in SEA by 6 000 spaces Admiral Gayler started off by saying that we needed a decision whether or not we were going to_ support the SVN SIGINT intelligence until they can establish the capability I cooled him right from the start and said that we were still planning some 8 000 TACAIR 1 000 and other requirements through FY73 so that will answer Gayler s question on whether we need SIGINT I pointed cut that we can not delete intelligence collection capabilites and it would be tough to do with the 127 men Gayler proposes to leave in country after he'redeploys the 6 000 Gayler then mentioned that maybe we could have a pool in CONUS and rotate them with the thought of providing the VNAF SIGINT continuity and continue in supplementing their capability 539 Docld 31291446 DECLASSIFIED AuthorityW 1555 He said that the VNAF are approximately 20% capable of providing the needed support I said we can not leave our trOOps uncovered I said we should go to CINCPAC and see what he required in US Army based resources for this purpose I wondered if we could expect the RDF and fragging capabilites to be effec tive with US front seat operators from Thai bases Gayler indicated they must be Air Force people in the RDF front seat and there had been no priority given to trying the Vietnamese in this capacity I went into the rationale on the problem to reduca to 60 000 troops by the end of FY72 instead of 90 000 as previously planned It is absolutely essential that we provide SIGINT for these forces We must insure the following three points One - security of US ground forces Two support for Us air activity Three s EEort for VNAF forces Abrams certainly wants SIGINT support Following was a little exchange between General Vogt and Admiral Gayler each-indicating that the other was not keeping them properly informed The end resultcwas that Vogt indicated that he would keep Gayler informed and use his NSA REP Buffum who is in the Pentagon and Gayler would keep Vogt cut in We pointed out that in any event Laird indicated that he was going to have SIGINT support for the troops as long as it was needed SIGINT was not reduced in any of the plans Vogt indicated that it would certainly bring Gayler in after we have reviewed our intelligence collection capabilities This would include the majority of the effective productivity of each type surveillance I asked if satelites permitted the reduction of fixed wing reconnasiance Also proposed the thought that we might be able to reduce elsewhere in the world Gayl dicated that the logical talent wasi of the total strength overseas At any rate it was not a large percentage Gaylor felt that he might be able to reduce 10-15% in EurOpe if we could get two more satelites He pointed out that the high frequency trans -mission is not too good in the satelite but we could do thel Other functions required the aircraft to get very close to the transmitting source Some V0 ACRE requirements could be pooled and perhaps replacedby U-2 s Gayler said that he does not want Ns to grow in SIGINT size bUt rather in efficiency General Bennett thought that the purpose was not to_cut overseas but to do the best job anywhere as it is required Bennett closed with the-thought that we can not let up on the intelligence collectiOn and evaluation and the for improved systems The conference ended and General Knowles stayed behind to mention the replacement of MGEN Brown as the JCS Representative to the peace conferences in Paris He indicated that Brown was ready to quit at any cost and asked for a transfer so it was necessary for us to get a replacement as soon as we could I asked how long Brown sozsxa use - so use 402 Note Sec 6 NSA Docld 31291446 DECLASSIFIED AuthorityW 1602 1636 1659 1705 1823 had been there and be indicated only 8 months which I did not think was excessive Met with Admiral Zumwalt in my office and discussed several personal matters Met with LTGEN VOGT in my office for a general discussion Met with RADM Donaldson as he came to escort me to the WARSHIP ANNEX to SM 701 briefing I asked him what the briefing was all about and he filled me in on its purPQSe Departed my office for the JRC Conference Room accompanied by RADM Donaldson to attend the WARSHIP ANNEX to SM 701 briefing - Departed the Pentagon for Quarters SIX 2% This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu